RC.REV. 305/2025 Page 1 of 21

$~14

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Date of decision: 22.09.2026

# CNR No. DLHC010762172025

+ RC.REV. 305/2025, CM APPL. 62582/2025 (Stay) & CM

APPL. 62583/2025 (Ex.)

MOHD. SHAFIQ .....Petitioner

Through: Mr. Yatin Sharma, Advocate.

versus

MOHD. ARSHAD .....Respondent

Through: Mr. Gaurav Sindhwani,

Advocate.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN

SHANKAR

% JUDGEMENT (Oral)

1. The present Petition, filed under Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi

Rent Control Act, 1958

1

, seeks to assail the Order dated

11.08.2025

2

, passed by the learned Additional Rent Controller-02,

Central District, Tis Hazari Court, Delhi

3

in the Eviction Petition,

being RC/ARC No. 294/2021

4

, titled “Mohd. Arshad vs. Mohd.

Shafiq”.

2. By way of the Impugned Order, the Application seeking Leave

to Defend, filed by the Petitioner, came to be dismissed and,

consequently, an Eviction Order being passed in favour of the

1

DRC Act

2

Impugned Order

3

ARC

4

Eviction Petition

RC.REV. 305/2025 Page 2 of 21

Respondent, with respect to the tenanted premises, being Shop ad-

measuring 8.8 X 7.2 square feet on the ground floor forming part

of the property No. 997-998 at Madarsa Hussain Baksh (haveli

Bakhtwar Khan) Bazar, Matia Mahal, Jama Masjid, Delhi-

110006

5

.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE P ARTIES:

3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent, at the

outset, submits that the present Petition has become infructuous,

inasmuch as vacant and peaceful possession of the Subject Premises

have been handed over by the Respondent.

4. Learned counsel for the Respondent submits that possession has

been handed over in pursuance of Warrants of Possession dated

21.02.2026, issued by the learned Executing Court, while adjudicating

the Execution Petition, being Ex. 426/2026. It is submitted that the

said Warrants of Possession were executed by the Bailiff on

07.03.2026 and, consequently, vide Order dated 09.03.2026, the said

Execution Petition was disposed of as satisfied.

5. Learned counsel for the Respondent, therefore, submits that the

present Petition is liable to be dismissed as being rendered infructuous

since it is trite law that when peaceful and vacant possession of the

tenanted premises have already been handed over to the landlord in

pursuance of execution proceedings, the pending Revision Petition,

challenging the Eviction Order, becomes incapable of serving any

useful purpose.

6. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

Petitioner, forthrightly acknowledges the fact that peaceful and vacant

5

Subject Premises

RC.REV. 305/2025 Page 3 of 21

possession of the Subject Premises has indeed been handed over to the

Respondent, in pursuance and to the satisfaction of the Execution

proceedings, however, he seeks to press upon the merits of the present

Petition.

7. Learned counsel for the Petitioner, with respect to the merits of

the present Petition, submits that the challenge to the present Petition

is limited to one aspect only, namely, that the learned ARC failed to

appreciate that the Will, relied upon by the Respondent to evidence his

ownership and in turn, the status of being a landlord, bequeathed only

half portion of the Subject Premises to the father of the Respondent,

which in turn, devolved upon the Respondent.

8. Learned counsel for the Petitioner further submits that the

Respondent, being entitled to only half portion of the Subject

Premises, could not have individually maintained the aforesaid

Eviction Petition.

9. Learned counsel for the Petitioner submits that the aforesaid

ground manifestly gave rise to a triable issues, which obviated the

grant of leave to defend to the Petitioner and that, accordingly, the

Impugned Order is liable to be set aside.

10. In rejoinder submissions, learned counsel appearing on behalf

of the Respondent, controverting the submissions advanced on behalf

of the Petitioner on merits, submits that the aforesaid ground, sought

to be raised by the Petitioner, has already been considered and dealt

with, in extenso, by the learned ARC.

11. Learned counsel for the Respondent submits that the Petitioner,

by pressing upon the aforesaid ground, is essentially urging this Court

to re-appreciate the evidence to arrive at a possible alternative

RC.REV. 305/2025 Page 4 of 21

conclusion, which, according to the learned counsel, is beyond the

circumscribed scope of Revisional Jurisdiction exercisable by this

Court under Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act.

12. Learned counsel for the Respondent, therefore, in light of the

foregoing contentions, submits that the present Petition is liable to be

dismissed on merits as well.

13. No other submissions have been advanced by the learned

counsel appearing on behalf of the parties.

ANALYSIS:

14. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties and,

with their able assistance, perused the material available on record,

including the Impugned Judgment.

15. Before proceeding to examine the merits of the challenge raised

in the present Petition, this Court deems it necessary to note that the

Eviction Order under challenge has, admittedly, during the pendency

of the present Petition, been the subject matter of an execution

proceedings, culminating in the vacant and peaceful handing over of

the possession of the Subject Premises to the Respondent/Landlord.

16. The issue regarding whether Revision Petition would survive

upon the handing over of possession is no longer res integra and has

received consideration not only from the Hon’ble Supreme Court but

also from several Coordinate Benches of this Court. The consistent

judicial approach in such cases has been to examine whether, upon

execution of the Eviction Order and delivery of possession to the

landlord, the challenge survives for any effective adjudication.

17. This Court, very recently, in Baljeet Singh & Anr. v. Santosh

RC.REV. 305/2025 Page 5 of 21

Bhutani

6

, pronounced on 01.09.2026, had the occasion to consider the

aforesaid issue in some detail. After examining the relevant Judgments

of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as the subsequent line of

authorities of this Court, this Court delineated the circumstances in

which a Revision Petition, under Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act,

challenging an Eviction Order, would cease to survive upon the

Eviction Order having been satisfied in execution proceedings and

possession having been delivered to the Landlord. The relevant

observations of this Court in Baljeet Singh & Anr. v. Santosh Bhutan

(supra) read as under:

“Legal position governing the effect of execution of an Eviction

Order

50. In N.C. Daga v. Inder Mohan Singh Rana, the Hon’ble

Supreme Court was seized of a challenge to the Judgment of this

Court affirming the decision of the learned Rent Controller

declining leave to defend in an Eviction Petition instituted under

Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act. During the pendency of the said

proceedings, the possession of the tenanted premises had already

been taken pursuant to execution of the Eviction Order. In view of

the aforesaid development during the pendency, the Hon’ble

Supreme Court declined to examine the rival contentions any

further, observing that, once possession had been taken pursuant to

execution of the Order permitting eviction, such an exercise “would

amount to rendering a decision on a purely academic question”.

The relevant portion thereof, being Paragraph No. 6, reads as

under:

“6. In view of the admitted position that pursuant to the

order passed by the Rent Controller, possession has been

taken on execution of the order permitting eviction, and

absence of specific stand regarding implied consent it is,

however, not necessary to go into the finer details and to

examine the rival stand in the background of legal position

as it would amount to rendering decision on a purely

academic question. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed,

without any order as to costs.”

6

2026:DHC:7346

RC.REV. 305/2025 Page 6 of 21

51. The aforesaid principle was subsequently reiterated in the

Judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vinod Kumar Verma

v. Manmohan Verma, where, upon being informed that possession

of the premises had already been taken over by the landlord, the

Hon’ble Supreme Court held that nothing further survived in the

Appeals and accordingly disposed of the same as being infructuous.

The aforesaid Order reads as under:

“Leave granted.

At the time of hearing of these appeals, the learned

counsel appearing on behalf of the landlord-respondent

submits, on instructions, that the possession of the

premises in question has already been taken over by the

landlord-respondent. That being the position, these appeals

have now become infructuous, which have been filed

against the final judgment and order dt.25.02.2008 and

28.03.2008 passed by the High Court of Delhi at New

Delhi in RCR No.49 of 2007 and C.M.No.119 of 2008

(Review) in RCR No.49 of 2007, by which the Revision

Petition filed by the tenant/appellant was dismissed and

order of eviction was affirmed. Since the possession has

already been taken over by the landlord-respondent, in our

view nothing survives in these appeals and accordingly,

the appeals are disposed of as infructuous.

Interim order, if any, stands vacated.

There will be no order as to costs.”

(Emphasis supplied)

52. The aforesaid principle was also directly applied by a

Coordinate Bench of this Court in circumstances materially

analogous to those obtaining in the present case, and the conclusion

so arrived came to be affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

53. In Neelam Sharma v. Ekant Rekhan, a Revision Petition arose

from an Eviction Order passed under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC

Act and, during the pendency of the Revision, possession of the

subject premises had been taken over by the landlord in execution

proceedings. Taking note of the said subsequent development, the

Coordinate Bench of this Court held that the Revision Petition had

become infructuous. The relevant observation reads as under:

“15. The possession of the shop in question, admittedly, is

taken over by the respondent on 30.08.2018 in execution

proceedings, hence even otherwise, this petition has

become infructuous.”

54. Significantly, the aforesaid Judgment was thereafter carried in

challenge before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Neelam Sharma v.

Ekant Rekhan. The Hon’ble Supreme Court took note of the

aforesaid finding of this Court and declined to interfere with the

said conclusion, thereby dismissing the Special Leave Petition. The

relevant portion of the Order reads as under:

RC.REV. 305/2025 Page 7 of 21

“We have heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of

the petitioner.

In Paragraph 15 of the impugned judgment, the High

Court has observed that the possession of the shop in

question, admittedly is taken over by the respondent on

30.08.2018 in execution proceedings. Therefore, the

revision before the High Court has become infructuous. In

such view of the matter, we are not inclined to entertain

this special leave petition.”

The special leave petition is, accordingly, dismissed.

Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed

of.”

(Emphasis supplied)

55. Having thus noticed and considered the aforesaid Judgements

of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it would now be apposite to

examine the manner in which the aforesaid principle has been

interpreted, developed and consistently applied by this Court in the

context of Revision Petitions arising under the DRC Act.

56. This Court is conscious of the fact that the question, at hand in

the present case, has, over the years, engaged the attention of this

Court on numerous occasions, resulting in a substantial and

consistent body of judicial authority. It would serve little purpose

to burden the present Judgment by traversing each decision

rendered on the subject. The authorities noticed hereinafter are,

therefore, not intended to be exhaustive, but are illustrative of the

consistent judicial approach adopted by this Court and sufficiently

represent the manner in which the question has been considered

and dealt with in successive decisions.

57. In Mohd. Akram v. Nafisa Begum, a Coordinate Bench of this

Court, most recently, was faced with a similar circumstance. The

said matter also arose from a Revision Petition under Section 25-

B(8) of the DRC Act challenging an Eviction Order passed under

Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act. During the pendency of the

Revision Petition, it was confirmed before the Court that

possession of the demised premises had already been handed over

to the landlord. After noticing the Judgments of the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in N.C. Daga (supra) and Vinod Kumar Verma

(supra), the Coordinate Bench held that the Revision Petition had

become infructuous. The relevant observations are contained in

Paragraph No. 9 of the said Order, which reads as under:

“9. In view of the fact that the possession of the demised

premises in terms of order dated 28.02.2025 has already

been handed over to the respondent/landlord, and the

aforesaid observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as

well as view taken by learned Coordinate Bench, the

present petition has become infructuous and the same is

disposed of accordingly.”

RC.REV. 305/2025 Page 8 of 21

58. A similar view of taken by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in

Nathi Lal Chaurasia (since deceased through LR) v. Sushila Devi

Jain & Anr. reiterated that where an Eviction Order has gained

fruition and has been implemented through execution proceedings

resulting in the landlord obtaining possession in accordance with

law, the Revision Petition challenging such Order becomes

infructuous. The relevant portion of the said Judgement reads as

under:

“15. This Court in various orders including Order dated

14.12.2023 passed in RC. REV. 335/2019 captioned Ajay

Kumar v. Ranbir Singh, Order dated 06.12.2023 passed in

RC. REV. 52/2023 captioned Govardhan Lal v. Smt.

Vidya Rani (Deceased) Through Lrs dated 03.11.2023

passed in RC. REV. 104/2021 captioned Ram Avtar v.

Smt. Anuradha Shukla has held that when a Revision

Petition has been filed challenging an order of learned

Trial Court which has now gained fruition and has already

been implemented through execution proceedings, in such

circumstances, the Revision Petition has become

infructuous. In addition, it was held that once possession

was taken over by the Respondent/landlord in accordance

with law, the Petition becomes infructuous.”

59. Likewise, in Gulzar Singh & Anr. (supra), a Coordinate Bench

of this Court, upon noticing that possession of the tenanted

premises had already been restored to the landlords in execution of

the Warrant of Possession, held the Revision Petition to have

become infructuous.

60. The Coordinate Bench, in holding so, relied upon the decision

of this Court in Om Prakash Ashok Kumar & Sons v. Ajay

Khurana, which in turn relied various Judgements and Orders of

this Court, inter alia, in Poonam Bangia v. Harbhagwan Dass

Chandiramani, Mange Ram v. Rajesh Narain Goel

and Ram

Avtar v. Anuradha Shukla. The relevant portion thereof read as

under:

“4. This Court in the judgment dated 26.07.2024 passed in

RC.REV. 284/2023 titled as Om Prakash Ashok Kumar &

Sons V Shri Ajay Khurana held as under:-

7. The issue which needs Judicial consideration is

whether the revision petition which is filed as per

section 25B (8) of the Act to impugn the order of

eviction as per section 25B of the Delhi Rent Control

Act and if during the pendency of the revision petition,

the possession is restored back to the landlord/owner,

whether, in that eventuality the revision petition is

maintainable or not.

8. In N. C. Daga V Inder Mohan Singh Rana 2003 (1)

SCC 453 the respondent/landlord filed the petition for

RC.REV. 305/2025 Page 9 of 21

eviction primarily on the ground of bona fide

requirement which was opposed by the

petitioners/tenant. The eviction order was passed as per

section 14(1)(e) of the Act in favour of the

respondent/landlord with the direction that the

possession of the tenanted premises shall not be taken

before the expiry of 06 months in terms of section 14(7)

of the Act. The revision petition before the High Court

of Delhi was also dismissed by holding that no prima

facie case was made out by the tenant. The Supreme

Court dealt with the arguments raised on behalf of the

landlord that the petition has become infructuous

because the possession has already been taken in

pursuant to the execution of the order passed by the rent

controller. The Supreme Court has observed that in

view of the admitted position that pursuant to the order

passed by the rent controller, the possession has already

been taken on execution of order permitting eviction

did not examine the rival stand of the parties and

accordingly dismissed the petition.

9. The Supreme Court in Vinod Kumar Verma V

Manmohan Verma & Anr. in Civil Appeal No.5220-

5221 of 2008 arising out of SLP (C) nos. 11268-

11264/2008 vide order dated 19.08.2008 has also

disposed of the appeals as infructuous as the possession

of the tenanted premises was taken over by the

landlord.

10. This Court in various decisions has followed the

decision given by the Supreme Court in N. C. Daga V

Inder Mohan Singh Rana. The Co-ordinate Bench of

this Court in Poonam Bangia V Harbhagwan Dass

Chandiramani in RC. REV. no.16/2021 vide order

dated 22.07.2021 after following the law laid down in

N. C. Daga V Inder Mohan Singh Rana, dismissed the

revision petition after observing that the landlord has

received the possession of the tenanted premises

through execution proceedings. Another Co-ordinate

Bench of this Court in Mange Ram V Rajesh Narain

Goel, in RC. REV. no. 147/2021, decided on

19.03.2024 after following N. C. Daga V Inder Mohan

Singh Rana and Vinod Kumar Verma V Manmohan

Verma & Anr., in Civil Appeal nos. 5220-5221/2008

passed by the Supreme Court and in Poonam Bangia V

Harbhagwan Dass Chandiramani in RC. REV no.

16/2021 passed by this Court as mentioned hereinabove

also dismissed the revision petition as became

infructuous due to the reason that the possession of the

RC.REV. 305/2025 Page 10 of 21

subject premises has been restored to the

respondent/landlord. The same view was also taken by

another Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Ram Avtar

V Anuradha Shukla in RC. Rev. Bearing no. 104/2021

vide order dated 03.11.2023, the revision petition was

ordered to be dismissed as the possession of the

tenanted premises has already been taken by the

respondent/landlord in accordance with law.”

5. Accordingly, in view of the above observations made in

the judgment dated 26.07.2024 passed in RC.REV.

284/2023 and as the possession of the tenanted premises

has already been restored back to the

respondents/landlords in execution of warrant of

possession in accordance with law, the present revision

petition has become infructuous. Hence, the present

petition along with pending application, stands dismissed

being infructuous.”

(Emphasis supplied)

61. The aforesaid Judgments, though not exhaustive, sufficiently

demonstrate the consistency with which the aforesaid principle has

been recognised and applied by this Court. This consistent judicial

approach leaves no room for doubt that the legal position in this

regard is now well settled and can no longer be regarded as res

integra.

Legal position emerging from the Judicial precedents

62. The legal position, therefore, which emerges from the aforesaid

discussion is that, once a Eviction Order has been acted upon in

accordance with law and the landlord has, pursuant thereto,

obtained vacant and peaceful possession of the Subject premises,

the substratum of the tenant’s challenge to such Order ceases to

survive for effective adjudication.

63. In such circumstances, the Revisional Court is no longer in a

position to grant any meaningful or executable relief against an

Eviction Order which has already attained fruition through

execution. Where no independent or surviving relief otherwise

preserves a live controversy between the parties, the Revision

Petition would consequently be liable to be dismissed as having

become infructuous.”

18. The aforesaid principle condensed in Paragraph Nos. 62 and 63

of Baljeet Singh & Anr. v. Santosh Bhutan (supra), after considering

a line of Judicial precedents, squarely applies to the facts of the

present case. It is not in dispute that, during the pendency of the

present Petition, the Eviction Order came to be acted upon in

RC.REV. 305/2025 Page 11 of 21

execution proceedings. The learned Executing Court, vide Order dated

21.02.2026, issued Warrants of Possession in respect of the Subject

Premises, pursuant to which the Bailiff executed the said Warrants on

07.03.2026 and handed over vacant and peaceful possession of the

Subject Premises to the Respondent. The execution proceedings were

thereafter taken up by the learned Executing Court on 09.03.2026,

when, upon perusal of the Bailiff’s report, recording receipt of vacant

and peaceful possession, the Execution Petition was disposed of as

satisfied.

19. In these circumstances, the challenge to the Impugned Order

has lost its very substratum. Any adjudication upon the correctness of

the Impugned Order, in circumstances where the possession of the

Subject Premises has already been delivered to the Respondent in

execution thereof, would no longer result in any effective relief

capable of being granted in the present proceedings.

20. Accordingly, having regard to the aforesaid admitted position,

this Court is of the considered view that the present Petition, insofar as

it assails the said Impugned Eviction Order, does not survive for

further adjudication and is liable to be dismissed as having become

infructuous.

21. Ordinarily, having arrived at the aforesaid conclusion, no

further adjudication on the merits of the challenge would be

warranted. However, for the sake of completeness and also since

learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner has pressed the present

Petition on merits and the challenge is confined to the limited issue of

the Respondent’s entitlement to maintain the Eviction Petition on the

ground that he is stated to be the owner of only a part of the Subject

RC.REV. 305/2025 Page 12 of 21

Premises, this Court deems it appropriate to examine the merits of the

present Petition as well.

22. However, before proceeding to examine the grounds of

challenge urged on behalf of the Petitioner, it would be apposite to

advert to the scope and ambit of the revisional jurisdiction vested in

this Court under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act.

23. The contours of the aforesaid jurisdiction are well settled. The

Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance

Co. Ltd.

7

, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar

Singh

8

, and, more recently, in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua

9

, has

consistently held that the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court

under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act is supervisory

and revisional in character and cannot be equated with the exercise of

appellate jurisdiction.

24. The aforesaid principles have also been reiterated and relied

upon by Coordinate Benches of this Court, inter alia, in Pankaj

Pahwa v. Prem Wati & Ors.

10

, and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny

Grover

11

.

25. In Abid-Ul-Islam (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while

elucidating the legislative intendment underlying Section 25-(B) of the

DRC Act, observed that the omission of an appellate remedy against

an Order passed by the learned Rent Controller is conscious and

deliberate. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court is,

therefore, one of superintendence over the decision-making process,

7

(1998) 8 SCC 119

8

(2014) 9 SCC 78

9

(2022) 6 SCC 30

10

2024:DHC:9322

11

2025:DHC:11285

RC.REV. 305/2025 Page 13 of 21

including the legality and propriety thereof, and does not permit the

High Court to substitute its own view for that of the learned Rent

Controller merely because another view on the material available on

record may be possible. The relevant observations of the Hon’ble

Supreme Court read as under:

“23. The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court exclusive

power of revision against an order of the learned Rent Controller,

being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior court on the

decision-making process, inclusive of procedural compliance.

Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute and supplant its

views with that of the trial court by exercising the appellate

jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. The

scope of interference by the High Court is very restrictive and

except in cases where there is an error apparent on the face of the

record, which would only mean that in the absence of any

adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to disturb

such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving inquiry in

such matters which would otherwise amount to converting the

power of superintendence into that of a regular first appeal, an act,

totally forbidden by the legislature.”

26. In Pankaj Pahwa (supra), a Coordinate Bench of this Court,

considering the principles enunciated in Abid-Ul-Islam (supra),

reiterated that the jurisdiction exercised by this Court under the

proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act is limited in scope and that

this Court is not expected to substitute or supplant its view for that of

the learned ARC. The revisional scrutiny is confined to examining the

decision-making process and determining whether the Impugned

Order suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record or an

absence of adjudication warranting interference.

27. In view of the foregoing discussion, the position which emerges

is that, while exercising jurisdiction under the proviso to Section 25-

B(8) of the DRC Act, this Court is neither required nor permitted to

undertake a fresh appreciation of the material on record with a view to

RC.REV. 305/2025 Page 14 of 21

arrive at an independent conclusion on the merits of the dispute.

Interference would be warranted only where the Impugned Order

suffers from a jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material

irregularity or perversity, or where the conclusion arrived at by the

learned ARC is wholly unreasonable or founded upon an erroneous

premise of law. Equally, where a material plea has been left

unconsidered, or the decision-making process otherwise discloses an

error apparent on the face of the record, exercise of revisional

jurisdiction may be warranted.

28. It is within the aforesaid limited parameters of revisional

scrutiny that the grounds urged by the learned counsel on behalf of the

Petitioner against the Impugned Order are required to be examined.

29. For the sake of completeness and clarity, this Court also deems

it apposite to reproduce the findings returned by the learned ARC,

regarding to the aforesaid aspect of challenge, sought to be raised on

behalf of the Petitioner. The relevant portions of the Impugned Order

read as under:

“I.(a) Ownership of the petitioner over the tenanted premises :-

10.1 It has been argued by counsel for petitioner that father of the

petitioner namely Sh. Wasiq became the owner of the property in

question bearing no. 997-998, Haveli Bakhtwar Khan, Gali

Madarsa Wali, Bazar Matia Mahal, Jama Masjid, Delhi-06 on the

basis of a Will executed by Abdur Rashid in his favour. That said

Will was in Urdu language and translation of the same in English

language has been filed. That after death of Mohd Wasiq, the

petitioner alongwith other LRs of late Mohd Wasiq became the co-

owner of property in question .

10.2 On the other hand, it is submitted by counsel for the

respondent that on the basis of said Will, the father of petitioner

had become the owner of only half of the portion of the said

property in question and not the absolute owner and again as

reflected from the document issued by MCD filed by the petitioner

himself, name of the mother of the petitioner is mentioned. It is

further submitted that previously an eviction petition was filed by

the father of the petitioner against the father of the respondent

RC.REV. 305/2025 Page 15 of 21

bearing no. E-187/98, which was dismissed by the then ARC vide

judgment dated 19.07.2003 and it was recorded in the said

judgment that petitioner was never the owner of property in

question. That said judgment operates as resjudicata against the

present case and accordingly, triable issue is there with respect to

the ownership of the petitioner in the tenanted premises. Again it is

further argued that as far as knowledge of the respondent, the

property in question is the Custodian Property.

10.3 Heard. It is observed that law is very well settled that in an

eviction petition filed by the landlord against the tenant, there is no

question of absolute ownership of the tenanted premises and what

the petitioner has to prove is that her title is more than a tenant. In

the case titled as Bharat Bhushan Vij Vs. Arti Teckchandani

153(2008)DLT 247 the Hon'ble Supreme Court inter-alia observed

as under:-

4. The concept of ownership in a landlord-tenant litigation

governed by the Delhi Rent Control Act, has to be

distinguished from the one in a title suit. If the premises

was let out by a person and after his death, the premises

has come in the hands of beneficiary under a Will, the

tenant has no right to challenge the title of such a

beneficiary. If on the death of the original owner the

tenant has any doubt as to who was the owner of the

premises, he is supposed to file an interpleader suit

impleading all the legal heirs of the deceased and ask the

Court to decide as to who shall be the landlord/owner after

the death of the original owner. Where no interpleader suit

is filed by the tenant and the tenant continues in

possession after death of the original owner without demur

and without raising an objection against the person, who

claims to have inherited the property under the Will, he

later on cannot challenge the ownership of such a person.

It is not the domain of the tenant to challenge the Will of

the deceased landlord. If a landlord is able to show that

there is a testament in his/her favour, he/she is deemed to

have discharged his/her burden of proving the ownership

under the Act. If the tenant takes a frivolous objection

about ownership, such an objection cannot be entertained

unless the tenant comes forward as to who was the

landlord/owner of the premises and to whom he has been

paying rent after the death of the original owner.

5. This Court in Ram Chander v. Ram Pyari 109 (2004)

DLT 388 and Plashchemicals Company v. Ashit Chadha

& Anr. : 114(2004)DLT408 have laid down the law that it

was not for the tenant to challenge the Will of the landlord

and any such challenge made by the tenant is a baseless

and frivolous challenge. I, therefore, consider that even if

RC.REV. 305/2025 Page 16 of 21

the learned Additional Rent Controller did not dwell upon

this point, such a challenge made by the tenant would not

result into non suiting the landlord. Moreover, the

evidence led by the landlady in this case makes it clear

that she inherited the property, in question, on the basis of

Will left by her father in law. There is no other person

who has claimed ownership over the property and this

objection was raised just for the sake of raising objection.”

10.4 Again in the case titled as “Plastic Chemicals Company Vs

Ashit Chadha & Ors. 114 (2004) DLT 408, the Hon'ble High

Court of Delhi inter-alia observed as under:-

“4. I have heard counsel for the parties and carefully

examined the judgment under challenge as also the

material on record. As regards the contentions raised by

counsel for the petitioner challenging the Will, the law has

since been crystalised by the Supreme Court in Smt.

Shanti Sharma vs. Smt.Ved Prabha, as also in Sheela and

others vs. Firm Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash, . Once the

landlord has been able to show that there is a testament in

his favor, the landlord is deemed to have discharged his

burden of ownership, vis-a-vis, the Rent Control Act. In

the present case, the landlord has been able to prove that a

testament has been made in his favor by the previous

owner which, at best, could be challenged by the heirs of

Smt. Saroj Mohan and certainly not by the tenant. In this

view of the matter I hold that the objection of the

petitioner herein to the maintainability of the eviction

petition by the landlord is frivolous.”

10.5 In view of this legal position, let me advert to the question of

ownership to the petitioner in the present case. As reflected from

the translated copy of Will , filed by the petitioner, the previous

owner of property in question namely Abdur Rashid had

bequeathed his half share in the property in question in favour of

Mohd Wasiq, who was the father of the petitioner. Now in the

entire application for leave to defend, the respondent has no where

pleaded if there was any other person who was the owner of

property in question except the father of the petitioner. As observed

above, in the case of Bharat Bhushan Vij (Supra), if the father of

petitioner became the co-owner of property in question, the

respondent has no right to challenge the said Will. Again as

discussed above, the petitioner is not required to prove the absolute

title in the tenanted premises and therefore, I am duly satisfied that

for purpose of present eviction petition, the petitioner has duly

established his co-ownership in the property in question on the

basis of Will executed in favour of his father and his father having

expired.

10.6 Now law is further very well settled that any coowner can file

RC.REV. 305/2025 Page 17 of 21

an eviction petition against the tenant and all the co-owners are not

required to be impleaded as petitioners. In this regard, reliance can

be placed upon the judgment of M/s Indian Umbrella

Manufacturing Co. & Ors. vs. Bhagabandei Agarwalla (Dead) by

LRs Smt. Savitri Agarwalla & Ors., AIR 2004 1321. Accordingly,

the plea taken on behalf of respondent that father of petitioner

became the owner of only half portion of the property in question

on the basis of said Will is not tenable and again non impleadment

of other LRs of Mohd Wasiq is also not material for purpose of

filing of eviction petition against the tenant.

10.7 Now regarding the plea of resjudicata taken by the respondent

on the basis of the earlier judgment dated 19.07.2003, it is

observed that firstly the provisions of CPC are not strictly

applicable to the provision of section 25 B of DRC Act under

which present eviction petition has been filed and in this regard

reliance can be placed upon the judgment of Prithipal Singh Vs.

Satpal Singh ( that through LRs) (2010) 2SCC 15. Again it was

further held by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Faquir Chand

Vs.Ram Rattan Bhanot 1973 RCR 221 that plea of resjudicata is

not applicable in the eviction petition filed under DRC Act.

Secondly, even if the plea of resjudicata is taken up for

consideration, it is observed that said judgement by the then ARC

was passed in the year 2003 and since thereafter, several judgment

have been passed by Hon’ble Apex Court as well as Hon’ble High

Court of Delhi to lay down the law that in the eviction petition the

Rent Controller is not supposed to adjudicate the title of the

petitioner /landlord like a civil suit for possession on the basis of

title and the only fact to be appreciated is that the title of the

petitioner /landlord is better than the respondent /tenant. In this

regard, reference can be made to the several judgments including

Bharat Bhushan (Supra), which was passed in the year 2004,

judgment of Plastic Chemicals Company Vs Ashit Chadha &

Ors. 114 (2004), and also to the judgment of Rajendra Kumar

Sharma and Ors. Vs. Lilawati and Ors 155 (2008) DLT 383.

10.8 Regarding the plea that property is owned by Custodian of

Enemy Property, it is observed that except making the vague

averment, the respondent has failed to file any document in support

of said plea and therefore, said plea is not tenable in any manner.

10.9 Accordingly, it is concluded that for purpose of present

eviction petition, the petitioner has duly established his ownership

in the property in question and there is no triable issue with respect

to the ownership in the property in question raised by the

respondent.”

(Emphasis supplied)

30. Adverting to the facts of the present case, the challenge urged

RC.REV. 305/2025 Page 18 of 21

by the Petitioner is confined to the aspect of Respondent’s alleged lack

of absolute ownership of the Subject Premises. It is contended that the

Respondent could not have maintained the Eviction Petition since the

Will relied upon by him did not bequeath the entirety of the Subject

Premises in favour of his father and, consequently, the Respondent

could not claim to be the absolute owner thereof. The contention,

therefore, proceeds on the premise that the alleged deficiency in the

Respondent’s title constitutes a triable issue within the meaning of

Section 25-B of the DRC Act. This submission, however, does not

inspire the confidence of this Court.

31. This Court is of the considered view that the aforesaid

contention does not take into account the settled distinction between

the concept of ownership in a title suit and the nature of the inquiry

required in an eviction proceeding under the DRC Act. A perusal of

the Impugned Order evidences that the learned ARC has rightly

noticed that in proceedings under the DRC Act, the landlord is not

required to establish an indefeasible or absolute title in the manner

required in a suit for declaration of title. What is required to be shown

is a title better than that of the tenant, coupled with the relationship of

landlord and tenant between the parties.

32. In the present case, the learned ARC has examined the

translated copy of the Will relied upon by the Respondent and has

noted that the predecessor-in-interest, namely Abdur Rashid, had

bequeathed his half share in the Subject Premises in favour of the

Respondent’s father, Mohd. Wasiq. Upon the death of Mohd. Wasiq,

the Respondent succeeded to the property along with the other legal

heirs. The learned ARC has, accordingly, concluded that the

RC.REV. 305/2025 Page 19 of 21

Respondent had established, for the purposes of the present eviction

proceedings, his co-ownership in the Subject Premises.

33. The fact that the Will is stated to have bequeathed only a half

share in the Subject Premises does not, by itself, constitute a triable

issue so as to defeat the Eviction Petition. It is trite law that a co-

owner is competent to maintain an eviction proceeding against a

tenant, and the absence of the other co-owners from the array of

petitioners does not, by itself, render such proceedings non-

maintainable.

34. This Court also takes note of the fact that the Petitioner has not,

in the Application seeking leave to defend, disclosed any competing

title in himself or identified any person claiming ownership of the

Subject Premises adverse to the Respondent, and the learned ARC has

rightly appreciated the said aspect as well. The objection, that the Will

did not confer absolute ownership upon the Respondent’s father, in

the absence of any competing claimant or material demonstrating a

superior title in favour of the Petitioner or any third party, does not, in

the facts of the present case, disclose a triable issue as to the

Respondent’s entitlement to maintain the Eviction Petition.

35. The Impugned Order, therefore, demonstrates that the learned

ARC has considered the various objections raised by the Petitioner

with respect to the Respondent’s ownership, the effect of the Will, the

earlier proceedings and the alleged status of the Subject Premises as

Custodian property. The conclusion that the Respondent had

established a title sufficient for the purposes of maintaining the

Eviction Petition is neither founded upon a misdirection in law nor

suffers from any apparent perversity.

RC.REV. 305/2025 Page 20 of 21

36. This Court is also conscious of the fact that in revision

proceedings, the Court is not required to undertake a re-appreciation

of the material relating to the title of the Respondent or substitute its

own assessment for that of the learned ARC. The scope of revisional

scrutiny under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Ac, as

rightly raised by the learned counsel for the Respondent, remains

confined to examining the legality and propriety of the decision-

making process. No such infirmity is discernible from the Impugned

Order.

37. Thus, even on merits, the limited challenge raised by the

Petitioner does not disclose any ground warranting interference with

the Impugned Order. The finding of the learned ARC that the

Respondent had established the requisite ownership for the purposes

of the eviction proceedings and that no triable issue arose in that

regard calls for no interference.

38. However, as noticed hereinabove, the aforesaid discussion on

merits is only for the sake of completeness. The more fundamental

circumstance which governs the fate of the present Petition is that the

Eviction Order has already been acted upon in execution proceedings

and the Respondent has admittedly obtained vacant and peaceful

possession of the Subject Premises. In such circumstances, the present

Petition has ceased to present any surviving or effective controversy

requiring adjudication.

DECISION:

39. In view of the foregoing discussion, the present Petition is

dismissed.

40. The present Petition, along with pending Application(s), if any,

RC.REV. 305/2025 Page 21 of 21

stands disposed of in aforementioned terms.

41. There shall be no Order as to the Costs.

HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J .

SEPTEMBER 22, 2026/tk/DJ