REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL     NO.1880 OF 2011

MOHAN LAL ....APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

THE STATE OF PUNJAB      ...RESPONDENT(S)

JUDGMENT

NAVIN SINHA, J.

The appellant assails his conviction under Section 18 of

the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985

(hereinafter referred as “the NDPS Act”), sentencing him to

rigorous   imprisonment   for   10   years   and   a   fine   of

Rs.1,00,000/­   (Rupees   one   lakh   only),   with   a   default

stipulation.

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2.An F.I.R. was lodged on 03.02.1997 by PW­1, Chand

Singh, Sub­Inspector of Balianwali Police Station, that while

on patrol duty, he was accompanied by Darshan Singh,

Sarpanch   and   Assistant   Sub­Inspector   Balwinder   Singh.

The witness entertained doubts about the appellant upon

seeing him.  PW­4, Shri Rajinder N. Dhoke, IPS, a gazetted

officer, was called and the appellant was searched, leading to

recovery of 4 kg of opium in a bag carried by him.   The

consent memo, Exhibit­ PB was signed by Darshan Singh

and PW­1.  The seized opium was separated into a sample of

20 gm. and 3kg 980 gm.  The specimen seal was prepared by

PW­1   and   after   use,   the   seal   was   handed   over   to   ASI,

Balwinder   Singh.     “Ruqa”   was   prepared   by   PW­1   and

forwarded   to   Balianwali   Police   Station.     PW­3,   Assistant

Sub­Inspector, Darshan Singh registered the formal F.I.R.

and handed over investigation to PW­1.  Upon conclusion of

investigation, the appellant was charge­sheeted, put on trial,

and convicted. 

3.Sh. Chanchal Kumar Ganguli, learned counsel for the

appellant submitted that the NDPS Act being a stringent law

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carrying a reverse burden of proof, there had to be strict

adherence to the law and procedures.  The investigation was

not only required to be fair and judicious, but must also

appear to have been so.  The investigation ought not to be in

a manner leaving a genuine apprehension in the mind of the

accused that it was not fair and bonafide.  No reasons have

been furnished why Darshan Singh and ASI Balwinder Singh

have not been examined by the prosecution.  No explanation

has been furnished by PW­1 why he did not deposit the

seized narcotics in the malkhana.  Likewise, the delay of 9

days   in   sending   the   sample   for   chemical   analysis   also

remains unexplained.  The investigation was fundamentally

flawed.  PW­1, being the informant, he could not have been

the   investigating   officer   himself.   Reliance   was   placed   on

Bhagwan Singh vs. State of Rajasthan , (1976) 1 SCC 15,

Megha Singh vs. State of Haryana , 1996 (11) SCC 709,

State   by   Inspector   of   Police,   Narcotics   Intelligence

Bureau, Madurai, Tamilnadu vs. Rajangam ,  2010 (15)

SCC 369.

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4.Ms. Jaspreet Gogia, learned counsel for the respondent

contended that the appellant was searched in presence of a

Gazetted Officer, PW­4.   The failure to examine Darshan

Singh or ASI Balwinder Singh was inconsequential as the

search and recovery were duly proved by PW­1 and PW­4.

Merely because they were police officers, their evidence does

not stand vitiated. There shall be a presumption that official

duties were regularly performed.   The burden of proof for

innocence lay upon the accused in view of the statutory

presumption under Sections 35 and 54 of the NDPS Act,

which he failed to discharge.   The investigation was not

vitiated because PW­1 may have been the informant himself.

Reliance was placed on State of Punjab vs. Baldev Singh,

(1999) 6 SCC 172, Bhaskar Ramappa Madar & Ors.  vs.

State   of   Karnataka,   (2009)11   SCC   690,  Surender   vs.

State of Haryana, (2016) 4 SCC 617. 

5.We have considered the submissions on behalf of the

parties.  The primary question for our consideration in the

present appeal is, whether in a criminal prosecution, it will

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be in consonance with the principles of justice, fair play and

a fair investigation, if the informant and the investigating

officer were to be the same person.   In such a case, is it

necessary   for   the   accused   to   demonstrate   prejudice,

especially under laws such as NDPS Act, carrying a reverse

burden of proof.

6.Darshan Singh was an illiterate person.  He is stated to

have been accompanying PW­1 in a police vehicle while on

official duty along with ASI Balwinder Singh.   This to our

mind, is certainly not in the normal course of events.  The

consent memo Exhibit­PB was stated to have been signed by

Darshan Singh, despite his being an illiterate, along with

PW­1.  The seal sample was prepared by PW­1, and signed

by Darshan Singh and ASI Balwinder Singh.  The seal was

then handed over to ASI Balwinder Singh.  The case property

was   retained   by   PW­1   in   his   possession   and   was   not

deposited in the malkhana nor entered in the roznamcha.

There is no explanation for the same.     The sample was

retained   by   PW­1   in   his   private   custody   in   a   rented

accommodation.   No explanation is forthcoming from the

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prosecution why Darshan Singh, and ASI Balwinder Singh

were not examined despite service of summons on the official

witness   and   issuance   of   bailable   warrants   against   the

private witness.  In their absence, neither the consent memo

nor the seal can be stated to have been proved.  There was

nine days’ delay in sending the sample for chemical analysis.

No explanation has been furnished in respect of the same.

PW­4 acknowledged that the recovery memo, Exhibit­PC was

not signed by the accused and that copies of documents

were not supplied to the accused nor any memo in this

regard prepared in his presence.   Exhibit­PB, the consent

memo only mentioned that he was the ASP, Phul. 

7. The presence of a private person in a police vehicle while

on patrol duty, the individual being an illiterate, but having

signed   the   consent   memo   were   surely   matters   for

investigation. Similarly, why the signature of ASI Balwinder

Singh or PW­4 was not obtained on the consent memo was

again a subject matter of investigation.  The veracity of the

sample seal handed over to ASI Balwinder Singh was likewise

a matter for investigation as to whether it was the same as

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the seal on the case property retained in his private custody

by PW­1 and that sent for chemical analysis.  The mere fact

that   there   may   have   been   a   seal   cannot   lead   to   any

presumption in absence of the examination of ASI Balwinder

Singh.   Likewise, it was also a subject of investigation why

PW­1   did   not   make   any   roznamcha   entry   of   the   seized

property and the reason why he retained the case property

and sample in his private custody in a rented house despite

the availability of a malkhana.   The delay in sending the

sample for chemical analysis, in the facts and circumstances

of the case was again a matter for investigation.     Had the

investigator been different from the complainant, the issues

for   consideration   may   have   been   entirely   different.     The

appellant   in   his   defence   under   Section   313   Cr.P.C.   had

specifically   taken   a   plea   of   false   implication   by   PW­1   on

account of a dispute with regard to purchase of a tractor.

8. The view taken by the High Court that under Section

55 of the NDPS Act, that PW­1 was empowered to keep the

case property and sample in his individual safe custody is

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completely erroneous on the face of it.  The provision reads

as follows:

“55. Police to take charge of articles seized and

delivered­

An officer­in­charge of a police station shall take

charge of and keep in safe custody, pending the

orders of the Magistrate, all articles seized under

this Act within the local area of that police station

and which may be delivered to him, and shall

allow   any   officer   who   may   accompany   such

articles   to   the   police   station  or   who   may   be

deputed for the purpose, to affix his seal to such

articles or to take samples of and from them and

all samples so taken shall also be sealed with a

seal   of   the   officer­in­charge   of   the   police

station.”(emphasis added)

A plain reading of the provision makes it manifest that

it   is  the   duty   of  the   police  officer   to  deposit   the   seized

material in the police station malkhana.

9.Standing Order No. 1 of 88 issued by the Narcotics

Control Bureau in clause 1.13 reads as follows:

“Mode and time limit for dispatch of sample to

Laboratory.

The  samples  should be sent either by insured

post   or   through   special   messenger   duly

authorised for the purpose. Dispatch of samples

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by registered post or ordinary mail should not

be resorted to. Samples must be dispatched to

the Laboratory within 72 hours of seizure to

avoid any legal objection.”(emphasis added)

The Drug Law Enforcement­Field Officer’s Hand Book

issued by the Narcotics Control Bureau also provides that:

“28.  Were   the   seized   goods   and   samples

deposited   in   the   Malkhana   at   the   earliest

opportunity after seizure, an acknowledgement

receipt obtained from the Malkhana­in­Charge?

(emphasis added)

29. Were the samples sent to the designated

laboratory   for   analysis   and   report   within   72

hours of seizure?”

In Noor Aga vs. State of Punjab, (2008) 16 SCC 417,

under the NDPS Act, it was held : 

“91.   The   logical   corollary   of   these

discussions is that the guidelines such as

those present in the Standing Order cannot

be   blatantly   flouted   and   substantial

compliance   therewith   must   be   insisted

upon   for   so   that   sanctity   of   physical

evidence   in   such   cases   remains   intact.

Clearly,   there   has   been   no   substantial

compliance   with   these   guidelines   by   the

investigating   authority   which   leads   to

drawing   of   an   adverse   inference   against

them to the effect that had such evidence

been produced, the same would have gone

against the prosecution.”

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10.Unlike the general principle of criminal jurisprudence

that an accused is presumed innocent unless proved guilty,

the   NDPS   Act   carries   a   reverse   burden   of   proof   under

Sections 35 and 54.  But that cannot be understood to mean

that the moment an allegation is made and the F.I.R. recites

compliance with statutory procedures leading to recovery,

the   burden   of   proof   from   the   very   inception   of   the

prosecution shifts to the accused, without the prosecution

having   to   establish   or   prove   anything   more.     The

presumption is rebuttable.   Section 35 (2) provides that a

fact can be said to have been proved if it is established

beyond   reasonable   doubt   and   not   on   preponderance   of

probability. The stringent provisions of the NDPS Act, such

as Section 37, the minimum sentence of ten years, absence

of any provision for remission, do not dispense with the

requirement of the prosecution to establish a prima facie

case beyond reasonable doubt after investigation, only after

which the burden of proof shall shift to the accused.  The

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case   of   the   prosecution   cannot   be   allowed   to   rest   on   a

preponderance of probabilities.  

11.A fair trial to an accused, a constitutional guarantee

under Article 21 of the Constitution, would be a hollow

promise if the investigation in a NDPS case were not to be

fair or raises serious questions about its fairness apparent

on the face of the investigation.  In the nature of the reverse

burden of proof, the onus will lie on the prosecution to

demonstrate on the face of it that the investigation was fair,

judicious   with   no   circumstances   that   may   raise   doubts

about   its   veracity.       The   obligation   of   proof   beyond

reasonable   doubt   will   take   within   its   ambit   a   fair

investigation, in absence of which there can be no fair trial.

If the investigation itself is unfair, to require the accused to

demonstrate prejudice will be fraught with danger vesting

arbitrary powers in the police which may well lead to false

implication also.   Investigation in such a case would then

become   an   empty   formality   and   a   farce.     Such   an

interpretation therefore naturally has to be avoided.

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12. That investigation in a criminal offence must be free

from   objectionable   features   or   infirmities   which   may

legitimately lead to a grievance on part of the accused was

noticed in Babubhai vs. State of Gujarat, (2010) 12 SCC

254 as follows: 

“32.  The   investigation   into   a   criminal   offence

must   be   free   from   objectionable   features   or

infirmities   which   may   legitimately   lead   to   a

grievance   on   the   part   of   the   accused   that

investigation was unfair and carried out with an

ulterior   motive.   It   is   also   the   duty   of   the

investigating  officer to conduct the investigation

avoiding any kind of mischief and harassment to

any   of   the   accused.   The   investigating   officer

should be fair and conscious so as to rule out

any possibility of fabrication of evidence and his

impartial conduct must dispel any suspicion as

to its genuineness. The investigating officer “is

not merely to bolster up a prosecution case with

such evidence as may enable the court to record

a   conviction   but   to   bring   out   the   real

unvarnished truth”. 

33.  In  State of Bihar  v.  P.P. Sharma  this Court

has held as under: 

“57.   …   Investigation   is   a   delicate

painstaking and dextrous process. Ethical

conduct   is   absolutely   essential   for

investigative  professionalism. … Therefore,

before   countenancing   such   allegations   of

mala   fides   or   bias   it   is   salutary   and   an

onerous   duty   and   responsibility   of   the

court,   not   only   to   insist   upon   making

specific and definite allegations of personal

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animosity against the investigating officer at

the start of the investigation but also must

insist to establish and prove them from the

facts and circumstances to the satisfaction

of the court.

* * *

59. Malice in law could be inferred from

doing of wrongful act intentionally  without

any just cause or excuse or without there

being reasonable relation to the purpose of

the exercise of statutory power. …

61.   An  investigating  officer   who   is   not

sensitive   to   the   constitutional   mandates,

may be prone to trample upon the personal

liberty of a person when he is actuated by

mala fides.”

13.      The duty of the prosecution under the NDPS Act,

considering the reverse burden of proof, was noticed in Noor

Aga (supra) observing: ­

“58……An   initial   burden   exists   upon   the

prosecution   and   only   when   it   stands

satisfied, would the legal burden shift. Even

then, the standard of proof required for the

accused to prove his innocence is not as

high as that of the prosecution. Whereas

the standard of proof required to prove the

guilt of the accused on the prosecution is

“beyond   all   reasonable   doubt”   but   it   is

“preponderance   of   probability”   on   the

accused. If the prosecution fails to prove the

foundational   facts   so   as   to   attract   the

rigours of Section 35 of the Act, the actus

reus which is possession of contraband by

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the accused  cannot  be said to have been

established. 

59. With a view to bring within its purview

the requirements of Section 54 of the Act,

element of possession of the contraband was

essential so as to shift the burden on the

accused. The provisions being exceptions to

the   general   rule,   the   generality   thereof

would continue to be operative, namely, the

element of possession will have to be proved

beyond reasonable doubt.”

Furthermore, the sample not having been deposited in

the malkhana, coupled with non­examination of the private

witnesses, an adverse inference was drawn therein against

the prosecution.  This principle has been reiterated in Bhola

Singh vs. State of Punjab, 2011(11) SCC 653.  

14.In a criminal prosecution, there is an obligation cast on

the investigator not only to be fair, judicious and just during

investigation, but also that the investigation on the very face

of   it   must   appear   to   be   so,   eschewing   any   conduct   or

impression   which   may   give   rise   to   a   real   and   genuine

apprehension   in   the   mind   of   an   accused   and   not   mere

fanciful,   that   the   investigation   was   not   fair.     In   the

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circumstances, if an informant police official in a criminal

prosecution, especially when carrying a reverse burden of

proof, makes the allegations, is himself asked to investigate,

serious doubts will naturally arise with regard to his fairness

and impartiality.  It is not necessary that bias must actually

be proved.  It would be illogical to presume and contrary to

normal human conduct, that he would himself at the end of

the investigation submit a closure report to conclude false

implication   with   all   its   attendant   consequences   for   the

complainant himself.  The result of the investigation would

therefore be a foregone conclusion.

15.The   discussion   in   the   present   case   may   not   be

understood   as   confined   to   the   requirements   of   a   fair

investigation under the NDPS Act only carrying a reverse

burden   of   proof.    Baldev   Singh  (supra)   related   to   a

prosecution under Section 165A of the IPC.  Nonetheless, it

observed   that   if   the   informant   were   to   be   made   the

investigating officer, it was bound to reflect on the credibility

of the prosecution case.   Megha Singh (supra) concerned a

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prosecution   under   the  Terrorist   and   Disruptive   Activities

(Prevention) Act, 1985.  It was held that the Head Constable

being the complainant himself could not have proceeded

with the investigation and it was a practice, to say the least,

which should not be resorted to so that there may not be

any   occasion  to  suspect   fair   and   impartial   investigation.

Rajangam (supra) was a prosecution under the NDPS Act,

an objection was taken that PW­6 who apprehended the

accused could not have investigated the case.  Upholding the

objection, relying on Megha Singh (supra) the accused was

acquitted. The view taken by the Madras High Court in

Balasundaran vs. State, 1999 (113) ELT 785 (Mad.), was

also noticed as follows :

“16.  Learned  Counsel for the  appellants

also stated that P.W. 5 being the Inspector

of Police who was present at the time of

search and he was the investigating officer

and as such it is fatal to the case of the

prosecution.   P.W.   5,   according   to   the

prosecution, was present with PWs 3 and

4 at the time of search. In fact, P.W. 5

alone took up investigation in the case and

he had examined the witnesses. No doubt

the successor to P.W. 5 alone had filed the

charge sheet. But there is no material to

show   that   he   had   examined   any   other

witness. It therefore follows that P.W. 5

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was the person who really investigated the

case.   P.W.   5   was   the   person   who   had

searched the appellants in question and he

being the investigation officer, certainly it

is not proper and correct. The investigation

ought   to   have   been   done   by   any   other

investigating agency. On this score also,

the investigation is bound to suffer and as

such   the   entire   proceedings   will   be

vitiated.”

16.Bhaskar   Ramappa   Madar   (supra)   concerned   a

prosecution under Section 304B, I.P.C. which also carries a

reverse   burden   of   proof.   The   Trial   Court   held   that   the

investigating officer who was also the complainant could not

have investigated, and on that ground, held the prosecution

to be tainted.  The acquittal was reversed by the High Court.

In   appeal,   this   Court   declined   to   interfere   with   the

conviction.  After referring to Bhagwan Singh  (supra) and

Megha Singh  (supra), it was observed that the principles

laid down therein had to be confined to the facts of the said

cases and that the matter would have to be decided on the

facts of each case without any universal generalisation.

17

17.Hardip Singh vs. State of Punjab, 2008 (8) SCC 557

concerned   a   prosecution   under   the   NDPS   Act.     The

contention   was   that   the   Inspector,   PW­5   being   the

complainant   himself   would   be   an   interested   person   and

should not have been made the investigating officer.   The

argument was repelled relying on State rep. by Inspector

of Police, Vigilance and Anti­Corruption, Tiruchirapalli,

Tamil Nadu vs. V. Jayapaul, 2004 (5) SCC 223 observing

as follows:

“6…. We find no principle or binding authority to

hold   that   the   moment   the   competent   police

officer,   on   the   basis   of   information   received,

makes out an FIR incorporating his name as the

informant, he forfeits his right to investigate. If at

all, such investigation could only be assailed on

the ground of bias or real likelihood of bias on

the part of the investigating officer. The question

of   bias   would   depend   on   the   facts   and

circumstances of each case and it is not proper

to lay down a broad and unqualified proposition,

in the manner in which it has been done by the

High   Court,   that   whenever   a   police   officer

proceeds to investigate after registering the FIR

on his own, the investigation would necessarily

be unfair or biased.”

18

Significantly,  V.   Jayapaul,   (supra)   related   to   a

prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act which

sought to distinguish Megha Singh, (supra) on its facts.

18.Baldev   Singh,   (supra)   relied   upon   by   the   State   is

distinguishable on its own facts concerning an irregularity in

an   investigation   by   an   officer   not   especially   empowered

under the NDPS Act to do so.

19.In  Surender  (supra), the prosecution was under the

NDPS Act. There was no independent witness.  The objection

that   PW­6,   Sub­inspector   Satbir   Singh   being   the

complainant   could   not   have   investigated   relying   on

Rajangam, (supra) and Megha Singh, (supra) was rejected

on the ground that he was not the sole person investigating

the case, and that the ground had not been raised before the

High Court in appeal. 

19

20.In the nature of the controversy, it would be useful to

also notice the view taken by different High Courts on the

issue.   In  State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Atul Sharma

2015 (2) shimLC 693 (Crl. Appeal No. 246 of 2008, decided

on 28.02.2015), under the NDPS Act, it was observed as

follows:

“10.8  In present case it is proved on record that

complainant   is   SI   Bahadur   Singh   as   per   FIR

Ext.PW12/A   and   it   is   proved   on   record   that

entire   investigation   has   been   conducted   by

complainant himself and there is no evidence on

record in order to prove that investigation was

handed   over   to   some   other   independent

Investigating   Officer.   It   is   not   the   case   of

prosecution   that   no   other   independent

Investigating   Officer   was   available   to   conduct

impartial   investigation.   We   are   of   the   opinion

that   conducting   entire   investigation   i.e.

preparation of seizure memo, site plan, recording

statements of witnesses by complainant himself

has caused miscarriage of justice to accused qua

fair investigation.”

21.A similar view has been taken in Shri Fayas Ali vs.

State of Mizoram  Crl. Appeal No. 26 of 2013 (J) dated

19.09.2013, relating to prosecution under the NDPS Act, by

the Gauhati High Court as follows: 

20

“From the evidence of PWs 1 and 4, it is clearly

found that the major part of the investigation

including the arrest of the accused, preparation

of seizure, taking of sample, examination of the

seizure   witnesses   and   examination   of   the

accused person, was completed by the PW1, who

was the informant/complainant in the present

case.   Therefore,   it   is   clearly   found   that   the

investigation, in its true sense, was done by the

complainant   himself.   In   the   case   of   State   by

Inspector of Police, Narcotic Intelligence Bureau,

Madurai(supra), the Supreme Court, relying on

the decision held in the case of Megha Singh

(supra), observed that the investigation is to be

done by a person other than the complainant

and   that   the   investigation   done   by   the

complainant is bound to suffer and vitiate the

entire proceeding.”

22.The Punjab & Haryana High Court in Gannu and Ors.

vs.   State   of   Punjab,  2017   (3)   RCR   (criminal) 566   (Crl.

Appeal No. 1688­SB of 2004 dated 26.05.2017) relating to

the NDPS Act, after referring to Noor Aga, (supra) and the

views   of   the   Calcutta   High   Court   also   apart   from  Atul

Sharma (supra), concluded as follows:

“14. Another aspect of the matter is that in sheer

violation of the principles of fair and impartial

investigation,   the   complainant   and   the

investigating officer is the same person, which

makes the prosecution case doubtful. In Laltu

Prasad v. State of West Bengal, 2017(2) R.C.R.

21

(Criminal) 237 (Calcutta) (DB), it was held that

the   complainant   himself   acting   as   the

investigating officer violating the principles of fair

and impartial investigation is a practice, to say

the least, should not be resorted to and it is a

disturbing   feature.   To   the   same   effect,   is   a

Division  Bench  judgment  of   Hon'ble   Himachal

Pradesh   High   Court   reported   as   State   of

Himachal Pradesh v. Atul Sharma and others,

2015 (6) R.C.R. (Criminal) 949, wherein, it has

been held that where the complainant himself

conducts investigation, it causes miscarriage of

justice to accused qua fair investigation.”

23.A Single Judge of the Kerala High Court in Naushad

vs. State of Kerala, 2000 (1) KLT 785, relating to the NDPS

Act held as follows:

“…In   a   case   of   this   nature,   when   the

complainants himself is a Police Official, the

investigation should have been conducted

by   his   top   ranking   officer   and   the   final

report also ought to have been filed by the

higher official. A complainant being a police

officer cannot be an Investigating Officer.

For,   in   such   case,   the   accused   and   the

prosecution   will   be   deprived   of   their

valuable   rights   of   contradicting   and

corroborating,   the   previous   information

recorded under Ss. 154 or 155 Cr.P.C. and

previous statement of the witness, being a

police officer, complaint recorded, under S.

161 Cr.P.C. enjoined in S. 145 and 157 of

the Indian Evidence Act and proviso of S.

162 Cr.P.C. In the instant case, before me,

PW1 is an Assistant Sub Inspector of Police,

22

and   I   understand   from   the   Public

Prosecutor as well as from the Counsel for

the   petitioner   that   the   particular   Police

Station has got a Sub Inspector of Police.

Therefore,   in   this   case,   the   investigation

ought to have been conducted by the Sub

Inspector   of   Police   or   any   other   Police

Officer   above   the   rank   of   PW1.   In   the

instant   case,   thus   an   incurable   infirmity

and   flaw   have   been   committed   by   the

prosecution, quite against the proposition of

law.   Therefore,   on   that   score   itself,   the

petitioner   is   entitled   to   get   an   order   of

acquittal. In view of my above conclusion on

the footing of position of law, this is a fit

case, which has to be allowed by acquitting

the petitioner."

Disapproving of the same, a Division Bench in Kader vs.

State of Kerala,  2001 CriLJ 4044, held:

“6. Unlike usual cases  under the Criminal

Procedure Code, in cases under the NDPS

Act,   by   the   time   of   arrest,   main   part   of

investigation will be completed and duty of

the investigating officer is mainly in sending

the samples for chemical analysis and other

routine work and there is no likelihood of

any   prejudice   in   usual   circumstances.

Therefore, we are of the opinion that merely

because   a   detecting   officer   himself   is

investigating   officer   or   the   officer   of   the

same ranks as that of the detecting officer is

investigating the case and files report before

the Court will not vitiate the proceedings

under N.D.P.S. act in the absence of proof

of   specific   prejudice   to   the   accused.

Therefore, legal position stated in Naushad

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v. State of Kerala 2000 (1) KLT 785 to the

contrary is overruled.”

24.The view taken by the Kerala High Court in   Kader

(supra)   does   to   meet   our   approval.     It   tantamounts   to

holding   that   the   F.I.R.   was   a   gospel   truth,   making

investigation an empty formality if not a farce. The right of

the accused to a fair investigation and fair trial guaranteed

under Article 21 of the Constitution will stand negated in

that event, with arbitrary and uncanalised powers vested?

with the police in matters relating to the NDPS Act and

similar   laws   carrying   a   reverse   burden   of   proof.     An

investigation is a systemic collection of facts for the purpose

of describing what occurred and explaining why it occurred.

The word systemic suggests that it is more than a whimsical

process. An investigator will collect the facts relating to the

incident under investigation.  The fact is a mere information

and is not synonymous with the truth.    Kader (supra) is,

therefore,   overruled.     We   approve   the   view   taken   in

Naushad (supra).  

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25.   In   view   of   the   conflicting   opinions   expressed   by

different two Judge Benches of this Court, the importance of

a fair investigation from the point of view of an accused as a

guaranteed   constitutional   right   under   Article   21   of   the

Constitution of India, it is considered necessary that the law

in this regard be laid down with certainty.   To leave the

matter for being determined on the individual facts of a case,

may not only lead to a possible abuse of powers, but more

importantly will leave the police, the accused, the lawyer and

the courts in a state of uncertainty and confusion which has

to be avoided.  It is therefore held that a fair investigation,

which is but the very foundation of fair trial, necessarily

postulates that the informant and the investigator must not

be the same person.   Justice must not only be done, but

must appear to be done also.   Any possibility of bias or a

predetermined   conclusion   has   to   be   excluded.     This

requirement is all the more imperative in laws carrying a

reverse burden of proof.

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26.Resultantly, the appeal succeeds and is allowed.  The

prosecution is held to be vitiated because of the infraction of

the   constitutional   guarantee   of   a   fair   investigation.   The

appellant is directed to be set at liberty forthwith unless

wanted in any other case.

…………...................J.

[RANJAN GOGOI]

…………...................J.

[R. BANUMATHI]

…………...................J.

[NAVIN SINHA]

NEW DELHI

AUGUST 16, 2018

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