2023 INSC 683 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2340 OF 2023

(Arising out of S.L.P. (Criminal) No. 10656 of 2022)

MOHAMMAD WAJID & ANR. …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

STATE OF U.P. & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

J.B. PARDIWALA, J. :

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal is at the instance of the original accused

Nos. 1 and 2 resply of the First Information Report (FIR) being

the Crime Registration No. 224 of 2022 dated 19.09.2022

registered with the Mirzapur Police Station, District

Saharanpur, State of U.P. for the offences punishable under

Sections 395, 504, 506 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC)

and is directed against the order passed by the High Court of

Judicature at Allahabad dated 17.10.2022 in the Criminal

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Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 15174 of 2022 by which the

High Court rejected the Writ Petition filed by appellants herein

thereby declining to quash the aforesaid FIR.

FACTUAL MATRIX

3. The respondent No. 4 herein namely Ram Kumar lodged

FIR No. 224 of 2022 for the offences enumerated above at the

police station also referred to above. The FIR reads thus:-

“… The undersigned Ramkumar son of Sadhuram is

a resident of Kasimpur, P.S. Mirjapur. I want to

submit that Haji Iqbal, his son Javed, Wazid,

Alishan, Afjal and brother of Iqbal namely Mehmood

Ali forcefully started to tell us since long that our land

bearing Khasra No. 256/1 situated at Village

Mayapur belongs to them. It is in the year 2021

when time for cultivation arrived, that myself and my

brother Rajkumar went to the house of Iqbal, son of

Abdul Wahid at Mirjapur. We requested him that you

people are disturbing the peace and tranquility of us.

We said, we were destitudes. It is on that Iqbal, his

brother Mehmood and his sons namely Zabed, Wajid,

Alishan and Afjal became very furious on us. They

started using abusive language against us. We

requested them to stop uttering abusive language. It

is at that time all these persons assaulted us with

their hands and fists for a long time. It is thereafter

they on a point of pistol put on my forehead, they

took away Rs. 2 lakh kept in my pocket forcefully.

Thereafter, all these people stated that if we would

talk of this to any one, they would kill all the

members of our family. It is then Iqbal told me to sign

the stamp paper. After terrorizing and threatening us,

they compelled we both brothers to put our

signatures on the stamp papers. We being robbed,

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we returned silently to our home. We thereafter

communicated the present fact before our family

members. It is however due to fear of these persons,

none of the members of our family supported us

against these persons. After thinking a lot and

mustering courage, I have come down before your

police station for lodging the present report.

Applicant Sd/-Rajkumar 19.09.2022-Ram Kumar

s/o Sadhuram r/o Kasimpusr, P.S. Mirjapur, District

Saharanpur, M.No. 9758031420.”

(Emphasis supplied)

4. Thus the FIR as aforestated reveals that the first

informant is a resident of village Kasimpur, Mirzapur, District

Saharanpur. His name has been recorded as a tenure holder of

agricultural land bearing Khasra No. 256/1 situated at village

Mayapur, District Saharanpur. He has alleged that the

appellants herein alongwith few other co-accused have been

putting forward wrong claim of being the owners of the land

bearing Khasra No. 256/1. It is his case that sometime in the

year 2021, he along with his brother namely Rajkumar had

visited the house of the appellant No. 2 herein situated at

Mirzapur to request him not to interfere with their lawful

possession and ownership of the land in question. It is his

case that at that point of time the appellants herein and other

co-accused hurled abuses to the first informant and his

brother Rajkumar and all the accused thereafter assaulted the

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first informant and his brother with hands and fists. It is

further alleged that at that point of time the accused persons

on the point of a gun forcibly took away Rs. 2 Lakh from the

pocket of the first informant. The accused persons are also

alleged to have threatened the first informant that if he would

talk to anyone about the incident, then all his family members

would be killed. In the last, the first informant has alleged that

the accused persons forcibly obtained signatures of the first

informant and his brother on a plain stamp paper. After the

alleged incident, the first informant and his brother Rajkumar

left the house of the appellant No. 2 herein.

5. It is pertinent to note that for the incident alleged to

have occurred in the year 2021, the FIR was lodged in the year

2022. It is also pertinent to note that in the FIR, no date and

time of the alleged incident has been stated. No plausible

explanation was offered by the first informant as to why there

was inordinate delay in lodging the FIR.

6. The appellants herein went before the High Court of

Judicature at Allahabad and filed Criminal Miscellaneous Writ

Petition No. 15174 of 2022 and prayed for the quashing of the

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FIR in question. The High Court declined to entertain the writ

application and rejected the same observing as under:-

“Heard learned counsel for the petitioners and

learned A.G.A for the State respondents.

The relief sought in this petition is for quashing

of the F.I.R. dated 19.09.2022, registered as Case

Crime No. 0224 of 2022, under sections 395, 504,

506, 323 I.P.C., Police Station Mirzapur, District

Saharanpur.

Learned AGA opposed the prayer for quashing

of the FIR, which discloses cognizable offence.

Perusal of the impugned first information report

prima facie reveals commission of cognizable offence.

Therefore, in view of the law laid down by Hon'ble

Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana and

others vs. Bhajan Lal and others, 1992 Supp. (1) SCC

335 and M/s Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. vs.

State of Maharashtra, AIR 2021 SC 1918 and in

Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.3262/2021

(Leelavati Devi @ Leelawati & another vs. the State of

Uttar Pradesh) decided on 07.10.2021, no case has

been made out for interference with the impugned

first information report.

Therefore, the writ petition is dismissed leaving

it open for the petitioners to apply before the

competent court for anticipatory bail/bail as

permissible under law and in accordance with law.”

Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid, the

appellants are before this Court with the present appeal.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS

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7. Mr. Siddhartha Dave, the learned senior counsel

appearing for the appellants in the written submissions filed

by him has stated as under:-

“1. The Petitioners who are Accused Nos. 6 and 1

respectively in FIR No. 224 of 2022 have filed the

present Special Leave Petition against the impugned

judgment and final order dated 17.10.2022 passed

by the Hon’ble High Court of Judicature at Allahabad

in Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 15174 of 2022,

whereby the Hon’ble High Court has dismissed the

said Writ Petition filed by the Petitioners under Article

226 of the Constitution of India seeking quashing of

FIR No. 224 of 2022 dated 19.09.2022 registered

under Sections 395, 504, 506 & 323 of the Indian

Penal Code against six accused persons namely,

Mohd. Iqbal alias Bala (Petitioner No. 2 herein),

Mehmood Ali (Brother of Petitioner No. 2), Afjal (Son

of Petitioner No. 2), Alishan (Son of Petitioner No. 2),

Javed (Son of Petitioner No. 2), and Mohammad

Wajid (Petitioner No. 1 herein and son of Petitioner

No. 2) at Police Station Mirzapur, District Saharanpur.

2. The allegation in the said FIR No. 224 of 2022

dated 19.09.2022 is that the Complainant Ram

Kumar (Respondent No. 4 herein), who is a resident

of Village Kasimpur, Mirzapur, District Saharanpur, is

recorded as a tenure holder of land situated at

Khasra No. 256/1, Village Mayapur, Mirzapur,

District Saharanpur. It is further alleged that the

accused Haji Iqbal (Petitioner No. 2 herein) and his

sons Javed, Mohammad Wajid (Petitioner No. 1

herein), Alishan, Afjal and his brother Mehmood Ali

had earlier claimed that the said land bearing

Khasra No. 256/1 belonged to them. In the year

2021, when the Complainant and his bother Raj

Kumar went to Petitioner No. 2’s house situated at

Mirzapur, Saharanpur and requested him not to

disturb the peace and tranquility of their land upon

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which Petitioner No. 2 Iqbal, Mehmood Ali, Javed,

Petitioner No.1 Mahmood Wajid, Alishan and Afzal

abused the Complainant and thereafter they

assaulted him and his brother Raj Kumar with their

hands and fists. It is further alleged that the accused

persons then pointed a pistol on the Complainant’s

forehead and forcibly took an amount of Rs. 2 lakh

from the Complainant’s pocket. The accused persons

threatened the Complainant that in case he told

anyone about the incident then all his family

members will be eliminated. It is further alleged that

the accused persons forcibly got the signatures of the

Complainant and his brother on a blank stamp paper

and after being robbed of their money the

Complainant and his brother quietly returned home.

3. It is respectfully submitted that the alleged

First Information Report is absolutely false and

frivolous, and on a reading of the said FIR, the

offence of dacoity is clearly not made out against the

Petitioners. It is highly doubtful that the

Complainant, who was aware of the criminal history

of Petitioner No. 2 Iqbal, would go to the house of the

accused Petitioner No. 2 with a huge sum of money,

that is, Rs. 2 lakh in his pocket and after the alleged

incident would remain silent for one year. Although it

is alleged that the Complainant and his brother Raj

Kumar were assaulted by the accused persons

however there is no injury or medical report

whatsoever to substantiate the said allegation.

4.The allegations in the First Information Report

are not only vague but also highly improbable given

that except for the bald allegation that the incident

occurred in the year 2021, there is no mention of the

date and time of incident in the FIR. The said

incident allegedly occurred in the year 2021, while

the FIR has been lodged after an inordinate delay of

1 year, that is, on 19.09.2022. On a reading of the

FIR it is evident that the entire dispute is with respect

to the land situated at Khasra No. 256/1, Village

Mayapur, Mirzapur, District Saharanpur. It is

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pertinent to submit that the Petitioners are neither the

owner of the land nor have they got anything to do

with the said land and there was therefore no

question of the Petitioners having threatened and

assaulted the Complainant.

5.It is submitted that after the change of

Government in the State of Uttar Pradesh in the year

2017, the ruling party came to power and

immediately after the change of the Government the

Petitioners along with their family members were

falsely implicated in more than 30 criminal cases at

the behest of the ruling party. The Petitioners are

being unnecessarily harassed by the State

machinery including the Police. Although the

Respondent State is heavily relying upon the criminal

cases registered against the Petitioners and their

family members to show that they are habitual

offenders but till date the petitioners have not been

convicted by any Court of law and moreover every

time the Petitioners or their family members gets

protection (anticipatory bail or stay of arrest) from

either this Hon’ble Court or the Hon’ble High Court,

the local police immediately registers false cases

against them.

6.It is submitted that the alleged Look Out Notice

dated 10.05.2022 was issued much prior to the

registration of the present FIR No. 224 of 2022 which

was registered on 19.09.2022 and as such is

inconsequential.

7.It is respectfully submitted that the alleged

First Information Report has been maliciously

instituted at the behest of the present ruling party in

the State of Uttar Pradesh to wreak vengeance and to

settle political scores with Petitioner No. 2 Mohd.

Iqbal alias Bala as he belongs to a rival political

party and he was also a Member of Legislative

Council from the period 2011 to 2016. Petitioner No.

2 Mohd. Iqbal alias Bala belongs to a respectable

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family of Saharanpur and he is running several

Charitable Institutions.

8.The allegations made in the First Information

Report do not prima facie constitute any offence or

make out a case under Sections 395, 504, 506 and

323 IPC against the Petitioner and thus, the FIR is

liable to be quashed. It is pertinent to mention that

even after the charge sheet has been filed, the

petition for quashing of a FIR is well within the

powers of a Court of law [ Please see: Anand

Kumar Mohatta and another VS. State (NCT of

Delhi), Department of Home & Another (2019)

11 SCC 706 at paragraph 14 & 16]

9.For the reasons mentioned above, the Special

Leave Petition may be allowed and the order of the

Hon’ble High Court refusing to quash the FIR No. 224

of 2022 dated 19.09.2022 be set aside.”

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE STATE

8. Ms. Garima Prasad, the learned Additional Advocate

General appearing for the State of U.P. in her written

submissions has stated as under:-

“A. NO AFFIDAVIT OR VAKALATNAMA FILED BY

ACCUSED IQBAL @ HAJI IQBAL @ BALA,

ACCUSED MEHMOOD AND DILSHAD - NO RELIEF

CAN BE GIVEN TO PETITION FILED BY THIRD

PARTIES

● That the instant SLPs have been filed by a third

party. The Accused Iqbal @ Haji Iqbal @ Bala nor the

other petitioners have signed the vakalatnama and

affidavit and Iqbal is absconding from the law. Even,

the Writ Petition under section 482 Cr.P.C. filed before

the Hon’ble High Court, has not been signed by Iqbal

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himself. No relief can be granted to those who have

not approached this Hon’ble Court.

● Accused Iqbal has absconded from the jurisdiction

of this Hon’ble Court and has in all likelihood

absconded from the country. It is humbly submitted

that a person who is not within the jurisdiction of this

Hon’ble Court and has not signed any affidavit or

vakalatnama, cannot be entitled for any relief.

● The accused have selectively brought only a few

cases before this Hon’ble Court leaving the more

heinous and gross cases.

B. Iqbal @ Haji Iqbal @ Bala is the Most Wanted

Criminal in the area of Mirjapur District

Saharanpur creating terror in the minds of the

citizens. He is a known sand mafia, land

grabber having grabbed Government Land,

Forest Land, Poor Farmers’ Land and built a

university namely Glocal University,

Saharanpur in the area of more than 700

Acres. The Office of Senior Superintendent of

Police, Meerut Zone, Meerut, vide its office

memo dated 11.02.2023, has declared Iqbal @

Bala a most wanted criminal with a prize

money of Rs. 1,00,000/-

● PROTECTION OF EARLIER DISPENSATION : It is

evident that the Crime world of Accused Iqbal and

his family has grown over the past decades with

support of earlier dispensation/Government(s), and

that is why the criminal cases registered against him

in the years 1990 – 1993, were withdrawn by the

earlier Government(s). The Accused Iqbal terrorized

the people, he is a known name of terror in the area

of District Saharanpur or Western State of Uttar

Pradesh, due to which, no FIR(s)/Criminal cases

were registered against the Accused Iqbal and his

family members.

● LOOK OUT NOTICES : The accused Iqbal is

absconding from the process and the number of Look

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Out Circulars were issued against him. But the

Accused Iqbal has not appeared even once in any

case and has already absconded. A person who

does not cooperate with the investigation, no relief

can be granted to him.

● NOTICES U/S SECTION 41 : A large number of

notices under section 41A Cr.P.C. have been issued

in a large number of cases. were issued to the

accused Iqbal @ Bala, despite the service of notices,

the Accused Iqbal neither appeared nor joined the

investigation in any criminal case.

● HISTORY SHEETER GANGSTER GANG LEADER

: The Accused Haji Iqbal @ Mohd. Iqbal @ Bala is a

history-sheeter, gang leader, known name of terror, if

any relief to be given to such type of criminals, who

are publicly involved in rape cases, dacoity cases,

fraud cases, land grabbing cases, extortion cases etc

will send a wrong message/signal to the society and

those persons/victims who come against these

wrongdoers will never get justice and no one will ever

raise their voices against these criminals in future.

● So far as concerned, admitted with the change of

Government, complainant/terrified people, aggrieved

peoples, have been able to come forward to lodge or

register complaints against the Accused Iqbal. Due to

illegal support of earlier Government(s), no complaint

or criminal cases were registered against them. Now,

they have come forward to register their grievances.

In the present Government, the number of aggrieved

People, Terrified People/Complainant(s) have been

able to come forward to register or raise a voice

against the Accused Iqbal. On the basis of criminal

complaint(s) actions were taken against the Accused

Iqbal and his family members.

● Even, if these are false cases, the honest or law

abiding persons should join the investigation but the

accused Iqbal is evading all notices and has not

joined any investigation in any criminal case, and

hence Look Out Notices have been issued.

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● It is pertinent to mention here that in all criminal

cases, the complainants are different and the crime

is different and some accused are also different.

● Further, it is pertinent to mention that the Accused

Iqbal and his family regularly threatened the

witnesses.

● The Accused Iqbal should be called upon to submit

and appear before this Hon’ble Court or any court of

law.

● The Accused Iqbal is a land mafia, sand mafia,

rapists, gangster.

● The Accused Iqbal started committing fraud, theft

and robbery cases in the initial days. Eventually, he

became involved in the illegal mining cases and

became a gang leader. Thereafter, the Accused Iqbal

started to grab the forest land as well as government

land in the District of Saharanpur. His family

members and close associates also started to grab

the land of the poor people.

● The Accused Mohd. Iqbal @ Bala is the mining

mafia in western part of state of Uttar Pradesh and

several number of criminal cases are registered

against him and his family members.

● The Accused Mohd. Iqbal, Resident of District

Saharanpur and Ex-Member, Uttar Pradesh

Legislative Council (BSP MLC) is involved in the

various criminal activities. The main allegations

against Mohd. Iqbal are as follows:

● Amassed disproportionate assets;

● Incorporated a number of sham companies under

the Companies Act, 1956, many of which have

dummy directors or fictitious shareholders;

● Used Golbal University in Saharanpur (located in

exceeding area more than 700 acres, where he is the

founder Chancellor and managed by the Abdul

Waheed Educational and Charitable Trust, a trust

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set up in in his father’s name with his family

members as its trustees, for creating assets out of

money illegally earned through the mining contracts.

● The Accused Haji Iqbal @ Bala and his family

members are involved in illegal mining cases, land

grabbing cases, fraud cases and other criminal cases

including rape, dacoity and others.

● The Accused Iqbal @ Bala, being Gang leader, and

his gang members are criminal minded persons and

indulges in anti-social activities and the Petitioners,

to gain the illegal money, are involved in illegal

mining business, grabbing the government and non-

government land by taking illegal possession.

● It is submitted that the fact that the complaints

may have been initiated by reason of political

vendetta is not in itself ground for quashing the

criminal proceedings.

● That the section 482 of the Cr.P.C. provides:- “482.

Saving of inherent powers of High Court — Nothing in

this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the

inherent powers of the High Court to make such

orders as may be necessary to give effect to any

order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the

process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends

of justice.”

● That this Hon’ble Court has held in Monica

Kumar (Dr.) v. State of U.P. reported as (2008) 8

SCC 781, that inherent jurisdiction under Section

482 of the Cr. P. C has to be exercised sparingly,

carefully and with caution and only when such

exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down

in the section itself.

● That further, it is pertinent to mention that this

Hon’ble Court has held in case Mrs. Dhanalakshmi

Vs R. Prasanna Kumar , reported as AIR 1990 SC

494 that in exceptional cases, to prevent of the

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powers of Court, the High Court might in exercise of

its inherent powers under section 482 Cr. P.C. quash

criminal proceedings. However, interference would

only be justified when complaint did not disclose any

offence, or was patently frivolous, vexatious or

oppressive.

In the present case, the FIR/Crime No. 122/2022

U/s 376, 323, 354(A) IPC & Section 7, 8 of POCSO

Act, 2012 was registered at P.S. Mahila Thana,

District Saharanpur disclosed the glaring facts and

there are serious allegations against the Accused

Iqbal and other accused. The facts of the FIR No. 122

of 2022 prima facie reveals commissions of

cognizable offence.

The Accused Haji Iqbal @ Bala has been involved in

more than 45 criminal cases including rape cases,

illegal mining, land grabbing, fraud cases, assault

cases and other criminal cases since 1990. The first

FIR was registered against the Accused Iqbal in 1990

i.e. FIR No. 57 of 1990 U/s 379, 411 IPC and Section

26 of Forest Act at Mirzapur Police Station. However,

due to earlier Government(s) supports, no legal

actions were taken against the Accused Iqbal and his

family members. The following criminal cases are

registered against the Accused Iqbal are as follows:-

Sr. No.FIR/Crime

No.

Under SectionPolice Station District

1.57 of 1990379, 411 IPC

and section 26

Forest Act

Mirzapur Saharanpur

2. 53 of 1991379, 411 IPC

and section

4/10 Forest Act

Chilkana Saharanpur

3. 217 of

1993

147,323, 504,

506 IPC

Behat Saharanpur

14

4. 302 of

2016

420,467, 468,

471 IPC

Ecotech third Gautambudh

Nagar

5. 196 of

2017

420, 406, 506

IPC

Mirzapur Saharanpur

6. 246 of

2017

452,323,504,

506,354, 147,

148,386, 420,

467,468, 471,

120B IPC

SadarBajar Saharanpur

7. 39 of 2018420,467, 468,

471 IPC

Janakpuri, Saharanpur

8. 52 of 2018147,148,149,

352,504,147,

148,386,420,

467,468,471,

120B IPC

Section 3(2)(5)A

SC/ST Act and

Section 7

Criminal Law

Amendment

Act

SadarBajar Saharanpur

9. 65 of 2018403,447,506,

120B IPC

Mirzapur Saharanpur

10. 165 of

2018

2/3 Gangster ActMirzapur Saharanpur

11. 177 of

2019

420,504,506,

467, 468, 471

IPC

Mirzapur Saharanpur

12. 178 of

2019

406,342,392,

504, 506, 354

IPC

Mirzapur Saharanpur

13. 587 of

2019

120B, 167,

467,

468, 471 IPC

SadarBajar Saharanpur

14. 519 of

2021

420,466,467,

468,471,

120B IPC

Behat Saharanpur

15

15. 83 of 20222/3 Gangster ActMirzapur Saharanpur

16. 97 of 2022504, 506, 386

IPC

Mirzapur Saharanpur

17. 101 of

2022

504, 506 IPC Mirzapur Saharanpur

18. 102 of

2022

420,467,468,

471 IPC

Mirzapur Saharanpur

19. 89 of 87-88 Badkala Forest

Range

20. 29 of 89-90 Badkala Forest

Range

21. 173 of

89-

90

Badkala Forest

Range

22. 53 of 91 4/10 Forest ActBehat Saharanpur

23. 70 of 91-92 Behat Saharanpur

24. 71 of 91-92 Behat Saharanpur

25. 72 of 91-92 Behat Saharanpur

26. 103 of

1992

379, 411 IPC

and

26 of Forest Act

Behat Saharanpur

27. 104 of

1994

379, 411 IPC

and

section 26

of Forest Act

Behat Saharanpur

28. 105 of

1992

379, 411 IPC

and

section 26

of Forest Act

Behat Saharanpur

29. 32 of 2001147, 148, 306

IPC

Yamuna Nagar, Yamuna

Nagar,

Haryana

16

FIR No. 224 of 2022 U/s 395, 504, 506, 323

IPC:-

c) The Petitioners and other accused robbed the

Complainant and his brother and got the signature on

stamp papers of the aforementioned land forcefully.

d) Further, it was alleged in that due to terror of the

Petitioners and their family, no other family members

have supported to lodge the complaint, but after seeing

that the other aggrieved persons are taking action

against the Petitioners and their family members, the

complainant decided to lodge the complaint against the

Petitioners and other accused persons for the said

criminal incident.

e) The Investigation Officer also recorded the statement

of the independent witnesses and collected the other

material evidence against the Petitioners and other

accused persons, which prima facie shows that the

Petitioners ad other accused persons have committed

the serious offences.

f) The Investigation has been completed and

chargesheet is ready to file against the Petitioners but

due to stay order dated 28.11.2022 of this Hon’ble

Court, the chargesheet could not be submitted.

SUBMISSIONS IN RESPECT OF DELAY

a) The impugned first information report prima

facie reveals commission of cognizable offences and

which inspire confidence that it is clear from the

contents of the FIR that serious crime was committed

by the Petitioners and other accused persons.

b) The Dacoity is defined under section 391 IPC,

which stipulates that when five or more persons

conjointly or attempt to commit a robbery or, or where

the whole number of persons conjointly committing or

attempting to commit a robbery, and persons present

and aiding such commission or attempt, amount to five

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or more, every person so committing, attempting or

aiding, is said to commit “dacoity.

c) Further, the robbery has defined under section

390 IPC, which stipulates that Theft is “robbery” if, in

order to the committing of the theft, or in committing the

theft, or in carrying away or attempting to carry away

property obtained by the theft, the offender, for that

end, voluntarily causes or attempts to cause to any

person death or hurt or wrongful restraint, or fear of

instant death or of instant hurt, or of instant wrongful

restraint.

In the present case, the other accused persons (total 6

accused persons) have looted & extorted the

complainant. The contents of the FIR prima facie

reveals that the Complainant, when they visited the

house of the Petitioners, he was looted and wrongful

restrained by the Petitioners. The petitioners and the

other accused persons, as such, prima facie involved in

the offences as mentioned in the FIR.

d) Recently, this Hon’ble Court has held in case

Mahendra Prasad Tiwari Vs Amit Kumar Tiwari

& Anr reported as 2022 SCC Online SC 1057 held that

delay is registration of the FIR is not a ground to

discharge.

e) This Hon’ble Court has held in case Thakur

Ram v. State of Bihar, reported as (1966) 2 SCR 740,

that barring a few exceptions, in criminal matters the

party who is treated as the aggrieved party is the State

which is the custodian of the social interests of the

community at large and so it is for the State to take all

the steps necessary for bringing the person who has

acted against the social interests of the community to

book.

f) This Hon’ble Court has held in case Sheonandan

Paswan v. State of Bihar, (1987) 1 SCC 288

17. It is undoubtedly true that the prosecution

against Dr. Jagannath Mishra was initiated by

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the successor government of Karpoori Thakur

after Dr. Jagannath Mishra went out of power.

But that by itself cannot support the inference

that the initiation of the prosecution was

actuated by political vendetta or mala fides

because it is quite possible that there might be

material justifying the initiation of prosecution

against Dr. Jagannath Mishra and the

successor government might have legitimately

felt that there was a case for initiation of

prosecution and that is why the prosecution

might have been initiated. There would be

nothing wrong on the part of the successor

government in doing so and the prosecution

cannot be said to be vitiated on that account.

This is precisely what Hidayatullah, J.

speaking for the Constitution Bench pointed out

in Krishna Ballabh Sahay v. Commission of

Enquiry [AIR 1969 SC 258 : (1969) 1 SCR 387,

393 : 1969 Cri LJ 520] :

“The contention that the power cannot be

exercised by the succeeding Ministry

has been answered already by this Court

in two cases. The earlier of the two has

been referred to by the High Court

already. The more recent case is P.V.

Jagannath Rao v. State of Orissa [AIR

1969 SC 215 : (1968) 3 SCR 789] . It

hardly needs any authority to state that

the inquiry will be ordered not by the

Minister against himself but by someone

else. Where a Ministry goes out of office,

its successor may consider any glaring

charges and may, if justified, order an

inquiry. Otherwise, each Ministry will

become a law unto itself and the corrupt

conduct of its Ministers will remain

beyond scrutiny.”

These observations afford a complete answer to the

contention urged on behalf of Dr. Jagannath Mishra

19

that this Court should not interfere with the

withdrawal of the prosecution because the successor

government of Karpoori Thakur or Sheonandan

Paswan was actuated by political motivation or

vendetta.”

9. Ms. Garima Prasad brought to the notice of this Court

that the investigation has been completed and charge sheet is

ready to be filed against the appellants and other co-accused,

however, due to the interim order passed by this Court on

28.11.2022, the Investigation Officer has not been able to file

the charge sheet before the concerned trial court.

ANALYSIS

10.Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the

parties and having gone through the materials on record, the

following questions fall for the consideration by this Court:-

1. Whether the plain reading of the FIR discloses

commission of the offence of dacoity punishable under

Section 395 of the IPC? To put it in other words, even

if the entire case of the prosecution is believed to be

true, whether the ingredients to constitute the offence

of dacoity punishable under Section 395 of the IPC

are disclosed?

20

2. Whether any case of criminal intimidation

punishable under Sections 504 and 506(2) of the IPC

is made out?

3. Whether the allegations levelled in the FIR

inspire any confidence considering the fact that the

FIR was lodged in the year 2022 for the alleged offence

of the year 2021 and more particularly, without

furnishing any details as regards the date and time of

the alleged incident?

4. Whether the case on hand falls within any

one of the parameters laid down by this Court in the

case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal , AIR 1992

SC 604, for the purposes of quashing the criminal

case?

DISCUSSION

OFFENCE OF DACOITY:-

11.The offence of dacoity falls within Chapter XVII of the

IPC which relates to Offences Against Property. Section 390

explains what is “robbery”. It explains, when theft is robbery

21

and when extortion is robbery. Section 390 along with

illustrations reads thus:-

“Section 390. Robbery.─In all robbery there is either

theft or extortion.

When theft is robbery.—Theft is "robbery" if, in order

to the committing of the theft, or in committing the theft,

or in carrying away or attempting to carry away

property obtained by the theft, the offender, for that end

voluntarily causes or attempts to cause to any person

death or hurt or wrongful restraint, or fear of instant

death or of instant hurt, or of instant wrongful restraint.

When extortion is robbery.—Extortion is "robbery" if

the offender, at the time of committing the extortion, is in

the presence of the person put in fear, and commits the

extortion by putting that person in fear of instant death,

of instant hurt, or of instant wrongful restraint to that

person or to some other person, and, by so putting in

fear, induces the person so put in fear then and there to

deliver up the thing extorted.

Explanation.—The offender is said to be present if he is

sufficiently near to put the other person in fear of instant

death, of instant hurt, or of instant wrongful restraint.

Illustrations

(a) A holds Z down, and fraudulently takes Z's money

and jewels from Z's clothes, without Z's consent. Here A

has committed theft, and, in order to the committing of

that theft, has voluntarily caused wrongful restraint to Z.

A has therefore committed robbery.

(b) A meets Z on the high road, shows a pistol, and

demands Z's purse. Z, in consequence, surrenders his

purse. Here A has extorted the purse from Z by putting

him in fear of instant hurt, and being at the time of

committing the extortion in his presence. A has therefore

committed robbery.

22

(c) A meets Z and Z's child on the high road. A takes the

child, and threatens to filing it down a precipice, unless Z

delivers his purse. Z, in consequence, delivers his purse.

Here A has extorted the purse from Z, by causing Z to be

in fear of instant hurt to the child who is there present. A

has therefore committed robbery on Z.

(d) A obtains property from Z by saying "Your child is in

the hands of my gang, and will be put to death unless

you send us ten thousand rupees". This is extortion, and

punishable as such: but it is not robbery, unless Z is put

in fear of the instant death of his child.”

12.Section 391 of the IPC defines “dacoity”. Section 391

reads thus:-

“Section 391. Dacoity. — When five or more persons

conjointly commit or attempt to commit a robbery, or

where the whole number of persons conjointly

committing or attempting to commit a robbery, and

persons present and aiding such commission or attempt,

amount to five or more, every person so committing,

attempting or aiding, is said to commit "dacoity".”

13.Section 395 provides for punishment for the offence of

dacoity. Section 395 reads thus:-

“Section 395. Punishment for dacoity . —Whoever

commits dacoity shall be punished with imprisonment

for life, or with rigorous imprisonment for a term which

may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.”

14.Theft amounts to ‘robbery’ if, in order to the committing

of the theft, or in committing the theft, or in carrying away or

attempting to carry away property obtained by the theft, the

23

offender for that end, voluntarily causes or attempts to cause to

any person death or hurt or wrongful restraint, or fear of instant

death or of instant hurt, or of instant wrongful restraint. Before

theft can amount to ‘robbery’, the offender must have

voluntarily caused or attempted to cause to any person death or

hurt or wrongful restraint, or fear of instant death or of instant

hurt, or of instant wrongful restraint. The second necessary

ingredient is that this must be in order to the committing of the

theft, or in committing the theft, or in carrying away or

attempting to carry away property obtained by the theft. The

third necessary ingredient is that the offender must voluntarily

cause or attempt to cause to any person hurt etc., for that end,

that is, in order to the committing of the theft or for the purpose

of committing theft or for carrying away or attempting to carry

away property obtained by the theft. It is not sufficient that in

the transaction of committing theft, hurt, etc., had been caused.

If hurt, etc., is caused at the time of the commission of the theft

but for an object other than the one referred to in Section 390,

IPC, theft would not amount to robbery. It is also not sufficient

that hurt had been caused in the course of the same

transaction as commission of the theft.

24

15.The three ingredients mentioned in Section 390, IPC,

must always be satisfied before theft can amount to robbery,

and this has been explained in Bishambhar Nath v. Emperor,

A.I.R. 1941 Oudh 476, in the following words:-

“The words “for that end” in sec.390 clearly mean that

the hurt caused by the offender must be with the

express object of facilitating the committing of the theft,

or must be caused while the offender is committing the

theft or is carrying away or is attempting to carry away

the property obtained by theft. It does not mean that the

assault or the hurt must be caused in the same

transaction or in the same circumstances.”

16. In Karuppa Gounden v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1918 Madras

821, which followed two Calcutta cases of Otaruddi

Manjhi v. Kafiluddi Manjhi, (1900-01) 5 C.W.N. 372, and King

Emperor v. Mathura Thakur , (1901-02) 6 C.W.N. 72, it has

been observed at page 824 as follows:-

“Now it is our duty to give effect to the words “for that

end”. It would have been open to the legislature to have

used other words which would not raise the difficulty

that arises here. The Public Prosecutor has been forced

to argue that “for that end” must be read as meaning ‘in

those circumstances’. In my opinion we cannot do that in

construing a section in the Penal Code. Undoubtedly,

words ‘in those circumstances’ would widen the

application of the section and we are not permitted to do

that. The matter has been considered in two judgments

of the Calcutta High Court one of which is reported as

25

Otaruddi Manjhi v. Kafiluddi Manjhi (1900-01) 5 C.W.N.

372. Their Lordships put the question in this way:

“It seems to us that the whole question turns upon

the words “for that end”. Was any hurt or fear of

instant hurt, that was caused in the present case,

caused for the end of the commission of the theft? We

think not. It seems to us that whatever violence was

used for the purpose of dispossessing the persons

who were already in possession of the premises in

question and had no relation to the commission of

theft, although theft was committed at the same

time.”

(Emphasis supplied)

17.Ordinarily, if violence or hurt is caused at the time of

theft, it would be reasonable to infer that violence or hurt was

caused for facilitating the commission of the theft or for

facilitating the carrying away of the property stolen or for

facilitating the attempt to do so. But there may be something

in the evidence to indicate that hurt or violence was caused not

for this purpose but for a different purpose. We are of the view

that prosecution has blindfoldedly and without understanding

the true purport of the offence of “dacoity” registered the FIR

for the offence punishable under Section 395 of the IPC and

proceeded to even prepare charge sheet for the offence of

dacoity.

26

18.Even if we believe or accept the entire case put up by

the first informant, none of the ingredients to constitute the

offence of dacoity are disclosed. Let us once again recapitulate

the case of the first informant. The incident is alleged to have

occurred at the house of the appellant No. 2. It is the first

informant and his brother who are said to have visited one fine

day the house of the appellant No. 2. At that point of time, the

other co-accused are also shown to be present. There is no

good or plausible explanation coming from the first informant

as to why he was carrying Rs. 2 Lakh in his pocket. The entire

case put up by the first informant appears to be fabricated. Let

us assume for the time being that the first informant was in

fact carrying Rs. 2 Lakh in his pocket and at the time of alleged

incident, the amount was forcibly taken away by the accused

persons, whether this taking away of Rs. 2 Lakh from the

pocket of the first informant would fall within the ambit of the

words “for that end” occurring in Section 390 of the IPC. The

answer is an emphatic “No”. Even according to the first

informant, the dispute was one relating to the agricultural

land. The first informant says that he is the lawful owner of

the land in question, whereas, according to him, the accused

27

persons are wrongly claiming to be the lawful owners of the

land. With a view to settle this dispute, the first informant and

his brother are said to have visited the house of the appellant

No. 2 on their own free will and volition. It is only after

reaching the house of the appellant No. 2 that the entire

incident is alleged to have occurred. We should be mindful of

the fact that we are dealing with provisions of a criminal

statute, like the IPC. The provisions of any criminal statute are

to be construed and interpreted strictly.

19.The general rule governing the interpretation of penal

statute is that it must be strictly construed. Strict

interpretation in the words of Crawford connotes:-

“If a statute is to be strictly construed, nothing should

be included within its scope that does not come clearly

within the meaning of the language used. Its language

must be given exact and technical meaning with no

extension on account of implications or equitable

considerations; or has been aptly asserted, its

operation must be confined to cases coming clearly

within the letter of the statute as well as within its

spirit and reason. Or stated perhaps more concisely, it

is close and conservative adherence to the literal or

textual interpretation.”

20.According to Sutherland, by the rule of strict construction

it is not meant that the statute shall be stringently or narrowly

28

construed but it means that everything shall be excluded from its

operation which does not clearly come within the scope of the

language used.

21.When it is said that all penal statutes are to be

construed strictly, it only means that the Court must see that

the thing charged is an offence within the plain meaning of the

words used and must not strain the words.

22.In the circumstances referred to above, we have reached

the conclusion that Section 395 of the IPC is not applicable to

the case on hand.

SECTIONS 503, 504 AND 506 OF THE IPC

23.Chapter XXII of the IPC relates to Criminal Intimidation,

Insult and Annoyance. Section 503 reads thus:-

“Section 503. Criminal intimidation . —Whoever

threatens another with any injury to his person,

reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of

any one in whom that person is interested, with intent

to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person

to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to

omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled

to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such

threat, commits criminal intimidation.

Explanation.—A threat to injure the reputation of any

deceased person in whom the person threatened is

interested, is within this section.

29

Illustration

A, for the purpose of inducing B to resist from

prosecuting a civil suit, threatens to burn B's house. A

is guilty of criminal intimidation.”

Section 504 reads thus:-

“Section 504. Intentional insult with intent to

provoke breach of the peace .—Whoever

intentionally insults, and thereby gives provocation to

any person, intending or knowing it to be likely that

such provocation will cause him to break the public

peace, or to commit any other offence, shall be

punished with imprisonment of either description for a

term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or

with both.”

Section 506 reads thus:-

“Section 506. Punishment for criminal

intimidation. —Whoever commits, the offence of

criminal intimidation shall be punished with

imprisonment of either description for a term which

may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both;

If threat be to cause death or grievous hurt,

etc.—And if the threat be to cause death or grievous

hurt, or to cause the destruction of any property by

fire, or to cause an offence punishable with death

or imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment for a

term which may extend to seven years, or to impute

unchastity to a woman, shall be punished with

imprisonment of either description for a term which

may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both.”

24.An offence under Section 503 has following essentials:-

1) Threatening a person with any injury;

(i) to his person, reputation or property; or

30

(ii) to the person, or reputation of any one in whom

that person is interested.

2) The threat must be with intent;

(i) to cause alarm to that person; or

(ii) to cause that person to do any act which he is not

legally bound to do as the means of avoiding the

execution of such threat; or

(iii) to cause that person to omit to do any act which

that person is legally entitled to do as the means of

avoiding the execution of such threat.

25. Section 504 of the IPC contemplates intentionally

insulting a person and thereby provoking such person insulted

to breach the peace or intentionally insulting a person knowing

it to be likely that the person insulted may be provoked so as to

cause a breach of the public peace or to commit any other

offence. Mere abuse may not come within the purview of the

section. But, the words of abuse in a particular case might

amount to an intentional insult provoking the person insulted

to commit a breach of the public peace or to commit any other

offence. If abusive language is used intentionally and is of such

a nature as would in the ordinary course of events lead the

31

person insulted to break the peace or to commit an offence

under the law, the case is not taken away from the purview of

the Section merely because the insulted person did not

actually break the peace or commit any offence having

exercised selfcontrol or having been subjected to abject terror

by the offender. In judging whether particular abusive language

is attracted by Section 504, IPC, the court has to find out what,

in the ordinary circumstances, would be the effect of the

abusive language used and not what the complainant actually

did as a result of his peculiar idiosyncrasy or cool

temperament or sense of discipline. It is the ordinary general

nature of the abusive language that is the test for considering

whether the abusive language is an intentional insult likely to

provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace

and not the particular conduct or temperament of the

complainant.

26. Mere abuse, discourtesy, rudeness or insolence, may not

amount to an intentional insult within the meaning of Section

504, IPC if it does not have the necessary element of being

likely to incite the person insulted to commit a breach of the

32

peace of an offence and the other element of the accused

intending to provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of

the peace or knowing that the person insulted is likely to

commit a breach of the peace. Each case of abusive language

shall have to be decided in the light of the facts and

circumstances of that case and there cannot be a general

proposition that no one commits an offence under Section 504,

IPC if he merely uses abusive language against the

complainant. In King Emperor v. Chunnibhai Dayabhai ,

(1902) 4 Bom LR 78, a Division Bench of the Bombay High

Court pointed out that:-

“To constitute an offence under Section 504, I.P.C. it

is sufficient if the insult is of a kind calculated to

cause the other party to lose his temper and say or

do something violent. Public peace can be broken by

angry words as well as deeds.”

(Emphasis supplied)

27. A bare perusal of Section 506 of the IPC makes it clear

that a part of it relates to criminal intimidation. Before an

offence of criminal intimidation is made out, it must be

established that the accused had an intention to cause alarm

to the complainant.

33

28.In the facts and circumstances of the case and more

particularly, considering the nature of the allegations levelled

in the FIR, a prima facie case to constitute the offence

punishable under Section 506 of the IPC may probably could

be said to have been disclosed but not under Section 504 of the

IPC. The allegations with respect to the offence punishable

under Section 504 of the IPC can also be looked at from a

different perspective. In the FIR, all that the first informant has

stated is that abusive language was used by the accused

persons. What exactly was uttered in the form of abuses is not

stated in the FIR. One of the essential elements, as discussed

above, constituting an offence under Section 504 of the IPC is

that there should have been an act or conduct amounting to

intentional insult. Where that act is the use of the abusive

words, it is necessary to know what those words were in order

to decide whether the use of those words amounted to

intentional insult. In the absence of these words, it is not

possible to decide whether the ingredient of intentional insult

is present.

34

29.However, as observed earlier, the entire case put up by

the first informant on the face of it appears to be concocted

and fabricated. At this stage, we may refer to the parameters

laid down by this Court for quashing of an FIR in the case of

Bhajan Lal (supra). The parameters are:-

“(1) Where the allegations made in the first information

report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their

face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima

facie constitute any offence or make out a case against

the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report

and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do

not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an

investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of

the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within

the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the

FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support

of the same do not disclose the commission of any

offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a

cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable

offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer

without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under

Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint

are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis

of which no prudent person can ever reach a just

conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding

against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any

of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act

(under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the

35

institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or

where there is a specific provision in the Code or the

concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the

grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended

with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is

maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for

wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to

spite him due to private and personal grudge.”

In our opinion, the present case falls within the parameters Nos.

1, 5 and 7 resply referred to above.

30.At this stage, we would like to observe something

important. Whenever an accused comes before the Court

invoking either the inherent powers under Section 482 of the

Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) or extraordinary jurisdiction

under Article 226 of the Constitution to get the FIR or the

criminal proceedings quashed essentially on the ground that

such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or

instituted with the ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, then

in such circumstances the Court owes a duty to look into the

FIR with care and a little more closely. We say so because once

the complainant decides to proceed against the accused with an

ulterior motive for wreaking personal vengeance, etc., then he

would ensure that the FIR/complaint is very well drafted with

36

all the necessary pleadings. The complainant would ensure that

the averments made in the FIR/complaint are such that they

disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged

offence. Therefore, it will not be just enough for the Court to

look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the

purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to

constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not. In frivolous or

vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many

other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the

case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due

care and circumspection try to read in between the lines. The

Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the

CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself

only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account

the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of

the case as well as the materials collected in the course of

investigation. Take for instance the case on hand. Multiple FIRs

have been registered over a period of time. It is in the

background of such circumstances the registration of multiple

FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of

wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge as alleged.

37

31.In State of Andhra Pradesh v. Golconda Linga Swamy ,

(2004) 6 SCC 522, a two-Judge Bench of this Court elaborated on

the types of materials the High Court can assess to quash an FIR.

The Court drew a fine distinction between

consideration of materials that were tendered as evidence and

appreciation of such evidence. Only such material that manifestly

fails to prove the accusation in the FIR can be considered for

quashing an FIR. The Court held:-

“5. …Authority of the court exists for

advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to

abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the

court has power to prevent such abuse. It would be an

abuse of the process of the court to allow any action

which would result in injustice and prevent

promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court

would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds

that initiation or continuance of it amounts to

abuse of the process of court or quashing of these

proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice.

When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the

court may examine the question of fact. When a

complaint is sought to be quashed, it is

permissible to look into the materials to assess

what the complainant has alleged and whether

any offence is made out even if the allegations

are accepted in toto.

6. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC

866 : 1960 Cri LJ 1239, this Court summarised some

categories of cases where inherent power can and

should be exercised to quash the proceedings : (AIR p.

869, para 6)

38

(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a

legal bar against the institution or continuance

e.g. want of sanction;

(ii) where the allegations in the first information

report or complaint taken at its face value and

accepted in their entirety do not constitute the

offence alleged;

(iii) where the allegations constitute an

offence, but there is no legal evidence

adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or

manifestly fails to prove the charge.

7. In dealing with the last category, it is

important to bear in mind the distinction

between a case where there is no legal evidence

or where there is evidence which is clearly

inconsistent with the accusations made, and a

case where there is legal evidence which, on

appreciation, may or may not support the

accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under

Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would

not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether

the evidence in question is reliable or not or

whether on a reasonable appreciation of it

accusation would not be sustained. That is the

function of the trial Judge. Judicial process, no

doubt should not be an instrument of oppression, or,

needless harassment. Court should be circumspect

and judicious in exercising discretion and should take

all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration

before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument

in the hands of a private complainant to unleash

vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the

same time the section is not an instrument handed

over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and

bring about its sudden death…..”

(Emphasis supplied)

DELAY IN LODGING THE FIR

39

32.The alleged incident is said to have occurred sometime in

the year 2021. There is no reference to any date or time of the

incident in the FIR. The allegations are too vague and general.

Had it been the case of prompt registration of the FIR, probably

the police might have been able to recover Rs. 2 Lakh from the

possession of the accused persons alleged to have been forcibly

taken away from the pocket of the first informant. The FIR also

talks about a document on which the first informant and his

brother were forced to put their signatures. We wonder, whether

the investigating agency was in a position to collect or recover

any such document from the accused persons containing their

signatures in the course of the investigation, more particularly

when the State says that the investigation is over and the charge

sheet is also ready. In the absence of all this material, how is the

State going to prove its case against the accused persons. The

FIR in a criminal case is an extremely vital and valuable piece of

evidence for the purpose of corroborating the oral evidence

adduced at the trial. The object of insisting upon lodging of the

FIR to the police in respect of commission of an offence is to

obtain early information regarding the circumstances in which

the crime was committed, the names of the actual culprits and

40

the part played by them as well as names of the eye witnesses

present at the scene of occurrence.

33.In the aforesaid context, we may clarify that delay in the

registration of the FIR, by itself, cannot be a ground for

quashing of the FIR. However, delay with other attending

circumstances emerging from the record of the case rendering

the entire case put up by the prosecution inherently

improbable, may at times become a good ground to quash the

FIR and consequential proceedings. If the FIR, like the one in

the case on hand, is lodged after a period of more than one year

without disclosing the date and time of the alleged incident and

further without any plausible and convincing explanation for

such delay, then how is the accused expected to defend himself

in the trial. It is altogether different to say that in a given case,

in the course of investigation the investigating agency may be

able to ascertain the date and time of the incident, etc. The

recovery of few incriminating articles may also at times lend

credence to the allegations levelled in the FIR. However, in the

absence of all such materials merely on the basis of vague and

41

general allegations levelled in the FIR, the accused cannot be

put to trial.

34.The learned Additional Advocate General appearing for

the State vehemently submitted that considering the gross

criminal antecedents of the appellants before us, the criminal

proceedings may not be quashed. The learned Additional

Advocate General appearing for the State in her written

submissions has furnished details in regard to the antecedents

of the appellants. A bare look at the chart may give an

impression that the appellants are history sheeters and

hardened criminals. However, when it comes to quashing of the

FIR or criminal proceedings, the criminal antecedents of the

accused cannot be the sole consideration to decline to quash the

criminal proceedings. An accused has a legitimate right to say

before the Court that howsoever bad his antecedents may be,

still if the FIR fails to disclose commission of any offence or his

case falls within one of the parameters as laid down by this

Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra), then the Court should

not decline to quash the criminal case only on the ground that

the accused is a history sheeter. Initiation of prosecution has

42

adverse and harsh consequences for the persons named as

accused. In Directorate of Revenue and another v.

Mohammed Nisar Holia , (2008) 2 SCC 370, this Court

explicitly recognises the right to not to be disturbed without

sufficient grounds as one of the underlying mandates of Article

21 of the Constitution. Thus, the requirement and need to

balance the law enforcement power and protection of citizens

from injustice and harassment must be maintained. It goes

without saying that the State owes a duty to ensure that no

crime goes unpunished but at the same time it also owes a duty

to ensure that none of its subjects are unnecessarily harassed.

35.In the overall view of the matter, we are convinced that

the continuation of the criminal case arising from the FIR No.

224 of 2022 registered at Mirzapur Police Station, Saharanpur

will be nothing but abuse of the process of the law. In the

peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, we are inclined to

accept the case put up on behalf of the appellants herein.

36.In the result, this appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed.

The impugned order passed by the High Court of Judicature at

Allahabad is hereby set aside. The criminal proceedings arising

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from FIR No. 224 of 2022 dated 19.09.2022 registered at Police

Station Mirzapur, Saharanpur, State of U.P. are hereby quashed.

37.It is needless to clarify that the observations made in this

judgment are relevant only for the purpose of the FIR in

question and the consequential criminal proceedings. None of

the observations shall have any bearing on any of the pending

criminal prosecutions or any other proceedings.

………………………………..J.

( B.R. GAVAI )

………………………………..J.

( J.B. PARDIWALA )

NEW DELHI;

AUGUST 08, 2023

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