In the High Court at Calcutta

Civil Appellate Jurisdiction

Appellate Side

The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya

And

The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Supratim Bhattacharya

M.A.T. No. 1072 of 2026

+

CAN 1 of 2026

Arising out of

W.P.A. No.12272 of 2026

Md. Idrish and Others

-Versus-

Union of India and others

For the appellants : Mr. Kaustav Banerjee,

Ms. Ria Kunud, ... Advs.

For the Union of India : Mr. Uday Sankar Bhattacharya,

Mr. Tirtha Pati Acharya, … Advs.

For the respondents : Mr. Subhankar Nag,

Mr. Ashok Kr. Jena,

Mr. Sourav Ghosh,

Mr. Snehashis Sen,

Mr. Abhishek Banerjee, ... Advs.

Heard on : 16.07.2026

Reserved on : 16.07.2026

Judgment on : 21.07.2026

2

Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.:-

1. The present appellants filed a writ petition, bearing W.P.A. No.12272 of

2026, challenging a demolition drive initiated by the S yama Prasad

Mookherjee Port (SPMP), formerly known as the Calcutta Port Trust, in

respect of the subject-buildings, alleging that the appellants are occupants

of the said buildings. The said writ petition was dismissed on contest vide

Judgment dated June 30, 2026, giving rise to the present appeal.

2. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the learned Single Judge

observed that the writ petitioners/appellants could not satisfy the writ court

as to how they came into possession of the subject

premises/quarters/dwelling units and that from a careful scrutiny of the

Aadhaar Cards produced by the appellants, no materials could be found

regarding their alleged occupation and/or possession and, accordingly, held

that in the absence of any cogent evidence regarding ‘unauthorised

occupation’ of the appellants in the aforementioned premises, owned by the

respondent-Authorities, the provisions of Sections 4 and 5 of the Public

Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter

referred to as “the 1971 Act”) have got no manner of application.

Accordingly, the writ petition was dismissed.

3. Learned counsel contends that all the writ petitioners/appellants prima facie

proved their possession in respect of the subject-premises by production of

different documents, including Aadhaar Cards, Voter’s Identity Cards, and

Gas Supply Bills, which were overlooked by the learned Single Judge. In

3

view of such prima facie proof of occupation having been furnished, the Port

Authorities acted without jurisdiction in proceeding to demolish the subject

buildings without resorting to the provisions of Sections 4 and 5 of the 1971

Act. Under the said provisions, the Port Authorities are duty-bound to first

adjudicate as to whether the occupation the appellants is ‘unauthorised’

within the contemplation of the said Act and thereafter, upon giving

opportunity to show cause and hearing the appellants, to pass appropriate

orders.

4. Secondly, it is contended by the appellants that even if the demolition could

be construed to be under Section 5-B of the 1971 Act, the Authorities were

duty-bound to issue prior notice to each of the appellants and to give a

reasonable opportunity to them to show cause as to why an order of

demolition should not be made. Moreover, it is argued that the Port

Authorities do not have any power under any statute to undertake such

demolition drive.

5. Learned counsel for the appellants next takes the court through the

provisions of the Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other

Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act, 2016 (hereinafter referred to as “the

Aadhaar Act”), and contends that issuance of an Aadhaar card is preceded

by a verification as to “demographic information” furnished by the applicant.

6. Section 2(k) of the Aadhaar Act defines “demographic information”, which

also includes the address of the applicant as one of the necessary

components of such information. As per Section 2(c) of the said Act,

“authentication” means the process by which the Aadhaar number , along

4

with demographic information or biometric information of an individual, is

submitted to the Central Identities Data Repository for its verification and

such Repository verifies the correctness, or the lack thereof, on the basis of

information available with it.

7. Section 3(3) of the said Act stipulates that on receipt of the demographic

information and biometric information under sub-section (1), the Authority

shall, after verifying the information, in such manner as may be specified by

regulations, issue an Aadhaar number to such individual.

8. The Aadhaar (Enrolment and Upda te) Regulations, 2016 (for short, “the

Regulations”) provides for the modalities in such verification process.

Schedule II to the Regulations includes various documents, on the basis of

which the verification process is completed. Thus, only upon production of

documentary proof of address, the Aadhaar Cards are issued. Hence, it is

argued that learned Single Judge refused to exercise jurisdiction vested in

him by law in not considering the Aadhaar Cards produced by the

appellants as sufficient proof of occupation. Even the other documents

produced by the appellants, being in the nature of gas supply bills and

Voter’s Identity Cards, it is submitted, were sufficient to prima facie come to

the conclusion that the appellants are in occupation of the subject -

premises. However, the learned Single Judge overlooked the said documents

altogether.

9. Learned counsel appearing for the Port Authorities contends that out of 52

writ petitioners/appellants, only 22 produced their Aadhaar Cards whereas

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the other 30 did not. Thus, the learned Single Judge was justified in holding

that no proof of occupation was furnished by the appellants.

10. Learned counsel places reliance on Regulation 2(d) of the Regulations, which

defines “authentication” to mean the process by which the Aadhaar number,

along with demographic information or biometric informati on of an

individual, is submitted to the Central Identities Data Repository for its

verification and such Repository verifies the correctness, or the lack thereof,

on the basis of information available with it.

11. Regulation 7(1) thereof provides that the Registrars appointed by the

Authority shall carry out the enrolment by themselves or through enrolling

agencies contracted/appointed by them. Thus, it is such agencies which

carry out the verification process and the Authority does not have any direct

role to play therein. Learned counsel further argues that it will be evident

from Regulations 10 and 11 that the process of verification is confined to

ascertaining whether the information furnished by the applicant is correctly

recorded and is based on documents furnished by the applicant, without

any process of physical verification of the address being envisaged. Thus,

the mere production of an Aadhaar Card cannot justify the conclusion that

the applicant’s address is the actual place of residence of the applicant as

given by him/her before the Authority.

12. Learned counsel cites Debashis Nandy Vs. Union of India & Ors. [WP

No.15233(W) of 2018], rendered by a learned Single Judge of this court, to

argue that although an Aadhaar Card may be substantive proof of the

6

identity of the individual, based on the biometric information taken from the

applicant, it cannot be a conclusive proof of his/her identity or address.

13. Learned counsel further cites Parvati Kumar and Others. Vs. State of U.P.

Thru. Prin Secy Home and Others, reported at 2019 SCC OnLine All 7085,

where a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court held that in case a

person relies on entries in Aadhaar Card with regard to address, under the

Evidence Act, it cannot be said that the entries in that regard are conclusive

proof of such fact.

14. It was observed by the Division Bench that the Regulations provide for the

applicant to rely on a set of documents for giving information in regard to

name, address and proof of date of birth; however, because the said

information is merely given by the applicant, and is not authenticated by

UIDAI at the time of authentication, the Aadhaar Card cannot be conclusive

proof in regard to those entries.

15. Lastly, learned counsel cites Association For Democratic Reforms and Others

v. Election Commission of India and Others, reported at 2026 SCC OnLine SC

990, where the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that insofar as Aadhaar Card is

concerned, reliance was placed on Section 9 of the Aadhaar Act, which does

not recognize it as a proof of citizenship or domicile, thereby rendering it

unsuitable for the purpose of electoral verification. The statutory framework

governing the Aadhaar Card, it was observed, does not treat is as a proof of

citizenship or domicile. The Hon’ble Supreme Court went on to observe that

Section 23(4) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 expressly

contemplates the use of Aadhaar for the limited purpose of establishing the

7

identity of an individual but such recognition does not elevate Aadhaar to

conclusive proof, and that the authorities would remain empowered to verify

its authenticity and genuineness, including by calling for such further

material as may be necessary in a given case.

16. On the strength of the above judgments, it is argued that the reliance of the

appellants on their Aadhaar Cards and other documents does not entitle

them to a finding that they are in occupation of the subject-properties.

17. Learned counsel for the Port Authorities next submits that from the

photographs and correspondence produced before the writ court by way of a

report, it would be evident that the subject-buildings are in a dangerous and

dilapidated condition and may cav e in at any point of time, thus

endangering public safety. As such, the said properties are required to be

immediately demolished.

18. Learned counsel further argues that to be in ‘unauthorised occupation’

within the contemplation of the 1971 Act, such occupation has to be ‘settled

occupation’ and any and every intruder or passer-by cannot claim to be in

occupation for the purpose of the 1971 Act.

19. With regard to the Second Schedule of the Regulations, it is argued that the

verification process and the documents to be furnished are unilaterally

produced by the applicant, upon which the Aadhaar Cards are issued.

Thus, in the absence of any physical verification of the actual residence of

the applicant at the address given by him/her, Aadhaar Cards or other

similar documents cannot be taken to be substantial proof of occupation.

20. Heard learned counsel for the parties.

8

21. On the basis of the arguments of counsel and the materials on record, this

court comes to the following conclusions:

Proof of occupation

22. The writ petition was dismissed primarily on the ground of absence of any

proof as to the appellants’ occupation in respect of the subject-premises.

Out of the 52 appellants, some have produced their Aadhaar Cards and

others, documents such as Gas Supply Bills, Voter’s Identity Cards, etc.

23. Learned counsel for the Port Authorities argues that “occupation”, for the

purpose of the 1971 Act, ought to be “settled occupation”.

24. In respect of certain statutes such as the Electricity Act, 2003, courts have

held that in order to get an electricity connection, the appellant must be in

settled occupation of the property where such connection is sought, lending

an element of permanence or intention to reside to the quality of such

occupation.

25. However, there is no such qualification enumerated in the 1971 Act or the

body of judgments rendered thereon. Section 2(g) of the 1971 Act defines

“unauthorised occupation” to mean the occupation by any person of public

premises without authority for such occupation, and include the

continuance in occupation by any person of the public premises after the

authority (by way of grant or any other mode of transfer), under which he

was allowed to occupy the premises, has expired or has been determined for

any reason whatsoever. Such inclusive definition contemplates both cases -

where there was a prior grant which has since expired/ been determined

9

and rank trespassers whose occupation is not preceded by any such grant.

In respect of both, however, the trappings of the 1971 Act apply.

Accordingly, the observation of the learned Single Judge that the writ

petitioners/appellants could not satisfy the Court as to how they “came into

possession” of the subject-premises under the respondent-Authorities, could

not be a determinant of the applicability of the 1971 Act.

26. The next question which arises is whether Aadhaar Cards and the other

documents produced by the appellants were sufficient to come to a prima

facie conclusion of their occupation.

27. It is to be kept in mind that the writ court is not a fact-finding forum or a

competent authority to adjudicate upon such question conclusively. In order

to invoke the 1971 Act and its provisions, the writ petitioners/appellants

were merely to furnish prima facie proof of their occupation. The term

“occupation” is not separately defined in the 1971 Act but is a component of

“unauthorised occupation” as de fined in Section 2(g) thereof. Such

“occupation” is qualified in the said provision merely by the expression

“without authority for such occupation”, without any element of permanence

in it.

28. In Debashis Nandy (supra)

1

, the learned Single Judge of this Court was

considering the question of sanctity of an Aadhaar Card as a source of

individual identification, as reflected in Paragraph No. 21 of the said report.

In such context, it was held that Aadhaar is not the only means of

1

Debashis Nandy Vs. Union of India & Ors. [WP No.15233(W) of 2018]

10

identification and the question of identification of a person based on which a

civil dispute would be decided, does not solely rests with his/her Aadhaar

identification. Thus, in the context of a civil dispute, the Aadhaar Card

would not be the sole test of an individual’s identification. There is a gulf of

difference between a civil suit and a proceeding under the 1971 Act and/or

for that matter, a writ petition. Proof before a civil court, which conclusively

determines the rights of parties, has to be of a much higher standard than

before a writ court or an authority under the 1971 Act. Even otherwise, the

observation of the learned Single Judge in the cited decision was only to the

effect that an Aadhaar Card cannot be a sole proof of identification, thus

implicitly recognizing that it could be one of the circumstantial proofs

thereof.

29. The learned Single Judge ultimately came to the conclusion, as did the

Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Parvati Kumar (supra)

2

, that

an Aadhaar Card is not a conclusive proof of the ‘demographic information’

(including address) of an applicant.

30. In Association For Democratic Reforms (supra)

3

(commonly referred to as the

“SIR Case”), the Hon’ble Supreme Court was considering the procedure and

methodology adopted in carrying out the exercis e by the Election

Commission, including the method prescribed by the Commission to

ascertain the citizenship of the voters. In such specific context, the Hon’ble

2

Parvati Kumar and Others. Vs. State of U.P. Thru. Prin Secy Home and Others,

reported at 2019 SCC OnLine All 7085

3

Association For Democratic Reforms and Others v. Election Commission of India

and Others, reported at 2026 SCC OnLine SC 990

11

Supreme Court observed that insofar as the documentation regime was

concerned, the initial grievance of the petitioners centred around the

exclusion of widely held Aadhaar Cards, which was directly addressed by

the Court while directing the inclusion of the Aadhaar Card with a

clarification regarding the statutory status of Aadhaar as a valid document

for establishing identity. In such backdrop, it was observed by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court that the statutory framework governing the Aadhaar Card

does not treat it as proof of citizenship or domicile. It was also held that the

recognition of Aadhaar Card as an additional document of identity for

consideration in the process of inclusion in the voters’ list does not elevate

Aadhaar to conclusive proof and the authorities would remain empowered to

verify its authenticity and genuineness, including by calling for further

material as may be necessary.

31. It is to be noted that the paradigm of citizenship or domicile is somewhat

different from the residence of a person at a particular address.

“Citizenship” has a far wider connotation than the mere residence of a

person at a particular address. “Domicile” indicates the place or country of

ordinary residence of an individual, which is legally recognized or officially

recognized. Hence, in order to prove domicile or citizenship, many additional

ingredients, apart from mere occupation of a particular property, including

an element of permanence, are to be established. Thus, the proposition of

law that Aadhaar Card is not a proof of citizenship or domicile, does not

invalidate it, per se, as a proof of mere occupation of a premises. As held

12

earlier, no permanence is attached to the definition of ‘unauthorised

occupation’ in the 1971 Act.

32. All the above judgments merely come to the conclusion that an Aadhaar

Card is not a “conclusive” proof, either of address or i dentity and/or

domicile. However, “conclusive” and “prima facie” are diametrically opposite

concepts. Whereas the former has a sense of finality, the latter is merely a

preliminary assessment. Even if an Aadhaar Card is not conclusive proof of

residence, it is definitely a prima facie proof of occupation in respect of a

property.

33. Section 2(k) of the Aadhaar Act defines “demographic information” to include

address. Section 3(3) thereof stipulates that on receipt of the demographic

information and biometric information under sub-section (1), the Authority

shall verify the same and only then issue an Aadhaar number.

34. Regulation 7 of the Regulations, contrary to the argument of the Port

Authorities, envisages that the Registrars appointed by the Authorities are

to carry out the enrolment of individuals, either by themselves or through

enrolling agencies appointed by them. In either case, the responsibility of

carrying out such process ultimately lies with the Registrars and not their

agents.

35. Again, Regulation 11 is not restricted to collection of information but, under

sub-regulation (2)(b) thereof, confers on the individual seeking to enrol an

opportunity to check the accuracy of the information captured. The list of

documents that may be presented as proof of address for applicants of age 5

years and above, as given in Schedule II of the Regulations, names several

13

substantive documents, including Valid Indian Passport, Ration/PDS

Photograph Card/e-Ration Card, Voter Identity Card/e-Voter Identity Card,

Disability Identity Card, Photograph Identity Card, Scheduled

Tribe/Scheduled Caste/Other Backward Caste documents, Passbook with

photograph issued by a Public Sector Bank, Certificate issued by

MP/MLA/MLC/Municipal councillor or a Gazetted Officer, including

Tehsildar and other authorities, Electricity Bill, Water Bill, Telephone

Landline bill, Valid Sale Agreement, Gas Connection Bill, Allotment Letter of

accommodation, Life or Medical Insurance Policy, valid Long Term Visa,

valid Registration Certificate or Residential Permit issued by the FRRO, etc.

36. Thus, multiple categories of documents are recognized in the list given in

Schedule II as valid proof to verify the address of an applicant for the

purpose of issuance of Aadhaar Card. Notably, Gas Bills and Voter Identity

Cards, which are the documents produced by the appellants other than

Aadhaar Cards, are also documents recognized under Schedule-II as valid

documents for issuance of Aadhaar Cards.

37. The Legislature, in its wisdom, recognized all such categories of documents

as prima facie proof of address. Hence, it is not for the writ court to defy

such Legislative intent by brushing aside the said documents even for the

purpose of prima facie establishing the address of a person.

38. At the threshold stage, for undertaking any proceeding under the 1971 Act,

mere prima facie address proof is sufficient to set the ball rolling under the

provisions of Sections 4 and 5 of the 1971 Act.

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39. Thus, in the present case, the writ petitioners/appellants have produced

sufficient documents to prima facie establish their occupation of the subject

buildings for the purpose of being entitled to come within the purview of

“unauthorised occupants” under the 1971 Act.

Scope of adjudication under the 1971 Act

40. There are two stages of scrutiny envisaged for eviction of a person in

unauthorised occupation of public premises under the 1971 Act. Under

Section 4(1) thereof, if the Estate Officer has information and/or knows or

has reasons to believe that any person is in unauthorised occupation of a

public premises, he is to forthwith issue a notice in writing calling upon

such person to show cause why an eviction order should not be made. Sub-

section (2) of Section 4 stipulates several ingredients of such notice,

including the grounds on which the order of eviction is proposed to be made

and notice requiring all persons concerned, who may be in occupation or

even claim interest in the public premises, to show cause and to appear

before the Estate Officer along with evidence which they intend to produce

in support of the cause shown, if any, and also for personal hearing, if

desired.

41. Thus, not only occupants but also persons merely claiming interest in the

public premises are brought within the fold of a show cause notice under

Section 4 of the 1971 Act, coupled with the rights to disclose the evidence

which they intend to produce in support of the cause shown and to seek

personal hearing.

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42. At the second level, Section 5(1) stipulates that only if, upon considering the

cause shown and any evidence produced by the noticee in support of the

cause and after personal hearing, if any, the Estate Officer is satisfied that

the public premises are in unauthorised occupation, he shall make an order

of eviction, that too for reasons to be recorded.

43. Thus, it may very well be that upon the cause shown and the evidence

produced pursuant to a Section 4(1) notice, the Estate Officer is satisfied

and comes to the conclusion that the concerned person is not in

unauthorised occupation and drop the proceeding then and there. In such a

case, no question would arise at all to initiate an eviction proceeding.

44. The second stage involves an order being passed for eviction after giving full

opportunity of hearing and of production of evidence to the alleged

unauthorised occupant, whereafter an order is to be made granting 15 days

to such occupant to vacate the premises and only thereafter, to take

possession of the premises. Under the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section

5 of the 1971 Act, if the Estate Officer is satisfied, for reasons to be recorded

in writing, that there exists any compelling reason which prevents the

person from vacating the premises within 15 days, another 15 days may be

granted by the Estate Officer for the person to vacate the premises.

45. Thus, several layers of protection have been given to an unauthorised

occupant under Sections 4 and 5 of the 1971 Act. It is to be noted that the

satisfaction to be recorded under Section 5(1) by the Estate Officer, upon

perusing the cause shown and considering the evidence as well as hearing

the noticee, also includes a consideration as to whether the person is in

16

occupation of the premises, since “occupation” is an inextricable ingredient

of “unauthorised occupation”.

46. As to the provisions of Sections 5-A, 5-B and 5-C of the 1971 Act, those are

not attracted at all in the instant case. All the said three Sections pertain to

“unauthorised construction”, that is, any building or any movable or

immovable structure or fixture erected or placed or raised on or against or in

front of any public premises except in accordance with the authority under

which the occupant was allowed to occupy such premises. It is nobody’s

case here that any such unauthorised construction ha s been raised,

displayed or spread, or any cattle or other animal has been brought to be

kept, on any public premises, to come within the purview of “unauthorised

construction” under the said Sections.

47. “Unauthorised construction”, for the purpose of Sections 5-A, 5-B and 5-C,

and “unauthorised occupation” under Section 2(g), for the purpose of

invoking Sections 4 and 5, stand on entirely different footings.

48. Thus, Sections 5-A, 5-B and 5-C are not applicable, but Sections 4 and 5

are clearly attracted in the present case, in view of the appellants having

furnished prima facie material to show their occupation in respect of the

subject-premises, even if such proof is not ‘conclusive’.

49. Hence, the provisions of the 1971 Act are squarely attracted. Since the Port

Authorities have failed to invoke the same and/or issue any notice

contemplated under Section 4 thereof and/or to record prima facie

satisfaction upon hearing the appellants as to their occupation being

17

unauthorised, the attempts at demolition of the premises, in the process

evicting the appellants, is palpably illegal and de hors the law.

Power of demolition

50. The power of demolition vested in the authorities under the 1971 Act is

restricted to “unauthorised constructions” and not “authorised

constructions which are occupied by unauthorised occupants”, as in the

present case. The subject-properties admittedly belong to the Port

Authorities and are not unauthorised constructions erected by the

appellants. Thus, the procedure envisaged under Sections 5-A, 5-B and 5-C

is not attracted in the present case at all.

51. Sections 4 and 5 of the 1971 Act do not empower the Authorities to

demolish the properties but merely to evict unauthorised occupants

therefrom.

52. The ground of dilapidation of the premises and/or their allegedly precarious

condition is unknown as a ground of demolition or eviction by the

Authorities under the 1971 Act. Such ground, even if available under the

municipal statutes to the authorities so empowered under such statutes,

cannot be invoked or exercised by the Government or Government

Instrumentalities owning public premises within the contemplation of the

1971 Act. If at all, it is the municipal authorities who could have initiated a

demolition process in adherence to the respective governing statutes, upon

issuance of prior notice as contemplated therein, prior to demolishing the

precarious or dangerous buildings. In any event, the Port Authorities in the

18

present case are not an authority under any such statute, and/or the 1971

Act, empowered to demolish thei r own structures on the ground of

dilapidation or dangerous condition. Thus, the impugned action of

demolition undertaken by the Port Authorities cannot also be accepted.

Admission by the Port

53. From the correspondence relied on by the Port Authorities themselves, the

argument of the said Authorities, that the subject-buildings are vacant and

abandoned premises, is belied. In the report filed before the writ court, the

Port Authorities admitted that the subject -quarters are residential

apartments. Furthermore, in the letter dated May 22, 2025 issued by the

Deputy Commissioner of Police, Port Division, Kolkata to the Chairman of

the Kolkata Port Trust, it is admitted that the subject-properties comprised

of 502 residential quarters. Again, the request to the Port Authorities and

the KMC Authorities to take urgent steps, authored by the Officer-in-Charge

of the West Port Police Station, dated May 21, 2025, reiterates that the

premises consist of 502 residential quarters, occupied by 8,000 residents.

54. Not a single notice to any of such residents has been produced by the Port

Authorities, within the contemplation of the 1971 Act.

55. Although the Port Authorities claim that a general notice was pasted in a

public place near the premises, no proof in that regard has been furnished

either in the report filed before the writ court and/or before this Court.

Thus, the so-called demolition drive initiated by the SPMP (Port) is palpably

unlawful, de hors the law and violative of principles of natural justice

19

inasmuch as no opportunity has been given to the appellants to show cause

or be heard or to produce evidence in support of their stance regarding the

said premises.

56. The appellants rely on Board of Trustees for the Port of Kolkata & Anr. v.

Vijay Kumar Arya & Ors., reported at 2009 SCC OnLine Cal 266, which is

germane in the context. It was held therein that though an Estate Officer

under the 1971 Act is not required to be versed in law, he had sufficient

powers to decide the question as to whether a noticee under Section 4 of the

said Act is an unauthorised occupant and it is the adjudication on such

score against the noticee that will permit him to evict the occupant adjudged

to be authorised. Such prior adjudication as to whether a person is in

‘unauthorised occupation’ also includes the ingredient of whether a person,

who has prima facie shown that he/she is in possession, is actually in

physical occupation of the premises.

57. In the present case, in the absence of any such exercise being conducted by

the Port, in the teeth of the admission of the Port as indicated above, the

entire exercise of attempted demolition is palpably unlawful.

CONCLUSION

58. In view of the above discussions, the demolition drive sought to be carried

out by the respondent-Authorities is held to be unlawful and ought to be

halted. Thus, the learned Single Judge erred in law and proceeded on an

erroneous premise in dismissing the writ petition.

20

59. Accordingly, M.A.T. No.1072 of 2026 is allowed on contest, thereby

restraining the respondent-Authorities from undertaking any demolition

process and/or eviction drive in respect of the residential quarters, dwelling

units and structures named as Calcutta Dock Labour Board (CDLB)

Quarters and Calcutta Port Trust (CPT) Quarters, located at Brooke Lane,

Garden Reach, Kolkata.

60. Accordingly, W.P.A. No.12272 of 2026 stands allowed to the above extent.

61. However, nothing in this judgment shall preclude the respondent -

Authorities from initiating due proceedings under Sections 4 and 5 of the

1971 Act insofar as the subject-properties are concerned.

62. CAN 1 of 2026 is consequentially disposed of.

63. Interim orders, if any, stand vacated.

64. There will be no order as to costs.

65. Urgent certified copies, if applied for, be supplied to the parties upon

compliance of all formalities.

(Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.)

I agree.

(Supratim Bhattacharya, J.)