Page 1 of 32

REPORTABLE

Sl. No. 6

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MANIPUR

AT IMPHAL

WP(Crl.) No. 17 of 2026

Md. Abdul Hakim, aged about 36 years, S/o Md. Abdul

Khalique of Kyamgei Mayai Leikai, Irilbung P.S. Imphal East

District, Manipur – 795003.

….. Petitioner

-Versus-

1. District Magistrate, Imphal East, Manipur, Porompat –

795005.

2. State of Manipur represented by Chief Secretary,

Government of Manipur, South Block, Mantripukhri Imphal,

Manipur – 795002.

3. The Superintendent of Manipur Central Jail, Sajiwa, Imphal

East – 795010.

4. Union of India represented by (Secretary Home Affairs)

Department of Internal Security North Block, New Delhi –

110001.

..... Respondents

BEFORE

HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. M. SUNDAR

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE A. GUNESHWAR SHARMA

For Petitioner Mr. Ch. Ngongo, senior advocate instructed by

Ms. S. Gangarani, counsel on record

For respondent Nos. 1, 2

and 3

Mr. Phungyo Zingkhai, State Counsel.

For respondent No. 3 Mr. W. Darakeshwar, Sr. PCCG (Senior Panel

Counsel for Central Government)

Date of Judgment and

Order

16.09.2026

2026:MNHC:210-DB

Page 2 of 32

JUDGMENT AND ORDER

(ORAL)

[M. Sundar, CJ]

[1] The following abbreviations/short forms are used in this

order for the sake of brevity/convenience and clarity:

Sl.

No.

Abbreviations/

Short Forms

Full Form/Expansion

1. WP Writ Petition

2. WPs Writ Petitions

3. NSA National Security Act, 1980 (65 of 1980)

4. UAPA Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (37

of 1967)

5. FIR First Information Report

6. Explosive

Substances Act

the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 (6 of

1908)

7. BNS the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of

2023)

8. COFEPOSA the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and

Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974

(52 of 1974)

9. R1 first respondent

10. R2 second respondent

11. R3 third respondent

12. R4 fourth respondent

13. Detenu Md. Abdul Hakim @ Inaocha, aged 36 years,

son of Md. Khalique of Kiyamgei Mayai Leikai,

Irilbung PS, Imphal East District, Manipur

14. Detaining

authority

R1 (District Magistrate, Imphal East,

Manipur, Porompat – 795005)

15. Sponsoring

authority

Superintendent of Police, Imphal East

District

16. Impugned

preventive

detention order

order of State dated 21.04.2026 bearing

reference No. Cril/NSA/No.3 of 2026 made by

R1 (detaining authority) under Section 3(2)

of NSA

17. Impugned

approval order

order of R2 dated 01.05.2026 bearing

reference No. H-14/7/2026-HD-HD under

Section 3(4) of NSA approving the impugned

preventive detention order.

Page 3 of 32

Sl.

No.

Abbreviations/

Short Forms

Full Form/Expansion

18. Impugned

confirmation

order

order dated 27.05.2026 bearing reference

No. H-14/7/2026-HD-HD made by State

under Section 12(1) of NSA confirming the

impugned preventive detention order.

19. Sr.PCCG Senior Panel Counsel for Central Government

20. MHA Ministry of Home Affairs

[2] Captioned WP has been presented in this Court on

12.05.2026 assailing impugned preventive detention order made by

R1, approval of the same vide impugned approval order made by R2

and confirmation order (impugned confirmation order) made by R2.

To be noted, impugned approval order and impugned confirmation

have been signed by Joint Secretary (Home), Government of Manipur

and Commissioner (Home), Government of Manipur respectively

however, for the State Government of Manipur and are therefore

referred to as orders made by R2 solely for the sake of convenience.

[3] The writ petitioner was arrested on 26.03.2026

pursuant to an FIR dated 26.03.2026 on the file of Andro Police Station

in Imphal East District for alleged offences under Sections 17, 20 of

UAPA, Section 5 of Explosive Substances Act and Section 308 of BNS

read with Sections 13(2) and 18 of UAPA. Thereafter, writ petitioner

was remanded and when he remained incarcerated, impugned

preventive detention order was made by R1 on 21.04.2026 and the

same was served on the writ petitioner on the same day i.e.,

21.04.2026. Therefore, formal arrest pursuant to impugned preventive

Page 4 of 32

order was on 21.04.2026. Thereafter, R1/detaining authority made

detailed grounds dated 22.04.2026 based on history sheets and other

inputs from the sponsoring authority vide a letter of sponsoring

authority dated 13.04.2026 bearing reference No. C-5/12/SP-

IE/2026/11028. This grounds of detention was served on the detenu

on 25.04.2026. Notwithstanding myriad grounds raised in the WP, Mr.

Ch. Ngongo, learned senior counsel instructed by Ms. S. Gangarani,

learned counsel on record for the writ petitioner predicated his

campaign against the impugned preventive detention order/approval

order and confirmation order on 2 (two) points and the 2 (two) points

are as follows :

(i) in the grounds of detention dated

22.04.2026 which was served on the detenu

on 25.04.2026, vide paragraph 12, it has

been made clear that the detenu has a right

to make a representation to the detaining

authority (to be noted, R1 is the detaining

authority) within 12 (twelve) days or till the

order is approved by the State Government

whichever is earlier. Pursuant to grounds

being served on the detenu, detenu sent a

representation on 29.04.2026 to the

detaining authority (R1) but the detaining

authority did not consider and dispose of the

Page 5 of 32

same. However, this representation sent on

29.04.2026 to the detaining authority was

simply forwarded (without even comments)

to Commissioner (Home), Government of

Manipur and Commissioner (Home) disposed

of this representation (sent on 29.04.2026)

vide an order dated 13.05.2026 bearing

reference No. H-14/7/2026-HD-HD. This is

impermissible, as according to learned

senior counsel the detaining authority should

have applied her mind and disposed of the

representation sent to the detaining

authority separately and should not have

merely forwarded to her higher authority;

(ii) the second point is, a Notification dated

13.11.2023 bearing reference No. S.O.

4899(E) issued by MHA inter-alia declaring

Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) as an

‘unlawful association’ under UAPA has been

placed before the detaining authority,

detaining authority has relied on the same

and proceeded on the basis that writ

petitioner is a member of PLA (to be noted,

Page 6 of 32

this is denied by detenu) but the detaining

authority has not confirmed whether this

13.11.2023 Notification of MHA has been

confirmed by the tribunal under Section 4 of

UAPA though the impugned preventive

detention order was made on 21.04.2026

nearly two and half years after the

Notification. This according to learned senior

counsel is non-application of mind on the

part of the detaining authority and non-

application of mind which vitiates subjective

satisfaction arrived at by the detaining

authority.

[4] As regards response of the State Counsel (response to

afore referred two points), it is to be noted that Mr. Phungyo Zingkhai,

learned State Counsel for R1 to R3 and Mr. W. Darakeshwar, learned

Sr. PCCG for R4 are before this Court, R1 has filed an affidavit-in-

opposition dated 14.07.2026, R2 has filed an affidavit-in-opposition

dated 13.07.2026, R3 has filed an affidavit-in-opposition dated

08.07.2026 and R4 has filed an affidavit-in-opposition dated

02.06.2026.

[5] The afore referred 2 (two) points on which learned

senior counsel for the writ petitioner predicated his campaign against

Page 7 of 32

impugned preventive order, impugned approval and confirmation

orders the same have articulated in the writ petition and the same

have been responded to in the affidavits-in-opposition. Therefore, with

regard to the submissions to the contrary to the contrary made by

learned State Counsel with regard to the aforesaid 2 (two) points it

would be easier to set out the point as raised in the writ petition and

the responses in the affidavits-in-opposition.

[6] As regards the first point pertaining to detaining

authority not applying her mind and disposing of the representation

sent on 29.04.2026 the same has been raised vide paragraph 12 of

the writ affidavit and the same reads as follows :

[7] Afore-referred paragraph 12 point has been answered

by R1 in her affidavit-in-opposition dated 14.07.2026 in the following

manner :

Page 8 of 32

To be noted, stated position of R1 (detaining authority)

is that she did not consider the representation sent to her and she

merely forwarded to her higher authority.

[8] R2 in his affidavit-in-opposition dated 13.07.2026 has

answered the above point in the following manner :

To be noted, R2 has said that he has no comments.

[9] R3, in the affidavit-in-opposition dated 08.07.2026 has

answered this point in the following manner :

Page 9 of 32

To be noted, R3 is Superintendent of Jail in which detenu

is incarcerated and therefore, the above is merely trajectory the

representation took qua detenu.

[10] As regards R4, in the affidavit-in-opposition dated

05.06.2026, R4 has skipped paragraph 12 i.e., has not met paragraph

12 at all though the paragraphs and grounds before paragraph 12 and

after paragraph 12 have been met.

[11] A careful perusal of the responses of the respondents to

the first point brings to light that R1 (detaining authority) is now saying

that R2 (State) more {through Commissioner (Home)} has disposed

of the representation sent to detaining authority on 29.04.2026. As

regards R2, R2 says that he has no comments on this point. R3 merely

sets out the trajectory of the representation qua detenu. As regards

R4, the affidavit-in-opposition is silent. It is clear that the

representations sent by the detenu to the detaining authority on

29.04.2026 has not been considered by the detaining authority and

she has merely forwarded it to her higher authority without even her

comments. In this regard, we have the benefit of perusing the State

Page 10 of 32

files which were before us. It is clear from the State files that R1

(detaining authority) has merely forwarded the representation sent on

29.04.2026 to Commissioner (Home) under cover letter dated

29.04.2026 bearing reference No. Cril/NSA/No.3 of 2026 and scanned

reproduction of the same is as follows :

[12] Thereafter, Commissioner (Home) has disposed of on

13.05.2026 the afore referred representation sent to detaining

authority on 29.04.2026 and scanned reproduction of the disposal

proceedings is as follows :

Page 11 of 32

[13] On this first point, learned senior counsel pressed into

service 2 (two) cases laws. The first case law is Smt. Santosh Anand

-Vs.- Union of India and others reported in (1981) 2 SCC 420.

Santosh Anand, on facts, is a case which arose under COFEPOSA.

In Santosh Anand the detenu who was detained pursuant to a

preventive detention order made under Section 3 (1) of COFEPOSA

had sent a representation to the detaining authority but the

representation was not rejected by the detaining authority, instead it

Page 12 of 32

was sent to another authority for consideration. This was held to be

an infraction of Article 22(5) by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Santosh

Anand and most significant paragraph (to the extent relevant) in

Santosh Anand is as follows :

‘3. ……………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………………

The aforesaid averments make the position quite clear that the

representation was considered by the Chief Secretary as the

detaining authority only for the Administrator, the purpose of

submitting the same for orders to who in his turn after

considering it rejected the same on May 22, 1979. It is quite

clear that the Chief Secretary as the detaining authority himself

did not reject it. The original files which were produced before

us by counsel for the respondents also confirm the aforesaid

position. From the notings in the file it appears clear that the

Chief Secretary had on May 9, 1979 called for advice and

comments of the Secretary of Law and Justice in the matter and

on receipt of those comments the Chief Secretary on May 21,

1979 made an endorsement under signature to the effect "the

representation may be rejected". Below this endorsement of the

Chief Secretary appeared the endorsement of the Administrator

to the effect that he had considered the representation as well

as the comments of the Customs Department and after

examination thereof he agreed that the representation had no

merit and was rejected. It was on the basis of these

endorsements in the file that the averments quoted above were

made by Mr. Khambra in his counter-affidavit. It is thus very

clear to us that the representation could be said to have been

considered by the Chief Secretary at the highest but he did not

take the decision to reject the same himself and for that purpose

the papers were submitted to the Administrator who ultimately

rejected the same. There is no affidavit filed by the Chief

Secretary before us stating that he had rejected the

representation. The representation was, therefore, not rejected

Page 13 of 32

by the detaining authority and as such the constitutional

safeguard under Article 22(5), as interpreted by this Court,

cannot be said to have been strictly observed or complied with.

The continued detention of the detenu was clearly illegal and

deserves to be quashed and we accordingly quash the same and

direct that the detenu be released forthwith.’

(underlying made by this Court for ease of reference)

[14] The next case law relied on by learned senior counsel in

Sneha Khemka reported in (2004) 2 SCC 570 {Union of India

and another -Vs.- Sneha Khemka and another}. Sneha

Khemka, on facts, is also one that arose under COFEPOSA. In Sneha

Khemka case, Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down the ratio that when

3 (three) different authorities before whom representations are made

are required to look into the same separately. The authority concerned

will have to make an enquiry and dispose of the same. In this regard,

the further ratio that constitutional right to make a representation

includes the right to obtain proper consideration was laid down. The

most relevant paragraphs in Sneha Khemka are paragraphs 13 to 18

and the same read as follows :

‘13. A right to make a representation is, therefore, a facet

of fundamental right. Article 22(5) of the Constitution does

not state as to before whom such representation is to be

made, and provisions therefor are laid down in the statute

under which the detenu has been detained. It is now well-

settled that the object and purpose of the representation is

to enable the detenu to obtain relief at the earliest

opportunity wherefor, he may make representation before

such authority which can revoke the same by setting him at

Page 14 of 32

liberty. The cleavage in opinion of this Court as to whether

the detaining authority can pass an order revoking the order

of detention came up for consideration before a

Constitution Bench of this Court in Kamleshkumar

Ishwardas Patel wherein this Court in no uncertain terms

held that the revoking authority has the requisite

jurisdiction to revoke an order of detention. Upon service

of the order of detention on the detenu, the detaining

authority or the State Government is obligated to forward

to the Central Government a report thereabout; whereafter

the latter is entitled to consider at its earliest opportunity,

the validity or otherwise thereof so as to enable it to

intervene in appropriate cases by exercising its power of

revocation. Furthermore, the representation of the detenu,

if any, at a later stage is required to be considered by the

Central Government in terms of Section 11 of the Act

which reads thus :

“11. Revocation of detention orders.- (1)

Without prejudice to the provisions of section 21

of the General Clauses Act, 1897, a detention

order may, at any time, be revoked or modified-

(a) notwithstanding that the order has

been made by an officer of a State Government,

by that State Government or by the Central

Government;

(b) notwithstanding that the order has

been made by an officer of the Central

Government or by a State Government, by the

Central Government.

(2) The revocation of a detention order

shall not bar the making of another detention

order under section 3 against the same person.”

Page 15 of 32

14. A bare perusal of Section 11 of the Act would clearly

shows that the authority vested in the Central Government

or the State Government to revoke an order of detention is

without prejudice to the provisions contained in Section 21

of the General Clauses Act, 1897. In terms of Section 21 of

the General Clauses Act, an authority who passes an order

has the jurisdiction can revoke the same.

15. The power of the State Government or the Central

Government, therefore, is in addition to the power of the

detaining authority to revoke an order of detention. A

detenu in law, therefore, is entitled to make different

representations before different authorities at different

times in terms of statutory as also constitutional schemes.

16. Each authority, concededly, is required to apply its

mind on the materials placed on records and pass an order

either rejecting or allowing the said representation. A

representation of the detenu having regard to clause (5) of

Article 22 of the Constitution of India must also be

disposed of within a reasonable time.

17. It is equally well-settled that the constitutional right to

make a representation includes the right to obtain proper

consideration thereof by the authority to whom it is made.

18. Would that mean, as has been held by the High Court,

that a representation made before one authority must also

be considered by other authorities? The answer to the said

question must be rendered in the negative. If it is to be

assumed that the three different authorities before whom

the representations are made are required to obtain copies

of the representations made to the others; before a

representation is considered, the concerned authority will

have to make an enquiry from the authorities as to whether

Page 16 of 32

a representation had been made to it and if the answer

thereof is in the affirmative, to obtain a copy thereof.’

In paragraph 25 of Sneha Khemka, wherein Hon’ble

Supreme Court has reiterated earlier ratios in Sat Pal case and

Santosh Anand (we have already alluded to supra) and paragraph

25 reads as follows :

‘25. Referring to Sat Pal vs. State of Punjab and Others

[(1982) 1 SCC 12], Raj Kishore Prasad vs. State of Bihar

[(1982) 3 SCC 10] as also the decision in Santosh Anand

vs. Union of India [(1981) 2 SCC 420], it was held :

“...Having found that the representation

of the person detained was not considered by the

officer making the order of detention the High

Court was in error in holding that the said failure

on the part of the detaining authority to consider

and decide the representation is not fatal to the

order of detention. We are, therefore, unable to

uphold the answer given by the Full Bench to

Question No.3 and, in our view, the said question

should be answered in the affirmative. On that

basis it has to be held that since there was a

denial of the constitutional safeguard provided to

the detenu under Article 22(5) of the

Constitution on account of the failure on the part

of the officer who had made the order of

detention to independently consider the

representation submitted by the detenu against

his detention and to take a decision on the said

representation the further detention of the detenu

Ishwardas Bechardas Patel is rendered illegal.”

Page 17 of 32

[15] Ultimately, in Santosh Anand and Sneha Khemka

Hon’ble Supreme Court dislodged the impugned preventive order on

the point that the authority concerned had not considered the

representation by holding that it is an infraction of the Article 22(5)

i.e., right enshrined in Article 22(5) and vested in a detenu vide Article

22(5). We find that factual matrix in these two case laws are akin to

facts of case at hand and therefore we unhesitatingly apply and

respectfully follow the same.

[16] In the case at hand, from the factual matrix and rival

contentions, it is clear that the authority concerned i.e., the detaining

authority has not considered the representation sent on 29.04.2026 to

the detaining authority separately. The detaining authority has simply

forwarded to the Commissioner (Home) without applying her mind and

ultimately the Commissioner (Home) has considered the

representation. In this regard, it is also necessary to record that a

preventive detention order made by a detaining authority in exercise

of powers under Section 3 (2) of NSA is valid for a period of 12 (twelve)

days unless it is approved by the State under Section 3 (4) and

therefore, as regards 12 days the representation sent on 29.04.2026

to detaining authority was one which casts a more sanctus duty on the

detaining authority consider the same separately but the detaining

authority merely forwarded it to the Commissioner (Home) and this is

unacceptable. Therefore, we respectfully follow Santosh Anand,

Sneha Khemka principles laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court and

Page 18 of 32

unhesitatingly come to the conclusion that in the instant case also

there is an infraction of Article 22(5) more particularly, sanctus right

enshrined in Article 22(5) vested in the detenu warranting setting

aside of the impugned preventive detention order and as a

consequence approval and confirmation of the same stand vitiated.

[17] In normal circumstances, in a habeas corpus legal drill,

when a protagonist of habeas corpus writ petition succeeds on one

point it may not be necessary to examine the second point. However,

as the second point is of significance and as we find that second point

is popping up/recurring repeatedly in habeas corpus WPs in this Court,

we deem it appropriate to deal with the second point also.

[18] As would be evident from the narration thus far, the

second point pertains to a Notification by MHA inter-alia declaring PLA

as an ‘unlawful association’ by exercise of powers inter-alia under

Section 3 of UAPA. A careful perusal of the 13.11.2023 Notification

placed before the detaining authority by the sponsoring authority

brings to light that in this 13.11.2023 Notification MHA has resorted to

the proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 3 of UAPA and given

immediate effect to the Notification. More importantly, in this

Notification itself, MHA has made it abundantly clear that the

13.11.2023 Notification is subject to any order that may be made

under Section 4 of UAPA. Section 4 of UAPA deals with powers of the

Tribunal to adjudicate and either confirm or cancel a declaration in and

Page 19 of 32

vide Section 3 and sub-Section (3) of Section 4 prescribes a clear

timeline of 6 (six) months from the date of issue of Notification for

Tribunal to decide. In this regard, this Court deems it appropriate to

scan and reproduce 13.11.2023 MHA Notification. We do so and the

same are as follows :

Page 20 of 32

[19] This Court also deems it appropriate to scan and

reproduce Sections 3 and 4 of UAPA. We do so and the same read as

follows :

‘3. Declaration of an association as unlawful.—(1) If the

Central Government is of opinion that any association is, or

has become, an unlawful association, it may, by notification

in the Official Gazette, declare such association to be

unlawful.

(2) Every such notification shall specify the grounds on

which it is issued and such other particulars as the Central

Government may consider necessary:

Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall

require the Central Government to disclose any fact which

it considers to be against the public interest to disclose.

(3) No such notification shall have effect until the Tribunal

has, by an order made under section 4, confirmed the

declaration made therein and the order is published in the

Official Gazette:

Provided that if the Central Government is of

opinion that circumstances exist which render it necessary

for that Government to declare an association to be unlawful

with immediate effect, it may, for reasons to be stated in

writing, direct that the notification shall, subject to any order

that may be made under section 4, have effect from the date

of its publication in the Official Gazette.

(4) Every such notification shall, in addition to its

publication in the Official Gazette, be published in not less

than one daily newspaper having circulation in the State in

which the principal office, if any, of the association affected

is situated, and shall also be served on such association in

such manner as the Central Government may think fit and

Page 21 of 32

all or any of the following modes may be followed in

effecting such service, namely:—

(a) by affixing a copy of the notification to some

conspicuous part of the office, if any, of the association; or

(b) by serving a copy of the notification, where possible, on

the principal office-bearers, if any, of the association; or

(c) by proclaiming by beat of drum or by means of

loudspeakers, the contents of the notification in the area in

which the activities of the association are ordinarily carried

on; or

(d) in such other manner as may be prescribed.

4. Reference to Tribunal.—(1) Where any association has

been declared unlawful by a notification issued under sub-

section (1) of section 3, the Central Government shall,

within thirty days from the date of the publication of the

notification under the said sub-section, refer the notification

to the Tribunal for the purpose of adjudicating whether or

not there is sufficient cause for declaring the association

unlawful.

(2) On receipt of a reference under sub-section (1), the

Tribunal shall call upon the association affected by notice

in writing to show cause, within thirty days from the date of

the service of such notice, why the association should not

be declared unlawful.

(3) After considering the cause, if any, shown by the

association or the office-bearers or members thereof, the

Tribunal shall hold an inquiry in the manner specified in

section 9 and after calling for such further information as it

may consider necessary from the Central Government or

from any office-bearer or member of the association, it shall

decide whether or not there is sufficient cause for declaring

the association to be unlawful and make, as expeditiously as

Page 22 of 32

possible and in any case within a period of six months from

the date of the issue of the notification under sub-section (1)

of section 3, such order as it may deem fit either confirming

the declaration made in the notification or cancelling the

same.

(4) The order of the Tribunal made under sub-section (3)

shall be published in the Official Gazette.’

[20] In the instant case, MHA Notification is dated

13.11.2023. ‘within a period of six months’ elapsed on 12.05.2024.

Interestingly and intriguingly, this Notification was first placed before

the detaining authority by the sponsoring authority under cover of

letter dated 07.03.2026 (nearly two years after 12.05.2024).

Therefore, the detaining authority while making the impugned

preventive order on 21.04.2026 had certain and sanctus responsibility

to ascertain whether a reference to Tribunal under Section 4 has been

made and whether Tribunal under Section 4 has either confirmed or

cancelled the Notification dated 13.11.2023. In this regard, at the risk

of repetition, this court deems it appropriate to reiterate that

13.11.2023 Notification itself makes it clear that the Notification is

subject to any order to be made under Section 4. We had the benefit

of perusing the entire file of the detaining authority. The detaining

authority has neither examined the details as to whether the matter

has been referred to a Tribunal and whether the Tribunal has either

confirmed or cancelled the Notification nor has any order of the

Tribunal been placed before the detaining authority. Therefore, the

Page 23 of 32

subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority is clearly

flawed.

[21] As regards subjective satisfaction arrived at by a

detaining authority qua a preventive detention order, Hon’ble Supreme

Court has made it clear that subjective satisfaction, though subjective,

is justiciable on certain grounds and the grounds culled out i.e., the

grounds on which subjective satisfaction are justiciable has been laid

down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the oft quoted Ameena Begum

reported in (2023) 9 SCC 587 {Ameena Begum -Vs.- State of

Telangana and others}. In Ameena Begum, after a survey of

various case laws on preventive detention including case laws

pertaining to preventive detention orders under NSA, Hon’ble Supreme

Court made it clear that areas within which the validity of subjective

satisfaction can be tested are 6 (six) in number and the same are as

follows :

‘(a) When the detaining authority has not applied its mind

at all;

(b) When there is dishonest exercise of power by detaining

authority;

(c) Exercise of power of detaining authority for improper

purpose;

(d) Detaining authority acting under dictation of another

body;

(e) When the subjective satisfaction recorded by detaining

authority is based on application of wrong test or

misconception of a statute;

(f) When the detaining authority has arrived at and

recorded subjective satisfaction without the same being

Page 24 of 32

grounded on materials which are rationally probative

value.’

[22] In the case at hand, we find that the subjective

satisfaction recorded by detaining authority is based on misconception

of a statute which is (e) supra vide Ameena Begum. It is a

misconception of the legal architecture of UAPA as the statutory

scheme has been given a go by. It is also a case of arriving at and

recording subjective satisfaction without the same being grounded on

materials which are [(f) qua Ameena Begum] of ‘rationally

probative value’ as the order of the Tribunal which is clearly an

order which is of ‘rationally probative value’ was not before the

detaining authority. The reason is, the Notification dated 13.11.2023

made by MHA itself makes it clear that Notification is subject to order

to be made by Tribunal and the Tribunal has to make an order either

confirming or cancelling the Notification within 6 (six) months i.e., on

or before 12.05.2024. Therefore, it is clearly a case of misconception

of statute and not relying on material which are of ‘rationally

probative value’. We also find that it is a case of the detaining

authority not applying its mind at all as the detaining authority, on

seeing MHA Notification dated 13.11.2023 and more particularly the

last paragraph thereat should have asked for the order of the Tribunal

from the sponsoring authority or looked up official gazette publications

to see if any order of the Tribunal has been made. In this regard it is

relevant to notice that vide sub-Section (4) of Section 4 of UAPA the

Page 25 of 32

order made by the Tribunal should be published in the official gazette.

At the least the official gazette should have been looked up and the

grounds should mention whether there is confirmation of the MHA

Notification dated 13.11.2023 as it was placed before the detaining

authority nearly two and half years after the date of the Notification.

[23] Most relevant paragraph of Ameena Begum wherein

Hon’ble Supreme Court deals with justiciability is paragraph 16 and

paragraph 16 in turn extracts an earlier judgment. Paragraph 16 to

the extent relevant is as follows :

‘16.…………………………………………………………….

…………………………………………………………………

9. But that does not mean that the subjective satisfaction of the

detaining authority is wholly immune from judicial reviewability.

The courts have by judicial decisions carved out an area, limited

though it be, within which the validity of the subjective

satisfaction can yet be subjected to judicial scrutiny. The basic

postulate on which the courts have proceeded is that the

subjective satisfaction being a condition precedent for the

exercise of the power conferred on the Executive, the Court can

always examine whether the requisite satisfaction is arrived at by

the authority : if it is not, the condition precedent to the exercise

of the power would not be fulfilled and the exercise of the power

would be bad. There are several grounds evolved by judicial

decisions for saying that no subjective satisfaction is arrived at

by the authority as required under the statute. The simplest case

is whether the authority has not applied its mind at all; in such a

case the authority could not possibly be satisfied as regards the

fact in respect of which it is required to be satisfied. Emperor v.

Shibnath Bannerji is a case in point. Then there may be a case

where the power is exercised dishonestly or for an improper

purpose : such a case would also negative the existence of

satisfaction on the part of the authority. The existence of

‘improper purpose’, that is, a purpose not contemplated by the

statute, has been recognised as an independent ground of control

Page 26 of 32

in several decided cases. The satisfaction, moreover, must be a

satisfaction of the authority itself, and therefore, if, in exercising

the power, the authority has acted under the dictation of another

body as the Commissioner of Police did in State of Bombay v.

Gordhandas Bhanji and the officer of the Ministry of Labour and

National Service did in Simms Motor Units Ltd. v. Minister of

Labour and National Service the exercise of the power would be

bad and so also would the exercise of the power be vitiated where

the authority has disabled itself from applying its mind to the

facts of each individual case by self-created rules of policy or in

any other manner. The satisfaction said to have been arrived at

by the authority would also be bad where it is based on the

application of a wrong test or the misconstruction of a statute.

Where this happens, the satisfaction of the authority would not

be in respect of the thing in regard to which it is required to be

satisfied. Then again the satisfaction must be grounded ‘on

materials which are of rationally probative value’. Machindar

Shivaji Mahar v. R. The grounds on which the satisfaction is

based must be such as a rational human being can consider

connected with the fact in respect of which the satisfaction is to

be reached. They must be relevant to the subject-matter of the

inquiry and must not be extraneous to the scope and purpose of

the statute. If the authority has taken into account, it may even

be with the best of intention, as a relevant factor something

which it could not properly take into account in deciding whether

or not to exercise the power or the manner or extent to which it

should be exercised, the exercise of the power would be bad.

Pratap Singh v. State of Punjab [AIR 1964 SC 72 : (1964) 4 SCR

733]. If there are to be found in the statute expressly or by

implication matters which the authority ought to have regard to,

then, in exercising the power, the authority must have regard to

those matters. The authority must call its attention to the matters

which it is bound to consider.”

(emphasis supplied)

[24] This Court respectfully followed Ameena Begum

principle in an earlier case being Mutum Ranjan Meitei vide order

dated 11.02.2026 made in WP(Crl.) No. 34 of 2025 with regard to

Page 27 of 32

justiciability of subjective satisfaction, and we are informed that

Mutum Ranjan Meitei has been accepted by the State and the

detenu has since been released. Mutum Ranjan Meetei @

Lamjingba vs. District Magistrate, Thoubal District & Ors

reported in 2026 (1) MNLJ 126: 2026 Legal Eagle 6 (Neutral

Citation No.: 2026:MNHC:17-DB), was reiterated in Laishram Nilajit

Shija vs. State of Manipur & Ors (Neutral Citation No.:

2026:MNHC:43-DB), Yambem Manichandra Singh vs. State of

Manipur & Ors (Neutral Citation No.: 2026:MNHC:100-DB), Teresa

Lhingjakim Khongsai vs. District Magistrate, Tengnoupal

District & Ors (Neutral Citation No.: 2026:MNHC:151-DB), by this

Court and we are informed that in all these cases, State has accepted

the orders and has since released the detenu(s).

[25] Before concluding, this Court deems it appropriate to

advert to one more aspect of the matter. This is a case where

preventive detention order under NSA has been clamped on the basis

of a lone FIR. This Court is acutely conscious and unambiguously

aware that a preventive detention order can be clamped even on the

basis of a lone FIR. There is no difficulty on this point. However, as

already alluded to supra, pursuant to this lone FIR dated 26.03.2026

on the file of Andro Police Station in Imphal East, the detenu was

arrested on 26.03.2026, remanded and he remains incarcerated until

today. 90 days, even if completed from the date of arrest, without

going into the date of remand be it the same day or the next day

Page 28 of 32

elapsed on 24.06.2026. The investigating agency has not filed charge

sheet on or before 24.06.2026. This Court is informed that charge

sheet has not been filed until this date. Be that as it may, though the

FIR has been registered for alleged offences inter alia vide Sections 17

& 20 of UAPA, the investigating agency/prosecution has not resorted

to Section 43D(2) of UAPA and sought extension of time for filing

charge sheet and for extension of remand though Section 43D(2) of

UAPA provides for such an application. As investigating agency has not

resorted to this provision it has led to a situation wherein and whereby

the detenu i.e., the writ petitioner has got default bail from the Trial

Court vide order dated 21.07.2026 and a scanned reproduction of the

default bail order is as follows:

Page 29 of 32

Page 30 of 32

Page 31 of 32

[26] The above means that the writ petitioner/detenu who

has been arrested on the basis of a sole FIR has thereafter been

clamped with the impugned preventive detention order and he

remains incarcerated solely because of the impugned preventive

detention order though he has got default bail i.e., enlarged on bail

in the lone FIR against him. We make it clear that this point is being

recorded only for the limited purpose of comprehensively capturing

facts/for completion of facts and making it clear that in the regular law

and order drill, the investigating agency has allowed the detenu to get

default bail but is detaining the detenu by way of preventive detention

order which is not in the realm of law and order but in the realm of

public order domain. In this regard, we respectfully remind ourselves

of the three concentric circles illustration laid down by Hon’ble

Supreme Court in the oft quoted and celebrated Ram Manohar

Lohia vs. State of Bihar & Anr reported in (1965) SCC OnLine

SC 9. At the risk of repetition, we make it clear that we are interfering

and dislodging the impugned preventive detention order, consequently

approval and confirmation orders not on this point but on the afore-

referred two points, namely the detaining authority not considering

the representation made to her separately and subjective satisfaction

being flawed inter alia owing to non-application of mind/ not verifying

whether the Tribunal has confirmed or cancelled the Notification

declaring PLA as unlawful organization.

Page 32 of 32

[27] Ergo, the sequitur is, captioned writ petition is allowed.

The impugned preventive detention order dated 21.04.2026 bearing

reference No. Cril/NSA/No. 3 of 2026 made by R1 (District Magistrate,

Imphal East), impugned approval order dated 01.05.2026 bearing

reference No. H-14/7/2026-HD-HD and impugned confirmation order

dated 27.05.2026 bearing reference No. H-14/7/2026-HD-HD are all

set aside and Md. Abdul Hakim @ Inaocha, aged 36 years, son of Md.

Khalique of Kiyamgei Mayai Leikai, Irilbung Police Station, Imphal East,

Manipur now lodged in Manipur Central Jail, Sajiwa, Imphal East is

directed to be set at liberty forthwith if not required in connection with

any other case/s. There shall be no order as to costs.

JUDGE CHIEF JUSTICE

FR/NFR

Sushil/Victoria

P.S. I : Upload forthwith

P.S. II : All concerned will stand bound by instant order vide

web copy uploaded in High Court website inter-alia as

the same is QR coded.