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Mithlesh Kumari and Anr. Vs. Fateh Bahadur Singh and Anr.

  Supreme Court Of India Civil Appeal /2597/1983
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Case Background

The petitioner brought the case to the Supreme Court wanted a clear decision to confirm their ownership, protect their rights, calculate any profits owed, and stop any future disputes.

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PETITIONER:

MITHLESH KUMARI AND ANR.

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

FATEH BAHADUR SINGH AND ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT22/02/1991

BENCH:

SAIKIA, K.N. (J)

BENCH:

SAIKIA, K.N. (J)

PUNCHHI, M.M.

CITATION:

1991 SCR (1) 699 1991 SCC (2) 236

JT 1991 (2) 75 1991 SCALE (1)313

ACT:

U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950-

Scope and object of.

U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950-

Section 3(8a)-Definition of 'fragment'-Addition-Purpose of.

U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950-

Sections 168-A, 167-Object, scope and application of-Sale of

fragments of a fragment to non-tenure holders-Whether hit by

the provisions.

HEADNOTE:

The respondent No. 1 sued the second respondent

(defendant No. 1) and the appellants (defendant Nos. 2 and

3) for specific performance of a contract whereunder the

second respondent had agreed to sell his lands to the first

respondent for Rs. 5,000 out of which Rs.4,000 were paid,

and the balance Rs.1,000 was to be paid within 5 years

whereafter the second respondent was to execute a sale deed

in favour of the first respondent.

The Munsif decreed the suit only for recovery of

Rs,4,850 plus pendente lite and future interest on Rs.4,000

and this order was confirmed by the Civil Judge by

dismissing the appeal of respondent No.1.

A second appeal was preferred to the High Court by

respondent N. 1 contending that the transfers in favour of

the appellants, by respondent No. 2 were void being in

contravention of Section 168-A of the U.P. Zamindari

Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950. The appellants

contested the appeal contending that for a transfer being

hit by Section 168-A of the Act should be in respect of a

specific piece of land and not a share in a holding and that

the transfers were of a portion of the shares of respondent

No. 1 in the disputed plot.

The High Court allowed the appeal holding that the two

transfers made were clearly hit by the provisions of Section

168-A(2) of the Act and that the benefit of Section 43 of

the Transfer of property Act could not be availed of by the

appellants as the sale deeds were void in the eye of law.

700

The appellant in their appeal to this Court contended

that the sale made by respondent No. 2 to the 2nd appellant

being hit by the provisions of Section 168-A of the Act, the

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subject matter of transfer got vested in the Government and

the interest of respondent No. 2 in that part of the holding

stood extinguished on the date of transfer and that the sale

being void, he was left only with the subject matter of

transfer, and that the respondent No. 2 having transferred

that whole portion to the first appellant by sale deed such

transfer being a transfer of the whole area it would be

covered by the proviso under Section 168-A and as such, the

sale would not be hit by the provisions of Section 168-A.

The first respondent contended that as the sale deeds

in favour of the two appellants have been held to be void,

the High Court rightly decreed the suit; that he having been

in possession of the land and the second respondent's

fragmented sales having been found to be void, even if the

land would vest in the State, the first respondent would not

be divested automatically and the State has to seek

possession in accordance with the law.

On the question as to what would be the effect of the

two fragmented sales in favour of the appellants, setting

aside the order of the High Court and remanding the matter,

this Court,

HELD: 1. The U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms

Act was passed as it was considered expedient to provide for

the abolition of the Zamindari system which involved

intermediaries between the tiller of the soil and the State

in Uttar Pradesh and for the acquisition of their rights,

title and interest and to reform the law relating to land

tenure consequent upon such abolition and acquisition and to

make provision for other matters connected therewith. [705E-

F]

2. The original Act did not define fragment. The

definition of 'fragment' was added by Section 2 of the U.P.

Act XVIII of 1956 with a view to prevent fragmentation and

promote consolidation of holdings in order to avoid

uneconomic units. [705F-G]

3. The object of the section 168-A(1) was to prevent

fragmentation of land situated in a conolidated area and

transfers that would result in fragmentation or further

fragmentation shall be void and to such transfers, Section

167 will mutatis mutandis be applicable, when a fragment

situated in a consolidated area is transferred. If transfer

of a fragment is made in favour of tenure-holder who has a

plot contiguous to the fragment, the purpose of law is not

defeated inasmuch as it will be

701

consolidated with the contiguous plot of the transferee.

When the land held by a person in a consolidated area is

already a fragment then as was provided previous to the

amendment in 1961 the whole of the plot to which the

fragment pertained was to be transferred. [708F-709A]

4. After the amendment, the invalidity and

applicability of Section 167 is limited to a case where the

transfer is not in favour of any such tenure-holder and to

the whole or so much of the plot in which the person has

bhumidhar rights which pertains to fragment is thereby

transferred. If the transferor has bhumidhari rights on the

whole of the fragment the whole has to be transferred. If

the person has bhumidhari rights only in a part of the plot

that part on which he has bhumidhari rights can be

transferred. The part on which the person has not

bhumidhari rights is not covered by the provisions not

because that would not result in further fragmentation but

because he had transferable bhumidhari rights only on that

portion and not on the other portion. [709A-C]

5. The substitution of the words "bhumidhar with

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transferable rights" for the word "bhumidhar" would not make

any difference when the bhumidhar had transferable rights

but would make a difference where the bhumidhar had also

lands with non-transferable rights. [710C-D]

6. Under the amended provisions the interest of a

bhumidhar with transferable rights in his holding or in part

thereof shall be extinguished when the holding or part

thereof with bhumidhar rights has been transferred or let

out in contravention of the provisions of the Act. In other

words, when he had bhumidhar rights on the entire holding

and the same is transferred or let out in contravention of

the provisions of the Act his interest shall be

extinguished. If he had bhumidhari rights only on a part

thereof and it has been transferred or let out in

contravention of the provisions of the Act his interest in

bhumidhari rights in that part shall be extinguished. The

reason behind the provision to make fragmentation is the

need to prevent further fragmentation if the bhumidhar with

his bhumidhari rights over a fragment tries to transfer the

fragment, his right over the fragment is extinguished.

[710D-E]

7. In the instant case, the bhumidhar respondent No.

2's land measuring 10 bighas, 12 biswas and 10 biswansis was

a fragment. He entered into an agreement to sell the land

on 5.4.1966 and the first respondent on payment of advance

of Rs.4,000 is stated to have had possession of the land.

That sale would attract the provisions of Section

702

168-A, if it resulted in transfer of the fragment. The

sales to the appellant No. 1 was dated 2.9.1966 and to

appellant No. 2 was dated 21.12.1966. These two sales would

be convered by the old provisions of sections 166 and 167,

which section did not deal with the case of bhumidhar but

only by sirdar or asami. But section 168-A would be

attracted and the provisions of Section 167 would mutatis

mutandis be applicable. [710G-711B]

8. The High Court did not examine the facts of the case

in light of the laws prevailing at the time. Festination

justiate est noverea informateeni. Hasty justice is step-

mother of misfortune. Injustuim est nisitota lege inspecta,

de una aliqua ejus particula proposita judicare vel

respondere. It is unjust to decide or respond to any

particular part of a law without examining the whole of the

law. [711B, 711D-E]

JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2597 of

1983.

From the Judgment and Order dated the 27th October,

1980 of the Allahabad High Court in Second Appeal No. 567 of

1973.

K.V. Vishwanathan, S.R. Setia, K.V. Venkataraman and

C.S. Vaidyanathan for the Appellants.

Yogeshwar Prasad, P.K. Bajaj, Ms. Rachna Gupta, Ms.

Rani Chhabra for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

K.N. SAIKIA, J. This appeal is from the Judgment of the

Allahabad High Court dated 27.10.1980 in Second Appeal No.

567 of 1973 allowing the appeal and decreeing the suit of

the first respondent for specific performance of contract

dated 5.4.1966, wherein it was stipulated that the defendant

No. 1 (second respondent) had executed a fictitious sale

deed dated 2.9.1966 for Rs.1,000 in favour of defendant No.

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2 Kalawati, in respect of half of the suit chak and another

sale deed dated 21.12.1966 for Rs.2,000 in favour of

defendant No.3 Mithilesh Kumari. Accordingly the plaintiff

(first respondent) prayed for directing the defendants 2 & 3

(appellants herein) to execute the required sale deed in

case it was not possible for the court to get it executed by

defendant No. 1.

The first respondent Feteh Bahadur sued the second

respondent

703

Jang Bahadur and the appellants in O.S. No. 278 of 1970, for

specific performance of his contract whereunder the second

respondent Jang Bahadur had agreed to sell his chak No. 249

admeasuring 10 bighas, 12 biswas and 10 biswansis to the

first respondent of Rs. 5,000 out of which Rs. 4,000 were

paid and the balance Rs. 1,000 to be paid within 5 years

whereafter second respondent Jang Bahadur was to execute a

sale deed in favour of the first respondent Fateh Bahadur.

The Court of Munsif, Fatehpur decrced the suit only for

recovery of Rs. 4,850 plus pendent lite and future interest

on Rs. 4,000. Fateh Bahadur's apeal therefrom having been

dismissed by the Civil Judge he preferred second appeal No.

567 of 1973 in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad,

contending that the transfers in favour of defendant NOs. 2

& 3, the appellants herein, by Jang Bahadur were in

contravention of the provision of Section 168-A of the U.P.

Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (U.P. Act No.

1 of 1951) hereinafter referred to as `the Act', and thus

were void and that the view taken by the lower court that

the title of Jang Bahadur came to an end since void

transfers were made in favour of appellants Kalawati and

Mithlesh Kumari, and thus, Jang Bahadur was no longer the

holder of any title which could be conveyed to Fateh Bahadur

was erroneous in law. Reliance was placed on a decision of

the High Court in Parmanand v. Board of Revenue, U.P.,

Allahabad reported in 1966 ALJ 963. The defendants 2 & 3 who

are appellants herein, contended that the two transfers made

by Jang Bahadur in their favour were not hit by the

provision of Section 168-A of the Act inasmuch as the

transfers were of a portion of the shares of Jang Bahadur

in the plot in dispute. It was urged that for a transfer

being hit by provision of Section 168-A of the Act the same

should be in respect of a specific piece of land and not a

share in a holding. Reliance was placed on a decision of the

same High Court in Bibhuti v. Kashi Ram, 1977 AWC 491.

It was not disputed that the area of land transferred

under the two sale deeds in favour of appellants Kalawati

and Mithlesh Kumari amounted to fragments under the Act. The

High Court considered the question as to whether a transfer

which had been made not of the entire share of a holder in a

holding but of a fragment would be hit by the provisions of

Section 168-A of the Act and took the view that the two

transfers made in favour of Kalawati and Mithlesh Kumari

were clearly hit by the provisions of Section 168-A of the

Act in view of the provisions of sub-clause (2) of that

section and that the benefit of Kalawati and Mithlesh Kumari

only if the sale deeds executed in their favour could be

looked into and as those sale deeds were void in the

704

eye of law it would be presumed as if no legal transfer took

place in their favour and there being no legal transfer no

question of applicability of Section 43 of the Transfer of

Property Act arose. As Jang Bahadur executed the agreement

of sale in favour of Fateh Bahadur and as the sale deeds in

favour of Kalawati and Mithlesh Kumar were held to have

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been void, Fateh Bahadur, according to the High Court, was

entitled to a decree of specific performance against

Kalawati and Mithlesh Kumari on payment of Rs. 1,000 within

a period 2 months from the date of receipt of the record in

the trial court failing which the court would execute the

sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. The appeal was

accordingly allowed and the suit decreed as above.

Mr. K.V. Vishwanathan, the learned counsel for the

appellants submits that the sale made by Jang Bahadur to the

2nd appellant Kalawati on 2.9.1966 being hit by the

provisions of Section 168-A of the Act the subject matter of

transfer i.e. 5 bighas, 6 biswas and 5 biswansis of Plot No.

249 in village Kichakpur got vested in the Government and

the interest of Jang Bahadur in that part of the holding

stood extinguished on the date of transfer i.e. 2.9.1966;

that the sale made to Kalawati being void, Jang Bahadur was

left only with 5 bighas, 6 biswas and 5 biswansis in Plot

No. 249 of village Kichakpur. Jang Bahadur having

transferred that whole or entire portion to the first

appellants Mithlesh Kumari by sale deed dated 21.12.1966

such transfer being a transfer of the whole area of the

Bhumidhar it would be covered by the proviso under Section

168-A and as such, the sale would not be hit by the

provisions of Section 168-; that Sections 166, 167,168, 168-

A and 189 (aa) form a scheme and if the sale is hit by the

provision of 168-A, the result would be that on the date of

sale, the interest of the vendor in the subject matter of

sale would stand extinguished under Section 189 (aa) and

hence 189 (aa) is the provision which extinguishes the right

of the vendor in that part of the holding which he

contracted to sell in violation of Section 168-A and that

the interest of the transferee would stand extinguished

under Sections 167 & 168 when the Gaon Sabha or the

landholder ejects the transferee from the premises.

According to counsel, harmoniously construing Sections 168

and 189(aa), it would be amply clear that while 189(aa)

extinguishes the interest of the vendor on that part of the

property which he contracted to sell in violation of 168-A

on the date of transfer itself, the interest of the

transferee would be extinguished on ejectment from the suit

premises; and the High Court erred in directing the

appellants to specifically execute the sale deed in favour

of the first respondent.

Ms. Rachna Gupta, the learned counsel for the first

respondent.

705

submits that as the sale deeds in favour of the two

appellants have been held to be void the High Court rightly

decreed the suit for specific performance against them on

payment of the balance or Rs.1,000 and that he having been

in possession of the land and the second respondent's

fragmented sales having been found to be void, even if the

land would vest in the State, the first respondent would not

be divested automatically and the State has to seek

possession in accordance with the law.

The only question that falls for determination is what

would be the effect of the two fragmented sales in favour of

the appellants. In other words, whether as a result of the

two sales the entire holding of the bhumidhar Jang Bahadur

would vest in the State or only the half in the first sale

would vest in the State and the remaining half would

thereafter constitute the whole in the hand of the bhumidhar

Jang Bahadur and the second sale being of the whole of his

remnant holding would be valid so as to convey and transfer

right to the vendee Mithlesh Kumari.

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There is no dispute that the land of 10 bighas, 12

biswas and 10 biswansis was itself a fragment as defined in

clause 8(a) of Section 3 of the Act being less than 3.125

acres. There is also no dispute that the suit land is in a

consolidated area and that the appellants were not tenure-

holders. It would, therefore, follow that the two halves

sold to the appellants were fragments of a fragment.

The Act was passed as it was considered expedient to

provide for the abolition of the Zamindari system which

involved intermediaries between the tiller of the soil and

the State in Uttar Pradesh and for the acquistion of their

rights, title and interest and to reform the law relating to

land tenure consequent upon such abolition and acquisition

and to make provision for other matters connected therewith.

The original Act did not define fragment. The definition of

`fragment' was added by Section 2 of the U.P. Act XVIII of

1956 with a view to prevent fragmentation and promote

consolidation of holdings in order to avoid uneconomic

units. Sections 152 to 175 of the Act dealt with transfer.

Section 152 provided:

"The interest of a bhumidhar with tranferable

rights shall subject to the conditions hereinafter

contained, be transferable.

(2) Except otherwise expressly permitted by this

Act or

706

any other law for the time being in force, the

interest of a bhumidhar with non-transferable

rights shall not be transferable.

(3) A bhumidhar referred to in sub-section (2)

may, in such circumstances as may be prescribed,

mortgage, without possessions his interest in his

holding, as security for a loan taken from the

State Government by way of taqavi, or from a

cooperative society or from the State Bank of

India, or from any other bank, which is a scheduled

bank within the meaning of clause (e) of Section 2

of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934, or from the

Uttar Pradesh State, Agro-Industrial Corporation

Limited, and may also transfer by way of gift, the

interest in his holding, except the part thereof

which has been so mortgaged, to a recognised

educational institution for any purpose connected

with instructions in agriculture, horticulture and

animal husbandry."

The interests of sirdar or asami were originally not

transferable as Section 153 said: "Except as expressly

permitted by this Act, the interest of a sirdar and asami

shall not be transferable." Sections 154 to 170 dealt with

transfer of land by bhumidhar. Section 166 originally

provided that any transfer made by or an behalf of a sirdar

or asami in contravention of the provisions of that chapter

was to be void. Section 166 has undergone amendments. The

section was substituted by the present section by U.P. Act

No. XX of 1982 with effect from 3.6.1981. The present

section says: "Every transfer made in contravention of the

provisions of this Act shall be void." What was the

position in 1966 on the dates of the instant sales has to be

known and correctly applied. Section 167 earlier provided

for the consequences of void transfers in the following

language:

167. (1) Where a sirdar or asami has made any

transfer in contravention of the provision of this

Act, the transferee and every person who may have

thus obtained possession of the whole or part of

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the holding shall be liable to ejectment on the

suit of the Gaon Sabha or the landholder, as the

case may be.

(2) A decree for ejectment under sub-section (1)

may direct the ejectment of the sirdar or asami

from the whole or part of the holding as the Court

may, having regard to

707

the circumstances of the case, direct."

This section was also substituted by the same Act No. XX of

1982 with effect from 3.6.1981. Section 167 now says:

"167.(1) the following consequences shall ensue in respect

of every transfer which is void by virtue of Section 166,

namely-

(a) the subject-matter of transfer shall with

effect from the date of transfer, be deemed to have

vested in the State Government free from all

encumbrances;

(b) the trees, crops and wells existing on the

land on the date of transfer shall, with effect

from the said date, be deemed to have vested

in the State Government free from all encumbrances;

(c) the transferee may remove other movable

property or the materials of any immovable property

existing on such land on the date of transfer

within such time as may be prescribed.

(2) Where any land or other property has vested in

the State Government under sub-section (1), it

shall be lawful for the Collector to take over

possession over such land or other property

and to direct that any person occupying such

land or property be evicted therefrom. For

the purposes of taking over such possession or

evicting such unauthorised occupants, the

Collector may use or cause to be used such force as

may be necessary."

The position before the amendment has been shown to us

to enable us to apply the relevant law to the facts of the

case. Section 168 which dealt with consequences of

ejectment under Section 167 has been omitted by U.P. Act No.

VIII of 1977 with effect from 28.1.1977. What was the

provision in 1966 is not clear to us. We are told that the

section stood as follows in 1966: "S. 168.-Consequences of

ejectment under section 167. All the rights and interests

of the sirdar and asami upon ejectment in a suit under

section 167 in the holding (or part thereof) or in any

improvement made therein or to get compensation for such

improvements shall be extinguished." But we have not been

shown the enactment.

708

Section 168-A was added by Section 9 of U.P. Act XVIII

of 1956, subject to the saving contained in Section 23

thereof. This section now says:

"168-A. Transfer of fragments.-Notwithstanding the

provisions of any law for the time being in force, no

person shall transfer whether by sale, gift or

exchange any fragment situate in a consolidated area

except where the transfer is in favour of tenure-

holder who has a plot contiguous to the fragment or

where the transfer is not in favour of any such

tenure-holder the whole or so much of the plot in

which person has bhumidhari rights, which pertains to

the fragment is thereby transferred.

(2) The transfer of any land contrary to the

provisions of sub-section (1) shall be void.

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(3) When a bhumidhar has made any transfer in

contravention of the provisions of sub-section (1)

the provisions of Section 167 shall mutatis mutandis

apply."

Section 168-A has undergone amendment by Section 2 of U.P.

Act XXVIII of 1961 when for the words "whole of the plot to

which the fragment pertains is hereby transferred", the

present words "the whole or so much of the plot in which the

person has bhumidhari rights which pertains to the fragment

is hereby transferrd" were substituted. This amendment

would not affect the instant case. Some words between `167'

and `shall' were omitted by U.P. Act XIII of 1977, with

effect from 28.1.1977. It may be necessary to know what

those were. Sub-section (1) of Section 168-A begins with a

non-obstante clause and it over-rides the provisions of any

law for the time being in force. The expession `no

person' would include the bhumidhar. The object of the

section is to prevent fragmentation of land situated in a

consolidated area and transfers that would result in

fragmentation or further fragmentation shall be void and to

such transfers Section 167 will mutatis mutandis be

applicable. This section comes into play only when a

fragment situated in a consolidated area is transferred. If

transfer of a fragment is made in favour of tenure-holder

who has a plot contiguous to the fragment, the purpose of

law is not defeatd inasmuch as it will be consolidated with

the contiguous plot of the transferee. When the land held

by a person in a consolidated area is already a fragment

then as was provided previous to the amendment in 1961 the

whole of the plot to which the fragment pertained was to be

709

transferred. After the amendment, the invalidity and

applicability of Section 167 is limited to a case where the

transfer is not in favour of any such tenure-holder and to

the whole or so much of the plot in which the person has

bhumidhari rights which pertains to the fragment is thereby

transferred. If the transferor had bhumidhari rights on the

whole of the fragment the whole has to be transferred. If

the person has bhumidhari rights only in a part of the plot

that part on which he has bhumidhari rights can be

transferred. The part on which the person has not

bhumidhari rights is not covered by the provisions not

because that would not result in further fragmentation but

because he had transferable bhumidhari rights only on that

portion and not on the other portion. There is no doubt

that under sub-section (2) transfer of any land countrary to

the provisions of sub-section (1) shall be void and under

sub-section (3) the provisions of section 167 shall mutatis

mutandis apply.

Section 189 deals with extinction of the interest of a

bhumidhar with transferable rights and Section 190 deals

with extinction of the interest of a bhumidhar with non-

transferable rights. Section 189 earlier provided:

"189. The interest of a bhumidhar in his holding or

any part thereof shall be extinguished-

(a) when he died intestate leaving no heir

entitled to inherit in accordance with the provisions

of this Act;

(b) when the land compromised in the holding has

been acquired under any law for the time being in

force relating to the acquisition of land, or

(c) when he has been deprived of possession and

his right to recover possession is barred by

limitation"

The words "bhumidhar with transferable rights" were

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substituted in the first sentence by U.P. Act XVIII of 1977

with effect from 28.1.1977. Clause (aa) was added by

Section 50 of U.P. Act XXXVII of 1958, so that the amended

section now reads:

"189. Extinction of the interest of a bhumidhar with

transferable rights.-The interest of a bhumidhar with

transferable rights in his holding or any part

thereof shall be extinguished-

710

(a) when he dies intestate leaving no heir

entitled to inherit in accordance with the provisions

of this Act;

(aa) when the holding or part thereof has been

transferred or let out in contravention of the

provisions of this Act;

(b) when the land comprised in the holding has

been acquired under any law for the time being in

force relating to the acquisition of land; or

(c) when he has been deprived of possession and

this right to recover possession is barred by

limitation."

The substitution of the words "bhumidhar with transferable

right" for the word "bhumidhar" would not make any

difference when the bhumidhar had transferable rights but

would make a difference where the bhumidhar has also lands

with non-transferable rights. Thus, under the amended

provisions the interest of a bhumidhar with transferable

rights in his holding or in part thereof shall be

extinguished when the holding or part thereof with

bhumidhari rights has been transferred or let out in

contravention of the provisions of the Act. In other words

when he had bhumidhari rights on the entire holding and the

same is transferred or let out in contravention of the

provisions of the Act his interest shall be extinguished.

If he had bhumidhari right only on a part thereof and it has

been transferred or let out in contravention of the

provisions of the Act his interest in bhumidhari right in

that part shall be extinguished. The reason behind the

provisions to make fragmentation is the need to prevent

further fragmentation if the bhumidhar with his bhumidhari

rights over a fragment tries to transfer the fragment, his

right over the fragment is extinguished. Will the same by

the result if instead of transferring the entire fragment he

transfers a fragment of a fragment? If only a fragment of a

fragment is so transferred would the whole fragment be

vested in State?

Applying the law to the facts of the case in hand we

find that the bhumidhar Jang Bahadur's land admeasuring 10

bighas, 12 biswas and 10 biswansis was itself admittedly a

fragment. Jang Bahadur entered into an agreement to sell

the land on 5.4.1966 and the first respondent Fateh Bahadur

on payment of advance of Rs. 4000 is stated to have had

possession of the land. That sale would attract the

provisions of Section 168-A if it resulted in transfer of

the fragment. The sales to the appellants. Kalawati

defendant No. 2 was dated 2.9.1966 and to Mith-

711

lesh Kumari defendant No. 3 was dated 21.12.1966. These two

sales would be covered by the old provisions of sections 166

and 167, which sections did not deal with the case of

bhumidhar but only by sirdar or asami. But Section 168-A

would be attracted and the provisions of Section 167 would

mutatis mutandis be applicable.

The High Court did not examine the facts of the case in

light of the laws prevailing at the time of the sales. If

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 10

the sales were in contravention of the provisions of law so

as to entail invalidity of the sale and vesting of the land

sold in the State, the question whether in such a case

specific performance of the contract would be justified or

not would also be germane. While holding both the sales to

the appellants to have been void, the High Court did not

take into consideration the exception as to transfer of "the

whole or so much of the plot in which the person has

bhumidhari rights." The High Court also failed to notice

and apply clause (aa) of Section 189 which was added by

Section 50 of U.P. Act XXXVII of 1958 and was applicable to

the case.

Festinatio justitiae est noverea informateeni. (Hob.

97) Hasty justice is stepmother of misfortune. Injustum est

nisi tota lege inspecta, de una aliqua ejus particula

proposita judicare vel respondere. It is unjust to decide

or respond to any particular part of a law without examining

the whole of the law. But we are in time constraint. By

consensus with the learned counsel for the parties, we set

aside the impugned order and remand this case to the High

Court for disposal in accordance with the law applicable to

the facts of the case expeditiously. The appeal is disposed

of accordingly. We leave the parties to bear their own

costs.

V.P.R. Appeal disposed of.

712

Reference cases

Description

Case Analysis: Mithlesh Kumari & Anr. vs. Fateh Bahadur Singh & Anr. (1991)

The landmark Supreme Court judgment in Mithlesh Kumari & Anr. vs. Fateh Bahadur Singh & Anr. is a critical exposition on the intricacies of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, particularly concerning the rules against the transfer of land fragments. This pivotal case, now authoritatively documented on CaseOn, highlights the judicial expectation for a thorough and holistic interpretation of statutes, cautioning against hasty conclusions that overlook the complex interplay of legal provisions. It serves as an essential precedent for property law disputes arising from land consolidation areas in Uttar Pradesh.

Case Background: A Tangled Web of Agreements and Sales

The dispute originated from a simple agreement that spiraled into a complex legal battle involving multiple parties and void transactions. The facts unfolded as follows:

The Initial Agreement for Sale

The second respondent, Jang Bahadur, owned a plot of land measuring 10 bighas, 12 biswas, and 10 biswansis. This plot was legally classified as a 'fragment' under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 ('the Act'), as its area was below the prescribed minimum. On April 5, 1966, Jang Bahadur entered into an agreement to sell this entire fragment to the first respondent, Fateh Bahadur Singh, for Rs. 5,000. Fateh Bahadur paid an advance of Rs. 4,000 and took possession of the land, with the remaining balance to be paid upon the execution of the sale deed.

The Problematic Subsequent Transfers

Before finalizing the sale with Fateh Bahadur, Jang Bahadur executed two separate sale deeds for the same property in favour of the appellants:

  1. On September 2, 1966, he sold half of the land to Kalawati (appellant no. 2).
  2. On December 21, 1966, he sold the other half to Mithlesh Kumari (appellant no. 1).

These transactions were problematic because they involved the sale of a 'fragment of a fragment', directly contravening the Act's objective of preventing further land fragmentation.

The Legal Journey to the Supreme Court

Fateh Bahadur filed a suit for specific performance of his original contract. The trial court (Munsif) and the first appellate court denied specific performance, only allowing for the recovery of the advance money. However, on second appeal, the Allahabad High Court reversed this decision. It held that the sales to the appellants were void under Section 168-A of the Act. Consequently, the High Court decreed the suit for specific performance in favour of Fateh Bahadur. Aggrieved by this order, the appellants, Mithlesh Kumari and Kalawati, brought the matter before the Supreme Court of India.

Legal Analysis: The IRAC Framework

The Supreme Court's review did not focus on the merits but on the methodological flaws in the High Court's judgment. The analysis can be broken down using the IRAC method.

Issue: The Central Legal Question

The primary issues before the Supreme Court were:

  • What is the legal effect of a transfer made in contravention of Section 168-A of the Act, which prohibits the sale of land fragments?
  • If the first sale of a part of the fragment is deemed void, does the seller’s interest in that portion extinguish, thereby making the remaining land his 'whole' holding for the purpose of a subsequent sale?
  • Can a court grant a decree of specific performance against transferees whose own title deeds are void in the eyes of the law?

Rule: The Governing Legal Principles

The case revolved around a few critical sections of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, as they existed in 1966:

  • Objective of the Act: The primary goal was to abolish the Zamindari system, reform land tenure, and, crucially, prevent the fragmentation of agricultural holdings to maintain economic viability.
  • Section 168-A: This section explicitly prohibits the transfer (by sale, gift, or exchange) of any fragment located in a consolidated area. The key exceptions were if the transfer was of the whole plot or made in favour of a tenure-holder of a contiguous plot.
  • Section 167: This provision outlined the consequences of a void transfer. It stated that upon such a transfer, the subject matter would be deemed to have vested in the State Government, free from all encumbrances.
  • Section 189(aa): A crucial provision that the High Court overlooked, this section deals with the extinguishment of the interest of a bhumidhar (landholder). It stipulated that the landholder's interest in a holding (or part thereof) shall be extinguished when it has been transferred in contravention of the Act.

Analysis: The Supreme Court's Deliberation

The Supreme Court heavily critiqued the High Court's judgment for its lack of depth. It found that the High Court had acted with undue haste, failing to appreciate the complex statutory scheme. The appellants had put forth a clever argument: the first sale to Kalawati was void under Section 168-A. As a consequence of this void sale, Jang Bahadur's interest in that portion was extinguished under Section 189(aa), and the land vested in the state. The remaining land, therefore, constituted his *entire* holding. Consequently, the second sale to Mithlesh Kumari was of his 'whole' property and should be considered valid under the exception in Section 168-A.

The Supreme Court noted that this intricate argument required a careful and harmonious construction of Sections 168-A, 167, and 189(aa). The High Court had simply declared both sales void without considering their sequential effect or the applicability of all relevant provisions. The Court used powerful Latin maxims to underscore its point:

  • Festinatio justitiae est noverea informateeni — Hasty justice is the stepmother of misfortune.
  • Injustum est nisi tota lege inspecta, de una aliqua ejus particula proposita judicare vel respondere — It is unjust to decide or respond to any particular part of a law without examining the whole of the law.

For legal professionals navigating the nuances of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, understanding precedents like this is crucial. CaseOn.in simplifies this with 2-minute audio briefs, offering quick, insightful analysis of complex rulings for on-the-go learning.

Conclusion: A Remand for Meticulous Re-evaluation

The Supreme Court did not provide a definitive ruling on the merits of the case. Instead, it set aside the High Court's judgment due to its superficial analysis. The case was remanded back to the High Court with a clear directive: to re-examine the matter thoroughly, taking into account all relevant legal provisions of the Act as they existed in 1966 and to deliver a well-reasoned decision based on a complete examination of the law.

Final Summary of the Judgment

In essence, the Supreme Court's decision in Mithlesh Kumari is a procedural and jurisprudential lesson. It champions the principle of comprehensive judicial review over summary justice. The core takeaway is that in cases involving complex, socio-economic legislation like land reform laws, courts must meticulously analyze the entire statutory framework, including amendments and related provisions, to ensure that the legislative intent is upheld and justice is served. The judgment stands as a powerful reminder that the 'how' of a judicial decision is just as important as the 'what'.

Why is this Judgment Important for Lawyers and Students?

  • For Lawyers: This judgment is a masterclass in statutory interpretation and the importance of historical legal research. It demonstrates that one must argue a case based on the law as it stood at the time of the cause of action. It also highlights the strategic value of weaving together different sections of an Act to build a cohesive argument.
  • For Law Students: It is a perfect illustration of judicial caution, the appellate process, and the role of the Supreme Court in ensuring lower courts adhere to high standards of legal reasoning. The case effectively explains why land reform laws are strict and how their socio-economic objectives (preventing fragmentation) influence judicial interpretation.

Disclaimer: This article is intended for informational and educational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice. For advice on any specific legal issues, you should consult with a qualified legal professional.

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