2025 INSC 699

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3461 OF 2025

M/S. INTERSTATE CONSTRUCTION APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

NATIONAL PROJECTS CONSTRUCTION

CORPORATION LTD. RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

UJJAL BHUYAN, J.

This appeal by special leave is directed against the

judgment and order dated 01.08.2023 passed by the Division

Bench of the High Court of Delhi in FAO (OS) (Comm) No.175 of

2021.

2. It may be mentioned that by the aforesaid judgment

and order dated 01.08.2023 (impugned judgment), Division

2

Bench of the High Court of Delhi (High Court) allowed the

appeal of National Projects Construction Corporation Limited,

(NPCC) or the respondent hereinafter, filed under Section 37 of

the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (briefly ‘the 1996 Act’

hereinafter) setting aside that part of the judgment and order

dated 02.08.2021 passed by a learned Single Judge of the High

Court under Section 34 of the 1996 Act upholding the directions

contained in paragraph 58(b) of the award dated 28.10.2020 as

well as setting aside the directions of the arbitral tribunal as

contained in paragraph 58(b) of the said award.

3. Relevant facts may be briefly noted.

4. Respondent had engaged the services of the

appellant for executing a contract relating to Ramagundam

Super Thermal Power Project, Ramagundam, District

Karimnagar in the then composite State of Andhra Pradesh. In

this regard, two separate work orders were issued:

(i) Work order No.917344/838 dated 19.06.1984 in

respect of the work excavation of foundation package

work-II 3 X 500 MW of National Thermal Power

3

Corporation Limited, Ramagundam Super Thermal

Power Project;

(ii) Work Order No. 917344/2382 in respect of the work

foundation package work, stage-II, at Ramagundam

Super Thermal Power Project;

5. Thereafter, contract agreement was entered into

between the parties. As per clause 4 of the conditions of contract

read with clause 15 of the special conditions attached to the

work orders, all the disputes and differences between the

parties were to be settled by way of arbitration.

6. It is stated that appellant had completed the contract

work in the year 1987. Respondent had paid the appellant the

contractual dues after withholding certain sums on account of

recoveries. Appellant disputed such recoveries. Additionally,

appellant also raised certain claims which were not accepted by

the respondent.

7. In view of such disputes and differences, appellant

invoked the arbitration clause by issuing notice dated

17.05.1993.

4

8. Respondent did not take immediate steps for

appointment of an arbitrator. After considerable delay, by

communication dated 07.10.1997, respondent appointed Shri

Shivamoy Ghosh, Additional General Manager, NPCC, Madras

Sector, Chennai as the sole arbitrator to arbitrate on the subject

dispute.

9. Appellant filed statement of claims before the learned

arbitrator on 20.01.1998 claiming an aggregate amount of

Rs.4,46,29,404.00 along with pendente lite and future interest

at the rate of 24 percent per annum till final realization of the

amount.

10. Appellant sought for a direction from the learned

arbitrator to the respondent to supply various documents

related to the dispute. However, learned arbitrator only

permitted the appellant an opportunity to inspect the

documents and did not issue any direction to the respondent

for supply of copies.

11. Aggrieved thereby, appellant filed a petition under

Section 14 of the 1996 Act before the High Court seeking

5

termination of the mandate of the learned arbitrator and for

appointment of a new arbitrator in his place. This petition was

registered as OMP No. 214/2002. By order dated 11.10.2004,

learned Single Judge terminated the mandate of Shri Shivamoy

Ghosh and appointed Shri A.S. Chandhiok, Sr. Advocate, as the

sole arbitrator.

12. Respondent challenged the said order of the learned

Single Judge dated 11.10.2004 before the Division Bench of the

High Court in FAO (OS) No.241/2004. By order dated

02.02.2005, Division Bench appointed Shri L.R. Gupta, retired

Director General of CPWD as the sole arbitrator.

13. Before Shri L.R. Gupta, the learned arbitrator,

respondent while filing its reply to the statement of claims filed

by the appellant, also challenged the authority of one Shri

Jagdish Raj Yadav to file the claim on behalf of the appellant. In

this regard an application dated 23.02.2007 was filed before the

learned arbitrator. Learned arbitrator dismissed the said

application vide the order dated 03.08.2007.

6

14. The said order dated 03.08.2007 was challenged by

the respondent before the learned Single Judge of the High

Court by filing a petition under Section 34 of the 1996 Act, being

OMP No.537/2007.

15. It may be mentioned that Shri L.R. Gupta resigned

as the sole arbitrator on 23.06.2008.

16. Vide order dated 30.01.2007, learned Single Judge

disposed of the petition filed under Section 34 of the 1996 Act

bearing OMP No.537/2007.

17. Appellant filed a petition under Section 15 of the

1996 Act before the High Court being OMP (T) (Comm) No.

30/2018 seeking appointment of an arbitrator in place of Shri

L.R. Gupta who had resigned. The said petition was disposed of

by the learned Single Judge of the High Court vide order dated

31.05.2018 reconstituting the arbitral tribunal by appointing

Mr. Justice R.C. Jain, a former Judge of the High Court, as the

sole arbitrator to arbitrate on the disputes between the parties.

7

18. New arbitrator held the first hearing on 03.05.2019

and finally pronounced the award on 28.10.2020. While the

arbitral tribunal allowed the claims of the appellant under

several heads, we are concerned with the contentious part of

the award relating to payment of interest (claim No. 7) contained

in paragraph 58 of the award. Relevant portion contained in

paragraph 58 of the award reads as under:

58. *** *** *** ***

In a nutshell the claimant is held entitled to interest as

under:

a) Pre-reference / past period interest:

@ 18% per annum on a sum of Rs.34,43,490.61 w.e.f.

July 1987 up-till 19.01.1998.

b) Pendente lite interest:

i) @ 12% per annum w.e.f. 20.01.1998 uptill

31.12.2008 on the total amount (i.e. principal amount

+ the amount of interest on the pre-reference/past

period).

ii) @ 12% per annum w.e.f. 01.01.2017 till the date of

award on the total amount (i.e. principal amount + the

amount of interest for the pre-reference period and for

the period from 20.01.1998 till 31.12.2008).

c) Future interest:

8

@ 18% per annum from the date of the award till the

date of payment on the total amount (i.e. principal

amount + amount of interest on the pre-reference/past

period+ amount of interest pendente lite).

19. Respondent filed a petition under Section 34 of the

1996 Act before the Single Bench of the High Court for setting

aside the award dated 28.10.2020. The same was registered as

OMP (Comm) No. 78/2021. By the judgment and order dated

02.08.2021, learned Single Judge partly allowed the petition by

setting aside the award with regard to future interest at the rate

exceeding 9 percent per annum from the date of the award till

the date of payment.

20. Aggrieved by the judgment and order dated

02.08.2021 passed by the learned Single Judge, respondent

preferred an appeal under Section 37 of the 1996 Act before the

Division Bench of the High Court which was registered as FAO

(OS) (Comm) No. 175/2021. In the appeal, learned senior

counsel for the respondent (which was the appellant before the

Division Bench) clarified that the challenge would be restricted

to the directions issued by the arbitral tribunal insofar the issue

9

of interest was concerned. This was further clarified by

submitting that the challenge was not with respect to the rate

of interest or award of interest for the pre-reference/past period.

Grievance highlighted was against the directions contained in

sub-paragraph (b)(i) of paragraph 58 to the extent of the arbitral

tribunal stipulating that interest for the period mentioned

therein would be leviable not merely on the principal amount as

awarded but upon the said amount inclusive of the amount of

interest relating to the pre-reference/past period. Likewise,

arbitral tribunal awarded interest on identical terms in sub-

paragraph (b)(ii) of paragraph 58 which was objected to.

Division Bench of the High Court vide the judgment and order

dated 01.08.2023 (impugned judgment) allowed the appeal by

setting aside the directions contained in paragraph 58(b).

21. Aggrieved thereby, appellant filed the related SLP (C)

No.23235/2023 before this Court. By order dated 19.10.2023,

this Court issued notice. In the hearing held on 25.02.2025,

leave was granted.

10

22. Though there is no challenge by either parties to the

award on merit, challenge of the respondent being confined only

to the interest part, nonetheless, to have a complete picture, it

would be appropriate to mention the claims of the appellant and

the corresponding amounts awarded by the arbitral tribunal.

The following statement in tabular form will throw light on the

amounts claimed by the appellant and the amounts awarded by

the arbitral tribunal under sixteen heads of claim. The tabular

statement is as under:

Claim

No.

Particulars Amount

Claimed

Amount

Awarded

(a) Escalation at 10% for work

order 48/4

Rs.20,71,322.0

0

Rs.20,71,322

.00

(b) Escalation at 10% for work

order 47/11

Rs.1,84,418. 77 Rs.1,84,418.

77

(c) Refund of panel recovery of

steel taking 5% of scrap

wastage in place of 3%

wastage: -

I) Steel difference

II) M.S. Found Steel

III) 12 Dia M.S.

IV) Structural Steel

V) Steel Plates

VI) Scrap made in labour

rates

Rs.1,75, 132.00

Rs. 1,806.42

Rs. 68,750.00

Rs. 2,513.28

Rs. 2,649.84

Rs.12,000.00

Total Rs.2,62,850.70 Rs.1,82,463.

70

d) Unreasonable recoveries:-

i) Cribes

ii) Shutter plates

Rs. 3,747.75

Rs. 38,322.65

11

iii) B.F.P. Hire charges for

shutter plates

iv) B.F.P. Hire charges for

shutter plates

v) Refund of 28%

overhead supply for metal

vi) Dozer recovery for work

order No. 48/4

vii) Cubes failure

(never given in writing of any

cube failure of any member)

viii) Chain pulley

block (not with us)

ix) Clamps (already

returned)

x) Pipes (already

returned)

Rs. 15,776.31

Rs. 64,521.00

Rs. 60,833.00

Rs. 10,676.00

Rs. 34,701.92

Rs. 8,000.00

Rs. 14,990.00

Rs. 89,353.00

Total Rs.3,40,921.63 Rs.60,833.00

e) Work order by other agencies

but not in our scope like

plastering etc.

Rs.84,447.00 Rs.84,447.00

f) Held amounts:-

i) Amount held on account

of grouting T.G.

ii) Amount held on account

of grouting C.E.P.

iii) Staging held amount of

T.G.

iv) Work order No. 48/4

withheld amount

v) Work Order No. 47/11

withheld amount

vi) Work Order No. 48/4

shutter plates held

vii) Curing held amount

48/4

viii) Work order No.48/4

E.S.P. rectification held

amount

ix) Work order No.48/4

T.G. held amount for final

shape.

Rs.3,95,000.00

Rs.20,000.00

Rs.3,09,203.14

Rs.43,000.00

Rs.51,803.00

Rs.23,000.00

Rs.3,000.00

Rs.10,000.00

Rs.5,000.00

Total Rs.8,60,004.14 Rs.8,60,004.

14

12

g) Balance payable in bills

i) Payable in bills 47/11

ii) S.D. 47/11 total balance

iii) Work order No. 48/4

money payable in bills

Rs.64,376.76

Rs.2,02,870.00

Rs.84,000.00

Total Rs.3,51,246.76

h) Difference in excavation Rs.1,31,464.00

i) Booking of C.E.P. in package-

IV as agreed by E.D.S.R.

differences

Rs.17,690.00

j) Claims of not allotting quarry

as agreed by E.D.S.R.

Rs.2,66,000.00

k) 1200 M3 of stone aggregate

from Karim Nagar for

rate differences of Rs. 70/-

M

3

extra and the claim

was agreed by EDSR referred

to our letter ISC/ Claims/1

Dt.14.10.89 para III.

Rs.13,40,000.0

0

l) Idle labour charges refer

our letter ISC/Claims/1 dt.

14.10.89, para IV

Rs.4,81,000.00

m) 2% interest rate difference on

mobilization advance.

Rs.50,000.00

n) Interest on delayed release of

S.D. refer para 9 of our letter

ISC/Claims/1 dt. 14.10.89.

Rs.2,40,000.00

o) Mental anguishes, torture

and loss of social status

suffered refer Letter No. ISC/

Claims/1 dt. 14.10.89 para

II.

Rs.60,00,000.0

0

p) Addl. 24% interest for 10.5

years w.e.f. July 1987 upto

Dec. 1997.

Rs.3,19,57,039.

0

Total Rs.4,46,38,404.

00

Rs.34,43,490

.61

23. We have already extracted the nature of interest

payment provided in the award dated 28.10.2020. However, for

13

ready reference, interest awarded to the appellant by the

arbitral tribunal may once again be noted which is as under:

(a) Pre-reference/past period interest at the rate of

18% per annum on the sum of Rs. 34,43,490.61

with effect from July 1987 uptill 19.01.1998.

(b) Pendente lite interest at the rate of 12% per

annum with effect from 20.01.1998 uptill

31.12.2008 on the total amount (that is, principal

amount plus the amount of interest for the pre-

reference/past period).

(c) Pendente lite interest at the rate of 12% per

annum with effect from 01.01.2017 till the date of

the award on the total amount (that is, principal

amount plus the amount of interest on the pre-

reference period and for the period from 20.01.1998

till 31.12.2008).

(d) Future interest at the rate of 18% per annum

from the date of the award till the date of payment

on the total amount (that is, principal amount

added to the amount of interest for the pre-

reference/past period and interest pendente lite).

23.1. While holding that appellant was entitled to award of

interest for the pre-reference period i.e. from the date on which

the cause of action arose till filing of the claim before the arbitral

14

tribunal as well as for the pendente lite period and also for the

future period, arbitral tribunal agreed with the respondent that

no interest should be awarded to the appellant for the period

when there was absolute laches on the part of the appellant.

Arbitral tribunal held that for the period from 01.01.2009 till

31.12.2016, that is for a period of about eight years, there was

complete laches on the part of the appellant. Therefore, the

arbitral tribunal declared that appellant would not be entitled

to any interest for the aforesaid period.

24. Respondent filed a petition under Section 34 of the

1996 Act before the High Court impugning the arbitral award

dated 28.10.2020. Vide the judgment and order dated

02.08.2021, learned Single Judge upheld the claims awarded

by the arbitral tribunal. On the question of interest, learned

Single Judge framed the question as to whether interest

awarded by the arbitral tribunal was exorbitant and

unsustainable. Learned Single Judge held that arbitral

tribunal’s decision to award pre-reference interest at the rate of

18 percent per annum did not warrant any interference. As

15

regards pendente lite interest, learned Single Judge while noting

that arbitral tribunal had awarded 12 percent interest per

annum for the period from 20.01.1998 till 31.12.2008 and

again from 01.01.2017 till 28.10.2020, justified the decision of

the arbitral tribunal not to award interest for the period from

01.01.2009 to 31.12.2016 as during this period the appellant

was remiss and did not pursue its claim before the arbitral

tribunal diligently. On the rate of interest, learned Single Judge

held that interest at the rate of 12 percent per annum could not

by any stretch be considered to be exorbitant or unreasonable

but held that 18 percent future interest from the date of the

award till the date of payment granted by the arbitral tribunal

was ex facie erroneous as according to learned Single Judge the

interest rate should have been 2 percent higher than the

current rate of interest prevalent on the date of the award.

Therefore, this portion of the award was set aside by the learned

Single Judge; instead learned Single Judge awarded future

interest holding that it could not have been in excess of 9

percent per annum. Therefore, learned Single Judge partly

16

allowed the petition under Section 34 of the 1996 Act to the

extent of setting aside the award of future interest at a rate

exceeding 9 percent per annum from the date of the award till

the date of payment.

25. This brings us to the impugned judgment and order

dated 01.08.2023. We have already noted about the limited

nature of challenge made by the respondent during the hearing

of the appeal filed under Section 37 of the 1996 Act. Learned

senior counsel appearing for the respondent clarified that the

challenge to the award stood restricted to the directions issued

by the arbitral tribunal insofar the issue of interest was

concerned. He clarified that the challenge was not with respect

to either the rate at which interest was awarded or the grant of

interest for the pre-reference/past period. The grievance was

confined to the directions contained in paragraph 58(b)(i) of the

award and the similar nature of interest in paragraph 58(b)(ii)

inasmuch as the arbitral tribunal proceeded to award interest

on identical terms: on the principal amount plus the amount of

interest for the pre-reference/past period. Division Bench

17

referred to Section 31(7)(a) and (b) of the 1996 Act as well as

placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Sayeed Ahmed

and Company Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh

1 and came to the

following two conclusions:

i) Section 31(7) recognizes only two periods for which

interest may be awarded. The two periods are, firstly from

the date on which the cause of action arose till passing of

the award and secondly from the date of the award till

actual payment. Therefore, the distinction between pre-

reference/past period and pendente lite period no longer

existed. The period from the date of cause of action i.e.

July, 1987 till the date of the award dated 28.10.2020

would constitute the period contemplated under Section

31(7)(a) of the 1996 Act. The period commencing from the

date of award till payment would be the second period

within the meaning of Section 31(7)(b) of the 1996 Act.

Therefore, the arbitral tribunal committed an illegality in

awarding interest for three periods: pre-reference/past

periods, pendente lite and for the future period.

ii) Arbitral tribunal committed further illegality in

forging the principal amount with interest as would be

evident from paragraph 58(b) of the award. Interest

awarded for the pre-reference period as well as for the

pendente lite period have been subjected to further levy

1

(2009) 12 SCC 26

18

of interest for the said periods by adding the interest

amount with the principal amount awarded. This

amounted to levying compound interest which is

impermissible. Accordingly, the directions contained in

paragraph 58(b) were set aside by the Division Bench.

26. In our considered view, the reasonings given by the

Division Bench are fallacious. We say so for the reasons

mentioned hereunder.

27. Section 31 of the 1996 Act is the relevant provision.

It deals with the form and contents of arbitral award. Section

31 has eight sub-sections. Sub-section (7) is central to the

debate and after the amendment with retrospective effect from

23.10.2015 read as under:

31. Form and contents of arbitral award -

* * * * *

(7)(a) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties,

where and in so far as an arbitral award is for the

payment of money, the arbitral tribunal may

include in the sum for which the award is made

interest, at such rate as it deems reasonable, on

the whole or any part of the money, for the whole

or any part of the period between the date on

19

which the cause of action arose and the date on

which the award is made.

(b) A sum directed to be paid by an arbitral award

shall, unless the award otherwise directs, carry

interest at the rate of two per cent higher than

the current rate of interest prevalent on the date

of award, from the date of award to the date of

payment.

27.1. Before substitution and prior to 23.10.2015, clause

(b) of sub-section (7) of Section 31 stood thus:

(b) A sum directed to be paid by an arbitral award

shall, unless the award otherwise directs, carry interest

at the rate of eighteen per centum per annum from the

date of the award to the date of payment.

28. We now come to the analysis of Section 31(7), both

clauses (a) and (b). For the time being we concentrate on clause

(a) insofar it deals with the period for which interest may be

awarded. A reading of clause (a) reveals that interest may be for

the whole or any part of the period between the date on which

the cause of action arose and the date on which the award is

made. In real terms it means the period from the date on which

the cause of action arose till filing of the claim petition by the

20

claimant and from the date of filing of the claim petition till the

date of the award. Division Bench of the High Court relied upon

Sayeed Ahmed and Company (supra) wherein this Court

analyzed Section 31(7) of the 1996 Act and opined that the

difference between pre-reference period and pendente lite period

has disappeared insofar award of interest by the arbitrator is

concerned. The said section now recognizes only two periods

and makes the following provision:

i) In regard to the period between the date on which the

cause of action arose and the date on which the award is

made (pre-reference period + pendente lite), the arbitral

tribunal may award interest at such rate as it deems

reasonable for the whole or any part of the period unless

otherwise agreed by the party;

ii) For the period from the date of award to the date of

payment, interest at the rate of 18 percent per annum

(this is in reference to the pre 23.10.2015 position) if no

specific order is made in regard to interest; however, the

arbitrator may award interest at a different rate for the

period between the date of award and the date of payment.

29. Based on the aforesaid decision, the Division Bench

held that it was not open for the arbitral tribunal to have carved

out three periods for payment of interest: pre -reference,

21

pendente lite and future when the statute provides for only two

periods: first period being the period between the date on which

the cause of action arose and the date on which the award is

made and the second period is from the date of the award till

the date of payment.

30. We are unable to agree with the view expressed by

the Division Bench. Even in Sayeed Ahmed and Company

(supra) relied upon by the Division Bench, the Bench held that

Section 31(7) had carved out two periods, the first period being

from the date on which the cause of action arose till the date on

which the award is made and the second period being from the

date of award till the date of payment. As regards the first period,

the Bench clarified that it includes the pre-reference period plus

pendente lite period. Though the arbitral tribunal had granted

interest for three periods: pre-reference period, pendente lite

and post award period, the first two period basically comprises

of the period contemplated under clause (a) of sub-section (7) of

Section 31. It is another matter that the arbitral tribunal

awarded varying degrees of interest for the two sub-periods: 18

22

percent per annum for the pre-reference period and 12 percent

as pendente lite, excluding from the said period, the period of

eight years when the appellant was found to be re miss in

pursuing its claims before the arbitral tribunal. This is also

permissible as we shall explain.

31. Therefore, Sayeed Ahmed and Company (supra) does

not exclude or does not say that interest should not be granted

for the pre-reference period. All that it explains is that Section

31(7)(a) has joined the two periods of interest: pre-reference and

pendente lite.

32. This position has been clarified by a recent decision

of this Court in Pam Developments Private Limited Vs. State of

West Bengal

2. After extracting Section 31(7) of the 1996 Act, this

Court held that power of the arbitrator to grant pre-reference

interest, pendente lite interest and post award interest under

Section 31(7) of the 1996 is now fairly well settled. The Bench,

thereafter, culled out the following legal propositions in this

2

(2024) 10 SCC 715

23

regard highlighting the difference in the position of law qua the

Arbitration Act, 1940 vis-à-vis the 1996 Act:

23. The power of the arbitrator to grant pre -

reference interest, pendente lite interest, and post-

award interest under Section 31(7) of the Act is

fairly well-settled. The judicial determinations also

highlight the difference in the position of law under

the Arbitration Act, 1940. The following propositions

can be summarised from a survey of these cases:

23.1. Under the Arbitration Act, 1940, there was

no specific provision that empowered an arbitrator

to grant interest. However, through judicial

pronouncements, this Court has affirmed the

power of the arbitrator to grant pre-reference,

pendente lite, and post-award interest on the

rationale that a person who has been deprived of

the use of money to which he is legitimately

entitled has a right to be compensated for the same.

When the agreement does not prohibit the grant of

interest and a party claims interest, it is presumed

that interest is an implied term of the agreement,

and, therefore, the arbitrator has the power to

decide the same.

23.2. Under the 1940 Act, this Court has adopted

a strict construction of contractual clauses that

prohibit the grant of interest and has held that the

24

arbitrator has the power to award interest unless

there is an express, specific provision that excludes

the jurisdiction of the arbitrator from awarding

interest for the dispute in question.

23.3. Under the 1996 Act, the power of the

arbitrator to grant interest is governed by the

statutory provision in Section 31(7). This provision

has two parts. Under clause (a), the arbitrator can

award interest for the period between the date of

cause of action to the date of the award, unless

otherwise agreed by the parties . Clause (b)

provides that unless the award directs otherwise,

the sum directed to be paid by an arbitral award

shall carry interest @ 2% higher than the current

rate of interest, from the date of the award to the

date of payment (referring to the post 23.10.2015

position).

23.4. The wording of Section 31(7)(a) marks a

departure from the Arbitration Act, 1940 in two

ways : first, it does not make an explicit distinction

between pre-reference and pendente lite interest as

both of them are provided for under this sub -

section; second, it sanctifies party autonomy and

restricts the power to grant pre-reference and

pendente lite interest the moment the agreement

bars payment of interest, even if it is not a specific

bar against the arbitrator.

25

23.5. The power of the arbitrator to award pre-

reference and pendente lite interest is not

restricted when the agreement is silent on whether

interest can be awarded or does not contain a

specific term that prohibits the same.

23.6. While pendente lite interest is a matter of

procedural law, pre-reference interest is governed

by substantive law. Therefore, the grant of pre-

reference interest cannot be sourced solely in

Section 31(7)(a) (which is a procedural law), but

must be based on an agreement between the

parties (express or implied), statutory provision

(such as Section 3 of the Interest Act, 1978), or

proof of mercantile usage.

24. In view of the above, the High Court had no

reason to interfere with the arbitral award with

respect to grant of pre-reference interest, since the

contract between the parties does not prohibit the

same.

33. This position has been further explained by a recent

decision of this Bench in North Delhi Municipal Corporation Vs.

S.A. Builders Ltd.

3. After adverting to Section 31(7) of the 1996

Act, this Court explained as under:

3

(2024) SCC Online SC 3768

26

36.1. From a minute reading of sub-section (7), it is seen

that it has got two parts: the first part i.e. clause (a) deals

with passing of award which would include interest up to

the date on which the award is made. The second part i.e.

clause (b) deals with grant of interest on the ‘sum’

awarded by the arbitral tribunal.

33.1. Thereafter the Bench observed that under Section

31(7) of the 1996 Act, an arbitral tribunal has the power to grant

– (i) pre-award (ii) pendente lite (iii) post-award interest. The

Bench explained the reason for award of such interest in the

following manner:

39. Generally, going by the provisions contained in

Section 31(7) of the 1996 Act, it is evident that an arbitral

tribunal has the power to grant (i) pre-award (ii) pendente

lite (iii) post-award interest. Intention behind awarding

pre-award interest is primarily to compensate the

claimant for the pecuniary loss suffered from the time the

cause of action arose till passing of the arbitral award.

Further, this is also to ensure that the arbitral proceeding

is concluded within a reasonable period to minimise the

impact of the pre -award interest as well as

interest pendente lite; thereby promoting efficiency in the

arbitration process. Similarly, grant of post-award

interest also serves a salutary purpose. It primarily acts

27

as a disincentive to the award debtor not to delay

payment of the arbitral amount to the award holder.

34. Thus, what Section 31(7)(a) has done is that there is

now a statutory recognition of the power of the arbitral tribunal

to grant pre-reference interest from the date on which the cause

of action arose till the date on which the award is made. There

was a vacuum in the Arbitration Act, 1940 as there was no such

provision for granting pre-reference interest. It was through

judicial pronouncements that such power of the arbitrator to

grant pre-reference interest was conferred. Now under Section

31(7)(a) of the 1996 Act, such power is statutorily recognized.

35. Let us revert back to clause (a) of sub-section (7) of

Section 31 of the 1996 Act. A careful and minute reading of this

provision will make it clear that the arbitral tribunal has the

discretion to include in the sum awarded interest at such rate

as it deems reasonable on the whole or any part of the money

awarded for the whole or any part of the period from the date

on which the cause of action arose till the date on which the

award is made. We may exclude that part of the sentence ‘on

28

the whole or any part of the money’ from our analysis since this

is not relevant to the controversy. If we exclude this portion,

what then becomes discernible is that the arbitral tribunal has

the discretion to include in the sum awarded : firstly, interest at

such rate as it deems reasonable; and secondly, for the whole or

any part of the period between the date on which the cause of

action arose and the date on which the award is made. This

would mean that the arbitral tribunal can exclude a period from

the date on which the cause of action arose till the date on

which the award is made for the purpose of grant of interest, as

has been done in the present case. It would also mean that the

arbitral tribunal can grant interest for the whole or any part of

the period between the date on which the cause of action arose

and the date on which the award is made. It can be a composite

period or the said period can be further sub-divided, as done in

the present case i.e. from the date of cause of action to filing of

the claim and from the date of filing of the claim till the date of

the award excluding the period when the appellant was found

to be remiss. It would also mean that there can be one rate of

29

interest for the whole period or one or more rates of interest for

the sub-divided periods as has been done in the instant case.

In our opinion, this would be the correct approach to interpret

Section 31(7)(a), given the scheme of the 1996 Act.

36. That being the position, we are of the view that the

Division Bench had fallen in error by holding that the arbitral

tribunal had no jurisdiction to award interest for two periods i.e.

pre-reference and pendente lite when the statute provides for

only one period viz. from the date when the cause of action arose

till the date of the award. The view expressed by the High Court

is not the correct interpretation of Section 37(1)(a) of the 1996

Act as explained by us supra as well as in Pam Developments

Private Limited (supra) and S.A. Builders Ltd. (supra).

37. This brings us to the second issue on which the High

Court set aside the directions of the arbitral tribunal contained

in paragraph 58(b) of the award. According to the Division

Bench, the arbitral tribunal had committed an illegality in

forging the principal amount with interest while computing the

awarded amount on which future interest is to be paid. Interest

30

awarded for the past period could not have been subjected to

further levy of interest during the pendente lite or post award

period on merger with the principal amount as this would

amount to levy of compound interest.

38. This aspect of the matter is no longer res integra.

39. In State of Haryana Vs. S.L. Arora

4, a two-Judge

Bench of this Court observed that as regards pre-award period,

interest has to be awarded as specified in the contract and in

the absence of any contract, as per the discretion of the arbitral

tribunal. However, with regard to the post-award period, the

interest is payable as per the discretion of the arbitral tribunal

and in the absence of exercise of such discretion, at the

mandatory statutory rate of 18 percent per annum. Award of

interest like award of cost are ancillary matters. Therefore, the

expressions sum for which the award is made and the sum

directed to be paid by an arbitral award contextually refers to

the award on the substantive claims and not ancillary or

4

(2010) 3 SCC 690

31

consequential directions relating to interest or cost. It was held

that arbitral tribunals did not have the power to award interest

upon interest or compound interest either for the pre-award

period or for the post-award period.

40. A three-Judge Bench of this Court i n Hyder

Consulting (UK) Ltd. Vs. Governor, State of Orissa

5

, opined that

it was not possible to agree with the conclusion in S.L.

Arora (supra) that Section 31(7) of the 1996 Act does not require

that interest which accrues till the date of the award be included

in the sum from the date of the award for calculating the post-

award interest. Justice Bobde (as His Lordship then was)

authoring the majority opinion was of the view that the

conclusion reached in S.L. Arora (supra) did not seem to be in

consonance with the clear language of Section 31(7) of the 1996

Act. Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd. (supra) declared that S.L.

Arora (supra) was wrongly decided in that it held that a sum

directed to be paid by an arbitral tribunal and the reference to

the award on the substantive claim did not refer to

5

(2015) 2 SCC 189

32

interest pendente lite awarded on the sum directed to be paid

upon award and that in the absence of any provision of interest

upon interest in the contract, the arbitral tribunal did not have

the power to award interest upon interest or compound interest

either for the pre-award period or for the post-award period. It

has been clarified that the ‘sum’ includes the principal as

adjudged together with the interest granted.

41. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in UHL Power

Company Ltd. Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh

6 declared that the

judgment in S.L. Arora (supra) has since been overruled by a

three-Judge Bench of this Court in Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd.

(supra). The majority view in Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd. (supra)

is that post-award interest can be granted by an arbitrator on

the interest amount awarded.

42. This view was reiterated by this Court in subsequent

decisions (please see Delhi Airport Metro Express Private Ltd. Vs.

6

(2022) 4 SCC 116

33

Delhi Metro Rail Corporation

7 and Morgan Securities and Credits

Private Ltd. Vs. Videocon Industries Limited

8).

43. Finally, in S.A. Builders (supra), this Bench after a

thorough analysis of Section 31(7)(a) and Section 31(7)(b) of the

1996 Act came to the following conclusion:

38. Natural corollary to the above analysis would be that

the ‘sum’ so awarded by the arbitral tribunal which may

include interest from the date when the cause of action

arose to the date of the award, would carry further

interest of 18 percent from the date of the award to the

date of payment unless the arbitral award otherwise

directs (referring to the pre 23.10.2015 position). Thus,

the legislative intent is that the awarded sum whether

inclusive of interest or not, in case included, then from

the date of cause of action to the date of award, would

carry further interest from the date of the award to the

date of payment.

44. It has been held that the sum awarded would mean

the principal amount plus the interest awarded from the date of

cause of action upto the date of the award. The sum awarded in

Section 31(7)(a) would mean principal amount plus the interest

7

(2022) 9 SCC 286

8

(2023) 1 SCC 602

34

awarded. Thereafter, as per Section 31(7)(b) of the 1996 Act, the

sum (principal amount + interest) would carry further interest

at the rate of 2 per cent higher than the current rate of interest

prevalent on the date of the award to the date of payment.

45. Therefore, in view of the clear legal position

delineated as above, impugned judgment of the Division Bench

dated 01.08.2023 cannot be sustained.

46. Thus, having regard to the discussions made above,

impugned judgment and order dated 01.08.2023 passed by the

Division Bench of the High Court is hereby set aside. Civil

appeal is accordingly allowed. However, there shall be no order

as to cost.

………………………………J.

[ABHAY S. OKA]

.……………………………J.

[UJJAL BHUYAN]

NEW DELHI;

MAY 15, 2025.