As per case facts, the appellant entrusted a large consignment of salt to the Railways, but there was a significant shortage upon delivery. The Railway Claims Tribunal and the High ...
2026 INSC 711 C.A.No..of 2026 @ SLP(C)No.22748 of 2025 Page | 1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO…………. OF 2026
(Special Leave Petition (C) No.22748 of 2025)
M/S BAJAJ TRADING
COMPANY … APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
UNION OF INDIA … RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
Sanjay Karol, J.
1. Leave Granted.
2. The appellant is aggrieved by the concurrent rejection
of their claim by the Railway Claims Tribunal
1
, Guwahati
1
RCT
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Bench
2
in terms of order dated 3
rd
September 2012 and the
Gauhati High Court
3
by judgment dated 17
th
December 2024.
3. The appellant had entrusted the shipment of 40,444
bags of salt from Chirai Junction (CHIB), Gujarat to
Dharmanagar(DMR), Assam on 10
th
November 2009.
However, when the consignment reached DMR, delivery
recorded only 38,702 bags i.e. a shortage of 1742 bags. The
respondent-Railway Authorities issued a shortage certificate
being Serial No.82/77/57 dated 19
th
March 2010.
Accordingly, a claim notice dated 6
th
April 2010 was filed at
the rate of Rs.200 per bag totalling to Rs.3,48,400/-.
“30. Applicant is relying on exhibit R2 series i.e., copies
of the transshipment tallies. Reference to the page having
no.64 of exhibit R2 shows that at the time of
transshipment, it was found that one wagon bearing no.
SCBCN 38595 had 1286 bags of salt, wagon bearing no.
SE 180044 had 1320 bags, wagon bearing no. SC 28331
had 1205 bags, wagon bearing no. NR 90289 had 1250
bags when it was loaded with 1217 bags as per Railway
Receipt and wagon bearing no. SR 43356 had 1240 bags
which was allegedly loaded with 1217 bags. Likewise,
page no.65 says that wagon bearing no. SE 131794, which
was loaded with 1277 bags had 1173 bags, wagon bearing
no. 9931188 which was allegedly loaded with 1277 bags
had 1342 bags. Page no.66 of exhibit R2 says that wagon
bearing no. ERBCN 113457 which was allegedly loaded
with 1277 bags had 1331 bags at the time of unloading.
The above shows that either there was improper loading
or there was criminal interference during transit whereby
articles loaded in the above referred wagons were changed
2
Claim Application No: OA-I-6/2011
3
MFA No.1/2013
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to the other wagons. That is a situation which is difficult
to comprehend. Transshipment tally is a document ______
by an official during his official activities. It should be
treated with some respect. When given respect, it has to
be found that case of the applicant that there was loading
as contended by him and as stated in exhibit R1
forwarding note and exhibit R4 Railway Receipt, cannot
be accepted. In view of that finding, reference to exhibit
R3 delivery certificate is not necessary. As that finding is
not possible, it is not possible to conclude that there was
short delivery.”
4. A statutory appeal MFA No.1 of 2013 was filed before
the Gauhati High Court under Section 23 of Railway Claims
Tribunal Act, 1987
4
. It appears that the Court noticed four
aspects; (a) the goods were loaded directly from the truck/cart
to the wagon by the employees of the consignor; (b) such act
of loading was not supervised by any railway staff; (c)
sender’s weight was accepted; and (d) packing conditions
were not compliant, along with taking note of the fact that the
railway receipt had the ‘said to contain’ remark. As such, the
appeal was held to be bereft of merit, and accordingly stood
dismissed.
5. We have heard Mr. Gunjan Kumar, learned Advocate
on Record for the appellant and Ms. Archana Pathak Dave,
learned ASG for the respondents.
4
RCT Act
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5.1 The sum and substance of the appellant’s case is
that even if the booking was made at owner’s risk, the
general obligation cast upon the Railway Authorities,
under Section 93 of Railways Act, 1989
5
could not be
done away with; the loading of the goods was to be
supervised by a Goods Clerk (violation of Rule 1512 of
Indian Railway Commercial Manual
6
) and failure on the
part of the respondent cannot be held against the
appellant; “said to contain” bookings are only available
for “private siding” and this was a case of “railway
siding” hence, once a quantity has been mentioned in the
receipt, siding cannot be used to deny the claim; Section
97 of the 1989 Act makes it clear that the Railway
Authorities, will be liable for negligence even if booking
is under “owner’s risk”.
5.2 The case of the respondent as can be understood
from record, inter alia is that the grant of Shortage
Certificate issued by the railway authorities is, by no
means, an admission in any form; reference is made to
Section 65(2) of the 1989 Act which stipulates that in the
absence of a Clerk of the Railway having checked the
goods, the burden of proof for the number/quantity of
consignment rests with the
5
1989 Act
6
IRCM
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consignor/consignee/endorsee; neither Section 93 nor
Section 97 are of any use to the appellant since the
former does not talk about shortage and the latter limits
the liability upon the railways only in cases of negligence
or misconduct along with a few other exceptions.
6. Lord Parker of Waddington, J., in the matter of cargo
ex sailing ship “Parchim”
7
, 1917 observed:
“17. According to the authorities, it is beyond doubt that
the fact that the cargo was at the buyer's risk from the
moment it was placed on board points to the property
having been intended to pass at that time. The general
principle subsequently embodied in “The Sale of Goods
Act, 1893,” (Section 20) was, as early as 1873, laid down
by Lord Blackburn in Martineau v. Kitching [L.R. 7 Q.B.
453, 454.] where he says:—
“As a general rule, Res perit domino, the old
civil law maxim, is a maxim of our law; and
when you can show that the property passed
the risk of the loss, prima facie, is in the
person in whom the property is. If, on the
other hand, you go beyond that, and show that
the risk attached to one person or the other, it
is a very strong argument for showing that the
property was meant to be in him. But the two
are not inseparable. It may be very well that
the property shall be in the one and the risk in
the other.”
7. We may also observe that before the current legislation,
there was also the Carriers Act No.III of 1865 which was
similar to the Act of English Carriers Act, 1830. There was
7
SCC OnLine PC 69
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also an Indian Railways Act of 1890. The general position of
law, prior to these legislations and even prior to Indian
Contract Act 1872 has been captured by the Privy Council in
Irrawaddy Flotilla Co., Ltd. v. Bugwandass
8
, in the following
words:
“..At the date of the Act of 1872, the law relating to
common carriers was partly written, partly unwritten, law.
The written law is untouched by the Act of 1872. The
unwritten law was hardly within the scope of an Act
intended to define and amend the law relating to contracts.
The obligation imposed by law on common carriers has
nothing to do with contract in its origin. It is a duty cast
upon common carriers by reason of their exercising a
public employment for reward. “A breach of this duty,”
says Dallas, C.J., Bretherton v. Wood
7
, “is a breach of the
law, and for this breach an action lies founded on the
common law which action wants not the aid of a contract
to support it.”….”
8. Before proceeding further, let us take note of the
relevant provisions of the 1989 Act:
“65. Railway receipt
…
(2) A railway receipt shall be prima facie evidence of the
weight and the number of packages stated therein:
Provided that in the case of a consignment in wagon-load
or train-load and the weight or the number of packages is
not checked by a railway servant authorised in this behalf,
and a statement to that effect is recorded in such railway
receipt by him, the burden of proving the weight or, as the
case may be, the number of packages stated therein, shall
lie on the consignor, the consignee or the endorsee.
…
8
1891 SCC OnLine PC 11
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93. General responsibility of a railway administration as
carrier of goods.—Save as otherwise provided in this Act,
a railway administration shall be responsible for the loss,
destruction, damage or deterioration in transit, or non-
delivery of any consignment, arising from any cause
except the following, namely:—
(a) act of God;
(b) act of war;
(c) act of public enemies
(d) arrest, restraint or seizure under legal process;
(e) orders or restrictions imposed by the Central
Government or a State Government or by an officer or
authority subordinate to the Central Government or a State
Government authorised by it in this behalf;
(f) act or omission or negligence of the consignor or the
consignee or the endorsee or the agent or servant of the
consignor or the consignee or the endorsee;
(g) natural deterioration or wastage in bulk or weight due
to inherent defect, quality or vice of the goods;
(h) latent defects;
(i) fire, explosion or any unforeseen risk:
Provided that even where such loss, destruction, damage,
deterioration or non-delivery is proved to have arisen from
any one or more of the aforesaid causes, the railway
administration shall not be relieved of its responsibility for
the loss, destruction, damage, deterioration or non-
delivery unless the railway administration further proves
that it has used reasonable foresight and care in the
carriage of the goods.
…
97. Goods carried at owner’s risk rate.—Notwithstanding
anything contained in section 93, a railway administration
shall not be responsible for any loss, destruction, damage,
deterioration or non delivery in transit, of any
consignment carried at owner’s risk rate, from whatever
cause arising, except upon proof, that such loss,
destruction, damage, deterioration or non-delivery was
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due to negligence or misconduct on its part or on the part
of any of its servants:
Provided that,—
(a) where the whole of such consignment or the whole of
any package forming part of such consignment is not
delivered to the consignee or the endorsee and such non-
delivery is not proved by the railway administration to
have been due to fire or to any accident to the train; or
(b) where in respect of any such consignment or of any
package forming part of such consignment which had
been so covered or protected that the covering or
protection was not readily removable by hand, it is pointed
out to the railway administration on or before delivery that
any part of that consignment or package had been pilfered
in transit, the railway administration shall be bound to
disclose to the consignor, the consignee or the endorsee
how the consignment or the package was dealt with
throughout the time it was in its possession or control, but
if negligence or misconduct on the part of the railway
administration or of any of its servants cannot be fairly
inferred from such disclosure, the burden of proving such
negligence or misconduct shall lie on the consignor, the
consignee or the endorsee.
…
99. Responsibility of a railway administration after
termination of transit.—(1) A railway administration shall
be responsible as a bailee under sections 151, 152 and 161
of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), for the loss,
destruction, damage, deterioration or non-delivery of any
consignment up to a period of seven days after the
termination of transit:
Provided that where the consignment is at owner’s risk
rate, the railway administration shall not be responsible as
a bailee for such loss, destruction, damage, deterioration
or non-delivery except on proof of negligence or
misconduct on the part of the railway administration or of
any of its servants.
(2) The railway administration shall not be responsible in
any case for the loss, destruction, damage, deterioration or
non-delivery of any consignment arising after the expiry
of a period of seven days after the termination of transit.
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(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing
provisions of this section, a railway administration shall
not be responsible for the loss, destruction, damage,
deterioration or non-delivery of 40 perishable goods,
animals, explosives and such dangerous or other goods as
may be prescribed, after the termination of transit.
(4) Nothing in the foregoing provisions of this section
shall affect the liability of any person to pay any
demurrage or wharfage, as the case may be, for so long as
the consignment is not unloaded from the railway wagons
or removed from the railway premises.”
(Emphasis supplied)
9. Section 93 casts a responsibility upon the Railways for
loss, destruction, damage, deterioration, non-delivery of goods
arising from transit. While certain exceptions are listed, the
Section also places a responsibility on the Railways itself to
demonstrate that the exceptions are applicable and further to
prove that reasonable foresight and care had been employed in
the carriage of goods. Section 97 talks about the scenarios in
which goods are loaded onto the wagons at owner’s risk. It
absolves the Railways of liability except in cases of negligence
and misconduct of the railway employees being proved. A
burden of proof for negligence/misconduct lies on the person
making the allegations. Section 99 provides that the Railways
is responsible as a bailee for loss, destruction, damage,
deterioration or non-delivery up to seven days after
termination of transit and not thereafter. Exceptions to this
Rule are provided as in the case of perishable goods, animals,
C.A.No..of 2026 @ SLP(C)No.22748 of 2025 Page | 10
explosives or prescribed goods, along with those situations
where goods are loaded at owner’s risk. In the case of the
latter, only negligence or misconduct makes them liable.
10. If the case of the appellant is to be accepted, and
responsibility is to be fastened on the respondent- Railway
authorities, the same would have to be located somewhere
within the ambit and scope of Sections 93 and 97. One of the
primary grounds for repelling responsibility by the Railway
authorities has been ‘said to contain’ which is provided in Rule
1811 of the Indian Railway Code for Traffic (Commercial)
Department as follows :
“1811. Issue of "Said to contain" Railway Receipts
If no Railway staff is provided at a siding or if the strength
of railway staff provided is not adequate to check the
weight or the number of packages loaded in a wagon, a
remark should be recorded in the Railway receipt, by
issuing a "said lo contain" Railway Receipt. In such cases,
the burden of providing the weight or as the case may be.
the number of packages stated in the Railway Receipt
shall lie on the consignor, consignee or the endorsee.”
The non-obstante clause under Section 97 also becomes
important.
10.1 In Mohd. Abdul Samad v. State of Telangana
9
,
B.V. Nagarathna J. observed as under:
“82. A non obstante clause is usually appended to a
section in the beginning with a view to give the enacting
9
(2025) 2 SCC 49
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part of the section, in case of a conflict, an overriding
effect over the provision or the Act mentioned in the non
obstante clause. In other words, in spite of the provision
or the Act mentioned in the non obstante clause, the
enactment following it will have its full operation or that
the provisions embraced in the non obstante clause will
not be an impediment for the operation of the enactment.
Thus, a non obstante clause is a legislative device used
by a Parliament or legislature sometimes to give an
overriding effect to what has been specified in the
enacting part of a section in case of a conflict with what
is contained in the non obstante clause as stated above.
83. Further, a non obstante clause has to be distinguished
from the expression “subject to” where the latter would
convey the idea of a provision yielding place to another
provision or other provisions to which it is made subject
to. Also, the expression “notwithstanding anything in
any other law” in a section of an Act has to be contrasted
with the use of the expression “notwithstanding anything
contained in this Act”, which has to be construed to take
away the effect of any provision of that particular Act in
which the section occurs but it cannot take away the
effect of any other law. [Source : Principles of Statutory
Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, 15th Edn., Chapter
5.4, p. 284.]”
10.2 In A.G. Varadarajulu v. State of T.N
10
., a co-
ordinate Bench observed as follows with reference to the
interpretation of the non obstante clause as given by the
eleven-judge bench in Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia v.
Union of India
11
,
16. It is well settled that while dealing with a non
obstante clause under which the legislature wants to give
overriding effect to a section, the court must try to find
out the extent to which the legislature had intended to
10
(1998) 4 SCC 231
11
(1971) 1 SCC 85
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give one provision overriding effect over another
provision. Such intention of the legislature in this behalf
is to be gathered from the enacting part of the section.
In Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose [(1952) 2
SCC 237 : AIR 1952 SC 369 : 1953 SCR 1] Patanjali
Sastri, J. observed:
“The enacting part of a statute must, where it is
clear, be taken to control the non obstante
clause where both cannot be read
harmoniously;”
In Madhav Rao Scindia v. Union of India [(1971) 1 SCC
85] (SCC at p. 139) Hidayatullah, C.J. observed that the
non obstante clause is no doubt a very potent clause
intended to exclude every consideration arising from
other provisions of the same statute or other statute but
“for that reason alone we must determine the scope” of
that provision strictly. When the section containing the
said clause does not refer to any particular provisions
which it intends to override but refers to the provisions
of the statute generally, it is not permissible to hold that
it excludes the whole Act and stands all alone by itself.
“A search has, therefore, to be made with a view to
determining which provision answers the description
and which does not.”
10.3 In Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S.
Guram
12
, it was observed:
67. A clause beginning with the expression
“notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in
some particular provision in the Act or in some particular
Act or in any law for the time being in force, or in any
contract” is more often than not appended to a section in
the beginning with a view to give the enacting part of the
section in case of conflict an overriding effect over the
provision of the Act or the contract mentioned in the non
obstante clause. It is equivalent to saying that in spite of
the provision of the Act or any other Act mentioned in
the non obstante clause or any contract or document
12
(1986) 4 SCC 447
C.A.No..of 2026 @ SLP(C)No.22748 of 2025 Page | 13
mentioned the enactment following it will have its full
operation or that the provisions embraced in the non
obstante clause would not be an impediment for an
operation of the enactment. See in this connection the
observations of this Court in South India Corpn.
(P) Ltd. v. Secretary, Board of Revenue,
Trivandrum [AIR 1964 SC 207, 215 : (1964) 4 SCR
280].
11. In view of the above discussion, the non obstante clause
contained in Section 97 would exclude the general obligations
cast on the Railway by Section 93. Since, in the present case
the goods were booked at ‘owner’s risk’, if liability is to be
fastened on the authorities, it can only be done if negligence
or misconduct on its part or its employees.
12. Now, let us attempt to understand negligence. A
question may arise as to why only aspects of negligence are
taken into consideration. It is so because there are allegations
of the seal(s)being broken or the carriages being in open
condition on reaching the transshipment point. There aren’t
any specific allegations of misconduct by employees of
Railway wagons found to be open, would still not come to the
rescue of the appellants.
12.1 Concise Oxford English Dictionary
13
, the term
“negligence” is defined and explained as under:
13
Tenth Edition
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“negligence ▪ n. failure to take proper care over
something. Law - breach of a duty of care which results
in damage.”
“neglect ▪ v. fail to give proper care or attention to. fail
to do something. ▪ n. the state or process of neglecting or
being neglected. failure to do something.”
12.2 Black’s Law Dictionary
14
defines “negligence”
as under:
“the omission to do something which a reasonable man,
guided by those ordinary considerations which
ordinarily regulate human affairs, would do, or the doing
of something which a reasonable and prudent man would
not do.”
12.3 P Ramanatha Aiyar’s Advanced Law Lexicon
15
defines “negligence” as:
“A coming short of the performance of duty
Failure to use the care that a reasonable and prudent
person would have used under the same or similar
circumstances.”
12.4 In Poonam Verma v. Ashwin Patel
16
, it was held:
“42. Negligence has many manifestations — it may be
active negligence, collateral negligence, comparative
negligence, concurrent negligence, continued
negligence, criminal negligence, gross negligence,
hazardous negligence, active and passive negligence,
wilful or reckless negligence or negligence per se, which
is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as under:
“Negligence per se.—Conduct, whether of
action or omission, which may be declared
14
https://www.latestlaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Blacks-Law-
Dictionery.pdf
15
Third Edition
16
(1996) 4 SCC 332
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and treated as negligence without any
argument or proof as to the particular
surrounding circumstances, either because it
is in violation of a statute or valid municipal
ordinance, or because it is so palpably
opposed to the dictates of common prudence
that it can be said without hesitation or doubt
that no careful person would have been
guilty of it. As a general rule, the violation of
a public duty, enjoined by law for the
protection of person or property, so
constitutes.””
12.5 In Rajkot Municipal Corpn. v. Manjulben
Jayantilal Nakum
17
, the concept of negligence was
explained in detail, as follows:-
“14. Negligence has been viewed in three ways. Firstly
involving a careless state of mind; secondly, a careless
conduct; and thirdly, a tort in itself. Every case giving
rise to tortious liability, consists of injury and damage
done due to negligence. Injury and damage may be
found due to breach of contract or tort. We are
concerned in this case with the injury and damage in
tort. Therefore, it is necessary to dwell, in depth, on
strict liability, absolute liability or special liability. In
the present case, the omission alleged is to take care of
periodical check-up of the condition of the trees. The
degree of liability depends upon the degree of mental
element. The elements of tort of negligence, therefore,
consist in (a) duty of care; (b) duty owed to the
plaintiff; and (c) it has been carelessly breached.
Negligence does not give rise to liability unless the law
fastens the duty of care in given circumstances. Duty is
an obligation recognised by law to avoid conduct
brought with unreasonable risk of damage to another.
17
(1997) 9 SCC 552
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The question whether duty consists in a particular
situation involves determination as a question of law.
15. Negligence would include both acts and omissions
involving unreasonable risk of having done harm to
another. The breach of duty must cause damage. How
much of the damage to be compensated by the
defendant should be attributed to his wilful conduct and
how much to his wilful negligence or careless conduct
or remissness in performance of duty, are all relevant
facts to be considered in a given act or omission in
adjudging duty of care. The element of carelessness or
the breach of duty and whether that duty is towards the
plaintiff or the class of persons to which the plaintiff
belongs are important components in tort of
negligence. Negligence would, therefore, mean
careless conduct in commission or omission of an act,
whereby another to whom the plaintiff owed duty of
care has suffered damage. The duty of care is crucial in
understanding the nature and scope of tort of
negligence. The question in each case is whether the
defendant has been negligent in the performance of
duty or omission thereof. Determination of duty of care
also involves statutory action which requires detailed
examination…”
12.6 This Court in Jay Laxmi Salt Works (P) Ltd. v.
State of Gujarat
18
, observed:
“14. … Law of torts, however, is not confined and
cannot be strictly categorised. Where the State
undertakes common law duty its actions may give rise
to common law tort. Negligence in performance of
duty is only a step to determine if action of Government
resulting in loss or injury to common man should not
go uncompensated…”
18
(1994) 4 SCC 1
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13. What we must now consider is whether, the Union of
India, through the concerned Railway, had a duty towards the
goods of the appellant. If only, the answer to this question is
in the affirmative, then can liability be fastened upon them
under Section 97 of the 1989 Act.
14. The proviso to Section 65(2) which we have
reproduced above provides that when the particulars of a
consignment being loaded are not verified by the Railway
employees, burden of proof in regard thereto shall apply on
the consignor, consignee or endorsee. For it to be established
that the Railway authorities were negligent, it has to be shown
that they had a duty of care. Had they, at any stage been
involved in the noting, counting or weighing of goods, thereby
being actively aware of the amount being transported by them,
then, it could be said that they had duty to ensure that the total
amount that they have counted or weighed, was the amount
they ought to safely transit to the end destination. This was
not the case.
15. The learned Single Judge has correctly observed that
the appellant has not provided any documents to show that a
particular number of bags were procured and processed and
then were being further sent for iodisation. In other words, the
burden of proof as per the proviso to Section 65(2) was not
C.A.No..of 2026 @ SLP(C)No.22748 of 2025 Page | 18
discharged. Once this burden had been discharged, only then
could we come to the question of there being any
negligence/misconduct on part of the Railways or its
employees if liability was to be fastened upon them despite
the fact that the same had been booked in the “owner’s risk”
category.
16. The appeal is dismissed. Pending application(s) if any
stands disposed of.
…………………………J.
(SANJAY KAROL)
………………………… .J.
(VIPUL M. PANCHOLI)
New Delhi;
July 16, 2026
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