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2026:CGHC:430

AFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

SA No. 1 3 of 2019

Reserved on: 24.09.2025

Delivered on: 05.01.2026

Uploaded on: 05.01.2026

1.M.A. Rafi (Dead ) Through Lrs.,

1(A) (Deleted) Hajra Begum

1(B) Mohd. Aatif S/o Late M. A. Rafi Aged About 52 Years R/o M I G 764,

Padmanabhpur Durg, District - Durg Chhattisgarh.

1(C) Mohd. Asif. S/o Late M.A. Rafi Aged About 49 Years R/o M I G 764,

Padmanabhpur Durg, District - Durg Chhattisgarh.

1(D) Mohd. Tausif S/o Late M.A. Rafi, Aged About 46 Years R/o M I G 764,

Padmanabhpur Durg, District - Durg Chhattisgarh.

2.Jamilurrahman S/o Late Mohd. Fazlurrahman Aged About 80 Years R/o Opp.

Chhoti Masjid, Byron Bazar, Raipur District - Raipur Chhattisgarh.

3.(Died) Ziyaurrahman, Through Legal Heirs.

3(A) Nigahat Parveen Wd/o Late Ziyarrahman Aged About 66 Years R/o

House No. 263, Opposite Chhoti Maszid, Byron Bazar, Raipur, Dist - Raipur,

Chhattisgarh.

4.Zakeerurrahman S/o Late Mohd. Fazlurrahman Aged About 70 Years R/o

Opp. Chhoti Masjid, Byron Bazar, Raipur District - Raipur Chhattisgarh.

5.Wasiurrahman S/o Late Mohd. Fazlurrahman Aged About 62 Years R/o Opp.

Chhoti Masjid, Byron Bazar, Raipur District - Raipur Chhattisgarh.

6.Smt. Faheem Rahman Wd/o Late Safiurrahman Aged About 63 Years R/o

Opp. Chhoti Masjid, Byron Bazar, Raipur District - Raipur Chhattisgarh.

7.Nausheen Afroz D/o Haji Samsuddin Aged About 32 Years R/o Near House

Of Rahamatulla Advocate, Nayapara, Raipur District - Raipur Chhattisgarh.

8.Nasreen Afroz D/o Haji Samsuddin Aged About 31 Years R/o Near House Of

Rahamatulla Advocate, Nayapara, Raipur District - Raipur Chhattisgarh.

9.Smt. Zubaida Khan Wd/o Late Sultan Khan Aged About 72 Years R/o Kadar

Ka Jhanda, Kamthi, Nagpur Maharashtra.

10.Smt. Shahida Khan W/o Azizulhaw Khan Aged About 66 Years R/o Bharti

Hote, Antagarh, Tahsil - Antagarh, District - Kanker Chhattisgarh.

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11.Smt. Nahed Khan W/o Iliyas Khan Aged About 58 Years Through Power Of

Attorney Shri Wasiurrahman, S/o Late Mohd. Fazlurrahman, Aged About 62

Years, R/o Opp. Chooti Masjid, Byron Bazar Raipur, District- Raipur,

Chhattisgarh.

12.Smt. Shaheen Ali W/o Siddiq Ali Aged About 56 Years R/o Beside Post Office,

Vaishalinagar, Bhilai, District- Durg, Chhattisgarh,

Petitioners No 1 To 12 All Through Power Of Attorney Shri Wasiurrahman,

S/o Late Mohd. Fazlurrahman, Aged About 62 Years, R/o Opp. Chooti Masjid,

Byron Bazar Raipur, District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh.

--- Appellants/Plaintiffs

versus

1.Ejazurrahman S/o Late Habiburrehman Aged About 70 Years R/o C-6,

Shriramnagar, Phase - I, Opp. Golden Physiotherapy Shriram Nagar, Raipur,

District Raipur Chhattisgarh.

2.Smt. Abeda Begum W/o Shri Kazi Basheer Ahmad Aged About 78 Years R/o

Behind Akbad Manzil, Byron Bazar, Raipur, Disrtict- Raipur, Chhattisgarh.

3.Akhtar Sultana W/o Dr. Gafoor Mohammad Aged About 67 Years R/o

Kalahandi, Odisha.

4.Smt. Nafisa Hashmi W/o Abdul Rasheed Hashmi Aged About 64 Years R/o

Beside Vinsi Dress, Friends Colony, Mowa, Raipur, District- Raipur,

Chhattisgarh..

---Respondents/ Defendants

____________________________________________________________

For Appellants : Mr. Ravindra Sharma, Advocate

For Respondents : Mr. Kshitij Sharma, Advocate

Hon'ble Shri Justice Parth Prateem Sahu

C.A.V. Judgment

1.This appeal under Section 100 has been preferred by appellants- plaintiffs

challenging the legality and sustainability of impugned judgment and decree

dated 23.10.2018 passed by learned 8

th

Additional District Judge, Raipur

District Raipur in Civil Appeal No. 50-A/2018, whereby learned First Appellate

Court affirmed the judgment and decree passed by learned Trial Court,

wherein the suit filed by plaintiffs was dismissed and the counter claim filed

by defendants was allowed.

2.For the sake of convenience, parties shall be referred to in terms of their

status shown in Civil Suit No. 285-A/2015 before the Trial Court.

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3.Brief facts of the case necessary for disposal of this appeal are that the

plaintiffs stating themselves to be legal heirs of Fazlurrahman has filed the

suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction pleading therein that the

land situated at Mohalla Baron Bazar, Bhagwati Charan Shukla Ward,

Raipur bearing Block No. 110, Plot Nos. 106 (103 sq. ft.), 107 (3090 sq. ft.),

109/4 (32 sq. ft.), and 125 (165 sq. ft.), totaling 3390 sq. ft. of land was

consisting of two houses, both houses were marked by Municipal

Corporation as house No. 2/62 and 2/63, each measuring approximately

1695 sq. ft. Map of the houses is also enclosed along with plaint and the

portion of houses possessed by plaintiffs is marked with red ink (one house).

It is further pleaded that initially the property subject matter of the suit was

purchased by one Mohd. Abdul Rahim son of Mohd. Abdul Aziz with two

houses in the year 1924 from one Kutubuddin Musalman and had taken

possession. When Mohd. Abdul Rahim became in need of money he sold out

the entire property, subject matter of the suit, to his brother-in-law (husband

of his sister) Abdul Gafur and his wife Smt. Ashiya in the year 1929 by

registered sale deed and handed over ownership and possession of entire

property. Since the date of execution of sale deed Abdul Gafur and his wife

Ashiya Bee became owner of the property. When Abdul Gafur and his wife

were enjoying the properties with two houses, Abdul Gafur gave one portion

of the house to Fazlurrahman (his brother-in-law) for residence and one of

the house was being used by himself. Abdul Gaffur went to Pakistan in the

year 1948 and before going to Pakistan, one of the house in which

Fazlurrahman was residing was given to him by oral Hibanama. The other

house in which Abdul Gafur was residing was given to Mohd. Abdul Rahim. In

both the houses Fazlurrahman and Mohd. Abudl Rahim lived till their life.

4.Fazlurrahman died on 25.02.1986 and thereafter his sons and daughters

became owners and possessor of one of the house which was given to

Fazlurrahman by oral Hiba. It is also pleaded that Mohd. Abdul Rahim after

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residing for some time in one portion of the house received by him, he also

went to Pakistan along with his family in the year 1958. In that portion of the

house, Habiburrahman started residing without any authority of law and

thereafter defendants came in possession of the said house. Defendants

have demolished their portion of the house in the month of February 2015.

Relationship between two families ie., of Fazlurrahman and Habiburrahman

was cordial. There was no dispute and due to lack of knowledge father of

plaintiffs could not apply to record his name in the revenue records (nazul

records). In the year 2015, defendants have submitted an application before

the Municipal Corporation for mutation of name in revenue record of both

houses stating that the defendants are possessor of both the houses and

proclamation was also issued in this regard in the newspaper. Mutation was

objected by plaintiffs upon which it was informed that the entire property,

subject matter of the suit (two houses) were given by Mohd. Abdul Rahim in

favour of defendant (Habiburrahman) in Bakshishnama (gift). After death of

Habiburrahman, his legal heirs have partitioned the property in their name.

Plaintiffs have also pleaded that defendants in collision with the officials of

nazul department have got their name also recorded for both the houses

suppressing the fact that one of the houses is of father of plaintiffs as he was

owner and possessed the said house during his lifetime and now the plaintiffs

are in possession. Mutation was without following due process of law. It is

also pleaded that when once the entire property was sold by Mohd. Abdul

Rahim in favour of Abdul Gafur and Ashiya Bee by registered sale deed and

also handed over possession, the purchasers became the owner and

possessor of the house and Mohd. Abdul Rahim without any authority of law

based on unregistered document got his name recorded in nazul record. No

Bakshishnama was executed at any point of time by Mohd. Abdul Rahim in

favour of Abdul Gafur. It is a forged and fabricated document. It is also

contended that for a valid Bakshishnama under the Mohammadan Law there

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must be proposal of donor, interest of beneficiaries of Bakshishnama and

further there should be consequential transfer of possession of property and

as the property was not transferred, the consequence of execution of so

called Bakshishnama would not be a valid Bakshishnama as the important

ingredient of valid Bakshishnama is missing. Mohd. Abdul Rahim was not the

title holder of owner of the property and therefore the defendants would not

get any right of title over the property based on Bakshishnama. Defendants

are trying to forcefully evict them based on mutation entries and therefore the

suit was filed.

5.Defendants have submitted written statement to the pleadings of the plaint

and have also filed counter claim/ cross suit. The specifications of property

as pleaded in the plaint and further that the property consists of two separate

houses is denied. It is also denied that the two houses are on land measuring

1695 sq.ft. each. It is pleaded that the plaintiffs are residing in the house of

defendants which is measuring about 1200 sq.ft. and the remaining area is

vacant and no construction is made on it. It is further pleaded that they are

owner of the entire property. Though in para-3, there is averment of denial of

the fact that the property in dispute with two houses was purchased by

Kutubuddin Musalman, however in the same paragraph it is admitted that the

total area of the land ie., 3920 sqft (suit property) was purchased by Mohd.

Abdul Rahim son of Mohd. Abdul Aziz from Kutubuddin Musalman in 1924. It

is further pleaded that in the year 1929 Mohd. Abdul Rahim sold the property

to Mohd. Abdul Gafur. After some time Mohd. Abdul Gafur went to Pakistan

along with his entire family and thereafter name of Mohd. Abdul Rahim is

recorded in nazul record and Mohd. Abdul Rahim became owner and

possessor of the property. It is also pleaded that Mohd. Abdul Rahim by way

of registered Bakshishnama dated 26.06.1958 came entire property in

dispute to Habiburrahman and handed over the title and possession of the

entire property. It is also pleaded that Fazlurrahman, ancestor of plaintiffs and

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Habiburrahman, ancestor of defendants, were real brothers. They were

having love and affection to each other and therefore Habiburrahman gave

one portion of the house to Falurrahman. He was in permissive possession

and not occupied the house as its owner. Legal heirs of Fazlurrahman were

also not possessing that house and using it as owner. It is also pleaded that

one house was not demolished by defendants but due to dilapidated

condition being 100 years old, it fell on its own. Pleading of plaintiffs, that

father of plaintiffs, ‘Fazlurrahman’ due to lack of knowledge could not get his

his name recorded in revenue record after receiving the house in oral Hiba is

not correct. Father of plaintiffs got his name recorded in several other

properties situated in Mohalla Baron Bazar bearing Plot Nos. 2/2, 3/2

measuring 1514 sq.ft on which house is constructed. Other land is recorded

in the name of plaintiff No. 1 and 3 bearing khasra No. 39/2 measuring 4757

sq.ft. Plaintiffs are well aware about the fact that the property of which they

are claiming their rights is owned and possessed by Habiburrahman and

defendants are his legal heirs. Plaintiffs were having knowledge about

partition between the family members of the defendants.

6.It is also pleaded by defendants that name of Mohd. Abdul Rahim was

recorded in nazul record in the year 1954 and the property recorded in his

name ie., suit property was given to Habiburrahman by registered

Bakshishnama. They have denied the claim of plaintiffs in its entirety that

father of plaintiffs Fazlurrahman became owner of one house at any point of

time.

7.In cross suit/ counterclaim, it is pleaded that at present in the part of land,

subject matter of the suit, one house is standing in dilapidated condition on

which defendants are having their title and the said accommodation is in

possession of plaintiffs, ie., the disputed property measuring about 1200

sq.ft. and is marked in the map attached with the suit as A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H. It

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is also pleaded that in the year 1924 Mohd. Abdul Rahim son of Mohd. Abdul

Aziz purchased the property, subject mater of the suit from one Kutubuddin

Musalman and taken possession of the same. Mohd. Abdul Rahim sold the

suit land in favour of Abdul Gafur and his wife in the year 1929 is also

pleaded. It is also pleaded that pursuant to sale deed executed in favour of

Abdul Gafur and Ashiya Bee, they became recorded owner of the land/

property. The entire property was given in Bakshishnama (gift) dated

26.06.1958 to father of defendants (Habiburrahman) and based on which

Habiburrahamn became owner of the property and in possession. After death

of Habiburrahman name of legal heirs were mutated in nazul record. It is also

pleaded that Habiburrahman, Fazlurrahman and Mohd. Abdul Rahim were

real brothers and Habiburrahman permitted Fazlurrahman to use one of the

houses for residence and based on the pleading it was prayed that

defendants be evicted from the house marked with red ink as A,B,C,D, it be

declare that plaintiffs are having no right and title to reside in it and further

restrain them from interfering with possession of defendants.

8.Based on the pleadings made in the plaint, written statement and

counterclaim, learned Trial Court formulated as many as 12 issues for

consideration and proceed for trial. Trial Court upon conclusion of the trial

dismissed the plaint and allowed the counter claim/ counter suit of

defendants and further directed the plaintiffs to evict the portion of the house

on which they are residing and hand it over to defendant and further

restrained the plaintiffs from interfering in the property in dispute. The

judgment and decree passed by learned Trial court dated 19.04.2018 was

put to challenge by plaintiffs/ appellants by way of an appeal under Section

96 of CPC on the grounds raised therein. Learned First Appellate Court

dismissed the appeal affirming the judgment and decree of trial Court.

Against which this second appeal is filed.

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9.This second appeal was admitted on following substantial question of law:-

“Whether both the courts below were justified in

dismissing the suit holding that defendants

have acquired title by Bakshishnama dated

26.06.1958 (Ex. D-9) executed by Abdul Rahim

in favour of their father Mohd. Habiburrahman

ignoring the fact that Abdul Rahim has already

sold the property to Abdul Gafur and Ashiya

Bee vide sale deed dated 27.06.1929 (Ex. P-4)

and they have executed Hibbanama in favour

of Fazulur Rahman by recording finding, which

is perverse to the record?”

10.Learned counsel for plaintiffs submits that the property in dispute is originally

owned by Abdul Rahim. The suit property owned in the name of Abdul

Rahim was sold to Abdul Gaffur and Ashiya Bee through registered sale deed

dated 27.06.1929 (Annexure P-4) by Abdul Rahim and thereafter Abdul

Gaffur and Ashiya Bee both left to Pakistan. He further contended that

before Abdul Gaffur and Ashiya Bee left to Pakistan, part of the property was

gifted by oral Hibanama, one portion to Abdul Rahim and other in the name

of Fazlurrahman. Plaintiffs are the legal heirs of Fazlurrahman. Defendants

are legal heirs of Habiburrahman. He contended that possession of

Fazlurrahman and thereafter the plaintiffs in the suit property was not

question just before filing of the suit and therefore plaintiffs have filed the suit.

Defendants are trying to interfere in the possession of plaintiffs’ portion of suit

property on the basis of registered Bakshishnama dated 26.06.1958 in favour

of Habiburrahman by Abdul Rahim. Referring to question of law framed by

this Court, he would submit that considering the nature of dispute, facts of the

case, pleadings and the evidence brought on record, this Court vide order

dated 29.08.2019 has formulated question of law as quoted above. He

submits that transferee cannot transfer better title than what he possess on

the date of execution of the registered Bakshishnama on 26.06.1958. Abdul

Rahim was not having any title or ownership over the property in dispute as it

was already transferred by registered sale deed in favour of Abdul Gaffur and

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Ashiya Bee. Referring to the evidence of DW-1, he submits that this witness

has categorically stated about transfer of property in dispute by Abdul Rahim

in favour of Abdul Gaffur and Ashiya Bee and further stated about possession

of plaintiffs on the disputed portion of the house on the ground of oral

Hibanama. Learned Courts below have misread the evidence and arrived at

an erroneous finding. In support of his contention, he places his reliance

upon the decisions in the case of Prem Singh and others vs. Birbal and

others reported in AIR 2006 SC 3608; D.N. Joshi (D) through Lrs. and

others vs. D.C. Harris and another reported in AIR 2017 SC 3105; Nazir

Mohamed v. J. Kamala, reported in (2020) 19 SCC 57; Jitendra Singh vs.

State of M.P. and others reported in 2021 (4) C.G.L.J. 283 (SC); Kaushik

Premkumar Mishra and another vs. Kanji Ravaria @ Kanji and another

reported in AIR 2024 SC 3766.

11.Learned counsel for respondents would oppose the submission and would

submit that in the written statement there is clear pleading with regard to the

title that it will be governed by the entries made in the Nazul record. In

evidence, defendants have produced copy of Nazul record wherein name of

Abdul Rahim is recorded as owner on the date of execution of

Bakshishnama and therefore pleadings made in the plaint that the

defendants are not having any right or title over the property is misplaced. He

also contended that upon appreciation of the evidence learned Trial Court

has already recorded a finding that Hibanama, based upon which, plaintiffs

are claiming their title is not found to be proved. Learned counsel for

respondents further submits that merely based on possession, plaintiffs may

not succeed for getting the injunction against the person who is having title

over the property. As the defendants are having title over the property based

on the registered document ie., registered Bakshishnama dated 26.06.1958,

Ext. D-9, learned courts below have rightly dismissed the claim of plaintiffs

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considering execution of registered document Ext. D-9 in favour of

defendants. He places his reliance on the decisions of Hon’ble Supreme

Court in the case of Anathula Sudhakar vs. P. Buchi Reddy (dead) by LRS

and others reported in (2008) 4 SCC 594; Abdul Rahim and others vs. Sk.

Abdul Zabar and others reported in (2009) 6 SCC 160; Rajeev Gupta and

others vs. Prashant Garg and others reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC

889 and decision of this Court in the case of Madhu Shrivastava (dead)

through Lrs and others vs. Rahul Sharma and others reported in 2024

SCC OnLine Chh 2465.

12.I have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the record of trial court

as also first appellate court.

13.From the pleadings and evidence brought on record by the respective

parties, it is an undisputed fact that the property,subject matter of the suit,

was initially purchased by Mohd. Abdul Rahim son of Mohd. Abdul Aziz from

one Kutubuddin Musalman in the year 1924. Mohd. Abdul Rahim sold the

same property by registered sale deed to Abdul Gafur, his brother-in-law

(husband of his sister Smt. Ashiya) in the year 1929. Copy of registered sale

deed is placed before the trial court as Ext. P-4 which is dated 27.08.1929.

Plaintiffs to prove the pleadings made in the plaint have exhibited six

documents ie., Ext. P-1, General power of attorney executed by M.A. Rafiq

Rahman, Jamilulrrahman, Jiyaulrrahman, Jakirurrahman, Smt. Fahim

Rahman, Smt. Jubeda Khan, Smt. Naseem Begum in favour of

Wasiurrahman; Ext. P-2, General power of attorney executed by Smt. Nahed

Khan and Smt. Shahin Ali in favour of Wasiurrahman. In both power of

attorney it is mentioned that the executant of power of attorney and power of

attorney holder are brothers and sisters. Ext. P-3 is also a general power of

attorney in favour of Wasiurrahman. Ext. P-4, copy of registered sale deed

executed by Mohd. Abdul Rahim (seller) to Abdul Gafur and Smt. Ashiya Bee

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(wife of Abdul Gafur) dated 27.08.1929, it mentions that the subject matter of

the sale deed is two houses. Ext. P-5 is an order dated 04.03.2017 passed in

an appeal under Section 393(3) of the Chhattisgarh Municipal Corporation

Act by which the appellate authority affirmed the order passed by Zone

Commissioner dismissing an application for building permission and Ext. P-6

is photographs of spot.

14.Plaintiffs have examined, Jamilurrahman as PW-1, Nawal Kishor as PW-2,

Wasiurrahman as PW-3, Syed Nasir Ali as PW-4 and Kanhaiyalal as PW-5.

15.Defendants in support of their pleadings in support of written statement and

counter claim have produced Ext. D-1 objection for mutation submitted

before Zone Revenue Officer, an affidavit of Syed Nasir Ali dated 05.10.2016

as Ext. D-2, affidavit of Kanhaiyalal Shandil dated 05.10.2016 as Ext. D-3.

Receipt of Municipal Corporation, Raipur of house No. 62/63 of the year 1980

as Ext. D-4, receipt of house No. 62/63 of the year 1984 as Ext. D-5 and

similarly receipts of the year 1985 and 1986 as Ext. D-6 and D-8 and Ext. D-7

of the year 1988. Ext. D-9 is copy of registered Bakshishnama, Ext. D-10 is a

Najul Khasra of the year 1941-42 to 1944-45, Ext. D-11 is Najul Khasra of the

year 1945-46 to 1948 to 49. Ext. D-12 is Najul Khasra of the year 1949-50 to

1952-53. Ext. D-13 is Najul Khasra of the year 1953-54 to 1956-57 (ei., in the

name of Mohd. Abdul Rahim). Najul Khasra of the year 1957-58 to 1960-61

in the name of Mohd. Abdul Rahim. Copy of family partition deed Ext. D15-c,

copy of order dated 16.08.2012, copy of order of court of Najul Officer,

Raipur, Municipal Corporation receipts Ext. D-17 in the name of Mohd.

Ezazurrahman, Ext. D-18 in the name of Nafisa Hashmi, Ext. D-19 Municipal

receipt in the name of Abeda Begum, Ext. D-20 receipt in the name of Smt.

Akhtar Sultana and Ext. D-21 Najul Sandharan Khasra in the name of Mohd.

Jamilurrahman. Najul Khasra of the year 2006-07 in the name of Mohd.

Shafiqurrahman as Ext. D-22, Najul Khasra in the name of A.A. Safi and

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others of the year 2006-07 as Ext. D-23. Najul Khasra in the name of S.A.

Safi of the year 2006-07 to 2009-10 as Ext. D-24. Defendants have

examined Smt. Nafisha Hashmi as DW-1.

16.Claim of plaintiffs is that one of the house out of two, disputed house, stated

to have been given to Fazilurrahman (father of plaintiffs) through oral hiba by

Abdul Gafur, (registered owner of the property). There is no specific pleading

in the plaint as to on which date the house which is possessed by plaintiffs

were given in oral hiba to their father and further, before whom. Name of

Fazilurrahman even is not recorded in najul revenue records. They were

undisputedly in possession of the said portion of the house. Plaintiffs in their

evidence have not produced any admissible evidence to accept their plea

that the house which was possessed by them was given by Abdul Gafur,

(purchaser of property), in favour of Fazlurrahman. Mere possession will not

confer any title when it is a case that the owner of house went to Pakistan.

17.In evidence, PW-1 Jamilurrahman son of Fazlurrahman has stated that

Mohd. Abdul Rahim sold disputed house to his brother-in-law, later on it was

given to Fazlurrahman by oral hiba and also its possession as owner of the

land and thereafter Abdul Gafur went to Pakistan. This witness has proved

the document Ext. P-4 which is registered sale deed dated 27.07.1929 and

the order of miscellaneous appeal dated 04.03.2017 Ext. P-5. In para-31 of

his cross-examination, he admitted that the tax of the portion of the house

shown in the map marked with red ink was paid by them, however, no

document is enclosed in this regard. It is also stated that the property tax was

deposited, however, receipts were misplaced. He also admitted that neither

in his affidavit under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC nor in the plaint there is mention

of name of persons who were present or in whose presence oral hiba was

made. However, he made an attempt to state that, at that time Ramdas

Naidu and Anna Swami were present, however, at the time of filing of the

suit, they were not alive and therefore their names were not mentioned. He

13 / 26

also stated that the oral hiba was done in name of Fazlurrahman and Mohd.

Abdul Rahim on same date and same time. He also admitted that it is also

not pleaded in the plaint nor in the affidavit as to how he came to know about

the oral hiba.

18.Nawal Kishore, PW-2, has stated that he is not aware that Abdul Gafur has

made oral hiba in favour of Fazlurrahman, however, he got knowledge from

the elders of his family. He also stated that he is not aware of the date of oral

hiba.

19.Wasiburrahman, PW-3, has also stated according to the plaint in

examination-in-chief. He admitted that he has also not produced any

document with regard to payment of tax to Municipal Corporation. He shown

his unawareness that the defendants are depositing property tax.

20.Syed Nasir Ali, PW-4, in his examination-in-chief stated that plaintiffs are

children of Fazlurrahman and defendants are children of Habiburrahman.

Two houses are situated adjoining to each other in which plaintiffs and

defendant were residing. One house in which defendants were residing were

demolished by them and house possessed by plaintiff is in good condition.

He supported the pleading in the plaint with respect to purchase of the house

by Abdul Gafur and his wife and they gave one house to Fazlurrahman for

residence from earlier times and since then plaintiffs along with their father

started residing. In the year 1948-49, Abdul Gafur went to Pakistan and at

that time in presence of his father, Ramdas Naidu and Anna Swami by oral

hiba given it to Fazlurrahman in which he was residing.

21.In the aforementioned facts as pleaded in the plaint, written statement,

counterclaim as also the evidence of plaintiffs, the question arises for

consideration is whether even if the oral hiba stated to be made/ announced

by Abdul Gafur can be treated to be a valid hiba, more so when from the

document Ext. P-4, registered sale deed executed by Mohd. Abdul Rahim in

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name of Abdul Gafur and his wife Ashiya Bee, but according to pleadings and

evidence which is produced on record is that, Abdul Gafur only made hiba.

When the property is recorded in the name of two persons on the basis of its

registered sale-deed in their favour, the oral hiba, if any, cannot be made by

one co-owner of the property. Learned Trial Court upon appreciating the

evidence, oral and documentary, has arrived at a conclusion that the plaintiffs

could not able to prove their plea that the house possessed by them was

given to Fazlurrahman by oral hiba. The said finding recorded by the Trial

Court and affirmed by the first appellate court is on appreciation of oral and

documentary evidence.

22.The concurrent finding of facts is recorded by both the courts below and

hence in the second appeal the concurrent finding cannot be interfered

unless and until it is shown to be perverse. Learned counsel for the

appellants-plaintiffs could not able to make out a case before this Court that

the finding recorded by the trial court that, they became owner of the land

pursuant to the oral hiba to be perverse and therefore this Court in exercise

of jurisdiction under Section 100 of CPC does not find any good ground to

interfere the said finding. Accordingly,, the plea of plaintiffs that the finding

recorded by the trial court that the plaintiffs became owner of the land

pursuant to oral hiba of the house possessed by them is not sustainable,

accordingly it is repelled and the finding recorded by the trial court as also the

first appellate court in this regard is hereby affirmed.

23.So far as the second submission of learned counsel for plaintiffs that the

finding of the trial court as also the appellate court on the cross suit filed by

defendants declaring the defendants to be title holder of the entire suit

property to be perverse or contrary to evidence is concerned, defendants, for

claiming their right on the entire suit property based on the registered

Bakshishnama Ext. D-9 which is stated to be executed on 26.06.1958 at

15 / 26

Raipur. The pleadings of the plaintiffs as also the defendants before the trial

court with respect to ownership of the property in dispute is that originally

Mohd. Abdul Rahim sold the property purchased by him in favour of Abdul

Gafur and his wife Ashiya Bee in the year 1929 vide Ext. P-4 and handed

over the possession to purchasers. In the sale deed, the property is

mentioned to a house and the map forming part of the sale deed shows two

houses of equal area adjoining to each other. The plea of plaintiffs in the

plaint is that Abdul Gafur went to Pakistan along with his family members in

the year 1948. Execution of Bakshishnama is denied by the plaintiffs. In the

plaint it is pleaded that on the date of alleged execution of Bakshishnama,

Mohd. Abdul Rahim was not title holder of the property and therefore

Bakshishsnama is erroneous and no right or title is transfer in favour of

Habiburrahman in whose favour Bakshishnama is stated to be executed.

Mutation of name of Habiburrahman in najul record is based on alleged

Bakshishnama is also erroneous. In written statement/ counterclaim, property

purchased by Mohd. Abdul Rahim from Kutubuddin Musalman in the year

1924 is admitted. It is also admitted that Mohd. Abdul Rahim sold the

property to Abdul Gafur and his wife Ashiya Bee in the year 1929. It is

pleaded that after going of Abdul Gafur and Ashiya Bee to Pakistan name of

Mohd. Abdul Rahim is recorded in Najul revenue record. In written statement,

there is no specific mention as to how and on what basis name of Mohd.

Abdul Rahim was recorded in revenue record after 1948. In written

statement, there is mention that name of Mohd. Abdul Rahim son of Mohd.

Abdul Aziz name is recorded in revenue record in the year 1954. in cross

suit/ counterclaim also there is no specific mention as to how and on what

basis name of Mohd. Abdul Rahim is recorded in revenue record.

24.When the defendants by way of counter claim is raising claim ie., entire suit

property came in the name of Mohd. Abdul Rahim, the burden lies upon the

defendants to prove the fact as pleaded in the written statement/ counter suit.

16 / 26

In absence of admissible evidence, defendants may not succeed in their

counterclaim.

25.In the facts of the case, when once Mohd. Abdul Rahim had already

transferred entire suit property by way of execution of registered sale deed in

favour of Abdul Gafur and his wife Ashiya Bee then it is for the defendants to

prove as to how and on what basis Mohd. Abdul Rahim got title over the suit

property.

26.Perusal of documents ie. the mutation entries made in the najul revenue

record placed by defendants in support of their claim would show that initially

name of Abdul Gafur and Smt. Ashiya Bee, wife of Abdul Gafur is recorded

as joint owner in joint Najul revenue record of the year 1942 to 1943, 1943-

44, 1944-45 and 1945-46, 1948-49 and 1949-50, 1952-53. In Ext. P-12 which

is Najul Sandharan of the year 1949-50 to 1952-53 there is an endorsement

mentioning it to be of the year 1953-54 which is a written document and not a

xerox copy issued in the year 2015 mentions the name of Mohd. Abdul

Rahim son of Mohd. Abdul Aziz Musalman, Namantaran Adesh dated

15.02.1954, according to some endorsement made on back side of the sale

deed dated 27.08.1929. Defendants have not produced copy of sale deed,

however, it is available in record as Ext. P-4. It is certified copy issued from

the office of Sub-Registrar on 14.08.2000, however in back side there is no

such entry of endorsement mentioned in it. Ext. P-4 sale deed dated

27.08.1929 is a registered sale deed executed by Mohd. Abdul Rahim in

favour of Abdul Gafur and his wife Ashiya Bee. The sale deed is in two pages

from which it is not appearing that as to how and on what basis and

circumstances the seller of that sale deed will again regain ownership of the

same property which he has sold and got title on it again.

17 / 26

27.Mere mentioning of name in revenue records would not confer title upon any

person. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Durga Das v. Collector ,

reported in (1996) 5 SCC 618 has observed thus:

“2. ...The courts below held that since he

purchased a specified share from Kewal Krishan he

cannot be considered as a tenant in respect of other

lands and, therefore, is not entitled to the

compensation. We find that the view taken by the

High Court is in conformity with law. Mutation

entries do not confer any title to the property. It is

only an entry for collection of the land revenue

from the person in possession. The title to the

property should be on the basis of the title they

acquired to the land and not by mutation entries.

Admittedly, the appellant has purchased some lands

from Kewal Krishan one of the brothers of the

family to the extent of his specified share. No lease

deed was executed in respect of other lands. In

these circumstances, the appellant cannot be treated

to be a tenant of Vijay Kumar to claim

compensation on the basis of his title as a tenant.”

28.In the case of Rajinder Singh v. State of J&K , reported in (2008) 9 SCC 368

Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:

“17. It is well settled that revenue records confer no

title on the party. It has been recently held by this

Court in Suraj Bhan v. Financial Commr. [(2007) 6

SCC 186] that such entries are relevant only for

“fiscal purpose” and substantive rights of title and of

ownership of contesting claimants can be decided

only by a competent civil court in appropriate

proceedings.

18. It is clear from the record that grievance of

Respondent 2 daughter, related to mutation entry. If

the authorities under the Tenancy Act felt that the

action was in consonance with law, it could have

retained the entry. The inquiry, however, was limited

to the entry in the revenue records and nothing

more. It had no bearing whatsoever as to the right of

ownership, inheritance or title to the property. In our

opinion, therefore, neither the authorities under the

Tenancy Act nor the High Court could have entered

into the question of ownership, title or inheritance in

the present proceedings and they ought to have

decided the controversy limited to mutation entry in

the revenue records.

19. The present appeal, therefore, deserves to be

disposed of by leaving all the parties to take

18 / 26

appropriate proceedings in accordance with law in a

competent civil court so far as substantive rights of

ownership, title or inheritance are concerned. In

view of the fact, however, that certain observations

have been made and questions have been considered

with regard to rights of sons and daughters in the

property of father under the Hindu Succession Act

as also under the Jammu and Kashmir Hindu

Succession Act, we clarify that all those

observations which were not relevant in view of the

limited question before the Revenue Authorities,

would have no effect in the proceedings before the

civil court if such proceedings have been initiated in

a competent court.

20. We, therefore, dispose of this appeal by granting

liberty to the parties to take appropriate proceedings

in a competent civil court by making it clear that the

observations made in the orders of the Revenue

Authorities as also by the High Court will not come

in the way of the parties in a suit as and when

proceedings have been initiated for the purpose of

determination of substantive rights of ownership.”

29.In Jitendra Singh v. State of M.P., reported in 2021 SCC OnLine SC 802

Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed thus:

“6. … Be that as it may, as per the settled

proposition of law, mutation entry does not confer

any right, title or interest in favour of the person

and the mutation entry in the revenue record is only

for the fiscal purpose. As per the settled proposition

of law, if there is any dispute with respect to the

title and more particularly when the mutation entry

is sought to be made on the basis of the will, the

party who is claiming title/right on the basis of the

will has to approach the appropriate civil

court/court and get his rights crystalised and only

thereafter on the basis of the decision before the

civil court necessary mutation entry can be made.

7. Right from 1997, the law is very clear. In the

case of Balwant Singh v. Daulat Singh (D) By Lrs.,

reported in (1997) 7 SCC 137, this Court had an

occasion to consider the effect of mutation and it is

observed and held that mutation of property in

revenue records neither creates nor extinguishes

title to the property nor has it any presumptive

value on title. Such entries are relevant only for the

purpose of collecting land revenue. Similar view

has been expressed in the series of decisions

thereafter.

8. In the case of Suraj Bhan v. Financial

Commissioner , (2007) 6 SCC 186, it is observed

and held by this Court that an entry in revenue

records does not confer title on a person whose

19 / 26

name appears in record-of-rights. Entries in the

revenue records or jamabandi have only “fiscal

purpose”, i.e., payment of land revenue, and no

ownership is conferred on the basis of such entries.

It is further observed that so far as the title of the

property is concerned, it can only be decided by a

competent civil court. Similar view has been

expressed in the cases of Suman Verma v. Union of

India, (2004) 12 SCC 58; Faqruddin v. Tajuddin,

(2008) 8 SCC 12; Rajinder Singh v. State of J&K,

(2008) 9 SCC 368; Municipal Corporation,

Aurangabad v. State of Maharashtra, (2015) 16

SCC 689; T. Ravi v. B. Chinna Narasimha, (2017) 7

SCC 342; Bhimabai Mahadeo Kambekar v. Arthur

Import & Export Co., (2019) 3 SCC 191; Prahlad

Pradhan v. Sonu Kumhar, (2019) 10 SCC 259; and

Ajit Kaur v. Darshan Singh, (2019) 13 SCC 70.”

30.From the aforementioned facts of the case, evidence available on record as

also contents of Ext. D-12, it is apparent that mutation of name of in najul

record is without any authority and valid document. No right or title was

transferred in his favour prior to mutating his name in the property in dispute

and therefore merely mentioning of name in revenue record had not

conferred title and ownership right upon Habiburrahman of the suit property.

31.In the aforementioned facts of the case, now the question arises for

consideration of this Court is whether Bakshishnama said to be executed by

Mohd. Abdul Rahim in favour of Habiburrahman is a valid document and

admissible in law. The law in this regard is very clear that no better title can

be transferred by a person which he himself is having under law. Hon’ble

Supreme Court in the case of Ramlal v. Phagua , reported in (2006) 1 SCC

168 has held as under:

18 [Ed. : Para 18 corrected vide Official

Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./112/2005 dated 1-

12-2005.]. In our opinion, agreement to reconvey

the property will not ipso facto lead to the

conclusion that the sale is nominal and in view of

the stand of Defendant 8, as also of the fact that the

property worth Rs. 700 has been purportedly sold

for Rs 400, we are of the considered opinion that

the sale deed dated 1-12-1965 did not convey any

title to Defendant 8. It is well settled by a catena of

decisions that the vendor cannot convey to the

vendee better title than she herself has.”

20 / 26

32.In case of Thakar Singh v. Mula Singh, reported in (2015) 5 SCC 209,

Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed thus:

“9. 39. ... In Mahabir Gope v. Harbans Narain

Singh [1952 SCR 775 : AIR 1952 SC 205] which

was a decision dealing with a lease created by a

mortgagee with possession under the Bihar

Tenancy Act, this Court reiterated that the general

rule is that a person cannot by transfer or

otherwise confer a better title on another than he

himself has. A mortgagee cannot, therefore, create

an interest in the mortgaged property which will

enure beyond the termination of his interest as

mortgagee. …”

33.Defendants have examined Smt. Nafisha Hashmi as sole defendant witness

who in her cross-examination has also stated that Abdul Gafur went to

Pakistan and Mohd. Abdul Rahim became title holder and possessor of the

suit property. Name of Mohd. Abdul Rahim was recorded in accordance with

law in revenue records. She stated that she has not filed any document to

show as to on what basis name of Mohd. Abdul Rahim came to be recorded

as owner of the entire property in revenue records. She also admitted that

name of Mohd. Abdul Rahim is not recorded based on any registered

document.

34.Learned Trial court has considered that after the name of Abdul Gafur and

Smt. Ashiya Bee, name of Mohd. Abdul Rahim came to be recorded which is

specifically mentioned in Ext. D-12 in its back side and however, learned Trial

Court has not taken into consideration as to how the name of Mohd. Abdul

Rahim is mentioned and whether the reason assigned for mentioning of

name of Mohd. Abdul Rahim gives any title. Defendants to prove the fact of

mutation and its basis have not produced copy of order of mutation. When

defendants could able to obtain the mutation entries of the year 1941-42 to

1944-45 onward, then, they could have also produced the order dated

15.02.1954 which is mentioned in Ext. P-12 on its back side. Documents of

21 / 26

the year 1941-42 is obtained in the year 2015 but the defendants failed to

produce very important order of mutation.

35.It is not a case of defendants that the property was gifted by way of oral hiba

in favour of Mohd. Abdul Rahim but in their pleadings and evidence it has

only come that after Abdul Gafur and his wife went to Pakistan, Mohd. Abdul

Rahim became owner of the property and further stated that after execution

of so called Bakshishnama, Ext. D-9, Mohd. Abdul Rahim went to Pakistan

along with his family.

36.Section 101 of the Evidence Act defines burden of prove which reads as

under:

“101. Burden of proof. Whoever desires any Court

to give judgment as to any legal right or liability

dependent on the existence of facts which he

asserts, must prove that those facts exist. When a

person is bound to prove the existence of any fact,

it is said that the burden of proof lies on that

person.

Illustrations:

(a) A desires a Court to give judgment that B shall

be punished for a crime which A says B has

committed. A must prove that B has committed the

crime.

(b) A desires a Court to give judgment that he is

entitled to certain land in the possession of B, by

reason of facts which he asserts and which B

denies, to be true. A must prove the existence of

those facts.”

37.Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Subhra Mukherjee v. Bharat Coking

Coal Ltd. and others, reported in (2000) 3 SCC 312 while considering the

issue of burden of prove in the contexts of allegation of sham and bogus

transaction held that it is for the party/ plaintiffs relying on the transaction had

to first prove its genuineness and only thereafter the defendants would be

required to discharge the burden in order to dislodge such proofs and

establish that the transaction was sham and fictitious.

22 / 26

38.In the case of State of J&K v. Hindustan Forest Co., reported in (2006) 12

SCC 198 Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that “onus is on the plaintiff to

positively establish its case on the best material available and it cannot rely

on the weakness or absence of defence to discharge such onus.”

39.In the case at hand also, plea of execution of Bakshishnama by Mohd. Abdul

Rahim is pleaded in counter claim by the defendants and therefore the

burden lies upon the defendants to prove the fact that the executant Mohd.

Abdul Rahim was having any right and title over the property, subject matter

of Bakshishnama, to execute Bakshishnama. As the defendants could not

able to produce any acceptable documentary evidence before the trial Court

to show, as to how Mohd. Abdul Rahim got title over the property, in the

opinion of this Court, merely by recording his name in the revenue record will

not be sufficient to hold that Mohd. Abdul Rahim was having title over the

property and authority to execute Bakshishnama. Learned Trial Court only

considering that the revenue entries are made about more than 30 years old

and therefore the burden to prove it to be forged and fabricated is upon the

plaintiffs is contrary to law in the facts of the case.

40.Mutation of name of Mohd. Abdul Rahim in revenue record is not in dispute,

the question for consideration is whether Mohd. Abdul Rahim acquired title

on the land only because his name is recorded in revenue record. As

discussed in preceding paragraph that only mutation does not confer title, as

ruled by Hon’ble Supreme Court. Learned Courts below erred in confusing

between documents by which any right is transferred and the values of

entries made in revenue records. Learned trial court could have posed

question as to whether only because mentioning of name in revenue record

will confer any title or not upon such person in which it utterly failed. In above

facts of the case, settled legal position, learned courts below erred in holding

that Mohd. Abdul Rahim was having title because his name is recorded since

last more than 30 years in revenue records. Section 90 of the Evidence Act

23 / 26

gives discretion to court to draw presumption under Section 90 of Evidence

Act. Presumption of ownership cannot be raised under Section 90 of the

Evidence Act based on certified copies of revenue entries when basis of

entering of name in revenue record is not proved. Hon’ble Supreme Court in

the case of Om Prakash v. Shanti Devi, reported in (2015) 4 SCC 601 has

observed thus:

“5. The due execution and attestation of this gift

deed is the sole point in issue before us. The

appellant has rested his case on the favourable

presumption contained in Section 90 of the

Evidence Act i.e. that the gift deed being thirty-

years old should be taken as having been duly

executed and attested. The appellant seems to have

made little or no endeavour to prove the gift deed

without the advantage of this presumption. Under

Section 90, before any question of presuming a

document's valid execution can emerge, the

document must purport and be proved to be thirty-

years old. The law surrounding the date of

computation of the elapse of thirty-years stands

long-settled, since the verdict of the Privy Council

in Surendra Krishna Roy v. Mirza Mahammad Syed

Ali Matwali [Surendra Krishna Roy v. Mirza

Mahammad Syed Ali Matwali, (1935-36) 63 IA 85 :

(1936) 43 LW 107 : AIR 1936 PC 15] , which held

that the period of thirty-years is to be reckoned, not

from the date upon which the deed is filed in court

but from the date on which, it having been tendered

in evidence, its genuineness or otherwise becomes

the province of proof. Generally speaking, although

the date on which the document has been tendered

in evidence or subjected to being proved/exhibited

is the relevant date from which its antiquity is to be

computed, we think it necessary to underscore that

it should be produced at the earliest so that it is not

looked upon askance and with suspicion so far as

its authenticity is concerned.

10. ... The judgment [Surendra Krishna Roy v.

Mirza Mahammad Syed Ali Matwali, (1935-36) 63

IA 85 : (1936) 43 LW 107 : AIR 1936 PC 15] of the

High Court below has considered the issue of this

document's eligibility under Section 90, and

repudiated this submission, the document not even,

echoing the words of Section 90, “purporting” to be

thirty-years old at the time of tendering. We hasten

to add that even if the document purported or is

proved to be thirty-years old, the appellant would

not axiomatically receive a favourable presumption,

the Section 90 presumption being a discretionary

one.

24 / 26

41.To prove a valid oral hiba (gift), the parties are required to prove that the

donor on the date of making oral hiba is owner of the property which he is

gifting. The thing to be gifted should be in existence at the time of hiba. There

should be intention of donor of giving his property and title over the property

to others by oral hiba. Transfer of possession of property is also one of the

important ingredients of a valid oral hiba. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case

of Abdul Rahim v. Sk. Abdul Zabar, reported in (2009) 6 SCC 160 while

considering the issue or Hiba/ gift has observed thus:

“16. Syed Ameer Ali in his Commentary on

Mohammedan Law has amplified the definition of

“hiba” in the following terms:

“In other words the ‘hiba’ is a voluntary gift without

consideration of a property or the substance of a

thing by one person to another so as to constitute the

donee, the proprietor of the subject-matter of the

gift. It requires for its validity three conditions viz.

(a) a manifestation of the wish to give on the part of

the donor; (b) the acceptance of the donee either

impliedly or constructively; and (c) taking

possession of the subject-matter of gift by the donee

either actually or constructively.”

17. In Maqbool Alam Khan v. Khodaija [AIR 1966

SC 1194 : (1966) 3 SCR 479] it was held : (AIR pp.

1196-97, paras 6-7)

“6. The Prophet has said:‘A gift is not valid

without seisin.’ The rule of law is:

‘Gifts are rendered valid by tender, acceptance

and seisin. Tender and acceptance are necessary

‘because a gift is a contract, and tender and

acceptance are requisite in the formation of all

contracts; and seisin is necessary in order to

establish a right of property in the gift, because a

right of property, according to our doctors, is not

established in the thing given merely by means of

the contract, without seisin.’ [See Hamilton's

Hedaya (Grady's Edn.), p. 482.]

7. Previously, the rule of law was thought to be so

strict that it was said that land in the possession of

a usurper (or wrongdoer) or of a lessee or a

mortgagee cannot be given away, see Dorrul

Mokhtar, Book on Gift, p. 635 cited in Mullick

Abdool Guffoor v. Muleka [ILR (1884) 10 Cal

25 / 26

1112] . But the view now prevails that there can be

a valid gift of property in the possession of a

lessee or a mortgagee and a gift may be

sufficiently made by delivering constructive

possession of the property to the donee. Some

authorities still take the view that a property in the

possession of a usurper cannot be given away, but

this view appears to us to be too rigid. The donor

may lawfully make a gift of a property in the

possession of a trespasser. Such a gift is valid,

provided the donor either obtains and gives

possession of the property to the donee or does all

that he can to put it within the power of the donee

to obtain possession.”

(emphasis supplied)

(See also Mullick Abdool Guffoor v. Muleka [ILR

(1884) 10 Cal 1112] .)

18. Faiz Badruddin Tyabji in his Muslim Law — The

Personal Law of Muslims in India and Pakistan

states the law thus:

“395.(1) The declaration and acceptance of a gift

do not transfer the ownership of the subject of gift,

until the donor transfers to the donee such seisin or

possession as the subject of the gift permits viz.

until the donor (a) puts it within the power of the

donee to take possession of the subject of gift, if

he so chooses, or (b) does everything that,

according to the nature of the property forming the

subject of the gift, is necessary to be done for

transferring the ownership of the property, and

rendering the gift complete and binding upon

himself.

(2) Imam Malik holds that the right to the subject

of gift relates back to the time of the declaration.”

42.Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Prem Singh v. Birbal, reported in (2006) 5

SCC 353 has observed in para-16 that “When a document is valid, no

question arises of its cancellation. When a document is void ab initio, a

decree for setting aside the same would not be necessary as the same is non

est in the eye of the law, as it would be a nullity.”

43.In view of the aforementioned discussion and the decisions, in this opinion of

this court, learned Trial Court erred in accepting the claim of defendants

allowing the counterclaim in declaring them to be title holder of the entire suit

26 / 26

property. Such finding is not sustainable. Learned first appellate court also

erred in upholding such finding of the Trial Court. The finding of the trial court

and the first appellate court that the defendants have got title of the property

based on the Bakshishnama, in view of the aforementioned discussion, is not

sustainable, accordingly it is set aside.

44.Consequently the appeal is allowed in part. The challenge to the judgment

and decree passed by trial court dismissing the suit of plaintiff is affirmed and

the judgment and decree by both the courts below on counter claim declaring

the defendants to be owner of the entire suit property based on

Bakshishnama being unsustainable, is set aside. Resultantly, the suit and the

counterclaim both are dismissed.

45.No order as to cost.

46.Decree be drawn up accordingly.

Sd/-

(Parth Prateem Sahu)

Judge

pwn