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2026:CGHC:21284

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10.04.2026 07.05.2026 -- 07.05.2026

AFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

CRA No. 963 of 2014

1.Mohammad Yusuf Quraishi, S/o Mohd. Rajjab Quraishi

(Died and appeal abated as per Hon'ble Court Order Dated

08-04-2025.

2.Smt. Gulshana Quraishi W/o Mohammad Yusuf Quraishi,

Aged About 51 Years, R/o Mastan Para, Sukma, P.S.

Sukma, Civil District Sukma and Revenue District Sukma

C.G..

3.Mohammad Anwar Quraishi S/o Mohammad Yusuf Quraishi,

Aged About 34 Years, R/o Mastan Para, Sukma, P.S.

Sukma, Civil District Sukma And Revenue District Sukma

C.G.

4.Mohammad Sarwar Quraishi S/o Mohammad Sarwar

Quraishi, Aged About 32 Years R/o Mastan Para, Sukma,

P.S. Sukma, Civil District Sukma And Revenue District

Sukma C.G.

... Appellants

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versus

 State of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Sukma, Civil

District Sukma, Revenue District Sukma C.G.

...Respondent

For Appellant :Mr. Manoj Paranjape, Sr. Advocate with Mr.

Aditya Dhar Diwan, Advocate.

For

Respondent/State

:Mr. Siddhant Tiwari, Panel Lawyer.

(Hon’ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey)

(C A V Judgment)

1.This Criminal appeal is directed against the judgment of

conviction and order of sentenced dated 19.09.2014 passed

in Session Trial No. 111/2008 whereby the learned

Additional Sessions Judge (FTC), South Bastar Dantewara

(C.G.) has convicted the appellants under Section 304-B

(2) of IPC and sentenced them to undergo R.I. for 07 years.

2.Prosecution story, in brief, is that the marriage of deceased

Noor Bano was solemnized with accused Anwar Qureshi

about five years prior to the incident dated 14.04.2008.

Soon after the marriage, the accused persons started

demanding dowry, on account of which the deceased

remained at her parental home for a considerable period,

where she also gave birth to a male child. On the occasion

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of the marriage of her younger sister, the accused persons

were invited, and after attending the ceremony, they took

the deceased with them to their house at Sukma on

10.04.2008. On 14.04.2008, the deceased telephonically

informed her father that she was being assaulted by the

accused persons, whereupon her parents and relatives went

to Sukma and, after counselling the accused, were returning

to Chhindgarh when they received information that the

deceased had sustained burn injuries and had been

admitted to the hospital. The deceased was initially taken to

Sukma Hospital, where intimation was given to the police,

and considering her critical condition, she was referred to

District Hospital, Jagdalpur. Her dying declaration (Ex.P-3)

was recorded on 15.04.2008 by the Executive Magistrate

(PW-2) at Maharani Hospital, Jagdalpur, where she

succumbed to her injuries on the same day. Merg intimation

was registered, inquest proceedings (Ex.P-4) were

conducted, and the dead body was sent for postmortem

examination which was conduced vide Ex.P-1. During

investigation, statements of the witnesses Abdul Tahir

Quraishi and Saleem Quraishi, brother-in-law and brother of

deceased were recorded wherein it was revealed that the

deceased was subjected to cruelty and harassment on

account of dowry demand. Consequently, offence under

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Sections 304-B, 201 read with Section 34 of the IPC was

registered against the accused persons.

3.After due investigation, charge sheet was filed against the

accused for the offence under Section 304-B, 201, 34 of IPC

before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Sukma, from

where the case was committed to the Court of Sessions and

thereafter transferred to the learned Trial Court for trial. After

filing of the charge sheet, the trial Court framed the charge

against accused/appellants under Section 304-B (2) of IPC.

4.So as to hold the accused/appellant guilty, the prosecution

has examined as many as 12 witnesses. 06 defence

witnesses were examined by the accused/appellants in their

defence. Statements of the accused/appellants were also

recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. in which they

denied the charges levelled against them and pleaded

innocence and false implication in the case.

5.After hearing counsel for the parties, the learned trial Court

has convicted and sentenced the accused/appellants as

mentioned above in para 1 of this judgment. Hence this

appeal.

6.Mr. Manoj Paranjape, learned counsel for the appellants

submits that Learned counsel for the appellants submits that

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the charge framed against the appellants under Section

304-B of the IPC is wholly misconceived as it has not come

in the evidence on record, and has resulted in serious

prejudice to the appellants. It is contended that the learned

Trial Court has failed to appreciate that demand of dowry is

a sine qua non for constituting an offence under Section

304-B IPC, however, in the present case, there is not even

an iota of evidence to establish that the deceased was

subjected to cruelty or harassment in connection with any

demand of dowry soon before her death.

7.Learned counsel further submits that the prosecution

witnesses, who have attempted to introduce allegations of

dowry demand, have admitted during their cross-

examination that such allegations are being made for the

first time before the trial Court and were never stated either

in the written report or in their statements recorded under

Section 161 CrPC. This material omission renders their

testimony unreliable and unworthy of credence. It is also

contended that once the essential ingredient required to

establish an offence under Section 304-B IPC is absent, the

appellants are entitled to acquittal, particularly when no

alternative charge has been framed against them. It is

further submitted that as per the prosecution case itself, the

door of the room was found locked from inside, which

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clearly rules out the involvement of the appellants in the

alleged offence. Learned counsel further argues that PW-5

has specifically stated that an earlier dying declaration had

already been recorded by the Tahsildar at Sukma, but the

same has been deliberately withheld by the prosecution,

which creates serious doubt about the fairness of the

investigation and suggests that the best evidence has been

suppressed to falsely implicate the appellants.

8.It is further submitted that the learned Trial Court has erred

in not properly appreciating the dying declaration (Ex. P-3)

of the deceased, which clearly indicates that the quarrel

took place on account of an issue relating to her son. There

is not even a whisper in the entire dying declaration that the

deceased was subjected to cruelty on account of dowry

demand. Even PW-2, the Tahsildar who recorded the dying

declaration, has categorically admitted in paragraph 10 of

his deposition that the deceased did not make any

statement regarding demand of dowry. The prosecution has

failed to establish that the deceased was subjected to

cruelty or harassment in connection with dowry demand

soon before her death. In this regard, reliance is placed

upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sunil

Bajaj v. State of Madhya Pradesh ((2001) 9 SCC 417),

wherein it has been held that in absence of any specific

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material indicating demand of dowry, conviction under

Section 304-B IPC cannot be sustained merely on vague

and general allegations.

9.It is contended that the doctor who allegedly certified that

the deceased was in a fit state of mind to give the dying

declaration has neither been cited as a prosecution witness

nor examined before the Trial Court. In absence of such

crucial evidence, it cannot be said that the deceased was in

a fit mental and physical condition at the time of making the

statement. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the

judgment of the this High Court in Vinay Kumar Pandey vs.

State of Chhattisgarh and connected matters [CRA

No.1306/2022, Neutral Citation No.2025:CGHC:21002],

wherein it has been held that non-examination of the doctor

certifying the fitness of the deceased renders the dying

declaration unreliable and liable to be discarded.

10.It is also contended that the circumstances under which the

dying declaration was recorded create serious doubt about

its voluntariness and truthfulness. It is submitted that

presence or influence of relatives of the deceased at the

time of recording of the dying declaration raises the

possibility of tutoring or prompting. In this regard, reliance is

placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

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Phulel Singh v. State of Haryana reported in (2023) 10

SCC 268, wherein it has been held that where there exists a

reasonable suspicion of tutoring or influence, the dying

declaration cannot be safely relied upon.

11.Learned counsel further submits that the law relating to

dying declaration is well-settled that though it can form the

sole basis of conviction, it must be wholly reliable, voluntary

and inspire full confidence of the Court. Where the dying

declaration suffers from infirmities, inconsistencies or

suspicion, it would be unsafe to base conviction solely on

such evidence. Reliance is placed upon the decision of the

Hon’ble Supreme Court in Varikuppal Srinivas v. State of

Andhra Pradesh reported in (2009) 3 SCC 415, wherein

the principles governing appreciation of dying declaration

have been comprehensively laid down. It is further

contended that the prosecution has relied upon oral dying

declaration, which is inherently a weak piece of evidence

and such oral dying declaration, in absence of corroboration

and when surrounded by suspicious circumstances, cannot

form the basis of conviction. In this regard, reliance is

placed upon the decision of this High Court in Manish Soni

& Ors. vs. State of Chhattisgarh and connected matter

[CRA No.821/2014 and 1161/2014, Neutral Citation

No.2025:CGHC:21002],

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12.Learned State Counsel submits that the impugned judgment

of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned

Trial Court is well-reasoned, based on proper appreciation

of evidence on record, and does not suffer from any illegality

or perversity warranting interference by this Court. It is

contended that the prosecution has successfully established

the guilt of the accused/appellants beyond reasonable

doubt. It is further submitted that the death of the deceased

was admittedly unnatural, having occurred due to burn

injuries within seven years of her marriage, thereby

attracting the presumption under Section 113-B of the Indian

Evidence Act. The evidence on record clearly demonstrates

that the deceased was subjected to cruelty and harassment

by the accused persons. Merely because the dying

declaration does not contain elaborate details of dowry

demand, the same does not dilute the prosecution case,

particularly when the surrounding circumstances and

testimonies of prosecution witnesses establish that the

deceased was subjected to ill-treatment in her matrimonial

home.

13.Learned State counsel also submits that the evidence of

witnesses cannot be discarded merely on account of minor

discrepancies or improvements, as such variations are

natural and do not go to the root of the prosecution case.

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The consistent version of the witnesses establishes that the

deceased was subjected to cruelty by the accused persons.

It is argued that the learned Trial Court has rightly

appreciated the evidence in its proper perspective and has

recorded a finding of guilt based on cogent and credible

material. So, the appeal being without any merit is liable to

be dismissed.

14.Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the

material available on record.

15.It is clear from the record of the learned trial Court that the

learned trial Court framed charges under Section 304-B (2)

of IPC against the accused/appellants and after appreciation

of oral and documentary evidence, the learned trial Court

convicted the appellants accordingly.

16.It is an admitted position in the case that the marriage of

deceased Noorbano was solemnized with

accused/appellant Anwar Quraishi prior to 5 years of the

incident and deceased Noorbano committed suicide on

14.04.2008 within seven year of her marriage.

17.It is evident from the record that the learned Trial Court

heavily relied upon the dying declaration (Ex.P-3) of the

deceased, however, perusal of the same goes to show that

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the deceased alleged that she does not know who had set

her on fire from behind. Even, the dying declaration did not

mention the harassment or torture on account of dowry.

18.O.P. Dhawai (PW-2) is the Tahsildar who received letter

(Ex.P-2) on 15.04.2008 for recording dying declaration of

the deceased. He has stated that he had recorded dying

declaration of the deceased and admitted his signature on

‘A to A’ and ‘B to B’ part thereof & identified the signature of

Doctor and thumb impression of the deceased on ‘C to C’

part. This witness, in para 10 of his cross-examination, has

admitted that the certificate issued by the doctor is

mentioned below the last question. He did not ask the

doctor present at the spot about the percentage of burns

sustained by the deceased; and he only asked whether the

deceased was in a condition to give a statement or not, and

the doctor informed him that the deceased was in a

condition to give a statement. He also admitted that the

deceased did not say anything regarding dowry harassment.

19.The prosecution did not examine Dr. Sandeep Singh who

endorsed and certified that the deceased was in a fit state of

mind to given her statement.

20.While dealing with the issue where certifying doctor was not

examined by the prosecution and render the dying

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declaration unreliable, this High Court referring the decision

of Hon’ble Apex in Gopal Singh (supra), in the matter of

Vinay Kumar (supra), held in para 21 to 23 as under :-

“(21) In that view of the matter, since the doctor

i.e. Dr. Jagrani Lakra, who has certified the

deceased the deceased to be in fit state of mind

at the time of recording of dying declaration

(Ex.P/32), has neither been cited as a witness

nor brought to the witness-box to be examined

before the learned trial Court and neither

Executive Magistrate, namely, Prerna Singh (PW-

14), who has recorded the dying declaration

(Ex.P/32), has recorded her satisfaction either

the in dying declaration or in her statement

before the Court that the deceased was in fit

mental and physical condition to give statement

at the time of recording of the dying declaration

( Ex .P/32) therefore, it is not established on

record that the deceased was in fit state of mind

to give statement at the time of recording of dying

declaration ( Ex .P/32) . Moreover, though the

deceased remained alive till 16.07.2017, i.e.

around 02 months after the incident, but no

additional dying declaration in presence of any

doctor has been recorded. As such, there is no

evidence brought on record to hold that the

deceased was in fit state of mind at the time of

recording of dying declaration ( Ex .P/32) and, in

absence of which, dying declaration ( Ex .P/32)

cannot be relied upon, as the same is not true

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and voluntary. Consequently, the learned trial

Court has committed grave legal error in relying

upon the dying declaration ( Ex .P/32) to convict

the appellants herein for the offences in question.

It is held accordingly.

(22) Furthermore, the deceased in her dying

declaration ( Ex .P/32) has stated that in

connection with demand of dowry, her saas, pati,

sasur and jethani, caused her burn injuries.

Neither the exact name alongwith other

particulars like father's/husband's name or

address etc. of the accused/appellants have

been mentioned or spelled out by the deceased

in the dying declaration ( Ex .P/32).

(23) The Supreme Court in the matter of Gopal

Singh (supra) has clearly held with reference to

Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 that

a dying declaration which does not contain

complete names and addresses of the persons

charged with the offence, even though may help

to establish their identity, is not of such a nature

on which conviction can be based and it cannot

be accepted without corroboration and observed

in Para-07 & 08 as under:

"7. We have already referred to the fact

that the learned Sessions Judge was

not prepared to accept the evidence of

Umraodas, P.W. 1 and Chhotulal, P.W.

7, that deceased Modsingh had named

the appellants as assailants when they

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met him in the morning at 8.00 a.m. on

the roadside. Detailed reasons have

been given by the learned Sessions

Judge why he considered their

evidence unsatisfactory. The High

Court, however, in one sentence

expressed its opinion that the evidence

of these two witnesses, amongst

others, corroborated the dying

declaration in respect of the identity of

the appellants without giving any

reasons why it differed on the point

from the learned Sessions Judge. It is

obvious that the High Court was so well

satisfied by the written dying declaration

as establishing the identity of the

appellants that it ignored to consider the

evidence of Umraodas, PW 1 and

Chhotulal, PW 7 independently to see

how far they were reliable. In an appeal

against acquittal we think the High

Court ought to have expressed itself

more fully why it considered that the

learned Sessions Judges' conclusion

was unreasonable. In our opinion that

conclusion is unexceptionable.

8. But even if we assume that the High

Court was right in concluding that the

dying declaration established the

identity of the appellants, it was

certainly not of that of Bombay. In this

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case, it must be first remembered that

though the names of the appellants'

fathers were known to Modsingh and

others who accompanied him to the

Police Station, their fathers' names and

present residence have not been

mentioned. It is rather unusual for

Police Officers not to enquire and

record in the first information the full

name and address of the persons

complained against........" character as

would warrant its acceptance without

corroboration. It is settled law that a

court is entitled to convict on the sole

basis of a dying declaration if it is such

that in the circumstances of the case it

can be regarded as truthful. On the

other hand if on account of an infirmity,

it cannot be held to be entirely reliable,

corroboration would be required. See:

Kushal Rao v. State of Bombay, AIR

1958 SC 22. In this case, it must be first

remembered that though the names of

the appellants' fathers were known to

Modsingh and others who accompanied

him to the Police Station, their fathers'

names and present residence have not

been mentioned. It is rather unusual for

Police Officers not to enquire and

record in the first information the full

name and address of the persons

complained against........"

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21.Further, while dealing with the issue where dying declaration

termed to be a weak piece of evidence in absence of

corroboration and surrounded by suspicious circumstances,

this Court in the matter of Manish Soni (supra) held in para

24 as under :-

“24.It is well-settled law that oral dying

declaration is a weak kind of evidence. In the

matter of Darshan Devi v. State of Punjab

reported in 1995 Supp (4) SCC 126, with regard

to oral dying declaration, their Lordships of the

Supreme Court have held that an oral dying

declaration can form basis of evidence in a given

case, but such a dying declaration has to be

trustworthy and free from every blemish and

inspire confidence.”

22.In the present case also, the deceased in her dying

declaration (Ex.P-3) had only stated that someone set her

on fire from behind, and when a question was asked to the

deceased that who set her on fire?, the deceased answered

that she does not know, as such, the name of any of the

appellants was not uttered by the deceased in her dying

declaration.

23.Thus, in the light of judicial pronouncement of Hon’ble Apex

Court in Gopal Singh (supra), the dying declaration which

evidently does not contain name and address of the

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appellants, is fatal to the case of the prosecution. Even

otherwise, the deceased did not mention/utter any demand

of dowry or any torture regarding demand of dowry and the

deceased only stated that the dispute took place concerning

her son. Furthermore, the Doctor who endorsed/certified the

deceased to be in fit state of mind to give statement has

neither been cited as witness nor brought to the witness box

to be examined before the learned Trial Court, which also

castes serious doubt with regard to credibility and reliability

of the dying declaration.

24.The next question which arises for consideration by this

Court whether the deceased was subjected to cruelty for

demand of dowry soon before her death or not.

25.Gulam Waris (PW-5), father of the deceased, has stated

that all the accused/appellants tortured and harassed his

deceased daughter for bringing less dowry and due to this,

he had given Rs.10,000/-, Rs.15,000/-, and Rs.25,000/- total

Rs.50,000/- to appellant Yusuf (A-1), however, in para 15 of

his cross-examination, he admitted that he had disclosed in

his police statement (Ex.D-1) that he had paid Rs.10,000/-,

15,000/- and Rs.25,000/- total Ra.50,000/- to appellant

Yusuf Quraishi but if the said statement is not recorded in

his police statement, he cannot tell the reason thereof. He

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has also admitted that before the incident, he did not

complain about the demand of dowry or torture of his

daughter by the accused persons.

26.Saleem Quraishi (PW-6) is the brother of deceased. He has

also stated the same story as has been stated by Gulam

Waris (PW-5), father of the deceased. However, in cross-

examination, he has admitted that he did not tell the police

in his police statement (Ex.D-2) regarding the demand of

money by the accused persons, and for the first time, he is

deposing the aforesaid factum before the Court.

27.Abdul Tahir Quraishi (PW-7) is the brother-in-law (Jija) of the

deceased. He has also stated the same story as has been

stated by father of the deceased (PW-5) and brother of the

deceased (PW-6) that father of deceased gave Rs.10,000/-

and Rs.15,000/- on two different occasions and that all the

accused persons harassed and tortured the deceased. In

cross-examination, he has stated that what has been stated

by him before police, the same do not find in his police

statement (Ex.D-3).

28.Shanu Quraishi (PW-10) has also stated that her father

(PW-5) had given Rs.10,000/-, Rs.15,000/- and Rs.25,000/-

to the accused/appellants on three different occasions as

the accused/appellants were harassing her deceased sister

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for demand of dowry. She has also stated after giving

money, the accused/appellants kept the deceased well and

thereafter started harassing her for car. In cross-

examination, this witness has admitted that she did not

mention in her police statement the name of the accused

person who demanded Rs.10,000/-, Rs.15,000/- and

Rs.25,000/-. Further, this witness has stated that she had

disclosed in her police statement that the in-laws (accused)

of her deceased sister had demanded money, but if the said

statement is not recorded in her police statement, she

cannot tell the reason thereof.

29.The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sunil Bajaj (supra), has held

that under Section 304-B of the IPC relating to dowry death,

the provision being a deeming one with severe punishment

requires strict scrutiny of evidence by the Court. The

prosecution must establish essential ingredients, particularly

that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment

“soon before her death” and that such conduct was in

connection with demand for dowry. In the present case,

these key ingredients were not proved. Consequently, the

accused husband cannot be held guilty under Section 304-B

IPC and observed in para 5 as under :-

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“5.We have given our attention and

consideration to the submissions made by the

learned counsel for the parties. Normally this

Court will be slow and reluctant, as it ought to be,

to upset the order of conviction of the trial court as

confirmed by the High Court appreciating the

evidence placed on record. But in cases where

both the courts concurrently recorded a finding

that the accused was guilty of an offence in the

absence of evidence satisfying the necessary

ingredients of an offence, in other words, when no

offence was made out, it becomes necessary to

disturb such an order of conviction and sentence

to meet the demand of justice. In order to convict

an accused for an offence under Section 304-B

IPC, the following essentials must be satisfied:

(1)the death of a woman must have been caused

by burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under

normal circumstances;

(2)such death must have occurred within 7 years

of her marriage;

(3)soon before her death, the woman must have

been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her

husband or by relatives of her husband;

(4)such cruelty or harassment must be for or in

connection of demand of dowry.”

30.In the light of above judicial pronouncement, in the present

case, it is evident that the dying declaration (Ex.P-3) of the

deceased without examination of doctor who

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endorsed/certified the deceased to be in a fit state of mind,

is not admissible in evidence. That apart, in the dying

declaration (Ex.P-3) of the deceased, the factum of

harassment on account of bringing less dowry or dowry is

not mentioned and there is also no mention of name of any

of the accused person that who set the deceased on fire.

Furthermore, evidence of father of deceased (PW-5),

brother of deceased (PW-6), brother-in-law of deceased

(PW-7) and sister of deceased (PW-10) reveals material

contradictions and significant omissions in their testimonies.

While all these witnesses have alleged demand of dowry

and payment of amounts, they have admitted in cross-

examination that such material facts were either not stated

in their police statements or do not find place therein and

the brother of deceased (PW-6) has admitted that he was

deposing the demand of dowry and payment made by his

father for the first time before the Court. There is also no

prior complaint made regarding alleged harassment or

dowry demand. These improvements and inconsistencies

create serious doubt about the credibility of their version and

suggest afterthoughts. Thus, the essential ingredients for

constituting an offence under Section 304-B of IPC has not

been proved and the prosecution has only proved that the

deceased died otherwise than under normal circumstances

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within 07 years of her marriage but it has failed to prove that

soon before her death she was subjected to any cruelty or

harassment in connection with demand of dowry. Evidence

led by the prosecution does not fulfill the pre-requisite to

invoke presumption under Section 304-B IPC or Section

113-B of the Indian Evidence Act. As such, the prosecution

has utterly failed to prove all the ingredients required to hold

the appellants guilty under Section 304-B of IPC.

31.On the basis of aforesaid analysis of the evidence, I am of

the view that the finding of the learned trial Court convicting

the present appellants under Section 304-B(2) of IPC is not

based on proper appreciation of evidence and not

sustainable and they deserve to be acquitted of the charge

leveled against them.

32.In the result, the appeal succeeds and is, accordingly,

allowed. The impugned judgment is hereby set aside and

the appellants are acquitted of the charge under Section

304-B (2) of IPC.

33.The appellants are on bail. Keeping in view the provisions of

Section 437-A Cr.P.C. (481 of the B.N.S.S.), the appellants

are directed to forthwith furnish a personal bond in terms of

Form No.45 prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure of

sum of Rs.25,000/- each with one surety in the like amount

23 / 23

before the Court concerned which shall be effective for a

period of six months along with an undertaking that in the

event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant

judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellants on

receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon’ble

Supreme Court.

34.The trial Court record along with a copy of this judgment be

sent back immediately to the trial Court concerned for

compliance and necessary action.

Sd/-

(Rajani Dubey)

Judge

pekde