FAO (COMM) 231/2026 Page 1 of 18

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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

% Judgment reserved on: 16.09.2026

Judgment pronounced on: 28.09.2026

Judgment uploaded on: 28.09.2026

# CNR No. DLHC010368972026

+ FAO (COMM) 231/2026 and CM APPL. 53142/2026

M/S AIRPORT HANDLING SERVICES .....Appellant

Through: Mr. Jawahar Raja, Mr. Anirudh

Ramanathan, ⁠Ms. Sonali Shelar,

⁠Ms. Tamanna Pankaj, ⁠Mr.

Sumit Wadhva, ⁠Ms. Priya Vats,

⁠Mr. Anoop George, ⁠Mr. Nitai

Hinduja, ⁠Mr. Ishaan Goel,

Advs.

versus

INDIAN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, KANPUR

.....Respondent

Through: Mr. Manish Paliwal, Adv.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL

HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE SHAIL JAIN

J U D G M E N T

ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.:

1. The present Appeal under Section 37

1

of the Arbitration and

Conciliation Act, 1996

2

, read with Section 13 of the Commercial

Courts Act, 2015, assails the judgment dated 19.05.2026

3

passed by

the learned District Judge (Commercial Courts)-03, Central District,

Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi in O.M.P.(COMM.) No.44/2024, whereby

1

Hereinafter referred to as „Section 37‟

2

Hereinafter referred to as „A&C Act‟

3

Hereinafter referred to as „Impugned Judgment‟

FAO (COMM) 231/2026 Page 2 of 18

the learned District Judge allowed the petition

4

under Section 34

5

of

the A&C Act and set aside the arbitral award dated 28.02.2024

6

passed by the learned Sole Arbitrator, Hon‟ble Ms. Justice (Retd.)

Sangita Dhingra Sehgal.

2. The challenge raised by the Appellant is confined to the

finding of the learned District Judge that the learned Sole Arbitrator

was de jure unable to act as an arbitrator by virtue of Rule 11(3)

7

of

the Consumer Protection (Conditions of Service of President and

Members of the State Commission or District Commission) Model

Rules, 2020

8

. It is contended that Rule 11(3), even if construed as

creating a disability upon the learned Sole Arbitrator, is a condition of

service and cannot be equated with the ineligibility contemplated

under Section 12(5)

9

read with the Seventh Schedule

10

to the A&C

Act. The Appellant further contends that the learned District Judge

erred in treating the absence of an express written waiver under the

proviso to Section 12(5) as determinative of the validity of the Award.

3. The controversy, therefore, essentially concerns the effect of

Rule 11(3) upon the mandate of an arbitrator, the distinction between

de jure inability under Section 14(1)(a)

11

of the A&C Act and de jure

ineligibility under Section 12(5) read with the Seventh Schedule, and

whether the absence of an express written waiver under the proviso to

4

Hereinafter referred to as „Section 34 Petition‟

5

Hereinafter referred to as „Section 34‟

6

Hereinafter referred to as „Award‟

7

Hereinafter referred to as „Rule 11(3)‟

8

Hereinafter referred to as „Service Rules‟

9

Hereinafter referred to as „Section 12(5)‟

10

Hereinafter referred to as „Seventh Schedule‟

11

Hereinafter referred to as „Section 12(1)(a)‟

FAO (COMM) 231/2026 Page 3 of 18

Section 12(5) could invalidate the Award in the facts of the present

case.

FACTUAL MATRIX:

4. The relevant facts, necessary for adjudication of the present

Appeal, may be briefly noticed.

5. The Appellant is a partnership firm engaged in the business of

customs clearance, shipping and freight forwarding services. The

Appellant obtained registration as a Micro, Small and Medium

Enterprise („MSME‟) under the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises

Development Act, 2006

12

on 29.08.2012. The Respondent is the

Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur, an autonomous institution of

national importance constituted under the Institute of Technology Act,

1961.

6. The parties had entered into various Service Agreements

during the period from 2003 to 2011 and thereafter from 2014 to

2017. In pursuance thereof, the Appellant raised invoices during the

period from 2004 to 2018 aggregating to approximately

Rs.21,29,57,915/-. Against the said invoices, payments aggregating to

approximately Rs.21,16,64,706/- were made by the Respondent. The

last payments of Rs.2,200/- and Rs.5,035.83/- were made on

03.05.2018.

7. The Appellant thereafter addressed reminders dated

11.07.2018, 05.11.2019 and 11.11.2019 seeking payment of the

12

Hereinafter referred to as „MSMED Act‟

FAO (COMM) 231/2026 Page 4 of 18

outstanding amount. A legal notice was also issued by the Appellant

on 29.03.2022.

8. The Appellant filed its claim before the Micro and Small

Enterprises Facilitation Council („MSEFC‟) on 06.05.2022. Since the

conciliation proceedings did not result in a settlement, the dispute was

referred to the Delhi Arbitration Centre („DAC‟) on 08.06.2023 under

Section 18(3) of the MSMED Act.

9. The DAC, vide communication dated 07.07.2023, appointed

the Sole Arbitrator. The learned Sole Arbitrator submitted the

declaration contemplated under Section 12 of the A&C Act on

11.07.2023. The Appellant thereafter filed its Statement of Claim on

31.07.2023. The Respondent filed its Statement of Defence on

19.08.2023. No objection to the jurisdiction or competence of the

Arbitral Tribunal was raised under Section 16(2) of the A&C Act. The

parties thereafter participated in the arbitral proceedings and filed their

respective evidence affidavits. The Award came to be rendered on

28.02.2024, whereby the learned Sole Arbitrator awarded a sum of

Rs.27,76,996/- inclusive of interest on the principal amount in favour

of the Appellant.

10. Aggrieved by the Award, the Respondent preferred a Section

34 Petition on 31.05.2024. The learned District Judge, during the

course of those proceedings, directed deposit of 75% of the amount

awarded in terms of Section 19 of the MSMED Act. The Appellant

deposited a sum of Rs.20,82,747/- on 16.09.2024.

11. The Respondent, in its original Section 34 Petition, did not

challenge the competence or eligibility of the learned Sole Arbitrator

FAO (COMM) 231/2026 Page 5 of 18

on the ground subsequently urged with reference to Rule 11(3). The

said objection was raised for the first time in the Rejoinder dated

21.01.2025. The Appellant objected to the said plea by way of its Sur-

rejoinder dated 03.02.2025.

12. The learned District Judge, vide the Impugned Judgment,

rejected the other grounds raised by the Respondent in the Section 34

Petition. However, on the objection relating to the competence of the

learned Sole Arbitrator, the learned District Judge held that Rule 11(3)

operated as a legal bar against the learned Sole Arbitrator undertaking

arbitral work while holding the office of President of the Delhi State

Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission („SCDRC‟). The learned

District Judge consequently held that the learned Sole Arbitrator was

de jure unable to act and, on this ground, set aside the Award.

13. It is against the aforesaid finding, which was the sole ground

on which the Award came to be set aside, that the present Appeal has

been preferred.

CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES:

14. Heard learned counsel representing the parties and, with their

able assistance, perused the record.

15. Learned counsel representing the Appellant has made the

following submissions:

i. The learned District Judge erred in setting aside the Award on

the ground that Rule 11(3) disabled the learned Sole Arbitrator

from acting as an arbitrator. According to the Appellant, the said

Rule is a condition governing the service of the President of the

FAO (COMM) 231/2026 Page 6 of 18

Delhi SCRDC and does not constitute a statutory ineligibility

under Section 12(5) read with the Seventh Schedule.

ii. The distinction between de jure inability under Section

14(1)(a) and de jure ineligibility under Section 12(5) has been

authoritatively recognised by the Supreme Court in Bhadra

International (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Airports Authority of India

13

.

It is contended that while a statutory provision may render an

arbitrator de jure unable to continue, every such inability does

not attract Section 12(5), which is specifically confined to the

categories enumerated in the Seventh Schedule.

iii. The learned District Judge erred in relying upon the absence

of an express written waiver under the proviso to Section 12(5).

The requirement of an express agreement in writing arises only

where Section 12(5) is attracted. Since no relationship or

circumstance falling within the Seventh Schedule has been

identified in the present case, the proviso to Section 12(5) has no

application.

iv. The Appellant further relies upon the judgment of this Court

in Delhi Integrated Multi Modal Transit Systems Ltd. v. Delhi

Jal Board

14

, wherein, in the context of an identical objection

based upon the conditions of service applicable to a member of a

Consumer Forum, this Court held that even if acting as an

arbitrator was in violation of the conditions of service, the

consequence for such violation would follow, but that did not

13

2026 SCC OnLine SC 7

14

(O.M.P.)(T)(COMM.) 16/2021

FAO (COMM) 231/2026 Page 7 of 18

mean that the mandate of the arbitrator stood automatically

terminated.

v. The arbitration in the present case was a statutory arbitration

arising under Section 18 of the MSMED Act and was conducted

through the DAC. The appointment was made by the DAC

pursuant to the statutory reference and the DAC Arbitration

Rules, 2023 specifically recognise statutory arbitrations as a

distinct category.

vi. The Respondent participated in the arbitral proceedings

without raising any objection to the competence of the learned

Sole Arbitrator under Section 16 of the A&C Act or seeking

determination of the alleged de jure inability under Section

14(1)(a). The objection founded upon Rule 11(3) was introduced

for the first time by way of Rejoinder in the Section 34

proceedings and could not be permitted to furnish a new ground

for setting aside the Award.

16. Per contra, learned counsel representing the Respondent has

supported the Impugned Judgment and has contended that Rule 11(3)

imposed an absolute restriction upon the learned Sole Arbitrator from

undertaking arbitral work while holding office as President of the

SCDRC. It is contended that the learned Sole Arbitrator was,

therefore, legally incapable of acting as an arbitrator and that the

Award rendered by her could not be sustained.

17. Learned Counsel representing the Respondent has further

relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Bhadra

International (supra) to contend that a person who is legally

FAO (COMM) 231/2026 Page 8 of 18

ineligible to act as an arbitrator becomes de jure unable to continue

under Section 14(1)(a). It is submitted that the absence of an express

written waiver by the Respondent is consequently fatal to the

continuation of the learned Sole Arbitrator.

18. Reliance has also been placed upon the judgment of the

Allahabad High Court in Lucknow Development Authority Through

Vice Chairman v. Sudhanshu Rastogi

15

, in support of the proposition

that a person holding the office of a Consumer Commission cannot

simultaneously undertake arbitral assignments contrary to the

applicable Service Rules.

19. No other submissions have been advanced by learned counsel

representing the parties.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS:

20. The principal question which arises for consideration in the

present Appeal is whether the prohibition contained in Rule 11(3),

assuming the same to be applicable to the learned Sole Arbitrator,

rendered her de jure ineligible under Section 12(5) or de jure unable

under Section 14(1)(a) so as to invalidate the Award.

21. At the outset, it is necessary to notice the distinction between

the aforementioned two provisions of the A&C Act. For the sake of

convenience, Sections 12(5) and 14(1)(a) are reproduced hereinbelow:

“12. Grounds for challenge.-

…

(5) Notwithstanding any prior agreement to the contrary, any person

whose relationship, with the parties or counsel or the subject-matter of

15

2023:AHC-LKO:2097

FAO (COMM) 231/2026 Page 9 of 18

the dispute, falls under any of the categories specified in the Seventh

Schedule shall be ineligible to be appointed as an arbitrator:

Provided that parties may, subsequent to disputes having arisen

between them, waive the applicability of this sub-section by an

express agreement in writing.

***

14. Failure or impossibility to act.- (1) The mandate of an arbitrator

shall terminate and he shall be substituted by another arbitrator, if-

(a) he becomes de jure or de facto unable to perform his functions

or for other reasons fails to act without undue delay; and

…”

(Emphasis supplied.)

22. Section 12(5) provides that, notwithstanding any prior

agreement to the contrary, a person whose relationship with the

parties, counsel or the subject matter of the dispute falls within any of

the categories specified in the Seventh Schedule shall be ineligible to

be appointed as an arbitrator. The proviso permits the parties,

subsequent to disputes having arisen, to waive the applicability of the

said provision by an express agreement in writing.

23. Section 14(1)(a), on the other hand, contemplates termination

of the mandate where an arbitrator becomes de jure or de facto unable

to perform his or her functions. The expression “de jure inability” is

thus not confined, by the language of Section 14(1)(a), only to

circumstances arising under Section 12(5) or the Seventh Schedule.

24. The distinction assumes significance in view of the judgment

of the Supreme Court in Bhadra International (supra). The Supreme

Court, while examining the scheme of Sections 12(5) and 14(1)(a),

has explained the distinction between de jure ineligibility and de jure

inability. The relevant paragraphs are reproduced hereinbelow:

FAO (COMM) 231/2026 Page 10 of 18

“61. In the aforesaid context, it would be apposite to briefly explain

what constitutes as de jure ineligibility under Section 12(5). The

expression de jure denotes a condition rooted in strict compliance

with the requirements of law. De jure inability refers to a situation in

which an arbitrator is legally incapable of performing his functions

and is, by operation of law, barred from continuing in office. Such

inability strikes at the very root of the arbitrator's authority to act,

thereby affecting his inherent capacity to discharge his functions as

an arbitrator. It is this legal incapacity, arising from statutory

disqualifications, that results in the termination of the “mandate of

an arbitrator” under Section 14(1)(a) of the Act, 1996.

62. De jure inability referred to under Section 14(1)(a) may arise from

the provisions of the Act, 1996, or from any other existing law that

renders an arbitrator legally incapable of performing his functions. As

regards de jure ineligibility, it flows from sub-section (5) of Section

12 read with the Seventh Schedule, which disqualifies certain

persons from being appointed or continuing as arbitrators.

63. In other words, the ineligibility under Section 12(5) precedes de

jure inability under Section 14(1)(a). In other words, de jure

ineligibility is the specie and de jure inability is the genus. To put

this in context, de jure inability is determined when an aggrieved

party is able to indicate that the circumstances under the Seventh

Schedule have been met.”

(Emphasis supplied.)

25. Thus, while de jure inability refers to a legal incapacity to

perform the functions of an arbitrator, which may arise under the

A&C Act or any other existing law, de jure ineligibility specifically

flows from Section 12(5) read with the Seventh Schedule. The

Supreme Court has accordingly held that de jure ineligibility is a

species of de jure inability, which is the genus. Thus, while a person

falling within a category specified in the Seventh Schedule would

necessarily be de jure unable to act as an arbitrator, every legal

disability rendering a person incapable of acting as an arbitrator would

not, by that fact alone, constitute an ineligibility under Section 12(5).

26. The same distinction is evident from the discussion of the

Supreme Court and Madras High Court in HRD Corporation (Marcus

FAO (COMM) 231/2026 Page 11 of 18

Oil and Chemical Division) v. GAIL (India) Ltd.

16

and Clarke

Energy India Pvt. Ltd. v. SAS EPC Solution Pvt. Ltd.

17

, respectively.

The Seventh Schedule identifies specific relationships and

circumstances in which a person is statutorily rendered ineligible to

act as an arbitrator. Such ineligibility, once established, results in the

arbitrator being de jure unable to perform the functions of an

arbitrator within the meaning of Section 14(1)(a). However, this does

not mean that every case of de jure inability would necessarily fall

under Section 12(5) and the Seventh Schedule.

27. In Bhadra International (supra), the Supreme Court was

concerned with a situation where the disqualification of the arbitrator

arose from the specific circumstances enumerated in the Seventh

Schedule. It was in that context that Section 12(5) was attracted and

the requirement of an express agreement in writing under the proviso

to Section 12(5) assumed significance.

28. The principle regarding waiver by an express agreement in

writing, as explained by the Supreme Court in Bharat Broadband

Network Limited v. United Telecoms Ltd.

18

, is consequently a

consequence of Section 12(5). Where an arbitrator falls within one of

the categories specified in the Seventh Schedule, the statutory

prohibition under Section 12(5) operates notwithstanding any prior

agreement to the contrary. A waiver of that prohibition can then be

made only in the manner prescribed by the proviso, namely, by an

express agreement in writing entered into after the disputes have

arisen.

16

(2018) 22 SCC 471

17

2021 SCC OnLine Mad 6121

18

(2019) 5 SCC 755

FAO (COMM) 231/2026 Page 12 of 18

29. The question, therefore, in the present case is anterior to the

question of waiver. It must first be determined whether Rule 11(3)

brings the learned Sole Arbitrator within the statutory ineligibility

contemplated under Section 12(5) read with the Seventh Schedule.

30. There is no finding in the Impugned Judgment, nor has any

material been placed before this Court, to establish that the learned

Sole Arbitrator had any relationship with the Appellant, the

Respondent, the counsel representing either party or the subject matter

of the dispute which falls within any of the categories specified in the

Seventh Schedule. The objection to her appointment is founded

entirely upon Rule 11(3).

31. Rule 11(3), as relied upon by the Respondent, is a provision

governing the conditions of service of the President and Members of

the State Commission or District Commission. The prohibition

contained therein may, depending upon its interpretation and

applicability, regulate the conduct of a person holding such office and

may have consequences under the law governing such office.

However, a service-condition restriction cannot, without more, be

transposed into an ineligibility under Section 12(5).

32. This distinction has also been recognised by this Court in

Delhi Integrated Multi Modal Transit Systems Ltd. (supra), where an

objection was raised to the continuation of an arbitrator on the ground

that his appointment as a member of a Consumer Forum disabled him

from undertaking arbitral work. This Court specifically observed in

Paragraph No.36, as extracted hereinbelow:

“36. It is not necessary to go into the question whether the

conditions of service as applicable to the learned Arbitrator disabled

FAO (COMM) 231/2026 Page 13 of 18

him from taking any assignment as an arbitrator or continuing as

such. This is for the reason that if acting as an arbitrator is in

violation of the terms and conditions of his service as a member of

the District Consumer Forum, the consequence for violating the said

conditions of service would follow. However, that does not mean that

the mandate of the learned Arbitrator stands automatically

terminated.”

(Emphasis supplied.)

33. The aforesaid observation is of particular relevance to the

controversy before this Court. A breach of a condition governing the

office held by an arbitrator may entail consequences under the

statutory or regulatory framework governing that office. Such

consequence, however, cannot automatically be equated with

termination of the arbitral mandate under Section 12(5), particularly

when the alleged disability does not arise from any of the

circumstances specified in the Seventh Schedule.

34. The reliance placed by the learned District Judge upon

Bhadra International (supra) to hold that an express written waiver

under the proviso to Section 12(5) was necessary, therefore, proceeds

from a conflation of de jure inability with de jure ineligibility. The

fact that a particular legal provision may, in an appropriate case,

render an arbitrator de jure unable under Section 14(1)(a) does not

mean that the arbitrator consequently falls within Section 12(5) unless

the statutory requirements of that provision are independently

satisfied.

35. Put differently, Section 14(1)(a) may encompass legal

disabilities arising from sources other than the Seventh Schedule. But

where the alleged disability is not one contemplated by Section 12(5),

the proviso to Section 12(5) cannot be invoked to insist upon an

FAO (COMM) 231/2026 Page 14 of 18

express written waiver as a condition for the validity of the arbitral

mandate.

36. The judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Lucknow

Development Authority (supra), relied upon by the Respondent, does

not advance the case of the Respondent any further. The said decision

arose in proceedings concerning appointment and substitution of an

arbitrator under Sections 11(6) and 15(2) of the A&C Act, where the

arbitrator had recused herself upon being appointed to the Uttarakhand

SCDRC. The Court was thus concerned with the continuation and

substitution of an arbitrator in the context of an ad hoc arbitration.

37. The present case stands on a materially different footing. The

arbitration arose from a statutory reference under Section 18 of the

MSMED Act. The MSEFC referred the dispute to the DAC under

Section 18(3), and the learned Sole Arbitrator was appointed by the

DAC pursuant to the said reference. The DAC Arbitration Rules, 2023

themselves recognise statutory arbitration as a distinct category and

provide for appointment of a Sole Arbitrator by the Registrar in such

cases.

38. More importantly, the question before us is not whether a

person holding an office under the Consumer Protection framework

should, as a matter of service discipline, undertake arbitral

assignments. The question is whether such service restriction, by

itself, renders the person ineligible under Section 12(5) and

consequently requires an express written waiver under its proviso. For

the reasons already noticed, the answer must be in the negative.

FAO (COMM) 231/2026 Page 15 of 18

39. It is also material that the learned Sole Arbitrator had

furnished the declaration contemplated under Section 12 before

entering upon the reference. The Respondent thereafter filed its

Statement of Defence and participated in the arbitral proceedings

without raising any objection to the competence of the learned Sole

Arbitrator. No objection under Section 16(2) was taken and no

application was made during the arbitral proceedings seeking

termination of the mandate on the ground subsequently urged before

the learned District Judge.

40. The Respondent first raised the objection based upon Rule

11(3) in the Rejoinder filed in the Section 34 proceedings. While the

timing of the objection is not, by itself, determinative of a question of

statutory ineligibility as reiterated by the Supreme Court in Bhadra

International (supra). However, the timing of the objection assumes

significance when the Respondent seeks to characterise a service-

condition restriction as an absolute statutory bar under Section 12(5),

despite having participated throughout the arbitral proceedings

without raising such an objection.

41. Section 4 of the A&C Act embodies the principle of waiver

where a party, knowing that any requirement under the A&C Act from

which the parties may derogate or any requirement under the

arbitration agreement has not been complied with, proceeds with the

arbitration without stating its objection without undue delay. The

present case, however, does not require the Court to rest its conclusion

solely upon waiver under Section 4. The more fundamental reason is

that the alleged disability under Rule 11(3) has not been shown to

FAO (COMM) 231/2026 Page 16 of 18

constitute an ineligibility under Section 12(5) read with the Seventh

Schedule in the first place.

42. The challenge to the constitution of the Tribunal, therefore,

cannot be sustained by importing into the present case the line of

authorities dealing with unilateral appointment of arbitrators who were

themselves rendered ineligible under Section 12(5) or were otherwise

disqualified from making such appointments. The foundation upon

which those decisions operate is materially absent in the present case.

43. The Respondent‟s objection, in substance, is that the learned

Sole Arbitrator, while holding the office of President of the SCDRC,

could not undertake arbitral work by reason of the Service Rules.

Even assuming the correctness of that premise, the consequence of

such violation would have to be determined under the law governing

the office of the learned Sole Arbitrator. It does not follow that the

Award is automatically rendered void ab initio under the A&C Act.

44. It is also significant that the Respondent has not alleged any

actual bias, partiality or lack of independence on the part of the

learned Sole Arbitrator. The objection is founded exclusively upon the

alleged prohibition contained in the Service Rules. The issue,

therefore, remains one of legal competence and cannot be converted

into a challenge based upon the Fifth or Seventh Schedule in the

absence of the factual foundation necessary for invoking either.

45. The Court is conscious that the object of the statutory

provisions relating to independence and impartiality of arbitrators is to

ensure the integrity of the arbitral process. However, the safeguards

contained in Section 12(5) and the Seventh Schedule operate within

FAO (COMM) 231/2026 Page 17 of 18

the framework specifically prescribed by the A&C Act. The Court

cannot enlarge the categories of statutory ineligibility beyond those

contemplated by the legislature merely because a separate statutory or

regulatory provision may impose a restriction upon the person holding

the office of an arbitrator.

46. The learned District Judge, therefore, fell into error in treating

the alleged violation of Rule 11(3) as equivalent to an ineligibility

under Section 12(5) and in consequently holding that the absence of a

written waiver rendered the Award void.

47. It is also pertinent to note that the learned District Judge had

considered the other grounds raised by the Respondent in the Section

34 Petition, including the objection relating to limitation, the objection

concerning the period for which the claim could be entertained, and

the challenge based on appreciation of evidence. The said grounds

were rejected by the learned District Judge. No challenge to the

findings recorded on these grounds has been raised by the Appellant

in the present Appeal. The said findings, therefore, remain

undisturbed.

48. Thus, the only ground on which the learned District Judge

ultimately set aside the Award was the finding relating to the alleged

de jure inability of the learned Sole Arbitrator under Rule 11(3) of the

Service Rules. Having found the said finding to be unsustainable for

the reasons set out hereinabove, there remains no other ground on

which the Award stands set aside in the Impugned Judgment.

FAO (COMM) 231/2026 Page 18 of 18

CONCLUSION:

49. In view of the foregoing discussion, the present Appeal is

allowed. The finding of the learned District Judge that the learned

Sole Arbitrator was de jure unable to act as an arbitrator on account of

Rule 11(3) of the Service Rules is set aside. Consequently, the

judgment dated 19.05.2026, insofar as it sets aside the Award dated

28.02.2024 on the aforesaid ground, is also set aside.

50. The findings recorded by the learned District Judge on the

other grounds raised by the Respondent in the Section 34 Petition

have not been assailed in the present Appeal and are, therefore, left

undisturbed.

51. Since the aforesaid finding regarding the alleged de jure

inability of the learned Sole Arbitrator was the only ground on which

the Award came to be set aside, the Award dated 28.02.2024 passed

by the learned Sole Arbitrator stands restored.

52. The pending application stands closed.

ANIL KSHETARPAL , J.

SHAIL JAIN, J.

SEPTEMBER 28, 2026

jai/shah