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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION [C] NO.231 OF 2018

MEDICAL COUNCIL OF INDIA … PETITIONER

VERSUS

STATE OF KERALA & ORS. … RESPONDENTS

WITH 

WRIT PETITION [C] NO.178 OF 2018

J U D G M E N T

ARUN MISHRA, J.

1.The question involved in the writ petition/s is, whether the State

of Kerala is competent to promulgate the Kerala Professional Colleges

(Regularisation of Admission in Medical Colleges) Ordinance, 2017

(hereinafter referred to as “the Ordinance”) notified on 20.10.2017,

which is intended to nullify judgments and orders of this Court and

encroaches upon the power of the judiciary.  

2.The State of Kerala has promulgated the impugned Ordinance

for   regularising   the   admission   of   180   students   who   were   illegally

admitted in the Kannur Medical College and Karuna Medical College

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run by Prestige Educational Trust and Safe Development Alms Trust

respectively. The students were admitted to the said medical colleges

in the academic year 2016­17. After enquiry, it was found by the

Admission Supervisory Committee of the professional colleges (in short

"the ASC”) that admissions were illegal. The decision was upheld by

the High Court of Kerala and by this Court.

3.The   background   facts   are   that   on   28.4.2016,   this   Court   in

Sankalp Charitable Trust v. Union of India & Ors. (2016) 7 SCC 487

directed that admissions to the MBBS/BDS courses shall be through

the National Eligibility­cum­Entrance Test (NEET). The ASC vide order

dated 4.8.2016 issued several directions to all the professional colleges

in the State of Kerala to conduct the admission process in compliance

of the directions laid down by this Court in Sankalp Charitable Trust

(supra). On 9.8.2016, the Central Government directed all the States

and   Union   Territories   to   conduct   the   combined/centralised

counselling for the academic year 2016­17 for admission in MBBS

course  in the respective  States/Union Territories,  in line  with the

judgment passed by this Court in the case of Modern Dental College &

Research Centre & Anr. v. State of M.P. & Ors. (2016) 7 SCC 353.

4.The Government of Kerala vide order dated 23.8.2016 directed

all   the   medical   colleges   to   admit   only   those   students   who   were

selected through common counselling.  Writ Petition [Civil] No.28041

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of 2016 was filed in the Kerala High Court challenging the order dated

23.8.2016. The High Court vide order dated 26.8.2016 issued interim

directions that the admissions in the MBBS course for the academic

year 2016­17 shall be conducted on the basis of the marks obtained in

NEET,   2016   and   all   applications   will   be   made   online   to   facilitate

transparency with regard to merit and identities of the applicants.

5.The  ASC  on  3.9.2016   after  taking  cognizance  of  the   various

complaints received by it, issued directions to the private medical

colleges   in   Kerala   to   comply   with   the   directions   issued   by   it   on

4.8.2016. It was also mentioned that any student whose admission

was made in contravention of the directions issued by the ASC, will

not be registered by Kerala University of Health Sciences (KUHS). On

6.9.2016 and 9.9.2016, the ASC passed the orders with regard to the

prospectus   submitted   by   Kannur   and   Karuna   Medical   Colleges

approving the prospectus subject to the exception that reservation of

seats under the management quota for the dependents of various trust

associations was unsustainable in law and could not be applied while

admitting the students. Questioning the same, said medical colleges

filed W.P. No.30697/2016 and W.P. [C] No.30712/2016 in the Kerala

High Court. The ASC vide order dated 10.9.2016 observed that the

explanation submitted by the medical colleges was unsatisfactory and

decided to revise the approval of the prospectus and issued a revised

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admission schedule for the aforesaid medical colleges whereby the

date for submitting online applications was revised and extended till

19.9.2016.

6.After conducting an enquiry, the ASC issued an order dated

15.9.2016 with respect to Kannur Medical College observing that the

medical college had not called online applications as directed by the

ASC by its order dated 10.9.2016 and directed that the admissions

made, if any, shall stand cancelled.

7.The   ASC   passed   another   order   after   holding   an   enquiry   on

15.9.2016 with respect to Karuna Medical College and held that the

portal   for   online   was   closed   on   6.9.2016   and   there   was   a

contravention   of   the   directions   passed   by   it   in   the   order   dated

10.9.2016 wherein the revised date for submitting online applications

was up to 19.9.2016. On 17.9.2016 the ASC passed yet another order

addressed to all the medical colleges situated in Kerala State, the

directions issued by it were reiterated and it was also directed that the

directions be placed on the website of the medical colleges forthwith.

On 19.9.2016 the ASC further directed the colleges to conduct all

admissions   strictly   in   compliance   with   the   directions   which   were

issued by it from time to time.

8.The High Court of Kerala by its order dated 23.9.2016 passed in

aforesaid  writ petitions  filed  by the  medical colleges  approved  the

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decision   taken   by   the   ASC   in   respect   of   de­reservation   of   the

management quota seats which were reserved for the dependants of

various   Trust   associations,   and   issued   various   interim   directions,

keeping the writ petitions pending. The order dated 23.9.2016 was

questioned in this Court in SLP [C] CC. Nos.19387­88/2016 – State of

Kerala   v.   Safe   Development   Alms   Melamuri   &   Ors.   which   were

dismissed and this Court requested the High Court to decide the main

writ petition as expeditiously as possible. 

9.This   Court   vide   order   dated   28.9.2016   passed   in   C.A.

No.9862/2016 – Union of India v. Sree Narayana Institute of Medical

Sciences & Ors. set aside the interim direction passed by the Kerala

High Court which allowed private medical colleges in the State of

Kerala to conduct their own counselling and directed to conduct the

centralised   counselling   for   admissions   in   MBBS   course   for   the

academic year 2016­17. As the last date was closed, this Court on

30.9.2016 passed an order in CA No.9862/2016 –   Union of India v.

Sree   Narayana   Institute   of   Medical   Sciences   &   Ors.   (supra)   and

extended   the   last   date   for   admissions   in   MBBS   course   from   30

th

September to 7

th

 October 2016 so as to comply with the order.

10.On 2.10.2016 separate orders were passed by the ASC wherein it

was observed that the respondent­medical colleges have deliberately

flouted the directions issued vide its orders dated 4.8.2016, 3.9.2016,

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4.9.2016, 10.9.2016, 17.9.2016 and 19.9.2016. The ASC cancelled all

the admissions made by the respondent medical colleges in the MBBS

course for the academic year 2016­17. Aggrieved by the order dated

2.10.2016 the respondent medical colleges filed W.P. Nos.32186/2016

and 32185/2016 in the Kerala High Court. The Kerala High Court vide

its   order   dated   6.10.2016   was   pleased   to   direct   the   respondent

medical   colleges   to   place   all   the   relevant   records   pertaining   to

admission process before the Commissioner for Entrance Examination

(CEE) for verification. It was further directed that after verification of

the records the CEE shall finalise allotment of seats strictly on the

basis of interse merit and complete it by 7.10.2016. 

11.On 7.10.2016, Kannur Medical College made a statement before

the Kerala High Court that no student turned up before the CEE

seeking admission in their college. On 13.10.2016 the Commissioner

for Entrance Examination (CEE) submitted its report concluding that

the procedure followed by Karuna Medical College was flawed and

there were material irregularities committed by it while admitting 30

students.   So   far   as   Kannur   Medical   College   was   concerned,   the

representative   of   the   said   college   appeared   before   the   CEE   on

7.10.2016 at about 11.30 a.m. and left by 12.10 p.m. after furnishing

the   records.   No   explanation   or   clarification   was   furnished   by   the

representatives of the medical college, and the conduct was noted by

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the CEE. The person who claimed to be the representative of the

college left immediately when he was asked to furnish the letter of

authorisation from the college authorities.

12.The   Kerala   High   Court   vide   judgment   and   final   order   dated

28.10.2016 cancelled as many as 150 admissions made by Kannur

Medical College and 30 admissions made by Karuna Medical College

through ‘spot counselling’. The High Court of Kerala further directed

the ASC to decide the rival claims made by students of both the

medical colleges who had been admitted as well as the claims by other

eligible students who were parties before the court.

13.The ASC passed a reasoned order dated 14.11.2016 whereby it

quashed 150 admissions made in Kannur Medical College and ASC

has observed that applications were not received online:

“13. The ASC has scrutinized the ‘online application’ submitted

by the Medical College. Even a cursory look of the application

show that they are not actual ‘online applications’. The forms do

not show the name of the Medical College to which the

applications were made. It doesn’t carry photograph of the

applicant. There is no signature of applicant, either digital or

scanned. There is no application date. On the whole, the

submitted applications only shows that they have been prepared

for the purpose of submitting before the ASC as an attempt to

claim online application system. Even the documents submitted

before the CEE on 07.10.2016, as per the interim order of the

Hon’ble High Court, these applications were not seen submitted

for consideration, as reported by CEE…”

14.On   15.11.2016,   aggrieved   by   the   common   judgment   dated

28.10.2016 passed by the Kerala High Court in the case of respondent

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medical   colleges  i.e.  Karuna   Medical   College,   as   well   as   Kannur

Medical College and the trusts – Safe Development Alms Trust and

Prestige   Educational   Trust,   filed   SLP   [C]   Nos.32580­81/2016   and

35374­75/2016 before this Court. The MCI also filed SLP [C] Nos.

3882/2017 and 3952/2017. The students also petitioned this Court

against the judgment and order passed by the Kerala High Court. In

the matter which was filed by the colleges and the students, the order

dated 14.11.2016 by the ASC was also questioned and this Court after

hearing learned counsel for the parties for days together and after

perusing  the   record   which  was   adduced   before   it,   did   not  find   it

appropriate to interfere with the order dated 14.11.2016. The colleges

produced even those documents which they did not produce before the

CEE/ASC and after examining all the documents, this Court declined

to  interfere  in  the   matter  vide   order  dated  22.3.2017.   This  Court

further directed that the 30 students who were found eligible but were

deprived   of   the   admissions   in   Karuna   Medical   College,   shall   be

adjusted   in   the   next   academic   session   i.e.   2017­18   and   the

corresponding number of seats shall be reduced for the said session

for admissions. Review petitions were also filed which were dismissed

by this Court on 2.5.2017.

15.After the aforesaid controversy was set at rest by the judgment of

this Court, the State Government notified the impugned Ordinance on

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20.10.2017   whereby   admission   of   the   students   who   were   illegally

admitted in the MBBS course in the year 2016­17 in the said medical

colleges, were sought to be regularised. The Ordinance promulgated by

the Government of Kerala is extracted hereunder:

“THE KERALA PROFESSIONAL COLLEGES

(REGULARISATION OF ADMISSION IN MEDICAL

COLLEGES) ORDINANCE, 2017)

Promulgated by the Governor of Kerala in the Sixty-eighth Year

of the Republic of India

AN

ORDINANCE

to provide for regularisation of admission of students in certain

medical colleges in the State during the academic year 2016-17

Preamble- WHEREAS, the admission of certain students in

the discipline of medicine for the academic year 2016-17 was

cancelled by the Admission Supervisory Committee of the State

for non-compliance of its orders by certain managements;

AND WHEREAS, no fault was found on the part of any

student who got admission in such colleges;

AND WHEREAS, the seats so cancelled are not allotted to

any other students;

AND WHEREAS, it is expedient to provide for regularisation

of admission of students in such medical colleges in the State

during the academic year 2016-17;

AND WHEREAS, the Legislative Assembly of the State of

Kerala is not in session and the Governor of Kerala is satisfied

that circumstances exist which render it necessary for him to take

immediate action;

NOW, THEREFORE, in exercise of the powers conferred by

clause (1) of Article 213 of the Constitution of India, the

Governor of Kerala is pleased to promulgate the following

Ordinance: -

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BE it enacted in the Sixty-eighth Year of the Republic of India

as follows: -

I Short title and commencement-(1) This Ordinance may be

called the Kerala Professional Colleges (Regularisation of

Admission in Medical Colleges) Ordinance, 2017.

(2) It shall come into force at once.

2. Regularisation of admission in medical colleges.-

Notwithstanding anything contained in the Kerala Professional

Colleges or Institutions (Prohibition of Capitation Fee,

Regulation of Admission, Fixation of Non-exploitative Fee and

other measures to ensure equity and excellence in Professional

Education) Act, 2006 (19 of 2006) or in any judgment, decree,

order or any proceedings of any court or the Admission

Supervisory Committee constituted under section 4 of the said

Act or any other authority or in any agreement or instrument

made under any law for the time being in force, it shall be lawful

for the Government to regularise the admission of candidates

who were qualified for admission in the discipline of medicine in

any medical college in the State during the academic year 2016-

17, but their admission was cancelled by any court or Admission

Supervisory Committee, irrespective of the mode of submission

of application and the non-production of any material before the

Admission Supervisory Committee, subject to such terms and

conditions as the Government may deem fit:

Provided that such admission shall not be regularised unless

such candidate has duly attended the course during the said

academic year.

3. Procedure for regularisation.- (1) The managements of the

medical colleges who have admitted candidates as specified in

section 2 to the discipline of medicine in any medical college

and their admission was cancelled, may, within fifteen days from

the date of commencement of this Ordinance, apply for

regularisation of such admission.

(2) Every application for regularisation of admission under this

Ordinance shall be submitted to the Government through the

University concerned and the University shall, within seven days

of receipt of such application, forward the same to the

Government with a report containing its remarks on the

following

matters, namely: -

(i) whether the student who got admission is qualified and is

eligible as per the rank list prepared on the basis of the National

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Eligibility cum Entrance Test, for admission in the discipline of

medicine as per laws and orders in force applicable for the

academic year 2016-17;

(ii) whether the students as mentioned in the application has

duly attended the course during the academic year 2016-17;

(iii) whether the student is otherwise eligible to continue the

course.

(3) An officer not below the rank of a Secretary to Government,

as may be authorised by the Government by special order in this

behalf, shall be the Competent Authority to consider an

application under this Ordinance. The Competent Authority shall

have the power to summon any person or to call for any

document for the proper disposal of such application.

(4) On receipt of an application for regularisation under this

section, the Government shall call for a report on it from the

Director of Medical Education and after hearing the applicant

and the respondents or any other person concerned, if necessary,

consider the application and pass orders on it, including order for

payment of the regularisation fee payable under this Ordinance.

(5) Where the application is sanctioned by the Government, a

direction in this respect shall be issued to the University

concerned and notwithstanding anything contained in any

University Act or any statute or Ordinance made thereunder or in

any other law for the time being in force, the University shall

issue orders necessary for the enrolment of such students in the

University and thereafter such students shall be considered as

regular students of the discipline of medicine under the

University with effect from the academic year 2016-17 till the

completion of their course in the discipline.

Explanation. - For the purposes of this section, "University Act"

means an Act establishing a University, passed by the State

Legislature.

4. Matters for consideration of the Competent Authority. - While

considering an application for regularisation received under

Ordinance, the Competent Authority shall, -

(i) consider whether the student who got admission is qualified

and is eligible as per the rank list prepared on the basis of the

National Eligibility cum Entrance Test, for admission in the

discipline of medicine as per laws and orders in force applicable

for the academic year 2016-17;

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(ii) confirm that no student is continuing in the college in

violation of any other law for the time being in force;

(iii)not consider the mode of application submitted by the

students;

(iv) not consider the non-production of any document or

any material before the Admission Supervisory Committee;

(v)ensure that no capitation fee was collected by the

management;

(vi)ensure that there was no profiteering by the

management.

5.Payment of regularisation fee: - (1) Where the Government

sanctions an application for regularisation of admission under

this Ordinance, the management of such medical college shall be

liable to pay a regularisation fee of three lakh rupees per student

for such regularisation:

Provided that where any management collects such fee from

any student, such management shall be liable to pay a fine of six

lakh rupees per student.

(2) The competent authority under sub-section (3) of section 3

shall be competent to impose the fee as provided in sub-section

(1) and it shall be specified in the order issued under sub-section

(3) of section 3.

Date 20.10.2017 GOVERNOR”

16.Shri Vikas Singh, learned senior counsel appearing for the MCI,

urged that the Ordinance is ultra vires of the powers of the State

Government   and   is   contrary   to   the   various   Constitution   Bench

decisions of this Court which he has relied upon. He has further

submitted that the judgment has been nullified by the Ordinance. It is

not that there was any lacunae or flaw in the laws which has been

removed. There is an entrenchment by way of Ordinance upon the

power of judicial review of the court. This Court has adjudicated upon

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the legality of the order dated 14.11.2016 passed by the ASC which

was questioned in this Court and the entire material was filed in the

Court which was not even placed before the ASC/CEE. This Court

granted hearing for several days and on being wholly unconvinced,

dismissed the special leave petitions and clearly observed that no case

for interference in the order dated 14.11.2016 passed by ASC was

made out and further directed the admission of 30 students who were

illegally deprived of their admission to be made in the next academic

session. The State has no legislative power to nullify a judgment in

view of the Constitution Bench judgments of this Court in Janapada

Sabha Chhindwara vs.  The Central Provinces Syndicate Ltd. and Anr.

(1970) 1 SCC 509, Belgaum Gardeners Cooperative Production Supply

and Sale Society Ltd. v. State of Karnataka  (1993) Supp. 1 SCC 96,

and State of Tamil Nadu and Ors. v. State of Kerala and Ors. (2014) 12

SCC 696.

17.A galaxy of learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the

respondents has emphasised that the impugned Ordinance intends on

the admissions to be given on merits on the basis of performance in

the NEET examination. Thus, it was permissible to enact Ordinance to

make a scrutiny whether the candidates were eligible for admission on

the   basis   of   their   merit   in   the   NEET   examination.   It   was   also

contended that the order of online applications passed by the Kerala

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High  Court   was   based   upon  the   consent.   Hence,   it  could   not   be

termed to be an order passed by the court in judicial review. The

decision did not have the effect of judicial precedent which could be

said to be nullified by way of the Ordinance. It was also contended

that ultimately it was not the fault of the students and if there was

any   procedural   violation   committed   by   the   medical   colleges   in

question, the students could not have been made a scapegoat or made

to suffer for no fault of theirs. They were not heard by the ASC or CEE.

This Court may exercise power under Article 142 of the Constitution of

India and no interference is required to be made in the Ordinance as

in the facts and circumstances, regularisation of the admissions was

clearly permissible. It could not be said that the State Government has

tried to usurp the power of judicial review.

18.A bare reading of the Ordinance makes it clear that the same

aims at regularisation of admissions of students during the academic

year 2016­17which were set aside by the ASC, the High Court and by

this Court to benefit only two colleges and students in question. It is

also stated in it that the Legislative Assembly of the State of Kerala is

not   in   session   and   the   Governor   of   Kerala   is   satisfied,   the

circumstances render it necessary for him to take immediate action. In

exercise of the power conferred under clause (1) of Article 213 of the

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Constitution of India, the Governor of Kerala is pleased to promulgate

the impugned Ordinance.

19.It is provided in clause 2 of the Ordinance that notwithstanding

anything contained in the Kerala Professional Colleges or Institutions

(Prohibition of Capitation Fee, Regulation of Admission, Fixation of

Non­exploitative   Fee   and   other   measures   to   ensure   equity   and

excellence in Professional Education) Act, 2006 or in any judgment,

decree,   order   or   any   proceeding   of   any   court   or   the   Admission

Supervisory Committee or any other authority or in any agreement or

instrument made under any law for the time being in force, it shall be

lawful for the Government to regularise the admission of  candidates

who were qualified for admission in the discipline of medicine in any

medical college in the State during the academic year in question,

though their admissions had been cancelled by any court or ASC, and

irrespective of the mode of submission of application and the non­

production of any material before the ASC.

20.Clause 3 of the impugned Ordinance contains the procedure for

regularisation. Under clause 3(1) the students can apply within 15

days from the commencement of the Ordinance for regularisation of

such admission. Under clause 3(2), the application shall be submitted

to the Government through the University with the remarks whether

the student was qualified, eligible as per the rank list prepared on the

16

basis of the NEET for admission in the discipline of medicine as per

the laws and orders in force for the academic year 2016­17; whether

he has attended the course during the academic year 2016­17 and

whether the student was otherwise eligible to continue the course.

Clause 3(4) enables the Government to consider the application and

pass orders on it including the order for payment of the regularisation

fee payable under the Ordinance and clause 3(5) provides that where

the application is sanctioned by the Government, the student shall be

considered as regular student w.e.f. the academic session 2016­17 till

the completion of their course in the discipline. Clause 3(4)(i) provides

for consideration in case the candidate was eligible as per the rank list

prepared on the basis of NEET, and no student was continuing in the

college   in   violation   of   any   other   law   for   the   time   being   in   force.

Clause 4(iii) further provided for regularisation notwithstanding the

mode of submission of applications by the students. Regularisation fee

of Rs.3 lakhs was to be paid per student for such regularisation.

21.What has been done by the impugned Ordinance by the State

Government is clearly entrenching upon the field of judicial review and

it was obviously misadventure resorted to. In our considered opinion,

it was not at all permissible to the State Government to promulgate

the Ordinance/legislate in the matter. Not only the judgment of the

court is nullified and the arbitrariness committed in admissions was

17

glaring,   and   the   decision   of   the   High   Court   of   Kerala   which   was

affirmed by this Court with respect to applications to be entertained if

they were online applications has been undone. It was clearly an act of

nullifying judgment and is violative of judicial powers which vested in

the judiciary. It was not open for the State Government to nullify the

judgment/orders passed by the Kerala High Court or by this Court. It

was   not   a   case   of   removal   of   a   defect   in   existing   law.   Various

Constitution Bench decisions of this Court have settled the principles

of law governing the field. It passes comprehension how the State

Government has promulgated the Ordinance in question.

22.In  Janapada   Sabha   Chhindwara   vs.     The   Central   Provinces

Syndicate Ltd. and Anr. 1970 (1) SCC 509, a Constitution Bench of

this Court has observed that it is not open to legislation to render a

judgment ineffective. It is open to the Legislature within certain limits

to amend the provisions of an Act retrospectively and to declare what

the law shall be deemed to have been, but it is not open to the

legislature to say that the interpretation of the law shall be otherwise

than as declared by the Court. This Court has observed thus:

“10. The nature of the amendment made in Act 4 of 1920 has not

been indicated. Nor is there anything which enacts that the

notifications issued without the sanction of the State Government

must be deemed to have been issued validly under Section 51(2)

without the sanction of the Local Government. On the words

used in the Act, it is plain that the Legislature attempted to

overrule or set aside the decision of this Court. That, in our

judgment, is not open to the Legislature to do under our

18

Constitutional scheme. It is open to the Legislature within certain

limits to amend the provisions of an Act retrospectively and to

declare what the law shall be deemed to have been, but it is not

open to the Legislature to say that a judgment of a Court

properly constituted and rendered in exercise of its powers in a

matter brought before it shall be deemed to be ineffective and the

interpretation of the law shall be otherwise than as declared by

the Court.”

23.In the matter of Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal (1993) Supp. 1

SCC 96 (II), a Constitution Bench of this Court has observed that it is

open to change the law in general by changing the basis but it is not

open to set aside an individual decision inter­partes and thus affect

their  rights   and   liabilities   alone.   Such  an   act   on   the   part   of   the

legislature   amounts   to   exercising   the   judicial   power.   This   Court

quashed the Ordinance and observed that by issuing the Ordinance

the State of Karnataka has sought to take the law in its own hand and

tried   to   be   above   the   law.   Such   an   act   is   an   open   invitation   to

lawlessness and anarchy. There cannot be defiance to the decision of

the judicial authorities. This Court has observed thus:

“76.The principle which emerges from these authorities is

that the legislature can change the basis on which a decision is

given by the Court and thus change the law in general, which

will affect a class of persons and events at large. It cannot,

however, set aside an individual decision inter parties and affect

their rights and liabilities alone. Such an act on the part of the

legislature amounts to exercising the judicial power of the State

and to functioning as an appellate court or tribunal.

77.The effect of the provisions of Section 11 of the

present Act, viz. the Inter-State Water Disputes Act read with

Article 262 of the Constitution is that the entire judicial power

of the State and, therefore of the courts including that of the

19

Supreme Court to adjudicate upon original dispute or complaint

with respect to the use, distribution or control of the water of, or

in any inter-State river or river valleys has been vested in the

Tribunal appointed under Section 4 of the said Act. It is,

therefore, not possible to accept the submission that the question

of grant of interim relief falls outside the submission that the

question of grant of interim relief falls outside the purview of the

said provisions and can be agitated under Article 131 of the

Constitution. Hence any executive order or a legislative

enactment of a State which interferes with the adjudicatory

process and adjudication by such Tribunal is an interference with

the judicial power of the State. In view of the fact that the

Ordinance in question seeks directly to nullify the order of the

Tribunal passed on June 25, 1991, it impinges upon the judicial

power of the State and is, therefore, ultra vires the Constitution.

78.Further, admittedly, the effect of the Ordinance is to

affect the flow of the waters of the river Cauvery into the

territory of Tamil Nadu and Pondicherry which are the lower

riparian States. The Ordinance has, therefore, an extra-territorial

operation. Hence the Ordinance is on that account beyond the

legislative competence of the State and is ultra vires the

provisions of Article 245(1) of the Constitution.

79.The Ordinance is also against the basic tenets of the

rule of law inasmuch as the State of Karnataka by issuing the

Ordinance has sought to take law in its own hand and to be

above the law. Such an act is an invitation to lawlessness and

anarchy, inasmuch as the Ordinance is a manifestation of a desire

on the part of the State to be a judge in its own cause and to defy

the decisions of the judicial authorities. The action forebodes

evil consequences to the federal structure under the Constitution

and open doors for each State to act in the way it desires

disregarding not only the rights of the other States, the orders

passed by instrumentalities constituted under an Act of

Parliament but also the provisions of the Constitution. If the

power of a State to issue such an Ordinance is upheld it will lead

to the breakdown of the constitutional mechanism and affect the

unity and integrity of the nation.”

The Court has also observed in  Re: Cauvery Water Disputes

Tribunal (supra) that if the exercise of the power of judicial review can

be set at naught by the State Government by overriding the decision

20

given against it, it would sound the death knell of the rule of law. The

rule of law would be meaningless as it would be open to the State

Government to defy the law and yet get away with it.

24.Yet again a Constitution Bench of this Court in State of Tamil

Nadu v. State of Kerala and Anr. (2014) 12 SCC 696 has considered

the   question   of   separation   of   powers   doctrine   under   the   Indian

Constitution and it observed:

“126. On deep reflection of the above discussion, in our opinion,

the constitutional principles in the context of Indian Constitution

relating to separation of powers between legislature, executive

and judiciary may, in brief, be summarized thus:

126.1 Even without express provision of the separation of

powers, the doctrine of separation of powers is an entrenched

principle in the Constitution of India. The doctrine of separation

of powers informs the Indian constitutional structure and it is an

essential constituent of rule of law. In other words, the doctrine

of separation of power though not expressly engrafted in the

Constitution, its sweep, operation, and visibility are apparent

from the scheme of Indian Constitution. Constitution has made

demarcation, without drawing formal lines between the three

organs- legislature, executive, and judiciary. In that sense, even

in the absence of express provision for separation of powers, the

separation of powers between legislature, executive and judiciary

is not different from the Constitutions of the countries which

contain express provision for separation of powers.

126.2 Independence of courts from the executive and legislature

is fundamental to the rule of law and one of the basic tenets of

Indian Constitution. Separation of judicial power is a significant

constitutional principle under the Constitution of India.

126.3 Separation of powers between three organs – the

legislature, executive, and judiciary - is also nothing but a

consequence of principles of equality enshrined in Article 14 of

the Constitution of India. Accordingly, breach of separation of

judicial power may amount to negation of equality under Article

14. Stated thus, a legislation can be invalidated on the basis of

21

breach of the separation of powers since such breach is negation

of equality under Article 14 of the Constitution.

126.4 The superior judiciary (High Courts and Supreme Court) is

empowered by the Constitution to declare a law made by the

legislature (Parliament and State Legislatures) void if it is found

to have transgressed the constitutional limitations or if it

infringed the rights enshrined in Part III of the Constitution.

126.5 The doctrine of separation of powers applies to the final

judgments of the courts. The legislature cannot declare any

decision of a court of law to be void or of no effect. It can,

however, pass an amending Act to remedy the defects pointed

out by a court of law or on coming to know of it aliunde. In other

words, a court's decision must always bind unless the conditions

on which it is based are so fundamentally altered that the

decision could not have been given in the altered circumstances.

126.6 If the legislature has the power over the subject-matter and

competence to make a validating law, it can at any time make

such a validating law and make it retrospective. The validity of a

validating law, therefore, depends upon whether the legislature

possesses the competence which it claims over the subject-matter

and whether in making the validation law it removes the defect

which the courts had found in the existing law.

126.7 The law enacted by the legislature may apparently seem to

be within its competence but yet in substance, if it is shown as an

attempt to interfere with the judicial process, such law may be

invalidated being in breach of doctrine of separation of powers.

In such situation, the legal effect of the law on a judgment or a

judicial proceeding must be examined closely, having regard to

legislative prescription or direction. The questions to be asked

are:

(i) Does the legislative prescription or legislative direction

interfere with the judicial functions?

(ii) Is the legislation targeted at the decided case or whether

impugned law requires its application to a case already finally

decided?

(iii) What are the terms of law; the issues with which it deals and

the nature of the judgment that has attained finality?

If the answer to Questions (i) and (ii) is in the affirmative and the

consideration of aspects noted in Question (iii) sufficiently

establishes that the impugned law interferes with the judicial

functions, the Court may declare the law unconstitutional.”

22

This Court has observed that independence of the judiciary is

fundamental to the rule of law. A legislation can be invalidated on the

basis of breach of separation of judicial power since such breach is

negation of equality under Article 14. Law can be declared void if it is

found   to   have   transgressed   the   constitutional   limitations.   The

legislature cannot declare any decision of a court of law to be void or

of no effect. It can remove the defects of the law pointed out by the

court or on coming to know of it aliunde; otherwise, a court’s decision

must always bind unless the conditions on which it is based are so

fundamentally altered that the decision could not have been given in

such altered circumstances. The legislature can make a validating law.

Making validation as such, it removes the defect which the court finds

in the existing law. There cannot be an attempt to interfere with the

judicial process, and such law may be invalidated. The questions to be

examined are: whether the legislation targeted at the decided case,

what are the terms of law; the issues with which it deals and the

nature of the judgment that has attained finality? If law interferes with

the judicial functions on the aforesaid tests laid down in para 126.7,

the Court may declare the law as unconstitutional. 

25.In S.R. Bhagwat and Ors. vs. State of Mysore (1995) 6 SCC 16,

the   provisions   of   Karnataka   State   Civil   Services   (Regulations   of

Promotion, Pay & Pension) Act, 1973 came up for consideration of this

23

Court. Provisions were made in section 11 nullifying the judgments

and orders of this Court as had become final, and empowering the

State to review such judgments and orders was held to be interference

with the powers of the State legislature, and the Court struck down

section 11(2) as ultra vires of the legislative powers of the State and

sections 4(2), 4(3) and 4(8) were read down which sought to deprive

the petitioners of the benefits of the judgment of the court which had

become final. It was further observed that once the judgment has

attained   finality   and   was   binding   against   the   State,   it   cannot   be

overruled by any legislative measure. The Court observed that court’s

judgments cannot be nullified by the legislature:

“15. We may note at the very outset that in the present case the

High Court had not struck down any legislation which was

sought to be re-enacted after removing any defect retrospectively

by the impugned provisions. This is a case where on

interpretation of existing law, the High Court had given certain

benefits to the petitioners. That order of mandamus was sought

to be nullified by the enactment of the impugned provisions in a

new statute. This in our view would be clearly impermissible

legislative exercise.

18. A mere look at sub-section (2) of Section 11 shows that the

respondent State of Karnataka, which was a party to the decision

of the Division Bench of the High Court against it had tried to

get out of the binding effect of the decision by resorting to its

legislative power. The judgments, decrees, and orders of any

court or the competent authority which had become final against

the State were sought to be done away with by enacting the

impugned provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 11. Such an

attempt cannot be said to be a permissible legislative exercise.

Section 11(2), therefore, must be held to be an attempt on the

part of the State Legislature to legislatively overrule binding

decisions of competent courts against the State. It is no doubt

true that if any decision was rendered against the State of

24

Karnataka which was pending in appeal and had not become

final it could rely upon the relevant provisions of the Act which

were given retrospective effect by sub-section (2) of Section 1 of

the Act for whatever such reliance was worth. But when such a

decision had become final as in the present case when the High

Court clearly directed respondent-State to give to the petitioners

concerned deemed dates of promotions if they were otherwise

found fit and in that eventuality to give all benefits consequential

thereon including financial benefits, the State could not invoke

its legislative power to displace such a judgment. Once this

decision had become final and the State of Karnataka had not

thought it fit to challenge it before this Court presumably

because in identical other matters this Court had upheld other

decisions of the Karnataka High Court taking the same view, it

passes one's comprehension how the legislative power can be

pressed in service to undo the binding effects of such mandamus.

It is also pertinent to note that not only sub-section (2) of Section

11 seeks to bypass and override the binding effect of the

judgments but also seeks to empower the State to review such

judgments and orders and pass fresh orders in accordance with

provisions of the impugned Act. The respondent-State in the

present case by enacting sub-section (2) of Section 11 of the

impugned Act has clearly sought to nullify or abrogate the

binding decision of the High Court and has encroached upon the

judicial power entrusted to the various authorities functioning

under the relevant statutes and the Constitution. Such an exercise

of legislative power cannot be countenanced.

20. We, therefore, strike down Section 11 sub-section (2) as

unconstitutional, illegal and void. So far as the underlined

impugned portions of Section 4 sub-sections (2), (3) and (8) are

concerned, they clearly conflict with the binding direction issued

by the Division Bench of the High Court against the respondent-

State and in favour of the petitioners. Once respondent-State had

suffered the mandamus to give consequential financial benefits

to the allottees like the petitioners on the basis of the deemed

promotions such binding direction about payment of

consequential monetary benefits cannot be nullified by the

impugned provisions of Section 4. Therefore, the underlined

portions of sub-sections (2), (3) and (8) of Section 4 will have to

be read down in the light of orders of the court which have

become final against the respondent-State and insofar as these

provisions are inconsistent with these final orders containing

such directions of judicial authorities and competent courts,

these impugned provisions of Section 4 have to give way and to

the extent of such inconsistency must be treated to be inoperative

and ineffective. Accordingly the aforesaid provisions are read

25

down by observing that the statutory provisions contained in

sub-sections (2), (3) and (8) of Section 4 providing that such

persons who have been given deemed promotions shall not be

entitled to any arrears for the period prior to the date of their

actual promotion, shall not apply in cases where directions to the

contrary of competent courts against the respondent-State have

become final.”

26.On behalf of the respondents, certain decisions with respect to

legislative competence have been referred. In  S.T. Sadiq vs. State of

Kerala and Ors. (2015) 4 SCC 400, this Court has laid down that the

legislative function consists in “making” law and not in “declaring”

what the law shall be. The legislature can make a law retrospectively

which may alter the law as it stood when a decision was arrived at. It

is in this limited sphere, the legislature may alter the very basis of an

earlier decision given by the court. It cannot directly annul that final

judgment by a subsequent legislation. If its purpose is to annul a final

judgment,   such   act   of   legislature   must   be   declared   to   be

unconstitutional. The Court has observed:

“13. It is settled law by a catena of decisions of this Court that

the legislature cannot directly annul a judgment of a court. The

legislative function consists in "making" law [see: Article 245 of

the Constitution] and not in "declaring" what the law shall be

[see: Article 141 of the Constitution]. If the legislature were at

liberty to annul judgments of courts, the ghost of bills of

attainder will revisit us to enable legislatures to pass legislative

judgments on matters which are inter-parties. Interestingly, in

England, the last such bill of attainder passing a legislative

judgment against a man called Fenwick was passed as far back

as in 1696. A century later, the US Constitution expressly

outlawed bills of attainder [see: Article 1 Section 9].

26

14. It is for this reason that our Constitution permits a legislature

to make laws retrospectively which may alter the law as it stood

when a decision was arrived at. It is in this limited circumstance

that a legislature may alter the very basis of a decision given by a

court, and if an appeal or other proceeding be pending, enable

the Court to apply the law retrospectively so made which would

then change the very basis of the earlier decision so that it would

no longer hold good. However, if such is not the case then

legislation which trenches upon the judicial power must

necessarily be declared to be unconstitutional.”

27.The decision in Cheviti Venkanna Yadav v. State of Telangana &

Ors.  (2017)  1  SCC  283,   was   relied  on behalf   of  the  respondents,

wherein   the   Court   considered   the   question   of   amendment   with

retrospective effect after a provision of the Act is struck down by the

court.   When   does   it   not   amount   to   the   statutory   overruling   of   a

judgment by the legislature? This Court held that the legislature has

the power to legislate including the power to retrospectively amend the

laws   and   thereby   removing   causes   of   ineffectiveness   or   invalidity.

Further, when such correction is made, the purpose behind the same

is not to overrule the decision of the court or encroach upon the

judicial turf, but simply enact a fresh law with retrospective effect to

alter the foundation and meaning of the legislation and to remove the

base on which the judgment is founded. The order of the High Court,

inter alia, holding that the amended provisions did not usurp the

judicial power was upheld and the court also opined that there was no

violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. The Court observed:

27

“25. We shall deal first point first. The Reorganization Act came

into force on 02.06.2014. Submission is, prior to the said date,

the legislature that was not in existence as an entity could not

have legislated relating to some aspect that covers the prior

period. The aforesaid submission should not detain us long. In

M/s. Rattan Lal and Co. and Anr. etc v. The Assessing Authority,

Patiala, and Anr. AIR 1970 SC 1742 the Court was dealing with

the competence of State of Haryana pertaining to a legislation

enacted by the State of Haryana by way of an amendment prior

to the reorganisation of the State. In that context the Court held:

"12. …It is argued that the reorganisation of the State took

place on November 1, 1966, and the amendment in some of

its parts seeks to amend the original Act from a date

anterior to this date. In other words, the legislature of one

of the States seeks to amend a law passed by the composite

State. This argument entirely misunderstands the position

of the original Act after the reorganisation. That Act applied

now as an independent Act to each of the areas and is

subject to the legislative competence of the legislature in

that area. The Act has been amended in the new States in

relation to the area of that State and it is inconceivable that

this could not be within the competence. If the argument

were accepted then the Act would remain unamendable

unless the composite State came into existence once more.

The scheme of the States Reorganization Acts makes the

laws applicable to the new areas until superseded, amended

or altered by the appropriate legislature in the new States.

This is what the legislature has done and there is nothing

that can be said against such amendment."

The aforesaid passage makes it clear as crystal that after the

legislature came into existence, it has the competence to enact

any law retrospectively or prospectively within the constitutional

parameters.

26. The second issue that emanates for consideration is whether

the base of the earlier judgment has really been removed. Before

stating the factual score, it is necessary to state how this Court

has viewed the said principle. In Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd.

and Anr. v. Broach Borough Municipality and Ors. (1969) 2 SCC

283, the Constitution Bench while dealing with the legislation

which intended to validate the tax declared by law to be illegal,

opined that when a Legislature sets out to validate a tax declared

by a court to be illegally collected under an ineffective or an

invalid law, the cause for ineffectiveness or invalidity must be

28

removed before validation can be said to take place effectively.

The most important condition, of course, is that the Legislature

must possess the power to impose the tax, for if it does not, the

action must ever remain ineffective and illegal. Granted

legislative competence, it is not sufficient to declare merely that

the decision of the Court shall not bind, for that tantamount to

reversing the decision in exercise of judicial power which the

Legislature does not possess or exercise. A court's decision must

always bind unless the conditions on which it is based are so

fundamentally altered that the decision could not have been

given in the altered circumstances. Thereafter, the Court

proceeded to state that validation of a tax so declared illegal may

be done only if the grounds of illegality or invalidity are capable

of being removed and are in fact removed and the tax thus made

legal. The legislature does it many a way. One of the methods it

may adopt is to give its own meaning and interpretation of the

law under which tax was collected and by legislative fiat makes

the new meaning binding upon courts. On such legislation being

brought, it neutralizes the effect of the earlier decision as a

consequence of which it becomes ineffective. The test of validity

of a validating law depends upon whether the Legislature

possesses the competence which it claims over the subject-matter

and whether in making the validation it removes the defect

which the courts had found in the existing law and makes

adequate provisions in the validating law for a valid imposition

of the tax.

27. In Bhubaneshwar Singh and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors.

(1994) 6 SCC 77 in view of Section 3 of the Coking Coal Mines

(Emergency Provisions) Act, 1971 which was promulgated in the

year 1971 the Custodian being appointed by the Central

Government took over the management of Coking Coal Mines

and the said mines remained under the management of the

Central Government through the custodian during the period

from 17.10.1971 to 30.04.1972. The Coking Coal Mines

(Nationalisation) Act, 1972 came into force w.e.f. 1.5.1972, and

the right, title and interest of the owners in relation to Coking

Coal Mines stood transferred to and vested absolutely in the

Central Government free from all encumbrances. The provisions

of the said Act were challenged before this Court in the case of

Tara Prasad Singh and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. (1980) 4

SCC 179 and the Constitution Bench upheld the validity of the

said Act. The writ Petitioner before the High Court making a

grievance that the Custodian had debited the expenses for raising

the coal while the Coking Coal Mine was under the Management

of the Custodian but had not credited the price for the quantity of

29

the coal raised, which was lying in stock on the date prior to the

date the said Coal Mine vested under the Central Government.

The High Court allowed the writ petition and a direction was

issued that account be recast and payment be made to the

Petitioner. The appeal before this Court by special leave was

dismissed, as this Court was of the view that sale price of stock

of extracted coal lying at the commencement of the appointed

date had to be taken into account for determining the profit and

loss during the period of management of the mine by the

Custodian. After the appeal preferred by the Coal Fields was

dismissed, Coal Mines Nationalisation Laws (Amendment)

Ordinance, 1986 was promulgated and later on replaced by Coal

Mines Nationalisation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1986 came into

force. By Section 4 of the Amendment Act, Sub-section (2) was

introduced in Section 10 of the Coking Coal Mines

(Nationalisation) Act, 1972. The said provision declared that the

amounts specified in the fifth column of the First Schedule

against any coking coal mines or group of coking coal mine

specified in the second column of the said Schedule are required

to be given by the Central Government to its owner under Sub-

section (1) shall be deemed to be included, and deemed always

to have included, the amount required to be paid to such owner

in respect of coal in stock or other assets referred to in Clause (j)

of Section 3 on the date immediately before the appointed day

and no other amount shall be paid to the owner in respect of such

coal or other assets. Section 19 was the validating provision.

28. The writ petition was filed questioning the validity of the

said ordinance primarily on the ground that it purported to

nullify the judgment rendered in the case of Central Coal Fields

Ltd. v. Bhubaneswar Singh and Ors. (1984) 4 SCC 429. The

Court referred to the provisions and opined that:

“13. ...if Sub-section (2) as introduced by the Coal Mines

Nationalisation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1986 in Section

10 had existed since the very inception, there was no

occasion for the High Court or this Court to issue a

direction for taking into account the price which was

payable for the stock of coke lying on the date before the

appointed day. The authority to introduce Sub-section (2) in

Section 10 of the aforesaid Act with retrospective effect

cannot be questioned. Once the amendment has been

introduced retrospectively, courts have to act on the basis

that such provision was there since the beginning. The role

of the deeming provision need not be emphasised in view

of series of judgments of this Court. Hence reading Sub-

30

section (2) of Section 10 along with Section 19, it has to be

held that Respondents are not required to take into account

the stock of coke lying on the date prior to the appointed

day, for the purpose of accounting during the period when

the mine in question was under the management of the

Central Government, because it shall be deemed that the

compensation awarded to the Petitioner included the price

for such coal lying in stock on the date prior to the

appointed day. Neither any compensation is to be paid for

such stock of coal nor the price thereof is to be taken into

account for the purpose of Sub-section (1) of Section 22 of

the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1972.”

Being of this view, the Court dismissed the writ petition.

29. In State of H.P. v. Narain Singh (2009) 13 SCC 165 while

dealing with the validation of statute the Court ruled that:

“26. It is therefore clear where there is a competent

legislative provision which retrospectively removes the

substratum of foundation of a judgment, the said exercise is

a valid legislative exercise provided it does not transgress

any other constitutional limitation.”

To arrive at the said conclusion, the two-Judge Bench

reproduced from the decision in Constitution Bench in State of

T.N. v. Arooran Sugars Ltd. (1997) 1 SCC 326 which is to the

following effect:

“28. … ’16. …It is open to the legislature to remove the

defect pointed out by the court or to amend the definition or

any other provision of the Act in question retrospectively.

In this process, it cannot be said that there has been an

encroachment by the legislature over the power of the

judiciary. A court's directive must always bind unless the

conditions on which it is based are so fundamentally altered

that under altered circumstances such decisions could not

have been given. This will include removal of the defect in

a statute pointed out in the judgment in question, as well as

alteration or substitution of provisions of the enactment on

which such judgment is based, with retrospective effect.’

30. From the aforesaid authorities, it is settled that there is a

demarcation between legislative and judicial functions

predicated on the theory of separation of powers. The legislature

31

has the power to enact laws including the power to

retrospectively amend laws and thereby remove causes of

ineffectiveness or invalidity. When a law is enacted with

retrospective effect, it is not considered as an encroachment upon

judicial power when the legislature does not directly overrule or

reverse a judicial dictum. The legislature cannot, by way of an

enactment, declare a decision of the court as erroneous or a

nullity, but can amend the statute or the provision so as to make

it applicable to the past. The legislature has the power to rectify,

through an amendment, a defect in law noticed in the enactment

and even highlighted in the decision of the court. This plenary

power to bring the statute in conformity with the legislative

intent and correct the flaw pointed out by the court can have a

curative and neutralizing effect. When such a correction is made,

the purpose behind the same is not to overrule the decision of the

court or encroach upon the judicial turf, but simply enact a fresh

law with retrospective effect to alter the foundation and meaning

of the legislation and to remove the base on which the judgment

is founded. This does not amount to statutory overruling by the

legislature. In this manner, the earlier decision of the court

becomes non-existent and unenforceable for interpretation of the

new legislation. No doubt, the new legislation can be tested and

challenged on its own merits and on the question whether the

legislature possesses the competence to legislate on the subject

matter in question, but not on the ground of over-reach or

colourable legislation.”

There   is   no   dispute   with   the   aforesaid   proposition   that   the

legislature   has   the   power   to   retrospectively   amend   the   laws   and

thereby remove the causes of ineffectiveness or invalidity on which

judgment is based, and that would not be an encroachment upon

judicial   power   when   the   legislature   does   not   directly   overrule   or

reverse a judicial dictum.

28.Reliance   has   also   been   placed   by   the   respondents   on  Goa

Foundation & Anr. v. State of Goa & Anr. (2016) 6 SCC 602 wherein the

Court has discussed the matter thus:

32

“24. The principles on which first question would require to be

answered are not in doubt. The power to invalidate a legislative

or executive act lies with the Court. A judicial pronouncement,

either declaratory or conferring rights on the citizens cannot be

set at naught by a subsequent legislative act for that would

amount to an encroachment on the judicial powers. However, the

legislature would be competent to pass an amending or a

validating act, if deemed fit, with retrospective effect removing

the basis of the decision of the Court. Even in such a situation,

the courts may not approve a retrospective deprivation of

accrued rights arising from a judgment by means of a subsequent

legislation [Madan Mohan Pathak and Anr. v. Union of India and

Ors. (1978) 2 SCC 50. However, where the Court's judgment is

purely declaratory, the courts will lean in support of the

legislative power to remove the basis of a Court judgment even

retrospectively, paving the way for a restoration of the status quo

ante. Though the consequence may appear to be an exercise to

overcome the judicial pronouncement it is so only at first blush;

a closer scrutiny would confer legitimacy on such an exercise as

the same is a normal adjunct of the legislative power. The whole

exercise is one of viewing the different spheres of jurisdiction

exercised by the two bodies i.e. the judiciary and the legislature.

The balancing act, delicate as it is, to the constitutional scheme,

is guided by well-defined values which have found succinct

manifestation in the views of this Court in Bhaktwar Trust and

Ors. (supra).

26. If the above principles are to be applied to the present case

what follows is that Section 41(6) to (9) introduced in the

Principal Act by the Goa State Amendment renders ineffective

Clause 4(viii) of the Agreement executed by the parties Under

Section 41 of the Principal Act. With Clause 4(viii) being deleted

the embargo on constructions on the acquired land is removed. It

is the aforesaid Clause 4(viii) and its legal effect, in view of

Section 42, that was the basis of the Court's decision dated 20th

January 2009 holding the construction raised by the third

Respondent on the acquired land to be illegal and contrary to the

Principal Act. Once Clause 4(viii) is removed the basis of the

earlier judgment stands extinguished. In fact, it may be possible

to say that if Clause 4(viii) had not existed at all, the judgment of

the Court dated 20th January 2009 would not have been

forthcoming. It was therefore well within the domain of the

legislature to bring about the Amendment Act with retrospective

effect, the Legislative field also being in the Concurrent List,

namely, Entry No. 42 of List III (Acquisition and Requisition of

Property) of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.”

33

  The Court has re­emphasised that a judicial pronouncement,

either declaratory or conferring rights on the citizens cannot be set at

naught by a subsequent legislative act. However, the legislature shall

be competent to pass an amending or a validating Act, if deemed fit,

with  retrospective effect removing  the basis of the decision of the

Court by amending the law. Thus, once the provisions in clause 4(viii)

were removed, the basis of the earlier judgment stood extinguished.

29.In Goa Glass Fibre Ltd. v. State of Goa & Anr. (2010) 6 SCC 499,

a   question   arose   whether   under   the   Goa   (Prohibition   of   Further

Payment and Recovery of Rebate Benefits) Act, 2002, sections 2, 3, 5

and   6   were   unconstitutional.   The   contention   was   raised   that   the

impugned Act nullifies the judgment of the Court. The Court has

observed:

“15. It is well settled that a Statute can be invalidated or held

unconstitutional on limited grounds viz., on the ground of the

incompetence of the Legislature which enacts it and, on the

ground, that it breaches or violates any of the fundamental rights

or other Constitutional Rights and on no other grounds. (See

State of A.P. v. McDowell and Co. (1996) 3 SCC 709, Kuldip

Nayar v. Union of India and Ors. (2006) 7 SCC 1.

16. The scheme of the Act appears to be simple. The Act imposes

a Prohibition [under Section 2], requires recovery [under Section

3] and "extinguishes" all liabilities of the State that accrue or

arise from the Notifications dated 15.05.1996 and 01.08.1996.

17. From the language of the Act, it becomes clear that the Act is

not influenced by the outcome of the Judgment of the High

Court in Manohar Parrikar's case. By the enactment, the

Legislature has imposed prohibition of further payments under

34

the Notifications, provides for recovery of rebate benefits from

the beneficiaries and extinguishes the State's Liability under the

Notifications mentioned supra. This exercise by the Legislature

is independent of and dehors the results of the PIL of Manohar

Parrikar and can be said to be uninfluenced by the said judgment.

It was well within the Legislative power of the State to respond

to the undisputed and disturbing facts which had enormous

financial implication on the State's Finances to enact the Law

with an object of remedying the unsatisfactory state of affairs

which were known to the Legislature.

18. That the object of the Act is not to undo or reverse the

judgments of either this Court or that of the High Court. On a

reading of the Act as a whole, it does not appear that the

Legislature seeks to undo any judgment or any directions

contained therein. As observed earlier the Act imposes a

Prohibition [under Section 2], requires recovery [under Section

3] and "extinguishes" all liabilities of the State that accrue or

arise from the Notifications dated 15.05.1996 and 01.08.1996.

Therefore, no exception can be taken to the constitutionality of

the Act impugned, on the ground, that it seeks to undo or reverse

any judgment. The Legislature in its competence has enacted the

Act to achieve the purposes indicated therein and not to frustrate

any judgment of any court including that of this Court. It is to be

noted that State Legislature was competent to enact the Act in its

present form even before the judgment of the High Court in the

PIL and the fact that it has come after the judgment in PIL does

not render it unconstitutional on the ground that it seeks to

nullify the judgment of this Court in the earlier proceedings.”

The   liability   of   the   State   which   accrued   or   arose   from   the

notifications referred to therein was sought to be extinguished. It was

held that it was not to undo the judgment. The legislature was held to

be competent to remove the basis. 

30.In Tika Ram & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (2009) 10

SCC 689, this Court considered the provisions of Land Acquisition

(U.P. Amendment & Validation Act, 1991, in particular sections 2 and

35

3 thereof adding proviso to section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act,

1894 and held the same to be constitutional.  The contention that the

U.P.  Amendment Act merely sought to overrule judgments in Kashmir

Singh’s  case AIR 1987 All. 113 or  State of U.P. v. Radhey Shyam

Nigam (1989) 1 SCC 591 and did not remove the basis or foundation

thereof   and   was,   therefore,   ultra   vires   Articles   245   and   246   was

rejected. The question arose regarding the constitutional validity of the

Land Acquisition (Amending) Act. Notification under section 4 read

with section 17(4) was issued on 4.12.1984 which was published in

the Gazette on 8.12.1984. Declaration under section 6 was made on

4.12.1984 and published in the Gazette on 8.12.1984. It was found

that simultaneous notifications under sections 4 and 6 could not be

made and therefore the acquisitions were bad as held in   Kashmir

Singh v. State of U.P. AIR 1987 All. 113 which was upheld by this

Court. Thereafter, the Ordinance was promulgated. The Statement of

Objects and Reasons referred to the judgment in Kashmir Singh’s

case. It was decided to amend the Act for validating the proceedings in

respect   of   the   Notification   under   section   4   published   on   or   after

24.9.1984 but before 11.1.1989. Following provision was inserted:

“55. The amendment of Section 17 was brought on the legal

anvil by way of a proviso to Sub-section (4) thereof which ran as

under:

"Provided that where in case of any land notification under

Section 4(1) has been published in the official Gazette on

36

or after 24.09.1984 but before 11.1.1989 and the

appropriate Government has under this Sub-section

direction that proviso of Section 5A was not applied, a

declaration under Section 6 in respect of the land may be

made either simultaneously at a time after the publication

in the Official Gazette of the notification under Section 4

sub-section (1)."

The Court in Tika Ram (supra) observed that the legislature had

no power to overrule the judgment. However, it has the power to

suitably amend the law to remove flaw pointed out by the Court. It

was observed:

“57. This argument is completely answered in Meerut

Development Authority v. Satbir Singh reported in 1996 (11)

SCC 462. This Court was considering this very proviso of

Section 17(4) inserted by Land Acquisition [U.P. Amendment

and Validation Act, 1991 [UP Act No. 5 of 1991] and relying

upon the judgment reported as GDA v. Jan Kalyan Samiti,

Sheopuri reported in 1996 (2) SCC 365, the Court took the view

in paragraph 10 that when this Court had declared a particular

statute to be invalid, the Legislature had no power to overrule the

judgment. However, it has the power to suitably amend the law

by use of proper phraseology removing the defects pointed out

by the Court and by amending the law inconsistent with the law

declared by the Court so that the defects which were pointed out

were never on statute for enforcement of law. Such an exercise

of power to amend a statute is not an incursion on the judicial

power of the Court but as a statutory exercise on the constituent

power to suitably amend the law and to validate the actions

which have been declared to be invalid.

69. Reliance was also placed on the judgment in Bakhtawar

Trust v. M.D. Narayan and Ors. reported in 2003 (5) SCC 298.

Learned Counsel for the appellant relied on paragraphs 14 to 16.

In our opinion, paragraph 14 was completely against the

appellants wherein the State Legislature's power to make

retrospective legislation and thereby validating the prior

executive and legislative acts retrospectively is recognized. Of

course, the same has to be done only after curing the defects that

led to the invalidation. We respectfully agree with the

propositions laid down in paragraphs 14, 15 and 16 thereof. In

37

Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Broach Borough Municipality

reported in 1969 (2) SCC 283, which is referred to in paragraph

16 of the decision, it is stated that:

“the Legislature may follow any one method or all of them

and while it does so, it may neutralize the effect of earlier

decision of the Court which becomes ineffective after the

change of the law.”

It is further stated therein that the validity of the validating law,

therefore, depends upon whether the Legislature possesses the

competence which it claims over the subject matter and whether

in making the validation it removes the defect which the Courts

had found in the existing law. The Amending Act has clearly

passed these tests. All the relevant cases on this subject have

been considered in this judgment.”

The Court has observed that the State legislature has the power

to make retrospective legislation, thereby validating the prior executive

and   legislative   acts   retrospectively,   such   power   is   recognised.   Of

course, the same has to be done only after curing the defects that led

to the invalidation.

31.In the light of the exposition of the aforesaid principles of law in

the various judgments when we revert back to the scenario in the

instant matter, it is apparent that there was decision of the High

Court   of   Kerala   on   26.8.2016   regarding  admission  in  MBBS/BDS

courses   in   2016­17   directing   that   all   the   colleges   agree   that   the

applications for admission are received only through “on­line” and that

the said process provides transparency with regard to the merit as well

as the identities of the applicants. Such applications shall be uploaded

for scrutiny of the Admission Supervisory Committee also. 

38

32.Against the said interim order which was of final nature, the

Union of India had filed an SLP. This Court set aside only that part of

condition No.1 wherein the respective colleges were allowed to conduct

the counselling and admit the students without going into the merits.

This Court has referred to the aforesaid order of the Kerala High Court

in   a   decision   dated   28.9.2016   in   CA   No.9862/2016.   In   C.A.

No.3874/2018, (2018 (6) SCALE 174) – Anitta Job & Ors. v. The State

of Kerala & Ors. decided on 20.4.2018, this Court observed:

“14. We have already noticed above that Kerala High Court has

passed interim order on 26.08.2016 under which the High Court

issued certain directions regarding admission in MBBS/BDS

Courses 2016-2017. Paragraph 9 of the judgment which is

relevant in this context is as follows:

“9. Accordingly, there shall be an interim stay of

operation and implementation of the impugned orders,

G.O. (Rt) No. 2314/2016/H&FWD dated 20.08.2016

and G.O. (Rt) No. 2336/2016/H&FWD dated

23.08.2016, subject to the following conditions:

(i) Admissions to the MBBS/BDS courses shall be

only on the basis of the ranking of candidates in the

rank list of NEET, 2016, on the basis of the inter-se

merit among the candidates, who have applied to the

respective colleges.

(ii) All the colleges agree that the applications for

admission are received only through online and that,

the said process provides transparency with regard to

the merit as well as the identities of the applicants.

Such applications shall, therefore, be uploaded for the

scrutiny of the Admission Supervisory Committee

also immediately on the expiry of the last date for

submission of applications.

(iii) Since the counsel for the Admission Supervisory

Committee has voiced a complaint that some of the

39

colleges have not obtained approval of the Admission

Supervisory Committee, for their Prospectus, the

admission process shall be proceeded with only on the

basis of a Prospectus, for which approval of the

Admission Supervisory Committee has been obtained.

(iv) The Admission Supervisory committee is directed

to either approve or disapprove the Prospectus,

submitted to them for approval, within three days of

such submission.”

15. It is relevant that against the interim order of the Kerala High

Court dated 26.8.2016, Union of India has filed an SLP which

was disposed of by this Court on 28.9.2016 in C.A.No.9862 of

2016. This Court set aside only that part of Condition No.1

wherein the respective Colleges are allowed to conduct the

counselling and admit the students without going into the merits.

This Court, however, specifically observed that this Court is not

interfering with the admissions of students which have been

done by the respective Colleges as those were done after

reaching arrangement with the State Government. Last two

paragraphs of this Court’s order dated 28.9.2016 are as follows:

“Having regard to the aforesaid facts as stated by

the learned Solicitor General as well as the counsel

for the respondents, we set aside that part of

Condition No.1 wherein the respective colleges are

allowed to conduct the counselling and admit the

students without going into the merits.

This issue shall be finally thrashed out and decided

by the High Court in the writ petitions which are

pending before it. However, we are not inclined to

interfere with the admissions of students which have

been done by the respective colleges as these are done

after reaching arrangement with the State

Government. In that behalf, the conditions which are

mentioned in the impugned order shall continue to

apply.

The appeal stands disposed of in the aforesaid

terms.”

40

It is apparent from the order passed by this Court as well as by

the   High   Court   of   Kerala   that   receiving   online   applications   was

mandatory and it was laid down in the judgment for ensuring the fair

process   of   admissions,   transparency   as   well   as   identities   of   the

applicants. The condition was the outcome of the judgment on the

power of judicial review passed by the Kerala High Court and affirmed

by this Court also. Thus, the very same judgment is sought to be

nullified by the impugned Ordinance by making a provision to the

contrary.   Admissions   as   per   the   Ordinance   are   to   be   regularised

dehors the mode of submitting the applications. It is not removing the

defect   in   any   existing   law.   The   Ordinance   has   clearly   annulled   a

judgment   of   Court   which   was   laid   down   in   order   to   ensure   fair

procedure.

33.We have anxiously read the entire impugned Ordinance and a

perusal thereof indicates that it is a blatant attempt of regularisation

of admissions made which were declared to be invalid not only by the

High Court of Kerala but by this Court after this Court had dealt with

the   order   dated   14.11.2016   passed   by  the   ASC   after   hearing   the

matter for several days and the Court had passed a reasoned order.

While dismissing/disposing of the matters, this Court directed the 30

students who were illegally deprived of the admission, to be admitted

in the next academic session 2017­18. It was clearly not a dismissal of

41

the case in limine but a reasoned order. In the writ petitions filed by

the colleges and others, the validity and legality of the order dated

14.11.2016   was   questioned.   However,   this   Court   has   upheld   the

same. We also note that voluminous records were filed in this Court

by both the medical colleges. The students were also heard when the

decision  was   rendered.   Thereafter   also  several  petitions   were   filed

which   were   dismissed   by   this   Court.   Thus,   when   this   Court   has

upheld the order dated 14.11.2016 on the ground of illegality and

irregularities and not following the due procedure, such admissions

could   not   have   been   regularised   at   all.   In   case   such   a   power   of

covering   up   illegal   action   is   given   to   the   State   Government   in

individual cases of two colleges, the day is not far off when every

judgment can be annulled. It is crystal clear in the instant case that

the State Government has exceeded its powers and has entrenched

upon the field reserved for the judiciary. It could not have nullified the

judgment. The online procedure was laid down by the judgment. The

provision   of   any   existing   law   framed   by   legislation   has   not   been

changed by the State Government by the impugned Ordinance but

illegalities found in the admissions were sought to be got rid of. What

was laid down in the judgment for ensuring the fair procedure which

was required to be followed was sought to be undone, it was nothing

but the wholly impermissible act of the State Government of sitting

42

over the judgment and it could not have promulgated the Ordinance

setting at naught the effect of the judgment.

34.It is also apparent that what the State Government has done by

way of impugned Ordinance is not only impermissible and beyond

legislative competence it also has the effect of perpetuating illegality

and   arbitrariness   committed   by   the   colleges   in   question   by   not

following         the mandate of law laid down by the High Court as

affirmed by this Court. An effort has been made to cover up the

arbitrariness and illegality in an illegal and impermissible manner for

which the State Government had no competence. The provisions made

in the Ordinance are otherwise also quite illegal and arbitrary besides

in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers enshrined under

Article 50 of the Constitution of India.

35.Reliance has been placed by the respondents on a decision of

this Court in Kunhayammed & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Anr. (2000) 6

SCC 359 so as to contend that this Court has not dismissed the

special leave petition by a speaking order. Thus, it cannot be treated

to   be   a   precedent.   Reliance   has   been   placed   on   the   following

observations made by the Court:

“40. A petition seeking grant of special leave to appeal may be

rejected for several reasons. For example, it may be rejected (i)

as barred by time, or (ii) being a defective presentation, (iii) the

petitioner having no locus standi to file the petition, (iv) the

conduct of the petitioner disentitling him to any indulgence by

the Court, (iv) the question raised by the petitioner for

43

consideration by this Court being not fit for consideration or

deserving being dealt with by the apex court of the country and

so on. The expression often employed by this Court while

disposing of such petitions are - "heard and dismissed",

"dismissed", "dismissed as barred by time" and so on. Maybe

that at the admission stage itself the opposite party appears on

caveat or on notice and offers contest to the maintainability of

the petition. The Court may apply its mind to the merit

worthiness of the petitioner's prayer seeking leave to file an

appeal and having formed an opinion may say "dismissed on

merits". Such an order may be passed even ex-parte, that is, in

the absence of the opposite party. In any case, the dismissal

would remain a dismissal by a non-speaking order where no

reasons have been assigned and no law has been declared by the

Supreme Court. The dismissal is not of the appeal but of the

special leave petition. Even if the merits have been gone into,

they are the merits of the special leave petition only. In our

opinion, neither doctrine of merger nor Article 141 of the

Constitution is attracted to such an order. Grounds entitling

exercise of review jurisdiction conferred by Order 47 Rule 1 of

the C.P.C. or any other statutory provision or allowing review of

an order passed in exercise of writ or supervisory jurisdiction of

the High Court (where also the principles underlying or

emerging from Order 47 Rule 1 of the C.P.C. act as guidelines)

are not necessarily the same on which this Court exercises

discretion to grant or not to grant special leave to appeal while

disposing of a petition for the purpose. Mere rejection of special

leave petition does not take away the jurisdiction of the court,

tribunal or forum whose order forms the subject matter of

petition for special leave to review its own order if grounds for

exercise of review jurisdiction are shown to exist. Where the

order rejecting an SLP is a speaking order, that is, where reasons

have been assigned by this Court for rejecting the petition for

special leave and are stated in the order still the order remains

the one rejecting prayer for the grant of leave to appeal. The

petitioner has been turned away at the threshold without having

been allowed to enter in the appellate jurisdiction of this Court.

Here also the doctrine of merger would not apply. But the law

stated or declared by this Court in its order shall attract

applicability of Article 141 of the Constitution. The reasons

assigned by this Court in its order expressing its adjudication

(expressly or by necessary implication) on point of fact or law

shall take away the jurisdiction of any other court, tribunal or

authority to express any opinion in conflict with or in departure

from the view taken by this Court because permitting to do so

would be subversive of judicial discipline and an affront to the

44

order of this Court. However, this would be so not by reference

to the doctrine of merger.

44. To sum up our conclusions are:

(i) Where an appeal or revision is provided against an order

passed by a court, tribunal or any other authority before superior

forum and such superior forum modifies, reverses or affirms the

decision put in issue before it, the decision by the subordinate

forum merges in the decision by the superior forum and it is the

latter which subsists, remains operative and is capable of

enforcement in the eye of law.

(ii) The jurisdiction conferred by Article 136 of the Constitution

is divisible into two stages. First stage is up to the disposal of

prayer for special leave to file an appeal. The second stage

commences if and when the leave to appeal is granted and

special leave petition is converted into an appeal.

(iii) Doctrine of merger is not a doctrine of universal or

unlimited application. It will depend on the nature of jurisdiction

exercised by the superior forum and the content or subject-matter

of challenge laid or capable of being laid shall be determinative

of the applicability of merger. The superior jurisdiction should be

capable of reversing, modifying or affirming the order put in

issue before it. Under Article 136 of the Constitution, the

Supreme Court may reverse, modify or affirm the judgment-

decree or order appealed against while exercising its appellate

jurisdiction and not while exercising the discretionary

jurisdiction disposing of petition for special leave to appeal. The

doctrine of merger can, therefore, be applied to the former and

not to the latter.

(iv) An order refusing special leave to appeal may be a non-

speaking order or a speaking one. In either case, it does not

attract the doctrine of merger. An order refusing special leave to

appeal does not stand substituted in place of the order under

challenge. All that it means is that the Court was not inclined to

exercise its discretion so as to allow the appeal being filed.

(v) If the order refusing leave to appeal is a speaking order, i.e.

gives reasons for refusing the grant of leave, then the order has

two implications. Firstly, the statement of law contained in the

order is a declaration of law by the Supreme Court within the

meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution. Secondly, other than

the declaration of law, whatever is stated in the order are the

findings recorded by the Supreme Court which would bind the

parties thereto and also the court, tribunal or authority in any

45

proceedings subsequent thereto by way of judicial discipline, the

Supreme Court being the apex court of the country. But, this

does not amount to saying that the order of the court, tribunal or

authority below has stood merged in the order of the Supreme

Court rejecting special leave petition or that the order of the

Supreme Court is the only order binding as res judicata in

subsequent proceedings between the parties,

(vi) Once leave to appeal has been granted and appellate

jurisdiction of Supreme Court has been invoked the order passed

in appeal would attract the doctrine of merger; the order may be

of reversal, modification or merely affirmation.

(vii) On an appeal having been preferred or a petition seeking

leave to appeal having been converted into an appeal before

Supreme Court the jurisdiction of High Court to entertain a

review petition is lost thereafter as provided by Sub-rule (1) of

Rule (1) of Order 47 of the C.P.C.”

This Court has considered the expressions often employed by

this Court while disposing of the special leave petition as “heard and

dismissed”, “dismissed”, “dismissed as barred by time”. Maybe that at

the admission stage itself, the opposite party appears on caveat or on

notice and offers a contest to the maintainability of the petition. Such

an order may be passed even  ex parte  i.e. in the absence of the

opposite party. In any case, the dismissal would remain a dismissal by

a non­speaking order where no reasons have been assigned and no

law   has   been   declared   by   this   Court.   This   Court   has   ultimately

concluded that if an order refusing to grant leave to appeal by a

speaking order gives reasons for refusing the grant of leave, then the

order has two implications; firstly the statement of law contained in

the order is a declaration of law by this Court within the meaning of

46

Article 141 of the Constitution; secondly, other than the declaration of

law, whatever is stated in the order are the findings recorded by this

Court   which   would   bind   the   parties   thereto   and   also   the   court,

tribunal or authority. 

36.When we read the order passed by this Court, all the parties

have filed the pleadings while the order was passed by this Court.

Counter affidavits, rejoinder and various other applications for taking

on record the documents and plethora of documents were submitted

before this Court and it was argued for several days at length. This

Court has heard the matter and thereafter has expressed the opinion

and recording finding as to the legality of the order dated 14.11.2016

for the first time as the order was not before High Court, vide the order

passed on 22.3.2017 observing that:

“Heard learned counsel for the parties.

We do not find any ground to interfere in Order dated

14.11.2016.

As 30 students have been found by ASC, in the case of

Karuna Medical College, who have been illegally deprived of

their admission in spite of being meritorious, we deem it proper

to issue direction to the college and all other concerned

authorities to admit them in the next academic session 2017-18

in Karuna Medical College and the corresponding number of

seats, available to it, shall be reduced by 30 for the college in

question for academic session 2017-18.

The Special Leave Petitions are, accordingly, dismissed.

Pending applications stand disposed of.”

It is apparent from the aforesaid order passed by this Court that

this Court did not find any ground to interfere with the order dated

14.11.2016. The SLPs. against the order passed by the High Court

47

were also dismissed and this Court had directed that 30 students be

admitted   in   the   next   session.   Independent   directions   were   issued

which were not ordered by the High Court. This Court directed that

they are to be admitted to the academic session 2017­18. Thus, it

does not lie in the mouth of the respondents to contend at all that it

was not a decision on merits by this Court. Submission is startling

and in the negation of stupendous effort made and time given by this

Court while hearing the matters before deciding them by the aforesaid

order.

37.It was also contended on behalf of the respondents that NEET

merit   is   the   fulcrum   that   has   been   adopted   in   the   Ordinance;   a

student   who   could   have   obtained   admission   otherwise,   had   the

procedure been followed, should not be deprived of admission in the

course for no fault on his part.  The submission, though attractive, is

hollow   and   cannot   be   countenanced   for   assessment.     Firstly   the

matter stands adjudicated finally and finally concluded up to this

Court.  Merit was the basis earlier too when the admissions were to be

made   through   NEET   and   required   “on­line”   procedure   was   to   be

followed. It is not the change of the basis that has been made by merit

criteria. Apart from that, when once the basic procedure laid down in

the judgment for receiving online applications had not been followed,

admissions that were cancelled on that ground, could not have been

48

validated at all. The colleges were unable to satisfy this Court as to the

fairness of the procedure adopted by them. As such, this Court did not

interfere with the judgment of the High Court as well as the order

dated 14.11.2016 of the ASC. When merit was the basis earlier too, it

cannot be said that the legislature has tried to introduce something

new. It cannot be said that any defect has now been removed by the

State legislature from the existing law.  In fact, what was the judgment

of the court, has been attempted to be nullified. It is nothing but an

attempt to nullify the judgment which the legislature cannot do, as we

have   a   well­defined   field   of   separation   of   powers   of   the   judiciary,

legislature and the executive.

38.The decision in Dr. Preeti Srivastava & Anr. v. State of M.P. & Ors.

(1999) 7 SCC 120 has been referred to by the respondents in which

the Court considered the question of the need for common entrance

examination for admission to postgraduate medical courses in a State

and  observed  that  common  entrance   examination  provides  unique

criteria   for   judging   the   merits   of   all   candidates   who   come   from

different universities. The common entrance test alone will balance the

competing   equities   of   having   competent   students   for   specialised

education. This Court has made the following observations:

“28. This argument ignores the reasons underlying the need for a

common entrance examination for post-graduate medical courses

in a State. There may be several Universities in a State which

conduct M.B.B.S. courses. The courses of study may not be

49

uniform. The quality of teaching may not be uniform. The

standard of assessment at the M.B.B.S. examination also may

not be uniform in the different universities. With the result that in

some of the better universities which apply more strict tests for

evaluating the performance of students, a higher standard of

performance is required for getting the passing marks in the

M.B.B.S. examination. Similarly, a higher standard of

performance may be required for getting higher marks than in

other universities. Some universities may assess the students

liberally with the result that the candidates with lesser

knowledge may be above to secure passing marks in the

M.B.B.S. examination; while it may also be easier for candidates

to secure marks at the higher level. A common entrance

examination, therefore, provides a uniform criterion for judging

the merit of all candidates who come from different universities.

Obviously, as soon as one concedes that there can be differing

standards of teaching and evaluation in different universities, one

cannot rule out the possibility that the candidates who have

passed the M.B.B.S. examination from a university which is

liberal in evaluating its students, would not, necessarily, have

passed, had they appeared in an examination where a more strict

evaluation is made. Similarly, candidates who have obtained

very high marks in the M.B.B.S. examination where evaluation

is liberal would have got lesser marks had they appeared for the

examination of a university where stricter standards were

applied. Therefore, the purpose of such a common entrance

examination is not merely to grade candidates for selection. The

purposes is also to evaluate all candidates by a common

yardstick. One must, therefore, also take into account the

possibility that some of the candidates who may have passed the

M.B.B.S. examination from more "generous" universities, may

not qualify at the entrance examination where a better and

uniform standard for judging all the candidates from different

universities is applied. In the interest of selecting suitable

candidates for specialised education, it is necessary that the

common entrance examination is of a certain standard and

qualifying marks are prescribed for passing that examination.

This alone will balance the competing equities of having

competent students for specialised education and the need to

provide for some room for the backward even at the stage of

specialised postgraduate education which is one step below the

super specialities.”

50

The observations are of no help for the aforestated reasons. The

State Government was not competent to promulgate the impugned

Ordinance as already held. The question cannot be agitated afresh

who could have obtained admission on the basis of the merit. There

may   be   a   large   number   of   other   students   who   might   have   been

deprived of their right to obtain admission. Such kind of enquiry is

impermissible to be made now in the wake of the decisions which have

attained finality and are binding upon all concerned. 

39.Reliance has been placed by the respondents on a decision of

this Court in  Anitta Job & Ors. v. The State of Kerala  decided on

20.4.2018 (supra) so as to contend that this Court did not interfere

with the admissions which were made without applying the mind as

the students had appeared in the NEET examination and the college

had admitted other similar students also. This Court has passed the

order under Article 142. In the instant case in view of the previous

verdicts, such a power cannot be exercised and apart from that when

the   judgments   have   attained   finality,   they   are   binding   on   all

concerned including this Court. Power under Article 142 cannot be

exercised to nullify its own judgment and to perpetuate illegality. The

question involved in the case is the power of the State Government to

promulgate the impugned Ordinance. It was not the question in the

said decision of Anitta Job (supra). The decision is of no application to

51

the   instant   case.   The   power   under   Article   142   cannot   at   all   be

exercised by this Court in view of the previous decisions and also in

view of the fact that it was not competent to enact the impugned

Ordinance by the State Government so as to perpetuate an illegality

in view of the pronouncements made earlier.

40.Resultantly,   the   writ   petitions   deserve   to   be   allowed.   The

impugned Ordinance is declared to be  ultra vires  and entrenching

upon the field earmarked for the judiciary as it sought to nullify the

judgment and order passed by the High Court and by this Court.

………………………..J.

(Arun Mishra)

New Delhi; ………………………J.

September 12, 2018. (Indira Banerjee)