FAO(OS) (COMM) 100/2026 Page 1 of 16

$~22

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

% Date of Decision : 13.04.2026

+ FAO(OS) (COMM) 100/2026 CM APPL. 23776/2026 CM APPL.

23777/2026 CM APPL. 23778/2026 CM APPL. 23779/2026

CM APPL. 23780/2026

MAYANK JAIN PROPRIETOR OF MAHAVEER UDYOG

.....Appellant

Through: Mr. R. P. Yadav, Mr. Riju Mani

Talukdar and Mr. Divyanshu Yadav,

Advs.

versus

ATULYA DISCS PVT LTD & ORS. .....Respondents

Through: None.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V. KAMESWAR RAO

HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MANMEET PRITAM SINGH ARORA

MANMEET PRITAM SINGH ARORA, J. (ORAL)

1. The present appeal has been filed against the order dated 09.01.2026

[‘impugned order’] passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in I.A.

11309/2025 in CS (Comm) No. 412/2025 titled Mayank Jain, Proprietor

of Mahaveer Udyog v. M/s Atulya Discs Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.

2. Appellant is a proprietorship firm engaged in the business of

manufacturing and trading of agricultural implements more specifically

harrows disc. It adopted the mark TIGER GOLD BRAND

FAO(OS) (COMM) 100/2026 Page 2 of 16

[‘label’] [‘Appellant’s mark’] and has been using it for

its goods since 06.05.2010.

2.1. Appellant filed an application for registration of TIGER GOLD

BRAND (label) in Class 7 on 01.06.2022, which was registered by the

Registrar of Trademarks and the registration certificate was issued on

02.02.2023. In its application, the Appellant claimed user since 06.05.2010,

which was accepted.

3. Respondent No. 1 was incorporated on 26.11.2020. It applied for

registration of its mark TIGER PREMIUM BRAND

(Label) on 09.03.2022 [‘impugned mark’], on a proposed to be used basis

which is currently pending registration.

4. Appellant issued a cease-and-desist notice dated 08.10.2024 to the

Respondents which was replied vide notice dated 28.10.2024 whereby the

Respondent denied any similarity between the two labels and refrained from

ceasing the use of the same.

5. In these facts, Appellant filed the suit on 16.04.2025 and prayed for

an interim injunction. The Appellant contends that the Appellant is the prior

FAO(OS) (COMM) 100/2026 Page 3 of 16

user of its mark since 06.06.2010 and that there is overall similarity of the

marks between Appellant’s mark and Respondent’s impugned mark and

therefore raised a plea of passing of.

6. The ld. Single Judge has dismissed the injunction application held in

the impugned order as under: -

“7. Defendant Nos. 1 to 3 have contended that 'TIGER' cannot be

monopolized by the Plaintiff as 'TIGER' is common to the trade and

generic word. It is contended by Defendant Nos. 1 to 3 that the

Mark 'TIGER' is commonly used for goods falling under Class 7

and the online record of the Trade Marks Office reflects that the

word 'TIGER' in standalone has no Trade Mark value and is not

capable of distinguishing the goods and services. The Plaintiff has

not been able to establish ownership over the Mark 'TIGER' in

absence of the registration of Word Mark 'TIGER' or any 'TIGER'

formative Marks, which is relevant for examining the deceptive

similarity of the Impugned Mark.

8. The Marks 'TIGER' and 'BRAND' are generic in nature and

incapable of being registered as a Trade Mark. The Plaintiff does

not have exclusive right to use the Word Marks, 'TIGER' and

'BRAND'. There is a widespread use of the Mark 'TIGER' for

various goods and services across India. Hence, 'TIGER' is publici

juris and common to trade and is not uniquely identifiable with a

particular goods or services of the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff has also

not produced any material to show that the Mark 'TIGER' has

acquired secondary meaning. The Mark 'TIGER' does not have an

exclusive character and, therefore, the Plaintiff is not entitled to

claim exclusive right over the same.

Deceptive Similarity of the Plaintiff's Mark and the Impugned

Mark

9. The Plaintiff's Mark and the Impugned Mark are not deceptively

similar as the Impugned Mark has to be considered as a whole. The

Impugned Mark considered as a whole is wholly dissimilar to the

Plaintiff's Mark, the Impugned Mark is visually different to the

Plaintiff's Mark, even the 'TIGER' device in the rival Marks are

different. The colour scheme of the Impugned Mark is also

different from the colour scheme of the Plaintiff's Mark and the

FAO(OS) (COMM) 100/2026 Page 4 of 16

Impugned Mark is not deceptively similar to the Plaintiff's Mark.

Accordingly, considering the Impugned Mark as a whole there is no

deceptive similarity between the Plaintiff's Mark and the Impugned

Mark.

10. As 'TIGER' and 'BRAND' are found to be generic and common

to the trade, the Plaintiff cannot claim exclusive ownership over the

part of the Impugned Mark containing the Marks 'TIGER' and

'BRAND' as a part of them. As per Section 17 of the Act when a

Trade Mark consists of several matters, its registration shall confer

on the proprietor exclusive right to use of the Trade Mark taken as a

whole. Considering that the Appellant has no exclusive right over

the Marks 'TIGER' and 'BRAND', there is no deceptive similarity

between the Plaintiff's Mark and the Impugned Mark. It is well

settled that the registration of Device Marks does not automatically

grant the exclusive right in respect of the word mentioned in the

Device Marks. Further, the Supreme Court in Pernod Ricard India

(supra) held that the rival marks must be compared as a whole, and

not by dissecting them into individual components, as consumers

perceive trademarks based on their overall impression, including

appearance, structure, and commercial impression.

11. The registration of the Device Mark is to be considered as a

whole and while determining the deceptive similarity with another

Trade Mark, both the Marks have to be examined as a whole by

applying 'anti-dissection rule' rather than breaking the Marks into

their component parts for comparison. To determine whether there

is any deceptive similarity between the two Marks, it is imperative

to decide if the similarity is likely to cause any confusion or

deceive. The test of deceptive similarity as laid down in Kaviraj

Pandit (supra) has not been satisfied in the present case. Even from

eyes of the consumers of the goods of the Plaintiff and Defendant

Nos. 1 to 3, i.e., the farmers, the Marks are visually different and

would not cause confusion in the minds of the consumers and

therefore the decision in Cadila Healthcare Ltd. (supra) will not

help the case of the Plaintiff.

12. In the present case, the Plaintiff's Mark and the Impugned Mark

if considered as a whole cannot be held to be deceptively similar

and are able to be distinguished by the use of word 'PREMIUM'. In

addition, the descriptive nature of the Marks 'TIGER' and 'BRAND'

commonly used in the hospitality industry shows that there is no

deceptive similarity between the Plaintiff's Mark and the Impugned

FAO(OS) (COMM) 100/2026 Page 5 of 16

Mark. As the Plaintiff's Mark and the Impugned Mark are not

deceptively similar the judgments in S. Syed Mohideen (supra) and

Laxmikant V. Patel (supra) will not help the case of the Plaintiff.

13. The rival Marks are not identical/deceptively similar, the

Plaintiff's Mark and the Impugned Mark comprises of generic

words, which cannot be monopolised by any party. Further, the

Plaintiff has not been able to make a case of misrepresentation by

the Defendant nor has it been able to prove damages incurred by

the Plaintiff due to the adoption of the Impugned Mark by the

Defendant.

14. Further, the Plaintiff has not been able to establish goodwill and

reputation and, therefore, prima facie, a case of passing off has not

been made out by the Plaintiff. There is no likelihood of confusion

amongst the class of consumers, which is likely to. harm the

reputation of the, Plaintiff and dilute the Plaintiff's Mark.

CONCLUSION

15. Having considered the averments in the pleadings and the

submissions made by the Parties, the Plaintiff has no exclusive right

over the Marks 'TIGER' and 'BRAND' as the same are generic in

nature and common to the trade.

16. Hence, the use of the Impugned Mark,

does not amount to infringement of Copyright in or passing off of

the Plaintiff's Mark, as there is no deceptive

FAO(OS) (COMM) 100/2026 Page 6 of 16

similarity between the Plaintiff's Mark and the Impugned Mark.

Accordingly, no case is made out for grant of interim injunction as

prayed for in this Application.

17. Accordingly, the present Application is dismissed.”

(Emphasis supplied)

7. The Appellant has assailed the impugned order on the following

grounds: -

“I. Appellant is not claiming exclusive right over TIGER and

BRAND words per se and has nowhere pleaded the same in the

suit/ application.

II. The Act does not expressly place an embargo on monopoly in

respect of generic expressions.

III. TIGER is not publici juris and not common to trade and citing

of various marks existing in the Register of Trade Marks or existing

outside the Register is not sufficient to establish that Appellant’s

registered trade mark is common to the trade within the meaning of

this Act.

IV. GOLD and PREMIUM suggest quality of goods associated

with the mark and suggest origin from same source and Extension

of Appellant’s brand. Any prudent customer with average

intelligence would believe that the TIGER PREMIUM BRAND is

an extension of TIGER GOLD BRAND which is in market prior to

PREMIUM brand.

V. Respondent’s adoption of impugned mark is dishonest,

deliberate, intentional and in bad faith which is evident from the

fact that the Respondent tried to show that they have been using the

mark since March 2021 only based on Udyam Registration date

without any documents.

VI. Appellant is the prior user of the TIGER GOLD BRAND

trademark since 06.06.2010 whereas the Respondent, which was

incorporated in October 2020 started using the mark in October

2024.

VII. Main feature of both the marks/logos are, TIGER GOLD

BRAND in the case of the Appellant and TIGER PREMIUM

FAO(OS) (COMM) 100/2026 Page 7 of 16

BRAND in the case of the Respondent. The visual dissimilarity

between the logos cannot come to the aid of the Respondent.

VIII. TIGER does not describe the nature of the business or goods

of the Appellant and has no direct relation to their trademark and

TIGER GOLD BRAND has been coined by the Appellant and has

built its reputation over a period of 14.5 years.

IX. Infringement is not be assessed by placing the rival marks side-

by side whereas Ld. Single Judge has bifurcated the Appellant’s

mark and compared it with the impugned mark.

X. Overall similarity of the marks of the Appellant and the

Respondent requires an assessment from the perspective of an

average consumer with imperfect recollection. The average

consumer in the present case are Farmers/villagers.”

7.1. Learned counsel for the Appellant contends that the Respondent’s

impugned mark TIGER PREMIUM BRAND suggests that it is the

extension of the Appellant’s mark TIGER GOLD BRAND.

7.2. He states that the expression GOLD and PREMIUM suggest quality

of goods associated with the mark and origin from the same source.

7.3. He states that the word TIGER has nothing to do with the goods such

as agricultural implements and in this sense the use of the word TIGER by

the Appellant for the goods is unique thereby distinguishing Appellant’s

goods from the goods of the others.

7.4. He states that even though there are other traders who are using the

TIGER mark in Class 7, however Appellant’s mark has attained

distinctiveness over the period of use since May, 2010.

7.5. He states that a perusal of the register maintained by the Trademark

Registry shows that there is only one other registered mark in Class 7 in

respect of same goods with the word TIGER, however the said single

registration is not sufficient to show that the word TIGER is common to

FAO(OS) (COMM) 100/2026 Page 8 of 16

trade.

7.6. He states therefore the conclusion of the learned Single Judge that

TIGER mark is common to the trade in publici juris and common to trade is

incorrect.

7.7. He reiterates that the Appellant is not claiming any exclusivity in the

words TIGER or BRAND.

7.8. He states, however, on a perusal of whole of the mark TIGER

PREMIUM BRAND with TIGER GOLD BRAND, he submits there is

phonetic similarity.

7.9. He further states that since the Appellant’s mark and the impugned

mark are being applied to the same goods, the chances of confusion are

higher as the customer who in this case is a farmer(s) is likely to ask for the

goods by the name TIGER and given the imperfect recollection of a

consumer, he may not immediately recognise the distinction between the

labels.

7.10. He admits that the Appellant does not have a wordmark registration

for TIGER GOLD BRAND or a separate registration for its mark TIGER or

BRAND respectively.

7.11. He relies upon the judgment of the Division Bench in Chacha Saree

Bazar Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Chacha Cloth House

1

to contend that, in similar

facts, the Court held that the word ‘CHACHA’ though publici juris was not

common to the trade and therefore the plaintiff therein was entitled to raise a

plea of passing off when the defendant therein had adopted a similar mark.

8. We have heard the learned counsel for the Appellant and perused the

record.

FAO(OS) (COMM) 100/2026 Page 9 of 16

9. The scope of interference, while hearing appeal against the order

passed by a Commercial Court, in Intellectual Property matters, under Order

XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 CPC stands settled by the judgment of the Supreme

Court in Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd.

2

The relevant paragraph

reads as under: -

“13. On a consideration of the matter, we are afraid, the appellate

bench fell into error on two important propositions. The first is a

misdirection in regard to the very scope and nature of the appeals

before it and the limitations on the powers of the appellate court to

substitute its own discretion in an appeal preferred against a

discretionary order. The second pertains to the infirmities in the

ratiocination as to the quality of Antox's alleged user of the

trademark on which the passing-off action is founded. We shall

deal with these two separately.

14. The appeals before the Division Bench were against the

exercise of discretion by the Single Judge. In such appeals, the

appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of

the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except

where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised

arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had

ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of

interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is

said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate court will not reassess

the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one

reached by the court below if the one reached by that court was

reasonably possible on the material. The appellate court would

normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of

discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had

considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a

contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial

court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate

court would have taken a different view may not justify

interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion. After

referring to these principles Gajendragadkar, J. in Printers

1

2026: DHC:1296-DB

2

1990 Supp SCC 727

FAO(OS) (COMM) 100/2026 Page 10 of 16

(Mysore) Private Ltd. v. Pothan Joseph

3

:

“... These principles are well established, but as has been

observed by Viscount Simon in Charles Osenton & Co. v.

Jhanaton

4

‘...the law as to the reversal by a court of appeal of an

order made by a judge below in the exercise of his discretion is well

established, and any difficulty that arises is due only to the

application of well settled principles in an individual case’.

The appellate judgment does not seem to defer to this

principle. ….”

[Emphasis supplied]

10. In its recent decision in Pernod Ricard India (P) Ltd. v. Karanveer

Singh Chhabra

5

, the Supreme Court has reiterated the aforesaid principles

at paragraph 19.8 which reads as under: -

“19.8. In Wander Ltd., this Court elaborated the principles

governing the grant or refusal of interim injunctions in trademark

infringement and passing off actions. It was underscored that

appellate courts ought to be circumspect in interfering with the

discretionary orders of lower courts in such matters. Interference is

warranted only where the discretion has been exercised arbitrarily,

capriciously, perversely, or in disregard of settled legal principles.

[Emphasis supplied]

11. Thus, as summarized by the coordinate Bench in Sanjay Gupta and

Vinay Gupta v. Vineet Jain, Proprietor of Vijaypal Vineet Kumar and

Co.

6

an appeal against an interlocutory order passed by the Commercial

Court, the Appellate Court would not substitute its subjective view for the

view adopted by the Commercial Court. It is only if the Commercial Court

errs on principle that the Court would interfere; otherwise, factual and

3

AIR 1960 SC 1156

4

1942 AC 130

5

2025 SCC OnLine SC 1701

6

2026:DHC: 1248-DB

FAO(OS) (COMM) 100/2026 Page 11 of 16

discretionary evidence and findings of the Commercial Court are ordinarily

immune from interference in an appeal.

12. We have therefore examined the Appellant’s submissions keeping

these principles in mind.

13. For reference, a comparative table of the Appellant’s label mark and

the impugned label mark is reproduced hereunder: –

14. Learned Single Judge has in the impugned order

7

on comparison of

the two labels as a whole, returned a categorical finding that there is no

deceptive similarity in the Appellant’s label mark and the impugned label

mark. We find no ground for interfering in the view taken by the learned

Single Judge, as it is a plausible view, even if there could be a possible

alternate view.

15. The Appellant has challenged this finding of the learned Single Judge

on the plea that even when compared as a whole the impugned mark

‘TIGER PREMIUM BRAND ’ is deceptively similar to the registered mark

‘TIGER GOLD BRAND’ and likely to cause confusion amongst the

consumers. The Appellant has sought to illustrate this confusion at Ground

7

at paragraph nos. 9 to 13

FAO(OS) (COMM) 100/2026 Page 12 of 16

L of the appeal by alleging that customers refer to its product by the brand

name TIGER.

The fallacy in this submission of the Appellant is apparent. In its

illustration, the Appellant is emphasizing on the recall value of its trademark

by the customer as TIGER (wordmark) and not as TIGER PREMIUM

BRAND (label). The substance of the Appellant’s argument is that the word

TIGER is exclusively associated with its goods and therefore any reference

to TIGER would be construed as a reference to Appellant’s goods. However,

in contradiction the Appellant at Ground A has specifically pleaded that it is

not claiming any exclusive right over the word TIGER. It also concedes that

it has no registration for the word mark TIGER or BRAND or ‘TIGER

GOLD BRAND’.

16. If this Court was to accept the aforesaid submissions on deceptive

similarity of the Appellant, we would have to necessarily hold that, the

Appellant herein has exclusivity in the wordmark ‘TIGER’ ‘BRAND’ for

these agricultural goods, which would be contrary to the admission of the

Appellant that it does not have any exclusive right to the words ‘TIGER’

‘BRAND’.

17. The Appellant is therefore raising contradictory pleas, inasmuch as

while conceding that it has no exclusive rights to the word ‘TIGER’ or

‘BRAND’, it is still urging the test of customer recall based on the phonetic

use of the word ‘TIGER’ ‘BRAND’.

18. In view of the admitted fact that the Appellant does not have any

independent wordmark registration for the marks TIGER GOLD BRAND or

TIGER or BRAND, for the claim of infringement the comparison has to be

undertaken by the Court between the labels TIGER GOLD BRAND and

FAO(OS) (COMM) 100/2026 Page 13 of 16

TIGER PREMIUM BRAND.

19. Learned Single Judge (at paragraph 9) has given a detailed reasons for

holding that the competing labels are distinct and visually dissimilar.

The Appellant in this appeal has also conceded at para VII

8

that these

logos are visually dissimilar.

Therefore, the challenge to the finding of the learned Single Judge

holding that the two labels are not deceptively similar is not merited.

20. The Appellant has relied upon the judgment of Chacha Saree Bazar

Pvt. Ltd. (supra). However, in the facts of the said case, the plaintiff had

wordmark registration for its trademark ‘Chacha Saree Bazar Pvt. Ltd.’ It

also has registration for other formative marks wherein ‘Chacha’ was a

dominant mark. These facts were duly considered by the Division Bench

while granting injunction qua the impugned logo mark of the defendant

therein. However, in the facts of this case, there is no wordmark registration

in favour of the Appellant herein.

21. In the aforesaid judgment, the Division Bench also concluded that the

term ‘Chacha’ was not generic for the goods and services in question. In the

facts of this case, however, the learned Single Judge has opined that the

word ‘TIGER’ is commonly used for goods falling in relevant class 7 and

has concluded that the said word is publici juris and not uniquely

identifiable to the goods and services of the Appellant herein. The Appellant

in Ground F of the appeal has admitted that there are other traders who are

using the mark ‘TIGER’ in class 7, it is however contended that the said

mark has attained distinctiveness qua Appellant’s goods, which has been

rejected by the learned Single Judge.

FAO(OS) (COMM) 100/2026 Page 14 of 16

22. In this context, the learned Single Judge has expressly opined that the

Appellant/plaintiff has been unable to establish any misrepresentation, any

goodwill or reputation so as to establish passing off.

23. We have perused the plaint and have examined the advertisements

expenses, quoted in the plaint, which is as under: -

Financial Year Expenses in INR

01-Apr-10 to 31-Mar-11 43,200

01-Apr-11 to 31-Mar-12 57,500

01-Apr-12 to 31-Mar-13 1,25,850

01-Apr-13 to 31-Mar-14 38,500

01-Apr-14 to 31-Mar-15 68,500

01-Apr-15 to 31-Mar-16 4,200

01-Apr-16 to 31-Mar-17 1,97,590

01-Apr-17 to 31-Mar-18 1,73,740

01-Apr-18 to 31-Mar-19 1,17,783

01-Apr-19 to 31-Mar-20 3,30,741

01-Apr-20 to 31-Mar-21 1,17,492

01-Apr-21 to 31-Mar-22 1,10,819

01-Apr-22 to 31-Mar-23 2,27,244

01-Apr-23 to 31-Mar-24 1,07,616

01-Apr-24 to 28-Feb-25 4,20,924

Total 21,41,699

24. The Respondent was incorporated in the year 2020 and adopted this

mark in 2022. As is apparent from the above table, there is no substantial

8

Page 9 of the synopsis

FAO(OS) (COMM) 100/2026 Page 15 of 16

expenditure incurred by the Appellant on advertisements of its products

bearing the Appellant’s mark.

25. We have also examined the sales figures of the Appellant’s products

bearing the Appellant’s mark, provided in the plaint, at paragraph 18 which

reads as under: -

Financial Year Expenses in INR

01-Apr-10 to 31-Mar-11 52,85,106

01-Apr-11 to 31-Mar-12 93,96,876

01-Apr-12 to 31-Mar-13 99,45,171

01-Apr-13 to 31-Mar-14 1,12,01,977

01-Apr-14 to 31-Mar-15 14,28,180

01-Apr-15 to 31-Mar-16 29,29,780

01-Apr-16 to 31-Mar-17 20,46,32

01-Apr-17 to 31-Mar-18 53,94,468

01-Apr-18 to 31-Mar-19 33,36,160

01-Apr-19 to 31-Mar-20 70,84,405

01-Apr-20 to 31-Mar-21 24,64,599

01-Apr-21 to 31-Mar-22 2,34,841

01-Apr-22 to 31-Mar-23 1,06,38,229

01-Apr-23 to 31-Mar-24 2,28,50,978

01-Apr-24 to 31-Feb-25 1,97,27,199

Total 11,39,64,295

26. Having perused these figures, as well as considering the fact that the

Respondent adopted this mark in 2022 (when it applied for registration), it is

evident that there were no substantial sales recorded by the Respondent in

FAO(OS) (COMM) 100/2026 Page 16 of 16

the said period and to this extent the findings of the learned Single Judge

also do not require any interference.

27. The advertisement expenditure and the sales revenue fail to show that

that the Appellant’s mark has acquired such goodwill amongst its consumers

so as to associate the words ‘TIGER’ or ‘TIGER BRAND’ or TIGER

GOLD BRAND exclusively with the Appellant’s goods, leading to

misrepresentation amongst the consumers and consequent damages to the

Appellant. We concur with the finding of the learned Single Judge that

Appellant has failed to show that TIGER is associated exclusively with its

goods. In these facts, we are not inclined to interfere with the finding of the

learned Single Judge the mark TIGER has not attained distinctiveness qua

the goods of the Appellant.

28. We are of the view that the learned Single Judge has applied the

correct principles and there is no error whatsoever in the findings holding

that no case of passing off is made out, which led to the dismissal of the

injunction application.

29. For the aforesaid reasons, the present appeal is dismissed.

30. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.

MANMEET PRITAM SINGH ARORA , J

V. KAMESWAR RAO , J

APRIL 13, 2026/mt/IB