2026 INSC 942 Page 1 of 41

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2026

(ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 5654 OF 2026)

MAHAVIR @ AVNISH …Appellant(s)

VERSUS

THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH …Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR, J.

Leave granted.

2. The convict, who was found a juvenile on the date of commission

of the crime, is aggrieved by the decision in Miscellaneous Criminal

Case No. 24675 of 2018 rendered by a learned Single Judge of the High

Court of Madhya Pradesh at Gwalior; that the High Court in exercise of

its jurisdiction under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,

1973 cannot interfere with or reopen the judgment of conviction

passed against him under section 201 Part II of the Indian Penal Code,

1860 which attained finality up to the Supreme Court.

Page 2 of 41

3. A crime under sections 302, 304B and 201 read with section 34

of the Indian Penal Code was registered on 17

th September 2004 vide

FIR No. 489 of 2004 against Ramji Lal who is the father-in-law, Munni

Devi who is the mother-in-law, Pramod who is the husband and

Mukesh and Mahavir alias Avnish, who are the brothers-in-law of the

victim Bhuri. The allegations against them are that they tortured Bhuri

in connection to demand of dowry, committed her murder within

7 years of marriage and caused disappearance of evidence. The

incident took place on 13

th

September 2004, but a First Information

Report was lodged on 17

th September 2004. The dead bodies of Bhuri

and her infant daughter Guddi were found on the railway track near

village Sikrauda in the district of Morena (M.P.). It is the case of

prosecution that Badri Baghel, who was a Gangman with the Railways,

first saw the dead bodies on the railway track. Though a large crowd

had gathered there, the accused persons forcibly lifted the dead bodies

and performed the cremation rituals. It is alleged that the accused

persons did not inform the police or the relatives of Bhuri and caused

disappearance of evidence by cremating the dead bodies. After the

investigation, a chargesheet was filed in the Court and the accused

persons were sent up for trial to face the charge under

sections 302, 304B and 201 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal

Code. During the trial, the prosecution produced 13 witnesses to prove

the charge against the accused persons of committing murder, dowry

death and causing disappearance of evidence. PW2 Ram Lakhan,

PW4 Ram Naresh and PW5 Ram Veer, who are the brothers of Bhuri,

did not support the prosecution case and stated in the Court that the

accused persons never demanded any dowry nor did Bhuri ever

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complain about demand of dowry or her harassment at the hands of

the accused persons. Even PW3 Mahadevi, who is the mother of Bhuri,

did not make any allegation against the accused persons. PW6 Santosh,

PW7 Ram Ikhtiyar, PW10 Shiv Dayal and PW11 Ram Het also did not

support the prosecution and were declared hostile. PW9 Mahesh and

PW10 Shiv Dayal, who are the independent witnesses, deposed from

the dock that they had no knowledge about any demand of dowry by

the accused persons. These witnesses were cross-examined by the

prosecution with permission of the Court but nothing material could

be elicited from them to establish complicity of the accused persons in

the crime. The charge of murder and dowry death was not proved and

the accused persons were convicted under section 201 Part II of the

Indian Penal Code. The trial Judge extensively referred to and believed

the testimony of PW1 Badri Baghel, who had first seen the dead bodies,

and held that it was proved beyond reasonable doubt that the dead

bodies of Bhuri and Guddi were lying on the railway track and the

accused persons lifted the dead bodies from the railway track. The trial

Judge further held that the accused persons cremated Bhuri and Guddi

and, therefore, caused disappearance of the dead bodies.

4. By the judgment dated 21

st December 2005 passed in Sessions

Case No. 129 of 2005, the accused persons were sentenced to rigorous

imprisonment for 3 years and a fine of Rs.1000 each under

section 201 Part II of the Indian Penal Code, with a default stipulation

to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 6 months. Ramji Lal, Pramod,

Mukesh, Munni Devi and Mahavir alias Avnish challenged the said

judgment in Criminal Appeal No. 5 of 2006 which came to be dismissed

by the High Court by the judgment dated 17

th March 2017. Mahavir

Page 4 of 41

alias Avnish, the appellant, challenged the judgment passed in Criminal

Appeal No. 5 of 2006 before this Court. The said petition was registered

as Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 4286 of 2018 and it was dismissed

as withdrawn on 11

th May 2018. Thereafter, the appellant approached

the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Gwalior in Miscellaneous Criminal

Case No. 24675 of 2018 which was filed under section 482 read

with section 362 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 seeking

recall of the judgment dated 17

th March 2017 passed in Criminal

Appeal No. 5 of 2006.

5. Before the High Court, the appellant raised the plea of juvenility

and specifically pleaded that he was unaware of the laws relating to a

juvenile or that a juvenile has special rights. He further pleaded that the

juvenility of a child accused of committing a crime goes to root of the

matter, but the trial Court did not reflect on this aspect of the matter.

He contended that the High Court when seized with Criminal

Appeal No. 5 of 2006 overlooked a fundamental fact that he was a

juvenile aged about seventeen years when the alleged crime was

committed. The decision in “Abdul Razzaq v. State of U.P.”

1 was pressed

into service on behalf of the appellant to persuade the High Court to

recall the judgment of conviction passed against him on the ground that

the claim of juvenility can be raised even after final disposal of the case

and the delay in raising such a claim cannot be a ground to deny the

statutory benefit accruing to a juvenile. It was further contended on his

behalf with reference to “Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand & Anr.”

2 that

the claim of juvenility must be decided with reference to the date of

1

(2015) 15 SCC 637

2

(2005) 3 SCC 551

Page 5 of 41

commission of the offence. He relied on the marksheets of primary

school and middle school whereunder his date of birth was recorded

as 1

st

July 1987. The judgments rendered in “Dharambir v. State (NCT

of Delhi) & Anr.”

3, “Satish @ Dhanna v. State of M.P. & Ors.”

4 and “Vinod

Katara v. State of U.P.”

5 were also cited on behalf of the appellant to

impress upon the High Court to recall its earlier judgment and grant

him the benefit of juvenility without remitting the matter to the

Juvenile Justice Board (in short, JJ Board). On merits, it was contended

on behalf of the appellant that he could not have been convicted under

section 201 Part II of the Indian Penal Code because he was acquitted

of the charge under sections 302 and 304B of the Indian Penal Code.

As regards the testimony of PW1 Badri Baghel, who allegedly had first

seen the dead bodies on the railway track, it was contended that his

evidence could not be the foundation for recording his conviction as

this witness in the cross-examination stated that he had never seen the

accused persons.

6. The High Court referred to the laws on juveniles that the regular

criminal Courts are divested of their jurisdiction to try an accused who

was a juvenile on the date of offence and to sentence him in the manner

applicable to adults. The High Court also took note of the relevant

statutory provisions including section 7A of the Juvenile Justice

Act, 2000 (in short, JJA 2000) which casts a mandatory obligation on

the Courts to conduct an inquiry whenever a claim of juvenility is raised

or appears from the materials on record. But then, the High Court

3

(2010) 5 SCC 344

4

(2009) 14 SCC 187

5

(2023) 15 SCC 210

Page 6 of 41

proceeded to draw a distinction between inherent jurisdiction of the

High Court under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and

plenary powers of the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the

Constitution of India and dismissed the petition on the ground that the

judgment of conviction of the appellant has become final and cannot be

revisited by the High Court under section 482 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure.

7. In the present proceeding, it was pointed out on behalf of the

appellant that an inquiry was caused by the JJ Board, Morena pursuant

to an order passed by the High Court and it was found that the appellant

was below the age of eighteen years on the date of occurrence.

On 7

th April 2026, while issuing notice on the Special Leave Petition, the

following order was passed by this Court:

“1. Vide judgment dated 21.12.2005 passed by the Second Additional

Sessions Judge, Morena in 1 Sessions Case No.129/2005, the petitioner was

convicted for committing offence under section 201 of the Indian Penal Code,

1860 (“IPC”) while acquitting him of the charges under section 302/34 of the

IPC with regard to murder of Bhuri and Guddi as also for the charges under

section 304B of the IPC. The said judgment was affirmed by the High Court

and, thereafter, the Special Leave Petition preferred by the petitioner bearing

SLP (Crl) No.4286/2018 was dismissed as withdrawn.

2. After the dismissal of the SLP, petitioner moved the High Court under

section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 seeking recall of the

judgment dated 17.03.2017, in which his appeal was dismissed by the High

Court, on the ground that on the date of offence, petitioner was a juvenile.

The High Court directed an inquiry by the Juvenile Justice Board to ascertain

the petitioner’s claim about his juvenility. The Juvenile Justice Board, in its

report dated 11.05.2019 recorded a finding after inquiry that petitioner’s

date of birth is 01.07.1987. Therefore, as on the date of occurrence,

i.e., 13.09.2004, he was aged about 17 years 2 months and 12 days and thus,

he was a juvenile on the date of offence. Despite this report, the High Court

has rejected petitioner’s prayer on the ground that the Special Leave Petition

having already been dismissed, the High Court has no jurisdiction to reopen

the matter.

Page 7 of 41

3. Having considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the

petitioner and on perusal of records as also on the basis of judgments

rendered by this Court in the cases of Abuzar Hossain Alias Gulam Hossain

Vs. State of West Bengal, reported in (2012) 10 SCC 489 and State of Madhya

Pradesh Vs. Ramji Lal and Anr., reported in (2025) 5 SCC 697, we are inclined

to entertain this petition.

4. Issue notice to the respondent, returnable within six weeks.”

5. Mr. Surjeet Singh, learned counsel appears for the respondent – State of

Madhya Pradesh and accepts notice. Let counter-affidavit be filed within four

weeks from today.

6. In the meanwhile, petitioner shall be released on bail on such terms and

conditions as may be imposed by the trial court.”

8. Mr. Prashant Shukla, the learned counsel for the appellant

contended that the scope of interference by the High Court and this

Court in the matters concerning fundamental rights and socially

oriented beneficial legislations is vast and cannot be confined to a

straitjacket with a fixed formula. On the other hand, Mr. Aditya Vaibhav

Singh, the learned State counsel contended that the procedural

safeguards to weed out fake claims must be given due consideration

and the jurisdictional corrections can be done only in accordance with

law. The decisions in “Jitendra Singh alias Babboo Singh & Anr. v. State

of Uttar Pradesh”

6 and “Parag Bhati v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.”

7

were referred to on behalf of the State to contend that the claim on

juvenility if raised belatedly must be scrutinised carefully and the

accused person cannot be declared a juvenile on a mere asking, and

only if he produces reliable evidence.

9. The Preamble to the Declaration of the Rights of the Child, 1959

states that mankind owes to the child the best it has to give. It

6

(2013) 11 SCC 193

7

(2016) 12 SCC 744

Page 8 of 41

proclaimed that the child shall enjoy special protection and shall be

given opportunities and facilities, by law and by other means, to enable

him to develop physically, mentally, morally, spiritually and socially in

a healthy and normal manner and in the conditions of freedom and

dignity. About half a century before that, the League of Nations adopted

the Geneva Declaration on the Rights of the Child, 1924 which

articulated that all people owe the children a right to special help in

times of need, economic freedom and protection from exploitation. In

1946, the United Nations General Assembly established the

International Children’s Emergency Fund, commonly known as

UNICEF, with an emphasis on children throughout the world. The

United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of

Juvenile Justice, 1985 commonly referred to as the Beijing Rules laid

down the principles of Justice System that promise to protect the best

interests of children. The Beijing Rules stressed on the well-being of the

juvenile and proclaimed that it is the responsibility of the Government

to develop conditions for meaningful life of a juvenile. It suggested that

the Juvenile Justice should be an integral part of the national

development program and social justice. Not to forget, the widely

acclaimed Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989 (in short,

UNCRC) recognizes the role of children as social, economic, political,

civil and cultural actors. It speaks of a children’s right to survival, right

to protection, right to development and right to participation.

10. All these international covenants emerged from the social

doctrine that the State has a parens patriae interest in preserving and

promoting the welfare of children. The parens patriae jurisdiction is an

Page 9 of 41

ancient prerogative jurisdiction of the Crown going back to 13

th century

under which the Crown had both the power and duty to protect the

person and property of those who were unable to protect themselves.

This right and duty, as Lord Eldon noted in “Wellesley v. Duke of

Beaufort”

8 were founded on the obvious necessity that the law should

place somewhere the care of persons who are not able to take care of

themselves. The King was considered responsible for and in charge of

everything involving the children. They had no legal rights and were

considered as wards of the Court, which was to look after their welfare.

Lord Redesdale in “Wellesley v. Wellesley”

9 observed that parens patriae

jurisdiction was exercised by the Court of Chancery since the time of

Lord Somers. He further observed that: “they all say, that it is a right

which devolves to the Crown, as parens patriae, and that it is the duty

of the Crown to see that the child is properly taken care of”. Lord

Denning M.R.

10 held that the parens patriae jurisdiction which is now

vested in the High Court of Justice can be exercised by any Judge of the

High Court. In the United States, the majority view in “Schall v. Martin”

11

authored by Justice Rehnquist held that due process clause is

applicable in juvenile proceedings while recognizing that State has a

parens patriae interest in the welfare of child. Justice La Forest of the

Supreme Court of Canada

12 made a pertinent observation that from the

earliest time, the sovereign as parens patriae was vested with the care

of the mentally incompetent.

8

(1827) 2 Russ. 1, 38 E.R. 236

9

(1828) 2 Bli. N.S. 124, 130

10

In re L (An Infant) : (1968) P. 119, 156

11

(1984) SCC OnLine US SC 126

12

Eve v. Mrs. E: (1986) SCC OnLine Can SC 58

Page 10 of 41

11. The State, through the Courts, acts in the best interests of the

children and protects them from growing up as ill-prepared members

of the society. In “Commonwealth v. Fisher”

13

the Pennsylvania Supreme

Court conveyed the legal authority of the Juvenile Courts under parens

patriae as under:

“To save a child from becoming a criminal, or from continuing in a career of

crime,.. the legislatures surely may provide for the salvation of such a child,

if its parents or guardians be unable to unwilling to do so, by bringing it into

one of the Courts of the state without any process at all, to subject to the

state’s guardianship and protection.”

12. Our Constitution makes it imperative for the State to secure to all

its citizens the rights guaranteed to them. Article 15 of the Constitution

of India prohibits discrimination on the grounds of religion, race, caste,

sex or place of birth. This prohibition, however, does not prevent the

State from making any special provision for women and children.

Similarly, Article 39 directs the State to frame a policy to protect the

children of tender age. It further provides that the children should be

given opportunities and facilities to develop in a healthy manner and

under conditions of freedom and dignity. The mandate to protect

children goes further and provides under Article 45 that the State shall

endeavor to provide early childhood care and education for all children

until they attain the age of six years. The penal laws in India also

protect the child under twelve years of age of immature understanding.

Section 82 of the Indian Penal Code provides immunity from criminal

prosecution to a child under seven years of age. A child under twelve

years of age is also protected under General Exceptions under

section 83 which provides that a child above seven years of age

13

213 Pennsylvania 48 (1905)

Page 11 of 41

and under twelve, who has not attained sufficient maturity of

understanding to judge the nature and consequences of his act on that

occasion, shall not be liable for committing any crime. The Supreme

Court recognized the concept of parens patriae in “Mahant Ram Saroop

Dasji v. S.P. Sahi & Ors.”

14. The parens patriae jurisdiction recognizes the

need to act for the protection of those who cannot care for themselves.

As seen above, this jurisdiction is exercised in the best interest of the

person who cannot protect or defend himself. The State takes upon

itself a duty to save a child from becoming a criminal and to spend his

early years in jail with stigma and disgrace. The State takes the role of

parens patriae to shield a child from the consequences of a career of

waywardness. Wherever the children are not in a position to secure

their rights, the State must come into the picture and protect the rights

of the children. In “Sheela Barse (II) & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.”

15 this

Court held it as the duty of the State to look after the children and

ensure full development of their personality. The National Policy for the

Welfare of Children which was first adopted in 1974 declared that :

“The nation’s children are a supremely important asset. Their nurture

and solicitude are our responsibility. Children’s programmes should find a

prominent part in our national plans for the development of human

resources, so that our children grow up to become robust citizens, physically

fit, mentally alert and morally healthy, endowed with the skill and

motivations needed by society. Equal opportunities for development to all

children during the period of growth should be our aim, for this would serve

our large purpose of reducing inequality and ensuring social justice”.

13. The Juvenile Justice system in the country has evolved in

response to the domestic and international calls for a change in the

system. The expression Juvenile Justice was used for the first time in

14

AIR 1959 SC 951

15

(1986) 3 SCC 632

Page 12 of 41

State of Illinois in 1899 and the first Juvenile Court was created in Cook

County, Illinois in the same year. The Illinois Juvenile Court Act, 1899

provided an entirely separate system of Juvenile Justice. It was the first

statute in the United States that created Courts with jurisdiction over

all matters concerning neglected and delinquent children. The seeds of

Juvenile Justice System were sown in India through the Apprentices

Act, 1850. The concept gained momentum in the enactments of the

Indian Penal Code, 1860 and the Reformatory Schools Act, 1876. Then

came the recommendations by the Indian Jail Committee (1919-1920)

which suggested that (i) the juvenile offenders should be treated

differently from the adult offenders (ii) juvenile offenders should not

be detained and (iii) juvenile Courts should be constituted. Several

States responded swiftly and made laws for the care and protection of

children. The Tamil Nadu Children Act, 1920 made provisions for care,

protection, welfare, education and rehabilitation of neglected and

delinquent children. The detention of the children in jail was strictly

prohibited. It introduced the Juvenile Code Model for the first time in

India. It defined child and young person and provided the sentence that

cannot be inflicted on a child. Soon thereafter a legislation wave swept

the country and Bengal Children Act, 1922, Bombay Children Act, 1924,

Bombay Children Act, 1948, East Punjab Children Act, 1949, Hyderabad

Children Act, 1951, Saurashtra Children Act 1954, Mysore Children Act,

1964, Bihar Children Act, 1970, Rajasthan Children Act, 1970, and

Odisha Children Act, 1982 came to be enacted in the respective States.

The Children Act, 1960 which was made applicable to the Union

Territories addressed some of the issues, but several other States had

no law to deal with the children, young people and delinquent juvenile.

Page 13 of 41

“Sheela Barse II”

15 stressed on the desirability to have complete

uniformity in the Juvenile Justice System across the country. This Court

observed that the Central Government should initiate Parliamentary

Legislation on the subject instead of each State having its own

Children’s Act.

14. The Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 (in short, JJA 1986) provided a

uniform Juvenile Justice System across whole of India. It was modeled

on the pattern of the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of the

Child, 1959 which recognizes the children’s rights to education,

healthcare and a supportive environment among other rights. It

provided for the care, protection, treatment, development and

rehabilitation of neglected and delinquent juveniles. It also made

provisions for juvenile homes, observation homes, special homes, place

of safety, probation officer, etc. It incorporated a significant provision

in section 3 which contemplated the continuance of inquiry in respect

of a juvenile who had ceased to be a juvenile and provided that any

inquiry initiated against a juvenile may be continued and orders may

be made in respect of such person as if he had continued to be a

juvenile. Section 18 contained a non-obstante clause to the effect that

any person who appears to be a juvenile delinquent shall be released

on bail with or without surety notwithstanding any provision in the

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or in any other law for the time being

in force. An exception was also carved out that a juvenile delinquent

shall not be released on bail if there is reasonable ground for believing

that his release is likely to bring him into association with any known

criminal or expose him to moral danger or that his release would defeat

the ends of justice. Sub-section (2) of section 18 puts a bar on keeping

Page 14 of 41

in a police station or jail any person accused of committing a bailable

or non-bailable offence who apparently is a juvenile until he can be

brought before the Juvenile Court. Section 20 required a Juvenile Court

to hold an inquiry in accordance with the provisions of section 39 of

the Act and to make such order in relation to the juvenile as it deems

fit. Section 21 makes provision for release of delinquent juveniles

(i) after advice or admonition or, (ii) on probation of good conduct or,

(iii) by imposing fine. Section 22 which also starts with a non-obstante

clause provided that no delinquent juvenile shall be sentenced to death

or, imprisonment or, committed to prison in default of payment of fine

or in default of furnishing security. It made two categories of juveniles;

delinquent juvenile and neglected juvenile. A delinquent juvenile is

defined under section 2(e) to mean a juvenile who has been found to

have committed an offence. Section 2 (l) states that a neglected juvenile

means a juvenile who (i) is found begging; or (ii) is found without

having any home or settled place of abode and without any ostensible

means of subsistence and is destitute; or (iii) has a parent or guardian

who is unfit or incapacitated to exercise control over the juvenile; or

(iv) lives in a brothel or with a prostitute or frequently goes to any place

used for the purpose of prostitution, or is found to associate with any

prostitute or any other person who leads immoral, drunken or

depraved life; or (v) who is being or is likely to be abused or exploited

for immoral or illegal purposes or unconscionable gain. However, there

was no uniformity in the age of a boy and a girl who were to be declared

as delinquent juveniles. The threshold age for a boy to be considered as

a juvenile was sixteen years, whereas for a girl it was eighteen years.

Section 2(h) defined juvenile to mean a boy who was below the age of

Page 15 of 41

sixteen years or a girl who has not attained the age of eighteen years.

This led to ambiguity and confusion. The working of the JJA 1986 faced

several other practical difficulties and it was replaced by the JJA 2000.

It was in tune with the UNCRC which mandates under Article 2 that the

children be protected from all forms of discrimination irrespective of

their race, sex, color, religion, nationality or ethnic background.

15. The Preamble to the JJA 2000 states that it is an Act to provide for

proper care, protection and treatment of the juveniles in conflict with

law and children in need of care and protection by catering to their

development needs. It envisages a child-friendly approach in the

adjudication and disposition of matters keeping in mind the best

interest of children and ultimately leading to their rehabilitation. In the

Statement of Objects and Reasons, it states that much greater attention

is required to be given to children in conflict with law or those in need

of care and protection. It further states that there is also an urgent need

for creating adequate infrastructure and involvement of the family,

voluntary organizations and community to achieve the object behind

the JJA 2000. It refers to clause (3) of Article 15, clause(e) and (f) of

Article 39 and Articles 45 and 47 of the Constitution of India and states

that it is the primary duty of the State to ensure that all needs of the

children are fulfilled and that their basic human rights are fully

protected. The JJA 2000 brought all children below the age of eighteen

years within its fold and made two categories of children,

viz. (i) juvenile in conflict with law, and (ii) child in need of care and

protection. It brought uniformity in the age of the child under

section 2(k) and provided that a juvenile or child means a person who

has not attained eighteenth year of age. The JJA 2000 retained

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section 3 of the JJA 1986 in its original form and provides for

continuation of the inquiry in respect of juveniles who had ceased to be

juvenile. Section 7A (as introduced by the 2006 Amendment), which is

construed as a mandatory provision provides that the Courts shall

make an inquiry and take such evidence as may be necessary for

determining the age of an accused person who makes a claim of

juvenility. It further provides that the Court can start an inquiry

suo moto if it is of the opinion that the accused person was a juvenile

on the date of commission of the offence. After an inquiry is conducted,

the Court is required to record a finding whether the person is a

juvenile or not and state his age as nearly as possible. Section 14

contemplates an inquiry by the JJ Board within a period of 4 months

when the juvenile is produced before the Board. Section 15, which

retains most part of section 21 of the JJA 1986 as to the order that may

be passed against a juvenile, makes it obligatory for the Board to obtain

a social investigation report on the juvenile either through a probation

officer or a recognized voluntary organization or otherwise before

passing an order under section 15. It is provided under section 16 that

no juvenile in conflict with law shall be sentenced to death or

imprisonment for any term which may extend to imprisonment for life

or committed to prison in default of payment of fine or default of

furnishing security. Section 19 takes care of future employment of a

juvenile and provides that a juvenile who has committed an offence

shall not suffer disqualification if attached to a conviction for any

offence. Section 20 keeps alive and continues the proceedings in

respect of a juvenile pending in any Court on the date on which

the JJA 2000 came into force. It further provides that if the Court finds

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that the juvenile has committed an offence, it shall record such finding

and instead of passing any sentence in respect of the juvenile, forward

him to the Board which shall pass orders in respect of him in

accordance with provisions of the JJA 2000. It further provides that the

Board may, for any adequate and special reason to be recorded in the

order, review the case and pass proper order in the interest of such

juvenile. Besides this proviso an explanation was also added in

section 20 by an amendment in the year 2006 which further clarified

that the determination of juvenility of a child shall be in terms of

clause (l) of section 2 in all pending cases including trial, revision or

any other criminal proceedings, even if the juvenile ceased to be so on

or before the date of commencement of the JJA 2000. The Explanation

further states that the provisions of this Act shall apply as if the said

provisions had been in force for all purposes and at all material times,

when the alleged offence was committed.

16. The brutal Nirbhaya

16

case became the nation’s voice for a

change in the existing laws to deal with the juveniles with sufficient

maturity. The Juvenile Justice Act, 2015 (in short, JJA 2015) was

brought on the statute book and came into effect from

15

th January 2016. Section 2 (13) refers to the child in conflict with law

and provides that a child who is alleged or found to have committed an

offence and who has not completed eighteen years of age on the date of

commission of the crime is a child in conflict with law. It makes a

distinction between petty offence, serious offence and heinous offence.

The petty offences include the offences for which the maximum

16

Mukesh & Anr. v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors. : (2017) 6 SCC 1

Page 18 of 41

punishment provided under any law is 3 years and any offence for

which the punishment is imprisonment for 3 to 7 years has been

categorized as a serious offence. It further provides that a heinous

offence would be such offence for which the minimum punishment

provided under any penal statute is imprisonment for 7 years or more.

This categorization of offences in three groups is for the purpose of

inquiry and preliminary assessment by the JJ Board which is

constituted under section 4 in each district. Under section 14, the

Board holds an inquiry when a child alleged to be in conflict with law

is produced before it and the Board is empowered to pass such orders

in relation to such child as it deems fit. Sub-section (4) to section 14

provides that the inquiry proceedings for petty offences shall stand

terminated if they remain inconclusive even after an extended period.

However, for completion of inquiry in relation to serious or heinous

offences, the Board shall be granted further extension of time by the

Chief Judicial Magistrate/Chief Metropolitan Magistrate for the reasons

to be recorded in writing. Section 94 requires the Committee or the

Board to make an assessment of age of the child based on his

appearance and proceed with the inquiry without waiting for further

confirmation of the age. Sub-section (2) removes any doubt

whatsoever regarding the documents which shall be held proof of the

date of birth. The provisions made under section 94 read as under:

“(1) Where, it is obvious to the Committee or the Board, based on the

appearance of the person brought before it under any of the provisions of

this Act (other than for the purpose of giving evidence) that the said person

is a child, the Committee or the Board shall record such observation stating

the age of the child as nearly as may be and proceed with the inquiry under

section 14 or section 36, as the case may be, without waiting for further

confirmation of the age.

Page 19 of 41

(2) In case, the Committee or the Board has reasonable grounds for doubt

regarding whether the person brought before it is a child or not, the

Committee or the Board, as the case may be, shall undertake the process of

age determination, by seeking evidence by obtaining – (i) the date of birth

certificate from the school, or the matriculation or equivalent certificate from

the concerned examination Board, if available; and in the absence thereof;

(ii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a

panchayat; (iii) and only in the absence of (i) and (ii) above, age shall be

determined by an ossification test or any other latest medical age

determination test conducted on the orders of the Committee or the Board:

Provided such age determination test conducted on the order of the

Committee or the Board shall be completed within fifteen days from the date

of such order.

(3) The age recorded by the Committee or the Board to be the age of person

so brought before it shall, for the purpose of this Act, be deemed to be the

true age of that person.”

17. A significant change brought in by the JJA 2015 is incorporated

under section 15 which deals with a child who has completed or is

above the age of sixteen years and who is alleged to have committed a

heinous offence. It contemplates a preliminary assessment by the

JJ Board relating to the physical and mental capacity of the child who

has committed a heinous offence and is between the ages of sixteen and

eighteen years. On assessment of the ability to understand the

consequences of the offence and its circumstances, the JJ Board shall

have an option to transfer the matter to the Children’s Court if it

concludes that there is a need for further trial. Such a child is sent to a

place of safety for reformation and rehabilitation up to the age of

twenty-one years if he is found on trial, guilty of committing a heinous

offence. On completing the age of twenty-one years, an evaluation of

the child is conducted by the Children’s Court which may either release

the child or transfer him to an adult jail for the rest of the term of

imprisonment. Section 18 provides the manner in which and the

punishment to which the juvenile can be subjected to, except the award

Page 20 of 41

of death sentence or life imprisonment without the possibility of

release.

18. The JJA 2015 is a very exhaustive legislation which seems to

take care of every aspect of the Juvenile Justice. It is spread over

112 sections and appears to be a complete Code in itself. The way every

provision has been framed starting from the Preamble gives the

impression that the JJA 2015 is intended to provide a wholesome

solution to the problems relating to children. The definition clause

spread over 61 clauses in section 2 defines child; abandoned child;

child in conflict with law; child in need of care and protection; child

legally free for adoption; orphan; surrendered child; juvenile etc. It

defines juvenile to mean a child below the age of eighteen years.

Similarly, child has been defined to mean a person who has not

completed eighteen years of age. Section 2 (9) provides that the best

interest of child means the basis for any decision taken regarding the

child for fulfilment of his basic rights and needs, identity, social

well-being and physical, emotional and intellectual development. In the

JJA 2015, there is a separate chapter devoted to the rehabilitation and

social reintegration of the children. It provides that the process of

rehabilitation and social integration of the children shall be undertaken

preferably through family-based care, based on the individual care plan

of the child. It further provides under sub-section (2) of section 39 that

the process of rehabilitation and social integration of the child in

conflict with law shall be undertaken in the observation homes if

the child is not released on bail. Today this is the umbrella Act on

child protection. It lays down, in section 3, the general principles on

Page 21 of 41

protection of the child’s rights. The most important principle under

section 3 is the principle of presumption of innocence, which provides

that all children should be presumed to be innocent and not have any

criminal intent till the age of eighteen years. The other general

principles incorporated under section 3 are; (i) Principle of dignity and

worth, (ii) Principle of participation, (iii) Principle of best interest,

(iv) Principle of family responsibility, (v) Principle of safety,

(vi) Principle of positive measures, (vii) Principle of non-stigmatizing

semantics, (viii) Principle of non-waiver of rights, (ix) Principle of

equality and non-discrimination, (x) Principle of right to privacy and

confidentiality, (xi) Principle of institutionalization as a measure of last

resort, (xii) Principle of repatriation and restoration, (xiii) Principle of

fresh start, (xiv) Principle of diversion, and (xv) Principles of

natural justice. This is remarkable that the provisions under

sections 22, 23, 24 and 25 are intended to confer every conceivable

benefit to a child alleged to be in conflict with law. Section 22 provides

that no proceeding against a child shall be instituted or any order be

passed under Chapter VIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Section 23 puts a bar on the joint trial of a child in conflict with law and

a person who is not a child. Section 24 removes stigma of conviction

and provides that a child who has committed an offence shall not suffer

disqualification, if any attached to a conviction. All these provisions

start with a non-obstante clause and clearly protect the interest of a

child in conflict with law. Section 25 is also in sync with the legislative

intendment that a child alleged or found to be in conflict with law is

not denied any benefit under this Act. It provides that all pending

Page 22 of 41

proceedings before any Court on or before the commencement of the

JJA 2015 shall be continued as if this Act had been enacted.

19. Given the purpose behind the JJAs, every Court is obliged to give

effect to the child welfare legislations. The Courts are required to adopt

the route of purposive interpretation whenever a progressive

beneficial legislation is under review. It is the duty of the Court to

discern the object behind each provision in the context of the

background in which a particular provision is framed and enacted. We

may also recollect that long back “Sheela Barse (II)”

15

sent a message to

the nation that it is a duty of all Courts to give retrospective effect to the

child-related legislations so as to ensure that the children are not

denied the legal protection that the legislature intends to confer upon

them. The provisions of the JJAs must be given their fullest meanings

and should receive wide interpretation to cover every conceivable

circumstance leaning in favor of the children. A review of the case laws

indicates that the Legislature and the Judiciary both have been acting

in tandem with each other when it comes to protecting the rights of

children. The first landmark decision which expounded a child-related

legislation came in “Umesh Chandra v. State of Rajasthan”

17

. This Court

held that the relevant date for the applicability of the Rajasthan

Children Act, 1970 is the date on which the offence is committed. This

Court visualized a situation where the child may have crossed the

threshold age and ceased to be a child by the time the case comes up

for trial and held that the relevant date for age determination shall be

the date of occurrence and not the date of trial. In “Gopinath Ghosh v.

17

(1982) 2 SCC 202

Page 23 of 41

State of West Bengal”

18 a plea was raised for the first time before this

Court that Gopinath Ghosh was below eighteen years on the date of

occurrence and was, therefore, a child as defined under section 2(d) of

the West Bengal Children Act, 1959. He along with Bharat Ghosh and

Jagannath Ghosh was convicted under section 302 read with

section 34 of the Indian Penal Code for committing murder on

19

th August 1974. His conviction was confirmed by the High Court,

and he approached this Court in a Special Leave Petition. Pursuant to

an order passed by this Court, an inquiry was conducted in which both

parties were permitted to lead evidence. The concerned Judge

recorded a finding in his report that Gopinath Ghosh was aged between

sixteen and seventeen years on the date of offence. Unfortunately, the

jurisdiction of the trial Court to hold the trial of Gopinath Ghosh and to

sentence him to suffer imprisonment for life was never questioned

before any Court. This Court held that it was not proper to allow such a

technical plea and thwart the benefit of the Act being extended to him,

if he was otherwise entitled to it. In “Bhoop Ram v. State of U.P.”

19 a plea

of juvenility was raised for the first time before this Court. Bhoop Ram

was less than sixteen years of age as on 3

rd

October 1975, when the

offence was committed. He relied upon a school certificate which

recorded his date of birth as 24

th July 1960. However, in the report

pursuant to an inquiry conducted by the Sessions Judge, it was

recorded that Bhoop Ram would have completed sixteen years on the

date of occurrence. This Court held that the school certificate shall

prevail over the opinion of the doctor if no doubt is raised about

18

(1984) Supp. SCC 228

19

(1989) 3 SCC 1

Page 24 of 41

truthfulness of the entries in the certificate. Bhoop Ram was treated as

a child within the meaning of section 2(4) of the UP Children Act, 1951

and the sentence imposed upon him was quashed while sustaining his

conviction for murder. “Pradeep Kumar v. State of UP”

20 followed the

same line of reasoning and the sentences imposed upon Pradeep

Kumar and Krishan Kant were quashed upon a finding that they were

below the age of sixteen years as on the date of occurrence. Aligning

with these decisions, “Bhola Bhagat v. State of Bihar”

21 held that the

benefits of the Bihar Children Act, 1970 should not be refused on

technical grounds. There were three convicts who were claiming

benefit under the Act on the ground that they were below the age of

sixteen years on the date of offence and, therefore, should have been

treated as child within the meaning of section 2(h). This Court held that

in case there is any doubt about genuineness of the plea of juvenility,

then the Court must make due inquiry by giving opportunity to the

parties to establish their claims and record a positive finding regarding

the age of the accused. Upon holding that Bhola Bhagat, Parbhunath

Prasad and Chandra Sen Prasad were children as on the date of offence,

this Court quashed the sentence awarded to them while sustaining

their conviction for murder.

20. These decisions consistently held that the relevant date for

determination of the age of juvenile is the date of commission of the

offence. But, in the meantime, a 2-Judge Bench of this Court

22 struck a

discordant note and held that the age determination of the juvenile

20

(1995) Supp 4 SCC 419

21

(1997) 8 SCC 720

22

Arnit Das v. State of Bihar : (2000) 5 SCC 488

Page 25 of 41

must be with reference to the date of his production before the Court

and not the date of occurrence of the offence. This conflict was finally

resolved by a 5-Judge Bench in “Pratap Singh”

2

which affirmed that the

reckoning date for the age determination is the date of commission of

the offence. It further held that the JJA 2000 must be applied to the

pending cases provided the accused was below eighteen years of age

on 1

st April 2001, that is, when the JJA 2000 came to be enforced. This

restriction on applicability of the JJA 2000 deprived the benefit of

the JJA 2000 to a juvenile who was below the age of eighteen years on

the date of offence. The Government brought in amendments to obviate

the possible denial of benefit to a juvenile under the JJA 2000. The

Parliament introduced section 7A which provided that whenever a

claim of juvenility is raised before any Court, or a Court is of the opinion

that the accused person was a juvenile on the date of commission of the

offence, the Court shall make an inquiry and take such evidence as may

be necessary so as to determine the age of such person, and shall record

a finding whether the accused is a juvenile or not, stating his age as

nearly as possible. Proviso to section 7A further manifests the

legislative intendment to extend the benefit of the Act to the juvenile

even if he ceased to be a juvenile on or before the date of

commencement of this Act. It provides that a claim of juvenility may be

raised before any Court, and it shall be recognized at any stage even

after final disposal of the case. It further provides that such a claim of

juvenility shall be determined in terms of the provisions contained in

this Act and the rules framed thereunder and not as per the provisions

of the Code of Criminal Procedure. “Vaneet Kumar Gupta v. State of

Page 26 of 41

Punjab”

23 further reiterated that the plea of juvenility can be raised at

any stage, even after the final disposal of the case. However, this Court

raised a word of caution and observed that if the plea of juvenility was

not raised before the Courts below and is raised for the first time before

this Court, the judicial conscience of the Court must be satisfied by

placing adequate and satisfactory material that the accused was below

the age of eighteen years on the date of offence.

21. Another significant development in judicial interpretation as to

applicability of the JJA 2000 came in “Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan &

Anr.”

24. The accused was not a juvenile under the JJA 1986 as he had

crossed the age of sixteen years. According to the father of Hari Ram,

his date of birth was 17

th October 1982 and he had crossed the age of

sixteen years and thirteen days on the date of offence. The Sessions

Judge determined his age to be below sixteen years on the date of

offence and directed a trial by the JJ Board. This all happened after the

enforcement of the JJA 2000 with effect from 1

st

April 2001. This Court

held that Hari Ram must be treated as a juvenile even though he had

attained the age of eighteen years on or before the commencement of

the JJA 2000. Similarly, in “Dharambir”

3

the accused was not a juvenile

on the date of offence under the JJA 1986. He was convicted under

sections 302 and 307 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. His

conviction was maintained by the High Court but by the time Criminal

Appeal filed by him was dismissed, the JJA 2000 had come into force.

The plea of juvenility was raised for the first time before this Court and

his age as on the date of offence was determined to be sixteen years

23

(2009) 17 SCC 587

24

(2009) 13 SCC 211

Page 27 of 41

nine months and eight days. This Court laid stress on proviso to

sub-section (1) of section 7A of the JJA 2000 and referred to the

decision in “Hari Ram”

24

to hold that all persons who were below the

age of eighteen years on the date of commission of the offence, even

prior to 1

st April 2001, must be treated as juvenile notwithstanding that

the claim of juvenility was raised after the person had attained the age

of eighteen years on or before the date of the commencement of the

JJA 2000 or was undergoing sentence upon his conviction. The delay in

making a claim of juvenility is not fatal is again reiterated in “Jitendra

Singh”

6. As to the nature of inquiry for age determination, “Ashwani

Kumar Saxena v. State of Madhya Pradesh”

25 criticized the manner in

which the trial Court had conducted an inquiry for age determination

of the accused. It held that the inquiry under section 7A is not some

sort of investigation or a trial under the Code of Criminal Procedure

and the inquiry contemplated under section 7A must be held under the

provisions of the JJAs and the Rules framed thereunder. This Court

further held that a medical opinion can be obtained in cases where no

documentary proof such as Matriculation Certificate or equivalent

Certificate, or a birth Certificate from the school is not available. Even

so the birth Certificate given by a Corporation or a Municipal Authority

or a Panchayat shall suffice the purpose and there is no question of

obtaining medical opinion from the Medical Board.

22. The next stage in the adjudicatory process concerning the

juvenile pertains to the nature of order that can be passed by the Court

when the convict is found to be a juvenile on the date of offence.

25

(2012) 9 SCC 750

Page 28 of 41

A 3-Judge Bench of this Court in “Karan alias Fatiya v. State of Madhya

Pradesh”

26 dwelt upon the issue as to whether the conviction of a

person who was juvenile on the date of occurrence should be set aside.

This Court reflected on the previous judgments of the Court in “Ashwani

Kumar Saxena”

25, “Jitendra Singh”

6, “Raju v. State of Haryana”

27, “Ashok

Kumar Mehra v. State of Punjab”

28

, “Satya Deo v. State of U.P”

29

and

“Mahesh v. State of Rajasthan”

30, and observed that different Benches of

this Court have adopted different parameters. While a few judgments

interfered with the order of sentence and maintained the conviction of

the juvenile, there are cases which did not discuss the issue of whether

the conviction of the juvenile should be set aside. In “Karan”

26 this

Court held that the merits of the judgment of conviction can be tested

by the Court and set aside in appropriate cases.

23. Coming back to the facts of this case, we observe that during

pendency of Miscellaneous Criminal Case No. 24675 of 2018 the High

Court passed an order for causing an inquiry for assessing the age of

the appellant and directed suspension of sentence awarded to him in

Sessions Case No. 129 of 2005. In the inquiry before the JJ Board, the

original marksheet of Class V issued by the Government Secondary

School, Hetampur, original marksheet of Class VIII from the Hardikar

Kisan Higher Secondary School, Sikrauda Saraichaula and the original

Birth Certificate of the appellant issued by the Gram Panchayat

Sikrauda were produced in evidence. Three witnesses including the

26

(2023) 5 SCC 504

27

(2019) 14 SCC 401

28

(2019) 6 SCC 132

29

(2020) 10 SCC 555

30

(2021) 18 SCC 582

Page 29 of 41

father of the appellant who examined himself as PW1 deposed before

the JJ Board that the date of birth of the appellant was 1

st July 1987. The

Principal of the Government Secondary School where the appellant

was first admitted in Class V stated before the JJ Board that the

appellant's name is recorded at Roll No. 605 with his date of birth as

1

st

July 1987. The in-charge of the record room in the office of the

District Education Officer confirmed that the Primary School

Examination result for the year 1995-96 recorded the date of birth of

the appellant as 1

st

July 1987. This witness produced the original copy

of the admission register of the Hardikar Kisan Higher Secondary

School, Sikrauda. The JJ Board considered the materials laid before it

and concluded as under:

“It is noteworthy that Witness Ramjilal PW-1, the father of applicant

Avnish, stated in his statement that his son Avnish's date of birth was

01.07.1987 and expressed his desire to have him admitted directly to Class

5. In support of this, he presented the applicant's Class 5 and 8 mark sheets

and birth certificate. Ashok Sharma, PW-2, instructor at the Aupchariksetar

Education Center, Hetampur, also confirmed that the applicant was first

admitted to his school and that his date of birth was 01.07.1987. Similarly,

Witness Vinod Kumar Singh also confirmed that the applicant's date of birth

was 01.07.1987 in the archives of the office of the District Education, Officer,

Morena, in the records related to applicant Avnish Kumar Sharma.

It is noteworthy that the First Information Report FIR submitted by the

applicant and a copy of Sessions Case No. 129/05 of the Hon’ble Second

Additional Sessions Judge, Morena, mention the incident as having occurred

on 13.09.04. Therefore, in such a situation, the provisions of Rule 12(3) of

Rules 2007 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 are attracted for verification of

the age of the juvenile, which provides that "In every case involving a child

or a juvenile in conflict with law, the Court or the Board, as the case may be,

shall obtain evidence for the purpose of age verification by:

(a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available; and in the

absence whereof;

(ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first

attended; and in the absence whereof;

(iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a

panchayat;

(b) and only in the absence of either (i), (ii) or (iii) of clause (a) above, the

medical opinion will be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board, which

Page 30 of 41

will declare the age of the juvenile or child. In case exact assessment of the

age cannot be done, the Court or the Board or, as the case may be, the

Committee, for the reasons to be recorded by them, may, if considered

necessary, give benefit to the child or juvenile by considering his/her age on

lower side within the margin of one year.

and, while passing orders in such case shall, after taking into consideration

such evidence as may be available, or the medical opinion, as the case may

be, record a finding in respect of his age and either of the evidence specified

in any of the clauses (a)(i), (ii), (iii) or in the absence whereof, clause (b) shall

be the conclusive proof of the age as regards such child or the juvenile in

conflict with law.

In compliance with the provisions of Rule 12 (3) regarding his age, the

applicant has submitted his Class 5 mark sheet issued by the school in which

he was first admitted, in which the date of birth of applicant Mahavir alias

Avnish Sharma is mentioned as 01.07.1987 and the above mentioned date of

birth of the applicant has been confirmed by Ashok Sharma, instructor of his

first school and Aupchariketar school, Hetampur. The applicant has also

submitted his birth certificate issued by Gram Panchayat Sikroda under

Rule 12 (3) (a) (iii), in which the date of birth of the applicant is also

mentioned as 01.07.1987.

It is noteworthy that in the case for which the age of the applicant Avneesh

Sharma is being determined in the above case, the incident is recorded to

have taken place on 13.09.2004.

The oral and documentary evidence presented by the applicant confirms that

the applicant's date of birth is 01.07.1987 and the Juvenile Justice Board does

not find any basis to disbelieve the above documents and the incident date

13.09.2004 has been mentioned in the case on the basis of which the age of

the juvenile on the date of the incident is shown to be 17 years 2 months

12 days. And after investigation on the basis of the above evidence, the

applicant Mahavir alias Avnish Sharma is shown to be a minor juvenile on

the date of incident 13.09.2004.”

24. In face of the aforesaid findings by the JJ Board which were not

challenged by the State, it was the bounden duty of the High Court to

consider the case of the appellant in accordance with the applicable

laws on juvenile. The laws relating to child rights and protection of

children put the Court in the role of parens patriae. Keeping in mind the

object avowed behind the JJAs, it becomes a duty of the Court to secure

the best interest of children and ensure their ultimate rehabilitation.

This object can be achieved only when the Courts do not feel

Page 31 of 41

constrained to give a wider meaning to the provisions of the JJAs. This

also needs to be kept in mind that a juvenile proceeding is

fundamentally different from an adult criminal trial. The Courts should

be guided by the purposive interpretation of the JJAs and should not

feel handicapped by the temporal constraints. There is an added

responsibility on the Courts to ensure that the benefits of the beneficial

and remedial statutes such as the JJAs are not denied to the children

who have committed any crime. However, the High Court failed to give

effect to the plea of juvenility which was not considered by any Court

before, in accordance with law and by following the procedure

prescribed under the JJAs, and held as under:

“20. The core issue raised in the present petition is the claim of juvenility of

the petitioner on the date of incident i.e., 13.09.2004. It is asserted that the

petitioner's date of birth is 01.07.1987, and therefore he was juvenile on the

date of the alleged occurrence.

21. It is trite law that juvenility is not merely a mitigating circumstances but

a jurisdictional fact, which goes to the very root of the authority of the Court

to conduct trial and impose sentence. If an accused is found to be a juvenile

on the date of commission of offence, the regular criminal courts are divested

of jurisdiction to try and sentence such person in the manner applicable to

adults.

22. Section 7-A of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 casts a mandatory obligation

upon every Court to conduct an enquiry whenever a claim of juvenility is

raised or appears from the record. The proviso to Section 7-A unequivocally

declares that such claim may be raised at any stage, even after final disposal

of the case.

23. The legislative intent underlying this provision is to ensure that no

person who was a juvenile on the date of the offence is denied the protective

umbrella of juvenile justice jurisprudence on account of technicalities or

delay

24. Pursuant to the order passed by a Coordinate Bench of this Court, the

matter was referred to the Juvenile Justice Board, Morena, which conducted

an enquiry and submitted its report dated 11.05.2019, declaring the

petitioner to be a juvenile on the date of incident. Although such report

carries persuasive value and is based on appreciation of statutory

documents, this Court is of the considered opinion that this Court does not

possess jurisdiction to interfere with the matter especially, when the matter

Page 32 of 41

and travelled upto the Hon'ble Apex Court. This Court is conscious of the fact

that the inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are preventive and

corrective and not substitutive or appellate in nature. Unlike the Hon'ble

Supreme Court, which exercises plenary powers under Article 142 of the

Constitution, this Court does not possess unfettered authority to mould relief

beyond statutory confines. Therefore, while this Court can intervene to

ensure that a jurisdictional illegality is cured, it cannot itself assume the role

of the Trial Court and record primary findings of fact regarding juvenility or

alter the sentence on equitable considerations alone.

25. At this juncture, it is necessary to note an additional and determinative

circumstance, namely that the judgment of conviction dated 21.12.2005

passed by the Trial Court was affirmed by this Court in Criminal Appeal No.

05/2006 vide order dated 17.03.2017, and thereafter the petitioner carried

the matter before the Hon'ble Apex Court by filing Special Leave Petition

(Criminal) No. 8226/2017. The said Special Leave Petition came to be

dismissed as withdrawn on 11.05.2018, and admittedly, no plea of juvenility

was raised before the Hon'ble Apex Court, nor was any liberty sought or

reserved to agitate such issue at a later stage. Thus, the criminal proceedings

between the parties have attained finality up to the highest Court.

26. It is well settled that the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under

Section 482 Cr.P.C. cannot be exercised to reopen, review or nullify a

judgment which has attained finality particularly after affirmation by the

Hon'ble Supreme Court.

27. While Section 7-A of the Juvenile Justice Act permits a claim of juvenility

to be raised at any stage, the said provision cannot be read in isolation or in

a manner that obliterates doctrine of finality of litigation, especially where

the accused had full opportunity to raise all available pleas before the

appellate and constitutional courts and consciously chose not to do so. The

power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is procedural and corrective, not substitutive

of appellate of constitutional remedies. Once the matter has travelled up to

the Hon'ble Supreme Court and has been disposed of, this Court cannot sit in

appeal over the same by invoking inherent powers even on equitable

considerations.”

28. The judgments relied upon by the petitioner, including Pratap Singh,

Abdul Razzaq, Satish @ Dhanna, and Dharambir (supra), were rendered in

circumstances where:-

(i) Either the issue of juvenility was raised before the Hon'ble Supreme Court

itself; or

(ii) The Apex Court exercised its constitutional powers to do complete

justice; or

(iii) The proceedings had not attained irrevocable finality.

29. In the present case, however, the petitioner invoked the jurisdiction of

the Hon'ble Apex Court without raising the plea of juvenility, thereby

allowing the conviction to attain finality on merits. Having failed to urge such

Page 33 of 41

a plea at the highest forum, the petitioner cannot be permitted to reagitate

the issue collaterally by invoking Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.

30. Judicial discipline demands that once a matter has been adjudicated up

to the Hon'ble Apex Court, subordinate courts, including this Court, must

refrain from entertaining proceedings which have the effect of unsettling

concluded issues. Permitting such a course would not only run contrary to

the settled principles governing inherent jurisdiction but would also open

floodgates for endless litigations, defeating the very object of criminal

jurisprudence.

31. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court holds that although the

claim of juvenility is statutorily recognizable, the present case stands on a

different footing as the matter has attained finality up to the Hon'ble apex

Court. The plea of juvenility was never raised before the Apex Court and this

Court, in exercise of its limited jurisdiction vested under Section 482 of the

Cr.P.C., cannot interfere with or reopen a concluded judgment.

32. Accordingly, finding no ground for interference, the present petition is

dismissed. It is clarified that this Court has not examined the merits of the

conviction afresh and the dismissal is based on the bar of finality and

limitation of inherent jurisdiction. The petition stands dismissed

accordingly.”

25. Quite clearly, the High Court acted over cautiously. It felt that it is

bound by judicial discipline and propriety, though it was not so, having

regard to the admitted facts in the present case. The High Court missed

out on an important fact and committed an error of record inasmuch

as it held that the judgment of conviction rendered against the

appellant attained finality up to the Supreme Court. Whereas the

Special Leave Petition filed by the appellant was dismissed as

withdrawn on 11

th May 2018. The common order dated 11

th May 2018

passed in SLP(Crl.) No. 4286 of 2018 (@ Crl. M.P. No. 8226/2017) with

SLP(Crl.) No. 7662/2017 & SLP(Crl.) No. 5232/2017 reads as under:

“The special leave petition is dismissed as withdrawn.

SLP(Crl.)No.7662/2017 & SLP(Crl.)No.5232/2017 :

We do not find any ground to interfere with the conviction of the petitioners.

However, having regard to the advanced age of the petitioners, Ramji Lal and

Munni Devi, the sentence awarded to them is reduced to the period already

undergone by them.

Page 34 of 41

The special leave petitions are accordingly disposed of. Pending applications,

if any, shall also stand disposed of.”

26. On a glance at the order dated 11

th May 2018, it is easily gathered

that the Special Leave Petitions filed by Ramji Lal and Munni Devi were

taken up for hearing simultaneously and disposed of with a benefit to

them to the effect that the sentence awarded to them was reduced to

the period already undergone by them. Being on the same footing and

all having been convicted and sentenced under section 201 Part II of

the Indian Penal Code, it does not appeal to common sense that the

appellant would have withdrawn the Special Leave Petition without

any reason while a benefit on the point of sentence was granted to

Ramji Lal and Munni Devi, his parents. Before the High Court, the

appellant made a statement on oath that he had withdrawn the Special

Leave Petition with a view to raise the plea of juvenility before the High

Court. However, the High Court confined itself to too many technical

shackles while observing that no plea of juvenility was raised before

the Supreme Court nor was any liberty sought or reserved to agitate

such an issue at a later stage.

27. Section 362 of the Code of Criminal Procedure declares that:

“Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the

time being in force, no Court, when it has signed its judgment or final

order disposing of a case, shall alter or review the same except to

correct a clerical or arithmetical error”. On a plain reading of

section 362 it is easily gathered that inherent power of the High Court

under section 561-A of the old Code or section 482 of the new Code is

not covered under the saving provision thereunder. The expression

“otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being

Page 35 of 41

in force” refers to those provisions only which expressly authorizes the

Court to alter or review its judgment. In “Sankatha Singh & Ors. v. State

of U.P.”

31

this Court held that the inherent power of the Court cannot be

exercised for doing what is specifically prohibited by the Code.

“Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa & Ors.”

32 further restricted

the exercise of inherent power by the High Court and held that the High

Court is not authorized to review its judgment passed either in exercise

of its appellate or revisional or original criminal jurisdiction in the aid

or under the cloak of section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

28. However, the inherent power of the High Court which it

possessed even before a formal expression of such power is reflected

in the incorporation of section 561-A of the old Code cannot be

obliterated or rendered nugatory by operation of section 362 of the

Code of Criminal Procedure. Pertinently, section 561-A of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1898 was incorporated in 1923 to remove any

doubt about the existence of inherent power in the High Courts. In

“State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa & Anr.”

33 this Court held that

section 482 does not confer any new powers on the High Court and it

only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the

enactment of the Code. This Court further held that all Courts, whether

civil or criminal, possess in the absence of any express provision as

inherent in their constitution all such powers as are necessary to do the

right and to undo a wrong on the principle quando lex aliquid alicui

concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest.

31

AIR 1962 SC 1208

32

(2001) 1 SCC 169

33

(2002) 3 SCC 89

Page 36 of 41

Besides the frequently used expression “to prevent abuse of the

process of the Court” which is generally reflected in the orders

quashing the criminal proceedings in the exercise of inherent power

under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, this Court has

approved the exercise of powers by the High Court to interfere with its

own decision, order or judgment by carving out exceptions to the

general prohibition on the power to the criminal Court to alter its

decision, order or judgment.

29. The scope and ambit of the expression “to secure the ends of

justice” have been expanded in myriad situations, and this Court

approved the exercise of inherent power by the High Court to interfere

with its own decision in certain circumstances. The power under

section 482 is wide enough and exercise of this power cannot be

confined in cast iron. “P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka”

34

expressly held that the High Court can exercise its inherent power in

cases where there is a breach of fundamental right under Article 21 of

the Constitution of India. In “Talab Haji Hussain v. Madhukar

Purshottam Mondkar & Other”

35 this Court took a view that the

High Court has inherent power under section 561-A of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1898 to cancel the bail where the Court comes to

a conclusion that it would not be safe to permit the accused to be

enlarged on bail. In “Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs,

West Bengal v. Mohan Singh & Ors.”

36 this Court entertained a second

quash petition on the ground that the order passed in a subsequent

34

(2002) 4 SCC 578

35

AIR 1958 SC 376

36

(1975) 3 SCC 706

Page 37 of 41

quash petition would not amount to reviewing or revising the earlier

order made by the High Court.

30. The provisions under section 362 cannot be considered in a rigid

or overtechnical manner to defeat the ends of justice. The bar of

section 362 of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall not operate in cases

where the order or judgment under consideration was without

jurisdiction and inherent power of the High Court can be exercised to

recall such orders. This Court made a distinction between a review

petition and a recall petition in “Asit Kumar Kar v. State of West Bengal

& Ors.”

37 and held that the Court does not go into the merits of the

matter in a recall petition and simply recalls an order which was passed

without giving an opportunity of hearing to the affected party. In “State

of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar & Ors.”

38 this Court held that if

an order or judgment is pronounced in violation of the principles of

natural justice or without giving an opportunity of hearing to the

affected party the inherent power of the High Court can be exercised to

recall such an order which in effect was a nullity. In “Ganesh Patel v.

Umakant Rajoria”

39 this Court held that the High Court was right in

recalling the order which was passed in absence of the opposite party

and the order was based on false statement made by the other party.

This Court further held that such application for recall of the order is

maintainable as it is an application seeking a procedural review and

not a substantive review to which section 362 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure shall apply. The power of procedural review which is

37

(2009) 2 SCC 703

38

(2011) 14 SCC 770

39

2022 SCC OnLine SC 2050

Page 38 of 41

inherent in the High Court is not affected by section 362 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, and the High Court can set aside a palpably

erroneous order which was passed under some misconception of law.

The Court can review or recall its judgment or order if the proceedings

before it suffered from an inherent lack of jurisdiction or a fraud was

played upon the Court to obtain the order or a mistake was committed

by the Court which caused prejudice to the party. In “Madhu Limaye v.

The State of Maharashtra”

40 this Court held that the inherent power of

the High Court can be exercised to correct an order and that the

exercise of this inherent power by the High Court is not affected by

section 397 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure if interference by the

High Court is necessary for securing the ends of justice.

31. This needs no reiteration that mistakes committed by the Court

should not cause prejudice to any party. A Court can always recall its

order or judgment and correct the mistake in certain situations within

the statutory parameters. In “A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak & Anr.”

41

this

Court declared that no man should suffer because of the mistake of the

Court. It further held that no man should suffer a wrong by technical

procedure of irregularities. This Court held as under:

“83…The basic fundamentals of the administration of justice are simple. No

man should suffer because of the mistake of the Court. No man should suffer

a wrong by technical procedure of irregularities. Rules or procedures are the

handmaids of justice and not the mistress of the justice. Ex debito justitiac,

we must do justice to him. If a man has been wronged so long as it lies within

the human machinery of administration of justice that wrong must be

remedied. This is a peculiar fact of this case which requires emphasis.”

40

(1977) 4 SCC 551

41

(1988) 2 SCC 602

Page 39 of 41

32. For years, the appellant suffered due to the mistakes committed

by the Courts. The acquittal of the appellant recorded in the trial Court

for the charge under sections 302 and 304B of the Indian Penal Code

was not challenged before the High Court. The crime of murder and

dowry death having not been proved by the prosecution, the appellant

could not have been convicted under section 201 Part II of the Indian

Penal Code. His conviction under section 201 Part II can be recorded

only upon a finding that a crime was committed and he was knowing

or having reason to believe that such an offence was committed, and

with the intent to screen the offender from legal punishment, caused

the evidence thereof to disappear (refer “Suleman Rehiman Mulani &

Anr. v. State of Maharashtra”

42 and “Kedar Nath & Ors. v. State of M.P.”

43).

Therefore, the conviction of the appellant under section 201 Part II of

the Indian Penal Code must be held illegal.

33. The High Court has undoubted jurisdiction to recall its own order

or judgment which results in miscarriage of justice. Subject to a

decision in any case on the merits by this Court, a fundamental issue

which will change the course of the decision remains open in the case

so long as the High Court is seized with the matter. The High Court shall

have inherent jurisdiction to correct its order or judgment and do

complete justice. The limitation on inherent power of the High Court is

a kind of self-restraint originating from the philosophy of judicial

propriety. This shall, however, not be an issue falling in the realm of

inherent limitations under section 482 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, if the High Court decides to recall its previous order or

42

(1967) SCC OnLine SC 337

43

(1993) Supp 1 SCC 7

Page 40 of 41

judgment because a mistake was committed by the Court. If the

juvenile was denied a statutory benefit and thereby a grave prejudice

was caused to him, the High Court has all powers to remedy the

situation and secure the ends of justice.

34. The conviction of the appellant under section 201 Part II of the

Indian Penal Code having been found illegal, cannot be sustained and

is, accordingly, set aside. Consequently, the judgment of conviction and

of sentence both dated 21

st December 2005 in Sessions Case No. 129 of

2005 passed against the appellant by 2

nd

Additional Sessions Judge,

Morena are set aside. The appellant, who is on bail, stands discharged

from the liability of bail bonds furnished by him.

35. The appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms.

36. This case brings to the limelight a serious issue which has

hindered the implementation of the JJAs. We must remember that the

impact of industrialisation, urbanisation and migration changed the

people's daily lives. They started migrating from rural areas to the cities

as a result of which there was an explosion in population. The

cohesiveness of communities started weakening and the family

gradually lost effective control over the children. Poverty, inequality,

illiteracy and the discriminatory environment in which a child grows

trigger delinquent behavior in the child, and he becomes a victim of the

crime. The rise in the number of cases coming to this Court raising the

plea of juvenility for the first time in this Court indicates in ample

measures that there is a huge gap in the understanding of law by the

stakeholders. “Gopinath Ghosh”

18 took notice of this fact and made

certain suggestions. The investigating officers are generally obsessed

Page 41 of 41

with the motto to bring the culprit to book and the Courts before whom

a juvenile is produced do not focus attention on the assessment of age

of the juvenile. But in the process, the mandate of law is overlooked and

the rights of a juvenile in conflict with law get violated; the child

becomes a casualty. A child should not be treated as a criminal. He is a

victim of the circumstances. Sometimes he is drawn to the crime world

due to socio-economic or emotional and psychological reasons. The

State owes a responsibility to reintegrate the juveniles in society, rather

than permanently stigmatizing them. It is well remembered that

children are the greatest assets of any nation and they should be

nurtured and grown as responsible citizens, mentally alert, physically

fit and morally healthy to contribute to the betterment of society. The

greatest recompense that the State can gain from expenditure on

children is in the form of a powerful human resource which would be

ready to take its place in the forward march of the nation. In conclusion,

the existing system needs further strengthening, effective monitoring

of investigative processes and implementation of the statutory

provisions.

37. With these words, we close the proceedings of this case.

38. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

………...………….……………………….., J.

(PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA)

………...………….……………………….., J.

(SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR)

NEW DELHI;

SEPTEMBER 02, 2026.