IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA

AT CHANDIGARH

CRA-D No.749 of 2024

Reserved on : 16.10.2025

Pronounced on: 28.10.2025

Manjeet Singh

….Appellant

versus

State of Haryana

…Respondent

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK SIBAL

HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE LAPITA BANERJI

Present: Mr. M.S. Rana, Advocate

for the appellant.

Mr. Pardeep Chahar, Senior Deputy Advocate General,

Haryana.

DEEPAK SIBAL, J.

1. Through the instant appeal the appellant challenges the

order dated April 04, 2024, passed by the Additional Sessions Judge,

Karnal, (for short – the Trial Court), declining regular bail to the appellant

in FIR No.414 dated 20.06.2022 under Sections 10, 13 and 18 of the

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (for short – the UAPA),

Section 3 of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984 (for

short – the PDPP Act) and Sections 120-B/ 153-A of the Indian Penal

Code, 1860 (for short – the FIR in question).

CRA-D No.749 of 2024

2

THE FACTS

2. On 20.06.2022, Inspector Sandip Singh, who was posted as

Station House Officer, Civil Lines, Karnal received information that

certain objectionable slogans have been painted on the front walls of

Dayal Singh College and DAV School in Karnal. On receipt of such

information he reached the gate of Dayal Singh College and found pro

Khalistan slogans painted on its front wall in Punjabi and English.

Thereafter, he reached DAV School and found similar slogans painted on

the wall of the school. After taking photographs, he registered the FIR in

question.

3. During the course of investigation, on 03.07.2022, the

appellant was arrested and on being interrogated, through his alleged

disclosure statement, he allegedly admitted to have written pro Khalistan

slogans on the walls of Dayal Singh College and DAV School in Karnal.

Further investigation resulted in the alleged recovery of a motorcycle,

one bag and one mobile phone from the appellant’s possession.

Thereafter, co-accused Resham Singh was arrested on 22.07.2022.

4. The clothes, mobile phone of the appellant and his co-

accused were then subjected to forensic examination and after

completion of investigation the State filed before the Trial Court its final

report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. on the basis whereof the appellant was

charged and presently faces trial under Sections of the IPC, UAPA and

PDPP Act, under which the FIR in question had been registered.

CRA-D No.749 of 2024

3

5. Till date, only 01 out of the 16 prosecution witnesses has

been examined in the appellant’s trial and in the meanwhile, the appellant

has undergone actual custody of nearly 03 years and 04 months.

THE SUBMISSIONS

6. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the Trial

Court erred in law and in fact by denying bail to the appellant; the

appellant is sought to be prosecuted primarily on the basis of his

disclosure statement made by him in police custody which in the absence

of any corroborative evidence has no evidentiary value in the eyes of law;

the alleged recovery from the appellant of a motorcycle, a bag and a

mobile phone does not connect the appellant with the crime he is being

prosecuted for; there is also no forensic evidence connecting the

appellant with the crime for which he is facing trial; no incriminating

material has been recovered from the appellant; the investigation against

the appellant is complete and therefore, he is no longer required by the

prosecution for such purpose; through order dated 03.04.2024 passed in

CRA-D-378-2023-Resham vs. State of Haryana similarly placed co-

accused, namely, Resham who had undergone only 01 year and 09

months of custody has already been granted regular bail by a coordinate

Bench of this Court and that since till date only 01 out of 16 prosecution

witnesses has been examined in the appellant’s trial the same will take a

long time to conclude.

7. In support of his submissions learned counsel for the

appellant has relied on the judgments of the Supreme Court in Union of

India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713, Shoma Kanti Sen v. State of

CRA-D No.749 of 2024

4

Maharashtra and another, (2024) 6 SCC 591, Vernon v. The State of

Maharashtra and another, (2023) 15 SCC 56, Sheikh Javed Iqbal @

Ashfaq Ansari @ Javed Ansari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2024) 8 SCC

293 and Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra and

another, (2024) 9 SCC 813.

8. Learned State counsel fairly admits that a coordinate Bench

of this Court has granted regular bail to a similarly placed co-accused,

namely, Resham and to the period of appellant’s incarceration as also that

as on date in the appellant’s trial out of 16 only 01 prosecution witness

has been examined but seeks dismissal of the instant appeal by submitting

that the appellant is involved in anti-national activities and his role of

writing pro Khalistan slogans on the walls of a College and a School in

Karnal stands admitted by him and that in terms of Section 43-D (5) of

the UAPA the appellant should not be granted regular bail.

9. Learned counsel for the parties have been heard and with 

their able assistance the record of the case has also been examined. 

DISCUSSIONS AND FINDINGS

10. At the outset it would be apposite to refer to Section 43-D

of the UAPA. The same reads as follows:-

“43D. Modified application of certain provisions of the

Code.—

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code or any

other law, every offence punishable under this Act shall

be deemed to be a cognizable offence within the meaning

of clause (c) of section 2 of the Code, and “cognizable

case” as defined in that clause shall be construed

accordingly.

(2) Section 167 of the Code shall apply in relation to a case

involving an offence punishable under this Act subject to

the modification that in sub-section (2),-

CRA-D No.749 of 2024

5

(a) the references to “fifteen days”, “ninety days” and

“sixty days”, wherever they occur, shall be

construed as references to “thirty days”, “ninety

days” and “ninety days” respectively; and

(b) after the proviso, the following provisos shall be

inserted, namely:-

“Provided further that if it is not possible to complete the

investigation within the said period of ninety days, the

Court may if it is satisfied with the report of the Public

Prosecutor indicating the progress of the investigation

and the specific reasons for the detention of the accused

beyond the said period of ninety days, extend the said

period up to one hundred and eighty days:

Provided also that if the police officer making the

investigation under this Act, requests, for the purposes of

investigation, for police custody from judicial custody of

any person in judicial custody, he shall file an affidavit

stating the reasons for doing so and shall also explain the

delay, if any, for requesting such police custody.

(3) Section 268 of the Code shall apply in relation to a case

involving an offence punishable under this Act subject to

the modification that-

(a) the reference in sub-section (1) thereof-

(i) to “the State Government” shall be

construed as a reference to “the Central

Government or the State Government.”;

(ii) (ii)to “order of the State Government” shall

be construed as a reference to “order of the

Central Government or the State

Government, as the case may be”; and

(b) the reference in sub-section (2) thereof, to “the

State Government” shall be construed as a

reference to “the Central Government or the State

Government, as the case may be”.

(4) Nothing in section 438 of the Code shall apply in relation

to any case involving the arrest of any person accused of

having committed an offence punishable under this Act.

(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no

person accused of an offence punishable under Chapters

IV and VI of this Act shall, if in custody, be released on

bail or on his own bond unless the Public Prosecutor has

been given an opportunity of being heard on the

application for such release:

Provided that such accused person shall not be released

on bail or on his own bond if the Court, on a perusal of

the case diary or the report made under section 173 of the

Code is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds

CRA-D No.749 of 2024

6

for believing that the accusation against such person is

prima facie true.

(6) The restrictions on granting of bail specified in sub-

section (5) is in addition to the restrictions under the Code

or any other law for the time being in force on granting

of bail.

(7) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (5)

and (6), no bail shall be granted to a person accused of

an offence punishable under this Act, if he is not an Indian

citizen and has entered the country unauthorisedly or

illegally except in very exceptional circumstances and for

reasons to be recorded in writing.”

11. As per Section 43-D (5) of the UAPA, no person accused of

an offence punishable under Chapter IV and VI of the UAPA shall, if in

custody, be released on bail unless the public prosecutor has been given

an opportunity of being heard on the application made by him for such

release and if the Court, on perusing the case diary or the report filed

under Section 173 Cr.P.C. is of the opinion that there are reasonable

grounds for believing that the accusations against such person are prima

facie proved. Section 43-D (6) further stipulates that restrictions for the

grant of bail specified in Section 43-D (5) would be in addition to the

restrictions provided under the Cr.P.C. or any other law for the time being

in force on granting of bail.

12. A reading of the reply filed by the State does not reveal on

what basis the appellant was arrested. The prosecution’s case primarily

rests on the alleged admission made by the appellant while in the police

custody, the evidentiary value of which shall be gone into during the

course of the appellant’s trial. No material has been placed before this

Court of any monetary transactions having taken place in connection with

the allegations made against the appellant. Report of the FSL placed

CRA-D No.749 of 2024

7

before us also does not refer to any incriminating material found in the

appellant’s phone. Similarly placed co-accused namely Resham has

already been granted regular bail by a coordinate Bench of this Court in

CRA-D-378-2023-Resham vs. State of Haryana through order dated

03.04.2024. Investigation qua the appellant is also complete and

therefore, the prosecution does not require him for such purpose. The

appellant has also undergone nearly 03 years and 04 months of actual

custody and till date, in his trial, only 01 of the 16 prosecution witnesses

has been examined.

13. In the light of the above and in particular on the ground of

parity with similarly placed co-accused Resham, we find no reason to

deny regular bail to the appellant even though he is facing trial for

commission of offences under the UAPA. In this regard we may usefully

refer to the following observations made by the Supreme Court in

Jalaluddin Khan v. Union of India reported in (2024) 10 SCC 574:-

“17.1 Bihar Police had received information about a plan

to disturb the proposed visit of Hon’ble Prime Minister to

Bihar by some suspected persons who had assembled in

Phulwarisharif area. On 11.07.2022 at about 19:30 hrs, on

secret information, a raid was carried out by the police

officers of PS Phulwarisharif, Patna at the rented

house/premises of Athar Parvej (A-1) and recovered 05 sets

of documents “India 2047 Towards Rule of Islamic India,

Internal Document: Not for Circulation”, Pamphlets

“Popular Front of India 20-2-2021” – 25 copies in Hindi

and 30 copies in Urdu, 49 cloth flags, 02 magazines “Mulk

ke liye Popular Front ke saath” and one copy of rent

agreement on non-judicial stamp by Farhat Bano w/o Md.

Jalaluddin Khan (A-2) with tenant Athar Parvej (A-1) son of

Abdul Qayum Ansari. The recovered articles and a Samsung

mobile phone having SIM card of accused Md. Jalaluddin

(A-2) were seized in the instant case. They were related to

anti-India activities.”

xxx xxx xxx

CRA-D No.749 of 2024

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30. Therefore, on plain reading of the charge-sheet, it is

not possible to record a conclusion that there are reasonable

grounds for believing that the accusation against the

appellant of commission of offences punishable under UAPA

is prima-facie true. We have taken the charge-sheet and the

statement of witness Z as they are without conducting a

mini-trial. Looking at what we have held earlier, it is

impossible to record a prima-facie finding that there were

reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against

the appellant of commission of offences under UAPA was

prima-facie true. No antecedents of the appellant have been

brought on record.

31. The upshot of the above discussion is that there was

no reason to reject the bail application filed by the appellant.

32. Before we part with the judgment, we must mention here

that the Special Court and the High Court did not consider

the material in the charge-sheet objectively. Perhaps the

focus was more on the activities of PFI, and therefore, the

appellant’s case could not be properly appreciated. When a

case is made out for a grant of bail, the Courts should not

have any hesitation in granting bail. The allegations of the

prosecution may be very serious. But, the duty of the Courts

is to consider the case for grant of bail in accordance with

the law. “Bail is the rule and jail is an exception” is a settled

law.

33. Even in a case like the present case where there are

stringent conditions for the grant of bail in the relevant

statutes, the same rule holds good with only modification

that the bail can be granted if the conditions in the statute

are satisfied. The rule also means that once a case is made

out for grant of bail, the Court cannot decline to grant bail.

If the Courts start denying bail in deserving cases, it will be

a violation of the rights guaranteed under Article 21 of our

Constitution.”

14. After weighing the stringency with regard to grant of bail to

an undertrial facing charges under the UAPA vis-a-vis the rights

guaranteed under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, the Supreme

Court has held that right to a speedy trial was guaranteed under Article

21 of the Indian Constitution and that long custody by itself would entail

the accused being tried under the UAPA to be granted bail. In this regard

CRA-D No.749 of 2024

9

reference can be made to the following observations of the Supreme

Court in K.A. Najeeb’s case (supra):_

“17. It is thus clear to us that the presence of statutory

restrictions like Section 43-D(5) of UAPA per se does not

oust the ability of Constitutional Courts to grant bail on

grounds of violation of Part III of the Constitution. Indeed,

both the restrictions under a Statue as well as the powers

exercisable under Constitutional Jurisdiction can be well

harmonised. Whereas at commencement of proceedings, the

Courts are expected to appreciate the legislative policy

against grant of bail but the rigours of such provisions will

melt down where there is no likelihood of trial being

completed within a reasonable time and the period of

incarceration already undergone has exceeded a substantial

part of the prescribed sentence. Such an approach would

safeguard against the possibility of provisions like Section

43-D (5) of UAPA being used as the sole metric for denial

of bail or for wholesale breach of constitutional right to

speedy trial.

xxxxxxxxxxxx

19. xxxxxx

Instead, Section 43-D (5) of UAPA merely provides another

possible ground for the competent Court to refuse bail, in

addition to the well settled considerations like gravity of the

offence, possibility of tampering with evidence, influencing

the witnesses or chance of the accused evading the trial by

absconsion etc.”

15. Further, the Supreme Court, in the case of Vernon (supra)

has held that serious allegations against accused who is facing trial under

the UAPA by itself cannot be a reason to deny him bail. The relevant

extract from the said judgment is reproduced hereunder:-

“53. In Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (supra) reference was

made to the judgment of Jayendra Saraswathi Swamigal v.

State of Tamil Nadu [(2005) 2 SCC 13) in which, citing two

earlier decisions of this court in the cases of State v. Jagjit

Singh (AIR 1962 SC 253) and Gurcharan Singh v. State of

(UT of Delhi) [(1978) 1 SCC 118), the factors for granting

bail under normal circumstances were discussed. It was

held that the nature and seriousness of the offences, the

character of the evidence, circumstances which are peculiar

to the accused, a reasonable possibility of the presence of

CRA-D No.749 of 2024

10

the accused not being secured at the trial; reasonable

apprehension of witnesses being tampered with; the larger

interest of the public or the State would be relevant factors

for granting or rejecting bail. Juxtaposing the appellants’

case founded on Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of

India with the aforesaid allegations and considering the fact

that almost five years have lapsed since they were taken into

custody, we are satisfied that the appellants have made out

a case for granting bail. Allegations against them no doubt

are serious, but for that reason alone bail cannot be denied

to them. While dealing with the offences under Chapters IV

and VI of the 1967 Act, we have referred to the materials

available against them at this stage. These materials cannot

justify continued detention of the appellants, pending final

outcome of the case under the other provisions of the 1860

Code and the 1967 Act.”

16. Similarly, in the case of Shoma Kanti Sen (supra), the

Supreme Court held as follows:-

“44. In Union of India v. K.A.Najeeb, a three Judge Bench

of this Court (of which one of us Aniruddha Bose, J was a

party), has held that a Constitutional Court is not strictly

bound by the prohibitory provisions of grant of bail in the

1967 Act and can exercise its constitutional jurisdiction to

release an accused on bail who has been incarcerated for a

long period of time, relying on Article 21 of Constitution of

India. This decision was sought to be distinguished by Mr.

Nataraj on facts relying on judgment of this Court in the

case of Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab [2024 INSC 92].

In this judgment, it has been held:-

"44. The Appellant's counsel has relied upon the case of KA

Najeeb (supra) to back its contention that the appellant has

been in jail for last five years which is contrary to law laid

down in the said case. While this argument may appear

compelling at first glance, it lacks depth and substance.

45. In KA Najeeb's case this court was confronted with a

circumstance wherein except the respondent-accused, other

co-accused had already undergone trial and were sentenced

to imprisonment of not exceeding eight years therefore this

court's decision to consider bail was grounded in the

anticipation of the impending sentence that the respondent

accused might face upon conviction and since the

respondent-accused had already served portion of the

maximum imprisonment i.e., more than five years, this court

took it as a factor influencing its assessment to grant bail.

Further, In KA Najeeb's case the trial of the respondent

CRA-D No.749 of 2024

11

accused was severed from the other co-accused owing to his

absconding and he was traced back in 2015 and was being

separately tried thereafter and the NIA had filed a long list

of witnesses that were left to be examined with reference to

the said accused therefore this court was of the view of

unlikelihood of completion of trial in near future. However,

in the present case the trial is already under way and 22

witnesses including the protected witnesses have been

examined.

46. As already discussed, the material available on record

indicates the involvement of the appellant in furtherance of

terrorist activities backed by members of banned terrorist

organization involving exchange of large quantum of money

through different channels which needs to be deciphered

and therefore in such a scenario if the appellant is released

on bail there is every likelihood that he will influence the key

witnesses of the case which might hamper the process of

justice. Therefore, mere delay in trial pertaining to grave

offences as one involved in the instant case cannot on be

used as a ground to grant bail. Hence, the aforesaid

argument on the behalf of the appellant cannot be

accepted.”

45. Relying on this judgment, Mr. Nataraj, submits that

bail is not a fundamental right. Secondly, to be entitled to be

enlarged on bail, an accused charged with offences

enumerated in Chapters IV and VI of the 1967 Act, must

fulfill the conditions specified in Section 43D (5) thereof. We

do not accept the first part of this submission. This Court

has already accepted right of an accused under the said

offences of the 1967 Act to be enlarged on bail founding

such right on Article 21 of the Constitution of India. This

was in the case of Najeeb (supra), and in that judgment, long

period of incarceration was held to be a valid ground to

enlarge an accused on bail in spite of the bail-restricting

provision of Section 43D (5) of the 1967 Act.

46. Pre-conviction detention is necessary to collect

evidence (at the investigation stage), to maintain purity in

the course of trial and also to prevent an accused from being

fugitive from justice. Such detention is also necessary to

prevent further commission of offence by the same accused.

Depending on gravity and seriousness of the offence alleged

to have been committed by an accused, detention before

conclusion of trial at the investigation and post-charge sheet

stage has the sanction of law broadly on these reasonings.

But any form of deprival of liberty results in breach of

Article 21 of the Constitution of India and must be justified

on the ground of being reasonable, following a just and fair

procedure and such deprival must be proportionate in the

facts of a given case. These would be the overarching

CRA-D No.749 of 2024

12

principles which the law Courts would have to apply while

testing prosecution’s plea of pre-trial detention, both at

investigation and post-charge sheet stage.”

47. As regards second part of Mr Nataraj's argument

which we have noted in the preceding paragraph, we accept

it with a qualification. The reasoning in Najeeb case would

also have to be examined, if it is the constitutional court

which is examining prosecution's plea for retaining in

custody an accused charged with bail-restricting offences.

He cited Gurwinder Singh in which the judgment of K.A.

Najeeb was distinguished on facts and a judgment of the

High Court rejecting the prayer for bail of the appellant was

upheld. But this was a judgment in the given facts of that

case and did not dislocate the axis of reasoning on

constitutional ground enunciated in Najeeb. On behalf of

the prosecution, another order of a coordinate Bench passed

on 18-1-2024, in Mazhar Khan v. NIA New Delhi [Special

Leave Petition (Crl) No. 14091 of 2023] was cited. In this

order, the petitioner's prayer for overturning a bail-rejection

order of the High Court under similar provisions of the 1967

Act was rejected by the coordinate Bench applying the ratio

of Watali judgment and also considering Vernon. We have

proceeded in this judgment accepting the restrictive

provisions to be valid and applicable and then dealt with the

individual allegations in terms of the proviso to Section 43-

D (5) of the 1967 Act. Thus, the prosecution's case, so far as

the appellant is concerned, does not gain any premium from

the reasoning forming the basis of Mazhar Khan (supra).”

17. In the case of Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh (supra), the

Supreme Court held that criminals are not born but made out. Howsoever

serious the crime may be, an accused has a right to a speedy trial and that

the purpose of bail is only to secure the attendance of the accused at the

trial and that bail is not to be withheld as a form of punishment. In this

regard, it would be useful to refer to the following observations made by

the Supreme Court:-

“11. The aforesaid observations have resonated, time and

again, in several judgments, such as Kadra Pahadiya &

Ors. v. State of Bihar reported in (1981) 3 SCC 671 and

Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak reported in (1992) 1

SCC 225. In the latter the Court reemphasized the right to

CRA-D No.749 of 2024

13

speedy trial, and further held that an accused, facing

prolonged trial, has no option:

“84…..The State or complainant prosecutes him. It is, thus,

the obligation of the State or the complainant, as the case

may be, to proceed with the case with reasonable

promptitude. Particularly, in this country, where the large

majority of accused come from poorer and weaker sections

of the society, not versed in the ways of law, where they do

not often get competent legal advice, the application of the

said rule is wholly inadvisable. Of course, in a given case,

if an accused demands speedy trial and yet he is not given

one, may be a relevant factor in his favour. But we cannot

disentitle an accused from complaining of infringement of

his right to speedy trial on the ground that he did not ask for

or insist upon a speedy trial.”

12. In Mohd Muslim @ Hussain v. State (NCT of Delhi)

reported in 2023 INSC 311, this Court observed as under:

“23. Before parting, it would be important to reflect that laws

which impose stringent conditions for grant of bail, may be

necessary in public interest; yet, if trials are not concluded

in time, the injustice wrecked on the individual is

immeasurable. Jails are overcrowded and their living

conditions, more often than not, appalling. According to the

Union Home Ministry’s response to Parliament, the

National Crime Records Bureau had recorded that as on

31st December 2021, over 5,54,034 prisoners were lodged

in jails against total capacity of 4,25,069 lakhs in the

country. Of these 122,852 were convicts; the rest 4,27,165

were undertrials.

24. The danger of unjust imprisonment, is that inmates are

at risk of “prisonisation” a term described by the Kerala

High Court in A Convict Prisoner v. State, reported in 1993

Cri LJ 3242, as “a radical transformation” whereby the

prisoner:

‘13….. loses his identity. He is known by a number. He loses

personal possessions. He has no personal relationships.

Psychological problems result from loss of freedom, status,

possessions, dignity any autonomy of personal life. The

inmate culture of prison turns out to be dreadful. The

prisoner becomes hostile by ordinary standards. Self-

perception changes.’

25. There is a further danger of the prisoner turning to

crime, “as crime not only turns admirable, but the more

professional the crime, more honour is paid to the criminal”

(also see Donald Clemmer’s ‘The Prison Community’

published in 1940). Incarceration has further deleterious

effects - where the accused belongs to the weakest economic

strata: immediate loss of livelihood, and in several cases,

CRA-D No.749 of 2024

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scattering of families as well as loss of family bonds and

alienation from society. The courts therefore, have to be

sensitive to these aspects (because in the event of an

acquittal, the loss to the accused is irreparable), and ensure

that trials – especially in cases, where special laws enact

stringent provisions, are taken up and concluded speedily.”

Xxxxxxx

16. Criminals are not born out but made. The human

potential in everyone is good and so, never write off any

criminal as beyond redemption. This humanist fundamental

is often missed when dealing with delinquents, juvenile and

adult. Indeed, every saint has a past and every sinner a

future. When a crime is committed, a variety of factors is

responsible for making the offender commit the crime.

Those factors may be social and economic, may be, the

result of value erosion or parental neglect; may be, because

of the stress of circumstances, or the manifestation of

temptations in a milieu of affluence contrasted with

indigence or other privations.”

18. To the same effect are the following observations of the

Supreme Court in the case of Tapas Kumar Palit v. State of

Chhattisgarh, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 322:_

“10. However, many times we have made ourselves very

clear that howsoever serious a crime may be the accused

has a fundamental right of speedy trial as enshrined in

Article 21 of the Constitution.

Xxx

12. The aforesaid results in indefinite delay in conclusion

of trial. It is expected of the Public Prosecutor to wisely

exercise his discretion insofar as examination of the witness

is concerned.

Xxx

14. In this regard, the role of the Special Judge (NIA)

would also assume importance. The Special Judge should

inquire with the Special Public Prosecutor why he intends

to examine a particular witness if such witness is going to

depose the very same thing that any other witness might

have deposed earlier. We may sound as if laying some

guidelines, but time has come to consider this issue of delay

and bail in its true and proper perspective. If an accused is

to get a final verdict after incarceration of six to seven years

in jail as an undertrial prisoner, then, definitely, it could be

CRA-D No.749 of 2024

15

said that his right to have a speedy trial under Article 21 of

the Constitution has been infringed. The stress of long trials

on accused persons- who remain innocent until proven

guilty- can also be significant. Accused persons are not

financially compensated for what might be a lengthy period

of pre-trial incarceration. They may also have lost a job for

accommodation, experienced damage to personal

relationships while incarcerated, and spent a considerable

amount of money on legal fees. If an accused person is found

not guilty, they have likely endured many months of being

stigmatized and perhaps even ostracized in their community

and will have to rebuild their lives with their own resources.

15. We would say that delays are bad for the accused and

extremely bad for the victims, for Indian society and for the

credibility of our justice system, which is valued. Judges are

the masters of their Courtrooms and the Criminal Procedure

Code provides many tools for the Judges to use in order to

ensure that cases proceed efficiently.”

19. In the light of the above discussion, subject to the

satisfaction of the Trial Court/Duty Magistrate the appellant is ordered to

be released on regular bail on the following conditions:-

(i) He shall furnish bond of ₹10 lakh with two sureties of the like

amount;

(ii) He shall deposit his passport, if any, in the Trial Court;

(iii) He shall appear before the Trial Court on each and every date,

unless specifically exempted;

(iv) He shall appear before the Investigating Officer, as and when

summoned;

(v) He shall not directly or indirectly make any inducement, threat

or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case

or who is cited as a witness;

(vi) He shall not involve in any criminal activity;

(vii) He shall not sell, transfer or in any other manner create third

party right over immovable property or properties owned by

him;

(viii) At the time of release of the appellant, the SHO of the area

where he normally resides, shall be informed and that the

appellant shall mark his attendance before the said SHO on

every Monday till the conclusion of the trial and that

(ix) He shall furnish an undertaking to the effect that in case of his

absence, the Trial Court may proceed with the trial and in such

eventuality he shall not claim re-examination of any witness.

CRA-D No.749 of 2024

16

20. While granting bail to the appellant, at the time of recording

its satisfaction, the Trial Court/ Duty Magistrate may also impose any

further condition as it deems necessary.

21. If any of the above conditions or any further condition(s)

which may be imposed by the Trial Court/ Duty Magistrate are breached

by the appellant it would be open to the prosecution to seek cancellation

of the bail granted to him through the instant order.

22. It is clarified that the observations made through the instant

order have been made only for the limited purpose of deciding the present

appeal for the grant of regular bail and that the same would not be

construed to be an expression of opinion on the merits of the case.

23. The impugned order is set aside and the appeal is allowed in

the above terms.

               (DEEPAK SIBAL) 

                       JUDGE 

              (LAPITA BANERJI) 

                        JUDGE 

28.10.2025

gk 

Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No

Whether reportable: Yes/No