Page 1 of 37

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK

CRLMC No.4423 of 2024

Mr. Jitendra Nath Patnaik ..... Petitioner

-versus-

State of Odisha (Vigilance) ..... Opposite Party

For Petitioner … Mr. Asok Mohanty,

Senior Advocate

M/s. Umesh Chandra Patnaik,

S. Patnaik, M.R. Sahoo,

S.M. Pattnaik

For Opposite Party … Mr. Niranjan Moharana,

Standing Counsel for the

Vigilance Department

----------------

CORAM:

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ADITYA KUMAR MOHAPATRA

________________________________________________________

Date of hearing : 22.05.2026 :: Date of judgment : 06.08.2026

________________________________________________________

A.K. Mohapatra, J. The present CRLMC application is filed by the

Petitioner, one Jitendra Nath Patnaik, under section 482 of the Cr.P.C,

with a prayer to quash the F.I.R No.51 of 2009, registered on

Page 2 of 37

18.11.2009, before the Vigilance P.S Balasore for alleged commission

of offences punishable under Sections 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter “P.C Act”); Section

120-B of the IPC; Section 21 of the ‘Mines and Minerals

(Development and Regulation) Act, 1957’ (hereinafter “M.M.D.R

Act”) and Section 3 of the ‘Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980’

(hereinafter “FCA”), along with the Chargesheet No.06 of 2013, filed

on 26.03.2013 in V.G.R Case No.19 of 2011, which, as of now is

pending before the Learned Additional District and Sessions Judge,

Bargarh.

FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE CASE

2. The crux of the factual matrix forming the basis of the present

controversy, is as follows; the father of the Petitioner, Late Bansidhar

Patnaik (“the Original Lessee”), was granted a mining lease on

31.07.1959 by the Government of Odisha for extraction of Manganese

Ore and Iron Ore over 260 hectares at Kalaparbat, Joda, Keonjhar, for

periods of 20 and 30 years respectively. Upon surrender of the

Manganese Ore lease in 1967, the leasehold area for Iron Ore stood

reduced to 106.392 hectares, valid up to 31.07.1989. Concurrently, a

partnership with the name and style of M/s B.D. Patnaik was

constituted by the Original Lessee in 1969, to which the Petitioner

Page 3 of 37

was admitted in 1974 upon attaining majority. The partnership deed

was periodically reconstituted, culminating in the Deed of Partnership

dated 01.04.1995, under which the Original Lessee’s five sons,

including the Petitioner, became partners in equal share.

3. On 30.07.1988, twelve months prior to expiry of the lease, the

Original Lessee applied for renewal (“the First Renewal

Application”), which, upon amendment, was confined to 25.633

hectares comprising 7.810 hectares of non-forest land and 17.823

hectares of forest land requiring a De-Reservation Proposal (“DRP”)

under the FCA. The First Renewal Application remained un-

adjudicated beyond the date of expiry of the lease. During such

pendency, the Petitioner, in consonance with the original lessee and

Mr.Rabindra Nath Patnaik, sought temporary/interim work permits in

1992, which were granted by the Director of Mines from time to time

between November 1991 and December 1994, at Annexure-2 series,

and a power of attorney dated 05.01.1994 was executed by the

Original Lessee in favour of the Petitioner and his elder brother, Late

Rabindra Nath Patnaik, to handle communication concerning the

mining lease.

Page 4 of 37

4. Upon the demise of the Original Lessee on 05.11.1995, Mr.

Rabindra Nath Patnaik is stated to have handled the primary

responsibilities of the firm and the Petitioner is stated to have been in

charge of correspondence with the Government authorities.

Nevertheless, all the five partners/brothers received profits from the

firm. Subsequently, the Ministry of Environment and Forest

(“MoEF”) granted the DRP, over 17.823 hectares on 03.09.1998, for a

duration of ten years or co-terminous with the lease period.

Eventually, on account of advancing age, Mr. Rabindra Nath Patnaik

executed a power of attorney dated 09.01.2006 in favour of his son,

Saroj Kumar Patnaik. Upon expiry of the lease period on 31.07.2009,

the partners surrendered the mining lease.

5. On 17.11.2009, a written complaint was lodged by the Deputy

Superintendent of Police, Vigilance Cell, Cuttack, at Balasore Police

Station, pursuant to which F.I.R. No. 51 of 2009 was registered on

18.11.2009 against certain named mining and forest officials and “the

Managing Partners of M/s B.D. Patnaik”, alleging commission of

offences under Section 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the PC Act;

Section 120-B of the IPC; Section 21 of the MMDR Act; and Section

3 of the FCA. Thereafter, on 26.03.2013, a Chargesheet was filed in

the aforesaid offences and Section 58 of the MCD Rules, arraigning

Page 5 of 37

the Petitioner, by name, as a Managing Partner of the firm, together

with fourteen other mining officials. The matter was then taken up by

the learned Special Judge (Vigilance), Keonjhar, renumbered as

V.G.R. Case No. 19 of 2011 corresponding to T.R. No.07 of 2013,

and cognizance of the alleged offences was taken on 11.06.2013.

6. In due course, the Petitioner filed an application for discharge

under Section 239 of the Cr.P.C, which was dismissed by the learned

Special Judge (Vigilance), Keonjhar, by order dated 19.07.2019,

holding him liable, prima facie, for continuing illegal mining in

connivance with the co-accused officials, occasioning loss to the State

exchequer to the tune of Rs.1,30,39,13,397/-. The revision preferred

against such dismissal, bearing CRLREV No.534 of 2019, along with

connected matters was dismissed by a Coordinate Bench of this Court

vide judgment dated 06.08.2020. Assailing the said judgment, the

Petitioner approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP (Crl.) No.

2278 of 2021, wherein interim protection was granted on 15.03.2021

directing that no coercive steps be taken against him. The Special

Leave Petition was ultimately dismissed on 15.10.2024, affirming the

judgment of this Court.

Page 6 of 37

7. It is also noticed that while this was the position, the Director of

Enforcement registered ECIR No.BBZO/13/2021, on 19.03.2021,

against the Petitioner under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act,

2002 (“PMLA”), culminating in a Prosecution Complaint Case No.20

of 2023 dated 30.11.2023 before the Special Judge, Khurda; the said

proceedings, being independent of the Chargesheet impugned herein,

do not form the subject-matter of, and have not been examined in, the

present application. It is in the aforesaid backdrop that the present

application under Section 482 Cr.P.C has been filed with the prayer as

mentioned hereinabove.

CONTENTIONS OF THE PETITIONER

8. Heard Mr. Asok Mohanty, learned senior counsel appearing on

behalf of the Petitioner. The learned senior counsel, at the very outset,

has submitted that the impugned FIR does not, on its face, name the

Petitioner as an accused or suspected person. Rather, it refers only to

three named mining/forest officials and M/s B.D. Patnaik Mines and

others. It was contended that the Petitioner was implicated for the first

time only during the subsequent investigation, and that the Opposite

Party does not have any material to show any active involvement of

the Petitioner in the present crime. The learned senior counsel

submitted that since the firm has five partners with equal

Page 7 of 37

shareholding, the isolation of the Petitioner alone, some four years

later at the chargesheet stage, without any allegation against the

remaining partners, clearly betrays the mala fides of the Opposite

Party. It was stated that even though the Opposite Parties have levied

allegations of illegal mining against the firm, they have failed to

attribute any specific role to the present Petitioner. Given the delay of

four years in filing the Chargesheet, it can very well be inferred that

the implication of the Petitioner in the present case is merely an

afterthought without any logical basis.

9. In fact, the learned senior counsel has pointed out to this Court

that the role of the present Petitioner was limited to mere

correspondence with the Government and that the management of the

day-to-day affairs of the firm, including operation of its bank account

and signing of statutory returns, was discharged throughout by Mr.

Rabindra Nath Patnaik and, after his demise, by Mr. Saroj Kumar

Patnaik. In corroboration of his contention, the learned senior counsel

has referred to the letter dated 05.07.2022 of the Director of Mines, at

Annexure-13 and the letter dated 03.08.2022 of the State Bank of

India, Joda Branch. It was contended that all the documents relating to

the management of the firm were signed by either Mr. R. N. Patnaik,

or Mr. Saroj Kumar Patnaik, and that the Petitioner’s role in the firm

Page 8 of 37

was confined to correspondence with the State authorities on

instructions of the Managing Partner. Learned senior counsel has

stated that there is no material on record which demonstrates the

Petitioner’s personal and active involvement in the alleged illegal

mining.

10. Next, the learned senior counsel stated that hypothetically, and

without admitting such, even if it is assumed that the Petitioner was

responsible for the management of affairs of the firm, since the

operations of the firm were continuing pursuant to the extension of

operation granted from time to time, it cannot be said that any illegal

mining activity was carried out by the firm, and, by extension, the

Petitioner. It was contended that the mining operations conducted

pending adjudication of the First Renewal Application were carried

out under interim work permits periodically granted and extended by

the Director of Mines, and the requisite DRP was ultimately granted

on 03.09.1998. Similarly, learned senior counsel submitted that it is

the Opposite Party’s acknowledgement that the firm had applied for a

De-Reservation Proposal, pursuant to which the MoEF, vide letter

dated 03.09.1998, permitted the firm to carry on mining operation in

the forest area for a period of 10 years, which was co-terminous with

Page 9 of 37

the permission under the MMDR Act. As such, the mining operations

cannot, in any way, be characterised as illegal mining.

11. The learned senior counsel further submitted that the Petitioner

has already been punished, along with the other partners, following

the decision in W.P.(C) No.114 of 2014 (Common Cause v. Union of

India and Ors.), in the shape of a fine amounting to Rs.8,96,01,825/-

for operating mines without a valid DRP, under Section 2 of the FCA.

Therefore, the Petitioner cannot be subjected to double jeopardy. A

No-Due certificate has also been issued in favour of the Petitioner and

the firm regarding full payment of the fine amount. Further, it was

stated that an independent Central Empowered Committee (“CEC”)

was appointed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid writ

petition, which, after conducting a detailed fact finding exercise into

the allegations of illegal mining in the state of Odisha, did not return

any findings with regard to the involvement of the firm in any illegal

mining operations. Accordingly, the learned senior counsel submitted

that since a penalty imposed on the Petitioner has already been

discharged, a parallel criminal prosecution alleging illegal mining on

the self-same facts is, therefore, said to be impermissible.

Page 10 of 37

12. Referring to the scheme of the MMDR Act, specifically Section

22 thereof, the learned senior counsel contended that cognizance of

any offence punishable under the MMDR Act can be taken only when

the complaint with respect to such offences is made in writing by a

person authorised on behalf of the State or the Central Government. It

is the learned counsel’s contention that the complaint dated

17.11.2009, on which the present FIR dated 18.11.2009 came to be

registered, was lodged by the DSP Vigilance, who was not, at that

point in time, an authorised person. Likewise, the learned senior

counsel referred to Rule 2(1)(b) of the OMPTS Rules, 2007 and

Schedule-I thereof, and submitted that fifteen mining officers have

been designated as competent authority for various jurisdictions.

Similarly, referring to the Notification dated 19.12.2009 of the

Department of Steel and Mines, Government of Odisha, at Annexure-

14, the learned senior counsel pointed out that the Government, in

exercise of its powers under Sections 22 and 23B of the MMDR Act,

has authorised the Director of Mines and the Joint Directors to

exercise the powers of seizure/detection/confiscation in connection

with illegal mining activities in the state.

13. In addition to the aforesaid contention, the learned senior

counsel contended that even if it is assumed, but not admitted, that the

Page 11 of 37

DSP Vigilance was authorised to file the instant complaint, it would

be bad in law since the Notification dated 14.01.2010 of the Home

Department, at Annexure-15, which was promulgated after the

abovementioned notification dated 19.12.2009, clearly states that any

investigation/enquiry initiated under the MMDR Act, must be

preceded by an approval or sanction from the Competent Authority.

The notification also specifies that officers of and above the rank of

Inspector of Police under the Director of Vigilance, Odisha are

empowered to conduct investigation/enquiry and to take legal actions

under the provisions of the IPC, other relevant Acts and Rules

pertaining to illegal mining in the State. It was stated that in the

present case, the Opposite Parties have obtained no approval/sanction

of the competent authority and no authorisation for institution of the

Complaint or to conduct inquiry/investigation under the

corresponding Act.

14. In order to substantiate his claims, the learned senior counsel

for the Petitioner has placed reliance on Balasubramanian

Prabhakaran v. State of Odisha (Vigilance), reported in 2021 SCC

OnLine Ori 147; Nandalal Rungta v. State of Odisha (Vigilance),

reported in 2022 SCC OnLine Ori 744; Surendranath Agarwal v.

State of Odisha, reported in MANU/OR/0261/2009; 2026 (I) OLR

Page 12 of 37

301; and State (NCT of Delhi) v. Sanjay, reported in (2014) 9 SCC

772, for the proposition that cognizance of an offence under the

MMDR Act cannot rest upon a complaint by a person not shown to be

authorised, and that the consequent proceedings are liable to be set

aside. Additionally, the learned senior counsel has stated that in view

of the observation in Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi),

reported in (2019) 11 SCC 706, a petition for quashing of an FIR

remains maintainable notwithstanding the subsequent filing of a

chargesheet.

15. Finally, the learned senior counsel for the Petitioner contended

before this Court that the F.I.R in the present case is politically

motivated and borne out of vengeance, and does not reveal any

material to establish the allegations against the Petitioner. As such, the

attending circumstances of the present case, i.e. the timing of the FIR

within months of the Petitioner’s rejection of a political overture, the

omission of his name from the FIR, and his belated implication in the

Chargesheet without specific attribution of role, bring the case

squarely within the 1

st

, 2

nd

, 6

th

and 7

th

grounds enumerated by the

Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, reported

in 1992 AIR 604, at paragraph 102, warranting the exercise of

inherent powers by this Court. The learned senior counsel contended

Page 13 of 37

that the conduct of the Opposite Parties is motivated by mala fides

since the Petitioner has been isolated and no proceeding has been

initiated against any other partners of the firm. Criminal proceedings

should not be used to harass individuals. In such view of the matter, it

was stated that the impugned F.I.R No.51 of 2009 dated 18.11.2009,

at Annexure-1 and the Chargesheet dated 26.03.2013, at Annexure-8,

be quashed.

CONTENTIONS OF THE OPPOSITE PARTIES

16. Heard Mr. N. Maharana, learned Additional Standing Counsel

appearing on behalf of the Opposite Party-Vigilance Department. The

prosecution case, in substance, is that illegal mining and theft of

minerals occasioned loss to the State exchequer of the order of

Rs.130.39 crores, together with equivalent pecuniary advantage

conferred upon the Petitioner who has acted in collusion with the

mining officials in violation of the provisions under the PC Act, the

IPC, the MMDR Act, and the FCA. It was contended by the learned

opposing counsel that the Petitioner being a private person and the

rest of the accused persons being government officials, no

sanction/prior permission was required for lodging an F.I.R or

initiating an investigation. Further, referring to the Notification dated

14.01.2010, learned ASC submitted that it specifically empowers

Page 14 of 37

officers of and above the rank of Inspector of Police in the Vigilance

Directorate, Odisha, to investigate and take legal action, including

filing of Chargesheet, pertaining to illegal mining, subject to sanction

of the competent authority as and when required.

17. Equally, the learned counsel for the State-Vigilance

Department, drawing attention to Section 22 of the MMDR Act,

stated that a bar under the Act is on the “lodging of complaint” for the

purpose of taking cognizance and not upon “filing of the

chargesheet”. It was stated that the F.I.R in the present case has been

registered under Section 156 of the Cr.P.C. Sub-sections (1) and (2)

thereof empower “any officer-in-charge of a police station” to

investigate a cognizable offence without a Magistrate’s order and, bar

any challenge to the investigation on the ground that the officer was

not empowered to investigate, the Vigilance Police were competent to

register the FIR and initiate investigation in the matter. It was

contended that by the time the Chargesheet was filed (26.03.2013)

and the cognizance was taken (11.06.2013), the concerned Vigilance

officer stood duly empowered under the Notification dated

14.01.2010, and the Chargesheet was filed only after obtaining

sanction for prosecution from the State Government. Such sanction,

being accorded by a higher authority, cannot be equated to absence of

Page 15 of 37

sanction. Moreover, since the F.I.R was registered under Section 154

Cr.P.C (and not Section 200 Cr.P.C), and the Petitioner never having

assailed the order of cognizance at the initial stage, the authority

designated to investigate and file chargesheet, i.e. the Vigilance

Department, cannot be said to have acted without jurisdiction.

18. Next, the learned counsel for the Opposite Party-Vigilance

Department submitted that identical contentions were raised by the

Petitioner in his discharge application filed under Section 239 of the

Cr.P.C (which was dismissed on 19.07.2019) and in the revision

bearing CRLREV No.534 of 2019 along with other allied matters

(dismissed vide judgment dated 06.08.2020). In the aforesaid

dismissal orders, relying on Notification dated 14.01.2010, this Court

had specifically repelled the contention of the Petitioner that the

Vigilance Police were not the authorised person. Learned counsel

further stated that the aforesaid judgment passed in the CRLREV

No.534 of 2019 has been affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

SLP (Crl.) No.2278 of 2021 by keeping open the issue regarding the

competency of the officer lodging complaint, which is to be decided

at the stage of trial. Moreover, the Apex Court has also not remitted

the matter to this Court either for adjudication or reconsideration. As

such, the learned counsel for the Vigilance Department contended that

Page 16 of 37

the same contention, which has been settled, cannot be re-agitated in a

subsequent application under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

19. Notably, the learned counsel for the State-Vigilance

Department argued before this Court that a second or subsequent

petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C is not maintainable on grounds

available at the time of filing/decision of the first quashing petition,

absent a demonstrated change of circumstances, as held in M.C.

Ravikumar v. D.S. Velmurugan, bearing 2025 INSC 888 (paragraphs

11 to 15). In addition, relying upon the pronouncements of the

Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Gujarat v. Mohanlal Jitamalji

Porwal, reported in AIR 1987 SC 1321; H.N. Rishbud v. State of

Delhi, reported in AIR 1955 SC 196; R.A.H. Siguram v. Sankar

Gowda, reported in (2017) 16 SCC 126; Union of India v. T.

Nathamuni, reported in (2014) 16 SCC 285; State of M.P. v.

Virender Kumar Tripathi, reported in (2009) 15 SCC 533; Ashok

Tshering Bhutia v. State of Sikkim, reported in (2011) 4 SCC 402;

and NCT of Delhi v. Sanjay, reported in (2014) 9 SCC 772, the

learned counsel submitted that even assuming, without admitting, that

there was a formal defect or irregularity touching upon the authority

of the complainant, such defect does not vitiate the proceeding where

a prima facie case is otherwise made out and, has no direct bearing on

Page 17 of 37

the competence of the Court to take cognizance or proceed with the

trial in the matter.

20. So far as the judgements relied upon by the Petitioner are

concerned, the learned counsel for the State-Vigilance Department

attempted to distinguish such judgements from the present case on the

ground that in Balasubramanian Prabhakaran (supra) the

proceeding was quashed on the distinct ground of vicarious liability of

a Managing Director without arraigning the company. In Nandalal

Rungta (supra), the coordinate Bench itself rejected the contention

that Vigilance officials were not “persons authorised”, quashing

having been founded on an unrelated Multi-Disciplinary Committee

report exonerating the petitioner therein of illegal mining. Similarly, it

was stated that in Surendranath Agarwal (supra), the investigating

officer was an ordinary police officer, not a Vigilance officer covered

by the Notification dated 14.01.2010, a material distinction from the

present case.

21. In view of the aforesaid contentions, the learned counsel

appearing for the State-Vigilance Department submitted that the

present CRLMC petition, being devoid of merit, is liable to be

dismissed forthwith.

Page 18 of 37

ANALYSIS OF THE COURT

22. Heard the learned senior counsel for the Petitioner and the

learned Additional Standing Counsel for the Vigilance Department,

perused the F.I.R, the Chargesheet, the written submissions by the

parties and other documents available on record. The Petitioner, by

filing the present CRLMC petition, has impugned the F.I.R and the

subsequent chargesheet under the abovementioned offences on the

primary grounds that the complaint in the present case, which gave

rise to the F.I.R, was made by an unauthorised person, that the mining

operations by the Petitioner’s firm flagged as illegal, were actually

carried out with the approval of the mining department, that the

present criminal proceeding against the Petitioner is without any

material basis and attracts the bar of double jeopardy in light of the

earlier penalization under the FCA, and certain other grounds.

23. In order to fairly adjudicate the validity of the prayer made by

the Petitioner, this Court is required to determine the following issues:

Firstly, whether F.I.R. No.51 of 2009 and the consequential

Chargesheet dated 26.03.2013 are vitiated for want of a complaint by

a “person authorised” within the meaning of Section 22 of the MMDR

Act, having regard to the fact that the Notifications dated 19.12.2009

and 14.01.2010 relied upon by the Opposite Party post-date the

Page 19 of 37

complaint dated 17.11.2009 and, whether, assuming any infirmity in

the authorisation to lodge the complaint, such infirmity vitiates the

taking of cognizance and the consequent trial, having regard to the

settled principle that defects in investigation do not, without more,

affect the competence of the Court; Secondly, whether the present

application, being a subsequent attempt to press a contention already

addressed by a coordinate Bench of this Court in its judgment dated

06.08.2020 (later affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court), is barred

by the principle against successive petitions under Section 482

Cr.P.C., or is saved by the liberty expressly reserved by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in its order dated 15.10.2024; Thirdly, whether the

material on record discloses a prima facie case against the Petitioner

personally, having regard to his role as a partner of the firm, so as to

attract the Bhajan Lal parameters; and Fourthly, whether the penalty

already imposed and discharged under the FCA operates as a bar to

continuance of the present prosecution.

24. Before proceeding any further, it is apposite to establish that so

far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, the fundamental

principles governing this Court’s exercise of its inherent powers under

section 482 Cr.P.C are now well settled via State of Haryana v. Ch.

Bhajan Lal, reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein the Hon’ble

Page 20 of 37

Supreme Court has summarised the principles governing the quashing

of FIR/ complaints/ criminal cases in paragraph 102, which have been

reiterated recently in B.N. John v. State of U.P., reported in 2025

SCC OnLine SC 7 and in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand,

reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185 (specifically in paragraphs 8

and 9). In the same vein, in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi),

reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in

paragraph 29, has laid down that the High Court, while exercising its

inherent jurisdiction under section 482 Cr.P.C, has to take the

allegations in the FIR at face value and such powers must be

exercised only in exceptional cases where non-interference would

lead to miscarriage of justice. Additionally, while exercising the

inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C, it must be borne in mind

that no mini-trial is to be conducted. Instead, the High Court is

required to restrict its inquiry to the allegations made in the complaint

or FIR, and ascertain whether such allegations, if accepted as true on

their face, constitute a prima facie offence (see Abhishek Singh v.

Ajay Kumar & Ors., bearing 2025 INSC 807 and CBI v. Aryan

Singh, reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379). At this stage, a

meticulous analysis of the factum of taking cognizance of an offence

by the Magistrate is neither called for, nor is it permissible to

Page 21 of 37

undertake appreciation of evidence [see paragraph 13 of Dhruvaram

Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2019) 18

SCC 191].

25. Returning to the facts of the present case, specifically Section

22 of the MMDR Act, quoted hereinbelow, there is a clear bar to the

effect that no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable

under the Act or any allied rules except upon a written complaint by a

person authorised in this behalf by the Central or State Government. It

is not disputed that the written complaint dated 17.11.2009, on which

the impugned F.I.R. No.51 of 2009 was registered the following day,

predates both the Notification dated 19.12.2009 (declaring certain

officers, not including the DSP Vigilance, as “competent authority”

under Rule 2(1)(b) of the OMPTS Rules, 2007) and the Notification

dated 14.01.2010 (empowering Vigilance officers of and above the

rank of Inspector to investigate and take legal action pertaining to

illegal mining, subject to sanction of the competent authority as and

when required). It is also clear that neither Notification purports to

operate retrospectively.

“22. Cognizance of offences.― No court shall take

cognizance of any offence punishable under this Act

or any rules made thereunder except upon complaint

in writing made by a person authorised in this behalf

by the Central Government or the State Government.”

Page 22 of 37

26. Be that as it may, this Court is unable to accept, without

qualification, the submission of the Petitioner that this infirmity,

without more, vitiates the F.I.R, the Chargesheet and the entire

proceeding ab initio. The bar under Section 22 operates upon the

taking of cognizance, not upon registration of an FIR or conduct of

investigation. Cognizance in the present matter was taken on

11.06.2013, well over three years after the Notification dated

14.01.2010 came into force, and after the Chargesheet dated

26.03.2013 had been filed following sanction for prosecution obtained

from the State Government. The question, therefore, is not whether

the Vigilance Department possessed authority in vacuo at the moment

of the original complaint, but whether the authority possessed at the

point of cognizance suffices to sustain the proceeding,

notwithstanding that the FIR traces its origin to a complaint lodged

before the enabling Notifications.

27. The precise question as to whether a defect touching the

authority of the complainant/investigating agency at the threshold

vitiates cognizance validly taken thereafter, stands substantially

answered in the pronouncement of the Apex Court in H.N. Rishbud v.

State of Delhi, reported in AIR 1955 SC 196, wherein it was held that

Page 23 of 37

a defect or illegality in investigation, however serious, has no direct

bearing on the competency of the Court to take cognizance or on the

procedure relating to trial. This principle has been consistently

reiterated in State of M.P. v. Ramesh C. Sharma, reported in (2005)

12 SCC 628 and State of M.P. v. Virender Kumar Tripathi, reported

in (2009) 15 SCC 533, along with the decision relied on by the

Opposite Parties in Ashok Tshering Bhutia v. State of Sikkim,

reported in (2011) 4 SCC 402. At paragraph 20 of Ashok Tshering

Bhutia (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court has clarified that when

cognizance has been taken in a case, and the case has proceeded to

termination, unless a miscarriage of justice is shown to have been

caused, the invalidity of the preceding investigation does not vitiate

the result. Moreover, it is worth recalling that a mere

error/omission/irregularity in sanction is not to be considered fatal

unless such error/omission/irregularity has occasioned a failure of

justice. Once valid cognizance has been taken by the Court, with

jurisdiction to do so under the Cr.P.C, any presume d

irregularity/invalidity of the police report would not be considered the

foundation of jurisdiction of the Court to take cognizance, and cannot

vitiate the same [reference in this regard may be had to Kalpnath Rai

v. State, reported in (1997) 8 SCC 732; State of Orissa v. Mrutunjaya

Page 24 of 37

Panda, reported in (1998) 2 SCC 414; Shankerbhai Laljibhai

Rot v. State of Gujarat, reported in (2004) 13 SCC 487].

28. These authorities, read together, indicate that the question of

whether the DSP Vigilance was, on 17.11.2009, a “person authorised”

is not, without a further demonstration of resultant miscarriage of

justice, a ground sufficient in itself to quash the present F.I.R and

Chargesheet at the threshold under Section 482 Cr.P.C, more

particularly where, by the time of cognizance, the Vigilance

Department stood conclusively vested with authority under the

Notification dated 14.01.2010, and sanction for prosecution had been

obtained from the State Government prior to filing of the Chargesheet

(which, it is pertinent to mention, is a disputed question of fact, since

both the Petitioner and the Prosecution have taken opposite stance as

to whether a sanction/approval was actually obtained).

29. Having said that, this Court is not unmindful of the

countervailing authorities relied upon by the Petitioner

[Balasubramanian Prabhakaran v. State of Odisha (Vigilance),

reported in 2021 SCC OnLine Ori 147; Nandalal Rungta v. State of

Odisha (Vigilance), reported in 2022 SCC OnLine Ori 744; and

Surendranath Agarwal v. State of Odisha , reported in

MANU/OR/0261/2009], each concerned, in some measure, with

Page 25 of 37

authorisation under Section 22 of the MMDR Act. On examination,

however, the submission of the Opposite Party that these decisions are

distinguishable merits acceptance. In Nandalal Rungta (supra), the

coordinate Bench itself repelled the identical contention, holding it

“unacceptable” in para 23 that Vigilance officials were not “persons

authorised”, the quashing therein resting on the independent ground

that the Multi-Disciplinary Committee report found no violation

attributable to the Petitioner therein. Similarly, in Surendranath

Agarwal (supra), the investigation had been conducted by an ordinary

police officer rather than a Vigilance officer covered by the

Notification dated 14.01.2010, a material distinction, since the present

case concerns the Vigilance Department specifically empowered

under that Notification, the objection here going only to the date of

the original complaint, not to the Department’s want of power

altogether. The first issue is, therefore, answered accordingly. So far

as Balasubramanian Prabhakaran (supra) itself is concerned, that

decision is equally distinguishable, inasmuch as, the defect found

therein was a total absence of any written complaint under Section 22

of the MMDR Act, the prosecution having rested solely on a police

Chargesheet. In the present case, a complaint was in fact lodged, and

Page 26 of 37

only the complainant’s authorisation on that date, a curable infirmity

not a jurisdictional void, is disputed.

30. Next, the submission of the Opposite Party touching the

maintainability of a second or successive Section 482 Cr.P.C

application assumes considerable significance. It is evident from the

record that the precise contention now pressed, that the DSP Vigilance

lacked authority to lodge the complaint under Section 22 of the

MMDR Act, was raised by the Petitioner in the discharge application

under Section 239 Cr.P.C, rejected by order dated 19.07.2019, and

was again pressed in CRLREV No.534 of 2019, where this Court in

its judgment dated 06.08.2020 (at paragraphs 15-16 thereof),

expressly considered and rejected the contention, holding that the

Notification dated 14.01.2010 conferred the requisite authority upon

the Vigilance Police. The principle enunciated in M.C. Ravikumar v.

D.S. Velmurugan, reported in 2025 INSC 888, and contended by the

Opposite Parties, that a second quashing petition under Section 482

Cr.P.C raising grounds available at the time of the first quashing

proceeding is impermissible unless there is a demonstrated change of

circumstances, would ordinarily weigh heavily against entertaining

the present CRLMC petition on this very ground.

Page 27 of 37

31. However, the aforesaid principle must yield to the specific

liberty reserved by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in its order dated

15.10.2024 dismissing SLP (Crl.) No. 2278 of 2021, whereby it was

clarified that the contentions raised by the Petitioner/Accused with

regard to the competence of the officer(s) lodging complaint, are kept

open. This Court is of the considered view that the said clarification

constitutes a specific and deliberate carving out by the Court of last

resort, of this precise issue from the otherwise concluded findings

recorded in the judgment dated 06.08.2020, thereby permitting the

Petitioner to press the point afresh notwithstanding the ordinary bar

against re-agitation. Ergo, the question that consequently arises is not

whether the Petitioner may raise the contention at all, the Supreme

Court’s order settles that he may, but before which forum and at what

stage does such contention properly fall to be determined.

32. In this regard, this Court is of the considered view that the

challenge mounted by the Petitioner raises questions concerning the

validity of the sanction, authorisation and investigation which cannot

be adjudicated in isolation from the disputed factual matrix giving rise

to them, i.e. the precise sequence and interplay between the date of the

written complaint and the date of registration of the FIR (17.11.2009

and 18.11.2009 respectively); the dates of the enabling Notifications

Page 28 of 37

(19.12.2009 and 14.01.2010) and their impact on the facts of the

present case; the extent of surface right permissions and mining lease

granted, both temporal and territorial; the extent of validity of the

diversion proposal granted by the MoEF, duration-wise and territory-

wise; and other similar factual disputes. The aforesaid controversies,

which are overwhelmingly factual in nature, are more appropriately

examined at the stage of trial, where the attending facts and

circumstances may be established fully through evidence from both

sides, rather than being conclusively determined on affidavits and

annexures at the threshold while adjudicating an application under

Section 482 Cr.P.C. The liberty reserved by the Hon’ble Supreme

Court is, accordingly, more appropriately given effect to by directing

that the contention be urged before, and adjudicated by, the learned

trial Court, rather than by quashing the proceeding altogether at this

stage. The second issue is answered accordingly.

33. So far as it concerns the third issue and the contention of the

Petitioner that his implication was arbitrary, belated and without

specific attribution of role unto him, this Court notes that the

Chargesheet dated 26.03.2013 does arraign the Petitioner by name as

a managing partner of the firm, and the order dated 19.07.2019

dismissing the discharge application, at Annecxure-10, records a

Page 29 of 37

prima facie finding of his complicity, along with the co-accused, in

continuing mining operations without requisite renewal, occasioning

loss to the State exchequer. The aforesaid finding has been affirmed in

revision on 06.08.2020, and the Special Leave Petition assailing the

same has been dismissed. While the Petitioner’s submissions, that the

management of the firm’s affairs vested substantially in Mr. Rabindra

Nath Patnaik and subsequently in Mr. Saroj Kumar Patnaik, and that

his own role was confined to mere correspondence with the

Government, are not without force and may bear materially upon his

culpability, the assessment of the precise extent of his involvement as

a Partner, and the applicability of Section 23 of the MMDR Act

(which extends liability for an offence by a “company”, defined to

include a firm, to persons in charge of and responsible for its conduct,

subject to the defence of absence of knowledge or due diligence)

necessarily involve appreciation of evidence more appropriately

undertaken at trial.

34. Moreover, the categories enumerated in State of Haryana v.

Bhajan Lal, reported in 1992 AIR 604, at paragraph 102 (a) to (c),

permit quashing only where the allegations taken at face value do not

disclose commission of an offence. At present, that is not, on the

material before this Court, demonstrably the position. The Petitioner

Page 30 of 37

standing named as a partner of a firm alleged to have conducted

mining operations beyond the terms of its permits, the question of his

personal knowledge and diligence remains a matter for evidence, best

resolved at trial. As such, the 1

st

, 2

nd

, 6

th

and 7

th

grounds in para 102 of

Bhajan Lal (supra) relied upon by the Petitioner, do not seem to

support his overall stance since the present case is not one where the

allegations in the FIR fail to disclose a prima facie offence against the

Petitioner or a cognizable offence altogether (1

st

and 2

nd

ground).

Equally, there is no express statutory embargo against his prosecution,

nor is there any material to suggest that the proceedings are actuated

by manifest mala fides so as to render them legally unsustainable or

productive of a failure of justice (6

th

and 7

th

ground).

35. As to the allegation that the F.I.R was motivated by political

animosity and mala fides, while the timing of the complaint, i.e.

shortly after the Petitioner’s electoral success and his stated rejection

of a political overture, is a circumstance he is entitled to place before

the trial Court, mala fides of an informant does not, without more,

ordinarily justify quashing at the threshold where the material

otherwise discloses commission of a cognizable offence. It is well

settled that even a person actuated by malice may set the law in

motion, and the truth or otherwise of the allegations remains a matter

Page 31 of 37

for trial. Moreover, a criminal prosecution that is otherwise justifiable

and based on adequate evidence will not be vitiated on account of

political vendetta or mala fides of the complainant/informant

[reference may be had to Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar,

reported in (1987) 1 SCC 288; State of Bihar v. J.A.C. Saldanha,

reported in (1980) 1 SCC 554; State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma,

reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 222, specifically paragraphs 22 and

23; and para 9 of State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh, reported in

(1980) 2 SCC 471]. The adequacy of the evidence yet to be laid and

the justifiability of the prosecution, in the considered view of this

Court, are best tested at the stage of trial, upon contest between the

parties.

36. Even in Bhajan Lal (supra), paragraph 102 (g) of which has

been relied upon by the Petitioner, the Hon’ble Apex Court, in

paragraph 103, has sounded a note of caution that the High Court

must exercise its power of quashing only in the rarest of rare cases

and ought not to embark on an enquiry into the reliability or

genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the F.I.R. In fact,

the Hon’ble Supreme Court has also observed, towards the end of

paragraph 108, that when faced with only allegations and

recriminations but no evidence thereto, no finding on the question of

Page 32 of 37

malafides could be rendered at that stage. Even if it is assumed,

hypothetically, that the complaint was rife with personal animosity,

that alone cannot be a ground to discard a serious allegation. This

exercise, i.e. testing the veracity of the allegations and the strength of

the prosecution claim vis-à-vis the Petitioner’s stance, is best carried

out against the touchstone of evidence led by both sides, at the stage

of trial, before a trial Court. The third issue is answered accordingly.

37. Another facet of the controversy is the plea that the Petitioner

cannot be prosecuted a second time, having already discharged a

compensatory sum pursuant to the judgment dated 02.08.2017 in

Common Cause v. Union of India and Ors., bearing W.P.(C) No.114

of 2014. This plea does not, in the considered view of this Court,

squarely attract the doctrine against double jeopardy as ordinarily

understood. The protection under Article 20(2) of the Constitution,

and the cognate bar under Section 300 of the Cr.P.C, presupposes a

prior prosecution before a Court or judicial tribunal culminating in

punishment for the same offence. On the material presently on record,

neither requirement stands satisfied. As held in State of Bombay v.

S.L. Apte, reported in AIR 1961 SC 578, the constitutional protection

is attracted only where the offences in the two proceedings are

identical in their legal ingredients, and not merely because they arise

Page 33 of 37

from the same factual matrix. Tested against these principles, the

compensatory sum of Rs. 8,96,01,825/- paid pursuant to the

proceedings before the Central Empowered Committee was restitutive

in character, intended to address the civil consequences of the failure

to obtain the requisite forest clearance, and cannot be equated with a

criminal punishment so as to attract the constitutional or statutory bar

against a subsequent prosecution.

38. The proceedings in Common Cause (supra) were instituted in

the exercise of the Supreme Court’s writ jurisdiction to examine

widespread regulatory violations relating to mining operations and to

determine the appropriate civil, restitutive and regulatory

consequences flowing therefrom. They neither constituted a criminal

prosecution nor culminated in a conviction or acquittal for any

offence. The compensatory amount directed to be paid pursuant to

those proceedings was therefore a civil consequence of regulatory

violations and cannot be equated with “prosecution and punishment”

so as to attract Article 20(2) of the Constitution or Section 300 Cr.P.C.

39. The present prosecution, on the other hand, alleges distinct

offences of criminal conspiracy, criminal misconduct and

misappropriation under the PC Act, IPC, and the MMDR Act, each

involving ingredients fundamentally different from those underlying

Page 34 of 37

the earlier compensatory proceedings. This conclusion also finds

support in Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. Vimal

Kumar Surana, reported in (2011) 1 SCC 534, wherein the Supreme

Court held that disciplinary or regulatory proceedings and criminal

prosecution, being distinct in their nature, object and ingredients, may

proceed independently without offending the rule against double

jeopardy. That the Central Empowered Committee did not record a

specific finding of “illegal mining” against the firm is, nevertheless, a

circumstance germane to the merits of the Prosecution case and may

be urged before, and weighed by, the trial Court at the appropriate

stage. It does not, however, furnish an independent ground for

quashing the FIR and the chargesheet in the exercise of this Court's

inherent jurisdiction. The fourth issue stands addressed as above.

40. Equally, regarding the submission of the Petitioner that the

mining operations were conducted under duly granted interim permits

and the DRP eventually accorded on 03.09.1998, and could not,

therefore, be characterised as “illegal”, and the stance of the

Prosecution, as borne out from the Chargesheet at Annexure-8, that no

surface right permission post 05.03.1966 and mining lease post

31.07.1989 has been granted to the lessee, this Court is of the view

that the aforesaid contentions also raise disputed questions bearing

Page 35 of 37

upon the scope and duration of the permits vis-à-vis the extent of

mining actually undertaken, especially since these are matters

requiring appreciation of documentary and oral evidence that fall

outside the limited compass of an enquiry under Section 482 Cr.P.C

which does not extend to a mini-trial or weighing of the sufficiency of

evidence. Lastly, the submission of the Petitioner that a petition for

quashing remains maintainable notwithstanding the filing of a

chargesheet, as held in Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of

Delhi), reported in (2019) 11 SCC 706, is not in dispute and requires

no further elaboration. The present application is not being disposed

of on the ground of maintainability per se, but upon an assessment, on

the material presently available, of the specific grounds urged and

discussed hereinabove.

41. In conclusion, it is the considered view of this Court that the

contention of the Petitioner regarding the want of authorisation of the

DSP, Vigilance to lodge the complaint dated 17.11.2009 under

Section 22 of the MMDR Act, though expressly kept open by the

Hon’ble Supreme Court, does not, on the material presently available,

warrant quashing of the F.I.R or Chargesheet at the threshold,

particularly in view of the settled principle that a defect in the

initiation of investigation does not, by itself, vitiate cognizance validly

Page 36 of 37

taken or sanction duly obtained. Since the said contention involves

disputed questions of fact and law and has been left open by the

Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is more appropriately adjudicated by the

learned trial Court, where the Petitioner shall remain at liberty to urge

the same along with all consequential contentions and evidence in

support. Likewise, the remaining grounds relating to the Petitioner’s

role in the partnership firm, the legality of the mining operations, and

the effect of the penalty already discharged under the FCA also give

rise to triable issues that cannot be conclusively determined in

exercise of the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C and,

accordingly, are left open for consideration by the learned trial Court.

42. Having bestowed its anxious consideration on the rival

submissions, on a perusal of the documents annexed to the record and

on a conspectus of the foregoing analysis, this Court is unable to

discern any valid or compelling ground, much less the exceptional

parameters delineated in Bhajan Lal (supra), warranting the exercise

of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C to quash the

impugned F.I.R. and the Chargesheet. The case at hand does not fall

within the “rarest of the rare” [paragraph 103 of Bhajan Lal (supra)]

so as to justify interference by this Court, at this stage. Accordingly,

the present CRLMC petition is dismissed, with liberty to the

Page 37 of 37

Petitioner to raise all the contentions noted hereinabove, including the

question of the competence of the officer lodging the complaint under

Section 22 of the MMDR Act, before the learned trial Court. It is

made clear that the observations made herein are for the limited

purpose of disposal of the present application and shall not be

construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the prosecution

case, which shall be decided by the learned trial Court, uninfluenced

by any observation made hereinabove.

(A. K. Mohapatra)

Judge

Orissa High Court, Cuttack.

The 6

th

August, 2026/Debasis Aech, Secretary