Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:14765-DB

Page 1 of 33

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI

W.P. (PIL) No. 1218 of 2022

Md. Mumtaz Ansari, aged about 33 years, Son of Md. Mohiuddin

Ansari, Resident of Telkal Bhuli Road, P.S.- Bank More, P.O. and

District - Dhanbad, Jharkhand.

... Petitioner

Versus

1. The State of Jharkhand, Through Chief Secretary, 1st Floor, Project

Bhawan, P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, Ranchi-834004.

2. Secretary, Department of Home, Jail & Disaster Management, 2nd

Floor, Project Bhawan, Dhurwa, P.O. and P.S.-Dhurwa, Ranchi -

834004.

3. Secretary, Department of Law, 2nd Floor, Project Bhawan, P.O. and

P.S.-Dhurwa, Ranchi - 834004.

... Respondents

---------

CORAM: HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR

---------

For the Petitioner: Md. Shadab Ansari, Advocate

For the Respondents: Mr Gaurav Raj, A.C. to A.A.G.-II

---------

Reserved on: 07.05.2026 Pronounced on: 14/05/2026

Per M. S. Sonak, C.J.

1. The present writ petition has been filed in public interest seeking,

inter alia, the following reliefs –

a. Direction upon the Respondent concerned to issue

Government Order/direction/notification/ circular to

conduct Judicial Enquiry in every cases of death or

disappearance of a person, or rape of a woman while such

person/woman is in the custody of the police or in Judicial

Custody as per the mandate of 176 (1-A) of Cr.P.C

b. Pass any such other order/s as may be deemed fit in the

facts and circumstances of this case

Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:14765-DB

Page 2 of 33

2. The above reliefs are sought in public interest litigation on behalf of

the victims of custodial violence, the families of the deceased, and

the marginalised and socio-economically weaker sections of society

in the State of Jharkhand, who often lack the awareness and financial

resources to legally pursue and enforce their fundamental rights

against the State machinery.

3. The petitioner’s case is predicated upon a written reply furnished by

the Department of Home, Prison and Disaster Management,

Government of Jharkhand, in response to a starred question in the

State Legislative Assembly. This official disclosure reveals that a

total of 166 persons died in police or judicial custody between 2019

and 2021. Based on these figures, the petitioner contends that in most

of these instances, the cause of death was custodial violence or

torture.

4. The Petitioner further submitted that despite the statutory mandate

under S. 176(1-A) of the Cr.P.C., 1973, requiring custodial death

inquiries to be conducted by a Judicial Magistrate, the respondent

authorities have regularly deputed Executive Magistrates for this

purpose in blatant disregard of the law.

5. In response to these allegations, the respondents have filed several

affidavits in these proceedings. However, their consistent contention

is that the present petition is frivolous, misconceived, and legally

unsustainable, and therefore warrants dismissal. For a considerable

time, the respondents chose to remain in a state of denial. Finally, a

Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:14765-DB

Page 3 of 33

supplementary counter-affidavit dated 13.03.2026 was filed,

providing statistical data on custodial deaths between 2018 and 2026

and on how the State Administration handled these issues.

6. The rival contentions, therefore, now fall for our determination.

7. The supplementary counter-affidavit dated 13.03.2026, filed by

Respondent No. 2, paints a deeply distressing and shocking picture of

systemic non-compliance. The statistical data on custodial deaths

from 2018 onwards, as extrapolated from Annexure-D to the

affidavit, reveal a situation that strikes at the very root of the Rule of

Law.

8. The relevant particulars, as disclosed in the affidavit, are reproduced

below:

Particulars

Total

No. of custodial death

427

No. of Custodial Death brought to the

notice of Magistrate for enquiry.

427

No. of enquiry conducted by the

Magistrate under Section 176 Cr.P.C

or Section 196 of BNSS, 2023

427

No. of Magisterial inquiry held in

addition to police inquiry

427

No. of inquiry done by Executive

Magistrate

262

No. of inquiry done by Judicial

Magistrate

225

No. of cases in which NHRC

Guidelines taken into count

427

No. of cases in which provisions of

BNSS complied (for cases from 2023-

2025 only)

133

Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:14765-DB

Page 4 of 33

9. On a perusal of this data, this Court is shocked beyond words. While

the respondents claim that magisterial inquiries were conducted in all

427 cases, their own figures reveal either a fundamental

misunderstanding or a total disregard for the law. This Court fails to

comprehend how the respondents can, under oath, state that they

have complied with the mandates of Section 176 of the Cr.P.C. or

Section 196 of the BNSS in letter and spirit.

10. By their own admission, 262 inquiries were conducted by Executive

Magistrates, even though the law had unequivocally stripped the

Executive of this prerogative two decades ago. Enquiries by

Executive Magistrates could never have been regarded as substitutes

for enquiries by judicial magistrates in matters of custodial deaths.

Yet the affidavit claims that the letter and spirit of the law were

followed when addressing the issue of large-scale custodial deaths in

Jharkhand.

11. The figure, or at least the disclosed figure of 427 custodial deaths

between 2018 and 2016, is alarming. But even more alarming is the

utter disregard for legal procedures when addressing such issues of

custodial deaths. The breaches, serious by themselves, if unchecked,

will increase custodial unnatural deaths, embolden the perpetrators,

and promote lawlessness. The right to life protected by our

Constitution also extends to those in the custody of State Authorities,

and those in Authority cannot, therefore, trample upon this right by

disregarding, with impunity, the legal and Constitutional safeguards.

Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:14765-DB

Page 5 of 33

12. The right to life is not a mere biological concept; it is an expansive

guarantee that inherently encompasses the right to live with human

dignity

1

. These fundamental tenets of existence continue to animate

our legal and constitutional landscape, remaining immutable

regardless of an individual's status. Consequently, even when an

individual is accused of an offence or stands as a convicted prisoner,

her entitlement to a dignified and peaceful life remains inviolable.

13. The occurrence of a fatality within the coercive control of the State,

legally categorised as a "custodial death", represents a profound

failure of the constitutional machinery. In a civilised society

governed by the Rule of Law, custodial violence is an affront to the

very essence of justice. The social contract between the State and its

citizens is fundamentally predicated on the dual pillars of dignity and

security. Any breach of this trust while a person is in the State's care

strikes at the heart of our democratic values.

14. The Latin maxim “salus populi est suprema lex,” which translates

into the safety of the people is the supreme law, further emphasising

the need for the protection of dignity during arrest and custody.

Similarly, “salus republicae est suprema lex,” which translates into

the safety of the State, is the Supreme law, highlighting the co-

existence of the safety of people and the state.

15. A combined reading of these doctrines underscores the principle that

although an individual’s welfare may at times yield to the

1 Elizabeth Wicks, The Meaning of ‘Life’: Dignity and the Right to Life in International Human

Rights Treaties, Vol 12, Human Rights Law Review; c2012. p. 199-203.

Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:14765-DB

Page 6 of 33

community’s, the State, by taking a citizen into custody, does not

extinguish its obligations towards that individual. On the contrary,

those obligations are intensified, as the State alone stands between

the citizen and harm. The coercive power of the executive, which

deprives the citizen of his liberty, simultaneously generates a

corresponding constitutional duty to safeguard the liberty that

remains.

16. The constitutional anchor of this duty is enshrined under Article 21

of the Constitution, which declares that no person shall be deprived

of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure

established by law. Lest there be any doubt that this guarantee

extends in full vigour to the persons in custody, the Hon'ble Supreme

Court, in the case of In Re: Inhuman Conditions in 1382 Prisons,

reported in (2017) 10 SCC 658, laid down with constitutional

finality, in Paragraph 2 of that judgment:

“Like most societies, we are not strangers to custodial

violence and unnatural deaths but our vibrant democracy

permits us to debate and discuss these issues with rational

arguments. However, right sounding noises critical of

custodial violence (in any form) cannot achieve any useful

purpose unless persons in authority hear the voices of the

victims or the silence of the dead and act on them by taking

remedial steps. There must be a greater degree of

sensitivity among those in authority with regard to

Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:14765-DB

Page 7 of 33

persons in custody and it has been the endeavour of the

constitutional courts in our country, over several decades,

to consistently flag this issue. The results have been

somewhat mixed but the effort will continue as long as

Article 21 remains in our Constitution. This message goes

out loud and clear, as also the message that the dignity of

the individual is not a plaything for those in authority."

17. Moreover, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of Nilabati

Behera v. State of Orissa, reported in (1993) 2 SCC 746,

articulated the precise content of the State's constitutional obligation

towards persons in its custody with an authority and clarity that has

since become foundational to this entire branch of jurisprudence.

18. The relevant excerpt from the above-mentioned dictum is

reproduced as follows:

"It is an obligation of the State to ensure that there is no

infringement of the indefeasible rights of a citizen to life,

except in accordance with law while the citizen is in its

custody. The precious right guaranteed by Article 21 of

the Constitution of India cannot be denied to convicts,

under trials or other prisoners in custody, except

according to procedure established by law. There is a

great responsibility on the police or prison authorities to

ensure that the citizen in its custody is not deprived of his

right to life. His liberty is in the very nature of things

Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:14765-DB

Page 8 of 33

circumscribed by the very fact of his confinement and

therefore his interest in the limited liberty left to him is

rather precious. The duty of care on the part of the State

is strict and admits of no exceptions."

19. The expression “the duty of care on the part of the State is strict and

admits of no exceptions” is not rhetorical hyperbole. It is a precise

legal standard of constitutional magnitude. The concurring opinion of

Hon’ble Justice A.S. Anand in the same judgment reinforced the

corollary of this obligation, the availability of public law remedies

before this Court, in terms that this Bench adopts in full:

"The citizen complaining of the infringement of the

indefeasible right under Article 21 of the Constitution

cannot be told that for the established violation of the

fundamental right to life, he cannot get any relief under the

public law by the courts exercising writ jurisdiction."

20. In view of the legal principles elucidated above, the State’s

contention that the present petition is frivolous or misconceived in

law cannot be sustained. Given the alarming figures of custodial

deaths finally disclosed to the Court, the State should not have taken

such an insensitive plea, at least in this matter. This is more so

because the record in this case reveals a sustained non-compliance

with the substantive and procedural safeguards the law has provided

to check custodial deaths. The mandate of Section 176(1-A) of the

Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:14765-DB

Page 9 of 33

Cr.P.C. (now Section 196(2) of the BNSS) is not a directory

suggestion but a statutory command of paramount importance.

21. Any continued departure from this statutory requirement, as

highlighted by the petitioner, constitutes a direct infringement of the

procedural and substantive safeguards inherent in Article 21 of the

Constitution. This Court is constitutionally obligated to admit and

hear this matter to ensure that the Rule of Law is not diluted and that

the administrative machinery remains strictly within the bounds of its

legal authority.

22. Further, it is evident that the petitioner’s case rests primarily on the

assertion that the mandatory rigours of Section 176(1-A) of the

Cr.P.C. (now Section 196(2) of the BNSS) are being systematically

bypassed by the respondent authorities. The core grievance is that the

statutory requirement for an independent judicial inquiry is being

treated as discretionary rather than mandatory.

23. To fully appreciate the shift in the burden of inquiry from the

Executive to the Judiciary, it is imperative for this court to examine

the historical genesis of the amendment to the erstwhile Section 176

of the Cr.P.C.. This legislative evolution was not merely a procedural

update; rather, it was a substantive response to the systemic

vulnerabilities identified in the previous framework, particularly

regarding cases of custodial death, disappearance, and rape. The

legislative history of the provision mandating magisterial inquiries

Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:14765-DB

Page 10 of 33

into custodial deaths serves as a profound narrative of institutional

recognition, systemic failure, and subsequent legislative remediation.

24. Under the original framework of Section 176 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1973, the responsibility for conducting

inquests into deaths occurring in police or judicial custody was

vested in the Executive Magistrate. This arrangement was inherently

problematic, as it placed the inquiry within the same executive

framework it was designed to oversee. Both the inquiring officer and

the personnel whose conduct was under scrutiny were functionaries

of the same administrative hierarchy, often operating under identical

political and bureaucratic pressures. This structural overlap created a

fundamental conflict of interest, where the proximity between the

investigator and the investigated risked undermining the very

neutrality required for a credible fact-finding mission.

25. It was in this precise context that the Law Commission of India

addressed the grave issue of custodial crimes in its 152

nd

Report

of 1994. The Commission recognised that the existing executive

machinery was inadequate to satisfy the collective conscience and the

thirst for justice demanded by the citizenry.

26. Consequently, in paragraph 2.7 of the said report, the Law

Commission observed as follows:

“Where custodial violence results in death of the victim,

obviously the substantive law has failed. But procedural

law must ‘take over’ in order that the factum of death, the

Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:14765-DB

Page 11 of 33

cause of death, the mode of death and other relevant facts

are ascertained. As far as possible, the ascertainment of

such facts must be (a) quick in its timing, (b) adequate in its

coverage, (c) thorough in its methodology, and (d)

impartial in its approach. The desideratum that we have

mentioned last in the above enumeration is, of course, of

the highest importance. It is in regard to this very

desideratum that the present situation is not satisfactory.

No doubt, the statutory law, particularly, the Code of

Criminal Procedure, does contain a few provisions on the

subject, but experience seems to indicate that there are

three major defects in this regard. In the first place,

though inquest by the Executive Magistrate is, at present,

mandatory, cases are not known where police officers are

associated with the inquiry, thus defeating the very object

of the provision for Magisterial inquiry. Secondly, without

casting any reflections on the police or Executive

Magistrates, one must take note of the fact that these

inquests have not always inspired public confidence. This

is evident from the persistent demands for the

appointment of Commissions of Inquiry that are made

whenever there is custodial torture, rape or death.”

27. This judicial scepticism towards the impartiality of executive-led

investigations was further echoed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:14765-DB

Page 12 of 33

State of M.P. v. Shyam Sunder Trivedi, reported in (1995) 4 SCC

262. In that landmark decision, the Hon’ble Court recognised the

inherent difficulty in securing evidence against police personnel due

to institutional loyalties.

28. The Hon’ble Apex Court observed as follows:

“It is difficult to expect direct ocular evidence of the

complicity of the police. Bound as they are by the ties of

brotherhood, often police personnel would not come

forward to give evidence and more often than not, police

officers could, as happened in that case, feign total

ignorance about the matter. Courts should not, in such

cases, show an exaggerated adherence to the principle of

proof beyond reasonable doubt. There will hardly be any

evidence available to the prosecution to implicate the

police. The Court called deaths in police custody as the

‘worst kind of crimes in civilised society, governed by rule

of law. Men in khaki are not above the law.’”

29. This judicial recognition of the systemic hurdles in achieving

accountability within the executive framework served as a catalyst

for legislative change. It became evident that without a neutral

arbiter, the constitutional guarantee of a fair and impartial

investigation would remain elusive in cases of custodial deaths.

30. Accordingly, recognising this structural failure and the "ties of

brotherhood" that often impede the discovery of truth, Parliament

Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:14765-DB

Page 13 of 33

enacted what it expected to be a decisive legislative remedy. The

Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2005, inserted

Section 176(1-A) into the Code, which took effect on June 23, 2006.

This amendment signalled a fundamental shift in the legal landscape

by mandating judicial oversight in place of executive discretion.

31. The provision is reproduced in verbatim for the convenience of

reference:

“176. Inquiry by Magistrate into cause of death.—(1)

when the case is of the nature referred to in clause (i) or

clause (ii) of sub-section (3) of section 174], the nearest

Magistrate empowered to hold inquests shall, and in any

other case mentioned in sub-section (1) of section 174, any

Magistrate so empowered may hold an inquiry into the

cause of death either instead of, or in addition to, the

investigation held by the police officer; and if he does so, he

shall have all the powers in conducting it which he would

have in holding an inquiry into an offence.

(1A) Where,—

(a) any person dies or disappears, or

(b) rape is alleged to have been committed on any

woman,

while such person or woman is in the custody of the

police or in any other custody authorised by the

Magistrate or the Court, under this Code in addition

Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:14765-DB

Page 14 of 33

to the inquiry or investigation held by the police, an

inquiry shall be held by the Judicial Magistrate or

the Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be,

within whose local jurisdiction the offence has been

committed.

(2) The Magistrate holding such an inquiry shall record the

evidence taken by him in connection therewith in any

manner hereinafter prescribed according to the

circumstances of the case.

(3) Whenever such Magistrate considers it expedient to

make an examination of the dead body of any person who

has been already interred, in order to discover the cause of

his death, the Magistrate may cause the body to be

disinterred and examined.

(4) Where an inquiry is to be held under this section, the

Magistrate shall, wherever practicable, inform the relatives

of the deceased whose names and addresses are known,

and shall allow them to remain present at the inquiry.

(5) The Judicial Magistrate or the Metropolitan Magistrate

or Executive Magistrate or police officer holding an inquiry

or investigation, as the case may be, under sub-section (1A)

shall, within twenty-four hours of the death of a person,

forward the body with a view to its being examined to the

nearest Civil Surgeon or other qualified medical person

Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:14765-DB

Page 15 of 33

appointed in this behalf by the State Government, unless it

is not possible to do so for reasons to be recorded in

writing.

Explanation.—In this section, the expression “relative”

means parents, children, brothers, sisters and spouse.”

32. A plain reading of the above provision makes it axiomatic that the

law mandates a specific procedural course. It creates a compulsory

obligation that whenever the death or disappearance of an individual

or a rape occurs in police custody, the inquiry must be conducted by

a Judicial Magistrate or a Metropolitan Magistrate.

33. The legislative use of the term “shall” in this context is an

unequivocal command, signalling that the requirement is mandatory,

non-discretionary, and admits of no executive substitution. By

vesting this power exclusively in the Judicial Branch, the legislature

has effectively declared that, in matters of custodial deaths, the fact-

finding process must be independent and insulated from the police

department's hierarchical structure. Therefore, enquiries by the

Executive Branch in matters of custodial deaths can never be a

substitute for enquiries by the Judicial Branch.

34. In this regard, it is pertinent to note that Constitutional Courts across

the length and breadth of our country have consistently recognised

the mandatory nature of Section 176(1-A) of the Cr.P.C. and its

successor, Section 196(2) of the BNSS. The Hon’ble Gujarat High

Court in State v. Union of India (Cr.M.A. No. 10625 of 2009), the

Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:14765-DB

Page 16 of 33

Hon’ble Madras High Court in P. Pugalenthi v. State of Tamil

Nadu (W.P. No. 25743 of 2010), the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in

India Centre for Human Rights and Law v. State of Maharashtra

(Criminal PIL No. 8 of 2008), and the Hon’ble Andhra Pradesh

High Court in Mohamad Nazma Begum v. Government of

Andhra Pradesh (W.P. No. 15484 of 2009) have collectively and

unequivocally reiterated a foundational principle of criminal

jurisprudence, namely that the word "shall" in Section 176(1-A)

operates as an absolute jurisdictional mandate rather than a directory

prescription.

35. These Courts have consistently held that the provision is mandatory

and that custodial death inquiries must be conducted by the Judicial

Magistrate, thereby excluding the Executive branch to prevent any

conflict of interest or departmental bias.

36. This legislative imperative has been further carried forward and

reinforced under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023

(BNSS). Section 196(2) of the BNSS replicates the mandate for a

compulsory inquiry by a Judicial Magistrate or Metropolitan

Magistrate in cases of custodial death. However, it is pertinent to

clarify that the term “Magistrate” as employed in Section 196 must

not be broadly construed to include any category of Magistrate.

37. The interpretive mandate under S. 3(1) of the BNSS effectively

resolves any lingering ambiguity regarding the nature of the inquiring

authority. The provision stipulates that, unless the context otherwise

Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:14765-DB

Page 17 of 33

requires, any reference in any law to a “Magistrate” without any

qualifying words shall be construed as a reference to a Judicial

Magistrate of the first class or a Judicial Magistrate of the second

class, as the case may be, exercising jurisdiction in such area.

38. This statutory rule of construction makes it axiomatic that the

legislature intended the "Magisterial Inquiry" under S. 196(2) to be a

strictly judicial function. Consequently, the Executive, which is itself

charged with the failure to prevent custodial death, is left with no

prerogative to assign these duties to an Executive Magistrate, as such

a move would be an unequivocal violation of the definitions set out

by Parliament and of the legislative scheme.

39. Moreover, the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), New

Delhi, in its proceedings dated 04.09.2020, has further fortified this

position by providing a definitive interpretation of Section 176(1-A)

of the Cr.P.C. The Commission has observed as follows :

“Section 176 (1A) of Cr.P.C. has been inserted by way of

amendment with a view to deal with the cases of special

circumstances which are mentioned therein when a person

dies or disappears or rape is alleged to have been

committed on any woman while such person is in the

custody of police or any other custody authorized by the

court.

Inquiries shall also be held by Judicial Magistrate or the

Metropolitan Magistrate in addition to the inquiries or

Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:14765-DB

Page 18 of 33

investigations held by the police within the local

jurisdiction where the offence has been committed. So the

inquiry is the condition precedent to determine an offence

and unless the inquiry is conducted by Judicial Magistrate

or the Metropolitan Magistrate in cases where any person

dies or disappears or rape is alleged to have been

committed on any woman, while such person or woman in

police or judicial custody, there seems to be no scope to

determine that such incident of custodial death,

disappearance or rape as the case may be, is an offence.

Therefore, to give more sanctity to such inquiry, the power

has been given to the Judicial Magistrate/Metropolitan

Magistrate by inserting new amended provision in Section

176 Cr.P.C.

Alternatively, it can be viewed that the contemplation of

legislature is that in three circumstances viz. death,

disappearance or rape alleged to have been committed on

any woman within the police or judicial custody, there must

be an inquiry to be conducted by the Judicial Magistrate or

Metropolitan Magistrate, in whose jurisdiction, the incident

has taken place. The purport and meaning of 'offence' as

inserted in 176 (1A) Cr.P.C., presumably, the death,

disappearance or rape alleged to have been committed on

any woman, while the person is in police or judicial

Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:14765-DB

Page 19 of 33

custody, is that, the Judicial Magistrate or the

Metropolitan Magistrate by holding an enquiry must come

to a conclusion whether the death in custody, is due to

torture, ill-treatment or negligence by the concerned

public servant culminating to an offence or a natural

death. Therefore, before holding an inquiry by the Judicial

Magistrate or the Metropolitan Magistrate, nothing can be

attributed as to the cause of death, disappearance or rape

alleged to have been committed on any woman, qua

offence...”

40. Lastly, the continuity of this mandate across two successive codes of

criminal procedure reflects a settled and irreversible parliamentary

determination. It establishes that the inquiry into custodial death

belongs exclusively to the judicial branch, and the executive

enquiries can offer no substitute. Accordingly, an inquiry

conducted by an Executive Magistrate into a custodial death

occurring after June 23, 2006, in substitution for a judicial

enquiry as mandated by law, is not a mere procedural lapse but a

serious dereliction in the discharge of statutory duty.

41. As noted at the outset, the counter-affidavits on behalf of the State

reveal a deeply distressing and shocking picture of systemic non-

compliance. The statistical data on custodial deaths from 2018

onwards, as extrapolated from Annexure-D of the affidavit, show that

there were 427 custodial deaths since 2018. This is an unusually large

Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:14765-DB

Page 20 of 33

figure. In 262 cases, no inquiries were held by a judicial magistrate,

thereby grossly breaching statutory and constitutional mandates.

Enquiries through the executive magistrates, perhaps hand-picked,

were sought to be passed off as substitutes for statutory compliance.

The NHRC guidelines on the subject were also observed only in

breach. Despite all this, the State alleges that this petition is frivolous

and should be dismissed.

42. On a perusal of the data furnished by the State itself, and assuming

that it reflects the entire and correct position, this Court is shocked

beyond words. While the respondents claim that magisterial inquiries

were conducted in all 427 cases, their own figures betray a

fundamental misunderstanding or a total disregard for the law. This

Court fails to comprehend how the respondents can, under oath, state

that they have complied with the mandate of Section 176 of the

Cr.P.C. or Section 196 of the BNSS in letter and spirit. By their own

admission, 262 inquiries were conducted by Executive Magistrates,

even though the law unequivocally stripped the Executive of this

prerogative two decades ago.

43. Furthermore, the data presented is mathematically irreconcilable.

The respondents state that 262 inquiries were conducted by Executive

Magistrates and 225 by Judicial Magistrates, resulting in a total of

487 inquiries. This figure stands in inexplicable contradiction to the

respondents' own primary submission that the total number of

reported custodial deaths is only 427. This discrepancy not only

Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:14765-DB

Page 21 of 33

reflects a systemic disregard for the law but also casts serious doubt

on the State’s veracity and diligence in maintaining these records.

44. This also reveals a sorry state of affairs and compels this Court to

presume that the correct data is not being presented. Regardless of

the numerical inconsistencies, the failure to hold the mandatory

judicial enquiries, or to regard enquiries held by Executive

magistrates as a substitute, demonstrates utter disdain for statutory

compliance and the sanctity accorded to the right to life under our

Constitution.

45. Apart from the statutory breaches, no criterion is disclosed for the

Executive to handpick which custodial death cases are to be enquired

into by a Judicial Magistrate and which by an Executive Magistrate.

Similarly, no criterion is disclosed for the Executive to handpick an

Executive Magistrate to enquire into cases of custodial deaths. The

law does not provide the State with the luxury of choice, nor does it

allow the Executive to "pick and choose" its preferred forum for an

inquiry into its own alleged transgressions. The statutory language is

axiomatic, and the command is unequivocal. Despite this, the

mandate of Parliament is being discarded with impunity by the

authorities in the State of Jharkhand.

46. In such circumstances, this Court is constrained to hold that the

present non-compliance is systemic in nature and cannot be brushed

aside as a mere procedural irregularity or an isolated administrative

lapse. There is a total failure by the Government of Jharkhand to

Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:14765-DB

Page 22 of 33

comply with the mandatory provisions of the law. Allowing these

262 inquiries to stand, or regarding them as substitutes for the

legislatively mandated judicial enquiries, would validate a process

that is void ab initio and permit the Executive to remain a judge in its

own cause.

47. This institutional bypass constitutes a grave constitutional lapse, as it

fundamentally violates the guarantees enshrined in Articles 14 and 21

of the Constitution of India. The protection of life and personal

liberty under Article 21 is not an empty promise; rather, it mandates

that any deprivation of life or investigation into its loss must strictly

follow a "procedure established by law."

48. When the Executive ignores the judicial inquiry mandated by

Parliament and substitutes it with its own administrative process, it

renders that procedure a mere farce, stripping the deceased and their

kin of their fundamental rights. Furthermore, the arbitrary selection

of which cases receive a judicial inquiry and which are relegated to

an executive inquiry is a direct violation of Article 14. Such "pick

and choose" governance introduces a level of whim and caprice that

is antithetical to equality before the law. In the eyes of this Court, a

procedure that is not followed in the manner prescribed by law is no

procedure at all; it is an act of administrative lawlessness.

49. The Courts world over have time and again emphasised that the

history of liberty has largely been the history of the observance of

procedural safeguards. These procedural safeguards are required to

Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:14765-DB

Page 23 of 33

be zealously watched and enforced by the Courts, and their rigour

cannot be allowed to be diluted based on the nature of the alleged

activities of the detenue (Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2011

SCW 2262).

50. Therefore, a situation of such magnitude, as finally disclosed in the

State’s supplementary affidavit, cannot be left unnoticed or

unaddressed by this Constitutional Court. As the sentinel on the qui

vive, it is the solemn obligation of this Court to protect the

constitutional fabric and ensure that the rule of law is not reduced to a

dead letter. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently affirmed

that the Rule of Law constitutes the bedrock of a democratic society.

[ See Erusian Equipment & Chemicals Ltd. v. State of W.B.

reported in (1975) 1 SCC 70, Ramana Dayaram Shetty v.

International Airport Authority of India, reported in (1979) 3

SCC 489, and Haji T.M. Hassan Rawther v. Kerala Financial

Corpn. Reported in (1988) 1 SCC 166].

51. The State’s affidavits initially revealed that it was in a state of denial.

After the records and figures were found to be too large and

incriminating, a misconceived defiance was attempted by passing off

enquiries by the executive branch as sufficient compliance with the

statutory and constitutional mandate. If such systemic defiance is

ignored, the entire legal system will lose the public confidence it

commands, which could fracture the very foundation of our society.

The common person’s trust in the administration of justice is the only

Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:14765-DB

Page 24 of 33

anchor that prevents a descent into social chaos. Tolerating such

systemic defiance or attempting to trivialise the situation would

constitute a serious breach of this trust.

52. Accordingly, an inquiry is required to uncover the reasons for this

systemic collapse and to determine how and why a mishap of this

scale, namely the bypassing of mandatory judicial inquiries in

hundreds of cases, was allowed to persist for years. It is imperative,

even at this point, to identify, to the extent possible, the specific

officials responsible for this institutional failure and to ascertain why

they disregarded the parliamentary mandate and subverted the

statutory process.

53. While the specific and consequential directions to remedy this

administrative lapse, including the timeline for the submission of the

report and the initiation of action against the erring authorities, shall

be delineated in the operative portion of this judgment, it is sufficient

to state here that the State cannot be permitted to remain a silent

spectator to its own statutory violations.

54. In doing so, we must remain mindful of our responsibilities and

duties. The judicial branch is an equal stakeholder in this process.

Only when an efficient and timely inquiry is conducted by a Judicial

Magistrate does a ray of hope remain, ensuring that in cases of

unnatural custodial death, the perpetrators are identified and brought

to justice. It is pertinent to note that such inquiries must be conducted

in strict adherence to the guidelines and circulars issued by the

Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:14765-DB

Page 25 of 33

National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) from time to time.

Needless to say, the mandate of Section 176(1-A) must be followed

meticulously by all Magistrates, in both letter and spirit.

55. Having said that, upon perusing several magisterial inquiry reports

submitted before this Court during these proceedings, we have

observed a marked lack of clarity and uniformity in the structure and

format of reports prepared by Magistrates across the State of

Jharkhand. The required sensitivity and adherence to the NHRC

guidelines and advisories were mostly lacking. The approach,

unfortunately, was more to have the matter done away with rather

than an attempt to find the truth of the circumstances of the custodial

death.

56. Consequently, we are of the considered view that a more structured

and uniform (though not a rigid one) practice must be adopted to

enhance the legibility and legal efficacy of reports prepared under

Section 176(1-A). To ensure a systematic presentation of the

materials collected that enables efficient appreciation of the record, it

is imperative that a standardised (though not a rigid) format be

established for cataloguing witnesses, documents, and material

objects. This institutionalised framework will facilitate better

comprehension and immediate reference for all stakeholders. The

specific modalities for the development and implementation of this

standardised framework are accordingly detailed in the operative

portion of this judgment.

Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:14765-DB

Page 26 of 33

57. At this juncture, we would also want to deal with the issue of

compensation in cases of unnatural custodial deaths. The issue is no

res integra, as the Hon’ble Apex Court, through a plethora of

judgments, has explicitly recognised the rights of the kith and kin to

be granted compensation. In the realm of public law, compensation is

not merely a civil remedy but a tool for constitutional remediation

when the State fails in its duty to protect the life of an individual in

its custody. This right to monetary compensation is an inherent

aspect of Article 21, serving as a balm to the bereaved family's

suffering and as a deterrent to the high-handedness of state actors.

58. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in landmark pronouncements such as

Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar, reported in (1983) 4 SCC 141,

Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa, reported in (1993) 2 SCC 746 ,

and D.K. Basu v. State of W.B., reported in (1997) 1 SCC 416, has

unequivocally laid down that the State is vicariously liable for the

acts of its public servants, and the defence of sovereign immunity is

entirely inapplicable in cases of fundamental right violations.

59. This legal mandate has been strictly enforced across various

jurisdictions, with almost every High Court awarding compensation

for unnatural deaths in custody. These constitutional courts have

uniformly held that, whether the victim is an under-trial or a convict,

their next of kin are legally entitled to compensation to redress the

established invasion of human rights. Reference in this regard may be

made to the dicta of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in Nina Rajan

Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:14765-DB

Page 27 of 33

Pillai v. Union of India, reported in 2011 SCC OnLine Del 2252;

the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in Kewalbai v. State of

Maharashtra, reported in 2013 SCC OnLine Bom 773; the

Hon’ble Gujarat High Court in Madhuben Adesara v. State of

Gujarat, reported in 2016 SCC OnLine Guj 1956; and the

Hon’ble Kerala High Court in Sabu E.K. v. State of Kerala,

reported in 2016 SCC OnLine Ker 22210.

60. Be that as it may, it is an admitted reality that the doors of this Court

are often practically inaccessible to every litigant for the purpose of

seeking compensatory remedies. While a robust framework already

exists in the form of District Victim Compensation Committees, we

find that its potential is seldom realised in cases involving custodial

deaths. The bereaved families of Under-Trial Prisoners (UTPs) or

convicts who have suffered an unnatural death in judicial or police

custody should not be compelled to undergo the rigours of Writ

litigation to secure their fundamental right to compensation.

61. Accordingly, we are of the considered view that additional directions

are required to activate and streamline this existing district-level

machinery. By mandating that such claims be adjudicated directly by

the District Victim Compensation Committees, under the

chairpersonships of the Principal District and Sessions Judge, within

a stipulated time frame, we aim to ensure that the administration of

justice is decentralised and made accessible. This will ensure that

relief is granted at the grassroots level itself, rather than forcing the

Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:14765-DB

Page 28 of 33

aggrieved to approach this Court for every instance of custodial

negligence

62. Before parting, we would like to state that the directions issued

hereinafter are formulated solely to ensure that the Rule of Law is

never compromised. The vision of our constitutional makers can only

be realised when the Executive and the Judiciary, though clearly

demarcated by the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, work in

tandem, strictly adhering to the laws, rules, and regulations within

their respective constitutional domains. Such institutional discipline

is the bedrock of an egalitarian society. It is only through the shared

commitment of these organs to remain within their prescribed

spheres that the rights of the common person can be truly protected,

and the promises of the Constitution fulfilled.

63. Accordingly, we dispose of this petition by issuing the following

directions:

a) It is declared that an inquiry under S. 176(1-A) of the Cr.P.C.

or S. 196(2) of the BNSS is required to be conducted by a

Judicial Magistrate in accordance with the statutory mandate,

and any inquiry conducted by an Executive Magistrate shall

not operate as a substitute for such judicial inquiry.

b) The Principal District Judge of the concerned district and the

Principal Secretary, Department of Home, Prison & Disaster

Management, are directed to enquire into and submit a

compliance report before this Court within six months of the

Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:14765-DB

Page 29 of 33

date of this judgment, explaining the failure to have at least

262 cases of custodial deaths enquired into by the judicial

magistrates, as required by the statutory mandate, and instead

to have them enquired into only by the Executive Magistrates;

to identify the specific officers responsible for such lapses; and

to show cause why this Court should not recommend the

initiation of departmental inquiries against the said officers.

c) The Principal Secretary, Department of Home, Prison &

Disaster Management, shall, within two months from the

date of this judgment, prepare and circulate to all Principal

District & Sessions Judges (including the Judicial

Commissioner, Ranchi) a district-wise list of all custodial

death cases from the year 2018 onwards in which inquiries

were conducted by Executive Magistrates, including the 262

cases disclosed in the State’s affidavit, along with copies of all

existing records and reports.

d) Within 15 days of the receipt of such records, the concerned

Principal District & Sessions Judge (including the Judicial

Commissioner, Ranchi) shall nominate a Judicial Magistrate

for conducting a de-novo inquiry under S. 176(1-A) of the

Cr.P.C. or Section 196(2) of the BNSS, as applicable. Such

inquiries shall, as far as practicable, be completed within six

months from the date of nomination.

Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:14765-DB

Page 30 of 33

e) Upon conclusion of the inquiry, the report shall be forwarded

to the NHRC and the Jharkhand State Human Rights

Commission. This report shall be accompanied by a covering

letter from the concerned District Magistrate or Superintendent

of Police, explicitly clarifying that the judicial inquiry has been

conducted to fulfil the statutory requirement under Section

176(1-A) Cr.P.C./Section 196(2) BNSS in place of the earlier

executive inquiry.

f) All Principal District & Sessions Judges (including the Judicial

Commissioner, Ranchi) shall submit a consolidated

compliance report regarding these de-novo inquiries before this

Court within eight (08) months from the date of this judgment.

g) The Chief Secretary and the Principal Secretary, Department

of Home, Prison & Disaster Management, shall, within thirty

(30) days from the date of this judgment, issue a circular to

all District Magistrates and Superintendents of Police in the

State, clarifying that jurisdiction under S. 176(1-A) of the

Cr.P.C. or S. 196(2) of the BNSS vests solely and exclusively

with Judicial Magistrates, and any future deviation shall be

treated as a willful violation of statutory law and the conduct

rules.

h) The above-referred circular must also apprise the concerned

officials that in every case of custodial death, disappearance,

or custodial rape, the District Magistrate and/or Superintendent

Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:14765-DB

Page 31 of 33

of Police shall intimate the NHRC, the State Human Rights

Commission, and the concerned Principal District Judge

(P.D.J.) within twenty-four hours of the occurrence.

i) Upon receipt of such intimation, the concerned P.D.J.

(including the Judicial Commissioner, Ranchi), must nominate

a Judicial Magistrate within forty-eight hours of the

intimation to conduct the inquiry. The inquiry shall

ordinarily be concluded within two months. In cases of delay,

the specific reasons shall be recorded by the concerned Judicial

Magistrate.

j) All relevant records, including post-mortem reports, treatment

records, CCTV footage, prisoner history, and allied materials,

shall be supplied to the nominated Judicial Magistrate by the

concerned Jail Superintendent or the Officer-in-Charge of the

Police Station within seven days of the receipt of a

requisition.

k) The Director, Jharkhand Judicial Academy, shall, within four

months from the date of this judgment, prepare and

circulate a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) and a

model format for inquiry reports to all Judicial Officers in the

State of Jharkhand. The SOP shall ensure the incorporation of

NHRC guidelines and relevant judicial precedents to foster a

uniform approach to judicial inquiries.

Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:14765-DB

Page 32 of 33

l) The State Government, in coordination with the Jharkhand

Judicial Academy, shall consider organising an

interdisciplinary conference/seminar involving Judicial

Officers, District Magistrates, Superintendents of Police, Jail

Authorities, and Medical Officers to ensure institutional

synchronisation and effective compliance with the statutory

mandate governing custodial death inquiries.

m) In cases where the inquiry report discloses unnatural death,

custodial violence, or negligence, the concerned P.D.J.

(including the Judicial Commissioner, Ranchi), as Chairperson

of the District Victim Compensation Committee, shall suo-

motu place the matter before the Committee for consideration

of compensation under the applicable Victim Compensation

Scheme, preferably within thirty days of the submission of the

inquiry report.

64. It is further clarified that the above directions are not exhaustive.

Consequently, they shall in no manner preclude the respondent

authorities from taking additional measures to ensure full compliance

with the statutory mandate of Section 176(1-A) of the Cr.P.C. or

Section 196(2) of the BNSS.

65. Let a copy of this judgment be forwarded forthwith to all the

respondent authorities, the Principal District and Sessions Judges of

all districts in the State of Jharkhand, including the Judicial

Commissioner, Ranchi, the Director of the Jharkhand Judicial

Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:14765-DB

Page 33 of 33

Academy, and the District Magistrates and Superintendents of Police

of all districts for immediate and necessary compliance. The

institutional district heads are further directed to share this judgment

with all Magistrates, whether Judicial or Executive, for their

information and necessary action.

66. This petition stands disposed of in the above terms. Pending I.A.s, if

any, will not survive and are disposed of. No costs.

(M. S. Sonak, C.J.)

(Rajesh Shankar, J.)

May 14

th

, 2026

A.F.R.

Manoj/Cp.2

Uploaded on 14.05.2026