Neeta Sawant CRA-464 OF 2025

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 464 OF 2025

1. Ajit Singh Wala (Deleted)

1.1. Mr. Popatbhai A. Wala

(deleted since deceased)

1.1.1 Mahendra Popatbhai Wala ….. APPLICANT

: VERSUS :

Shri Tilak Khetshi Shah, (deleted since deceased)

1(a) Smt. Shobhana Tilak Shah & Ors. ….RESPONDENTS

Mr. Vaibhav Sugdare with Mr. Gaurav Sawant i/b. Ms. Pooja Thakkar, for the

Applicants.

Mr. Shravan Vyas with Mr. Vivek Vyas, for the Respondents.

CORAM : SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.

JUDGMENT RESD. ON : 16 April 2026

JUDGMENT PRON. ON : 4 May 2026.

JUDGMENT :

1) The Applicant is an Obstructionist, who has obstructed

execution of decree passed in T.E. & R. Suit No. 263/284 of 2002. The

Trial Court has made the Obstructionist Notice absolute by judgment and

order dated 30 November 2024 directing the Applicant/Obstructionist to

deliver possession of the suit premises to the Plaintiff. The order passed

by the Trial Court is upheld by the Appellate Bench of the Small Causes

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Court by dismissing Execution Appeal No. 21 of 2025. The Applicant has

accordingly �led the present Revision Application challenging the

decisions of the Trial and Appellate Courts.

2) Plaintiffs had instituted T.E. & R. Suit No.263/284 of 2002 for

recovery of possession of land admeasuring 18,000 sq.ft forming part of

Cadastral Survey No. 6/172 of Parel Sewree Division, Tokershi Jivraj

Estate situated at Tokershi Jivraj Road and Acharya Donde Marg, Sewree,

Mumbai-400 015 (suit plot). By judgment and decree dated 4 April 2005,

the Trial Court decreed the Suit and directed the Defendants to handover

possession of the suit plot to the Plaintiffs. The decree was put in

execution by �ling Execution Application No. 259 of 2017. After the

warrant of possession was issued and the bailiff visited the premises, he

noticed several galas/structures on the suit plot occupied by different

individuals. The Applicant/Obstructionist was found in possession of Gala

Nos.8 and 9. The Obstructionist refused to vacate the possession of the

structures in his possession and a report to that effect was submitted by

the Bailiff.

3) In pursuance of Bailiff's Report, Plaintiff instituted

Obstruction Notice No. 233 of 2018 for removal of obstructions. The

notice was replied by the Obstructionists/Applicants clai ming

independent rights in respect of the structures. Based on the pleadings,

issues were framed by the Trial Court. Parties led evidence in support of

their respective claims.

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4) After considering the pleadings, oral and documentary

evidence, the Trial Court proceed to make the Obstructionist Notice

absolute vide judgment and order dated 30 November 2024. The Trial

Court directed the Obstructionist to vacate the possession of the suit

premises. The Appeal preferred by the Applicant/Obstructionist has been

dismissed by the Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court vide

judgment and order dated 10 June 2025. Accordingly, the Applicant has

�led the present Revision Application.

5) Mr. Sugdare, the learned counsel appearing for the Revision

Applicant has submitted that the Trial and the Appellate Courts have

grossly erred in not appreciating the position that the entire plot of land

is declared as Slum vide Noti�cation dated 16 February 1979 issued by the

Dy. Collector and Competent Authority. That CTS No.6/172, of which the

Suit plot forms a part, is undoubtedly declared as slum. That Appeal

preferred by the Plaintiffs against the Noti�cation dated 16 February 1979

has been dismissed by the Tribunal constituted under the provisions of

Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance Redevelopment) Act,

1971 (Slum Act) vide judgment and order dated 8 July 1981. He submits

that the Plaintiff suppressed the factum of land being declared as slum.

That Plaintiff did not lead any evidence to prove that the premises in

occupation of the Applicants do not form part of slum declaration. That

once the Applicant produced Noti�cation showing slum declaration in

respect of CTS No.6/172, the onus gets shifted onto the Plaintiff/decree

holder to prove that the premises in occupation of Obstructionists fell

within the excluded area in the Noti�cation. That there is speci�c bar

under Section 22 of the Slum Act from entertaining any suit for eviction

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without the permission of the Competent Authority. That the decree

therefore in nullity and cannot be executed.

6) Mr. Sugdare further submits that the decree has been secured

behind the back of the Obstructionist despite Plaintiffs having full

knowledge of their presence in the constructed structures. That non-

impleadment of Obstructionist has resulted in passing of a faulty decree

on account of gross suppression indulged into by the Plaintiffs.

7) Mr. Sugdare further submits that the execution proceedings

were otherwise time barred. That the Execution Application was �led

beyond the period of 12 years and the same ought to have been dismissed

by the Trial and the Appellate Courts.

8) Mr. Sugdare further submits that the Suit itself was �led

against a dead person and therefore the decree passed therein is a nullity.

Mr. Sugdare relies on judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Laxmi

Ram Pawar Versus. Sitabai Balu Dhotre & Anr.

1

in support of his

contention that Section 22 of the Slum Act acts as a complete bar to

amenability of the suit without the written sanction of the Competent

Authority. He also relies on judgment of the Apex Court in S.P.

Chengalvaraya Naidu (Dead) by LRs. Versus. Jagannath (Dead) by LRs

and Ors.

2

in support of his contention that fraud and gross suppression

has resulted in a decree in nullity and it is unenforceable. On above broad

1 2011 1 SCC 356

2 (1994) 1 SCC 1

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submissions, Mr.Sugdare prays for setting aside the orders passed by the

Trial and the Appellate Courts.

9) Mr. Vyas the learned counsel appearing for the

Respondents/decree holders opposes the Revision Application. He

submits that the Suit was �led for recovery of possession of open piece of

land and that therefore decree is passed in respect of the land and not in

respect of the structures. That Applicants in R.A.D. Suit No. 6956 of 1974

speci�cally rejected the claim in respect of open piece of land. That the

said suit was instituted against the judgment debtor and an irrelevant

entity being Nav Bharat Lime and Motor Mills Co. and declaration of

tenancy in respect of the structure would not bind the decree holders. He

submits that the very fact that the Applicant sought declaration in respect

of the structure against the judgment debtor makes it abundantly clear

that he claimed rights through the judgment debtor and did not have any

independent right. He submits that concurrent �ndings are recorded by

the Trial and the Appellate Courts about absence of independent rights

which do not warrant any interference in exercise of revisionary

jurisdiction of this Court.

10) So far as the point of slum declaration is concerned, he

submits that the burden was on the Applicant/Obstructionist to prove

that the structures are located on portion of land which is declared as

slum. That the entire land bearing CTS No.6/172 is not declared as slum.

That in the Written Statement, no issue of land being declared as slum

was raised. That therefore Obstructionists cannot have any locus to raise

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the said issue. On above broad submissions, Mr. Vyas would pray for

dismissal of the Revision Application.

11) Rival contentions raised on behalf of the parties, now fall for

my consideration.

12) The challenge to the concurrent �ndings recorded by the

Trial and Appellate Courts is raised by the Applicant mainly on the

ground that the decree cannot be executed in the light of provisions of

Section 22 of the Slum Act without seeking prior permission of the

Competent Authority. Applicant relied on Noti�cation dated 16 February

1979 issued by the Deputy Collector and Competent Authority under the

Slum Act in support of their contention that CTS No. 6/172 has been

declared as Slum area. However, perusal of the Schedule to the said

Noti�cation would indicate that only portion of land admeasuring

3468.26 sq. mtrs. is declared as Slum area and the entire land bearing

C.T.S No. 6/172 is not declared as slum. More importantly, Noti�cation

excludes certain portions in CTS No. 6/172 which is clear from the

following caveat in Schedule to the Noti�cation-"excluding permanent

building known as 'Old Post Chawl', 'Timber Depot', 'Garage'”.

13) It appears that there was no occasion for the Trial Court to

conduct enquiry into suit plot being declared as slum. A defense was

sought to be raised for the �rst time in reply to Obstructionist Notice.

Since the Applicant took the said defense, the burden was on him to prove

that the land on which structures are located is declared as slum. In view

of the fact that only certain portion of land in CTS No.6/172 is declared as

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Neeta Sawant CRA-464 OF 2025

slum, the burden was on the Applicant to prove that the structures are

located on the land which is declared as slum by the Noti�cation.

However, the Applicant have thoroughly failed to prove the same by

leading cogent evidence. The Applicant ought to have undertaken the

exercise of conducting measurements for proving that their structures are

located on land which is declared as slum vide Noti�cation dated 16

February 1979.

14) Reliance by the Applicant on judgment of the Apex Court in

Laxmi Ram Pawar (supra) is inapposite. No doubt permission of a

Competent Authority under Section 22 is required even for execution of

the decree. However, since the Applicant has failed to prove that the

structures are located on the land, which is declared as slum, the question

of seeking prior permission of the Competent Authority for execution of

decree does not arise. The allegation of suppression sought to be raised by

the Applicant also does not merit consideration as he has failed to prove

that the portion of land on which the structures are situated has been

declared as slum. Hence reliance on judgment of the Apex Court in S.P.

Chengalvaraya Naidu (supra) is inapposite. The Appellate Court has

recorded an emphatic �nding that the Noti�cation explicitly excluded

certain portions and that the suit premises are situated within the

excluded portion.

15) Though full-�edged enquiry into existence of an independent

right of Obstructionist may be warranted in given circumstances under

Rule 101 of Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure,1908 (Code), under

the guise of conduct of such enquiry, the Executing Court cannot go

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behind the decree. The Obstructionist cannot seek to establish as to how

the Defendant in the Suit could have raised a particular defence and

prevented the decree from being passed. All that an obstructionist can do

under Rules 97 and 101 of Order 21 of the Code is to establish his

independent right, dehorse the judgment debtor, to occupy the premises.

This is the limited scope of enquiry in the obstructionist proceedings. In

the present case, however, Applicant expected the Executing Court to go

beyond the decree and questioned its very validity. It must be borne in

mind that the obstruction is by an inductee of original tenant. Therefore,

the limited enquiry which needs to be conducted in such circumstances is

whether such inductee can have independent right to occupy the

structure even if the tenant is evicted from the premises/land. Under the

garb of obstructing the decree, the obstructionist cannot be permitted to

question the very validity of the decree. The objection of land being

declared slum therefore needs to be considered and decided keeping in

mind the above broad principles.

16) In my view, the Trial and Appellate Courts have conducted

suf�cient enquiry into the claim of Applicant in respect of the Slum Act.

The �ndings recorded by the Courts do not suffer from the vice of

perversity. In that view of the matter, the defence of land being declared

as slum is clearly misconceived and taken for the sole purpose of

somehow protecting possession of the premises even after two Courts

concurrently ruling against the Applicant.

17) Coming to the issue of establishment of independent right,

the Applicant has failed to prove the same. The suit was �led for recovery

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of possession of land in respect of which lease was granted. Applicant

claimed possession through induction made by the original tenant. In

such circumstances, provisions of Section 15A of the Bombay Rents, Hotel

and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 does not have any

application. In the present case, induction is not by the landlord but the

same is made by the tenant. This Court has repeatedly taken a view that if

lease is granted in respect of open land and if tenant constructs structures

and inducts third parties into that structures, all the occupiers of the

structure must walk out of their respective structures once decree for

eviction from land is made. In Darryl D’Monte (deleted since deceased)

and Ors. Versus. Vadilal Kunverji Gada & Ors.

3

this Court has held in

paragraphs 62 to 66 as under :

62. However, the issue in this regard appears to be squarely covered by

the judgment of this Court in Sanjay Ramchandra Parab (supra) in

which, the obstructionists had challenged orders passed by the Small

Causes Court and its Appellate Bench directing their removal from

structures in execution proceedings taken out by decree holders, who

had secured decree for eviction against the lessee of the land. The

Plaintiff had granted lease in respect of the vacant land for a period of 25

years in favour of the lessee who was permitted to put up buildings,

structures or sheds on the demised land. The lessee was also entitled to

assign the buildings and structures alongwith leasehold interest in the

land. The Plaintiffs �led R.A.E. & R. Suit before the Small Causes Court

for recovery of possession of land alongwith shed located thereon. The

R.A.E. & R. suit was dismissed but the Appellate Court allowed the

Appeal and passed eviction decree for possession of the suit premises.

When decree was put in execution, possession warrant was obstructed

by 56 different persons claiming possession in respect of the various

structures constructed on the demised land. Plaintiffs therefore took out

Obstructionist Notice, which was resisted by the 56 obstructionists

claiming independent right in respect of the structures. The issue before

this Court was whether the obstructionist had any independent right to

possess the structures erected by the original lessee in view of

permission granted to them under the clauses of lease. This Court noted

the ratio of the judgment in Ramkrishna Girishchandra Dode and Ors.

3 CRA 417 OF 2022 decided on 6 April 2026

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Versus. Anand Govind Kelkar and another

4

which in turn had relied

upon judgment in Goregaon Malayalee Samaj (supra) and This Court

held that if the tenants of the demised land constructed structures and

inducted third parties, their status vis-a-vis the land is necessarily that

of licensees and that they do not enjoy protection of provisions of

Section 15A of the Bombay Rent Act. This Court also referred to the

judgment of the Apex Court in Jamnadas Dharamdas (supra) in which it

was held that the landlord is entitled to claim relief of possession of land

without recognizing rights of obstructionists who were inducted by the

tenant in structures constructed by him. This Court held in Sanjay

Ramchandra Parab in paras-16 to 19 as under :

16) The facts of the present case appear to be somewhat similar

to the facts involved in Ramkrishna Girishchandra Dode in

which the Single Judge of this Court (A.V. Sawant, J.) has noted

the plight of the landlord/decree holder trying to execute the

decree in petitions �led by the obstructionists. The suit premises

therein comprised of open piece of land in respect of which, a

registered lease-deed was executed in favour of the lessee for a

period of 50 years. The lease was terminated by issuance of

notice and suit was instituted for recovery of possession. One of

the grounds for eviction was carrying out construction on the

plot and induction of outsiders without prior consent of the

landlords. The suit was decreed on 4 October 1978 directing the

Defendants/Tenants to vacate the suit property. When the decree

was put in execution and warrant of possession was issued, the

bailiff returned the warrant with a report that execution of

decree was obstructed by 80 obstructionists claiming possession

in respect of various constructed portions in the suit property.

The decree holders took out obstructionist notice which came to

be made absolute and the order of the Executing Court was

upheld by the Appellate Bench. In the above facts, this Court

considered the right of occupants of structures constructed on

the leased land in respect of which decree of eviction was passed

against the original lessee. This Court referred to judgment of

Division Bench in S.R. Shetty vs. Phirozeshah Nusserwanji

Colabawala decided on 21 November 1962 in which the question

of right of obstructionists in respect of the structures put up by

the tenants of the plot was considered. This Court held in para-

17 of the judgment as under:

17. As far back as on 21st November, 1962, a Division Bench of

this Court in C.R.Equity Text AA. No. 1511 of 1960 of S.R. Shetty

vs. Phirozeshah Nusserwanji Colabawala and another wa s

considering the question of the right of the obstructionists in

respect of the structures put up by the tenant of the plot

4 1999 1 Mh.LJ 37

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belonging to landlord owner of the plot. Whatever right the

obstructionists may have against the owner of the structures, it

was held that it was almost impossible to accept the suggestion

that after the structure is built and the sub-tenant has been

inducted by the tenant, such a sub-tenant also becomes the

subtenant of the land belonging to the landlord. The sub-tenant

of the structure erected by the tenant had only right to occupy

the said structure without any right to occupy the land on which

the structure was erected. This was all the more so in a case

where a multi-storeyed building is erected on a plot of land

where it would be dif�cult to decide as to which subtenant of

which structure had right to occupy the particular portion of the

plot of land in dispute which was leased by the landlord to the

tenant who had erected the super structure may be a multi

storeyed structure. This view expressed by the Division Bench in

S.R. Shetty vs. Phirozeshah Nusserwanji Colabawala, was

considered in a series of judgments rendered by this Court while

dealing with the right of the obstructionists in the proceedings

under the Rent Act.

17) In Ramkrishna Girishchandra Dode, this Court also relied upon

judgment in Goregaon Malayalee Samaj vs. M/s. Popatlal Prabhudas

and Sons wherein again the same issue was decided and this Court held

in para-21 as under:

21. In Goregaon Malayalee Samaj vs. M/s. Popatlal Prabhudas

and Sons, 1987 Mah.Rent Control Journal 701, A.C. Agarwal, J.

had occasion to consider the same question. Originally the

tenancy was in respect of the land. The tenant of the land

constructed structures thereon and inducted third parties. The

question arose whether such a third party could become

subtenant of the landlord in respect of the land beneath the

structure and claim protection of the provisions of section 15A of

the Rent Act. It was held that persons so inducted on the

structures would be the tenants in respect of the super structure

on the land only. Their status vis-a-vis the land is necessarily

that of a licensee only and not any higher status. Where a decree

is sought to be executed in respect of land which was subject

matter of the original lease, the status of the tenants of the

structure on the land was nothing more than that of mere

licensees. The right of the occupants of the structures on the

land was nothing more than that of a mere licensee. Such

licence must necessarily come to an end when the landlord

obtains a decree for eviction of his tenant and the occupants

have got to be evicted from the land which could not be

done unless they are also evicted from the structures which

stand on the land. All subsidiary interests that would have been

created by the original lessee of the land pursuant to the lease

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deed must necessarily come to an end unless the occupant was

otherwise protected by the provisions of the Rent Act. On the

question as to whether such an occupant would be protected

by the provisions of section 15A of the Rent Act, this Court

gave the answer in the negative.

18) This Court further held in para-23 and 24 as under :

23. I must now make a reference to the judgment of the Apex

Court which sets at rest the entire controversy and to which a

reference has been made in some of the decisions of this Court

referred to above. In Jamnadas Dharamdas vs. Dr. J. Josheph,

AIR 1980 SC 1605, the Apex Court considered identical situation

where the obstructionists were claiming protection after the

tenant had suffered a decree for eviction under section 12(3) of

the Rent Act. On consideration of some of its earlier

decisions, Apex Court held in para 18 of the judgment at

page 1610 that the landlord was entitled to claim relief of

possession of his land and in effect the decree for possession

of the land would mean that the land should be delivered to

him without structures. The tenant had committed defaults in

payment of rent. Reference was made by the Apex Court to the

decision of this Court in Ramchandra Raghunath Shirgaonkar

vs. Vishnu Balaji Hindalekar, AIR 1920 Bom. 87 where it was

held that ordinary rule of law is that tenant must give up

vacant possession of the land demised at the end of the term

and that if he builds on the land of the tenancy, he builds at

his own risks. At the end of the term, he can take away his

building but if he leaves it there it becomes the landlord's

property. A reference was also made to another decision on this

Court in Khimjee Thakersee vs. Pioneer Fibre Co. Ltd., AIR 1941

Bom. 337 where it was held that on determination of the lease

the lessees were required to deliver over possession of the

demised premises to the lessors and the lessees were entitled to

remove the structures which they might have erected during the

continuance of the tenancy. In para 21, the Apex Co urt

concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to ask for relief as to the

possession of the land and he was also entitled to ask for

demolition of the structures and for grant of vacant possession of

the plots.

24. In the light of the above legal position, I will consider the

contentions raised by the petitioners. The �rst contention is that,

in the facts of this case, since the lessee of the plot Kelkar was

permitted to put up or erect structures, the licensees of the

structures inducted by the lessee Kelkar were also entitled to

become the tenants of the land underneath the structures.

Reliance was placed on the observations of a learned Single Judge

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Bhasme, J. in Mangharam Chubarmal vs. B.C. Patel, 1971 Mh.L.J.

369=73 BLR 140 where it was held that in a suit against the

tenant, if other persons are joined on the allegation that they are

sub-tenants and if eviction is sought only on the grounds which

are personal to the tenant (sections 13(1)(a), (b), (c), (d) and (e)

of the Rent Act) then decree in ejectment against him will result

in conferring the direct tenancy rights on the lawful sub tenant.

It was further held that if sub-tenants are not impleaded in such

a suit, then the landlord, after obtaining the decree against the

tenant, will have to �le a fresh suit against the subtenants who

had by then became his direct tenant by virtue of section 14 of

the Rent Act. This view expressed by Bhasme, J., need not detain

me any longer since it is contrary to the earlier Division Bench

decision of this Court in S.R. Shetty's case (C.R.A. No. 1511 of

1960 decided on 21st November, 1962). The view expressed by

Bhasme J. has also been dissented by P.B. Sawant, J. in Damji

Nansi's case, 1979 BCR 670 by Sharad Manohar, J. in Dinkar

Vaidya's case, AIR 1981 Bom. 190 by S.J. Deshpande, J. in Mrs.

Suman Damani's case 1986 Mah. R.C. J. 376 and by A.C. Agarwal,

J. in Goregaon Malayalee Samaj's case 1987 Mah.R.C. J. 701. More

over in view of the decision of the Apex Court in Jamnadas

Dharamdas vs. Dr. J. Joseph, AIR 1980 SC 1605, with respect it is

not possible for me to agree with the view expressed by Bhasme,

J. that the sub-tenants or licensees of the structures inducted in

the structures by the lessee of the plot will still be entitled to

claim protection of the provisions of section 14 or 15-A of the

Rent Act despite the decree for eviction being passed against the

tenants under the provisions of the Rent Act. There is thus no

substance in the �rst contention advanced on behalf of the

obstructionists.

19) Thus it is settled position of law as expounded by the Apex

Court in Jamnadas Dharamdas (supra) that obstructionist claiming

protection after suffering of decree of eviction by a tenant cannot

defeat landlord’s entitlement to claim possession of his land and if

any structure is built on the land, such structure is at the risk of

the tenant and at the end of the term, the land must be returned to

the landlord and persons inducted in such structures cannot

oppose execution of the decree. Thus, if Defendant-M/s. Bhide Textile

Industry has inducted Applicants/their predecessor-in-title in the

constructed portion of the suit property during pendency of the suit, the

tenant has done so at its own risk and Applicants/predecessor-in-title

have occupied the structures at their own risk. Their status vis-a-vis

the land is necessarily that of lessee and they cannot claim any

higher status. Once the tenant is directed to vacate, his licensee

must also vacate the structures on the land. This position of law is

repeatedly expounded in various other judgments relied upon by Mr.

Jahagirdar.

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(emphasis and underlining added)

63. In Virji Nathuram (supra) the Single Judge of this Court has held in

para-9 of the judgment as under:

9. The argument is highly attractive. Though this

argument had not been advanced in such terms in the

Court below, since it is based on the facts already on

record and it is raised in the form of a legal proposition, I

have heard Mr. Walavalkar at length on the same. In my

opinion, though, as mentioned above, the argument is

highly attractive, it ignores one basic ingredient in the

dual relationship which has come into existence as a

result of the lease deed executed by the respondent in

favour of the origin al lessee and the law laid down by the

long line of decisions to which I have already made

reference earlier. The original lessee has naturally got to

be evicted pursuant to the decree passed in the suit

preferred by the respondent. The original lessee has to be

evicted from the entire land which was the subject-matter

of the lease which has now been determined.

Undoubtedly, as has been pointed out repeatedly, the

original lease has permitted the erection of a

superstructure on the land and the induction of third

parties in the said superstructure. The persons so

inducted were no doubt the tenants of the

superstructure which was erected. The status of the

persons who were inducted, though legally, in the

superstructure vis-a-vis the land is necessarily that of

licensees and not any other higher status. At present

the decree is being sought to be executed in respect of the

land which was the subject-matter of the original lease

and upon which the status of the petitioners is nothing

more than that of licensees. The correct legal position

is that on the determination of the lease or other

interests which are created on the land including the

superstructure, the interest, if it can be so called, of

the licensees has necessarily to come to an end. The

decree which is being executed by the respondent cannot

be properly executed unless the status of the petitioners

as licensees on the land also comes to an end. It is in this

sense that the petitioners have got to be evicted from the

suit land. This cannot be done unless naturally they are

also evicted from the structure which is standing on the

land in question. Therefore, in execution of the decree

by the respondent inexorably the possession of the

petitioners of the land as licensees must also come to

an end. The petitioners cannot remain in possession of

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the structure unless they have a right to remain in

possession of the land as licensees, which they are not

entitled to do in view of the decree which has been validly

passed against the lessee. The petitioners, therefore,

cannot resist the execution of the decree which had been

undoubtedly passed validly against the original lessee. All

the subsidiary interests which were created, even if legal,

by the original lessee pursuant to the lease deed must

necessarily come to an end unless otherwise they are

protected under the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act.

The possession of a licensee in the year 1964 when the

suit was �led could not survive the determination of the

lease in respect of the land on which the licence was

created. It is thus that the petitioners do not enjoy any

protection even in respect of the structure in which they

have been inducted legally pursuant to the term of the

lease.

(emphasis added)

64. In Virji Nathuram this Court has recognised the principle that mere

permission to erect a superstructure on the land, and induction of the

parties in the superstructure does not create a right in favour of occupier

of such superstructure to obstruct execution of decree.

65. In C. Albert Morris Versus. K. Chandrasekaran and others

5

the

Apex Court has held in para-40 of the judgment as under :

40. We have already referred to the arguments advanced

by both the parties in regard to the nature of tenancy and

the statutory protection. It is abundantly clear from the

recitals in the plaint, the Schedule to the notice and to

the plaint and also of the lease deed that what was "leased

out" was only a vacant site to put up a petrol bunk with

accessory constructions thereon. The mention of a

small shed in the current lease undoubtedly belonged

to the tenant himself and, therefore, the building put

up by the tenant situated in the vacant site belonging

to the landlord cannot be said to be the building of

the landlord in order to attract the statutory

protection of the Rent Control Act. This issue is,

therefore, answered against the tenant.

(emphasis added)

66. Thus, in Ramkrishna Girishchandra Dode, Jamnadas Dharamdas,

C. Albert Morris, Sanjay Ramchandra Parab and Virji Nathuram it is

repeatedly held that a person, inducted by the lessee in structure

5 2006 1 SCC 228

_____________________________________________________________________________

PAGE NO. 15 OF 16

4 May 2026

Neeta Sawant CRA-464 OF 2025

constructed by him as per permission granted under the lease, is not

entitled to claim protection of possession of structures constructed by

the lessee and that he must vacate the structure when decree against the

lessee is executed.

18) Thus, in the present case, no independent right could be

established by the Applicant to occupy the structures in his possession.

19) The Applicant has thus failed to prove existence of any

independent right to occupy the suit premises. The Revision Application

is devoid of merits. It is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.

[SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.]

_____________________________________________________________________________

PAGE NO. 16 OF 16

4 May 2026

NEETA

SHAILESH

SAWANT

Digitally

signed by

NEETA

SHAILESH

SAWANT

Date:

2026.05.04

20:42:43

+0530