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PETITIONER:

MINERVA MILLS LTD.

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

THEIR WORKERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT:

08/10/1953

BENCH:

MAHAJAN, MEHR CHAND

BENCH:

MAHAJAN, MEHR CHAND

MUKHERJEA, B.K.

JAGANNADHADAS, B.

CITATION:

1953 AIR 505 1954 SCR 465

CITATOR INFO :

E&D 1958 SC1018 (16,19)

ACT:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, ss. 7, 8, 10-Tribunal

constituted for fixed period-Constitution of new tribunal

for hearing cases not fully disposed of by previous

tribunal-Legality-Powers of State Government.

HEADNOTE:

Under Section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the

appropriate Government has ample power to constitute an

industrial tribunal for a fixed period of time and to

constitute a new tribunal on the expiry of that period, to

hear and dispose of all references made to the previous.

tribunal which had not been disposed of by that tribunal.

JUDGMENT:

APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 140 to 143 and

156 and 157 of 1953.

Appeals by special leave granted by the Supreme Court by

its Order dated the 23rd April, 1953, from the decision

dated the 19th December, 1952, of the Labour Appellate

Tribunal of India, Third Bench, Madras, in Appeals Nos.

Bom. 245/52, 246/52, 247/52 and 248/52.

466

C.K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India, (I. B.

Dadachanji, with him) for the appellants in all the appeals.

S.Mohan Kumaramangalam for the respondents in Civil

Appeals Nos. 140 to 143.

H. J. Umrigar for the respondents in Civil Appeals Nos.

156 and 157.

1953. October 8. The Judgment of the Court was delivered

by

MAHAJAN J.-The Government of Mysore by a notification

dated 15th June, 1951, under powers conferred by section 7

of the Industrial *Disputes Act, 1947, constituted an

Industrial Tribunal for a period of one year consisting of a

chairman and two members for the adjudication of industrial

disputes in accordance with the provisions of the Act. It

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appointed the following persons as chairman and members

thereof:-

Chairman : Rajadharmaprasakta

T. Singaravelu Mudaliar.

Members : Janab Mohamed Sheriff.

Sri S. Rangaramiah.

Two disputes between the management and the workers of

the Minerva Mills Ltd., Bangalore, and two other disputes

between the management and workers of the Mysore Spinning

and Manufacturing Co. Ltd., Bangalore, were referred to the

said Industrial Tribunal under section 10 (1) )c) of the Act

for adjudication. Several other disputes were also referred

for adjudication to the same tribunal. Till the 15th June,

1952, when the period of one year expired, the tribunal had

only disposed of 5 out of the 22 disputes referred to it. In

the four disputes with which we are concerned ,the tribunal

had only framed issues and had not proceeded to record any

evidence.

On 27th June, 1952, the Government by

another notification constituted another tribunal for

adjudication of these disputes and acting under section

10(1) (c) of the Act referred all the disputes left

undisposed of by the first tribunal to the newly constituted

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tribunal. This notification was not very happily worded and

has been the subject matter of a good deal of comment in the

courts below and also before us. It runs thus :-

"Whereas under Notification No. L.S. 1075-L.W. 68-51-2,

dated 15th June, 1951 an Industrial Tribunal for the

adjudication of industrial disputes in accordance with the

provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, was

constituted for a period of one year,

And whereas the said period of one year has expired

creating a vacancy in the office of both the chairman and

the two members, namely,

Chairman: Sri B. R. Ramalingiah.

Members : Janab Mohamad Sheriff.

Sri S. Rangaramiah.

Now therefore in exercise of the power conferred

under sections 7 and 8 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,

H.H. the Maharaja of Mysore is hereby pleased to constitute

an Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of industrial

disputes in the Mysore State in accordance with the

-provisions of the Act and further to appoint the following

persons as chairman and members thereof

Chairman Sri B. R. Ramalingiah.

Members Janab Mohamad Sheriff.

Sri K. Shamaraja Iyengar.

Under section 10 (1) (c) of the Industrial Disputes Act,

1947, H. H. the Maharaja is pleased to direct that the

tribunal now constituted under this notification shall hear

and dispose of all the references made to the previous

tribunal constituted under the notification of 15th June,

1951, and which have remained undisposed of on 15th June,

1952."

When the second tribunal proceeded to hear the four

disputes which are the subject matter of these appeals, the

employers raised a number of preliminary objections

regarding the jurisdiction of the tribunal to hear and

dispose of the disputes, the principal contentions being,

(1) that the time limit of one year fixed

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for die life of the first tribunal was unauthorized illegal

and therefore the first tribunal continued to exist in spite

of the expiry of that period; (2) that the Government could

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not withdraw the disputes referred to the first

tribunal,from it, so long as the members of the first

tribunal were available for discharging their duties and.

that section 8 had no application to the facts of this case

; and (3) that the trial of these disputes by the newly

constituted tribunal, even if,it had jurisdiction to

entertain them, could not be started from the stage at which

they were left by the first tribunal and should begin de

novo.

The employees contested these propositions and contended

that it was competent for the Government to constitute one

or more Industrial Tribunals under section 7 and it was open

to it to prescribe that these tribunals should function for

a limited period; that the notification dated the 27th June,

1952, was valid both under sections 7 and 8 of the Act and

the second tribunal was properly constituted and had

jurisdiction over the disputes referred to it under section

10 (1) (c) of the Act and that there was no need for a de

novo trial in law.

The second tribunal rejected the preliminary objections

raised by the employers and came to the conclusion that the

Government was competent to constitute the first tribunal

for a limited period, that the second tribunal was properly

constituted and that the references made were proper and

could be proceeded with from the stage at which the first

tribunal had left them. Against this order the employers

preferred appeals' to the Labour Appellate Tribunal, Nos.

245 to 248 of 1952. They also filed writ applications under

article, 226 of the Constitution of India before the Court,

C.P. Nos. 79 and 80 of 1952-53, for the issue of writs of

prohibition prohibiting the second tribunal from proceeding

with the adjudication of the four disputes, the subject

matter of the appeals. The points that arose for decision

in the appeals as well as in the writ applications were

substantially the same. In these circumstances the High

Court postponed hearing the

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writ applications till the appeals had been heard by the

Labour Appellate Tribunal.

The Labour Appellate Tribunal by its order dated 19th

December, 1952, dismissed all the 'appeals and subsequently

the High Court of Mysore by its order dated 25th March,

1953, also dismissed the writ applications. It, however,

granted the employers a certificate of leave to appeal to

this court. The employers filed applications for special

leave to appeal against the order of the Labour Appellate

Tribunal passed in the appeals before it, and this court

granted special leave to appeal by an order dated 23rd

April, 1953. The result is that we have four appeals now

before us against the order of the Labour Appellate

Tribunal, C.A. Nos. 140 to 143 of 1953 and two appeals

before us from the order of the High Court refusing the

application of the employers under article 226 of Constitu-

tion, C.A. Nos. 156 and 157 of 1953.

As all these appeals raise a common question of law they

can conveniently be disposed of by one judgment.

Mr. Daphtary, who appeared for the employers, contended

that the four disputes between the ,employers and employees

that were referred to the Industrial Tribunal constituted by

the notification of 15th June, 1951, were still in law

pending before that tribunal and it was that tribunal and

that tribunal alone that could adjudicate on them and give

its award on them and that the second tribunal constituted

by the notification of 27th June, 1952, had no jurisdiction

to entertain the references or to give any awards concerning

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them. It was contended that under the Industrial Disputes

Act there is no power in the Government for appointing a

tribunal for a limited duration, and that its power is only

to constitute a tribunal and to refer certain disputes to

it.

It is said that in the provisions of the Act it is

implicit that a tribunal once appointed can cease to

function only after the references made to, it have been

exhausted, i.e., after it has given its award. It

6-83 S.C. India/59.

470

was further urged that there is no power in the Government

once it has made a reference under section 10 of the Act to

withdraw it from the tribunal and to hand it over to another

tribunal. It was suggested that the members of the first

tribunal should be directed to hear those references and to

give their award. In our opinion, none of these contentions

can be sustained on the provisions of the Act Section 7 of

the Act provides as follows :

"The appropriate Government may constitute one or more

Industrial Tribunals for the adjudication of industrial

disputes in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

(2)A tribunal shall consist of such number of

independent members as the appropriate Government may think

fit to appoint, and where the tribunal consists of two or

more members, one of them shall be appointed as the chairman

thereof ..........".

Section 8 provides that if for any reason a vacancy

occurs in the office of the chairman or any other member of

a court or tribunal, the appropriate Government shall, in

the case of a chairman, and may, in the case of any other

member, appoint another independent person, in accordance

with the' provisions of section 6 or section 7, as the case

may be, to fill the vacancy, and the proceedings may be

continued before the court or the tribunal so reconstituted.

Section 7 does not restrict or limit the powers of the

Government in any manner and does not provide that a

tribunal cannot be constituted for a limited period or for

deciding a limited number of disputes. From the very nature

and purpose for which Industrial Tribunals are constituted

it is quite clear that such tribunals are not to be

constituted permanently. It is only when some industrial

disputes arise that such tribunals are constituted and

normally such tribunals function so long as the disputes

referred to them are not disposed of. But from this

circumstance it cannot be inferred that it is not open to

the Government to fix a time limit for the life of these

tribunals in order

471

to see that they function expeditiously and do not prolong

their own existence by acting in a dilatory manner. Mr.

Daphtary, however, contended that though the language of

section 7 was wide enough to include within its phraseology

a power in the Government to constitute tribunals for any

period of time it thought fit, this wide construction of its

language had been limited by the other provisions of the

Act. He made reference to the provisions of section 4 which

deals with conciliation officers. Sub-section (2) of

section 4 provides that a conciliation officer may be

appointed for a specified area or for specified industries

in a specified area or for one or more specified industries

and either permanently or for a limited period. It is

obvious that the nature of duties of conciliation officers

being of a different character, provision has been made

that they may be either appointed permanently or for a

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limited period. From these provisions it is difficult to

infer the same or a different intention regarding Industrial

Tribunals. They may well be appointed ad hoc for a

particular dispute. It was for this reason that no

restriction was placed on the powers of Government regarding

the constitution of tribunals, and Government was given very

wide discretion and it could appoint them for any limited

time or for a particular case or cases as it thought fit and

as the situation in a particular area or a particular case

demanded. Reference was then made to the provisions of

sections 15 to 20 of the Act for the proposition that once a

reference is made to a tribunal, the adjudication must be

,concluded by that tribunal and that tribunal alone must

give the award, and that the life of the tribunal cannot be

cut short between the date of the reference of the dispute

for adjudication and the date of the award. Section 15

provides that where an industrial dispute has been referred

to a Tribunal for adjudication, it shall hold its

proceedings expeditiously and shall, as soon as practicable,

on the conclusion thereof, submit its award to the

appropriate Government. We are unable to see that any

inference

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can be raised from the provisions of the section supporting

the contention of Mr. Daphtary. This is a provision

directing the tribunal to function expeditiously and give

its award as soon as possible. Section 20(3) is in these

terms

"Proceedings before a tribunal shall be deemed to have

commenced on the date of the reference of dispute for

adjudication and such -proceedings shall be deemed to have

concluded on the date on which the award becomes enforceable

under section 17-A."

This section lays down the date or the terminus a quo for

the termination and commencement of the proceedings. It is

difficult to see that it in any way cuts the power of the

Government to appoint a tribunal for a limited duration.

Reference was also made to the provisions of section 33

which relate to the conditions of service during the

pendency of the proceedings in adjudication. It is provided

therein that there shall be no change in the conditions of

service of the workmen pending adjudication. In our

opinion, the Labour Appellate Tribunal and the High Court

were right in holding that from these provisions it could

not be held that it was implicit in section 7 that the

Government could not withdraw a dispute referred to a

tribunal or make the appointment of a tribunal for a limited

period of time. In our opinion, under the provisions of

section 7, the appropriate Government has ample power of

constituting a tribunal for a limited time, intending

thereby that its life would automatically come to an end on

the expiry of that time. The contention therefore of Mr.

Daphtary that the notification appointing the first tribunal

for a period I of one year was illegal and that the first

tribunal continues to exist is without force. His further

contention that the Government could not withdraw the

dispute referred to the first tribunal so long as the

members of the first tribunal were available and could not

hand it over to the 'second tribunal cannot also be

sustained.

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