2025 INSC 105 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 4884 OF 2024

[arising out of S.L.P. (CRIMINAL) No. 10082/2019]

MADHUSHREE DATTA …APPELLANT

VERSUS

THE STATE OF KARNATAKA & ANR. …RESPONDENTS

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 4883 OF 2024

[arising out of S.L.P. (CRIMINAL) No. 10115/2019]

BADRINARAYAN A JAGANATHAN … APPELLANT

VERSUS

THE STATE OF KARNATAKA & ANR. …RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

DIPANKAR DATTA, J.

THE APPEAL

1. By a common impugned judgment and order dated 31

st

July, 2019

1

, a

1

impugned order

2

learned Judge of the High Court of Karnataka

2

dismissed Criminal

Petition No. 3961 of 2015 (Badrinarayana Jaganathan vs. State of

Karnataka & Anr.) and Criminal Petition No. 3962 of 2015 (Madhushree

Datta vs. State of Karnataka & Anr.), both filed under Section 482 of the

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

3

, seeking quashing of the chargesheet

filed under Section 173(2), Cr. PC and the entire proceedings in Case

Crime No. 53073 of 2014, on the file of the Additional Chief Metropolitan

Magistrate, Bangalore

4

.

2. The accused appellants

5

- Madhushree Datta

6

and Badrinarayana

Jaganathan

7

- have taken exception to the impugned order by

presenting these appeals.

FACTS

3. The proceedings before the ACMM have, as its genesis, an incident of

25

th

October, 2013. The second respondent as complainant

8

lodged a

complaint dated 26

th

October, 2013 with the Sub-Inspector of Police,

H.A.L. Police Station, Marathahalli, Bangalore, against M/s Juniper

Networks India Private Limited

9

and the appellants. The complainant

asserted that she was employed as a Technical System Analyst at the

2

High Court

3

Cr. PC

4

ACMM

5

appellants

6

first accused

7

second accused

8

complainant

9

Company

3

Company, where she was subjected to ongoing harassment by the

management. She claimed that she was coerced into resigning under

duress, with the threat of immediate termination if she did not comply.

Specifically, the complainant alleged that on October 25, 2013, between

2:00 p.m. and 3:00 p.m., the first accused, who held the position of

Human Resources Manager at the Company, demanded that the

complainant resign under threat of immediate dismissal. Furthermore,

the first accused, allegedly instructed the complainant not to return to

work and confiscated her personal belongings, including her laptop, bag,

wallet, money, credit cards et cetera. The complainant further asserted

that the laptop contained proprietary intellectual property, specifically

codes and other work, that she had personally created. In addition, the

complainant alleged that the management ordered her removal from

the premises, with security personnel escorting her out and reportedly

engaging in behaviour amounting to physical harassment, assault and

threatening with dire consequences.

4. Following the above complaint, a Non-Cognizable Report

10

was

registered on 26

th

October, 2013. The NCR states that the employees of

the Company, namely the appellants, subjected the complainant to both

mental and physical harassment by confiscating her laptop, which

contained her data. The complainant subsequently filed a formal

complaint seeking an inquiry and investigation into the matter, following

her forcible termination from employment on October 25, 2013.

10

NCR

4

5. More than 2 (two) months later, a First Information Report

11

was lodged

by the complainant accusing the Company and the appellants of having

committed offences punishable under sections 323, 504, 506, 509, 511

of the Indian Penal Code, 1860

12

. The FIR states that the Company,

along with the first accused, subjected the complainant to both physical

and mental torture. They allegedly confiscated the laptop issued to the

complainant and forcibly evicted her from the Company.

6. Following the registration of the FIR, an investigation was conducted

into the alleged offences under Sections 323, 504, 506, 509, and 511

of the IPC. A chargesheet was filed on 23

rd

April 2014, arraigning the

appellants as accused. The chargesheet alleges that the appellants

physically assaulted the complainant and confiscated the laptop

provided by the Company, preventing her from retrieving the data

stored on it. Additionally, the appellants were accused of scolding the

complainant in “filthy language” a nd forcibly terminating her

employment. Furthermore, with the assistance of security personnel,

the appellants are said to have had the complainant removed from the

premises of the Company.

7. Aggrieved thereby, the appellants unsuccessfully approached the High

Court as noted above.

IMPUGNED ORDER

8. A perusal of the impugned order reveals that the High Court primarily

considered the allegations set forth in the complainant's complaint and

11

FIR

12

IPC

5

concluded that, prima facie, they meet the necessary elements to

constitute the offences attributed to the appellants. The High Court

rejected the appellants’ objection regarding the procedure followed by

the police in registering FIR No. 823/2013, and observed that the

materials on record suggest that the offences alleged against the

appellants involve both cognizable and non-cognizable offences. The

High Court further held that a mere lapse in the process of investigation,

by itself, would not constitute a valid ground for quashing the

proceedings. Moreover, the records indicate that the investigating officer

had obtained the requisite authorization under Section 155(2) of the Cr.

PC prior to registration of the FIR. Additionally, the High Court noted

that the alleged offences were committed by employee s of the

Company, that is, the appellants, and not by the Company itself, without

the Company's consent. Consequently, non-inclusion of the Company as

an accused in the chargesheet did not entitle the appellants to seek

quashing of the chargesheet.

CONTENTIONS

9. Mr. Luthra, learned senior counsel for the appellants argued that the

High Court erred in failing to exercise its inherent power under Section

482 of the Cr. PC, and to quash the chargesheet filed against the

appellants. He contended that the following points warrant consideration

by this Court:

A. Firstly, the FIR and the chargesheet filed by the first respondent fail

to disclose a prima facie case against the appellants. The

6

chargesheet, according to the appellants, does not disclose any of

the essential elements of the offences under Sections 323, 504, 506,

509, and 511 of the IPC even if accepted as true.

B. Secondly, the offences alleged in the complaint are of a general

nature and do not specify the appellants' involvement in the

commission of the alleged offences. Categorical assertion is that the

second accused was not present in the office on the date of the

alleged incident and, therefore, no specific role has been attributed

to him in relation to the alleged offences.

C. Thirdly, the issues pertaining to resignation and termination are civil

in nature. Criminal proceedings have been initiated by the

complainant solely to exert pressure on the Company and the

appellants, with the intent of coercing them to settle the matter, and

thereby enabling complainant to gain an undue monetary advantage.

D. Fourthly, the allegations levelled in the FIR are so absurd and

inherently improbable that no reasonable person could, based on

these allegations, conclude that there are sufficient grounds to

proceed against the appellants.

E. Fifthly, the allegations made in the FIR and reiterated in the

chargesheet are inconsistent.

F. Sixthly, initially, a NCR was registered against the appellants, and

despite the investigation, no new material has been placed on record

to substantiate the commission of a punishable offence under

Sections 323, 504, 506, 509, and 511 of the IPC.

7

G. Seventhly, in criminal proceedings, the appellants cannot be held

liable for the actions of a third party. The complainant has alleged

that it was the security guard who harassed and assaulted her,

threatening her with dire consequences.

H. Eighthly, no medical examination was conducted by the first

respondent on the complainant to ascertain any injury resulting from

an alleged assault by the appellants, thereby leading to a serious

miscarriage of justice.

I. Finally, it was contended that no FIR based on the complaint dated

26

th

December, 2013 ought to have been registered on the face of

the NCR.

10. Per contra, learned counsel for both sets of respondents supported the

High Court's order dismissing the appellants' petitions under Section

482 of the Cr. PC. They vehemently refuted the submissions made by

the learned counsel for the appellants and presented the following

arguments:

A. Firstly, the allegations made in the complaint, prima facie, disclose

the essential ingredients of criminal offences. A plain reading of the

complaint, the FIR, and the chargesheet clearly establishes a case

against the appellants under Sections 323, 504, 506, and 511 of the

IPC.

B. Secondly, the Company and its employees, namely the appellants,

subjected the complainant to harassment and humiliation. They

8

issued life threats, engaged in criminal intimidation, committed

physical assault, inflicted mental torture, insulted her, and unlawfully

seized her intellectual property, including code, data, and other

related materials. Furthermore, during the act of forcibly taking her

laptop, she was inappropriately touched and handled, thereby

subjecting her to physical harassment.

C. Thirdly, the complainant was coerced into tendering her resignation,

and when she protested, force was used to compel her to return the

laptop. Additionally, she was physically assaulted and threatened

with severe consequences.

CONSIDERATION

11. We have heard learned senior counsel/counsel for all the parties at

length and examined the materials on record.

12. The points for determination that emerge for decision are:

(i) Whether, based on the materials on record, prima facie,

ingredients of the offences under Sections 323, 504, 506,

509, and 511 of the IPC are made out, even if the allegations

are taken at face value and accepted in their entirety?

(ii) Whether the chargesheet and the related criminal

proceedings against the appellants, are liable to be quashed?

13. At the outset, we record that none of the two complaints lodged by the

complainant - the first on 26

th

October, 2013 and the next on 2 3

rd

December, 2013 - does with any degree of clarity and certainty suggest

the presence of the second accused at the time of the alleged occurrence

9

in the office premises of the Company. In fact, when this was pointed

out to learned counsel for the complainant, he had no answer. Even

though it is admitted that the second accused was not present, we are

minded to proceed on the premise as if the second accused too was

present. What would be the effect of arraigning him as an accused

though not present shall, however, be dealt with at a later stage of this

judgment.

14. While considering the first point, we need to examine in brief the

relevant provisions of the IPC.

SECTION 323, IPC

15. To determine what are the ingredients of the offence under Section 323

of the IPC, it is important to read Sections 319, 321 and 323 together.

16. What emerges on a conjoint reading of the aforementioned provisions

is that, for a conviction under Section 323 of the IPC, there must be a

voluntary act of causing hurt, i.e., bodily pain, disease, or infirmity, to

another person. Therefore, it is essential that actual hurt is caused.

17. Turning to the facts of the case, the complaint merely states that the

complainant was forcibly ejected from the Company's office by security

personnel, who allegedly attempted to assault, physically harass, and

threaten her with dire consequences. Therefore, the complaint does not

directly attribute any voluntary act of causing hurt to the complainant

by any of the two accused.

18. Furthermore, the chargesheet reiterates the similar version set forth in

the complaint, stating that the complainant was forcibly thrown out of

10

the office by the security personnel. While the actions of the security

personnel could potentially constitute an offence of causing hurt, they

are neither named in the complaint nor figure as accused in the

chargesheet. Having said that, the appellants cannot be said to have

foreseen or anticipated the actions of the security personnel in such a

manner that would render them co-perpetrators of the offence. Hence,

there is no basis for the prosecution to set forth the concept of liability

of the employer or for the overt acts of its employees in this matter.

19. In the light of the abovementioned discussion, we are of the considered

opinion that the ingredients of offence under Section 323 of the IPC

have not been made out, prima facie, either in the complaint or the

chargesheet.

SECTIONS 504 AND 509, IPC

20. The next question for determination is, whether the mere assertion of

"filthy language" allegedly used by the appellants in scolding the

complainant, is sufficient to establish commission of offences under

Sections 504 and 509 of the IPC.

21. In the above context, it would be apt to consider the provisions

contained in Section 504 of the IPC.

22. A perusal of Section 504 of the IPC reveals that a mere act of insulting

someone does not fulfil its requirements; the insult must be of such a

nature that it provokes the person insulted to breach the public peace

or engage in criminal conduct. Therefore, to establish the ingredients of

Section 504 of the IPC, it must be demonstrated, based on the available

11

material, that there was intentional insult with the intent or knowledge

that such insult would provoke either disturbance of the public peace or

the commission of any other offence.

23. We may, at this juncture, profitably refer to the decision of this Court in

Fiona Shrikhande v. State of Maharashtra & Anr.

13

, wherein

Section 504 of the IPC came up for interpretation and it was held as

under:

“13. Section 504 IPC comprises of the following ingredients,

viz., (a) intentional insult, (b) the insult must be such as to

give provocation to the person insulted, and (c) the accused

must intend or know that such provocation would cause

another to break the public peace or to commit any other

offence. The intentional insult must be of such a degree that

should provoke a person to break the public peace or to

commit any other offence. The person who intentionally

insults intending or knowing it to be likely that it will give

provocation to any other person and such provocation will

cause to break the public peace or to commit any other

offence, in such a situation, the ingredients of Section 504 are

satisfied. One of the essential elements constituting the

offence is that there should have been an act or conduct

amounting to intentional insult and the mere fact that the

accused abused the complainant, as such, is not sufficient by

itself to warrant a conviction under Section 504 IPC.

14. We may also indicate that it is not the law that the actual

words or language should figure in the complaint. One has to

read the complaint as a whole and, by doing so, if the

Magistrate comes to a conclusion, prima facie, that there has

been an intentional insult so as to provoke any person to

break the public peace or to commit any other offence, that

is sufficient to bring the complaint within the ambit of Section

504 IPC. It is not the law that a complainant should verbatim

reproduce each word or words capable of provoking the other

person to commit any other offence. The background facts,

circumstances, the occasion, the manner in which they are

used, the person or persons to whom they are addressed, the

time, the conduct of the person who has indulged in such

actions are all relevant factors to be borne in mind while

13

AIR 2014 SC 2013

12

examining a complaint lodged for initiating proceedings under

Section 504 IPC.”

(emphasis supplied)

24. In the instant case, the chargesheet states that the appellants used

"filthy language" while scolding the complainant; however, no such

allegation is made against the appellants in the complaint. Furthermore,

it is nowhere alleged that this act of using filthy language and insulting

the complainant by the appellants, has provoked the complainant to

commit breach of public peace or to commit any other offence.

Therefore, from the materials on record, the ingredients of the offence

under Section 504 of the IPC, as explained in the abovesaid decision,

are not satisfied.

25. For ascertaining whether, prima facie, the provision of Section 509 of

the IPC was attracted, it is essential to first understand the meaning of

the term "modesty", to determine whether modesty has been insulted.

While modesty is not explicitly defined in the IPC, this Court has

addressed the essence of a woman's modesty in the decision in

Ramkripal v. State of Madhya Pradesh

14

. Excerpts from the decision

read as under:

“12. What constitutes an outrage to female modesty is

nowhere defined in IPC. The essence of a woman's modesty

is her sex. The culpable intention of the accused is the crux

of the matter. The reaction of the woman is very relevant,

but its absence is not always decisive. Modesty in this

Section is an attribute associated with female human beings

14

(2007) 11 SCC 265

13

as a class. It is a virtue which attaches to a female owing to

her sex...”

(emphasis supplied)

26. Further, this Court while discussing the test for outraging the modesty

of a woman under Section 509 of the IPC in Rupan Deol Bajaj v.

Kanwar Pal Singh Gill

15

, observed as under:

“15. In State of Punjab vs. Major Singh (AIR 1967 SC 63) a

question arose whether a female child of seven and a half

months could be said to be possessed of ‘modesty' which

could be outraged. In answering the above question

Mudholkar J., who along with Bachawat J. spoke for the

majority, held that when any act done to or in the presence

of a woman is clearly suggestive of sex according to the

common notions of mankind that must fall within the

mischief of Section 354 IPC. Needless to say, the `common

notions of mankind' referred to by the learned Judge have

to be gauged by contemporary societal standards. The other

learned Judge (Bachawat J.) observed that the essence of a

woman's modesty is her sex and from her very birth she

possesses the modesty which is the a ttribute of her sex.

From the above dictionary meaning of ‘modesty' and the

interpretation given to that word by this Court in Major

Singh's case (supra) it appears to us that the ultimate test

for ascertaining whether modesty has been outraged is, is

the action of the offender such as could be perceived as one

which is capable of shocking the sense of decency of a

woman...”

(emphasis supplied)

27. The conclusion that emerges from the above discussion is that it will be

essential for this Court to carefully assess the evidence presented, in

order to determine whether there is sufficient material to establish the

intention and knowledge on the part of the appellants, to insult the

modesty of the complainant or, to put it pithily, whether any act was

15

(1995) 6 SCC 194

14

intended to shock the sense of decency of the complainant being a

woman.

28. The term "filthy language," when examined in isolation, and without any

contextual framework or accompanying words , indicating an intent to

insult the complainant's modesty, does not fall within the purview of

Section 509 of the IPC. Had there been references to specific words

used, contextual details, or any gestures —whether preceding,

succeeding, or accompanying these words —that could demonstrate a

criminal intent to insult the modesty, and it might have assisted the

prosecution in establishing the case against the appellants.

29. In considering the term "filthy language" objectively, in the overall

conspectus of the case, we are of the view that the appellants' actions

do not demonstrate the requisite intent or knowledge that would

reasonably lead to the conclusion that their conduct could provoke such

a severe emotional response as to constitute an insult to a woman's

modesty.

30. Be that as it may, it goes without saying that each case must be

assessed having regard to the specific facts and circumstances, not only

of the case itself, but also of the individuals involved in the alleged

incident. It is undisputed that the complainant and the appellants were

positioned as an employee and senior officials, respectively. Moreover,

it is evident from the case presented by both parties that a dispute

existed between them with regard to the employment in question.

15

31. To reiterate, in the present case, the complaint does not indicate that

the appellants used language towards the complainant that would

warrant an offence under Section 509 of the IPC. However, the

chargesheet alleges that the appellants scolded the complainant using

"filthy language." Notably, this allegation is also absent in the FIR.

32. In light of the employer-employee relationship between the appellants

and the complainant; the existing dispute between them relating to the

employment; the absence of any references to specific words used,

contextual details, or accompanying gestures—whether preceding or

succeeding the alleged words—the failure to mention the use of any

"filthy language" in the complaint; and the fact that this allegation is

only found in the chargesheet: there are serious concerns regarding the

claim of insulting modesty of the complainant by the appellants.

Considering the materials available on record, we are of the view that

prima facie ingredients of an offence under Section 509 of the IPC have

not been disclosed.

SECTION 506, IPC

33. This brings us to the offence under Section 506 of the IPC, which the

High Court has found to be prima facie disclosed against the appellants.

Section 506 of the IPC prescribes the punishment for the offence of

criminal intimidation, while Section 503 defines the offence of criminal

intimidation.

16

34. This Court had the occasion to examine the ingredients of Sections 503

and 506 of the IPC in Manik Taneja and Another v. State of

Karnataka & Anr.

16

, where it was observed as follows:

“11. xxxxxxxxxxxx A reading of the definition of ‘criminal

intimidation’ would indicate that there must be an act of

threatening to another person, of causing an injury to the

person, reputation, or property of the person threatened, or

to the person in whom the threatened person is interested

and the threat must be with the intent to cause alarm to the

person threatened or it must be to do any act which he is

not legally bound to do or omit to do an act which he is

legally entitled to do.”

35. In the present case, the complaint does not specifically attribute any

threats or intimidation to the second accused. Therefore, ingredients of

Section 506 of the IPC, prima facie, are not made out against him. The

argument that the first accused acted at the behest of the second

accused is untenable, as Section 34 of the IPC, which imposes vicarious

liability in criminal matters, has not been applied in this case.

36. However, the complainant has stated in her complaint that she was

threatened by the first accused, as detailed below:

“Then on 25-10-2013 at about 2.00 P.M. and 3-00 P.M. one

MADHUSHIREE DUTTA (HR) asked me to forcefully resign or

otherwise I will be sent out immediately. Further she

abruptly asked me not to come for my work henceforth”.

37. Before an offence of criminal intimidation to be made out against the

first accused, it must be established that she had the intention to cause

alarm to the complainant. A review of the alleged threat reveals that

the complainant is primarily alleging illegal termination, which

16

(2015) 7 SCC 423

17

constitutes a civil dispute, rather than criminal intimidation. It is also

the appellants' case, which has not been disputed by the complainant,

that the complainant has filed a reference before the labour court

challenging her termination and seeking reinstatement along with back

wages. Given these circumstances and the material s on record, the

ingredients of Section 506 of the IPC, prima facie, are not disclosed

against the first accused too.

38. After a thorough examination of the matter, including a review of the

materials on record: viz., the complaint, the FIR, and chargesheet, we

are of the view that none of the ingredients of Sections 323, 504, 506,

and 509 of the IPC are present, even if they are taken at face value and

accepted in their entirety. The complaint is bereft of even the basic

facts, which are absolutely necessary for making out an offence.

39. Since the ingredients of the offences under the aforementioned sections

have not been made out, the charge under Section 511 of the IPC

cannot stand.

40. To sum up, after the complainant filed the complaint, a NCR was

registered. It indicated that no cognizable offence was initially believed

to have been committed against the complainant. Subsequently, an FIR

was lodged on 23

rd

December, 2012, i.e., 58 (fifty-eight) days after the

initial complaint was filed, under Sections 323, 504, 506, 509, and 511

of the IPC. It is pertinent to note that only Section 509 constitutes a

cognizable offence, whereas Sections 323, 504, and 506 are non -

cognizable offences. Furthermore, the FIR does not contain any

18

allegations that would substantiate a charge under Section 509 of the

IPC. Additionally, the chargesheet is the sole document that alleges the

use of "filthy language" by the appellants in scolding the complainant.

The discrepancies and variations outlined above, suggest a deliberate

attempt to reclassify the nature of the proceedings from non-cognizable

to cognizable or to transform a civil dispute into a criminal matter,

potentially aimed at pressurizing the appellants into settling the dispute

with the complainant.

41. Notwithstanding this, and as asserted by the appellants, there are

certain facts that strongly suggest that the criminal proceedings were

initiated by the complainant against the appellants with mala fide

intentions, specifically to wreak vengeance, cause harm, or coerce a

settlement. The presence of the second accused cannot by any stretch

of imagination be visualised, if one were to barely read the complaints

- initial and subsequent – and treat the contents as true; yet, the

complainant alleged acts against him which, according to her, amounted

to criminal offence. We are reminded of the maxim res ipsa loquitur and

leave the discussion at that.

42. The legal principles governing the exercise of jurisdiction under Section

482 of the Cr. PC for quashing complaints and criminal proceedings have

been formulated by this Court in a plethora of decisions. We see no

reason to burden this judgment of ours by referring to the same.

However, we are fully convinced that allowing the criminal proceedings

19

to proceed against the appellants would amount to an abuse of the legal

process and result in a travesty of justice.

43. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are also of the view that the

arguments advanced by Mr. Luthra on the permissibility of the police to

register the FIR on 23

rd

December, 2013 need not be examined in this

appeal.

CONCLUSION

44. We, therefore, answer point (i), referred to in paragraph 12 (supra) in

the negative while point (ii) of the same paragraph is answered in the

affirmative.

45. Thus, the impugned order passed by the High Court, dated 31.07.2019,

cannot be sustained and, consequently, stands set aside. The

chargesheet and the entire proceedings in Case Crime No. 53073 of

2014, on the file of the ACCM, Bangalore, against the appellants also

stand quashed.

46. The appeals are, accordingly, allowed.

47. We, however, make it clear that the findings/observations

recorded/made herein shall have no bearing on the pending reference

between the parties before the Labour Court.

……………… ……….…………….J.

[DIPANKAR DATTA ]

…………..………………………....J.

[PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA ]

NEW DELHI;

JANUARY 24, 2025.