O.M.P. (COMM) 223/2026 Page 1 of 40

$~

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

% Judgment reserved on: 13.05.2026

Judgment pronounced on: 29.05.2026

+ O.M.P. (COMM) 223/2026, I.A. 12470/2026 (Stay) & I.A.

12471/2026 (Ex.)

MR PATHAN IMRANKHAN ZAFARULLAKHAN & ANR.

.....Petitioners

Through: Ms. Anju Agrawal, Ms.

Manisha Singh, Mr. Abhai

Pandey, Ms. Khushi Chauhan

and Ms. Vidhi Gupta,

Advocates.

versus

MICROSOFT CORPORATION .....Respondent

Through: Mr. Ashim Sood, Ms. Pooja

Dodd, Mr. Anuraj Tirthankar,

Ms. Senu Nizar, Mr. Karan and

Mr. Kartikeya, Advocates.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN

SHANKAR

J U D G M E N T

HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.

1. The present Petition has been instituted under Section 34 of the

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

1

, seeking the setting aside of

the Arbitral Award dated 02.03.2026

2

, rendered by the learned Sole

Arbitrator in INDRP Case No. 2091 under the .IN Domain Name

Dispute Resolution Policy

3

.

1

A&C Act

2

Arbitral Award

3

INDRP

O.M.P. (COMM) 223/2026 Page 2 of 40

2. By way of the Impugned Arbitral Award, the learned Arbitrator

allowed the complaint preferred by the Respondent under the INDRP

framework and directed transfer of the domain name

“www.exceltotally.in”

4

from the Petitioners in favour of the

Respondent herein.

BRIEF FACTS:

3. Petitioner No.1 is engaged in the business of providing software

solutions and applications facilitating the transfer of data between

Microsoft Excel and Tally accounting software and the Subject

Domain Name has been adopted and used in connection with such

activities since the year 2010.

4. According to the Petitioners, the expression

“EXCELTOTALLY” was adopted in a descriptive and functional

sense merely to indicate compatibility and interoperability of the

software product with Microsoft Excel and Tally software.

5. The Respondent, on the other hand, claims to be the proprietor

of the globally reputed and well-known trademark “EXCEL”,

associated with its spreadsheet software and allied technological

products and services.

6. According to the Respondent herein, the Petitioners had

adopted the dominant portion of the Respondent‟s trademark as part

of the Subject Domain Name in a manner calculated to create

confusion and association amongst internet users.

7. The record reflects that disputes arose between the parties when

the Respondent issued a cease-and-desist communication dated

4

Subject Domain Name

O.M.P. (COMM) 223/2026 Page 3 of 40

18.07.2025, objecting to the Petitioners‟ use of the expression

“EXCELTOTALLY”.

8. Pursuant thereto, the Petitioners are stated to have withdrawn

the trademark application bearing no. 5790067 on 15.09.2025,

furnished an undertaking and incorporated a disclaimer since

07.09.2025 stating that the Petitioners are “neither affiliated with nor

endorsed by Microsoft Corporation”.

9. According to the Respondent, however, the Petitioners failed to

disclose the existence and continued use of the Subject Domain Name,

whereafter objections were raised in relation thereto as well.

10. Since the disputes between the parties could not be resolved

amicably, the Respondent invoked the mechanism under the INDRP

before the National Internet Exchange of India

5

seeking transfer of

the Subject Domain Name on the ground that the same was

confusingly similar to the Respondent‟s trademark “EXCEL”; that the

Petitioners lacked legitimate rights or interests therein; and that the

Subject Domain Name had been registered and used in bad faith

within the meaning of Clause 4 of the INDRP.

11. Upon reference of disputes under the INDRP framework, the

learned Arbitrator entered upon reference and, after considering the

pleadings and material placed on record, proceeded to pass the ex

parte Impugned Arbitral Award directing transfer of the Subject

Domain Name in favour of the Respondent.

12. Aggrieved by the aforesaid Award, the Petitioner has preferred

the present Petition under Section 34 of the A&C Act, seeking the

setting aside of the Impugned Arbitral Award.

5

NIXI

O.M.P. (COMM) 223/2026 Page 4 of 40

CONTENTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS :

13. At the outset, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

Petitioners would contend that the Impugned Arbitral Award stands

vitiated on account of violation of the Principles of Natural Justice

inasmuch as the Petitioners were deprived of an effective opportunity

to participate in the arbitral proceedings.

14. It would be submitted that the communications were issued

only upon an old administrative email account associated with the

Subject Domain Name, which was not being actively monitored,

despite the Respondent being aware of the Petitioners‟ active contact

details through prior correspondence.

15. According to the Petitioners, the learned Arbitrator proceeded

ex parte without ensuring effective and meaningful service and

consequently denied the Petitioners an adequate opportunity to present

their defence, thereby attracting Section 34(2)(a)(iii) of the A&C Act.

16. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners would

contend that the Impugned Arbitral Award suffers from a manifest

misapplication of the INDRP framework and is, therefore, liable to be

set aside under Section 34 of the A&C Act.

17. The principal thrust of the challenge, according to the

Petitioners, pertains to the interpretation accorded by the learned

Arbitrator to Clause 4 of the INDRP. Learned counsel would submit

that the three ingredients contemplated under the aforesaid clauses are

distinct, independent and cumulative in nature and all the conditions

are mandatorily required to be satisfied before an order directing

transfer of a domain name can be sustained. According to the

Petitioners, the learned Arbitrator erroneously conflated the

O.M.P. (COMM) 223/2026 Page 5 of 40

requirements under the said clauses and proceeded on the basis that

once confusing similarity stood established under Clause 4(a), the

requirement of bad faith under Clause 4(c) automatically stood

satisfied as well.

18. Elaborating on the aforesaid submission, learned counsel

appearing on behalf of the Petitioners would contend that the

requirement of bad faith under Clause 4(c) constitutes an independent

and substantive requirement requiring separate scrutiny and evidence.

It would be submitted that even assuming findings under Clauses 4(a)

and 4(b) could be sustained, the same would not ipso facto establish

bad faith within the meaning of the INDRP framework.

19. According to the Petitioners, bad faith necessarily postulates

deliberate intention to deceive, mislead or exploit the goodwill of

another and could not merely be inferred on account of alleged

confusing similarity.

20. Learned counsel would further submit that the learned

Arbitrator failed to appreciate that the expression

“EXCELTOTALLY” had been adopted in a descriptive and functional

sense in connection with the Petitioners‟ software product, facilitating

conversion of data from Microsoft Excel to Tally software. According

to the Petitioners, the use of the expression “EXCEL” would merely

indicative of software compatibility and not suggestive of any

association, sponsorship or affiliation with the Respondent.

21. It would be submitted that the Subject Domain Name had been

continuously used for a considerable period of time, and no dishonest

intention could legitimately be attributed to the Petitioners.

O.M.P. (COMM) 223/2026 Page 6 of 40

22. Learned counsel would additionally contend that the conduct of

the Petitioners was wholly inconsistent with any allegation of bad

faith.

23. It would be submitted that upon receipt of the Respondent‟s

cease-and-desist communication, the Petitioners had withdrawn the

trademark application filed by them and furnished an

undertaking/disclaimer, thereby demonstrating their bona fides.

According to the Petitioners, the aforesaid circumstances were

completely overlooked by the learned Arbitrator while arriving at the

impugned findings.

24. On the strength of the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel

for the Petitioners prayed that the Impugned Arbitral Award be set

aside.

CONTENTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT :

25. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

Respondent would submit that the objection regarding service is

wholly misconceived and contrary to the record.

26. It would be contended that the learned Arbitrator had recorded

satisfaction regarding service upon the Petitioners through the contact

details and email address associated with the Subject Domain Name

and only thereafter proceeded ex parte.

27. Learned counsel would further submit that once the Petitioners

themselves had furnished the said contact particulars in connection

with the Subject Domain Name, they cannot subsequently evade the

proceedings by merely asserting that the concerned email account was

not being regularly monitored. According to the Respondent, adequate

notice and sufficient opportunity had been afforded during the arbitral

O.M.P. (COMM) 223/2026 Page 7 of 40

proceedings and, therefore, no violation of the Principles of Natural

Justice is made out.

28. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent would

support the Impugned Arbitral Award and contend that the learned

Arbitrator has rendered a detailed, reasoned and plausible Award upon

due appreciation of the pleadings, documents and the applicable

provisions of the INDRP framework and, therefore, no interference is

warranted within the limited supervisory jurisdiction exercisable

under Section 34 of the A&C Act.

29. It would further be contended that in the case of an International

Commercial Arbitration, as in the present case, the challenge to an

arbitral award is confined only to the limited grounds contemplated

under Section 34(2) of the A&C Act, thereby rendering the scope of

judicial interference significantly narrower than that applicable in the

case of a domestic arbitral award.

30. Learned counsel for the Respondent would rely upon the

Judgment of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Ssangyong Engineering

and Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI

6

, to contend that the present

proceedings arise out of an International Commercial Arbitration

within the meaning of Section 2(1)(f) of the A&C Act, the

Respondent being a corporation incorporated outside India, and

consequently the ground of “patent illegality” under Section 34(2A) of

the A&C Act is itself unavailable to the Petitioners.

31. It would further be contended that the INDRP framework

operates as a contractual mechanism governing domain name disputes

6

(2019) 15 SCC 131

O.M.P. (COMM) 223/2026 Page 8 of 40

and, therefore, the interpretation accorded thereto by the learned

Arbitrator is entitled to substantial judicial deference.

32. Reliance in this regard would be placed upon Quantum

University v. International Quantum University for Integrative

Medicine Inc.

7

to contend that this Court, while exercising

jurisdiction under Section 34 of the A&C Act, would refrain from

interfering with the interpretation adopted by the learned Arbitrator

unless the same is shown to be wholly untenable in law.

33. In light of the aforesaid judgment, it would be further contended

that Clause 7 of the INDRP is illustrative and not exhaustive, and

specifically contemplates that intentional use of a domain name so as

to attract internet users by creating a likelihood of confusion with the

complainant‟s mark itself constitutes evidence of bad faith.

34. According to the Respondent, the learned Arbitrator rightly

applied the said principle while concluding that incorporation of the

Respondent‟s mark “EXCEL” within the Subject Domain Name was

likely to create confusion and diversion of internet users and,

therefore, squarely attracted Clauses 7(c) of the INDRP.

35. It would further be contended that the Petitioners‟ own conduct

in withdrawing the trademark application for “EXCELTOTALLY”

immediately upon receipt of the cease-and-desist notice itself

constitutes a relevant circumstance evidencing bad faith, inasmuch as

such withdrawal demonstrates prior knowledge of the Respondent‟s

rights in the mark “EXCEL” and acknowledgment of the legal

vulnerability of the impugned adoption.

7

2023 SCC OnLine Del 8016

O.M.P. (COMM) 223/2026 Page 9 of 40

36. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent would

further submit that the learned Arbitrator rightly appreciated that the

analysis under Clauses 4(a), 4(b) and 4(c) of the INDRP cannot be

viewed in isolated watertight compartments. According to the

Respondent, while the ingredients may be distinct, the findings

returned under Clauses 4(a) and 4(b) necessarily bear upon and inform

the determination under Clause 4(c).

37. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent would

lastly contend that the Petitioners are effectively inviting this Court to

re-appreciate the factual findings returned by the learned Arbitrator

regarding confusing similarity, legitimate interests and bad faith,

which exercise is wholly impermissible within the confines of Section

34 jurisdiction under the A&C Act.

ANALYSIS:

38. This Court has heard the learned counsel appearing for the

parties at considerable length and, with their able assistance, carefully

perused the Impugned Arbitral Award, the pleadings and the material

placed on record.

39. At the outset, this Court considers it appropriate to address the

preliminary procedural objection raised by the Petitioners concerning

the alleged absence of proper service in relation to the initiation and

conduct of the arbitral proceedings under the INDRP framework.

40. In the considered opinion of this Court, the Petitioners have

failed to place any cogent material on record to substantiate the

contention that they were genuinely denied notice of the proceedings

or deprived of a fair and reasonable opportunity to present their case.

The plea advanced on behalf of the Petitioners, namely that the

O.M.P. (COMM) 223/2026 Page 10 of 40

concerned email address was allegedly not in regular use and that

knowledge of the proceedings was acquired only subsequently, does

not persuade this Court to take a view different from that reflected in

the Impugned Arbitral Award.

41. The material available on record indicates that all relevant

communications and notices were issued to the contact details and

electronic coordinates associated with the Subject Domain Name,

including the email addresses reflected in the relevant registration

records. The Impugned Arbitral Award itself records that the learned

Arbitrator proceeded ex parte only upon being satisfied that due

service had been effected upon the Petitioners in accordance with the

applicable procedure governing the proceedings.

42. Further, once the Petitioners themselves had furnished,

maintained, or permitted the continued use of the said contact details

in connection with the Subject Domain Name, they cannot

subsequently avoid the legal consequences of valid service merely by

asserting that the concerned email account was not being regularly

monitored, accessed, or actively used. A party cannot be permitted to

defeat the efficacy of electronic service by relying upon its own

failure to maintain or monitor the communication channels voluntarily

associated with the disputed domain registration.

43. In the considered view of this Court, mere dissatisfaction with

the ultimate outcome of the arbitral proceedings cannot, by itself,

justify an inference that the proceedings stood vitiated on account of

lack of notice or denial of opportunity. The Principles of Natural

Justice do not mandate actual participation by a party despite due

notice; they require only that a fair and reasonable opportunity be

O.M.P. (COMM) 223/2026 Page 11 of 40

afforded. In the present case, no material irregularity or procedural

infirmity has been demonstrated which would warrant interference on

this ground. Accordingly, this Court finds no merit in the objection

raised by the Petitioners concerning service of notice or the alleged

violation of the Principles of Natural Justice as contemplated under

Section 34(2)(a)(iii) of the A&C Act.

44. Before proceeding to examine the merits of the rival

submissions advanced on behalf of the parties, this Court considers it

apposite to reiterate the well-settled limitations governing the exercise

of jurisdiction under Section 34 of the A&C Act, particularly in the

context of an International Commercial Arbitration. The jurisdiction

of this Court in such proceedings is supervisory and not appellate in

nature, and therefore does not permit a reappreciation of facts or a

reconsideration of the merits of the dispute as though this Court were

sitting in appeal over the arbitral award.

45. There exists a consistent and authoritative line of decisions

rendered by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, which has clearly delineated

the contours of judicial interference under Section 34 of the A&C Act.

Such precedents repeatedly emphasise that the scope of interference

with an arbitral award arising out of an International Commercial

Arbitration is significantly narrower than that applicable in the case of

a purely domestic award.

46. In this regard, this Court considers it apposite to refer to the

decision of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Ssangyong Engineering

(supra), wherein the Apex Court, while examining the scope of

interference with an arbitral award arising out of an International

Commercial Arbitration, reiterated that, by virtue of Section 34(2A)

O.M.P. (COMM) 223/2026 Page 12 of 40

read with Section 2(1)(f) of the A&C Act, the ground of „patent

illegality‟ is not available as a basis for challenging an award rendered

in an International Commercial Arbitration. The Apex Court further

clarified that the additional ground introduced under Section 34(2A)

of the A&C Act is confined only to domestic arbitral awards and does

not extend to awards arising from International Commercial

Arbitrations seated in India. The relevant extracts from the said

judgment are reproduced hereunder:

“34. What is clear, therefore, is that the expression

“public policy of India”, whether contained in Section 34

or in Section 48, would now mean the “fundamental policy of

Indian law as explained in paragraphs 18 and 27 of Associate

Builders (supra), i.e., the fundamental policy of Indian law would

be relegated to the “Renusagar understanding of this expression.

This would necessarily mean that the Western Geco (supra)

expansion has been done away with. In short, Western

Geco (supra), as explained in paragraphs 28 and 29 of Associate

Builders (supra), would no longer obtain, as under the guise of

interfering with an award on the ground that the arbitrator has not

adopted a judicial approach, the Court„s intervention would be on

the merits of the award, which cannot be permitted post

amendment. However, insofar as principles of natural justice are

concerned, as contained in Sections 18 and 34(2)(a)(iii) of the 1996

Act, these continue to be grounds of challenge of an award, as is

contained in paragraph 30 of Associate Builders (supra).

***

36. Thus, it is clear that public policy of India is now constricted to

mean firstly, that a domestic award is contrary to the

fundamental policy of Indian law, as understood in paragraphs 18

and 27 of Associate Builders (supra), or secondly, that such award

is against basic notions of justice or morality as

understood in paragraphs 36 to 39 of Associate Builders (supra).

Explanation 2 to Section 34(2)(b)(ii) and Explanation 2 to Section

48(2)(b)(ii) was added by the Amendment Act only so

that Western Geco (supra), as understood in Associate

Builders (supra), and paragraphs 28 and 29 in particular, is now

done away with.

37. Insofar as domestic awards made in India are concerned, an

additional ground is now available under sub-section (2A), added

by the Amendment Act, 2015, to Section 34. Here, there must be

patent illegality appearing on the face of the award, which refers to

such illegality as goes to the root of the matter but which does not

O.M.P. (COMM) 223/2026 Page 13 of 40

amount to mere erroneous application of the law. In short, what is

not subsumed within “the fundamental policy of Indian law”,

namely, the contravention of a statute not linked to public policy or

public interest, cannot be brought in by the backdoor when it

comes to setting aside an award on the ground of patent illegality.

38. Secondly, it is also made clear that re-appreciation of evidence,

which is what an appellate court is permitted to do, cannot be

permitted under the ground of patent illegality appearing on the

face of the award.

39. To elucidate, paragraph 42.1 of Associate Builders (supra),

namely, a mere contravention of the substantive law of India, by

itself, is no longer a ground available to set aside an arbitral award.

Paragraph 42.2 of Associate Builders (supra), however, would

remain, for if an arbitrator gives no reasons for an award and

contravenes Section 31(3) of the 1996 Act, that would certainly

amount to a patent illegality on the face of the award.

***

41. What is important to note is that a decision which is perverse,

as understood in paragraphs 31 and 32 of Associate

Builders (supra), while no longer being a ground for challenge

under “public policy‟ of India, would certainly amount to a patent

illegality appearing on the face of the award. Thus, a finding based

on no evidence at all or an award which ignores vital evidence in

arriving at its decision would be perverse and liable to be set aside

on the ground of patent illegality. Additionally, a finding based on

documents taken behind the back of the parties by the arbitrator

would also qualify as a decision based on no evidence inasmuch as

such decision is not based on evidence led by the parties, and

therefore, would also have to be characterised as perverse.

42. Given the fact that the amended Act will now apply, and that

the “patent illegality” ground for setting aside arbitral awards in

international commercial arbitrations will not apply.”

(emphasis supplied)

47. In view of the aforesaid settled principles governing the limited

scope of judicial interference under Section 34 of the A&C Act in

matters arising out of International Commercial Arbitration, this Court

now proceeds to examine the Impugned Arbitral Award strictly within

the narrow confines permissible under the said provision. In

proceedings of the present nature, the scope of interference remains

circumscribed by the grounds expressly enumerated under Section

O.M.P. (COMM) 223/2026 Page 14 of 40

34(2) of the A&C Act, including Section 34(2)(b)(ii), namely, whether

the award is in conflict with the public policy of India.

48. The significant facet of Section 34 of the A&C Act, namely,

“conflict with the public policy of India”, which constitutes the core

fulcrum for testing an arbitral award arising out of an International

Commercial Arbitration, has been comprehensively explained and

authoritatively summarised by a three-Judge Bench of the Hon‟ble

Supreme Court in OPG Power Generation (P) Ltd. v. Enexio Power

Cooling Solutions (India) (P) Ltd.

8

.

49. The said judgment, after undertaking an exhaustive examination

of a catena of prior decisions rendered on the subject, lucidly

delineates the contours, limitations, and permissible extent of judicial

interference on the ground of “public policy of India”, particularly

after the amendments introduced by the Arbitration and Conciliation

(Amendment) Act, 2015.

50. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court, in that Judgment, while

summarising the legal position in paragraphs 55 and 56 of the said

judgment, reiterated that following the 2015 Amendments to Sections

34(2)(b)(ii) and 48(2)(b) of the A&C Act, the expression “conflict

with the public policy of India” has been accorded a narrow and

restricted interpretation, and since mere contravention of law is

insufficient to invalidate an arbitral award unless such contravention

affects the fundamental policy of Indian law governing the

administration of justice and enforcement of law, only violations such

as breach of natural justice, disregard of binding judgments or orders

of superior courts, or contravention of laws linked to public interest or

8

(2025) 2 SCC 417

O.M.P. (COMM) 223/2026 Page 15 of 40

public good may justify interference, though even such scrutiny

cannot extend into a review on merits. Certain pertinent observations

from OPG Power (supra) are reproduced hereunder:

“Public policy

31. “Public policy” is a concept not statutorily defined, though it

has been used in statutes, rules, notification, etc. since long, and is

also a part of common law. Section 23 of the Contract Act, 1872

uses the expression by stating that the consideration or object of an

agreement is lawful, unless, inter alia, opposed to public policy.

That is, a contract which is opposed to public policy is void.

*****

36. In fact, in Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co.,

1994 Supp (1) SCC 644], this Court was dealing with the

enforceability of a foreign award. For that end, it had to interpret

the expression “contrary to public policy” in the context of Section

7(1)(b)(ii) of the Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement)

Act, 1961. While doing so, this Court held that:

(a) contravention of law alone will not attract the bar of public

policy, and something more than contravention of law is

required [Renusagar Power Co. case, 1994 Supp (1) SCC 644,

para 65]; and

(b) the expression “public policy” must be construed in the sense

the doctrine of public policy is applied in the field of private

international law.

Applying the said criteria, it was held that enforcement of a foreign

award could be refused on the ground of being contrary to public

policy if such enforcement would be contrary to:

(a) fundamental policy of Indian law, or

(b) the interests of India, or

(c) justice or morality [Renusagar Power Co. case, 1994 Supp (1)

SCC 644, para 66].

The Court thereafter proceeded to hold that a contravention of the

provisions of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act would be

contrary to the public policy of India as that statute is enacted for

the national economic interest to ensure that the nation does not

lose foreign exchange which is essential for the economic survival

of the nation [Renusagar Power Co. case, 1994 Supp (1) SCC

644, para 75].

37. What is clear from above is that for an award to be against

public policy of India a mere infraction of the municipal laws of

India is not enough. There must be, inter alia, infraction of

fundamental policy of Indian law including a law meant to serve

public interest or public good.

*****

41. In Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49, a two-Judge

Bench of this Court, held that audi alteram partem principle is

O.M.P. (COMM) 223/2026 Page 16 of 40

undoubtedly a fundamental juristic principle in Indian law and is

enshrined in Sections 18 and 34(2)(a)(iii) of the 1996 Act. In

addition to the earlier recognised principles forming fundamental

policy of Indian law, it was held that disregarding:

(a) orders of superior courts in India; and

(b) the binding effect of the judgment of a superior court would

also be regarded as being contrary to the fundamental policy of

Indian law [See Associate Builders case, (2015) 3 SCC 49,

para 27].

Further, elaborating upon the third juristic principle (i.e. qua

perversity), as laid down in ONGC Ltd. v. Western Geco

International Ltd., (2014) 9 SCC 263, it was observed that where:

(i) a finding is based on no evidence; or

(ii) an Arbitral Tribunal takes into account something irrelevant to

the decision which it arrives at; or

(iii) ignores vital evidence in arriving at its decision, such decision

would necessarily be perverse [Associate Builders case, (2015)

3 SCC 49, para 31].

To this a caveat was added by observing that when a court applies

the “public policy test” to an arbitration award, it does not act as a

court of appeal and, consequently, errors of fact cannot be

corrected; and a possible view by the arbitrator on facts has

necessarily to pass muster as the arbitrator is the ultimate master of

the quantity and quality of evidence to be relied upon when he

delivers his arbitral award. It was also observed that an award

based on little evidence or on evidence which does not measure up

in quality to a trained legal mind would not be held to be invalid on

that score. Thus, once it is found that the arbitrator's approach is

not arbitrary or capricious, it is to be taken as the last word on facts

[Associate Builders case, (2015) 3 SCC 49, para 33] .

The 2015 Amendment in Sections 34 and 48

42. The aforementioned judicial pronouncements were all prior to

the 2015 Amendment. Notably, prior to the 2015 Amendment the

expression “in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian

law” was not used by the legislature in either Section 34(2)(b)(ii) or

Section 48(2)(b). The pre-amended Section 34(2)(b)(ii) and its

Explanation read:

*****

44. By the 2015 Amendment, in place of the old Explanation to

Section 34(2)(b)(ii), Explanations 1 and 2 were added to remove

any doubt as to when an arbitral award is in conflict with the public

policy of India.

45. At this stage, it would be pertinent to note that we are dealing

with a case where the application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act

was filed after the 2015 Amendment, therefore the newly

substituted/added Explanations would apply [Ssangyong Engg. &

Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019) 15 SCC 131].

O.M.P. (COMM) 223/2026 Page 17 of 40

46. The 2015 Amendment adds two Explanations to each of the

two sections, namely, Section 34(2)(b)(ii) and Section 48(2)(b), in

place of the earlier Explanation. The significance of the newly

inserted Explanation 1 in both the sections is two-fold. First, it does

away with the use of words: (a) “without prejudice to the

generality of sub-clause (ii)” in the opening part of the pre-

amended Explanation to Section 34(2)(b)(ii); and (b) “without

prejudice to the generality of clause (b) of this section” in the

opening part of the pre-amended Explanation to Section 48(2)(b);

secondly, it limits the expanse of public policy of India to the three

specified categories by using the words “ only if”.

Whereas, Explanation 2 lays down the standard for adjudging

whether there is a contravention with the fundamental policy of

Indian law by providing that a review on merits of the dispute shall

not be done. This limits the scope of the enquiry on an application

under either Section 34(2)(b)(ii) or Section 48(2)(b) of the 1996

Act.

47. The 2015 Amendment by inserting sub-section (2-A) in Section

34, carves out an additional ground for annulment of an arbitral

award arising out of arbitrations other than international

commercial arbitrations. Sub-section (2-A) provides that the Court

may also set aside an award if that is vitiated by patent illegality

appearing on the face of the award. This power of the Court is,

however, circumscribed by the proviso, which states that an award

shall not be set aside merely on the ground of an erroneous

application of the law or by reappreciation of evidence.

48. Explanation 1 to Section 34(2)(b)(ii), specifies that an arbitral

award is in conflict with the public policy of India, only if:

(i) the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or

corruption or was in violation of Section 75 or Section 81; or

(ii) it is in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law;

or

(iii) it is in conflict with the most basic notions of morality or

justice.

49. In the instant case, there is no allegation that the making of the

award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption, or was in

violation of Section 75 or Section 81. Therefore, we shall confine

our exercise in assessing as to whether the arbitral award is in

contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law, and/or

whether it conflicts with the most basic notions of morality or

justice. Additionally, in the light of the provisions of sub-section

(2-A) of Section 34, we shall examine whether there is any patent

illegality on the face of the award.

50. Before undertaking the aforesaid exercise, it would be apposite

to consider as to how the expressions:

(a) “in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law”;

(b) “in conflict with the most basic notions of morality or justice”;

and

O.M.P. (COMM) 223/2026 Page 18 of 40

(c) “patent illegality” have been construed.

In contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law

51. As discussed above, till the 2015 Amendment the expression

“in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law” was

not found in the 1996 Act. Yet, in Renusagar Power Co.

Ltd. v. General Electric Co., 1994 Supp (1) SCC 644, in the

context of enforcement of a foreign award, while construing the

phrase “contrary to the public policy”, this Court held that for a

foreign award to be contrary to public policy mere contravention of

law would not be enough rather it should be contrary to:

(a) the fundamental policy of Indian law; and/or

(b) the interest of India; and/or

(c) justice or morality.

52. In the judicial pronouncements that followed Renusagar Power

Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co., 1994 Supp (1) SCC 644, already

discussed above, the domain of what could be considered contrary

to the “public policy of India”/“fundamental policy of Indian law”

expanded, resulting in much greater interference with arbitral

awards than what the lawmakers intended. This led to the 2015

Amendment in the 1996 Act.

53. In Ssangyong Engg. & Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019)

15 SCC 131, this Court dealt with the effect of the 2015

Amendment. While doing so, it took note of a supplementary

report of February 2015 of the Law Commission of India made in

the context of the proposed 2015 Amendments. The said

supplementary report has been extracted in para 30 of that

judgment. The key features of it are summarised below:

(a) Mere violation of law of India would not be a violation of

public policy in cases of international commercial arbitrations

held in India.

(b) The proposed 2015 Amendments in the 1996 Act [i.e. in

Sections 34(2)(b)(ii) and 48(2)(b) including insertion of sub-

section (2-A) in Section 34] were on the assumption that the

terms, such as, “fundamental policy of Indian law” or conflict

with “most basic notions of morality or justice” would not be

widely construed.

(c) The power to review an award on merits is contrary to the

object of the Act and international practice.

(d) The judgment in ONGC Ltd. v. Western Geco International

Ltd., (2014) 9 SCC 263 would expand the court's power,

contrary to international practice. Hence, a clarification needs to

be incorporated to ensure that the term “fundamental policy of

Indian law” is narrowly construed. The applicability

of Wednesbury [Associated Provincial Picture Houses

Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223 (CA)] principles

to public policy will open the floodgates. Hence, Explanation 2

to Section 34(2)(b)(ii) has been proposed.

O.M.P. (COMM) 223/2026 Page 19 of 40

*****

55. The legal position which emerges from the aforesaid discussion

is that after “the 2015 Amendments” in Section 34(2)(b)(ii) and

Section 48(2)(b) of the 1996 Act, the phrase “in conflict with the

public policy of India” must be accorded a restricted meaning in

terms of Explanation 1. The expression “in contravention with the

fundamental policy of Indian law” by use of the word

“fundamental” before the phrase “policy of Indian law” makes the

expression narrower in its application than the phrase “in

contravention with the policy of Indian law”, which means mere

contravention of law is not enough to make an award vulnerable.

To bring the contravention within the fold of fundamental policy of

Indian law, the award must contravene all or any of such

fundamental principles that provide a basis for administration of

justice and enforcement of law in this country.

56. Without intending to exhaustively enumerate instances of such

contravention, by way of illustration, it could be said that:

(a) violation of the principles of natural justice;

(b) disregarding orders of superior courts in India or the binding

effect of the judgment of a superior court; and

(c) violating law of India linked to public good or public interest,

are considered contravention of the fundamental policy of

Indian law.

However, while assessing whether there has been a contravention

of the fundamental policy of Indian law, the extent of judicial

scrutiny must not exceed the limit as set out in Explanation 2 to

Section 34(2)(b)(ii).”

(emphasis supplied)

51. Accordingly, the scope of enquiry before this Court is confined

to examining whether the learned Arbitrator correctly appreciated,

interpreted, and applied the mandatory jurisdictional requirements

embodied in Clause 4 read conjointly with Clause 7 of the INDRP,

and whether the essential conditions stipulated therein stood

independently, objectively, and substantively satisfied prior to

directing transfer of the Subject Domain Name in favour of the

Respondent under the Impugned Arbitral Award.

52. At this stage, it is necessary to note that the INDRP constitutes

a dispute resolution mechanism formulated by NIXI for adjudicating

disputes concerning “.in” and “.Bharat” domain names. The policy is

O.M.P. (COMM) 223/2026 Page 20 of 40

substantially modelled on the internationally recognised Internet

Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers

9

formulated by

Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy

10

, which governs

domain name disputes across jurisdictions.

53. The principal object of the INDRP is to provide a speedy,

efficient, and cost-effective mechanism for resolving disputes arising

out of abusive, dishonest, or unauthorized registration and use of

domain names, commonly referred to as “cybersquatting”. The policy

seeks to safeguard the legitimate rights and commercial interests of

trademark owners, business entities, and individuals against bad-faith

registration or misuse of domain names that are identical or

confusingly similar to their trademarks, trade names, or service marks.

54. Under the framework of the INDRP, a complainant may

institute proceedings before NIXI alleging unlawful registration or use

of a domain name. Such disputes are adjudicated by an independent

Arbitrator appointed in accordance with the policy and the rules made

thereunder.

55. The remedies contemplated under the INDRP are primarily

limited to cancellation or transfer of the disputed domain name. The

mechanism, therefore, operates as an important protective instrument

within India‟s digital and commercial ecosystem by ensuring fairness,

preserving consumer confidence, and protecting intellectual property

and business goodwill in the online sphere.

56. A bare reading of INDRP makes it evident that the INDRP

constitutes the governing legal framework for the adjudication of

disputes concerning abusive or unauthorized registration and use of

9

Known as ICANN

10

Known as UDRP

O.M.P. (COMM) 223/2026 Page 21 of 40

specified domain names. The policy not only provides the procedural

mechanism for the resolution of such disputes, but also prescribes

substantive jurisdictional conditions that must necessarily be fulfilled

by a complainant before any relief can be granted. Consequently,

compliance with the requirements embodied therein is mandatory, and

the learned Arbitrator is required to objectively satisfy himself that the

conditions prescribed under the policy stand duly established before

directing cancellation or transfer of a domain name. Failure to adhere

to such mandatory requirements would necessarily entail legal

consequences affecting the validity and sustainability of the award

rendered thereunder.

57. The provisions contained in the INDRP are intended to prevent

misuse of domain names and online identifiers by persons seeking to

unfairly exploit another‟s trademark, brand identity, business

reputation, or commercial goodwill. Clause 4 of the INDRP delineates

the circumstances under which a complaint may be maintained before

the INDRP authority.

58. It provides that a complainant may challenge a domain name

where: (i) the disputed domain name is identical or confusingly

similar to a trademark or business name in which the complainant

possesses rights; and (ii) the registrant lacks any genuine or legitimate

interest in the domain name; and (iii) the domain name has been

registered or is being used in bad faith. All three requirements are

required to co-exist and be independently established before relief

may be granted.

59. Clause 6 of the INDRP, which bears direct linkage with the

second requirement contained in Clause 4 of the INDRP relating to

O.M.P. (COMM) 223/2026 Page 22 of 40

the “Registrant’s Rights and Legitimate Interests in the Domain

Name”, operates as a safeguard in favour of bona fide registrants. The

provision explains the circumstances in which a registrant may

legitimately claim entitlement to retain the disputed domain name. A

registrant may successfully resist a complaint by demonstrating, inter

alia, that the domain name was being genuinely used in connection

with a lawful business or service prior to the dispute, that the

registrant has become commonly known by the disputed name, or that

the domain name is being used fairly and legitimately without any

intent to mislead consumers or derive unfair commercial gain. Clause

6 of the INDRP, therefore, protects honest and legitimate use of

domain names and prevents arbitrary deprivation of lawful registrants‟

rights merely on the basis of a trademark claim.

60. Similarly, Clause 7 of the INDRP elucidates the third

jurisdictional element contemplated under Clause 4 of the INDRP,

namely “bad faith” registration or use of a domain name. The

provision sets out illustrative circumstances that may constitute

evidence of bad faith. A registrant may be regarded as acting in bad

faith where the domain name has been acquired primarily for the

purpose of selling or transferring it to the trademark owner for

excessive consideration, preventing the rightful owner from reflecting

its mark in a corresponding domain name, misleading internet users

by creating confusion as to source or affiliation, or disrupting the

business activities of a competitor.

61. These provisions are intrinsically interconnected and must be

read harmoniously. While Clause 4 of the INDRP prescribes the

foundational grounds upon which a complaint may be preferred,

O.M.P. (COMM) 223/2026 Page 23 of 40

Clause 6 of the INDRP delineates the legitimate defences available to

a registrant, and Clause 7 of the INDRP provides the guiding

parameters for determining whether the conduct of the registrant is

dishonest, abusive, or tainted by bad faith. Collectively, these

provisions form the substantive jurisdictional framework governing

adjudication under the INDRP.

62. At this stage, it is apposite to reproduce the relevant provisions

of the INDRP governing the present dispute, namely, Clauses 4 and 7,

upon which substantial reliance has been placed by the parties, which

are as follows:

“4. Class of Disputes

Any Person who considers that a registered domain name conflicts

with his/her legitimate rights or interests may file a Complaint to

the .IN Registry on the following premises:

(a) the Registrant's domain name is identical and/or confusingly

similar to a name, trademark or service mark in which the

Complainant has rights; and

(b) the Registrant has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of

the domain name; and

(c) the Registrant‟s domain name has been registered or is being

used in bad faith.”

*****

“7. Evidence of Registration and use of Domain Name in Bad

Faith

For the purposes of Clause 4(c), the following circumstances, in

particular but without limitation, if found by the Arbitrator to be

present, shall be evidence of the Registration and use of a domain

name in bad faith:

(a) circumstances indicating that the Registrant has registered or

acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling,

renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration

to the Complainant, who bears the name or is the owner of the

Trademark or Service Mark, or to a competitor of that

Complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of the

Registrant's documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to

the domain name; or

(b) the Registrant has registered the domain name in order to

prevent the owner of the Trademark or Service Mark from

reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name, provided

that the Registrant has engaged in a pattern of such conduct; or

O.M.P. (COMM) 223/2026 Page 24 of 40

(c) by using the domain name, the Registrant has intentionally

attempted to attract Internet users to the Registrant's website or

other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with

the Complainant's name or mark as to the source, sponsorship,

affiliation, or endorsement of the Registrant's website or

location or of a product or service on the Registrant's website or

location; or

(d) The Registrant has registered the domain name primarily for

the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor.”

63. The gravamen of the Petitioners‟ challenge pertains to the

manner in which the learned Arbitrator interpreted and applied Clause

4(c) read conjointly with Clause 7 of the INDRP. According to the

Petitioners, the Impugned Arbitral Award effectively proceeds on the

premise that once confusing similarity under Clause 4(a) stood

established, the requirement of bad faith under Clause 4(c)

automatically stood satisfied.

64. In the considered opinion of this Court, the aforesaid challenge

cannot be characterised as a mere disagreement with the factual

appreciation undertaken by the learned Arbitrator. Rather, the

challenge strikes at the foundational structure and jurisdictional

architecture of the INDRP framework itself. The Petitioners

essentially contend that the learned Arbitrator failed to undertake the

independent legal examination mandated under the policy before

arriving at a conclusion of bad faith.

65. A plain reading of Clause 4 of the INDRP makes it abundantly

clear that all the three ingredients as set out in Clause 4 would require

to be satisfied in order for the complaint to be maintainable. Absent

any one of the conditions enumerated therein, the complaint would

fail to qualify for the grant of the remedies available under Clause 11

of the INDRP. The requirement of bad faith under Clause 4(c)

constitutes an independent, substantive, and jurisdictional condition

O.M.P. (COMM) 223/2026 Page 25 of 40

precedent for directing transfer or cancellation of a domain name. The

requirement cannot be diluted into a mere automatic consequence

flowing from the existence of confusing similarity under Clause 4(a)

of the INDRP.

66. In the opinion of this Court, domain name disputes frequently

involve compatibility-based references, nominative usage, descriptive

adoption, interoperability claims, or functional descriptions, all of

which may give rise to some degree of similarity without necessarily

disclosing mala fide conduct or dishonest intention. It is precisely for

this reason that the framers of the INDRP consciously incorporated

Clause 4(c) as a distinct safeguard requiring an independent

examination into mala fide intent, deliberate deception, or dishonest

exploitation of another‟s goodwill. If confusing similarity alone were

sufficient to sustain a finding of bad faith, the separate jurisdictional

safeguard embodied in Clause 4(c) would stand rendered wholly

otiose and redundant.

67. The aforesaid position becomes even more apparent upon a

conjoint reading of Clause 4(c) with Clause 7 of the INDRP.

68. Clause 7 of the INDRP does not proceed on the premise that

every confusingly similar domain name ipso facto constitutes bad

faith. On the contrary, the provision repeatedly emphasises intentional

and deliberate conduct on the part of the registrant.

69. Clauses 7(c) and 7(d) of the INDRP, in particular, contemplate

situations where the registrant intentionally attempts to attract internet

users for commercial gain by creating confusion as to source,

sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement, or where the registration is

O.M.P. (COMM) 223/2026 Page 26 of 40

undertaken primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a

competitor.

70. The common thread running through the aforesaid provisions is,

therefore, not the mere existence of confusion in the abstract, but the

intentional exploitation of such confusion through dishonest conduct

aimed at deriving unfair commercial advantage or causing commercial

prejudice.

71. In the considered opinion of this Court, the expressions

employed under Clause 7 of the INDRP, such as “intentionally

attempted”, “affiliation”, “endorsement”, “disrupting the business of a

competitor”, and “in order to prevent the owner of the trademark or

service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain

name”, are not ornamental phrases. They constitute substantive

indicators of the degree and nature of conduct required before a

finding of bad faith can legally be sustained. The architecture of

Clause 7 thus makes it abundantly clear that bad faith under the

INDRP framework is rooted in demonstrable intention, deliberate

deception, and conscious exploitation of another‟s commercial

goodwill.

72. Mere incorporation of a prior trademark within a domain name,

absent surrounding circumstances evidencing intentional deception,

diversion, or dishonest commercial exploitation, would not by itself

satisfy the threshold contemplated under Clause 4(c) of the INDRP.

To hold otherwise would amount to treating every instance of

similarity as synonymous with bad faith, thereby collapsing the

carefully demarcated distinctions consciously embedded within the

INDRP framework. All the sub clauses of Clause 4 are conjunctive

O.M.P. (COMM) 223/2026 Page 27 of 40

and become so by the insertion of the conjunction “and” between the

independent sub-clauses. In the event that a remedy were to be granted

on the satisfaction of only any of the conditions set out therein,

without fulfilling the requirements of the remainder of the sub-

clauses, the same would result in a rewriting of the rules and result in

the reading down of the conjunction “and” to “or”.

73. In reality, if every situation where a registrant‟s domain name is

identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in

which the complainant has rights were, by itself, sufficient to establish

bad faith, Clause 7 of the INDRP would become entirely redundant. In

such a circumstance, there would have been no necessity for the

policy to separately prescribe illustrative indicators and mandatory

parameters for determining “registration and use of a domain name in

bad faith”. The very existence of Clause 7 of the INDRP demonstrates

that confusing similarity and bad faith are distinct juridical

requirements requiring separate examination.

74. It is important to note that, unlike Trade Mark law where the

determination of infringement or deceptive similarity ordinarily does

not require a specific inquiry into the mens rea underlying the

adoption or use of a mark, the INDRP framework expressly

contemplates and mandates the establishment of bad faith as a

foundational requirement. In other words, while Trade Mark

jurisprudence may proceed on the basis of likelihood of confusion

simpliciter, the INDRP regime requires a qualitatively distinct

examination directed towards the intention, conduct and surrounding

circumstances attributable to the registrant. The analytical standards

governing the two regimes are therefore fundamentally different.

O.M.P. (COMM) 223/2026 Page 28 of 40

Consequently, any adjudication under the INDRP which proceeds

merely on the basis of similarity or likelihood of confusion, without

independently examining and recording a finding on the existence of

bad faith or mala fide intent, would fail to satisfy the mandatory

requirements of the INDRP framework and, to the mind of this Court,

would strike at its very foundation.

75. Turning now to the examination undertaken by the learned

Arbitrator in the Impugned Arbitral Award, this Court finds

substantial merit in the Petitioners‟ submission that the Award does

not independently undertake the evaluative exercise mandated under

Clause 4(c) read with Clause 7 of the INDRP. Though the Impugned

Arbitral Award contains a separate heading dealing with “Bad Faith”,

the analysis thereunder does not appear to reflect strict or substantive

compliance with the requirements contemplated under the INDRP

framework.

76. Upon examination of the Impugned Arbitral Award, this Court

finds that the learned Arbitrator has principally rested the conclusion

under Clause 4(c) of the INDRP upon the likelihood of confusion

arising from the incorporation of the Respondent‟s mark within the

Subject Domain Name. However, the Award does not proceed further

to independently examine whether such a likelihood of confusion was

intentionally created or consciously exploited by the Petitioners in the

manner specifically contemplated under Clauses 7(c) and 7(d) of the

INDRP. It is pertinent to note that the finding of bad faith in the

Impugned Arbitral Award has been premised purportedly on Clauses

7(c) and 7(d) of the INDRP.

O.M.P. (COMM) 223/2026 Page 29 of 40

77. These clauses specifically require a finding that the registrant

intentionally attempted to attract internet users to its website or online

location by creating confusion regarding source, sponsorship,

affiliation, or endorsement, or that the domain name was registered

primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor.

The existence of confusion simpliciter is therefore not sufficient; the

policy mandates an independent finding of deliberate intent and

dishonest commercial objective.

78. The analysis contained in the Impugned Arbitral Award,

however, substantially remains confined to two aspects, namely, the

subsequent registration of the disputed domain name vis-à-vis the

Respondent‟s mark, and the possibility of association or confusion

with the Respondent‟s trademark. The Impugned Arbitral Award does

not disclose any substantive evaluation regarding deliberate intent,

intentional diversion for commercial gain, calculated disruption of the

Respondent‟s business, or conscious exploitation of the Respondent‟s

goodwill, as contemplated under Clauses 7(c) and 7(d) of the INDRP.

The relevant portions of the Impugned Arbitral Award read as

follows:

Respondent's disputed domain name confusingly similar to

Complainant's trade mark

13. The trade mark and tradename of the Complainant are prior to

the registration of the disputed domain name. The EXCEL mark is

used in respect of a spreadsheet software program developed by the

Complainant and was first adopted and used as a trade mark in the

year 1985.

14. The Complainant is successful in showing the prior use of its

registered trademark EXCEL which is much prior to the

registration/creation of the disputed domain name.

15. It is well established law that the specific top-level domain

such as .com, 'net', '.net', 'in' etc does not affect the domain name

for the purpose of determining whether it is identical or

confusingly similar (Relevant decision:- Rollerblade, Inc. v. Chris

McCrady). Therefore, TLD .in' is to be disregarded while

O.M.P. (COMM) 223/2026 Page 30 of 40

comparing the disputed domain name with the trademark of the

Complainant. When the trade mark EXCEL of the Complainant

and the disputed domain name (<exceltotally.in) are considered,

there is no doubt that the disputed domain name is confusingly

similar to the registered trade mark of the Complainant.

16. The registered trade mark of the Complainant is prior in use.

The applications for the registration for trade mark EXCEL were

filed much prior to the registration of the disputed domain name.

The Respondent cannot be said to be unaware about the trade mark

EXCEL of the Complainant.

17. Moreover, the disputed domain name includes the whole of the

prior used trade mark EXCEL. A domain name which wholly

incorporates a Complainant's mark may be sufficient to establish

deceptive similarity, despite the addition of other words to such

marks. [Living Media, Limited v. India Services, Case No.

D2000-0973]

18. In view of foregoing, it is apparent that the disputed domain

name is confusingly similar to the registered trade mark, the

domain name and trade name of the Complainant. Therefore, The

Complainant has established its case under paragraph 4 (a) of the

INDRP.

Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in disputed

domain name

19. The Respondent has used the disputed domain name which is

similar to the domain name and registered trade mark of the

Complainant. The Respondent is not commonly known by the

domain name. Furthermore, the registration of the disputed domain

name is created and used without any consent of the Complainant.

20. An email dated 30.10.2025 was sent by the Respondent to the

advocate of the Complainant whereby the Respondent stated that:

"We would also like to clarify that the broader wording

used in the 2023 "EXCEL TO TALLY" trademark

application (covering software development, networking,

and related services) was submitted by our agent in error.

Our actual intent, consistent with our earlier 2012 filing

(application no. 2350180), was only to describe our core

business (data migration software and services) not to

claim any association or overlap with Microsoft's

products or trademarks.

We have already withdrawn the "Excel to Tally"

trademark application and provided our signed

undertaking confirming our position and commitments.

The website content has been updated so that the phrase

"Excel to Tally" is used only in a descriptive context to

explain functionality and is accompanied by clear

disclaimers that we are independent and not endorsed by

Microsoft.

O.M.P. (COMM) 223/2026 Page 31 of 40

We derive no commercial advantage from any association

with Microsoft's brand. Given our legitimate business

interests and the descriptive nature of our usage, we do

not intend to transfer or cancel the domain. We believe

our current position fully addresses any genuine concerns

while preserving our business operations."

21. Despite the undertaking mentioned in the said email of the

Respondent, the disputed domain name is similar to the trade mark

EXCEL of the Complainant which was used by the Respondent.

Furthermore, the said email irrevocably shows that the Respondent

is much aware about the prior used trade mark of the Complainant

and reputation and goodwill thereof.

22. The domain names do come under the purview of trade mark

law. In Yahoo! Inc. v. Akash Arora & Anr., 1999 (19) PTC 201

(Del), the Delhi High Court held that use of a deceptively similar

mark in a domain name amounts to passing off, as domain names

serve the same function as trademarks. In Satyam Infoway Ltd. v.

Sifynet Solutions Pvt. Ltd., (2004) 6 SCC 145 the Hon'ble

Supreme Court confirmed that domain names are business

identifiers entitled to the same legal protection as trademarks.

Rediff Communication Ltd. v. Cyberbooth & Anr., 1999 (4)

Bom CR 278 - Bombay High Court held that domain names are

valuable corporate assets and must be protected against misuse.

Therefore, the Respondent cannot be allowed to use the trade mark

of the Complainant in its domain name.

23. The disputed domain name is such that it makes an association

with the Complainant which can never be termed as legitimate use

of the disputed domain name. The disputed domain name uses in

its disputed domain name the trade mark EXCEL.

24. The Respondent cannot be said to have any legitimate right or

interest in the disputed domain name which is confusingly similar

the prior used trade mark of the Complainant.

25. The Respondent is not known by the disputed domain name.

The Respondent did not file any reply to the Complaint filed by the

Complainant despite multiple opportunities.

26. The Complainant has been using the trade mark EXCEL which

was registered is international domains much prior to the

registration of the disputed domain name.

27. Therefore, the Respondent/Registrant has no rights or

legitimate interests in respect of the disputed domain name. The

Complainant has established its case under paragraph 4 (b) of the

INDRP.

Bad Faith (sic)

28. The registration of the disputed domain name affects the rights

of the Complainant vis-à-vis complainant's domain names and its

registered trade mark. Therefore, the Complainant's right to

O.M.P. (COMM) 223/2026 Page 32 of 40

exclusively use its domain name and its trade marks is affected by

the registration of the disputed domain name.

29. The disputed domain name will negatively affect the

goodwill and reputation of the Complainant thereby disrupting

business of the Complainant. Therefore, the registration of the

disputed domain name is in bad faith according to paragraph

7(d) of the INDRP.

30. The Respondent registered the disputed domain name

much subsequent to the use and international registrations of

the domain name of the Complainant. The said registration of

the disputed domain name is in bad faith to confuse internet

users as to a possible association between the disputed domain

name and the Complainant. The registration of the disputed

domain name is in bad faith according to paragraph 7(c) of the

INDRP.

31. In view of foregoing, it is apparent that the registration of the

disputed domain name is in bad faith to hurt the commercial

activity of the Complainant. The Complainant has established its

case under paragraph 4 (c) of the INDRP.

Decision

In view of the foregoing, it is ordered that the disputed domain

name <exceltotally.in> be transferred to the Complainant from the

Respondent. Parties are ordered to bear the cost of the present

proceedings.

(emphasis supplied)

79. In the considered opinion of this Court, the reasoning adopted

in the Impugned Arbitral Award effectively reduces Clause 4(c) of the

INDRP to a mere corollary or appendage of Clause 4(a). Such an

approach, if accepted, would fundamentally alter the carefully

structured scheme of the INDRP and obliterate the clear distinction

consciously maintained between the concepts of “confusing

similarity” and “bad faith”. The distinction between the two is neither

superficial nor merely semantic in nature; rather, it is substantive,

jurisdictional, and foundational to the adjudicatory framework

contemplated under the policy.

80. In the opinion of this Court, while similarity may give rise to

the possibility of confusion, a finding of bad faith necessarily requires

O.M.P. (COMM) 223/2026 Page 33 of 40

something more, namely, cogent material demonstrating that such

confusion was intentionally engineered, consciously exploited, or

deliberately leveraged for obtaining an unfair commercial advantage

or for causing commercial prejudice to the complainant. Mere

existence of similarity, howsoever strong, cannot by itself substitute

the independent jurisdictional requirement of establishing mala fide

intent.

81. The distinction may appropriately be understood as akin to the

distinction between resemblance and deception. Resemblance may

arise incidentally, descriptively, functionally, or even legitimately in

the course of commercial activity, particularly in cases involving

compatibility references, descriptive expressions, nominative use, or

interoperability claims. Deception, however, necessarily imports an

element of intention, namely, a conscious design to mislead, divert,

confuse, or unfairly capitalize upon another‟s goodwill and reputation.

It is precisely this additional element of deliberate exploitation and

dishonest intention that Clause 7 of the INDRP obligates the

complainant to independently establish, through objective

circumstances and surrounding material, before a finding of bad faith

can legally be sustained.

82. The structure of Clause 7 of the INDRP itself reinforces this

interpretation. The repeated use of expressions such as “intentionally

attempted”, “creating a likelihood of confusion”, “affiliation”,

“endorsement”, “commercial gain”, and “disrupting the business of a

competitor” clearly demonstrates that the policy contemplates an

inquiry extending beyond the mere existence of similarity. The

emphasis throughout the provision is upon intentional conduct and

O.M.P. (COMM) 223/2026 Page 34 of 40

calculated misuse of another‟s mark or reputation. Consequently, the

jurisdictional threshold contemplated under Clause 4(c) of the INDRP

cannot be said to stand satisfied merely because a domain name

incorporates or resembles a prior trademark.

83. A further perusal of the Impugned Arbitral Award reveals that

the governing framework of the INDRP, to which the Respondent

herein had consciously subjected itself for adjudication of the present

dispute, has not been applied in the manner contemplated under the

policy itself. The Impugned Arbitral Award does not disclose any

meaningful or independent examination of the Petitioners‟ alleged

intent to intentionally divert internet users, dishonestly exploit the

Respondent‟s goodwill, derive unfair commercial benefit, or

deliberately disrupt the Respondent‟s business operations within the

parameters contemplated under Clause 7(c) and 7(d) of the INDRP.

84. Consequently, the Impugned Arbitral Award fails to

demonstrate substantive compliance with the mandatory jurisdictional

requirements governing adjudication under the INDRP framework.

The policy mandates not merely a finding of similarity, but an

independent and reasoned determination that the registrant‟s conduct

satisfies the threshold of bad faith as specifically contemplated under

Clause 7 of the INDRP. In the absence of such an evaluative exercise,

the conclusion reached under Clause 4(c) of the INDRP cannot be said

to reflect a legally sustainable application of the governing framework

under which the dispute itself was adjudicated.

85. This Court also takes note that the reliance placed by the

Respondent herein upon Quantum University (supra) is misplaced. In

the said decision, the finding of bad faith was sustained upon an

O.M.P. (COMM) 223/2026 Page 35 of 40

independent appreciation of the surrounding circumstances and

material, evidencing deliberate mala fide intent, intentional diversion

of internet users and conscious exploitation of the complainant‟s

goodwill.

86. The Co-ordinate Bench in Quantum University (supra)

specifically noticed material demonstrating knowledge of the

complainant‟s prior rights and intentional creation of misleading

association before affirming the conclusion under Clause 7 of the

INDRP Rules. The said judgment, therefore, cannot be construed as

laying down that bad faith automatically follows upon proof of

confusing similarity or that the independent jurisdictional requirement

under Clause 4(c) of the INDRP stands dispensed with. The relevant

portions of Quantum University (supra) appreciating the existence of

bad faith are reproduced herein below:

“(xxxvii) In arriving at a conclusion that the registration and use of

the impugned domain name www.quantumuniversity.edu.in, by the

petitioner, was vitiated by bad faith, the learned Arbitrator has

noted that

(a) admittedly, the respondent had several domain names

of which “quantum university” was a part, used in

relation to online educational services were provided

worldwide,

(b) the mark “Quantum University” of the respondent also

stood registered with the USPTO,

(c) the petitioner was, therefore, well aware of the services

provided by the respondent while seeking registration

of the domain name www.quantumuniversity.edu.in,

(d) Clause 3 of the INDRP obligated the petitioner to

declare that the registration of the domain

name www.quantumuniversity.edu.in would not

infringe upon or violate the rights of any third party,

(e) the petitioner had not denied the fact that it

knew and had knowledge of the domain names of the

respondent, as pleaded in the complaint instituted by

the respondent before the .IN Registry, and

(f) the petitioner, therefore, clearly registered

the www.quantumuniversity.edu.in domain name with

O.M.P. (COMM) 223/2026 Page 36 of 40

an obvious intent to attract internet users to the

petitioner's website by creating a likelihood of

confusion with the respondent's name.

(xxxviii) These findings of the learned Arbitrator clearly attract

sub-clause (c) of Clause 7 of the INDRP. The said sub-clause

applies where a registrant intentionally attempts to attract internet

users to its website by creating a likelihood of confusion with the

name of the prior registrant as to the source, sponsorship,

affiliation or endorsement of the registrant website or the location

of a product or a service on the registrant website or location. As

such, the registration of use of a domain name, with an intent to

attract internet users to the registrant's website or location by

creating a likelihood of confusion ipso facto amounts to

registration and use of the domain name in bad faith.

(xxxix) Based on the above undisputed facts, the learned Arbitrator

has, in para 79(c)(vii) to (xii), concluded that the petitioner had in

fact intentionally attempted to attract internet users to its

website and had created a likelihood of confusion by using the

domain name www.quantumuniversity.edu.in in the full

(presumed) knowledge of the fact that the respondent was a prior

registrant of the domain name www.quantumuniversity.com and a

number of other quantum university formative domain names,

registered prior in point of time.

(xl) This, again, is a finding of fact based on an appreciation of the

material on record. It cannot be said that the finding suffers from

perversity or patent illegality. The question of whether the

petitioner was, or was not, acting intentionally with a view to

confuse internet users by adopting a deceptively similar domain

name is essentially a matter of discretion of the learned Arbitrator.

Such a discretionary finding cannot brook interference under

Section 34 of the 1996 Act unless it is completely perverse. The

Court, in exercise of jurisdiction vested in it by Section 34 of the

1996, cannot venture into a re-appreciation of the facts and arrive

at its own subjective satisfaction as to whether they make out, or

do not make out, a case of intentional diversion of internet users by

adoption of a deceptively similar domain name.

(xli) So long as the findings of the learned Arbitrator in that regard

do not suffer from perversity or by the illegality, the matter must

rest there. The Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 34

of the 1996 Act, cannot itself venture into the factual thicket to

arrive at its own decision regarding the satisfaction of the

ingredients which are required to be satisfied.

(xIii) The findings of the learned Arbitrator on this score do not, in

my opinion, suffer either from perversity or patent illegality, so as

to justify interference by the court under Section 34 of the 1996

Act.”

O.M.P. (COMM) 223/2026 Page 37 of 40

87. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the Impugned Arbitral

Award suffers from a foundational infirmity inasmuch as the essential

requirement of “bad faith” under Clause 4(c) of the INDRP was not

independently established prior to directing transfer of the Subject

Domain Name. Although the learned Arbitrator returned findings

regarding confusing similarity between the disputed domain name and

the Respondent‟s mark, the Impugned Arbitral Award does not

disclose any distinct substantive evidentiary scrutiny directed towards

determining the existence of deliberate intent, intentional diversion of

internet users for commercial gain, conscious deception, or mala fide

exploitation of the Respondent‟s goodwill.

88. The analysis undertaken in the Impugned Arbitral Award

substantially proceeds on the assumption that the existence of

confusing similarity itself was sufficient to sustain a finding of bad

faith. Such an approach materially dilutes the cumulative and

compartmentalised structure consciously embedded within the INDRP

framework and effectively collapses separate and independent

jurisdictional requirements into one another. The scheme of the

INDRP, however, requires each constituent ingredient under Clause 4

of the INDRP to be independently and substantively established

before the consequence of transfer or cancellation of a domain name

may legally follow.

89. In the considered opinion of this Court, the aforesaid defect is

not merely one relating to factual appreciation or sufficiency of

evidence, but strikes at the legality and sustainability of the arbitral

determination itself. Once the governing framework expressly

mandates independent satisfaction of each jurisdictional requirement

O.M.P. (COMM) 223/2026 Page 38 of 40

before the transfer of a domain name can be directed, failure to

establish one such foundational ingredient necessarily renders the

decision-making process itself legally unsustainable. The defect,

therefore, transcends the realm of factual disagreement and enters the

domain of jurisdictional illegality and non-compliance with the

governing legal framework applicable to the dispute.

90. The Impugned Arbitral Award consequently falls foul of the

limited public policy scrutiny permissible under Section 34(2)(b)(ii)

of the A&C Act, as elucidated in OPG Power (supra), particularly

insofar as it concerns adherence to the fundamental legal framework

governing adjudication of the dispute. Where the governing legal

regime expressly mandates the determination of specific jurisdictional

and substantive conditions in a prescribed manner, a failure to

undertake such determination in accordance with the governing

framework cannot be relegated to the category of a mere error within

jurisdiction. Such a defect strikes at the legality of the decision-

making process itself.

91. It is pertinent to note that the INDRP is not merely a procedural

guideline, but a specialised regulatory framework intended to govern

and adjudicate disputes relating to a particular class of domain names

in a specifically structured manner. The requirements embedded

therein, including the mandatory determination of bad faith and the

satisfaction of the jurisdictional conditions contemplated under the

Policy and Rules, constitute foundational safeguards forming part of

the adjudicatory mechanism itself. Consequently, an adjudication

rendered in disregard of these mandatory requirements would amount

O.M.P. (COMM) 223/2026 Page 39 of 40

to a contravention of the governing legal framework underpinning the

INDRP regime.

92. Since the INDRP operates within the legal architecture

recognised in India and is intended to serve larger considerations of

fairness, commercial certainty, and protection of legitimate rights in

the digital domain, any decision rendered in violation of its essential

requirements would necessarily offend the fundamental policy of

Indian law and thereby attract the limited public policy ground

contemplated under Section 34(2)(b)(ii) of the A&C Act.

93. This Court further notes that the governing framework of the

INDRP not only requires adjudication upon distinct jurisdictional

ingredients, but also necessarily contemplates a reasoned

determination demonstrating how such requirements stood

independently satisfied. The obligation to provide intelligible and

adequate reasons is an integral facet of a valid adjudicatory process

and constitutes an essential component of the Principles of Natural

Justice. The absence of any substantive reasoning demonstrating

independent satisfaction of the requirement of bad faith, despite the

same constituting a mandatory jurisdictional prerequisite under Clause

4(c) read with Clause 7 of the INDRP, therefore, materially affects the

fairness and legality of the adjudicatory process itself.

94. In the present case, the Impugned Arbitral Award does not

disclose any independent evaluative analysis establishing intentional

deception, conscious diversion of internet users, deliberate

exploitation of the Respondent‟s goodwill, or calculated disruption of

the Respondent‟s business in the manner contemplated under Clause 7

of the INDRP. The conclusion regarding bad faith thus remains

O.M.P. (COMM) 223/2026 Page 40 of 40

unsupported by the nature of reasoned examination mandated under

the governing framework itself. Such absence of reasons in respect of

a foundational jurisdictional requirement renders the Award

vulnerable to interference under the limited contours of public policy

review recognised under Section 34(2)(b)(ii) of the A&C Act.

CONCLUSION:

95. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the

considered opinion that the Impugned Arbitral Award cannot be

sustained insofar as it directs transfer of the Subject Domain Name in

favour of the Respondent without an independent, substantive, and

evidentiary finding regarding “bad faith” as contemplated under

Clause 4(c) read with Clause 7 of the INDRP.

96. The present petition is accordingly allowed, and the Impugned

Arbitral Award dated 02.03.2026 passed by the learned Arbitrator is

set aside.

97. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of

accordingly.

98. No order as to costs.

HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.

MAY 29, 2026/sm/kr/ma