[2026:RJ-JP:36945-DB]

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN

BENCH AT JAIPUR

D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 675/2025

CNR: RJHC020026802025 | URN: CW / 1569U / 2025

M/s Ridhiraj Builders And Promoters, Through Its Authorized Signatory

Mr. Pradeep Jain Having Its Office At 166, First Floor, Slc Tower,

Amrapali Marg, Vaishali Nagar, Jaipur- Rajasthan.

----Petitioner

Versus

1. State Of Rajasthan, Through Labour Commissioner, Having Its

Office At Shram Bhawan, Shanti Nagar, Khatipura Road,

Hasanpura, Jaipur.

2. Joint Divisional Labour Commissioner- Cum- Assessing Officer,

Office Of Divisional Joint Labour Commissioner, Shanti Nagar,

Hasan Pura, Jaipur, Rajasthan.

3. The Appellate Authority-Cum- Labour Commissioner, Shram

Bhawan, Shanti Nagar, Khatipura Road, Hasanpura, Jaipur.

4. The District Collector, Collectorate, Bani Park, Jaipur.

5. Union Of India, Through Secretary, Ministry Of Labour And

Employment, Government Of India, Shram Shakti Bhawan, Rafi

Marg, New Delhi.

----Respondents

Connected with –

D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 16679/2022 ; D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.

18564/2022 ; D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 507/2023 ; D.B. Civil Writ

Petition No.629/2023; D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1036/2023 ;D.B. Civil

Writ Petition No. 1415/2023 ; D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 6571/2023 ;

D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 6672/2023; D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.

8584/2023 ; D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3616/2024

D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4254/2024 ; D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.

6843/2024; D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 6888/2024; D.B. Civil Writ

Petition No. 10215/2024 ; D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10219/2024 ;

D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10220/2024; D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.

10223/2024; D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 13511/2024 ; D.B. Civil Writ

Petition No. 13761/2024 ; D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 14769/2024 ;D.B.

Civil Writ Petition No. 19357/2024 ;D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 676/2025

;D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1015/2025 ; D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.

2399/2025 ; D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2400/2025; D.B. Civil Writ

Petition No. 2401/2025 ; D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 7648/2026.

:

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For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Nitesh Kumar Bagri

Ms. Shretima Bagri

Mr. Madhusudan Purohit

Ms. Alankrita Sharma

Mr. Pranjul Chopra

Ms. Priyanshi Katta

Mr. Kamal Suthar

Mr. Hitesh Soni

Mr. Rachit Sharma

For Respondent(s) : Ms. Mahi Yadav, AAG with

Ms. Chelsi Agarwal, AAAG

Mr. Bharat Vyas, ASG

Mr. Devesh Yadav for UOI

Mr. Rakesh Choudhary

Ms. Shikha Sharma for

Mr. G.S. Gill

Mr. C.S. Sinha

Mr. Lokesh Choudhary

Mr. Kuldeep Singh Rathore

Mr. Vaibhav,

Mr. Nirmal and

Mr. Lakshya Sharma for

Mr. Rahul Kamwar

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN MONGA

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANEESH SHARMA

Order

Pronounced on : 15/ 09/2026

Reportable

Per: Arun Monga, J.

1. Since the issues arising in this bunch of writ petitions

1

are

identical, i.e., challenging, inter alia, Rule 14(2)(b) of the Building

and Other Construction Workers' Welfare Cess Rules, 1996, all

the petitions are being decided by this common order.

2. For the sake of brevity, the facts and recitals are taken from D.B.

Civil Writ Petition No. 675/2025, titled as above, i.e., M/s Ridhiraj

Builders And Promoters v. State of Rajasthan &Ors. This writ

petition raises three distinct challenges. They rest upon wholly

different foundations and are therefore dealt with separately.

3. First, the petitioner assails the constitutional validity of Rule 14(2)

(b) of the Building and Other Construction Workers' Welfare Cess

1

As per the schedule attached.

[2026:RJ-JP:36945-DB] (3 of 25) [CW-675/2025]

Rules, 1998, hereinafter referred to as the Rules of 1998. The

Rule requires that an appeal be accompanied by a certificate of

the Cess Collector certifying that the entire amount of cess or

penalty or both relating to the appeal has been deposited. The

petitioner contends that the Rule is ultra vires the rule making

power conferred by Section 14 of the Building and Other

Construction Workers' Welfare Cess Act, 1996, hereinafter

referred to as the Act of 1996, and that it offends Articles 14, 19

and 21 of the Constitution.

4. Secondly, the petitioner assails the assessment order dated

03.09.2021 passed by the Joint Divisional Labour Commissioner

cum Assessing Officer. Two grounds are urged. The first is that the

order was passed without service of notice and without any

opportunity of hearing. The second is that interest has been levied

from the year 2011, that is to say, for a period anterior to the

assessment itself, which is said to be impermissible under Section

8 of the Act of 1996.

5. Thirdly, the petitioner assails the penalty order dated 30.09.2022,

by which penalty equivalent to the assessed cess was imposed. It

is said to be consequential upon an assessment which is itself

void, and to have been passed without hearing.

6. A fourth prayer is ancillary. The petitioner seeks a direction to the

Appellate Authority to entertain and decide its statutory appeal

under Section 11 of the Act of 1996 without insisting upon

compliance with Rule 14(2)(b) of the Rules of 1998.

PART I. FACTS

7.The petitioner constructed a residential project known as "Riddhiraj

Enclave" at D-182, Block-D, Hanuman Nagar, Vaishali Nagar, Jaipur.

According to the record of the respondents, construction

commenced in the year 2013 and was completed in the year 2017.

7.1For the purpose of assessment of labourcess, the respondents

issued show cause notices dated 20.09.2019 and 16.10.2019

calling upon the petitioner to appear and to produce the layout

plan, the estimated cost of construction, the dates of

commencement and completion of the work, and other relevant

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documents. The petitioner asserts that the notice dated 20.09.2019

was never served and that the respondents' own note sheet bears

this out. The respondents assert, equally categorically, that both

notices were duly served and that the note sheets establish

service. This is a disputed question of fact.

7.2On 03.09.2021 the Joint Divisional Labour Commissioner cum

Assessing Officer passed an order of assessment. The cost of

construction was estimated at approximately Rs.3,50,14,000/-,

computed at the rate of Rs.1,000/- per square foot, and cess was

assessed at Rs.3,50,140/-. Interest was levied from the year 2011.

The petitioner disputes both the rate applied, contending that the

applicable notification prescribes Rs.750/- per square foot for

residential construction and Rs.1,000/- per square foot for

commercial construction, and the levy of interest from a date

preceding the assessment.

7.3Notices dated 09.06.2022 and 12.09.2022 were thereafter issued

calling upon the petitioner to deposit the assessed amount, failing

which recovery was proposed. By order dated 30.09.2022, penalty

equivalent to the amount of cess was imposed. A recovery notice

dated 24.03.2023 followed. The petitioner states that it became

aware of the proceedings only when the recovery authorities visited

its office.

7.4The petitioner sought to prefer a statutory appeal under Section 11

of the Act of 1996 against both orders. The appeal was not

entertained for want of the certificate contemplated by Rule 14(2)

(b) of the Rules of 1998. It is in these circumstances that the

present petition has been filed.

PART II. SUBMISSIONS

A. For the petitioner

8.On the vires of Rule 14(2)(b), learned counsel appearing for

respective parties submit that Section 14(2)(f) and Section 14(2)

(g) exhaust the rule making power in relation to appeals, and that

neither clause authorises a condition of deposit. Rule 14(2)(c)

already prescribes a fee of one per cent of the disputed amount,

which is the fee contemplated by Section 11(2). Rule 14(2)(b)

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therefore imposes a second and independent financial burden for

which the parent Act supplies no warrant.

8.1.It is further submitted that the requirement is arbitrary because it

demands the whole of the disputed demand and confers no power

upon the Appellate Authority to waive or to reduce it in any

circumstance whatsoever. Comparison is invited with fiscal statutes

in which the legislature, when it chose to impose such a condition,

confined it to a fraction of the demand. Under the Central Goods

and Services Tax Act, 2017 the deposit is limited to a percentage of

the disputed tax subject to a monetary ceiling. Under the Central

Excise Act, 1944 as amended by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2014, the

deposit is limited to 7.5 per cent or 10 per cent subject to a ceiling,

and the earlier regime, which contemplated a larger deposit,

expressly empowered the appellate forum to grant waiver.

8.2.Reliance is placed upon Mardia Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of

India

2

, decided by the Supreme Court of India. In that case the

Supreme Court examined the condition, then contained in sub-

section (2) of Section 17 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of

Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002,

requiring deposit of 75% of the amount claimed before an

application could be entertained. Our attention is invited in

particular to paragraphs 78 and 80 of the judgment, which read as

follows.

"78. It was sought to be argued that fairness cannot be a one-way

street. The plea of absence of natural justice lies ill in the mouth of

chronic defaulters who have not paid the principal amounts

admittedly due to the banks. The said argument presupposes

admission of the liability by the borrowers and all of them to be

chronic defaulters. It would only be prejudging an issue. We hope it

was not meant to be said that all those who defaulted according to the

banks and financial institutions must be condemned unheard who

might not deserve any hearing to place their side of the case, unless

they must go through the crushing pre-conditions of deposit of 75% of

the amount demanded over and above their secured assets already

having been taken possession of. We feel this can well be one example

of hitting below the belt.

...

80. In view of the discussion already held in this behalf, we find that

the requirement of deposit of 75% of the amount claimed before

entertaining an appeal (petition) under Section 17 of the Act is an

oppressive, onerous and arbitrary condition against all the canons of

reasonableness. Such a condition is invalid and it is liable to be struck

down."

2

(2004) 4 SCC 311

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8.3Learned counsel submits that the present case is a fortiori. The

impugned Rule requiring deposit of the whole and not three fourths

of the demand, and conferring no power of waiver at all is onerous

to the hilt.

8.4Reliance is also placed upon MTNL v. Deputy Labour

Commissioner

3

, decided on 31.10.2022 by a Division Bench of

the High Court of Delhi. In that case this very Rule was struck

down as ultra vires Section 11 of the Act of 1996. The Delhi High

Court in turn relied upon and applied Additional District

Magistrate (Rev.) Delhi Admn. v. Siri Ram

4

, decided by the

Supreme Court of India. It is stated at the Bar that the said

judgment was carried to the Supreme Court in Union of India v.

MTNL

5

, and that the challenge was not entertained by order dated

08.04.2024.

8.5Reliance is also placed upon Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd. v.

Union of India

6

, decided by the Supreme Court of India, and in

particular upon paragraph 22 thereof, which reads as follows.

"22. The court must have the requisite territorial jurisdiction. An

order passed on writ petition questioning the constitutionality of a

Parliamentary Act whether interim or final keeping in view the

provisions contained in Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of

India, will have effect throughout the territory of India subject of

course to the applicability of the Act."

8.6It is submitted that a central Rule struck down by one High Court

cannot survive selectively in another State.

8.7On the levy of interest, it is submitted that Section 8 is attracted

only where an employer fails to pay any amount of cess payable

under Section 3 within the time specified in the order of

assessment. The expression "cess payable" means the amount

which becomes due upon determination under Section 5. Section

5(3) requires every assessment order to specify the date of

payment. Interest can therefore begin to run only from that date

and not earlier. Rule 4(2) of the Rules of 1998, which fixes the time

for deposit, prescribes no consequence in the nature of interest,

and sub-rule (6) of Rule 4 expressly contemplates that advance

cess is to be adjusted in the final assessment, which confirms that

3

2022 SCC OnLine Del 3704

4

(2000) 5 SCC 451

5

Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No. 6033 of 2024

6

(2004) 6 SCC 254

[2026:RJ-JP:36945-DB] (7 of 25) [CW-675/2025]

assessment precedes the crystallisation of liability. It is added that

Section 8 is penal in character, that a taxing provision must be

construed strictly, and that ambiguity must enure to the benefit of

the assessee.

B. For the respondents

9.On the vires of Rule 14(2)(b), learned counsel for the respondents

would submit that there is a presumption in favour of the validity of

subordinate legislation and that the burden of displacing it lies

upon the person who challenges it. Section 14(1) confers a general

power to make rules for carrying out the provisions of the Act, and

Section 14(2)(h) permits rules upon any other matter which has to

be or may be prescribed. Rule 14(2)(b) is said to fall within that

general power. Reliance is placed upon Tecnimont Private

Limited v. State of Punjab

7

, decided by the Supreme Court of

India, in which a condition of deposit of twenty five per cent under

Section 62(5) of the Punjab Value Added Tax Act, 2005 was in

issue. The Supreme Court there approved the conclusion of the

High Court of Punjab and Haryana, which it reproduced, and stated

its own conclusion, in the following terms.

"It is, thus, concluded that the State is empowered to enact Section

62(5) of the Act and the said provision is legal and valid. The

condition of 25% pre-deposit for hearing first appeal is not onerous,

harsh, unreasonable and violative of the provisions of Article 14 of the

Constitution of India."

...

... The High Court rightly held Section 62(5) of the PVAT Act to be

legal and valid and the condition of 25% of pre-deposit not to be

onerous, harsh, unreasonable and violative of Article 14 of the

Constitution of India. ... The reliance on the principle laid down in

Kunhi cannot go to the extent, as concluded by the High Court, of

enabling the Appellate Authority to override the limitation prescribed

by the statute and go against the requirement of pre-deposit."

9.1It is further submitted that the right of appeal is not an inherent

right but a statutory one, which may be exercised only upon the

conditions on which it is granted. Rule 14(2)(b) and Rule 14(2)(c)

are said to operate in different fields, the former being a deposit

which is refundable if the assessment is set aside or reduced and

the latter being a fee. Mardia Chemicals is sought to be

distinguished by reference to the paragraph in which the Supreme

7

(2021) 12 SCC 477

[2026:RJ-JP:36945-DB] (8 of 25) [CW-675/2025]

Court set out the grounds upon which it held the condition there in

question to be bad. That paragraph reads as follows.

"The condition of pre-deposit in the present case is bad rendering the

remedy illusory on the grounds that (i) it is imposed while

approaching the adjudicating authority of the first instance, not in

appeal, (ii) there is no determination of the amount due as yet, (iii) the

secured assets or its management with transferable interest is already

taken over and under control of the secured creditor, (iv) no special

reason for double security in respect of an amount yet to be

determined and settled, (v) 75% of the amount claimed by no means

would be a meagre amount, (vi) it will leave the borrower in a

position where it would not be possible for him to raise any funds to

make deposit of 75% of the undetermined demand. Such conditions

are not alone onerous and oppressive but also unreasonable and

arbitrary. Therefore, in our view, sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the

Act is unreasonable, arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the

Constitution."

9.2It is submitted that grounds (i), (ii) and (iv), mentioned in Mardia,

ibid, are absent here, because under the Act of 1996 the amount

stands determined by the Assessing Officer upon an assessment

before the appeal is filed, and the appeal is a true appeal and not a

proceeding at first instance.

9.3On disputed facts, the respondents assert that both notices were

duly served, that the note sheets bear this out, that the petitioner

furnished neither reply nor documents and did not appear through

any authorised representative, and that the assessment was

accordingly made under Section 5(2) upon the basis of the

available material. It is submitted that the challenge to vires is a

device to escape the appellate forum, and that where a matter is

capable of being decided upon other grounds a court should not

embark upon a question of constitutionality.

PART III. THE STATUTORY SCHEME

10.Before we deal with the merits of the case, let us first walkthrough

the relevant provisions of the applicable statutes.

A. The two enactments of 1996 and their Statements of

Objects and Reasons

Parliament enacted two statutes simultaneously in the year 1996,

and they must be read together. The Building and Other

Construction Workers (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of

Service) Act, 1996, being Act 27 of 1996; and, The Building and

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Other Construction Workers’ Welfare Cess Act, 1996, being Act 28

of 1996.

10.1The first is the Building and Other Construction Workers

(Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1996,

being Act 27 of 1996, hereinafter referred to as the main Act. It

regulates the employment and conditions of service of building and

other construction workers and provides for their safety, health and

welfare, and it requires the constitution of a Welfare Board in every

State. The Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the Bill

which became the main Act reads, only the opposite part, as

follows.

"STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS

It is estimated that about 8.5 million workers in the country are

engaged in building and other construction works. Building and other

construction workers are one of the most numerous and vulnerable

segments of the unorganisedlabour in India. The building and other

construction works are characterised by their inherent risk to the life

and limb of the workers. The work is also characterised by its casual

nature, temporary relationship between employer and employee,

uncertain working hours, lack of basic amenities and inadequacy of

welfare facilities. In the absence of adequate statutory provisions, the

requisite information regarding the number and nature of accidents is

also not forthcoming. In the absence of such information, it is difficult

to fix responsibility or to take any corrective action.

2. Although the provisions of certain Central Acts are applicable to

the building and other construction workers yet a need has been felt

for a comprehensive Central Legislation for regulating their safety,

health, welfare and other conditions of service. The State

Governments and Union Territory Administrations have been

consulted in the matter and a majority of them have favoured such a

legislation. Also, in a meeting of the Committee of State

LabourMinisters constituted pursuant to the decision of the 41st

Labour Ministers’ Conference held under the Chairmanship of the

then Union Labour Minister on the 18th May, 1995, a general

consensus had emerged on the need for the proposed Central

Legislation.

3. In view of the circumstances explained above, it has been

considered necessary to constitute Welfare Boards in every State so as

to provide and monitor social security schemes and welfare measures

for the benefit of building and other construction workers. For the

said purpose, it has been considered appropriate to bring in a

comprehensive legislation by suitably amplifying the provisions of the

Building and Other Construction Workers (Regulation of Employment

and Conditions of Service) Bill, 1988 which was introduced in the

Rajya Sabha on the 5th December, 1988. It has also been considered

necessary to levy a cess on the cost of construction incurred by the

employers on the building and other construction works for ensuring

sufficient funds for the Welfare Boards to undertake the social security

Schemes and welfare measures."

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10.2The second statute is the Building and Other Construction Workers’

Welfare Cess Act, 1996, being Act 28 of 1996 and referred to in

this judgment as the Act of 1996. It is the funding statute. Its long

title describes it as an Act to provide for the levy and collection of a

cess on the cost of construction incurred by employers with a view

to augmenting the resources of the Welfare Boards constituted

under the main Act. The Statement of Objects and Reasons

appended to the Bill which became the Act of 1996 reads as

follows.

"Statement of Objects and Reasons.—

The Bill is complementary to the Building and Other Construction Workers

(Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Bill, 1996 proposed

to be introduced and considered simultaneously. With a view to provide for

the levy and collection of a cess on the cost of construction incurred by the

employers for augmenting the resources of the Building and Other

Construction Workers’ Welfare Boards constituted by the State Governments

under the Building and Other Construction Workers (Regulation of

Employment and Conditions of Service) (Ordinance 14 of 1995), an

Ordinance, namely, the Building and Other Construction Workers’ Welfare

Cess Ordinance, 1995 (15 of 1995), was promulgated by the President on

the 3rd November, 1995. The intention was to make over, after due

appropriation by Parliament by law, the proceeds of the cess, to the State

Building and Other Construction Workers’ Welfare Boards and the cost of

collection not exceeding one per cent. of the cess collected to the State

Governments to whom it is proposed to delegate the authority to collect the

cess. A Bill, namely, the Building and Other Construction Workers’ Welfare

Cess Bill, 1995 was introduced in Lok Sabha on the 1st December, 1995 to

replace the said Ordinance by an Act of Parliament. Since the said Bill

could not be taken up for consideration and passing in the Winter Session,

1995 and the Budget Session 1996 of Lok Sabha, the Building and Other

Construction Workers’ Welfare Cess Ordinance, 1996 and the Building and

Other Construction Workers’ Welfare Cess Second Ordinance, 1996

respectively were promulgated on the 5th January, 1996 and the 27th March,

1996 with a view to give continued effect to the legislative protection. On the

dissolution of the Tenth Lok Sabha, the Building and Other Construction

Workers’ Welfare Cess Bill, 1995 stood lapsed. By virtue of Article 123(2)(a)

of the Constitution the Building and Other Construction Workers’ Welfare

Cess Second Ordinance, 1996 promulgated on the 27th March, 1996 would

have also ceased to operate with effect from the 4th July, 1996. In view of

the urgency felt and as the Parliament was not in session, the President was

pleased to promulgated the Building and Other Construction Workers’

Welfare Cess Third Ordinance, 1996 on 20th June, 1996 in order to give

continued effect to the legislative protection envisaged in the earlier

Ordinance.

2. The Bill seeks to replace the Building and Other Construction Workers’

Welfare Cess Ordinance, 1996 (Ordinance 26 of 1996)."

10.3Three things emerge from these two Statements read together, and

they govern the construction of the enactments. First, the mischief

which Parliament addressed was the vulnerability of a very large

and unorganised workforce, estimated in the Statement at about

8.5 million persons, whose employment is casual, whose hours are

uncertain, whose amenities are inadequate and whose work carries

inherent risk to life and limb. Secondly, the remedy chosen was

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institutional, namely a Welfare Board in every State to provide and

to monitor social security schemes. Thirdly, which is most and

immediate significance, the levy of cess was conceived from the

outset not as a source of general revenue but as the means of

ensuring sufficient funds for those Boards.

10.4The aforesaid characterization has already been affirmed by way of

judicial confirmation. In Dewan Chand Builders and

Contractors v. Union of India

8

, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of

India has upheld the constitutional validity of both enactments and

of the Rules framed under them, holding that the levy is in

substance a fee and not a tax and that it is referable to Entry 97 of

List I of the Seventh Schedule. While doing so the Supreme Court

relied upon the very passages set out above.

"7. ... The Statement of Objects and Reasons to the BOCW Act

explained that it had been considered “necessary to levy a Cess on the

cost of construction incurred by the employers on the building and

other construction works for ensuring sufficient funds for the Welfare

Boards to undertake the social security Schemes and welfare

measures.” Simultaneously with the enactment of the BOCW Act, the

Parliament enacted the Cess Act. ... The Statement of Objects and

Reasons to the Cess Act noted that the intention was to “provide for

the levy and collection of a Cess on the cost of construction incurred

by the employers for augmenting the resources of the Building and

Other Construction Workers’ Welfare Boards constituted by the State

Governments under the Building and Other Construction Workers

(Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Ordinance,

1995.”"

10.5Thus, two consequences follow which ought to be borne in mind.

The first is that the money collected does not go into the

Consolidated Fund. It is transferred to the Welfare Board and is

earmarked for the workers. The second is that both enactments are

beneficial legislation, so that delay in the flow of funds is not a

matter of mere revenue inconvenience. It affects directly the

persons for whose benefit Parliament legislated.

B. The charging, assessment, interest and penalty provisions

11. With the aforesaid backdrop, let us now advert to the substantive

provisions of the statute and the Rules in question. Section 3 of the

Act no.28 of 1996 is the charging provision. Section 4 obliges the

employer to furnish returns. Section 5 provides for assessment.

Sections 8 and 9 provide, respectively, for interest and for penalty.

So far as is material, relevant thereof read as follows :-

8

(2012) 1 SCC 101

[2026:RJ-JP:36945-DB] (12 of 25) [CW-675/2025]

"4. Furnishing of returns.—

(1) Every employer shall furnish such return to such officer or

authority, in such manner and at such time as may be prescribed.

(2) If any person carrying on the building or other construction work,

liable to pay the cess under section 3, fails to furnish any return under

sub-section (1), the officer or the authority shall give a notice

requiring such person to furnish such return before such date as may

be specified in the notice.

5. Assessment of cess.—

(1) The officer or authority to whom or to which the return has been

furnished under section 4 shall, after making or causing to be made

such inquiry as he or it thinks fit and after satisfying himself or itself

that the particulars stated in the return are correct, by order, assess

the amount of cess payable by the employer.

(2) If the return has not been furnished to the officer or authority

under sub-section (2) of section 4, he or it shall, after making or

causing to be made such inquiry as he or it thinks fit, by order, assess

the amount of cess payable by the employer.

(3) An order of assessment made under sub-section (1) or sub-section

(2) shall specify the date within which the cess shall be paid by the

employer.

8. Interest payable on delay in payment of cess.—

If any employer fails to pay any amount of cess payable under

section 3 within the time specified in the order of assessment, such

employer shall be liable to pay interest on the amount to be paid at

the rate of two per cent. for every month or part of a month

comprised in the period from the date on which such payment is due

till such amount is actually paid.

9. Penalty for non-payment of cess within the specified time.—

If any amount of cess payable by any employer under section 3 is not

paid within the date specified in the order of assessment made under

section 5, it shall be deemed to be in arrears and the authority

prescribed in this behalf may, after making such inquiry as it deems

fit, impose on such employer a penalty not exceeding the amount of

cess:

Provided that, before imposing any such penalty, such employer shall

be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard and if after such

hearing the said authority is satisfied that the default was for any

good and sufficient reason, no penalty shall be imposed under this

section."

C. The right of appeal

12.Section 11 of the Act no.28 of 1996 confers the right of appeal. It

reads as follows.

"11. Appeals.—(1) Any employer aggrieved by an order of assessment

made under section 5 or by an order imposing penalty made under

section 9 may, within such time as may be prescribed, appeal to such

appellate authority in such form and in such manner as may be

prescribed.

(2) Every appeal preferred under sub-section (1) shall be

accompanied by such fees as may be prescribed.

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(3) After the receipt of any appeal under sub-section (1), the appellate

authority shall, after giving the appellant an opportunity of being

heard in the matter, dispose of the appeal as expeditiously as possible.

(4) Every order passed in appeal under this section shall be final and

shall not be called in question in any court of law."

D. The rule making power

13.The Rules of 1998 were framed by the Central Government by

Notification No. G.S.R. 149(E) dated 26.03.1998, in exercise of the

power conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act of

1996. That section is the parent of the impugned Rule and is

therefore the measure of its validity. It reads as follows.

"14. Power to make rules.—(1) The Central Government may, by

notification in the Official Gazette, make rules for carrying out the

provisions of this Act.

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such

rules may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely:—

(a) the manner in which and the time within which the cess shall be

collected under sub-section (2) of section 3;

(b) the rate or rates of advance cess leviable under sub-section (4) of

section 3;

(c) the particulars of the returns to be furnished, the officer or

authority to whom or to which such returns shall be furnished and the

manner and time of furnishing such returns under sub-section (1) of

section 4;

(d) the powers which may be exercised by the officer or authority

under section 7;

(e) the authority which may impose penalty under section 9;

(f) the authority to which an appeal may be filed under sub-section

(1) of section 11 and the time within which and the form and

manner in which such appeal may be filed;

(g) the fees which shall accompany an appeal under sub-section (2)

of section 11; and

(h) any other matter which has to be, or may be, prescribed.

(3) Every rule made under this Act shall be laid, as soon as may be

after it is made, before each House of Parliament, while it is in

session for a total period of thirty days which may be comprised in

one session or in two or more successive sessions, and if, before the

expiry of the session immediately following the session or the

successive sessions aforesaid, both Houses agree in making any

modification in the rule or both Houses agree that the rule should not

be made, the rule shall thereafter have effect only in such modified

form or be of no effect, as the case may be; so, however, that any such

[2026:RJ-JP:36945-DB] (14 of 25) [CW-675/2025]

modification or annulment shall be without prejudice to the validity of

anything previously done under that rule."

E. The impugned Rule

14.Rule 14 of the Rules of 1998 prescribes the procedure governing an

appeal. So far as is material, it reads as follows.

"14. Appeal.—(1) An employer aggrieved by an order of the assessment made

under rule 7 or by an order imposing penalty made under rule 12 may appeal

against such order, within three months of the receipt of such order, to the

Appellate Authority.

(2) The appeal shall be accompanied with,

(a) the order appealed against;

(b) a certificate from the cess collector to the effect that the amount of cess

or penalty or both, as the case may be, relating to such appeal has been

deposited;

(c) a fee equivalent to one per cent, of the amount in dispute or penalty or

both, as the case may be, under such appeal;

(d) a statement of questions in dispute;

(e) documentary evidence relied upon.

...

(5) On being satisfied on the quantum of cess the Appellate Authority shall

confirm the order of the Assessing Officer or if in his opinion the assessment

was wrong; or on the higher side shall modify the order of assessment or if in

his opinion the assessment is on the lower side or if the basis of assessment is

wrong, it shall remand back the assessment order to the Assessing Officer

alongwith his observations to rectify the wrong.

...

(8) If the Appellate Authority is of the opinion that the quantum of penalty

imposed is on the higher side or not correctly made it shall suitably modify

or set aside the order of the Assessing Officer, as the case may be.

...

(10) An order in appeal reducing the amount of cess shall also ask the Board

to refund the excess cess."

Clause (b) of sub-rule (2), set out in bold above, is the provision

impugned in this petition.

F. The legislative objective of the impugned Rule and of its

parent provision

15.Let us now see as to with what object Rule 14(2)(b) was framed to

serve, and likewise, as to what object Section 14 was enacted to

serve.

[2026:RJ-JP:36945-DB] (15 of 25) [CW-675/2025]

15.1Taking the Rule first, its object is not difficult to discern and is, in

itself, entirely legitimate. The cess is collected for a Welfare Fund

which exists to provide wage compensation, medical assistance,

pension, maternity benefit and education allowance to construction

workers. Every rupee withheld by an employer during the pendency

of an appeal is a rupee unavailable to that Fund. Rule 14(2)(b)

therefore serves twin purposes. It secures the resources of the

Fund against the risk that the assessed amount will become

irrecoverable, and it discourages appeals filed with no object except

delay. The Rule is also not confiscatory in design. Sub-rule (10) of

Rule 14 requires the Board to refund the excess where an appeal

succeeds in reducing the cess, sub-rule (8) empowers the Appellate

Authority to modify or set aside a penalty, and Rule 8 provides a

parallel mechanism for refund upon revision of an assessment. To

that extent the deposit is in the nature of security rather than of

collection.

15.2Turning to Section 14, its object is altogether narrower. It is a

conventional delegation clause. Sub-section (1) confers a general

power to make rules for carrying out the provisions of the Act.

Those closing words are words of limitation and not of

enlargement. They authorise the delegate to supply the machinery

by which the legislative scheme is worked, and no more. Sub-

section (2) then enumerates the specific matters upon which rules

may be made. The enumeration is expressed to be without

prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, which means

that the list illustrates the general power and does not cut it down.

It does not mean that the general power is at large.

15.3What is significant for present purposes is the manner in which

Parliament dealt with appeals. It did not leave that subject to be

worked out generally by the delegate. It addressed appeals twice

over, once in the parent provision and once in the delegation

clause. In Section 11(1) it identified who may appeal and against

what orders, and it left three matters to be prescribed, namely the

time, the appellate authority, and the form and manner. In Section

11(2) it stipulated one thing, and one thing only, that must

accompany an appeal, namely such fees as may be prescribed.

Section 14(2)(f) then mirrors Section 11(1) exactly, and Section

[2026:RJ-JP:36945-DB] (16 of 25) [CW-675/2025]

14(2)(g) mirrors Section 11(2) exactly. The correspondence

between the two sections is precise, and it is plainly deliberate.

15.4The legislative objective thus appears to be that the delegate was

to fill in the procedural detail of an appellate remedy whose

substantive contours Parliament had itself fixed. Where the

legislature has specified what must accompany an appeal, and has

specified only fees, the question that necessarily arises is whether

the delegate may add a second and far weightier condition of its

own. We are of the opinion that same is not answered by showing

as to how additional condition serves a worthy purpose. In any

case, we feel that the worthiness of the object of a subordinate

Rule cannot supply the power to make it. More of it in greater

details, in the subsequent part.

PART IV. QUESTIONS FOR DETERMINATION

16.On the pleadings and on the arguments addressed at the Bar, the

following questions arise for determination.

(i) Whether Rule 14(2)(b) of the Rules of 1998 falls within the

rule making power conferred by Section 14 of the Act of 1996,

read with Section 11 thereof ?

(ii) Whether interest under Section 8 of the Act of 1996 can be

levied in respect of a period preceding the date specified for

payment in the order of assessment ?

(iii) Whether the assessment order dated 03.09.2021 and the

penalty order dated 30.09.2022 are vitiated by breach of the

principles of natural justice, and whether the petitioner ought

nevertheless to be relegated to the statutory appeal ?

PART V. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Question (i). Whether Rule 14(2)(b) is within the rule making

power

17.The submission that Section 14(1) and Section 14(2)(h) between

them are wide enough to sustain any rule which the delegate

considers useful cannot be accepted in that unqualified form. The

words "for carrying out the provisions of this Act" in Section 14(1)

confine the delegate to the working out of the legislative scheme.

[2026:RJ-JP:36945-DB] (17 of 25) [CW-675/2025]

The residuary clause in Section 14(2)(h) speaks of any other

matter which has to be, or may be, prescribed, and the expression

"prescribed" is defined by Section 2(c) to mean prescribed by rules

made under the Act. The clause therefore gathers up those matters

which the Act itself leaves to be prescribed. It is a gathering clause

and not a source of independent authority, and it cannot be read as

conferring power to add a condition which the parent section did

not contemplate.

17.1The difficulty confronting Rule 14(2)(b) is a precise one. Section

11(2) states what an appeal shall be accompanied by, and it states

one thing only, namely such fees as may be prescribed. Section

14(2)(g) tracks that sub-section and authorises rules prescribing

those fees. Rule 14(2)(c), which fixes a fee of one per cent, is

referable to that power and is unexceptionable. Rule 14(2)(b), by

contrast, requires the deposit of the entire demand. That is a

condition of a different order and of a wholly different magnitude,

and no clause of Section 14 answers to it. Section 14(2)(f) is

confined to the appellate authority, the limitation and the form and

manner of the appeal. Section 14(2)(g) is confined to fees. A

deposit of the whole demand is neither a matter of form, nor a

matter of manner, nor a fee.

17.2The reliance placed upon Tecnimont Private Limited (supra)

does not meet this difficulty. In Tecnimont the condition of deposit

was contained in Section 62(5) of the Punjab Value Added Tax Act,

2005, that is to say, in the parent statute itself, enacted by a

competent legislature. The question before the Supreme Court was

one of constitutional validity under Article 14, and not one of

delegated legislative competence. That a legislature may attach a

condition of deposit to a statutory right of appeal is not in doubt.

The question here is whether a delegate may do so where the

legislature has not. Those are different questions, and an answer to

the first is not an answer to the second. For the same reason the

plea that the deposit is refundable, and therefore benign, is beside

the point. A rule which the delegate had no power to make is not

saved by the mildness of its operation.

17.3It is also necessary to observe that the object of a subordinate

rule, however beneficial, cannot supply the power to make it. For

[2026:RJ-JP:36945-DB] (18 of 25) [CW-675/2025]

the reasons set out in paragraph 17 above, Rule 14(2)(b) pursues

an object which is entirely legitimate. That does not conclude the

enquiry, because the vires of delegated legislation is tested by the

ambit of the delegation and not by the merits of the policy which

the delegate has adopted. If Parliament considers a condition of

deposit desirable in this field, it is for Parliament to enact it, as it

has done in other fiscal statutes and as it did in the provision

considered in Tecnimont.

17.4The question is no longer res integra. In MTNL v. Deputy Labour

Commissioner (Supra), decided on 31.10.2022, the Division

Bench of the High Court of Delhi considered a challenge to this very

Rule. The assessee there had been assessed to cess, penalty and

interest in a sum of Rs.9,13,77,520/-. Its appeal had been

dismissed by the Appellate Authority for non-compliance with Rule

14(2). The question framed was whether the assessee could be

required to deposit one hundred per cent of the cess, penalty and

interest in order to prosecute its appeal.

17.5The Delhi High Court held that although the rule making authority

had been given the necessary power to frame rules under Section

14 of the Act of 1996, it could not frame a rule going beyond the

power conferred by that Act. Upon an examination of the width and

scope of Section 11, the Court held that an appeal under sub-

section (1) may be preferred in the prescribed form and manner

only if it is accompanied by the stipulated fees, and that the

prescription in that behalf is contained in Rule 14. It held that the

provision made in clause (b) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 14 lies clearly

beyond Section 11(2), which, in the words of the Court, "only

speaks about" fees. The Court accordingly struck down clause (b)

of sub-rule (2) of Rule 14 of the Rules of 1998 as ultra vires the

provisions of Section 11 of the Act of 1996. Relevant paras (Paras

35-46) of M.T.N.L. (supra) have been reproduced hereinbelow for

ready reference:-

“35. Insofar as the provisions made in Clause (c) of sub-rule (2) of

Rule 14 of the 1998 Rules are concerned, which prescribes that fee

equivalent to one per cent of the amount in dispute or penalty or

both, as the case may be, should accompany the appeal, Ms. Geeta

Luthra, learned senior counsel, who appears on behalf of the

petitioner, says that she has no cavil with the same. According to

Ms. Luthra, the fee would have to be deposited, as that provision is

[2026:RJ-JP:36945-DB] (19 of 25) [CW-675/2025]

in line with what is provided in sub-section (2) of Section 11 of the

1996 Act.

36. This leaves us with the only aspect left, which is whether the

rule making authority could have insisted upon the deposit of cess

or penalty or both, for the purposes of institution of a viable

appeal.

37. In our view, the provision made in sub-clause (b) of sub-rule

(2) of Rule 14 of the 1998 Rules is clearly beyond the provisions of

Section 11(2) of the 1996 Act.

38. The said section i.e., Section 11(2) of the 1996 Act, as noticed

above, only speaks about “fees”.

39. The rule making authority, being cognizant of this, has clearly

made a provision in that behalf in Clause (c) of sub-rule (2) of

Rule 14 of 1998 Rules.

40. Interestingly, the 1998 Rules make no provision for waiver, or

for reduction of cess or penalty; a certificate in respect of which

issued by the cess collector is required to accompany the appeal.

41. In this case, as noticed above, the petitioner, which is a Public

Sector Undertaking (PSU) has been called upon to deposit the

entire amount, which, as noticed above, is Rs. 9,13,77,520/-.

42. Insofar as Mr. Ahluwalia's contention is concerned, that sub-

section (1) of Section 11 of the 1996 Act alludes to both form and

manner, in our opinion, while form and manner can be prescribed

by the rule making authority, it cannot possibly issue directions for

deposit of cess or penalty or both, as the case may be, as no such

power has been conferred on the rule making authority.

43. In this context, it would be apposite to refer to the following

observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of Additional

District Magistrate (Rev.) Delhi Admn. v. Siri Ram, (2000) 5 SCC

451, while considering the amendments made in the Delhi Land

Revenue Rules, 1962. The Court ruled, that the amendments made

in the said Rules were ultra vires the provisions of the Delhi Land

Revenue Act, 1954. The relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid

judgment are extracted hereafter:

“11. Under the old Rule 49 the Patwari is required to

make field-to-field inspection three times in a year, the

object being to maintain the map and the field book

properly. Rule 51 enjoins a duty upon the Patwari to

compare the fields one by one with the map and in every

inspection shall note any change which might have

occurred on the boundaries etc. By amending this Rule

the rule-making authority has excluded certain classes

of land which are defined as “extended abadi” from the

operation of preparation of the map and the field book.

The Act does not authorise the rule-making authority to

exclude any area from the purview of Section 16 of the

Land Revenue Act. Thus the rule-making authority

acted beyond its power.

xxxxxxxxxxxx

16. It is a well-recognised principle of interpretation of

a statute that conferment of rule-making power by an

Act does not enable the rule-making authority to make a

rule which travels beyond the scope of the enabling Act

[2026:RJ-JP:36945-DB] (20 of 25) [CW-675/2025]

or which is inconsistent therewith or repugnant thereto.

From the above discussion, we have no hesitation to

hold that by amending the Rules and Form P-5, the

rule-making authority has exceeded the power

conferred on it by the Land Reforms Act.”

44. In these circumstances, we are in agreement with the

petitioner, that Rule 14(2)(b) of the 1998 Rules is clearly beyond

the powers of the rule making authority.

45. The said clause i.e., Clause (b) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 14 of the

1998 Rules is, accordingly, struck down, being ultra vires the

provisions of Section 11 of the 1996 Act.

46. Given the fact, that the impugned order does not deal with the

merits of the case, and that the appeal was dismissed only on the

ground, that there was non-compliance of the provisions of Rule

14(2) of the 1998 Rules, the impugned order i.e., the order dated

05.08.2013 is set aside, with the direction, that the appeal will be

taken up for hearing, and shall be disposed of, on merits, provided

that the fee in terms of clause (c) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 14 of the

1998 Rules is deposited, if not already deposited, within two weeks

of the receipt of a copy of this judgment.”

17.6In reaching the above conclusion the Delhi High Court also applied

the principle stated by the Supreme Court of India in Additional

District Magistrate (Rev.) Delhi Admn. (supra), in the following

terms.

"... it is a well-recognized principle of interpretation of a statute that

conferment of rule-making power by an Act does not enable the rule-

making authority to make a rule which travels beyond the scope of the

enabling Act, or which is inconsistent therewith or repugnant thereto.

From the above discussion, we have no hesitation to hold that by

amending the Rules and Form P-5, the rule-making authority has

exceeded the power conferred on it by the Land Reforms Act."

17.7We are in respectful agreement with the reasoning and with the

conclusion in MTNL. The reasoning therein is in accordance with the

plain structure of Sections 11 and 14 of the Act of 1996. Parliament

having itself declared, in Section 11(2), what an appeal is to be

accompanied by, and having declared that it is to be accompanied

by fees alone, the delegate could not superadd a condition

requiring deposit of the entire demand. In doing so, the Central

Government travelled beyond Section 14 and legislated where only

Parliament could legislate.

17.8It follows that clause (b) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 14 of the Rules of

1998 is ultra vires Section 11 read with Section 14 of the Act of

1996 and is void. The Rules of 1998 are central subordinate

[2026:RJ-JP:36945-DB] (21 of 25) [CW-675/2025]

legislation of uniform application, and the declaration already made

by the High Court of Delhi in a proceeding to which the Union of

India was a party operates, upon the principle stated in paragraph

22 of Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd. (supra) , throughout the

territory of India. It is therefore neither necessary nor appropriate

for this Court to make a fresh declaration striking down the same

provision a second time. It is sufficient, and it is hereby held, that

Rule 14(2)(b) of the Rules of 1998 no longer holds the field and is

not available to the respondents.

17.9Question (i) is answered accordingly. It follows as a necessary

consequence that the Appellate Authority was in error in declining

to entertain the petitioner's appeal for want of a certificate under

Rule 14(2)(b), and that it cannot insist upon such a certificate

hereafter. In view of this conclusion it is unnecessary to examine

the further submission founded upon Mardia Chemicals Ltd.

(supra) and upon Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution. The

challenge thus succeeds upon the narrower and anterior ground of

want of power in the delegate, and we, therefore, need not and

refrain to adjudicate on a constitutional question which is not

necessary for the decision of the case.

Question (ii). Interest under Section 8

18.The language of Section 8 is not open to serious doubt, as has

been canvassed on behalf of the petitioners. The liability to interest

is triggered by a failure to pay any amount of cess payable under

Section 3 within the time specified in the order of assessment. Two

conditions must therefore coexist. There must be an order of

assessment specifying a date of payment, which Section 5(3)

makes mandatory, and there must be a failure to pay within that

date. Interest then runs from the date on which such payment is

due, which can only mean the date so specified.

18.1It follows that until an assessment is made under Section 5 there is

no ascertained sum, no specified date, and consequently no default

of the kind which Section 8 contemplates. Rule 4 of the Rules of

1998, which fixes the time for payment, does not create an

independent liability to interest and prescribes no such

consequence, and sub-rule (6) of Rule 4 confirms that amounts

[2026:RJ-JP:36945-DB] (22 of 25) [CW-675/2025]

paid earlier are to be adjusted in the final assessment. The scheme

accordingly contemplates that determination precedes default.

18.2Upon the material placed before us, interest appears to have been

levied in the assessment order dated 03.09.2021 with effect from

the year 2011, that is to say, for a period during which no order of

assessment was in existence and no date of payment had been

specified. That is prima facie difficult to reconcile with Section 8.

18.3Having opined as above, we may also like to observe that the levy

of interest forms part of a composite order of assessment made

under Section 5, and an order of assessment is appealable under

Section 11(1). The Appellate Authority is not merely a forum for

arithmetic. Sub-rule (5) of Rule 14 empowers it to modify the

assessment where it considers the assessment to be wrong, or on

the higher side, or where the basis of the assessment is wrong. A

challenge to the inclusion of an interest component in an

assessment order is therefore a challenge to the assessment, and it

lies within the appellate jurisdiction. Question (ii) is answered

accordingly, the question being left to be decided upon its merits

by the Appellate Authority in the light of the construction of Section

8 stated above.

Question (iii). Natural justice and the alternative remedy

19.The rival facts qua service of notice appear to be irreconcilable.

Both sides invoke the same note sheets in support of diametrically

opposed conclusions. Whether the notices dated 20.09.2019 and

16.10.2019 were served, whether the petitioner had knowledge of

the proceedings before 03.09.2021, whether the correct rate is

Rs.750/- or Rs.1,000/- per square foot for this project, and what

the actual cost of construction was, are all questions of fact

requiring appreciation of the departmental record.

19.1This Court does not sit in appeal over an assessment and is not the

appropriate forum for the resolution of such disputes. Specific

remedy is under Section 11 before an authority senior in rank to

the Assessing Officer. The appellate authority is to give a hearing

and is empowered under sub-rule (5) of Rule 14 to modify or to

remand the assessment, and is also empowered under sub-rule (8)

to modify or to set aside an order of penalty.

[2026:RJ-JP:36945-DB] (23 of 25) [CW-675/2025]

19.2It was urged, and rather urged with force, that the alternative

remedy was illusory because the door to it was barred by Rule

14(2)(b). To be fair to the petitioners, the said objection stood at

the threshold of the case. With Rule 14(2)(b) out of the way, it no

longer survives. The appeal under Section 11 is now available to

the petitioner as of right, only upon payment of the fee prescribed

by Rule 14(2)(c) alone. It is thus an efficacious remedy in which

every question of fact now raised can be gone into. The petitioner

is accordingly relegated to that remedy. Question (iii) is answered

accordingly.

PART VI. CONCLUSION AND DIRECTIONS

20.For the reasons set out above, the writ petition succeeds in part. To

reiterate, we are in respectful agreement with MTNL v. Deputy

Labour Commissioner (supra), that clause (b) of sub-rule (2) of

Rule 14 of the Rules of 1998 is ultra vires Section 11 read with

Section 14 of the Building and Other Construction Workers' Welfare

Cess Act, 1996. We decline to adjudicate, in the exercise of writ

jurisdiction, the disputed questions of fact arising out of the

assessment order dated 03.09.2021 and the penalty order dated

30.09.2022. Same are left to the Appellate Authority.

21.The writ petition is disposed of with the following directions.

(a) The petitioner may prefer an appeal alongwith stay application

under Section 11 of the Act of 1996 against the assessment

order dated 03.09.2021 and the penalty order dated

30.09.2022 within a period of four weeks from today. If so

filed, the appeal shall not be dismissed upon the ground of

limitation.

(b) The Appellate Authority shall entertain and register the appeal

without insisting upon a certificate under Rule 14(2)(b) of the

Rules of 1998, or upon any deposit of the assessed cess,

interest or penalty, as a condition of entertaining or of hearing

the appeal. The appeal shall be accompanied by the fee

prescribed by Rule 14(2)(c) and by the documents required by

clauses (a), (d) and (e) of Rule 14(2).

(c) The Appellate Authority shall decide the appeal upon its merits,

in accordance with law.

[2026:RJ-JP:36945-DB] (24 of 25) [CW-675/2025]

(d) Subject to compliance of Rule 14(2)(c), ibid, recovery

proceedings, if already initiated, pursuant to the recovery notice

dated 24.03.2023, and pursuant to the impugned orders, shall

be put on hold until the stay application in the appeal is

decided, which we expect shall be done as expeditiously as

possible.

22.All contentions of both sides upon the merits are kept open.

Nothing in this judgment shall be construed as an expression of

opinion upon the correctness of the assessment or of the penalty.

There shall be no order as to costs. All pending applications, if any,

stand disposed of.

(MANEESH SHARMA),J (ARUN MONGA),J

1/PARSHANT/BIJESH

SCHEDULE

S.No. WRIT PETITION NO. CAUSE TITLE

1 D.B. Civil Writ Petition

No. 16679/2022

R-Tech Capital Gallaria (Jaipur) Llp

v/s Union of & Ors.

2 D.B Civil Writ Petition

No. 18564/2022

R-Tech Capital Highstreet (Jaipur)

Llp v/s Union of India & Ors.

3 D.B. Civil Writ Petition

No. 507/2023

Shivgyan Developers Pvt. Ltd.

V/S Union of India & Ors.

4 D.B. Civil Writ Petition

No. 629/2023

Shivgyan Developers Pvt. Ltd.

V/S Union of India & Ors.

5 D.B. Civil Writ Petition

No. 1036/2023

Columbus Overseas Llp

V/S Union of India & Ors.

6 D.B. Civil Writ Petition

No. 1415/2023

M/s Tiger Vanijya Private Limited

V/S Joint Divisional Labour

Commissioner-Cum-Assessing

Officer

7 D.B. Civil Writ Petition

No. 6571/2023

M/s Ridhiraj Builders And

Promoters

V/S The State of Rajasthan & Ors.

8 D.B. Civil Writ Petition

No. 6672/2023

M/s Ridhiraj Builders And

Promoters

V/S The State of Rajasthan & Ors.

9 D.B. Civil Writ Petition

No. 8584/2023

M/s Narayan Builders And

Developers

V/S The State of Rajasthan & Ors.

[2026:RJ-JP:36945-DB] (25 of 25) [CW-675/2025]

10 D.B. Civil Writ Petition

No. 3616/2024

M/s Trimurti Landcon

V/S Union of India & Ors.

11 D.B. Civil Writ Petition

No. 4254/2024

R-Tech Infra Capital Gallaria Llp

V/S Union of India & Ors.

12 D.B. Civil Writ Petition

No. 6843/2024

M/s Ajay Fine Tech Developers Pvt.

Ltd V/S Union of India & Ors.

13 D.B. Civil Writ Petition

No. 6888/2024

R-Tech Promoters Pvt. Ltd.

V/S Union of India & Ors.

14 D.B. Civil Writ Petition

No. 10215/2024

M/s D.C Agarwala And Co. Private

Limited V/S State of Raj. & Ors.

15 D.B. Civil Writ Petition

No. 10219/2024

M/s Unique Builders

V/S State of Raj. & Ors.

16 D.B. Civil Writ Petition

No. 10220/2024

M/s Unique Builders

V/S State of Raj. & Ors.

17 D.B. Civil Writ Petition

No. 10223/2024

M/s Unique Builders

V/S State of Raj. & Ors.

18 D.B. Civil Writ Petition

No. 13511/2024

Renaissance Buildhome Pvt Ltd.

V/S State of Raj. & Ors.

19 D.B. Civil Writ Petition

No. 13761/2024

Renaissance Buildhome Pvt Ltd.

V/S State of Raj. & Ors.

20 D.B. Civil Writ Petition

No. 14769/2024

Arihant Dream Infra Projects

Limited

V/S State of Raj. & Ors.

21 D.B. Civil Writ Petition

No. 19357/2024

M/s Megha Colonizers

V/S Union of India & Ors.

22 D.B. Civil Writ Petition

No. 676/2025

M/s Ridhiraj Builders And

Promoters

V/S State of Raj. & Ors.

23 D.B. Civil Writ Petition

No. 1015/2025

Skg B3B Llp

V/S State of Raj. & Ors.

24 D.B. Civil Writ Petition

No. 2399/2025

Spytech Buildcon Pvt. Ltd

V/S State of Raj. & Ors.

25 D.B. Civil Writ Petition

No. 2400/2025

Spytech Buildcon Pvt. Ltd.

V/S State of Raj. & Ors.

26 D.B. Civil Writ Petition

No. 2401/2025

Spytech Buildcon Pvt. Ltd.

V/S State of Raj. & Ors.

27 D.B. Civil Writ Petition

No. 7648/2026

Mody Education Foundation (Mody

University)

V/S State of Raj. & Ors.