W.P.(C) 1630/2006 Page 1 of 18

$~

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Reserved on: 23rd January, 2026

Date of Decision: 25

th

February, 2026

Uploaded on: 25

th

February, 2026

+ W.P.(C) 1630/2006 & CM APPL. 1417/2006

MAHANAGAR TELEPHONE NIGAM LTD. .....Petitioner

Through: Mr. Chandan Sharma and Mr.

Vikram Sharma, Advs.

versus

SHRI RAM RATAN .....Respondent

Through: Mr. Chirayu Jain, Mr. Raksha

Awasya and Ms. Tanishqua Dhar,

Advs.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE SHAIL JAIN

JUDGMENT

SHAIL JAIN, J.

1. The present writ petition has been filed by the

Petitioner/Management, Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Limited (MTNL),

under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, assailing the Award dated

26.09.2005 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Central Government

Industrial Tribunal-cum- Labour Court–II, Rajendra Place, New Delhi,

in I.D. No. 56/1995, whereby the termination of the

Respondent/workman was held to be illegal and unjustified, and the

Petitioner was directed to reinstate the Respondent without back wages

but with continuity of service.

W.P.(C) 1630/2006 Page 2 of 18

Facts of the case:

2. Brief facts emerging from the records, which are necessary for the

adjudication of the writ, are that the Respondent was engaged with the

Petitioner/management as a driver (DRM) with effect from 28.09.1982

and was treated as a daily-rated/casual worker, being paid wages as fixed

and revised from time to time under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948.

3. On 09.01.1988, the Respondent was assigned a Standard–20

vehicle bearing No. DEP-5070, which, according to the Management,

was taken out of the premises of Kidwai Bhawan at about 15:30 hours

and was not parked back on the same day. It was alleged that on

10.01.1988 at about 20:30 hours, the said vehicle was noticed by the Sh.

A.K Trikha, DDG, Vigilance Department at Kosikalan on Delhi-Mathura

Road. Consequently, a show cause notice dated 14.01.1988 was issued to

the Respondent calling upon him to explain why the said lapse should

not be treated as a serious misconduct warranting termination of service.

4. The Respondent/workmen submitted his written explanation dated

28.01.1988, stating that the vehicle was taken out under the oral

directions of Sh. Hari Singh, Junior Telecom Officer for repairs, that the

repairs were carried out, and that the vehicle was duly parked back at

Kidwai Bhawan on the same day at about 18:30 hours. It was further

stated that 10.01.1988 was his weekly off and he had no knowledge of

the subsequent movement of the vehicle.

5. A domestic inquiry was initiated against the Respondent. An

Inquiry Officer was appointed, and after completion of the inquiry

proceedings, the Inquiry Officer submitted a report dated 30.06.1988

holding the charges against the Respondent to be proved. Based on the

W.P.(C) 1630/2006 Page 3 of 18

inquiry report, the services of the Respondent were terminated vide order

dated 01.08.1988. The departmental appeal preferred by the Respondent

was also dismissed.

6. Aggrieved by the termination, the Respondent raised an industrial

dispute. The appropriate Government, by reference dated 05.05.1995,

referred the following question for adjudication to the Central

Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court–II:

“Whether the action of the Management of MTNL,

New Delhi, in terminating the services of Shri Ram

Rattan is legal and justified? If not, to what relief is the

workman entitled?”

7. Before the Labour Court, the Respondent/workman filed a

statement of claim challenging the legality of the domestic inquiry and

the order of termination. The Respondent alleged, inter alia, that the

inquiry was vitiated on account of violation of principles of natural

justice, that the findings of the Inquiry Officer were based on conjectures

and surmises, and that the punishment imposed was disproportionate.

8.The Management filed a written statement opposing the claim,

contending that a fair and proper inquiry had been conducted, that the

Respondent was afforded adequate opportunity to defend himself, and

that the misconduct stood duly proved on the basis of evidence led in the

inquiry.

9.Upon appreciation of the pleadings and evidence, the learned

Labour Court returned a finding that the domestic inquiry conducted by

the Management was fair and in accordance with the principles of

natural justice. The Labour Court, in clear terms, recorded that the

W.P.(C) 1630/2006 Page 4 of 18

Respondent had been given sufficient opportunity to participate in the

inquiry proceedings and to cross-examine the witnesses of the

Management. The relevant para is reproduced as under:

“It also transpires from perusal of the inquiry

proceedings that principles of natural justice have been

followed. The workman applicant has been given ample

opportunity to cross examine the witnesses of the

management. The workman has examined the witnesses

in his defence as such principles of natural justice have

been followed in conduct of the inquiry proceedings.”

10.However, while accepting the fairness of the inquiry, the Labour

Court proceeded to examine the findings returned by the Inquiry Officer

and held that the conclusion regarding misconduct was not sustainable.

The Labour Court observed that the evidence on record did not

conclusively establish that the Respondent had unauthorisedly misused

the vehicle.

11.On the aspect of relief, the Labour Court recorded a finding that

the Respondent was gainfully employed during the intervening period.

Nevertheless, the Labour Court directed reinstatement of the Respondent

with continuity of service, while denying back wages. The operative

portion of the Award reads as under:

“The action of the management of MTNL, New Delhi,

in terminating the services of Shri Ram Rattan is held

to be illegal and unjustified. The workman is entitled to

reinstatement in service with continuity of service.

However, no back wages are awarded.”

12. Aggrieved by the said Award, the Petitioner/Management has

approached this Court by way of the present writ petition.

W.P.(C) 1630/2006 Page 5 of 18

Submissions of the Parties:

13. The learned counsel for the Petitioner/Management argued that the

Tribunal while exercising jurisdiction under Section 11A of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred as ‘The Act’) had

exceeded its jurisdiction and acted as a Court of Appeal. It is contented

that, though, the Labour Court vide order dated 26.09.2005 had held that

the Disciplinary Enquiry against the Respondent was fair and proper, had

re-appreciated the evidence and had interfered with the punishment order

illegally.

14. Learned counsel for the Petitioner submitted that the sole issue in

the present writ petition is whether, after upholding the fairness of the

inquiry, the Labour Court could have interfered with the findings of

misconduct on the ground that the evidence was “not reliable”. It was

contended that such an exercise amounts to examining the adequacy and

sufficiency of evidence, which is impermissible in law once procedural

fairness is established. Reliance in this regard was placed on the

judgment of the Supreme Court in General Manager (P) Canara Bank

v. Ganganarasimhaiah [2025 SCC OnLine SC 1939].

15. Learned counsel further contended that the impugned Award

suffers from an inherent contradiction, inasmuch as the Labour Court has

itself held that the principles of natural justice were followed during the

inquiry proceedings, yet proceeded to discard the findings of the Inquiry

Officer by reassessing the evidentiary material. It was urged that the

Labour Court could have interfered only if the findings were perverse or

based on no evidence, which is not the case here.

W.P.(C) 1630/2006 Page 6 of 18

16. Learned counsel also drew the attention of this Court to the

interim order dated 11.07.2012 passed in the present writ petition,

whereby the Petitioner was directed to pay wages to the Respondent

under Section 17B of the Act, subject to an undertaking by the

Respondent to refund the amount in the event the Petitioner succeeds. It

was submitted that the Respondent has admittedly received payments

under Section 17B up to 16.12.2016, being the date of his

superannuation.

17. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

Respondent/workman sought to sustain the impugned Award by

contending that the present case is one of absence of evidence and

perversity in the findings of the domestic inquiry. It was submitted that

the Respondent had been permitted on 09.01.1988 to take the vehicle out

for repairs, which fact stands noticed even in the inquiry report, and that

after repairs the vehicle was parked back at Kidwai Bhawan on the same

day.

18. Learned counsel for the Respondent submitted that 10.01.1988

was a Sunday and the Respondent was on his weekly off. It was

contended that the allegation of the vehicle being seen at Kosikalan on

that date was based solely on the statement of Shri A.K. Trikha, who did

not appear as a witness in the inquiry proceedings. According to learned

counsel, the Respondent was thus deprived of an opportunity to cross-

examine the sole complainant, rendering the inquiry violative of the

principles of natural justice.

19. Learned counsel for the Petitioner, opposed the aforesaid

submissions and contended that the Respondent ought to have sought his

W.P.(C) 1630/2006 Page 7 of 18

examination as a defence witness during the inquiry proceedings. It was

submitted that it was never the Petitioner’s case that Shri A.K. Trikha

was required to be examined by the Management, and that the

Respondent, despite being afforded full opportunity, failed to summon

him.

20. Learned counsel for the Respondent further submitted that none of

the documentary material relied upon by the Management established

that the vehicle was missing or unauthorisedly used. It was argued that

the log book was not produced, the relevant registers did not reflect any

missing entry, and the registers themselves were not properly

maintained. On this basis, it was contended that the Labour Court rightly

exercised its powers under Section 11A of the Act.

Issues for consideration:

21. In light of the pleadings, the impugned Award and the

submissions advanced on behalf of the parties, the following issues arise

for consideration before this Court:

21.1 Whether the learned Labour Court, after holding that the

domestic inquiry was fair and conducted in accordance with the

principles of natural justice, was justified in interfering with the

findings of the Inquiry Officer and setting aside the order of

termination?

21.2 Whether the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer could

be said to be perverse or based on no evidence so as to warrant

interference by the Labour Court in exercise of its powers under

Section 11A of the Act?

W.P.(C) 1630/2006 Page 8 of 18

21.3 Whether the impugned Award suffers from any perversity,

patent illegality or jurisdictional error warranting interference by

this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India?

Analysis and Reasoning

22. This Court has heard the rival contentions of both the parties and

perused the documents placed on record and judgments relied upon by

the parties.

23. Issue Nos. 1 and 2, which concern the scope of interference by the

learned Labour Court with the findings recorded in the domestic inquiry

after holding the inquiry to be fair and proper, are closely interlinked and

are therefore taken up together for consideration.

24. A perusal of the impugned Award shows that the Labour Court

has returned a categorical finding that the domestic inquiry conducted by

the Petitioner/Management was fair, proper and that the principles of

natural justice were duly complied with. The said finding was returned

after noticing that the Respondent had participated in the inquiry

proceedings, that several management witnesses were examined, that the

Respondent was afforded opportunity to cross-examine them, and that he

was also permitted to lead defence evidence. The said finding has

attained finality.

25. Having so held, the Labour Court nevertheless proceeded to

examine the evidence led before the Inquiry Officer and concluded that

the findings of misconduct were “not based on reliable evidence” and

were therefore liable to be set aside. The relevant portion of the final

award is reproduced hereunder:

W.P.(C) 1630/2006 Page 9 of 18

“The Inquiry Officer has proceeded on assumptions

inasmuch as the fault, if any, lay with the gateman who

was responsible for making entries regarding the

movement of vehicles. Merely because the entry was not

found in the register, the workman cannot be held guilty

of misconduct.

…..

Strict Rules of Evidence Act is not applicable in domestic

inquiries but the evidence that has come during the

inquiry should be considered and the Inquiry Officer

should not hold the charge sheeted employee guilty on the

basis of assumption and preponderance of probability.

He should also consider the other aspect of the evidence

and after consideration of totality of evidence he should

reach the conclusion regarding the guilt or otherwise of

the charge sheeted employee. In the instant case the

Inquiry Officer has not taken into account the statement

of the Gateman, Shri Trilok Singh, Security man, Ram

Milan and the Driver Shri Amar Singh and the Junior

Engineer who permitted the workman to take the vehicle

out. The evidence of these four witnesses is material for

the correct conclusion of the inquiry. No attempt has been

made by the Inquiry Officer to consider the substantial

evidence of the witnesses referred to above. Hence the

findings of the Inquiry Officer are based on assumption,

conjecture and surmises in utter disregard of the evidence

of the material witnesses. If there are several witnesses

and there is material contradiction in their evidence then

the entire evidence is to be analyzed and then conclusion

should follow. There is no consideration of the material

evidence referred to above by the Inquiry Officer. This is

not the case of a sole testimony. It can be gathered that

according to the reliable witness the vehicle might be

inside the parking place as the incoming entry was not

made by the Gateman in the relevant register. The

findings of the Inquiry Officer is not based on reliable

evidence so it is liable to be set aside and is set aside.”

[Emphasis Supplied]

W.P.(C) 1630/2006 Page 10 of 18

26. A careful reading of the above reasoning shows that the Labour

Court interfered with the findings on the following premises:

(i) that the gate register was not properly maintained;

(ii) that the negligence, if any, was attributable to the Gateman;

(iii) that certain witnesses were not properly considered; and

(iv) that the Inquiry Officer allegedly proceeded on “assumption

and preponderance of probability”.

27. Learned counsel for the Petitioner has assailed this approach by

contending that the Labour Court has exceeded its jurisdiction by re-

appreciating the evidence and substituting its own conclusions for those

of the Inquiry Officer, despite having upheld the fairness of the inquiry.

It was urged that the Labour Court has ventured into the realm of

adequacy and reliability of evidence, which is impermissible in law.

28. On the other hand, learned counsel for the Respondent sought to

justify the interference by submitting that the present case is one of

perversity and absence of evidence, and that the Labour Court was

therefore justified in exercising its powers under Section 11A of the Act.

29. The legal position governing the scope of interference by a Labour

Court with the findings of a domestic inquiry is well settled. Once a

domestic inquiry is held to be fair and in compliance with the principles

of natural justice, the Labour Court does not sit as an appellate authority

over the findings of the Inquiry Officer. Interference is permissible only

where the findings are perverse, based on no evidence, or are such that

no reasonable person could have arrived at. The Hon’ble Supreme Court

in B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749, has held as

under:-

W.P.(C) 1630/2006 Page 11 of 18

“12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but

a review of the manner in which the decision is made.

Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the

individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that

the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily

correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is

conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant,

the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the

inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules

of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings

or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority

entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction,

power and authority to reach a finding of fact or

conclusion. But that finding must be based on some

evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor

of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to

disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that

evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the

disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the

delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The

Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not

act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence

and to arrive at its own independent findings on the

evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the

authority held the proceedings against the delinquent

officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural

justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the

mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding

reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no

evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no

reasonable person would have ever reached, the

Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the

finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate

to the facts of each case.”

[Emphasis supplied]

30. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Standard Chartered

Bank v. R.C. Srivastava, (2021) 19 SCC 281 has held that in the

W.P.(C) 1630/2006 Page 12 of 18

disciplinary proceedings, the tribunal cannot convert itself into court of

appeal and also cannot revisit the evidence and in excess of its

jurisdiction conferred by Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act,

1947. Relevant Paragraphs of the Judgment are reproduced hereunder:

“19. In the instant case, after we have gone through the

record, we find that the Tribunal has converted itself into

a court of appeal as an appellate authority and has

exceeded its jurisdiction while appreciating the finding

recorded in the course of domestic enquiry and tested on

the broad principles of charge to be proved beyond

reasonable doubt which is a test in the criminal justice

system and has completely forgotten the fact that the

domestic enquiry is to be tested on the principles of

preponderance of probabilities and if a piece of evidence

is on record which could support the charge which has

been levelled against the delinquent unless it is per se

unsustainable or perverse, ordinarily is not to be

interfered by the Tribunal, more so when the domestic

enquiry has been held to be fair and proper and, in our

view, the Tribunal has completely overlooked and

exceeded its jurisdiction while interfering with the finding

recorded during the course of enquiry in furtherance of

which, the Respondent was dismissed from service and

the High Court has also committed a manifest error while

passing the judgment impugned.

20. The decision of the Labour Court should not be based

on mere hypothesis. It cannot overturn the decision of the

management on ipse dixit. Its jurisdiction under Section

11-A of the 1947 Act although is a wide one but it must be

judiciously exercised. Judicial discretion, it is trite,

cannot be exercised either whimsically or capriciously. It

may scrutinise or analyse the evidence but what is

important is how it does so.”

31. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in General Manager (P), Canara

Bank v. Ganganarasimhaiah [2025 SCC OnLine SC 1939], while

W.P.(C) 1630/2006 Page 13 of 18

dealing with a similar situation where the Tribunal had re-appreciated

the evidence after holding the inquiry to be fair, observed that courts and

tribunals are required to examine and determine only the following

aspects:

“(i) Whether the enquiry was held by the competent

authority?

(ii) Whether the rules of natural justice have been complied

with?

(iii) Whether the conclusions arrived at by the Disciplinary

Authority are based on no evidence or the findings are

perverse?”

The Court further reiterated that strict rules of evidence are not

applicable to departmental proceedings and that charges can be proved

on the principle of preponderance of probabilities.

32. Applying the parameters laid down in General Manager (P),

Canara Bank v. Ganganarasimhaiah (supra) to the facts of the present

case, this Court finds that none of the conditions warranting interference

are attracted.

32.1 As regards the first criterion, there is no dispute that the

domestic enquiry was conducted by a competent authority in

accordance with the applicable rules.

32.2 With respect to the second criterion, the enquiry proceedings

were held in compliance with the principles of natural justice; the

Respondent/workman participated in the enquiry, several

management witnesses were examined, opportunity of cross-

examination was granted, defence evidence was permitted, and the

learned Labour Court itself returned a categorical finding at the

W.P.(C) 1630/2006 Page 14 of 18

preliminary stage that the enquiry was fair and proper, which

finding has attained finality.

32.3 Turning to the third criterion, namely whether the

conclusions of the Disciplinary Authority were based on no

evidence or were perverse, this Court finds no such infirmity. The

expression “perversity” has a well-understood connotation in

service jurisprudence. A finding can be termed perverse only

when it is based on no evidence, or when relevant material has

been completely ignored, or where the conclusion is such that no

reasonable person acting judicially could have arrived at on the

material available on record. In the present case, The Inquiry

Officer relied upon the material on record, including the gate

register entries, the movement of the vehicle, and the explanation

furnished by the Respondent. Importantly, the case of the

Management that the vehicle was seen at Kosi Kalan by Shri A.K.

Trikha on 10.01.1988 was not specifically denied or controverted

by the Respondent during the enquiry; rather, the Respondent’s

defence was confined to asserting that the said date was his

weekly off. In the presence of such material, it cannot be said that

the findings of the Inquiry Officer were based on no evidence or

were so unreasonable that no prudent person could have arrived at

them. At best, the reasoning adopted by the learned Labour Court

reflects a different appreciation of the same evidence, which does

not meet the threshold of perversity as laid down by the Supreme

Court. Consequently, the interference by the learned Labour Court

W.P.(C) 1630/2006 Page 15 of 18

cannot be sustained within the limited parameters governing

judicial review in disciplinary matters.

33. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court holds that the

learned Labour Court, despite having upheld the fairness of the domestic

inquiry, exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 11A of the Act by re-

appreciating the evidence and substituting its own conclusions for those

of the Inquiry Officer. The findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer were

based on material forming part of the inquiry record and cannot be

characterised as perverse or based on no evidence. The principal ground

urged by the Respondent to assail the inquiry findings is the non-

examination of Shri A.K. Trikha. This Court is unable to accept the said

contention. The non-examination of Shri A.K. Trikha, by itself, does not

vitiate the inquiry, particularly when the Respondent did not dispute the

management’s assertion regarding the sighting of the vehicle and failed

to summon the said witness as a defence witness despite opportunity.

34. Accordingly, Issue Nos. 1 and 2 are answered in favour of the

Petitioner/Management and against the Respondent/Workman.

35. Issue No. 3 concerns the scope of interference by this Court under

Article 226 of the Constitution of India with an Award passed by the

Labour Court. It is well settled that the jurisdiction of this Court in such

matters is supervisory and not appellate. Interference under Article 226

is warranted only where the Award suffers from patent illegality,

perversity, jurisdictional error or where the Labour Court has acted in

excess of its jurisdiction.

36. In Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610, the

Hon’ble Supreme Court authoritatively delineated the parameters

W.P.(C) 1630/2006 Page 16 of 18

governing judicial review in disciplinary matters and simultaneously

identified the acts which are impermissible for High Courts while

exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of

India. The relevant observations are reproduced hereunder:

“12. [...] The High Court, in exercise of its powers

under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall

not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High

Court can only see whether:

(a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority;

(b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure

prescribed in that behalf;

(c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in

conducting the proceedings;

(d) the authorities have disabled themselves from

reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations

extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case;

(e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be

influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations;

(f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly

arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could

ever have arrived at such conclusion;

(g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to

admit the admissible and material evidence;

(h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted

inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding:

(i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence.

13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India,

the High Court shall not:

(i) reappreciate the evidence;

(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case

the same has been conducted in accordance with law;

(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;

(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;

(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which

findings can be based.

W.P.(C) 1630/2006 Page 17 of 18

(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear

to be;

(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it

shocks its conscience.”

37. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, it

becomes evident that the impugned Award does not withstand scrutiny

under Article 226 of the Constitution. As already held while deciding

Issue Nos. 1 and 2, the learned Labour Court, despite having upheld the

fairness of the domestic inquiry and compliance with the principles of

natural justice, proceeded to reappreciate the evidentiary material and to

substitute its own conclusions for those of the Inquiry Officer. The

Labour Court did not record any finding of perversity, absence of

evidence, or consideration of extraneous material, yet interfered on the

basis of its own assessment of reliability and sufficiency of evidence.

This clearly amounts to an excess of jurisdiction and a failure to adhere

to the settled limits of judicial review.

38. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered view that the

impugned Award suffers from a jurisdictional error and patent illegality

warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Issue No. 3 is answered in favour of the Petitioner/management and

against the Respondent/workman.

Conclusion

39. In view of the findings returned on Issue Nos. 1, 2 and 3, this

Court is of the considered opinion that the impugned Award cannot be

sustained. The learned Labour Court, despite having held the domestic

inquiry to be fair and in accordance with the principles of natural justice,

W.P.(C) 1630/2006 Page 18 of 18

exceeded the limits of its jurisdiction under Section 11A of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947 by re-appreciating the evidence and substituting its

own conclusions for those of the Inquiry Officer, without recording any

finding that the disciplinary conclusions were perverse or based on no

evidence.

40. Consequently, the Award dated 26.09.2005 passed by the learned

Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour

Court–II, in I.D. No. 56/1995, is hereby set aside.

41. As a result, thereof, the order of termination dated 01.08.1988

passed against the Respondent/workman stands restored.

42. It is clarified that the amounts paid to the Respondent under

Section 17B of the Act during the pendency of the present writ petition

were paid pursuant to interim orders of this Court and shall not be

recoverable from the Respondent.

43. The writ petition is accordingly allowed in the above terms.

Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of. There shall be no order

as to costs.

SHAIL JAIN

JUDGE

FEBRUARY 25, 2026/dg