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CGHC010303572026 2026:CGHC:35949-DB

NAFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

CRMP No. 2086 of 2026

Manoharlal Choudhary S/o Late Umed Ram Choudhary, Aged About 65

Years R/o Om Shanti Vihar Colony (Plot No. 14), Kotra Road, Distt -

Raigarh (C.G.)

... Petitioner

versus

1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, Police Station

Ambikapur District Sarguja (C.G.)

2 - District Magistrate Ambikapur, Sarguja, Distt. Sarguja (C.G.)

... Respondents

(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)

For Petitioner :Ms. Priyanka Rai Mishra, Advocate

For State/Respondents :Mr. Ashish Shukla, Additional Advocate

General

Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice

Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge

Order on Board

Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice

13.08.2026

1.Heard Ms. Priyanka Rai Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner

as well as Mr. Ashish Shukla, learned Additional Advocate General,

appearing for respondents/State.

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2.By filing the present petition, the petitioner calls in question the

legality and validity of FIR No.694/1992 registered at Police Station

Ambikapur, charge-sheet No.255-A/2026 dated 23.06.2026 and the

consequential cognizance order passed by the learned Special Judge

(Prevention of Corruption Act), Ambikapur, in Special Criminal Case

No.03/2026, insofar as the same relate to the petitioner for the offences

punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 34 of the IPC and

the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The petitioner has

prayed for following relief:

“It is therefore most humbly and respectfully

prayed that this Hon'ble Court may kindly be

pleased to quash the FIR No. 694/1992

registered at P.S.Ambikapur, Chhattisgarh

(then M.P) along with chargesheet no. 255-

A/2026 dated 23.06.2026 presented before

First Additional sessions Judge, Ambikapur

District sarguja and the cognizance order by

special judge (PC Act) sarguja, Ambikapur in

special criminal case no. 03/2026 for offence

U/S 420,468,467,471,34 of IPC and section

13 (1)(d) and 13(2) of prevention of corruption

Act (Annexure P/1) so far as the petitioner is

concerned.”

3.Brief facts of the case, in a nutshell, are that the co-accused, while

posted as Joint Collector (Land Acquisition), Ambikapur, had acquired

land belonging to one Amarsai and an award of compensation of

Rs.12,840.55/- was passed in his favour. It is alleged that the amount in

the cheque was subsequently altered to Rs.5,12,840.55/- and a savings

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bank account was opened in the name of Amarsai on the basis of false

identification, resulting in withdrawal of the enhanced amount. The

petitioner, who was then posted as Postal Assistant, is alleged to have

opened the account in discharge of his official duties.

4.The FIR was registered in the year 1992 and the investigation

remained pending for more than three decades. The petitioner

subsequently superannuated in the year 2021. Upon his earlier petition

being registered as Cr.M.P. No.1024/2026, this Court called for an

explanation from the Director General of Police regarding the

extraordinary delay and directed completion of investigation. Thereafter,

the charge-sheet was filed on 23.06.2026, after a lapse of about 34

years. The earlier petition was withdrawn with liberty to challenge the

charge-sheet.

5.Ms. Priyanka Rai Mishra, learned counsel appearing for the

petitioner, submits that the prosecution itself suffers from an inordinate

and wholly unexplained delay of about 34 years, which has seriously

prejudiced the petitioner and infringed his fundamental right to speedy

investigation and trial guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. It

is submitted that the petitioner was never absconding, had remained

available to the authorities, continued in service and ultimately

superannuated in the year 2021, yet the investigating agency failed to

complete the investigation for decades.

6.Learned counsel further submits that the extraordinary delay is

attributable entirely to the investigating agency and not to the petitioner.

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Even after this Court called for an explanation, the authorities merely

stated that the officers posted between 2016 and 2025 had not taken

steps to complete the investigation. Such a superficial explanation, it is

argued, cannot justify keeping a criminal investigation pending for more

than three decades, particularly when the delay has resulted in loss of

evidence, documents and availability of witnesses. Reliance has been

placed on Abdul Rahman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, 1992 Cri LJ 2717;

Dr. Sarvesh Bhattacharjee v. State (NCT of Delhi) , W.P.(Crl.)

No.781/2021; Madan Mohan Saxena v. State of U.P., 2023 (3) ALJ 7;

Mahendra Lal Das v. State of Bihar, (2002) 1 SCC 149; and Pankaj

Kumar v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 16 SCC 117.

7.It is next submitted that the prosecution sanction granted against

the petitioner is vitiated by non-application of mind, as the sanction

order does not disclose consideration of the FIR, the relevant

documents or the material collected during investigation, nor does it

record any reasons indicating satisfaction of the competent authority

regarding commission of the alleged offences by the petitioner. Learned

counsel submits that sanction is not an empty formality but a statutory

safeguard intended to protect public servants against frivolous

prosecution. Reliance has been placed on Bindyachal Chaubey v.

State of Jharkhand, 2010 Cri LJ 1531; Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed v. State

of A.P., AIR 1979 SC 677; M. Shrinivasulu Reddy v. State Inspector

of Police, ACB, Nellore Range, 1993 Cri LJ 558; and Ayya Samy v.

State through Inspector of Police, Vigilance and Anti-Corruption,

1996 Cri LJ 125 (Mad.).

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8.Learned counsel also submits that the departmental fact-finding

inquiry had not found the petitioner involved in forging any document

and had only attributed negligence in discharge of official duties, for

which a minor penalty was imposed. It is contended that the petitioner

had merely processed the application for opening the savings account

in accordance with the prescribed procedure and neither forged any

signature nor impersonated or identified any person as Amarsai. Thus,

even if the allegations in the charge-sheet are taken at their face value,

the essential ingredients of the offences alleged against the petitioner

are not made out.

9.Lastly, learned counsel submits that the continuation of the

prosecution has caused grave prejudice to the petitioner, who has

already superannuated and has been deprived of his pensionary and

retiral benefits on account of the pendency of the criminal case. It is

therefore submitted that, having regard to the extraordinary delay,

violation of Article 21, absence of the essential ingredients of the

alleged offences and the invalidity of the prosecution sanction, the FIR,

charge-sheet and consequential proceedings deserve to be quashed

insofar as the petitioner is concerned.

10.Per contra, Mr. Ashish Shukla, learned Additional Advocate

General, opposes the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioner

and submits that the petitioner has been arrayed as an accused on the

basis of material collected during investigation, which prima facie

discloses his involvement in the alleged transaction. It is submitted that,

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at the relevant time, the petitioner was posted in the Postal Department

and, while discharging his official duties, the savings account was

opened and the payment of the disputed amount was facilitated without

following the prescribed procedure. The question as to the precise role

and involvement of the petitioner is a matter to be adjudicated on the

basis of evidence during trial and cannot be conclusively determined at

the stage of exercise of jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS.

11.Learned Additional Advocate General further submits that the

principal ground urged by the petitioner is the delay in completion of

investigation and filing of the charge-sheet; however, such delay, by

itself, cannot furnish a ground for quashing the entire prosecution where

the investigation has ultimately been completed and the competent

authority has granted the requisite prosecution sanction. It is submitted

that the case involves allegations concerning manipulation of a

compensation cheque, opening of a bank account in the name of the

beneficiary and withdrawal of Government money, requiring

investigation by the competent agency and compliance with the

statutory requirements under the Prevention of Corruption Act. The

record itself indicates that the matter was initially investigated at

Ambikapur and was subsequently transferred to the Economic Offences

Wing, and correspondence relating to collection of handwriting samples

was also undertaken during the course of investigation.

12.It is lastly submitted that the petitioner cannot seek quashing of

the criminal proceedings merely by relying upon the delay, particularly

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when the prosecution has collected material against him and the

question whether such material is sufficient to establish the ingredients

of the alleged offences is required to be tested during trial. The defence

raised by the petitioner regarding his limited role, compliance with

departmental procedure and absence of mens rea involves disputed

questions of fact which cannot appropriately be adjudicated in

proceedings under Section 528 of the BNSS. It is, therefore, submitted

that the present petition, being premature and devoid of merit, deserves

to be dismissed and the petitioner be relegated to face the trial in

accordance with law.

13.By filing rejoinder to the reply filed by the respondents/State,

learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the allegations attributed

to the petitioner, even if taken at their face value, do not disclose

commission of the offences alleged against him. It is submitted that the

petitioner was merely discharging his limited official duty of opening the

savings account in accordance with the rules prevailing at the relevant

time, and he neither verified or forged the cheque, identified the person

impersonating Amarsai, nor received or withdrew any part of the alleged

amount. The person who allegedly identified the beneficiary was co-

accused Anoop Kashyap. Learned counsel further submits that the

State has failed to produce any rule or document requiring the petitioner

to intimate the District Small Savings Officer before making the payment

and, therefore, even the allegation of procedural lapse, if accepted,

could at best constitute negligence or dereliction of official duty and

cannot, in the absence of the requisite criminal intent or participation,

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attract the penal provisions invoked against the petitioner. She further

submits that the extraordinary and wholly unexplained delay of about 34

years cannot be brushed aside as mere administrative or procedural

delay, particularly when the investigating agency remained inactive for

decades and the charge-sheet came to be filed only after this Court

called for an explanation regarding the pendency of the investigation. It

is submitted that the alleged prosecution sanction is also not a valid

sanction in the eye of law, as it does not demonstrate due application of

mind to the material against the petitioner. The prolonged delay has

seriously prejudiced the petitioner’s right to speedy trial and fair

defence, besides resulting in non-availability of material evidence; even

the alleged forged cheque, which constitutes the foundation of the

prosecution case, has not been seized or reflected in the seizure memo.

Learned counsel, therefore, submits that the present case is not one

where the petitioner is seeking adjudication of disputed questions of fact

at the stage of trial, but one where the allegations and material

collected, even if accepted in their entirety, fail to disclose the essential

ingredients of the offences against him; hence, continuation of the

criminal proceedings would amount to abuse of the process of law and

the charge-sheet and consequential cognizance order, insofar as the

petitioner is concerned, deserve to be quashed.

14.We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered

their rival submissions made hereinabove and also went through the

records with utmost circumspection.

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15.The question which falls for consideration before this Court is not

merely whether the prosecution has ultimately succeeded in filing the

charge-sheet after completion of investigation, but whether, in the

peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case, the petitioner can

be compelled to undergo the ordeal of criminal prosecution after the

investigating agency has permitted the matter to remain in a state of

suspended animation for about 34 years, and whether the material

collected during such belated investigation discloses the essential

ingredients of the offences alleged against the petitioner.

16.At the outset, it is necessary to emphasise that the power vested

in this Court under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha

Sanhita, 2023 is of wide amplitude and is intended to secure the ends of

justice and to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. The exercise

of such jurisdiction is undoubtedly to be undertaken sparingly and with

circumspection; however, sparing exercise does not mean that the

Court should remain a mute spectator where continuation of a criminal

prosecution itself results in manifest injustice. The settled parameters

for exercise of inherent jurisdiction include cases where the allegations,

even if taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not

constitute the offence alleged, where the material does not disclose the

necessary ingredients of the offence, and also where continuation of the

proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of law.

17.In the present case, the chronology of events assumes

considerable significance. The FIR was registered as far back as in the

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year 1992 in relation to an alleged transaction concerning a cheque and

compensation amount arising out of land acquisition proceedings. The

petitioner was admittedly a Postal Department employee at the relevant

time. The investigation was thereafter transferred to the Economic

Offences Wing and remained pending for several decades. The

petitioner continued in service, ultimately superannuated in the year

2021, and yet the investigating agency did not bring the investigation to

its logical conclusion. It was only when the petitioner approached this

Court in Cr.M.P. No.1024/2026 seeking quashing of the FIR on account

of prolonged inaction that this Court called for an explanation from the

Director General of Police regarding the extraordinary pendency of the

investigation and directed that the investigation be completed.

Thereafter, the charge-sheet came to be filed on 23.06.2026, i.e. after

approximately 34 years from registration of the FIR. These facts are

borne out from the record placed before this Court.

18.The explanation furnished by the State for such extraordinary

delay does not inspire confidence. The State has sought to explain the

delay by referring to transfer of the matter from one investigating

agency to another and to certain procedural steps allegedly undertaken

during the course of investigation. However, mere transfer of

investigation or the existence of correspondence during the intervening

period cannot, by itself, constitute a legally acceptable explanation for

keeping a criminal investigation pending for more than three decades.

An investigating agency is required to act with reasonable expedition.

Administrative inconvenience, change of officers, movement of files or

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transfer of investigation may explain a reasonable period of delay, but

they cannot furnish an omnibus justification for an unexplained delay

extending over several decades.

19.The right to speedy investigation and speedy trial is an integral

and essential facet of the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21

of the Constitution of India. The expression "speedy trial" cannot be

understood narrowly so as to commence only after filing of the charge-

sheet. The constitutional guarantee necessarily embraces the

investigation stage, because an accused is subjected to the continuous

anxiety, uncertainty and threat of criminal prosecution from the very

inception of the criminal process.

20.The Supreme Court in Robert Lalchungnunga Chongthu @

R.L. Chongthu v. State of Bihar, 2025 INSC 1339, has recently

reiterated that timely completion of investigation is intrinsically

connected with Article 21 and that investigation cannot be permitted to

continue indefinitely without adequate justification. The Supreme Court

specifically recognised that where investigation has continued for an

unduly long period without a justifiable explanation, the accused may

approach the High Court under Section 528 of the BNSS/Section 482 of

the CrPC for appropriate relief, including quashing in an appropriate

case.

21.More significantly, the aforesaid decision in Robert

Lalchungnunga Chongthu (supra) is not a case in which the Supreme

Court treated delay in isolation as an automatic ground for quashing.

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The Court examined the overall circumstances, including the validity of

the sanction and the prolonged delay in filing the charge-sheet, and

ultimately quashed the prosecution. The Supreme Court observed that

the accused cannot be made to suffer endlessly under the threat of

continuing investigation and eventual criminal proceedings bearing

upon his everyday existence. The principle laid down therein is directly

attracted to the facts of the present case, where the petitioner has

remained under the shadow of the criminal case since 1992 and the

prosecution has taken approximately 34 years to reach the stage of

filing of the charge-sheet.

22.The subsequent pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Sahil

Abdulsattar Mansuri v. Safimahamad Fafirbhai Mansuri, 2026 INSC

626, further reinforces the constitutional requirement of timely

investigation. In that case, the Supreme Court expressly observed that

the right to speedy trial is intrinsically linked to Article 21 and that timely

completion of investigation is inherent in that constitutional guarantee.

The Court held that an unexplained and inordinate delay in filing the

charge-sheet warrants judicial intervention. Though the factual setting of

that case is different, the constitutional principle is of general

application: the State cannot keep the criminal process pending

indefinitely and thereafter seek to justify its own inaction merely by

stating that investigation has ultimately been completed.

23.Tested on the aforesaid principles, the explanation furnished by

the respondents in the present case falls woefully short of the

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constitutional standard. The delay here is not of a few years or even a

decade. It is a delay of approximately three and a half decades. The

petitioner has not been shown to have absconded, evaded

investigation, obstructed the proceedings or otherwise contributed to the

delay. On the contrary, he continued in Government service and

ultimately superannuated in the year 2021. Thus, there is no material

before this Court to attribute the extraordinary delay to any conduct of

the petitioner. The entire burden of explaining the delay, therefore, lies

upon the investigating agency, and the explanation offered is neither

adequate nor convincing.

24.The contention of the learned Additional Advocate General that

the delay cannot, by itself, be the sole ground for quashing the

prosecution is undoubtedly correct as a general proposition. However,

the said proposition cannot be divorced from the facts of the case. This

Court is not proceeding merely on the mathematical calculation of 34

years. The delay has to be examined in conjunction with the

circumstances in which it occurred, the absence of any satisfactory

explanation, the consequent prejudice caused to the petitioner, the

nature of the material collected against him, the fact that the

prosecution was completed only after intervention of this Court, and the

fact that the petitioner had already superannuated and suffered

deprivation of his retiral benefits on account of the pendency of the

criminal case. It is this cumulative effect which brings the present case

within the exceptional category warranting exercise of inherent

jurisdiction.

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25.The submission of the State that the petitioner should be

relegated to trial also cannot be accepted mechanically. It is true that

ordinarily this Court does not undertake a meticulous examination of

evidence while exercising jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS.

Equally settled, however, is the principle that where the uncontroverted

allegations and the material placed by the prosecution, taken at their

face value, fail to disclose the commission of an offence by the

particular accused, the accused cannot be compelled to undergo the

rigours of a criminal trial merely because a charge-sheet has been filed.

26.In the present case, the prosecution case, in substance, is that the

compensation amount payable to Amarsai was manipulated, a savings

account was opened in his name on the basis of false identification and

the enhanced amount was thereafter withdrawn. The specific allegation

concerning impersonation and identification is attributed to the co-

accused. So far as the petitioner is concerned, his alleged role is

essentially confined to opening the savings account in the course of his

official duties. The petitioner has consistently asserted that he neither

forged the cheque, nor altered the amount mentioned therein, nor

identified the person who allegedly impersonated Amarsai, nor received

or withdrew the alleged misappropriated amount.

27.The distinction between a mere procedural lapse or negligence in

discharge of official duties and participation in a criminal conspiracy or

fraudulent transaction cannot be lost sight of. Mere negligence, however

serious it may be from the standpoint of departmental discipline, does

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not automatically constitute cheating, forgery, use of forged document

or criminal conspiracy. For attracting the penal provisions invoked

against the petitioner, there must be material indicating the requisite

elements of the respective offences and, where necessary, the

intentional participation or common design attributed to the accused.

28.The State has also failed to point out any specific material

demonstrating that the petitioner had knowledge of the alleged

manipulation of the cheque or that he was party to the impersonation of

Amarsai. The allegation that the account was opened without adequate

verification, even if accepted for the sake of argument, cannot by itself

establish that the petitioner knowingly participated in the alleged

fraudulent transaction. The person who allegedly identified the

beneficiary is stated to be a co-accused. There is also no allegation that

the petitioner himself received the disputed amount or derived any

benefit therefrom.

29.The circumstance relating to the alleged forged cheque assumes

further importance. The petitioner has pointed out that the very cheque

which forms the foundation of the prosecution case has not been seized

and is not reflected in the seizure material relied upon by the

prosecution. In a prosecution substantially founded upon alleged

alteration of the amount mentioned in a cheque, the absence of the

primary document is not an insignificant circumstance, particularly when

the investigation itself has been permitted to remain pending for

approximately 34 years. The passage of such a long period naturally

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creates serious difficulties in preservation, production and examination

of primary evidence and materially enhances the prejudice caused to

the accused.

30.The State has sought to contend that the question of the

petitioner’s involvement can be decided only after evidence is led at

trial. Such submission overlooks the fact that the inherent jurisdiction of

this Court is precisely meant to prevent a person from being subjected

to a criminal trial where the foundational requirements for prosecuting

him are absent. The Court is not required to conduct a mini-trial, but it is

equally not required to shut its eyes to the absence of material which

would constitute the essential ingredients of the alleged offences.

31.The issue regarding prosecution sanction also requires

consideration. The Supreme Court in Robert Lalchungnunga

Chongthu (supra) has reiterated the settled principle that sanction for

prosecution of a public servant is not an empty formality. It is a solemn

statutory safeguard intended to protect public servants from frivolous or

vexatious prosecution. The validity of sanction depends upon the

material placed before the sanctioning authority and due application of

mind to such material. The sanction order must, at least ex facie,

disclose that the competent authority considered the relevant material

before arriving at the requisite satisfaction.

32.In the present case, the sanction order relied upon by the State

does not demonstrate the requisite application of mind to the specific

role attributed to the petitioner. There is no satisfactory indication from

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the material placed before this Court that the sanctioning authority

independently considered the specific evidence against the petitioner

and applied its mind to whether his alleged conduct constituted the

offences for which prosecution was proposed. The mere existence of an

order granting sanction cannot, therefore, be treated as conclusive

proof that the statutory safeguard has been duly complied with.

33.It is true that ordinarily the validity of sanction may be considered

during the course of trial. But where the challenge to sanction forms part

of a larger and exceptional circumstance involving an unexplained

investigation of about 34 years and where the prosecution material itself

does not disclose the petitioner’s individual criminal participation, the

Court cannot treat the sanction as an answer to every defect in the

prosecution. Sanction is a safeguard; it cannot become a device to

revive an otherwise constitutionally infirm prosecution.

34.The Court is also conscious of the fact that the alleged occurrence

dates back to the year 1992. With the passage of approximately 34

years, witnesses may no longer be available, memories inevitably fade,

relevant records may have been lost, and the ability of the accused to

effectively defend himself is substantially impaired. The right to a fair

trial is not merely a right to have a trial conducted in accordance with

procedural rules; it includes a meaningful opportunity to meet the case

of the prosecution. A trial commenced after such an extraordinary

period, in circumstances where the delay is attributable to the

prosecution and not to the accused, cannot be viewed in isolation from

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the prejudice caused by the passage of time.

35.The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognised that the right to

speedy trial is not an abstract or ornamental right. In Abdul Rehman

Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, 1992 Cri LJ 2717, the Constitution Bench

explained the constitutional significance of speedy trial and emphasised

that the Court must consider the length of delay, reasons for delay,

responsibility for the delay and prejudice caused to the accused. The

later decisions relied upon by the petitioner, including Mahendra Lal

Das v. State of Bihar, (2002) 1 SCC 149 and Pankaj Kumar v. State

of Maharashtra, (2008) 16 SCC 117, reinforce the principle that

unreasonable delay attributable to the prosecution cannot be ignored

when examining the constitutional validity of continuing criminal

proceedings.

36.The recent pronouncement in Robert Lalchungnunga

Chongthu (supra) brings the aforesaid constitutional principle into the

present statutory framework by expressly recognising the availability of

the inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS where

investigation has continued for an unduly long period without adequate

justification. The Supreme Court has thus made it clear that the remedy

of quashing is not foreclosed merely because the investigating agency

eventually submits a charge-sheet after an inordinate and unexplained

delay.

37.Similarly, the decision in Sahil Abdulsattar Mansuri (supra)

demonstrates that even in circumstances where the investigating

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agency seeks to rely upon the gravity or nature of allegations, the

constitutional requirement of timely investigation cannot be diluted. The

Supreme Court has reiterated that where an investigation remains

incomplete for an extraordinarily long period and the delay is not

attributable to the accused, judicial intervention is warranted to protect

the guarantee under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

38.Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case,

we are of the considered opinion that the prosecution against the

petitioner cannot be permitted to continue. The extraordinary delay of

approximately 34 years remains substantially unexplained; the

petitioner has not contributed to such delay; the investigation was

completed only after judicial intervention; the petitioner has already

superannuated; the pendency of the criminal case has affected his

retiral benefits; the primary document allegedly forming the basis of the

charge of manipulation has not been shown to have been seized; and,

more importantly, the material relied upon by the prosecution does not

disclose a clear and specific act of criminal participation by the

petitioner corresponding to the offences alleged against him.

39.We are not oblivious to the seriousness of allegations relating to

alleged misappropriation of Government money. Economic offences and

offences involving public funds undoubtedly require serious

consideration. However, seriousness of an allegation cannot authorise

the State to disregard the constitutional guarantee of speedy

investigation and trial. The more serious the allegation, the greater is

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the obligation upon the investigating agency to conduct the investigation

fairly, efficiently and within a reasonable time. Constitutional rights do

not become subordinate to administrative convenience merely because

the prosecution alleges an offence involving public money.

40.Equally, the submission that the petitioner should face trial

because the charge-sheet has been filed cannot be accepted as an

absolute proposition. Filing of a charge-sheet is not an irreversible event

which places the prosecution beyond scrutiny under Section 528 of the

BNSS. The High Court retains jurisdiction to examine whether

continuation of the prosecution would amount to abuse of the process of

law. In the present case, the cumulative circumstances are sufficiently

exceptional to warrant such intervention.

41.The Court also cannot ignore that the prosecution itself, when

called upon to explain the extraordinary pendency, furnished an

explanation which substantially attributes the delay to inaction on the

part of the investigating officers. Such institutional or administrative

failure cannot be shifted upon the accused. The petitioner cannot be

made to suffer indefinitely for the failure of the State machinery to

perform its statutory obligation. The criminal justice system cannot

operate on the principle that an accused must remain under perpetual

threat of prosecution until such time as the State finds it convenient to

complete its investigation.

42.In our considered view, permitting the present prosecution to

continue would result in precisely the kind of prejudice which Article 21

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of the Constitution of India seeks to prevent. It would subject the

petitioner to the anxiety and uncertainty of a criminal trial relating to an

occurrence which is approximately 34 years old, notwithstanding that

the delay is not attributable to him. Such continuation, in the peculiar

facts of the present case, would not advance the cause of justice but

would amount to abuse of the process of law.

43.There is yet another circumstance which cannot be lost sight of

while considering the overall equities of the matter. The petitioner

herein, namely Manoharlal Choudhary, is sought to be prosecuted in

respect of an occurrence dating back to the year 1992. From the

material placed on record, it appears that one of the co-accused,

namely Anoop Kashyap, has already expired, whereas Amir Ali, who

was the then Collector/Land Acquisition Officer and is stated to be one

of the principal accused in the alleged transaction, is presently

bedridden and, on account of his physical condition, is not in a position

to effectively participate in the criminal proceedings. Though the

individual circumstances of the co-accused are not directly under

consideration in the present petition, these circumstances are relevant

while examining the practical consequences of permitting a prosecution

relating to an occurrence nearly three and a half decades old to proceed

further.

44.It further appears from the record that Md. Sabir Ali, another co-

accused, has either remained in custody/arrested in connection with the

case or has been enlarged on bail, as the case may be. Thus, the

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prosecution, which originated from an occurrence of the year 1992, has

reached the present stage after an extraordinary passage of

approximately 34 years, during which the status and physical condition

of the persons allegedly connected with the transaction have materially

altered. One accused has passed away, another is stated to be

physically incapacitated, while the proceedings against the remaining

accused have continued for several decades. These circumstances,

though not by themselves determinative of the petitioner’s liability,

demonstrate the extent to which the passage of time has impaired the

possibility of a meaningful and effective criminal adjudication.

45.The criminal justice system is undoubtedly required to deal firmly

with allegations involving misappropriation of public money and

offences of corruption; however, such objective cannot be pursued at

the cost of the constitutional guarantee of a fair, meaningful and

reasonably expeditious criminal process. The death of one co-accused,

the serious physical incapacity of another, and the prolonged pendency

of the proceedings against the remaining accused are circumstances

which, when considered cumulatively with the unexplained delay of

about 34 years, the prejudice caused to the petitioner Manoharlal

Choudhary, his superannuation, and the absence of specific material

demonstrating his conscious participation in the alleged offences,

reinforce the conclusion that continuation of the criminal proceedings

against the petitioner would serve no legitimate purpose. In the peculiar

facts of the present case, compelling the petitioner to undergo the

ordeal of a criminal trial after such an extraordinary lapse of time would

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neither advance the cause of justice nor serve any meaningful

prosecutorial purpose and would, rather, amount to an abuse of the

process of law.

46.For the foregoing reasons, this Court is satisfied that the present

case falls within the exceptional parameters warranting exercise of

inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS. The extraordinary

and unexplained delay, the consequent infringement of the petitioner’s

right to speedy investigation and trial under Article 21 of the Constitution

of India, the serious prejudice occasioned to his defence by the

passage of approximately three and a half decades, the absence of

specific material disclosing his conscious and intentional participation in

the alleged offences, and the infirmity attending the prosecution

sanction, when considered cumulatively, constitute sufficient grounds for

interference.

47.Accordingly, the present petition is allowed.

48.Consequently, FIR No.694/1992 registered at Police Station

Ambikapur, District Surguja (then Madhya Pradesh), charge-sheet

No.255-A/2026 dated 23.06.2026 and the consequential cognizance

order passed by the learned Special Judge (Prevention of Corruption

Act), Ambikapur, in Special Criminal Case No.03/2026, insofar as they

relate to the present petitioner, are hereby quashed and set aside,

including the proceedings arising therefrom for the offences punishable

under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code and

Sections 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.

24

49.It is made clear that the present order is confined to the

prosecution of the petitioner and shall not affect the proceedings, if any,

against the other accused persons, which shall proceed in accordance

with law and on their own merits.

50.Before parting, this Court deems it appropriate to observe that the

present case is a reminder that investigation is not an open-ended

statutory exercise. The power of the State to investigate an offence

carries with it a corresponding constitutional obligation to conduct and

conclude such investigation with reasonable expedition. The sword of

criminal prosecution cannot be permitted to remain hanging over an

individual for decades merely because the investigating agency failed to

act within a reasonable time. As recently reiterated by the Supreme

Court, the right to speedy investigation is embedded within Article 21 of

the Constitution of India, and where an investigation continues for an

unduly long period without adequate justification, the High Court is

competent to intervene under Section 528 of the BNSS.

51.The petition is, accordingly, allowed in the aforesaid terms. All

pending interlocutory applications, if any, stand disposed of.

Sd/- Sd/-

(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)

Judge Chief Justice

Anu