W.P.(C) 6066/2026 Page 1 of 17

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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

% Judgment reserved on: 19.08.2026

Judgment pronounced on: 02.09.2026

Judgment uploaded on: 02.09.2026

# CNR No. DLHC010194422026

+ W.P.(C) 6066/2026

MOHAMMAD JUNAID .....Petitioner

Through: Dr. Ashutosh, Ms. Fatima, Mr.

Rohit Swarup, Mr. Dalip Singh,

Mr. Avinash Kumar Singh, Mr.

Pravej Hasan, Mr. Abhijeet

Sagar, Mr. S.Vijaykanth, Advs.

versus

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS .....Respondent

Through: Sh. Atul Tripathi, SSC-CBIC

Mr. Akshay Sagar and Mr.

Shubham Mishra, Advs.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL

HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE SHAIL JAIN

J U D G M E N T

ANIL KSHETARPAL , J.:

1. The principal issue which arises for consideration in the present

Petition is whether this Court ought to interfere with an Order-in-

Appeal dated 21.01.2026 passed by the Commissioner of Customs

(Appeals), whereby the order of the Adjudicating Authority permitting

re-export of the gold bar on payment of redemption fine, penalty and

W.P.(C) 6066/2026 Page 2 of 17

applicable customs duty has been set aside and the gold bar has been

ordered to be absolutely confiscated, particularly when the petitioner

has an efficacious statutory remedy available under Section 129DD of

the Customs Act, 1962 [the „Act‟].

2. Through the present petition, the Petitioner seeks quashing of

the Order-in-Appeal dated 21.01.2026 and consequential restoration

of the Order-in-Original dated 28.05.2025. The principal grievance of

the Petitioner is that the gold bar seized from him was confiscated

without issuance of a valid show cause notice under Section 124 of the

Act and, consequently, the proceedings culminating in the Order-in-

Original as well as the subsequent Order-in-Appeal are vitiated for

violation of the statutory requirement and principles of natural justice.

FACTUAL MATRIX

3. In order to appreciate the controversy involved in the present

Petition, the relevant facts, in brief, are required to be noticed.

4. The Petitioner, an Indian national, arrived at the Indira Gandhi

International Airport, New Delhi, from Doha, Qatar on 01.07.2024 by

Flight No. AI-972. Upon his arrival, he crossed the Green Channel

and was thereafter intercepted by the Customs authorities and a gold

bar weighing 117 grams was recovered from his possession.

5. A Detention Receipt bearing No. 4745 dated 01.07.2024 was

issued in respect of the said article. The article was described therein

as one gold bar engraved with the marking “TT044200”, having purity

of 998 and weighing 117 grams. The detention receipt records that the

W.P.(C) 6066/2026 Page 3 of 17

article was repacked in a cut plastic bottle, sealed with Customs tape

and the plier marked “IGI WH Customs”, in the presence of the

petitioner. The receipt further records that the goods were detained for

the purposes of appraisement.

6. On the same date, i.e. 01.07.2024, a statement of the Petitioner

was recorded under Section 108 of the Act. In the said statement, the

Petitioner stated, inter alia, that he had been intercepted by the

Customs authorities after crossing the Green Channel and that the

aforesaid gold bar had been recovered from him. It was stated that the

gold belonged to him and that he had not declared the same. It was

further stated that he was aware that Customs duty was leviable on

import of the goods and that he had intentionally not declared the

recovered article. It was also stated that he agreed with the

description, quantity and value to be assessed by the Department and

was willing to pay the applicable customs duty, fine and penalty.

7. The said statement further records the following:

“I also do not need any Show Cause Notice or personal hearing in the

matter.”

The statement records that it was read over and explained to the

Petitioner in the vernacular and that he had tendered the same without

any duress, pressure or threat.

8. The Respondent has placed on record a chart containing the

relevant procedural particulars of the present case. According to the

said chart, an oral show cause notice under the proviso to Section 124

of the Act was given to the Petitioner on 01.07.2024 and personal

W.P.(C) 6066/2026 Page 4 of 17

hearing was granted to him on 21.05.2025. The Respondent further

states that the Petitioner‟s authorised representative participated in the

adjudication proceedings.

9. Thereafter, the Adjudicating Authority passed the Order-in-

Original dated 28.05.2025. The said order denied the Petitioner the

benefit of free allowance and dealt with the confiscation of the gold

bar. The Petitioner was granted the option of re-export of the gold

upon payment of the applicable customs duty, redemption fine and

penalty.

10. The Petitioner thereafter approached this Court by filing

W.P.(C) 14957/2025. In the meantime, an appeal against the Order-in-

Original dated 28.05.2025 had been preferred before the

Commissioner of Customs (Appeals). On 25.09.2025, this Court

disposed of the said writ petition and directed the departmental

appellate proceedings to be decided within the stipulated period. The

existence of the said proceedings before the Commissioner (Appeals)

is also reflected in the record of this Court.

11. Pursuant thereto, the Commissioner of Customs (Appeals)

passed the impugned Order-in-Appeal dated 21.01.2026. By the said

order, the appeal preferred by the Department was allowed and the

gold bar weighing 117 grams was ordered to be absolutely

confiscated.

12. Aggrieved by the aforesaid Order-in-Appeal, the Petitioner has

instituted the present Writ Petition on 27.04.2026.

W.P.(C) 6066/2026 Page 5 of 17

CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES

13. Contentions of the Petitioner

13.1. Learned counsel for the Petitioner submitted that the impugned

Order-in-Appeal is liable to be set aside as the mandatory requirement

of Section 124 of the Act was not complied with before confiscation

of the gold bar. It was contended that no written show cause notice

was ever served upon the Petitioner. It was submitted that the

document dated 01.07.2024, described by the Respondent as a

voluntary statement under Section 108 of the Act, cannot be treated as

a show cause notice under Section 124 of the Act.

13.2. It was further submitted that the statement dated 01.07.2024

merely contains an alleged waiver of the requirement of a show cause

notice and personal hearing. According to the Petitioner, such waiver

cannot substitute the statutory requirement contained in Section 124 of

the Act. Reliance was placed upon the judgment of this Court in Ms.

Shubhangi Gupta v. Commissioner of Customs & Ors., W.P.(C)

10772/2024, decided on 04.11.2024. In the said case, this Court held

that there is no provision under the Act permitting waiver of the notice

contemplated by Section 124.

13.3. It was submitted that the Petitioner never made any request for

an oral show cause notice in the manner contemplated by the first

proviso to Section 124 of the Act. It was contended that the first

proviso permits the notice under Section 124(a), as well as the

representation under Section 124(b), to be oral only at the request of

the person concerned. Consequently, according to the Petitioner, the

W.P.(C) 6066/2026 Page 6 of 17

mere recording of a statement that the Petitioner did not require a

show cause notice cannot amount to compliance with the said

statutory provision.

13.4. Learned counsel further challenges the manner in which the

statement dated 01.07.2024 was recorded. It was submitted that the

statement was not handwritten by the Petitioner and that the Petitioner

was made to sign documents already prepared by the Customs

authorities. It was further alleged that the contents thereof were not

properly explained to him and that the petitioner was subjected to

coercion. Reliance was also placed upon certain departmental

instructions concerning recording of statements under Section 108 of

the Act.

13.5. It was further submitted that the statutory requirement

contained in Section 110(2) of the Act cannot be defeated by merely

describing the statement dated 01.07.2024 as a waiver of show cause

notice. According to learned counsel, unless a valid notice under

Section 124 was issued within the period prescribed by law, the

consequences flowing from Section 110(2) would follow.

13.6. It was also submitted that the subsequent personal hearing

cannot cure the initial defect in the proceedings, since the right to

notice under Section 124 is a statutory safeguard preceding

confiscation. Reliance was placed upon the judgment of the Supreme

Court in Union of India v. Jatin Ahuja, decided on 11.09.2025, to

contend that the statutory scheme relating to seizure and issuance of

notice under Sections 110(2) and 124 of the Act has to be strictly

W.P.(C) 6066/2026 Page 7 of 17

complied with.

14. Contentions of the Respondent

14.1. Per contra, learned counsel for the Respondent opposed the

present Petition primarily on the ground of maintainability. It was

submitted that the impugned order is an order passed in appeal under

the Act and the Petitioner has an efficacious statutory remedy of filing

a revision application before the Central Government under Section

129DD of the Act.

14.2. It was submitted that the Petitioner cannot bypass the statutory

remedy and invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court,

particularly when the impugned Order-in-Appeal is a reasoned and

speaking order passed after granting an opportunity of hearing to the

Petitioner.

14.3. On merits, it was submitted that the Petitioner, in his voluntary

statement recorded under Section 108 of the Act on 01.07.2024,

admitted that he had crossed the Green Channel, that the gold

belonged to him, that he was aware of the customs duty leviable on

import of gold and that he had intentionally failed to declare the gold

bar. The Petitioner also expressly stated that he did not require a show

cause notice or personal hearing.

14.4. It was further submitted that, contrary to the Petitioner‟s

assertion, the Department has specifically recorded that an „oral show

cause notice was given on 01.07.2024‟ and that personal hearing was

subsequently granted to the Petitioner on 21.05.2025. The

W.P.(C) 6066/2026 Page 8 of 17

Respondent‟s chart specifically records 01.07.2024 as the date of the

oral show cause notice and 21.05.2025 as the date of personal hearing.

14.5. It was submitted that the authorised representative of the

Petitioner also participated in the adjudication proceedings and sought

release/re-export of the gold upon payment of the applicable duty, fine

and penalty. It was therefore contended that the allegation that the

Petitioner was denied an opportunity of hearing is untenable.

14.6. It was further submitted that the Petitioner had earlier

approached this Court in W.P.(C) 14957/2025 and, by order dated

25.09.2025, the Petitioner was relegated to the departmental appellate

proceedings. The said appellate proceedings culminated in the

impugned Order-in-Appeal dated 21.01.2026. It was therefore

submitted that the Petitioner ought to pursue the statutory remedy

available against the said appellate order.

14.7. Reliance was placed upon the judgment of the Supreme Court

in Radha Krishan Industries v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2021) 6

SCC 771, to contend that although the existence of an alternative

remedy does not absolutely bar exercise of writ jurisdiction, ordinarily

a writ petition ought not to be entertained where an efficacious

statutory remedy is available. Further reliance was placed upon

Rikhab Chand Jain v. Union of India, Civil Appeal No. 6719/2012,

to contend that where an equally efficacious statutory remedy is

available, the Petitioner should ordinarily pursue that remedy instead

of invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court.

ANALYSIS & FINDINGS

W.P.(C) 6066/2026 Page 9 of 17

15. This Court has carefully considered the submissions advanced

on behalf of the parties and perused the material on record.

16. At the outset, it is necessary to notice the nature of the order

under challenge. The present Petition is not directed against the

detention of the gold bar on 01.07.2024 simpliciter. The proceedings

thereafter culminated in an Order-in-Original dated 28.05.2025,

whereby the gold bar was ordered to be dealt with in terms of the

provisions of the Act, with an option of re-export upon payment of the

applicable customs duty, redemption fine and penalty. The said order

was thereafter subjected to appellate proceedings and the

Commissioner of Customs (Appeals), by the impugned Order-in-

Appeal dated 21.01.2026, allowed the Department‟s appeal and

ordered absolute confiscation of the gold bar.

17. The impugned order is, therefore, an order passed by the

Commissioner of Customs (Appeals) in relation to goods imported as

baggage. The Customs Act, 1962 provides a specific statutory remedy

against such an order by way of revision before the Central

Government under Section 129DD of the Act.

18. The principal question which consequently arises is whether, in

the facts and circumstances of the present case, this Court ought to

exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the

Constitution notwithstanding the availability of the aforesaid statutory

remedy.

19. The law governing exercise of writ jurisdiction in the presence

of an efficacious alternative statutory remedy is well settled. In Radha

W.P.(C) 6066/2026 Page 10 of 17

Krishan Industries (supra), the Supreme Court reiterated that the

power under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and that,

ordinarily, a writ petition ought not to be entertained where an

efficacious alternative remedy is available. The rule is one of policy,

convenience and discretion and does not constitute an absolute bar to

the exercise of writ jurisdiction. The recognised exceptions include

cases involving enforcement of fundamental rights, violation of

principles of natural justice, proceedings wholly without jurisdiction

and challenge to the vires of legislation.

20. Learned counsel for the Petitioner seeks to bring the present

case within the exception relating to violation of principles of natural

justice. The principal contention is that no valid show cause notice

under Section 124 of the Act was ever issued before the confiscation

proceedings were undertaken. The Petitioner further disputes the

reliance placed by the Respondent upon the statement dated

01.07.2024 and contends that the statement merely records an

impermissible waiver of the statutory requirement of notice and

personal hearing.

21. There is, however, a material distinction between the factual

position in the present case and that which obtained in Ms. Shubhangi

Gupta (supra). In the said case, the Revenue had not asserted in its

counter-affidavit that an oral show cause notice under Section 124 of

the Act had actually been issued. On the contrary, the Revenue's

position was that no such notice was required as the petitioner had

waived the same. This Court, therefore, found that in the absence of a

notice, whether written or oral, the requirement contained in Section

W.P.(C) 6066/2026 Page 11 of 17

124(a) had not been satisfied. The Court also observed that there was

no provision under the Act permitting waiver of the statutory notice.

22. The factual position in the present case is not identical. The

Respondent does not rest its defence solely upon the statement dated

01.07.2024 or upon the alleged waiver recorded therein. The

Respondent has specifically asserted that an oral show cause notice

was given on 01.07.2024 and that a personal hearing was subsequently

granted to the Petitioner on 21.05.2025. The chart placed on record by

the Respondent specifically records 01.07.2024 as the date of the oral

show cause notice and 21.05.2025 as the date of personal hearing. The

Respondent has further relied upon the participation of the Petitioner‟s

authorised representative in the adjudication proceedings.

23. The Petitioner disputes the aforesaid assertion and contends that

no oral show cause notice, in the manner contemplated by the first

proviso to Section 124 of the Act, was ever given. The Petitioner also

disputes the circumstances in which the statement dated 01.07.2024

came to be recorded and alleges that the document was prepared in

advance and was made to be signed by him without its contents being

properly explained to him.

24. The Respondent, on the other hand, relies upon the statement

dated 01.07.2024 as a voluntary statement recorded under Section 108

of the Act and points out that the statement records that its contents

were read over and explained to the Petitioner in the vernacular and

that it was tendered without duress, pressure or threat.

25. These rival assertions are accompanied by corresponding rival

W.P.(C) 6066/2026 Page 12 of 17

submissions concerning the effect of the statement dated 01.07.2024,

the alleged waiver of show cause notice and personal hearing, the

alleged request for an oral show cause notice and the subsequent

proceedings stated to have taken place on 21.05.2025. This Court does

not consider it appropriate, in exercise of writ jurisdiction, to

undertake an evidentiary examination of these matters when the

impugned order is itself amenable to a statutory revisional remedy.

26. At the same time, it is necessary to clarify that this Court is not

holding that a mere waiver of the show cause notice contained in the

statement dated 01.07.2024 would, by itself, dispense with the

statutory requirement under Section 124 of the Act. The decision in

Shubhangi Gupta (supra) makes the position clear that the statutory

requirement of notice cannot be treated as having been satisfied

merely on the basis of an alleged waiver.

27. The Respondent‟s case in the present proceedings, however, is

that an oral show cause notice was given on 01.07.2024. Whether such

notice was in fact given; whether it was given pursuant to a request

contemplated by the first proviso to Section 124; whether the contents

of the proposed action were adequately communicated; and whether

the other requirements of Section 124 stood satisfied are matters

which can be examined by the competent statutory authority on the

basis of the complete record. The subsequent grant of personal hearing

on 21.05.2025 is also a matter forming part of the procedural record.

28. There is yet another aspect which cannot be lost sight of. The

Petitioner relies upon Section 110(2) of the Act and contends that the

W.P.(C) 6066/2026 Page 13 of 17

requirement of notice under Section 124 was not complied with within

the statutory period. The detention of the gold bar took place on

01.07.2024, and, according to the Respondent‟s chart, the oral show

cause notice was also given on 01.07.2024. The legal effect of these

dates, including whether the oral show cause notice satisfies the

requirements of Section 124 and the consequences, if any, flowing

from Section 110(2), are matters which have not been finally

adjudicated by this Court.

29. The judgment of the Supreme Court in Jatin Ahuja (supra)

underscores the importance of the statutory scheme contained in

Section 110(2) and the consequence contemplated where the requisite

notice is not issued within the prescribed period. The Supreme Court

has also explained that the time period contemplated under Section

110(2) and the substantive requirements relating to issuance of a show

cause notice under Section 124 operate in distinct fields.

30. The aforesaid decision, therefore, does not warrant this Court

determining, in the present writ proceedings, the disputed question as

to whether the requirements of Sections 110(2) and 124 were duly

complied with in the facts of the present case. Those questions remain

open.

31. This Court is also conscious of the Petitioner‟s submission that

a subsequent personal hearing cannot cure the alleged failure to issue

a valid show cause notice. That proposition, in the abstract, is not

being rejected. However, the present case is not one where the

Respondent admits that no notice was given. The Respondent

W.P.(C) 6066/2026 Page 14 of 17

specifically asserts that an oral show cause notice was given on

01.07.2024 and that the Petitioner was subsequently granted a

personal hearing on 21.05.2025. The legal sufficiency of the alleged

oral show cause notice, as well as the significance of the subsequent

personal hearing, are matters which the Petitioner can agitate before

the Revisional Authority.

32. There is an additional circumstance which weighs with us. The

Petitioner had earlier approached this Court in W.P.(C) 14957/2025 in

relation to the proceedings arising from the Order-in-Original dated

28.05.2025. By order dated 25.09.2025, the said proceedings were

permitted to be dealt with in the departmental appellate forum and the

Department‟s appeal was thereafter adjudicated by the Commissioner

of Customs (Appeals). The impugned Order-in-Appeal dated

21.01.2026 is thus the result of the statutory appellate proceedings.

33. The present Petition consequently seeks, in substance,

adjudication by this Court of questions arising out of the statutory

adjudication proceedings which have culminated in an order against

which the Act provides a further statutory remedy.

34. In these circumstances, this Court is of the view that the

availability of the remedy under Section 129DD of the Act assumes

considerable significance. The Petitioner can urge before the

Revisional Authority all permissible grounds raised in the present

Petition, including:

i. the alleged non-issuance of a written show cause notice;

W.P.(C) 6066/2026 Page 15 of 17

ii. the effect of the statement dated 01.07.2024 and the alleged

waiver recorded therein;

iii. the question whether an oral show cause notice was in fact

given on 01.07.2024;

iv. whether the alleged oral show cause notice satisfied the

requirements of the first proviso to Section 124 of the Act;

v. the effect of Section 110(2) of the Act and the dates relevant

thereto;

vi. the Petitioner‟s allegations concerning the manner in which the

statement dated 01.07.2024 was recorded;

vii. the effect, if any, of the participation of the authorised

representative in the adjudication proceedings;

viii. the significance and legal effect of the personal hearing stated

to have been granted on 21.05.2025; and

ix. the legality and propriety of the order of absolute confiscation

passed by the Commissioner of Customs (Appeals).

35. The rule of alternative remedy is undoubtedly not an absolute

bar to the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226. However, in the

facts of the present case, we are unable to find any circumstance

which would justify bypassing the statutory remedy. The present case

does not involve a challenge to the vires of any statutory provision,

nor is the impugned Order-in-Appeal shown to have been passed by

an authority wholly lacking jurisdiction.

W.P.(C) 6066/2026 Page 16 of 17

36. The contention founded upon violation of principles of natural

justice also does not, in the facts presently before us, warrant exercise

of writ jurisdiction in disregard of the statutory remedy. The

Respondent asserts that an oral show cause notice was given on

01.07.2024, that personal hearing was subsequently granted on

21.05.2025, and that the Petitioner‟s authorised representative

participated in the adjudication proceedings. The impugned Order-in-

Appeal was thereafter passed by the Commissioner of Customs

(Appeals). Whether these proceedings constitute sufficient compliance

with the statutory requirements is a matter which can be examined by

the competent Revisional Authority.

37. This Court, therefore, refrains from expressing any final

opinion on the merits of the Petitioner‟s contentions concerning the

validity of the alleged oral show cause notice, the statement dated

01.07.2024, the alleged waiver of show cause notice or personal

hearing, the applicability of Section 110(2), compliance with Section

124, or the legality of the absolute confiscation of the gold bar.

CONCLUSION

38. For the foregoing reasons, we are not inclined to exercise our

discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of

India in the present case.

39. The present Petition is, accordingly, dismissed on the ground of

availability of an efficacious statutory remedy under Section 129DD

of the Customs Act, 1962, leaving all questions on merits open for

consideration by the competent Revisional Authority.

W.P.(C) 6066/2026 Page 17 of 17

40. It is clarified that nothing contained in this judgment shall be

construed as an expression of opinion on the validity or otherwise of

the alleged oral show cause notice dated 01.07.2024, the statement

dated 01.07.2024 recorded under Section 108 of the Act, the alleged

waiver of show cause notice or personal hearing, compliance with

Sections 110(2) and 124 of the Act, or the legality and propriety of the

absolute confiscation of the gold bar. All such questions are left open

to be considered by the competent authority in accordance with law.

ANIL KSHETARPAL , J.

SHAIL JAIN, J.

SEPTEMBER 02, 2026

sp/pal