1

CGHC010360732022 2026:CGHC:34456-DB

AFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

CRA No. 1775 of 2022

Milan Bharti S/o Bhuru Bharti, Aged About 32 Years R/o Village

Tihalipali, Police Station Sarshiva, District Balodabazar Bhatapara

(Chhattisgarh)

... Appellant

versus

State of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Sarshiva, District

Balodabazar Bhatapara (Chhattisgarh)

... Respondent

(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)

For Appellant :Mr. Akath Kumar Yadav, Advocate

For Respondent/State:Mr. Jitendra Shrivastava, Government

Advocate

Hon'ble Mr. Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice

Hon’ble Mr. Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge

Judgment on Board

Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice

06.08.2026

1.Heard Mr. Akath Kumar Yadav, learned counsel for the appellant

as well as Mr. Jitendra Shrivastava, learned Government

Advocate, appearing for the State/respondent.

2

2.The appellant has preferred this appeal under Section 374(2) of

the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘Cr.P.C.’)

questioning the impugned judgment of conviction and order of

sentence dated 20.09.2022 passed by the Additional District and

Sessions Judge, FTSC (POCSO Act), Balodabazar (C.G.) in

Special Sessions Case (POCSO) No.45/2019, by which, the

appellant has been convicted and sentenced as under :-

Conviction Sentence

Under Section 376(2)(f) of

the Indian Penal Code,

1860

:Life imprisonment with fine of

Rs.1,000/-, and in default of

payment of fine, additional

rigorous imprisonment for six

months.

Under Section 376(2)(i) of

the Indian Penal Code,

1860

:Life imprisonment with fine of

Rs.1,000/-, and in default of

payment of fine, additional

rigorous imprisonment for six

months.

Under Section 6 of the

Protection of Children from

Sexual Offences Act, 2012

:Life imprisonment with fine of

Rs.2,000/-, and in default of

payment of fine, additional

rigorous imprisonment for six

months.

All the sentences shall run concurrently.

3.Learned State counsel submits that notice issued to the mother of

the victim (PW-3) has been served, but none has appeared on

behalf of the victim to contest the present appeal.

3

4.The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 02.08.2019, a report was

lodged at Police Station Sarsiwa, District Balodabazar-Bhatapara

by Bhuru Bharti, the grandfather of the victim, alleging that the

appellant, who is the father of the victim, had committed repeated

sexual assault upon his own minor daughter aged about 13-14

years. It was alleged that the appellant was living separately with

his family and was habituated to consuming liquor and quarrelling

with his wife, due to which she had gone to her parental home. On

the intervening night of 01/02.08.2019, the appellant took his

children to his house and at about 12:30 a.m. committed forcible

sexual intercourse with the victim. On the following morning, the

victim disclosed the incident to her grandfather, who also informed

the village Sarpanch. The victim further revealed that the

appellant had been repeatedly subjecting her to sexual

intercourse even prior to the said incident. On the basis of the

said report, First Information Report was registered against the

appellant for offences punishable under Sections 376(2)(f) and

376(2)(i) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‘IPC’) and

Sections 4 and 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual

Offences Act, 2012 (for short, ‘POCSO Act’), whereafter

investigation was set in motion.

5.During the course of investigation, the statement of the victim

under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. was recorded. The victim was

medically examined and vaginal slides were collected and

forwarded for forensic examination. The Investigating Officer also

4

prepared the spot map, recorded the statements of material

witnesses under Section 161 Cr.P.C., and collected documentary

evidence relating to the age of the victim, including the admission

register and school records of the Government Primary School,

which recorded her date of birth as 18.08.2007, establishing that

she was below eighteen years of age on the date of occurrence.

Upon completion of investigation and finding sufficient material

against the appellant, charge-sheet was filed before the

competent Court for the aforesaid offences.

6.The learned trial Court, upon finding a prima facie case, framed

charges against the appellant under Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(2)

(i) of the IPC and Sections 4 and 6 of the POCSO Act. The

appellant denied the charges and claimed to be tried. No defence

evidence was adduced on his behalf.

7.In order to establish its case, the prosecution examined twelve

witnesses, including the victim, her mother, her grandfather, the

village Sarpanch, the medical experts, the Headmaster who

proved the school records relating to the age of the victim, and the

Investigating Officers.

8.The prosecution also exhibited the First Information Report, the

statement of the victim recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C., the

medical examination report, forensic science laboratory report,

school admission register and other documentary evidence

collected during investigation.

5

9.The statement of the appellant under Section 313 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure was recorded, wherein he denied all the

incriminating circumstances appearing against him and pleaded

false implication. His defence was that the victim and her mother

had falsely implicated him owing to domestic disputes and

because he had objected to the victim's association with a boy

named Atul.

10.The learned trial Court, upon completion of the trial and after a

meticulous appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence

brought on record by the prosecution, found that the prosecution

had succeeded in proving beyond reasonable doubt that the

appellant, being the biological father of the minor victim, had

repeatedly committed aggravated penetrative sexual assault upon

her. Consequently, by the impugned judgment of conviction and

order of sentence dated 20.09.2022 passed by the learned

Additional District and Sessions Judge, FTSC (POCSO Act),

Balodabazar (C.G.) in Special Sessions Case (POCSO)

No.45/2019, the appellant was convicted for the offences

punishable under Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) of the IPC and

Section 6 of the POCSO Act and sentenced in the manner

indicated in paragraph 2 of this judgment.

11.Aggrieved thereby, the appellant has preferred the present appeal

calling in question the legality, validity and correctness of the

impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence.

6

12.Mr. Akath Kumar Yadav, learned counsel for the appellant would

submit that the impugned judgment of conviction and order of

sentence suffers from serious legal and factual infirmities. It is

contended that the learned trial Court has failed to properly

appreciate the oral and documentary evidence available on record

and has erroneously held the appellant guilty of the offences

punishable under Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) of the IPC and

Section 6 of the POCSO Act. According to learned counsel, the

prosecution has failed to establish the guilt of the appellant

beyond reasonable doubt and the findings recorded by the

learned trial Court are perverse and contrary to the evidence

available on record.

13.It is further submitted by Mr. Yadav that there is no direct and

cogent evidence connecting the appellant with the alleged

offences and that he has been falsely implicated in the present

case. Learned counsel would argue that the prosecution

witnesses have made material omissions and contradictions in

their statements, rendering their testimonies unreliable. It is also

contended that the prosecution has failed to prove the presence

and participation of the appellant in the alleged crime and,

therefore, the conviction recorded under the IPC and the POCSO

Act is wholly unsustainable.

14.Lastly, it is urged by Mr. Yadav that the learned trial Court has

failed to consider the evidence in its correct perspective,

7

particularly the admissions elicited during the cross-examination

of the prosecution witnesses, and has overlooked material

discrepancies in the prosecution case. It is, therefore, submitted

that the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence

dated 20.09.2022 deserves to be set aside and the appellant is

entitled to be acquitted of all the charges by extending to him the

benefit of doubt.

15.Per contra, Mr. Jitendra Shrivastava, learned Government

Advocate appearing for the State/respondent, would submit that

the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence

passed by the learned trial Court is based on a proper and

meticulous appreciation of the entire oral and documentary

evidence available on record. It is contended that the prosecution

has succeeded in proving beyond reasonable doubt that the

appellant, being the biological father of the victim, repeatedly

committed aggravated penetrative sexual assault upon his minor

daughter. Learned State counsel would submit that the learned

trial Court has rightly appreciated the testimony of the victim,

which is natural, consistent and inspires confidence, and the

same is duly corroborated by the evidence of the mother of the

victim, the medical evidence, the FSL report and the documentary

evidence relating to the age of the victim.

16.It is further submitted by Mr. Shrivastava that the school records

conclusively establish that the victim was below eighteen years of

8

age on the date of the occurrence and, therefore, her consent,

even if assumed, is wholly immaterial in the eyes of law. Learned

State counsel would argue that the prosecution witnesses have

withstood lengthy cross-examination and no material contradiction

or omission has been elicited so as to discredit the prosecution

case. The defence of false implication set up by the appellant is a

mere bald assertion, unsupported by any acceptable evidence,

and has rightly been rejected by the learned trial Court.

17.Lastly, Mr. Shrivastava would submit that the findings recorded by

the learned trial Court are based on cogent and reliable evidence

and do not suffer from any perversity, illegality or misappreciation

of evidence warranting interference by this Court in exercise of

appellate jurisdiction. It is, therefore, submitted that the conviction

of the appellant under Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) of the IPC

and Section 6 of the POCSO Act, along with the sentence

imposed thereunder, has been rightly recorded and the present

appeal, being devoid of merit, deserves to be dismissed by

affirming the impugned judgment of conviction and order of

sentence dated 20.09.2022.

18.We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length,

considered their rival submissions made herein-above, and

carefully perused the entire record of the case with utmost

circumspection.

9

19.In light of the rival submissions advanced by learned counsel for

the parties and upon perusal of the record, the following points

arise for consideration in the present appeal:-

(i) Whether the learned trial Court has rightly held that the

victim was a minor and a "child" within the meaning of

Section 2(d) of the Protection of Children from Sexual

Offences Act, 2012, at the time of the commission of the

offence?

(ii) Whether the learned trial Court has rightly concluded, on

the basis of the oral and documentary evidence available on

record, that the appellant repeatedly committed rape upon

his minor daughter, thereby committing the offences

punishable under Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) of the IPC

and Section 6 of the POCSO Act?

(iii) Whether the findings of conviction and the sentence

imposed upon the appellant by the learned trial Court by

judgment dated 20.09.2022 suffer from any illegality,

perversity or infirmity warranting interference by this Court in

exercise of its appellate jurisdiction?

20.We shall first examine Point No. (i), namely, whether the learned

trial Court was justified in holding that the victim was a "child"

within the meaning of Section 2(d) of the Protection of Children

from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 at the time of the commission of

the offence, so as to attract the provisions of the said Act.

10

21.When a person is charged for the offence punishable under the

POCSO Act, or for rape punishable in the Indian Penal Code, the

age of the victim is significant and essential ingredient to prove

such charge and the gravity of the offence gets changed when the

child is below 18 years, 12 years and more than 18 years. Section

2(d) of the POCSO Act defines the “child” which means any

person below the age of eighteen years.

22.In Jarnail Singh Vs. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 263, the

Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down the guiding principles for

determining the age of a child, which read as follows:

“22. On the issue of determination of age of a

minor, one only needs to make a reference to

Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and

Protection of Children) Rules, 2007

(hereinafter referred to as the 2007 Rules).

The aforestated 2007 Rules have been

framed under Section 68(1) of the Juvenile

Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act,

2000. Rule 12 referred to hereinabove reads

as under :

“12. Procedure to be followed in

determination of Age.? (1) In every case

concerning a child or a juvenile in conflict

with law, the court or the Board or as the

case may be the Committee referred to in

rule 19 of these rules shall determine the

age of such juvenile or child or a juvenile in

conflict with law within a period of thirty

days from the date of making of the

application for that purpose.

(2) The court or the Board or as the case

may be the Committee shall decide the

juvenility or otherwise of the juvenile or the

11

child or as the case may be the juvenile in

conflict with law, prima facie on the basis of

physical appearance or documents, if

available, and send him to the observation

home or in jail.

(3) In every case concerning a child or

juvenile in conflict with law, the age

determination inquiry shall be conducted by

the court or the Board or, as the case may

be, the Committee by seeking evidence by

obtaining –

(a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent

certificates, if available; and in the

absence whereof;

(ii) the date of birth certificate from the

school (other than a play school) first

attended; and in the absence whereof;

(iii) the birth certificate given by a

corporation or a municipal authority or a

panchayat;

(b) and only in the absence of either (i),

(ii) or (iii) of clause (a) above, the

medical opinion will be sought from a

duly constituted Medical Board, which

will declare the age of the juvenile or

child. In case exact assessment of the

age cannot be done, the Court or the

Board or, as the case may be, the

Committee, for the reasons to be

recorded by them, may, if considered

necessary, give benefit to the child or

juvenile by considering his/her age on

lower side within the margin of one year.

and, while passing orders in such case

shall, after taking into consideration such

evidence as may be available, or the

medical opinion, as the case may be,

record a finding in respect of his age and

either of the evidence specified in any of

the clauses (a)(i), (ii), (iii) or in the

12

absence whereof, clause (b) shall be the

conclusive proof of the age as regards

such child or the juvenile in conflict with

law.

(4) If the age of a juvenile or child or the

juvenile in conflict with law is found to be

below 18 years on the date of offence, on

the basis of any of the conclusive proof

specified in sub-rule (3), the court or the

Board or as the case may be the

Committee shall in writing pass an order

stating the age and declaring the status of

juvenility or otherwise, for the purpose of

the Act and these rules and a copy of the

order shall be given to such juvenile or the

person concerned.

(5) Save and except where, further inquiry

or otherwise is required, inter alia, in terms

of section 7A, section 64 of the Act and

these rules, no further inquiry shall be

conducted by the court or the Board after

examining and obtaining the certificate or

any other documentary proof referred to in

sub-rule (3) of this rule.

(6) The provisions contained in this rule

shall also apply to those disposed off

cases, where the status of juvenility has not

been determined in accordance with the

provisions contained in sub- rule(3) and the

Act, requiring dispensation of the sentence

under the Act for passing appropriate order

in the interest of the juvenile in conflict with

law.”

23. Even though Rule 12 is strictly

applicable only to determine the age of a

child in conflict with law, we are of the view

that the aforesaid statutory provision should

be the basis for determining age, even for a

child who is a victim of crime. For, in our view,

there is hardly any difference in so far as the

issue of minority is concerned, between a

13

child in conflict with law, and a child who is a

victim of crime. Therefore, in our considered

opinion, it would be just and appropriate to

apply Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules, to

determine the age of the victim VW-PW6.

The manner of determining age conclusively,

has been expressed in sub-rule (3) of Rule 12

extracted above. Under the aforesaid

provision, the age of a child is ascertained, by

adopting the first available basis, out of a

number of options postulated in Rule 12(3). If,

in the scheme of options under Rule 12(3), an

option is expressed in a preceding clause, it

has overriding effect over an option

expressed in a subsequent clause. The

highest rated option available, would

conclusively determine the age of a minor. In

the scheme of Rule 12(3), matriculation (or

equivalent) certificate of the concerned child,

is the highest rated option. In case, the said

certificate is available, no other evidence can

be relied upon. Only in the absence of the

said certificate, Rule 12(3), envisages

consideration of the date of birth entered, in

the school first attended by the child. In case

such an entry of date of birth is available, the

date of birth depicted therein is liable to be

treated as final and conclusive, and no other

material is to be relied upon. Only in the

absence of such entry, Rule 12(3) postulates

reliance on a birth certificate issued by a

corporation or a municipal authority or a

panchayat. Yet again, if such a certificate is

available, then no other material whatsoever

is to be taken into consideration, for

determining the age of the child concerned,

as the said certificate would conclusively

determine the age of the child. It is only in the

absence of any of the aforesaid, that Rule

12(3) postulates the determination of age of

the concerned child, on the basis of medical

opinion.”

14

23.Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act unequivocally defines a “child” as

any person who has not completed eighteen years of age. The

legislative intent underlying the said provision is to afford the

widest possible protection to persons below the age of majority

from sexual exploitation and abuse. Thus, for invocation of the

provisions of the POCSO Act, the foundational requirement is that

the prosecution must satisfactorily establish that the victim was

below eighteen years of age on the date of occurrence. Likewise,

in the present case, the prosecution has also projected the age of

the victim as below sixteen years for the purposes of attracting

aggravated penal consequences under the Indian Penal Code, as

it then stood, thereby making the determination of age a crucial

and determinative issue.

24.At the outset, it is pertinent to note that the consistent defence of

the appellant, as emerging from his statement recorded under

Section 313 Cr.P.C., is one of complete denial and false

implication. The appellant has not disputed the relationship

between himself and the victim, who is his biological daughter.

However, no cogent documentary or oral evidence has been

adduced by the defence to dislodge the prosecution case

regarding the age of the victim or to establish that she had

attained majority on the date of the incident.

25.In order to establish the age of the victim, the prosecution Rajni

Bharti (PW-3), the mother of the victim, has unequivocally

15

deposed that the victim was about 13 years of age at the time of

the occurrence. She has further stated that the victim was the

eldest among her children and was residing with the family when

the appellant repeatedly subjected her to sexual assault. Despite

lengthy cross-examination, nothing substantial has been elicited

to discredit her testimony either with regard to the age of the

victim or the relationship between the parties. The learned trial

Court has, therefore, rightly placed reliance upon her evidence.

26.The evidence of the mother stands duly corroborated by the

testimony of the victim (PW-4), who has consistently stated that

she was a minor and was repeatedly subjected to sexual assault

by the appellant, her biological father. The learned trial Court has

rightly found her testimony to be natural, trustworthy and worthy of

acceptance. Nothing material has been brought on record to

discredit her version.

27.The prosecution has further examined Maniram Kurre (PW-8), the

Headmaster of Government Primary School, Tihalipali, who

proved the admission register (Ex.P-12 and Ex.P-12C). His

evidence clearly establishes that the date of birth of the victim is

18.08.2007. He has also explained that the entry was made on

the basis of the records received from the previous school and

maintained in the ordinary course of official business. The

authenticity of the school record has remained unimpeached. The

16

learned trial Court has, therefore, rightly relied upon the said

documentary evidence.

28.The testimony of PW-8 finds further corroboration from the

evidence of the Investigating Officer, Assistant Sub-Inspector

Shravan Kumar Netam (PW-12), who has proved the seizure of

the admission register during the course of investigation and has

categorically stated that, upon verification, the date of birth of the

victim was found to be 18.08.2007. We find no reason to

disbelieve the said evidence, which lends complete assurance to

the prosecution case on the question of age.

29.The contention advanced on behalf of the appellant that the

school records cannot be relied upon since the original entry was

not made by PW-8 deserves to be rejected. The admission

register is an official record maintained in the ordinary course of

business and carries due evidentiary value. More importantly, no

material has been placed on record by the defence to

demonstrate that the entries therein were fabricated or

manipulated. The learned trial Court has, therefore, committed no

error in placing reliance upon the said records.

30.It is equally significant that the appellant has failed to produce any

documentary evidence, such as a birth certificate, Aadhaar Card

or any other public document, to probabilise his plea that the

victim had attained majority on the date of the occurrence. A mere

denial in the statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. or

17

suggestions put to the prosecution witnesses during cross-

examination cannot outweigh the cogent oral and documentary

evidence adduced by the prosecution.

31.On an independent re-appreciation of the entire evidence, we are

satisfied that the learned trial Court has rightly held that the victim

was born on 18.08.2007 and was, therefore, below eighteen years

of age on the date of the occurrence. We find no perversity,

illegality or infirmity in the finding so recorded by the learned trial

Court. The said finding deserves to be, and is hereby, affirmed.

32.Accordingly, Point No. (i) is answered against the appellant by

holding that the learned trial Court has rightly concluded that the

victim was a "child" within the meaning of Section 2(d) of the

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, and we

affirm the said finding.

33.We shall now consider Point Nos. (ii) and (iii) together, as they are

closely interconnected. The principal question that arises for

consideration is whether the learned trial Court was justified in

holding that the appellant, being the biological father of the victim,

had repeatedly committed aggravated penetrative sexual assault

upon his minor daughter and, consequently, in convicting him for

the offences punishable under Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) of

the IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act. Upon re-appreciation of

the evidence available on record, the issue is whether the findings

18

recorded and the conviction imposed by the learned trial Court

warrant any interference in the present appeal.

34.Having carefully re-appreciated the entire evidence available on

record, we are of the considered opinion that the learned trial

Court has rightly appreciated the evidence in its proper

perspective and has recorded the finding of guilt on the basis of

cogent, reliable and trustworthy evidence. We find no perversity,

illegality or misreading of the evidence so as to warrant

interference with the well-reasoned judgment of conviction.

35.The learned trial Court has rightly placed reliance upon the

testimony of the victim (PW-4). Her deposition is clear, natural and

consistent throughout. She has categorically deposed that the

appellant, who is her biological father, repeatedly subjected her to

forcible sexual intercourse for a considerable period and also

narrated the incident which took place on the intervening night of

01/02.08.2019. Despite lengthy cross-examination, nothing

material has been elicited to discredit her testimony or to create

any doubt regarding its truthfulness. The learned trial Court has,

therefore, rightly accepted her evidence as wholly reliable.

36.The testimony of the victim finds substantial corroboration from

the evidence of her mother, Rajni Bharti (PW-3). The learned trial

Court has rightly noticed that PW-3 has categorically deposed that

the appellant repeatedly committed sexual assault upon their

minor daughter and that whenever she objected to such acts, the

19

appellant assaulted and threatened her. Her evidence not only

corroborates the version of the victim but also inspires confidence,

as no material contradiction or omission affecting the substratum

of the prosecution case has been brought out during her cross-

examination.

37.The learned trial Court has also rightly relied upon the testimony

of Bhuru Bharti (PW-2), who has deposed that after the incident

the victim disclosed the occurrence to him, whereupon he

informed the village Sarpanch and thereafter the report was

lodged. The prompt disclosure made by the victim and the prompt

initiation of criminal proceedings constitute an additional

circumstance lending assurance to the prosecution case.

38.The ocular version of the victim receives due corroboration from

the medical evidence. The learned trial Court has rightly relied

upon the testimony of the medical officer and the medical

examination report, which support the prosecution case and do

not contradict the version of the victim in any material particular.

The forensic evidence collected during investigation also lends

further assurance to the prosecution case. The learned trial Court

has, therefore, rightly appreciated the medical and scientific

evidence in conjunction with the ocular testimony.

39.The Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Himachal Pradesh v.

Shree Kant Shekari, (2004) 8 SCC 153, has categorically held

that medical evidence cannot be viewed in isolation and must be

20

appreciated in conjunction with the testimony of witnesses, and

where both are consistent, the evidentiary value of the

prosecution case stands strengthened.

40.We also find that the learned trial Court has rightly placed reliance

upon the documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution to

establish the age of the victim. The admission register of the

concerned school, duly proved by the Headmaster (PW-8),

records the date of birth of the victim as 18.08.2007. The said

document has been maintained in the ordinary course of official

business and its authenticity has not been impeached during the

course of trial. The learned trial Court has rightly held that, in the

absence of any material to indicate interpolation or fabrication, the

entries contained in the school records deserve due evidentiary

value. The testimony of PW-8, read in conjunction with the

evidence of the Investigating Officer, leaves no manner of doubt

regarding the correctness of the date of birth recorded in the

school register.

41.We further find that the appellant has failed to produce any

reliable documentary evidence to rebut the prosecution case

regarding the age of the victim. Neither any birth certificate nor

any public document or other reliable evidence has been brought

on record to demonstrate that the victim had attained the age of

majority on the date of the occurrence. The learned trial Court

has, therefore, rightly accepted the documentary evidence

21

produced by the prosecution and correctly concluded that the

victim was below eighteen years of age at the relevant point of

time and was, therefore, a "child" within the meaning of Section

2(d) of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012.

We find no illegality or perversity in the said finding warranting

interference in the present appeal.

42.Having regard to the evidence discussed hereinabove, we are of

the considered opinion that the learned trial Court has rightly

invoked the statutory presumption contained in Section 29 of the

POCSO. The prosecution has successfully established the

foundational facts, namely, that the victim was a minor and that

she was subjected to aggravated penetrative sexual assault by

the appellant. Once these foundational facts stood established by

cogent and reliable evidence, the statutory presumption under

Section 29 of the POCSO Act came into operation, thereby

shifting the evidentiary burden upon the appellant. Except taking a

plea of false implication and making bald suggestions during

cross-examination, the appellant has not adduced any evidence

capable of rebutting the statutory presumption.

43.The Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan v. Asharam

Bapu, (2023) 8 SCC 1, has reiterated in unequivocal terms that

Section 29 of the POCSO Act creates a reverse burden clause,

and once the prosecution establishes foundational facts, the Court

shall presume the accused to be guilty unless the contrary is

22

proved. It has further been held that mere denial or bald assertion

of innocence does not discharge the statutory burden cast upon

the accused.

44.Similarly, in Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat,

(1983) 3 SCC 217, the Supreme Court has observed that in cases

involving sexual offences, especially against minors, the

testimony of the victim or prosecution witnesses cannot be

discarded on minor inconsistencies, omissions, or absence of

independent corroboration, if the core of the prosecution case

inspires confidence and remains intact. The Court further

emphasized that undue importance should not be attached to

trivial discrepancies which do not go to the root of the matter.

45.Further, in Jarnail Singh (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has

authoritatively laid down that school records maintained in the

regular course of institutional duty constitute the most reliable and

primary evidence for determination of age in cases under the

POCSO Act. It has been held that such records, if duly proved

and not shown to be unreliable, should ordinarily be accepted as

conclusive proof of age.

46.Further, in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Madanlal, (2015) 7 SCC

681, the Apex Court has clearly held that consent of a minor is

immaterial in the eyes of law and cannot constitute a valid

defence either under Section 376 IPC or under the provisions of

the POCSO Act. It has been categorically observed that the

23

legislative intent behind the POCSO Act is to provide absolute

protection to children below 18 years from sexual exploitation, and

therefore, any alleged consent given by a minor has no legal

sanctity.

47.The principal defence of the appellant is one of false implication.

The appellant has neither offered any plausible explanation for the

incriminating circumstances appearing against him nor has he

adduced any cogent evidence in defence to probabilise his plea.

Mere denial in the statement recorded under Section 313 of the

Code of Criminal Procedure and bald suggestions put to the

prosecution witnesses during cross-examination are wholly

insufficient to discredit the otherwise consistent and trustworthy

prosecution evidence. The learned trial Court has, therefore,

rightly rejected the defence set up by the appellant.

48.On a cumulative appreciation of the entire evidence on record, the

following circumstances stand firmly established:–

(i) the victim was below eighteen years of age at the time of

the occurrence and was, therefore, a "child" within the

meaning of Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act;

(ii) the appellant, being the biological father of the victim,

repeatedly subjected her to penetrative sexual assault over

a considerable period;

24

(iii) the testimony of the victim is cogent, consistent and

wholly reliable and inspires confidence;

(iv) the evidence of PW-2 and PW-3 lends substantial

corroboration to the version of the victim;

(v) the medical evidence and the documentary evidence

collected during investigation support the prosecution case

in material particulars; and

(vi) the appellant has failed to rebut the statutory

presumption available in favour of the prosecution under the

provisions of the POCSO Act.

49.These circumstances constitute a complete and unbroken chain

pointing unerringly towards the guilt of the appellant and

completely rule out every hypothesis consistent with his

innocence.

50.In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered

opinion that the learned trial Court has rightly appreciated the

entire oral and documentary evidence in its proper perspective.

The findings recorded by the learned trial Court are based upon

sound appreciation of evidence and settled principles of criminal

jurisprudence and do not suffer from any perversity, illegality or

material irregularity.

51.Consequently, we find no reason to interfere with the well-

reasoned findings recorded by the learned trial Court holding the

25

appellant guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 376(2)

(f) and 376(2)(i) of the Indian Penal Code and Section 6 of the

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. The

prosecution has successfully proved the guilt of the appellant

beyond reasonable doubt.

52.Accordingly, Points No. (ii) and (iii) are answered in the

affirmative, in favour of the prosecution and against the appellant.

The findings recorded by the learned trial Court on the said issues

are hereby affirmed.

53.Having carefully considered the entire evidence available on

record in its cumulative perspective and upon close scrutiny of the

findings recorded by the learned Trial Court, we are of the

considered opinion that the learned Trial Court has rightly

appreciated the oral and documentary evidence brought on record

by the prosecution and has arrived at a well-reasoned conclusion

regarding the guilt of the appellant. The impugned judgment

reflects a proper consideration of the testimony of the victim (PW-

4), the evidence of her mother Rajni Bharti (PW-3), grandfather

Bhuru Bharti (PW-2), medical evidence, documentary evidence

relating to the age of the victim and other incriminating

circumstances emerging from the record.

54.The learned Trial Court has rightly placed reliance upon the

testimony of the victim (PW-4). Her statement, when considered

in its entirety, is found to be natural, consistent and trustworthy.

26

She has specifically stated that the appellant, being her biological

father, repeatedly subjected her to sexual assault. Despite

detailed cross-examination, the defence has failed to bring out

any material contradiction, omission or circumstance which could

affect the credibility of her testimony. The learned Trial Court has,

therefore, rightly accepted her evidence.

55.The Supreme Court in the matter of Rai Sandeep @ Deenu v.

State of NCT of Delhi, (2012) 8 SCC 21, held as under:

“22. In our considered opinion, the ‘sterling

witness’ should be of a very high quality and

caliber whose version should, therefore, be

unassailable. The Court considering the

version of such witness should be in a position

to accept it for its face value without any

hesitation. To test the quality of such a witness,

the status of the witness would be immaterial

and what would be relevant is the truthfulness

of the statement made by such a witness. What

would be more relevant would be the

consistency of the statement right from the

starting point till the end, namely, at the time

when the witness makes the initial statement

and ultimately before the Court. It should be

natural and consistent with the case of the

prosecution qua the accused. There should not

be any prevarication in the version of such a

witness. The witness should be in a position to

withstand the cross-examination of any length

and howsoever strenuous it may be and under

no circumstance should give room for any

doubt as to the factum of the occurrence, the

persons involved, as well as, the sequence of

it. Such a version should have co-relation with

each and everyone of other supporting material

such as the recoveries made, the weapons

used, the manner of offence committed, the

27

scientific evidence and the expert opinion. The

said version should consistently match with the

version of every other witness. It can even be

stated that it should be akin to the test applied

in the case of circumstantial evidence where

there should not be any missing link in the

chain of circumstances to hold the accused

guilty of the offence alleged against him. Only if

the version of such a witness qualifies the

above test as well as all other similar such tests

to be applied, it can be held that such a witness

can be called as a ‘sterling witness’ whose

version can be accepted by the Court without

any corroboration and based on which the

guilty can be punished. To be more precise, the

version of the said witness on the core

spectrum of the crime should remain intact

while all other attendant materials, namely, oral,

documentary and material objects should

match the said version in material particulars in

order to enable the Court trying the offence to

rely on the core version to sieve the other

supporting materials for holding the offender

guilty of the charge alleged.”

56.In the matter of Alakh Alok Srivastava v. Union of India and

others, (2018) 17 SCC 291, in paras 14 and 20, it is observed as

under:

“14. At the very outset, it has to be stated with

authority that the Pocso Act is a gender

legislation. This Act has been divided into

various chapters and parts therein. Chapter II

of the Act titled “Sexual Offences Against

Children” is segregated into five parts. Part A of

the said Chapter contains two sections, namely,

Section 3 and Section 4. Section 3 defines the

offence of “Penetrative Sexual Assault”

whereas Section 4 lays down the punishment

for the said offence. Likewise, Part B of the

said Chapter titled “Aggravated Penetrative

Sexual Assault and Punishment therefor”

28

contains two sections, namely, Section 5 and

Section 6. The various subsections of Section 5

copiously deal with various situations,

circumstances and categories of persons

where the offence of penetrative sexual assault

would take the character of the offence of

aggravated penetrative sexual assault. Section

5(k), in particular, while laying emphasis on the

mental stability of a child stipulates that where

an offender commits penetrative sexual assault

on a child, by taking advantage of the child's

mental or physical disability, it shall amount to

an offence of aggravated penetrative sexual

assault.”

***

“20. Speaking about the child, a three Judge

Bench in M.C. Mehta v. State of T.N. (1996) 6

SCC 756 “1. … “child is the father of man”. To

enable fathering of a valiant and vibrant man,

the child must be groomed well in the formative

years of his life. He must receive education,

acquire knowledge of man and materials and

blossom in such an atmosphere that on

reaching age, he is found to be a man with a

mission, a man who matters so far as the

society is concerned.”

57.The Supreme Court in the matter of Nawabuddin v. State of

Uttarakhand (CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.144 OF 2022), decided

on 08.02.2022 has held as under:-

“10. Keeping in mind the aforesaid objects and

to achieve what has been provided under

Article 15 and 39 of the Constitution to protect

children from the offences of sexual assault,

sexual harassment, the POCSO Act, 2012 has

been enacted. Any act of sexual assault or

sexual harassment to the children should be

viewed very seriously and all such offences of

sexual assault, sexual harassment on the

children have to be dealt with in a stringent

29

manner and no leniency should be shown to a

person who has committed the offence under

the POCSO Act. By awarding a suitable

punishment commensurate with the act of

sexual assault, sexual harassment, a message

must be conveyed to the society at large that, if

anybody commits any offence under the

POCSO Act of sexual assault, sexual

harassment or use of children for pornographic

purposes they shall be punished suitably and

no leniency shall be shown to them. Cases of

sexual assault or sexual harassment on the

children are instances of perverse lust for sex

where even innocent children are not spared in

pursuit of such debased sexual pleasure.

Children are precious human resources of our

country; they are the country’s future. The hope

of tomorrow rests on them. But unfortunately, in

our country, a girl child is in a very vulnerable

position. There are different modes of her

exploitation, including sexual assault and/or

sexual abuse. In our view, exploitation of

children in such a manner is a crime against

humanity and the society. Therefore, the

children and more particularly the girl child

deserve full protection and need greater care

and protection whether in the urban or rural

areas. As observed and held by this Court in

the case of State of Rajasthan v. Om

Prakash, (2002) 5 SCC 745, children need

special care and protection and, in such cases,

responsibility on the shoulders of the Courts is

more onerous so as to provide proper legal

protection to these children. In the case of

Nipun Saxena v. Union of India, (2019) 2

SCC 703, it is observed by this Court that a

minor who is subjected to sexual abuse needs

to be protected even more than a major victim

because a major victim being an adult may still

be able to withstand the social ostracization

and mental harassment meted out by society,

but a minor victim will find it difficult to do so.

Most crimes against minor victims are not even

30

reported as very often, the perpetrator of the

crime is a member of the family of the victim or

a close friend. Therefore, the child needs extra

protection. Therefore, no leniency can be

shown to an accused who has committed the

offences under the POCSO Act, 2012 and

particularly when the same is proved by

adequate evidence before a court of law.”

58.When considering the evidence of a victim subjected to a sexual

offence, the Court does not necessarily demand an almost

accurate account of the incident. Instead, the emphasis is on

allowing the victim to provide her version based on her

recollection of events, to the extent reasonably possible for her to

recollect. If the Court deems such evidence credible and free from

doubt, there is hardly any insistence on corroboration of that

version. In State of H.P. v. Shree Kant Shekar, (2004) 8 SCC

153, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court held as follows:

“21. It is well settled that a victim complaining

of having been a victim of the offence of rape is

not an accomplice after the crime. There is no

rule of law that her testimony cannot be acted

without corroboration in material particulars.

She stands on a higher pedestal than an

injured witness. In the latter case, there is injury

on the physical form, while in the former it is

physical as well as psychological and

emotional. However, if the court on facts finds it

difficult to accept the version of the victim on its

face value, it may search for evidence, direct or

circumstantial, which would lend assurance to

her testimony. Assurance, short of

corroboration, as understood in the context of

an accomplice, would suffice.”

31

59.On these lines, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shivasharanappa

and Others v. State of Karnataka, (2013) 5 SCC 705, observed

as follows:

“17. Thus, it is well settled in law that the court

can rely upon the testimony of a child witness

and it can form the basis of conviction if the

same is credible, truthful and is corroborated by

other evidence brought on record. Needless to

say as a rule of prudence, the court thinks it

desirable to see the corroboration from other

reliable evidence placed on record. The

principles that apply for placing reliance on the

solitary statement of the witness, namely, that

the statement is true and correct and is of

quality and cannot be discarded solely on the

ground of lack of corroboration, apply to a child

witness who is competent and whose version is

reliable.”

60.The Supreme court in the matter of State of UP v. Sonu

Kushwaha, (2023) 7 SCC 475 has held as under :

“12. The POCSO Act was enacted to provide

more stringent punishments for the offences of

child abuse of various kinds and that is why

minimum punishments have been prescribed in

Sections 4, 6, 8 and 10 of the POCSO Act for

various categories of sexual assaults on

children. Hence, Section 6,on its plain

language, leaves no discretion to the Court and

there is no option but to impose the minimum

sentence as done by the Trial Court. When a

penal provision uses the phraseology “shall not

be less than….”, the Courts cannot do offence

to the Section and impose a lesser sentence.

The Courts are powerless to do that unless

there is a specific statutory provision enabling

the Court to impose a lesser sentence.

However, we find no such provision in the

POCSO Act. Therefore, notwithstanding the

32

fact that the respondent may have moved

ahead in life after undergoing the sentence as

modified by the High Court, there is no

question of showing any leniency to him. Apart

from the fact that the law provides for a

minimum sentence, the crime committed by the

respondent is very gruesome which calls for

very stringent punishment. The impact of the

obnoxious act on the mind of the victim/child

will be lifelong. The impact is bound to

adversely affect the healthy growth of the

victim. There is no dispute that the age of the

victim was less than twelve years at the time of

the incident. Therefore, we have no option but

to set aside the impugned judgment of the High

Court and restore the judgment of the Trial

Court.”

61.Applying the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court to the

facts of the present case and as observed hereinabove, this Court

finds no reason whatsoever to doubt the credibility, consistency

and trustworthiness of the victim. The testimony of the victim is

further strengthened by the evidence of her mother Rajni Bharti

(PW-3) and grandfather Bhuru Bharti (PW-2). Their evidence

establishes the circumstances in which the victim disclosed the

incident and the subsequent lodging of the report. The learned

Trial Court has rightly found that the evidence of these witnesses

lends assurance to the version of the victim and supports the

prosecution case on material particulars.

62.The learned Trial Court has also correctly appreciated the

documentary evidence produced by the prosecution to establish

the age of the victim. The school records, duly proved by the

concerned witness, establish that the victim was below eighteen

33

years of age at the relevant point of time and was, therefore, a

"child" within the meaning of Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act. The

appellant has failed to produce any reliable documentary or oral

evidence to rebut the said finding recorded by the learned Trial

Court.

63.The medical evidence available on record has also been

considered by the learned Trial Court in its proper perspective.

The medical evidence, coupled with the ocular testimony of the

victim and other surrounding circumstances, provides necessary

assurance to the prosecution case. The learned Trial Court has

rightly appreciated that the prosecution evidence, when

considered as a whole, establishes the commission of the offence

by the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.

64.The law is well settled that in cases of sexual offences under the

POCSO Act, the testimony of the victim/victim assumes

paramount importance and can be made the sole basis of

conviction if it is found to be trustworthy and of sterling quality.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rai Sandeep @ Deenu (supra)

has laid down the test of a “sterling witness”, whose testimony

must be of such quality that it inspires implicit confidence and

does not suffer from any material infirmity. The victim in the

present case clearly satisfies this standard, her version being

consistent, natural and duly corroborated by medical and scientific

evidence. Further, in Alakh Alok Srivastava (supra), the Hon’ble

34

Supreme Court has emphasized that courts must deal with child

sexual abuse cases with utmost sensitivity and seriousness,

ensuring that the protective object of the POCSO Act is not diluted

by hyper-technical approaches. Similarly, in Nawabuddin (supra),

it has been reiterated that undue insistence on corroboration in

cases involving sexual offences against minors would defeat the

very object of the statute. Tested on the aforesaid principles, the

testimony of the victim in the present case stands fully established

and deserves acceptance in its entirety.

65.The defence plea of false implication raised by the appellant has

rightly been rejected by the learned Trial Court. Except making

suggestions during cross-examination and denying the allegations

in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., the

appellant has not produced any material evidence to substantiate

his defence. The prosecution, having established the foundational

facts, was entitled to the benefit of the statutory presumption

under Section 29 of the POCSO Act, and the appellant has failed

to rebut the same by any cogent evidence.

66.Upon an independent re-appreciation of the entire evidence

available on record, we find that the learned Trial Court has rightly

appreciated the testimony of the victim (PW-4), who has

categorically narrated the manner in which she was subjected to

repeated sexual assault by the appellant, who is none other than

her biological father. Her testimony is natural, consistent and

35

inspires confidence. Despite lengthy cross-examination, nothing

substantial could be elicited from her evidence to discredit her

version or to create any doubt regarding the occurrence of the

incident. The learned Trial Court has, therefore, rightly placed

reliance upon her testimony.

67. The evidence of the victim finds substantial corroboration from

the testimony of her mother Rajni Bharti (PW-3) and grandfather

Bhuru Bharti (PW-2). Their evidence establishes the

circumstances in which the victim disclosed the incident and the

subsequent lodging of the report. The prompt disclosure by the

victim and the consistent version of the prosecution witnesses

lend assurance to the prosecution case. The learned Trial Court

has rightly appreciated their evidence in its proper perspective

and has recorded findings based upon the same.

68.The prosecution has also successfully established the age of the

victim through the documentary evidence brought on record. The

school admission register, duly proved by the Headmaster (PW-

8), establishes that the date of birth of the victim was 18.08.2007

and, therefore, she was below eighteen years of age on the date

of occurrence. The said evidence remained unimpeached during

trial. The appellant has failed to produce any reliable documentary

or oral evidence to rebut the said finding. Thus, the learned Trial

Court has rightly held that the victim was a child within the

meaning of Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act.

36

69.The medical evidence and other documentary evidence available

on record have also been rightly considered by the learned Trial

Court while appreciating the prosecution case. Though the

medical evidence is not required to be treated as substantive

evidence in isolation, it provides necessary assurance to the

ocular testimony of the victim and the surrounding circumstances

proved by the prosecution. The entire evidence, when considered

cumulatively, establishes the commission of aggravated

penetrative sexual assault upon the minor victim by the appellant.

70.In view of the foregoing analysis, this Court finds itself in complete

agreement with the reasoning and conclusions arrived at by the

learned Trial Court. The prosecution has successfully established

its case beyond all reasonable doubt, and the appellant has failed

to rebut the statutory presumption or probabilise his defence in

any manner whatsoever.

71.Accordingly, having found no illegality, perversity or infirmity in the

findings recorded by the learned Trial Court, this Court affirms the

judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 20.09.2022

passed by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge,

FTSC (POCSO Act), Balodabazar (C.G.) in Special Sessions

Case (POCSO) No.45/2019. Consequently, the appeal preferred

by the appellant, being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. The

conviction recorded and sentence imposed by the learned Trial

Court shall remain undisturbed.

37

72.It is further stated at the Bar that the appellant is in jail. He shall

serve out the sentence as awarded by the learned Trial Court in

accordance with law.

73.Registry is directed to send a copy of this judgment to the

concerned Superintendent of Jail where the appellants are

undergoing their jail sentence to serve the same on the appellants

informing them that they are at liberty to assail the present

judgment passed by this Court by preferring an appeal before the

Hon’ble Supreme Court with the assistance of High Court Legal

Services Committee or the Supreme Court Legal Services

Committee.

74.Let a certified copy of this order alongwith the original record be

transmitted to trial Court concerned forthwith for necessary

information and action, if any.

Sd/- Sd/-

(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)

Judge Chief Justice

Anu

38

Head-Note

Testimony of the victim is vital and unless there are compelling

reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of her

statement, the Court should find no difficulty to act on the

testimony of the victim of sexual assault alone to convict an

accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to

be reliable.