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CASE NO.:

Appeal (civil) 6913-6914 of 2003

PETITIONER:

M.A. Murthy

RESPONDENT:

Vs.

State of Karnataka and Ors.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/09/2003

BENCH:

JUDGMENT:

J U D G M E N T

(Arising out of SLP(C) Nos. 8113-8114/2002)

ARIJIT PASAYAT, J

Leave granted.

Both these appeals have common factual matrix, and legal panorama

and, therefore, are dealt with by this common judgment.

Factual backdrop in a nutshell is as follows:

Karnataka State Financial Corporation (hereinafter referred to as

the 'Corporation') invited applications for recruitment to two posts of

Manager (Finance and Accounts) by advertisement dated 18.7.1995. The

advertisement inviting applications for the two posts of Manager

(Finance and Accounts), one post for general and one post of scheduled

caste, prescribed the requisite educational qualification. It was

stipulated in the advertisement that the age and other qualifications

were to be reckoned as of 31.7.1995. It was also indicated that the

applications in the prescribed format with complete information should

reach the prescribed authority before 29th July, 1995 and incomplete

applications and applications without necessary enclosures were to be

rejected.

Appellant and respondents 4 and 5 were applicants in response to

the advertisement. Though respondent No.4 was not qualified on the last

date of submission of application, he was permitted to attend and

appear for the written test. However, on the date of interview he was

eligible. The written test was conducted on 1.10.1995 and the viva vice

was conducted on 25.11.1995. Similar was stated to be the position vis-

à-vis respondent No.5. When respondent No.4 was selected, appellant

challenged his selection to be not in accordance with law. It is to be

noted that waiting list is prepared and respondent No.5 was placed in

the waiting list.

A writ application was filed before the Karnataka High Court at

Bangalore challenging the selection of respondent No.4 and placing

respondent No.5 in the waiting list. Though, learned Single Judge of

the High Court held that respondent No.4 was ineligible as on the date

of employment, he held that in public interest the selection was to be

maintained.

A reference was made to the decision of this Court in Ashok Kumar

Sharma and Anr. v. Chander Shekher and Anr. (1993 Supp (2) SCC 611)

(described hereinafter as Ashok Kumar Sharma â\200\223 case No.I) where it was

held that if the applicant had acquired qualification by the time of

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interview that is sufficient.

A writ appeal was filed before the Division Bench. The view of

the learned Single Judge was affirmed by the Division Bench. A review

application was filed inter alia taking the stand that the view in

Ashok Kumar Sharma's case No.I has been later on over-ruled in Ashok

Kumar Sharma and Ors. v Chander Shekhar and Anr. (1997 (4) SCC 18)

(described hereinafter as Ashok Kumar Sharma â\200\223 case No.II). Therefore,

a review of the judgment of the Division Bench was necessary. The High

Court by the impugned judgment held that though admittedly on 18.7.1995

i.e. on the date of advertisement the respondent No.4 was not qualified

to make an application, yet few dates and facts are relevant. He had

appeared for the M.B.A. examination in April 1995 and the results were

declared on 4.9.1995. The written examination was held on 1.10.1995 and

viva voce was conducted on 25.11.1995. At least by the time the written

examination and the viva voce tests were held, he had acquired the

requisite qualification. Judgment in Ashok Kumar Sharma's case No. I

was delivered on 18.12.1992 and decision in the review petition in the

said case was rendered on 10.3.1997. The appointment of respondent

No.4 was made when the earlier decision of Ashok Kumar Sharma's case

No.I held the field. It was, therefore, held that on the date of

selection, the first judgment held the field; and, therefore, by

applying logic of that decision the selection of respondent No.4 cannot

be questioned.

Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the approach of

the High Court is erroneous as the law declared by this Court is

presumed to be the law at all times. Normally, the decision of this

Court enunciating a principle of law is applicable to all cases

irrespective its stage of pendency because it is assumed that what is

enunciated by the Supreme Court is, in fact, the law from inception.

The doctrine of prospective over-ruling which is a feature of American

jurisprudence is an exception to the normal principle of law, was

imported and applied for the first time in L.C. Golak Nath and Ors. v.

State of Punjab and Anr. (AIR 1967 SC 1643). In Managing Director,

ECIL, Hyderabad and Ors. v. B. Karunakar and Ors. (1993 (4) SCC 727)

the view was adopted. Prospective over-ruling is a part of the

principles of constitutional canon of interpretation and can be

resorted to by this Court while superseding law declared by it earlier.

It is a device innovated to avoid reopening of settled issues, to

prevent multiplicity of proceedings, and to avoid uncertainty and

avoidable litigation. In other words, actions taken contrary to the

law declared prior to the date of declaration are validated in larger

public interest. The law as declared applies to future cases. (See

Ashok Kumar Gupta v. State of U.P. (1997) 5 SCC 201, Baburam v. C.C.

Jacob (1999) 3 SCC 362). It is for this Court to indicate as to whether

the decision in question will operate prospectively. In other words,

there shall be no prospective over-ruling, unless it is so indicated in

the particular decision. It is not open to be held that the decision in

a particular case will be prospective in its application by application

of the doctrine of prospective over-ruling. The doctrine of binding

precedent helps in promoting certainty and consistency in judicial

decisions and enables an organic development of the law besides

providing assurance to the individual as to the consequences of

transactions forming part of the daily affairs. That being the

position, the High Court was in error by holding that the judgment

which operated on the date of selection was operative and not the

review judgment in Ashok Kumar Sharma's case No.II. All the more so

when the subsequent judgment is by way of Review of the first judgment

in which case there are no judgments at all and the subsequent judgment

rendered on review petitions is the one and only judgment rendered,

effectively and for all purposes, the earlier decision having been

erased by countenancing the review applications. The impugned judgments

of the High Court are, therefore, set aside.

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That brings us to the ticklish question as to how the reliefs can

be moulded. It is not in dispute that subsequently the appellant has

also been appointed on 9.11.2002. Though it was permissible for this

case to set aside the appointments of respondent no.4 and respondent

no.5, on the peculiar facts of this case, we consider it to be not

called for and the rights of parties instead could be adjusted by

working out equities, in the interests of substantial justice by

adopting a different course. The appellant shall rank senior to

respondent No.4 by treating his appointment to be with effect from the

date of selection of respondent No.4. This shall be only for the

purpose of fixing the seniority and continuity of service only not for

entitlement to any salary or other financial benefits. As respondent

No.5 was only in the waiting list, and it is stated that he has been

subsequently appointed, he will also rank below the appellant and

respondent No.4. The appeals are accordingly allowed. There shall be no

order as to costs.