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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

BENCH AT AURANGABAD

WRIT PETITION NO. 606 OF 2026

M/s. MVV Satyanarayan

A registered Partnership Firm,

Through its Authorized Signatory,

Mr. Niel S/o. Kakasaheb Patil,

Age: 42 years, Occu.: Project Manager,

R/o.C/o.6-1-136/3M, Flat No.101

Meher Ratna Complex, Balram Colony,

Padmarraonagar, Secunderabad-500025 … Petitioner

VERSYUS

1. The General Manager,

Central Railway, D.N. Road,

Mumbai CSMT - 400001

2. The Chief Administrative Officer (Const.),

Central Railway, New Administrative Building

6

th

Floor, D.N. Road,

Mumbai, CSMT – 400001.

3.The Chief Engineer/C/Central CSMT

Chief Administrative Officer (c)’s Office

Central Railway, New Administrative Building

6

th

Floor, D.N. Road,

Mumbai, CSMT -400001 … Respondents

…...

Mr. Prasadrao Vemulapalli, Advocate h/f Mr. A.A. Fulfagar,Advocate for

Petitioner

Mr. N.S. Salunke, Advocate for Respondents No.1 to 3

…...

CORAM : SMT. VIBHA KANKANWADI AND

HITEN S. VENEGAVKAR, JJ.

RESERVED ON : 13 MARCH, 2026

PRONOUNCED ON : 27 MARCH,2026 2026:BHC-AUG:13099-DB

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JUDGMENT/ORDER [Per Hiten S. Venegavkar, J.] :-

1. Rule. Rule is made returnable forthwith. With the consent of the

parties, the petition is taken up for final disposal.

2. The present Writ Petition is filed under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India by a partnership firm, M/s. MVV Satyanarayan,

registered at Hyderabad, acting through its authorized signatory

(hereinafter referred to as 'the petitioner'), against Respondent No.1 –

the General Manager, Central Railway; Respondent No.2 – the Chief

Administrative Officer (Construction), Central Railway; and Respondent

No.3 – the Chief Engineer (Construction)/Central, Chhatrapati Shivaji

Maharaj Terminus, Mumbai (hereinafter collectively referred to as 'the

respondent railway authorities').

3. By way of the present petition, the petitioner challenges the

communication dated 13.11.2025 issued by Respondent No.3, whereby

a decision was taken to part terminate the contract/agreement dated

17.08.2024, and further challenges the termination notice dated

02.12.2025, on the grounds that the said actions are arbitrary, illegal,

and contrary to the principles of natural justice. The petitioner has also

prayed for a direction permitting it to complete the balance work as per

the petitioner's letter dated 6th December 2025 and for a further

direction to the respondents to release the payments for the work

executed by the petitioner till date.

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4. The factual matrix as pleaded by the petitioner in its memo of

petition is as follows. The petitioner is a duly registered partnership firm

based at Hyderabad and has been carrying on business since

03.09.1984. The petitioner claims to have been engaged in the field of

civil contract works for Indian Railways, both Central and various State

Governments and their instrumentalities, for over four and a half

decades, with what it describes as an immaculate track record in

meeting exact specifications and completing work within targeted

timelines. In the process, it is stated that the petitioner has acquired

specialized skills in the construction of bridges and other works for

Indian Railways.

5. It is the case of the petitioner that Respondent No.2 had invited

tenders for the construction of balance minor and major bridges at

various places, construction of Road Under Bridges (RUBs) and drain

works in connection with the Ahmednagar–Beed–Parli Vaidyanath New

Broad Gauge Line Project, by issuing a Tender Notice dated 19.01.2024.

The petitioner's tender was accepted by Respondent No.3, who issued a

Letter of Acceptance dated 30.04.2024. Thereafter, an agreement came

to be executed between Respondent No.2 and the petitioner on

17.08.2024. As per the terms of the Letter of Acceptance, the initial

value of the work was Rs.3,74,65,7193/- (Rupees Thirty Seven Crores

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Forty Six Lakhs Fifty Seven Thousand One Hundred and Ninety Three

only). The work was to be completed within twelve calendar months

from the date of the Letter of Acceptance, making the completion date

on or before 29.04.2025. Upon completion of the work, the petitioner

was also obligated to provide a maintenance period of twelve calendar

months, including through the monsoon season, under the defect

liability clause.

6. The petitioner further states that in terms of the Letter of

Acceptance, the Earnest Money Deposit (EMD) of Rs.20,66,500/-

submitted by the petitioner along with the tender document was to be

retained by the respondents as part payment of security deposit until

the liability period was over. In addition, the respondents were entitled

to deduct and recover an amount equivalent to 6% of each running bill

until the amount so deducted and recovered reached 5% of the contract

value towards the balance security deposit. The petitioner contends

that, as a consequence of these deductions, the respondents hold a sum

of approximately Rs.2.66 crores belonging to the petitioner. The

petitioner has also furnished a Bank Guarantee towards a Performance

Guarantee for an amount of Rs.1,87,32,859.67 issued by the Bank of

Maharashtra, the validity of which, according to the respondents, has

been extended up to 25.06.2026.

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7. The petitioner submits that upon receipt of the Letter of

Acceptance, it mobilized and deployed the necessary men, machinery,

and material to the site and commenced work with due earnestness so

as to complete it within the agreement period. It is further submitted

that during the execution of the work, due to prevailing site conditions,

certain additional quantities and extra items became necessary, on

account of which two supplemental agreements were entered into

between the parties, whereby the value of the work was increased to

Rs.54,85,03,233.53/- (Rupees Fifty Four Crores Eighty Five Lakhs Three

Thousand Two Hundred and Thirty Three and paise Fifty Three),

representing an increase of approximately 46 to 50% over the original

contract value. Consequent upon the increase in quantities and the

change in the scope of work, coupled with prevailing site conditions, the

completion period was also extended from time to time without the

imposition of any penalty, and the agreement was stated to be valid

through 31.03.2026. The petitioner contends that the extension of time

without any penalty is itself indicative of the fact that the delay in

completion of work was not attributable to the petitioner but was on

account of factors beyond its control.

8. As per the case of the petitioner, work to the tune of

approximately Rs.46 crores has been executed, out of which the

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petitioner has been paid an amount of Rs.38,95,69,185/- and that work

valued at approximately Rs.7.5 crores is yet to be measured, recorded

and paid for. The petitioner further contends that during the execution

of work, without the consent of the petitioner and without any formal

amendment to the agreement, certain works forming part of the scope

of work under the agreement dated 17.08.2024 were awarded by the

respondents to other agencies. Some of these offloaded works,

according to the petitioner, were crucial for the completion of the

petitioner's own scope, including the laying of the deck slab on the

major bridge. While the work was in progress, the petitioner alleges

that for extraneous reasons, Respondent No.3 issued a series of show-

cause and adverse notices in order to arm-twist and compel the

petitioner not to raise complaints about the unauthorized offloading of

works to what the petitioner describes as 'blue-eyed boys', without

entering into formal agreements with those agencies.

9. It is the case of the petitioner that without regard to the

prevailing site conditions and the progress of work, a communication

dated 13.11.2025 was issued by Respondent No.3 through which the

administration took a decision to 'part terminate' the work awarded to

the petitioner, which the petitioner describes as unheard of in the annals

of contract management. A Seven Days' Notice was issued on

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19.11.2025, followed by a 48-Hours' notice on 27.11.2025, and finally

the agreement was terminated by way of a Termination Notice dated

02.12.2025. The petitioner submits that the managing partner was out

of the country at the relevant time and returned only on 29.11.2025,

which is stated to be one of the reasons for not replying to the show-

cause notices. Feeling aggrieved by what it terms an illegal termination,

the petitioner has approached this Court invoking its jurisdiction under

Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

10.The learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner has

advanced the following arguments in support of the petition. It is firstly

argued that the reasons assigned in the communications dated

13.11.2025 and 02.12.2025 are absolutely contrary to the actual site

conditions and hence cannot be sustained. It is further argued that as on

13.11.2025, the petitioner still had more than 140 days remaining to

complete the balance work, and even as on the date of issuance of the

final termination notice on 02.12.2025, there were more than 100 days

remaining, which made the action of part termination and eventual

termination completely unwarranted and deserving of interference by

this Court. It is also submitted that since certain works were offloaded

by the respondents to other agencies without the consent of the

petitioner, the failure of those other agencies to complete the offloaded

work cannot be fastened as a liability upon the petitioner.

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11.The learned Advocate for the petitioner further argues that the

allegations made in the letters dated 13.11.2025 and 02.12.2025 are

trivial in nature and that most of the works were actually in progress at

the relevant point of time, and hence did not warrant either part

termination or full termination. He argues with vehemence that both

the communications dated 13.11.2025 and 02.12.2025 were issued in

gross violation of the principles of natural justice as the petitioner was

never afforded an adequate opportunity of being heard before the

impugned decisions were taken. He contends that the petitioner had

sufficient time remaining to complete the contracted work within the

extended period of validity of the agreement, namely, 31.03.2026, and

therefore the impugned communications are bad in law. He further

argues that some of the works offloaded to third agencies were a pre-

condition for the petitioner to take up and complete its allotted work,

and therefore, the non-completion of the offloaded work by those third

agencies cannot be attributed to the petitioner, nor can the petitioner be

held liable for any resultant delay. He submits that even at the time of

filing of the present petition, sufficient time remained for the balance

contract work to be completed, and if permitted by this Court, the

petitioner is ready and willing to complete the work within the balance

days. In support of this submission, he draws the attention of this Court

to the letter dated 06.12.2025 addressed by the petitioner to the

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respondent authorities expressing its desire to complete the work within

the balance period.

12.On the question of maintainability of the writ petition, the

learned Advocate for the petitioner acknowledges that the contract

agreement contains an arbitration clause but argues that the reliefs

sought in the present petition are declaratory and consequential in

nature, and if relegated to arbitration, it would consume substantial

time, during which the material already present at the site would get

damaged and rendered unusable, thereby causing irreparable harm to

the petitioner. He also argues that the primary challenge in the present

petition is to the termination order on the grounds of violation of the

principles of natural justice, which is a public law remedy and is

cognizable by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. In

support of the maintainability of the writ petition, the learned Advocate

places heavy reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of

India in the case of Union of India & Ors. v. Tantia Construction Pvt.

Ltd., (2011) 5 SCC 697, which is also a railway contract case, wherein

the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that an alternative remedy, including

the existence of an arbitration clause in a contract, is not an absolute

bar to the invocation of the writ jurisdiction of the High Court or the

Supreme Court, and that such a petition is maintainable.

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13.The learned Advocate appearing for the respondent railway

authorities has advanced arguments in support of the action taken and

in support of the impugned orders. He submits that the termination

order dated 02.12.2025 has been issued strictly in accordance with the

terms and conditions of the contract agreement and after duly following

the process of law as contemplated therein. He states that the

respondents had invited tenders for the completion of the subject work

and, after accepting the tender of the petitioner, issued a Letter of

Acceptance as per standard procedure and thereafter executed the

contract agreement in accordance with the General Conditions of

Contract (GCC). The completion period, maintenance period, retention

of EMD amount, deduction of security deposit, and the performance

guarantee are all strictly in terms of the contract agreement and the

Letter of Acceptance dated 30.04.2024. He further states that the

validity of the performance guarantee in the form of a Bank Guarantee

of the Bank of Maharashtra has been extended up to 25.06.2026.

14.The learned Advocate for the respondents further submits that it

was the sole and primary responsibility of the petitioner to deploy the

requisite manpower, machinery, and material at the site for

commencement and continuous progress of the work. He contends that

the respondents wrote to the petitioner on several occasions pointing

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out the slow progress of work and the non-deployment of requisite

manpower at the site. Regular meetings were held with the petitioner,

and the minutes of meetings dated 06.01.2025 and 13.06.2025 record

that target dates for completion of various works were provided to the

petitioner, but the same were never adhered to or achieved. Owing to

site conditions, additional quantities and additional items were

incorporated into the existing scope of work in agreement with the

petitioner, and variations were processed accordingly, for which the

petitioner also submitted numbered claim certificates. The first

extension of time was granted to the petitioner up to 30.09.2025, at the

request of the petitioner vide its communication dated 28.04.2025. A

second extension was thereafter granted up to 31.03.2026, again on the

specific request of the petitioner. Thus, according to the respondents,

the original timeline of twelve months has been extended by a further

eleven months, representing an extension of approximately 91% of the

original completion period, while the variation in the original contract

amount is approximately 46%.

15.The learned Advocate for the respondents submits that even

after the grant of extensions, the petitioner was unable to complete the

work, and after reviewing the progress, it was found that there was no

activity at the site for the casting of the deck slab. Accordingly, a Seven

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Days' Notice was issued to the petitioner on 19.11.2025. Even after the

said notice, the petitioner failed to mobilise the necessary resources. A

48-Hours' Notice was therefore issued on 27.11.2025, but there was still

no improvement. The part termination notice dated 13th November

2025 was issued in accordance with Annexure XIII of the contract

agreement, due to the urgency of completing the work before a

scheduled inspection by the Commissioner of Railway Safety (CRS), and

the poor performance and planning on the part of the petitioner had

resulted in the delay of the CRS inspection by four months. The

termination of the agreement on 02.12.2025 was accordingly a

culmination of a long process during which the petitioner was given

ample opportunity but repeatedly failed to comply.

16.With regard to the payments claimed by the petitioner, the

learned Advocate for the respondents submits that the amounts claimed

in the petition are incorrect, as the petitioner has not submitted the

details of measurements along with the technical site registers duly

signed by the railway officials in respect of the balance work.

Measurements for the balance work have not been initiated by the

petitioner till date, and therefore the payments in respect of such work

remain outstanding solely on that account. He further submits that the

action taken by the respondents is in strict accordance with the terms

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and conditions of the contract, which expressly reserves the right of the

railway to alter, omit, or get executed any part of the work through

other agencies.

17.On the question of maintainability of the writ petition, the

learned Advocate for the respondents strongly argues that, in view of

Clauses 63 and 64 of the General Conditions of Contract, all disputes

between the parties are required to be resolved by way of arbitration.

He submits that once the parties have consciously adopted an

arbitration mechanism for resolution of disputes arising out of the

contract, there is no warrant for invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction

of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. He further

submits that the issues raised by the petitioner are essentially disputed

questions of fact, requiring the recording of evidence and proof, which

is a function that cannot be performed in a writ petition but can only be

adjudicated before an arbitrator. In support of his contentions, he relies

upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in (i) State of U.P. &

Ors. v. Bridge & Roof Co. (India) Ltd., (1996) 6 SCC 22, (ii) Kerala

State Electricity Board & Anr. v. Kurien E. Kalathil & Ors., (2000) 6 SCC

293 and (iii) Joshi Technologies International Inc. v. Union of India &

Ors., (2015) 7 SCC 728.

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18.We have heard the learned Advocates for both the parties at

length and have carefully perused the material on record, including the

documents annexed to the petition and the reply filed by the

respondents, and have given our earnest consideration to the citations

relied upon by both sides. We are now called upon to adjudicate upon

the maintainability of the present writ petition and the merits of the

challenge mounted by the petitioner against the impugned orders.

19.Before we advert to the facts of the case, it would be apposite to

set out the legal framework governing the invocation of writ jurisdiction

by a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution in matters arising

out of contractual disputes between a contractor and a State or its

instrumentality. The law on this aspect is well-settled through a catena

of pronouncements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, and the

principles emerging therefrom may be briefly summarised. The power

of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is undoubtedly

plenary and wide. It is also well settled that the existence of an

alternative remedy, including an arbitration clause in a contract, does

not absolutely and invariably foreclose the exercise of writ jurisdiction

by a High Court. At the same time, however, it is equally well settled

that writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is discretionary in nature, and

the exercise of such extraordinary jurisdiction has to be calibrated with

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care and caution, having regard to the nature of the dispute, the

availability of an efficacious alternative remedy, and the question of

whether the dispute essentially involves contested questions of fact that

cannot be adjudicated in writ proceedings.

20.The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in State of U.P. & Ors. v. Bridge &

Roof Co. (India) Ltd. (supra), laid down the foundational principles

governing this field in clear and emphatic terms. In that case, the Apex

Court held that a contract between the parties is in the realm of private

law and is governed by the provisions of the Contract Act. Any dispute

relating to the interpretation of the terms and conditions of such a

contract cannot be agitated, and could not have been agitated, in a writ

petition; that is a matter either for arbitration, as provided by the

contract, or for the civil court, as the case may be. The Court further

held that where the contract itself contains a clause providing for

settlement of disputes by reference to arbitration, there is no reason

why the parties should not follow and adopt that remedy, and that the

existence of an effective alternative remedy, in such case provided in the

contract itself, is a good ground for the Court to decline to exercise its

extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

The Hon’ble Apex Court pointedly observed that Article 226 of the

Constitution of India was not meant to supplant the existing remedies

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at law but only to supplement them in certain well-recognized

situations.

21.The principle enunciated in Bridge & Roof Co. (supra) was

affirmed and elaborated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kerala State

Electricity Board & Anr. v. Kurien E. Kalathil & Ors. (supra), wherein the

Apex Court, speaking through a Bench of two learned Judges, reiterated

with clarity that every act of a statutory body need not necessarily

involve an exercise of statutory power, and that statutory bodies, like

private parties, have the power to contract or deal with property, and

such activities may not raise any issue of public law. The Court held that

the contract between the parties therein was in the realm of private law

and not a statutory contract, and that disputes relating to the

interpretation of the terms and conditions of such a contract could not

have been agitated in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. It

was further held that whether any amount is due to the contractor and,

if so, how much, and whether the refusal of the authority to pay it is

justified or not, are not matters which could have been agitated and

decided in a writ petition. The Court emphasized that the proper forum

for such adjudication is a civil court or, where the contract provides for

it, arbitration.

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22.The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Joshi Technologies International

Inc. v. Union of India & Ors., reported in (2015) 7 SCC 728, further

clarified the position by holding that the law has developed through a

catena of judgments, and from a reading of those judgments it emerges

that in pure contractual matters, the extraordinary remedy of writ

under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution cannot be invoked.

The Court held that such a remedy is available only in a limited sphere,

namely, when the non-Government contracting party is able to

demonstrate that it is a public law remedy which it seeks to invoke, as

contra-distinguished from the private law remedy simpliciter available

under the contract. This principle constitutes a clear and authoritative

statement of the law on the interface between writ jurisdiction and

contractual disputes.

23.We have given careful consideration to the judgment of the

Hon'ble Apex Court in Union of India & Ors. v. Tantia Construction Pvt.

Ltd. (supra), upon which the learned Advocate for the petitioner has

placed heavy reliance. The Hon’ble Apex Court, in that case, upheld the

maintainability of the writ petition filed by a railway contractor

challenging an order requiring it to execute enlarged and altered work

at the same rates as originally tendered, and held that the existence of

an arbitration clause in the agreement does not absolutely bar the

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parties from invoking the writ jurisdiction of the High Court or the

Supreme Court. The Court reiterated the rule that the exclusion of writ

jurisdiction on account of an alternative remedy is a rule of discretion

and not one of compulsion. We have no quarrel with the aforesaid legal

proposition. However, the Tantia Construction judgment must be read

in its correct context. In that case, the dispute was not merely a factual

dispute regarding slow progress or breach of contractual obligations;

rather, it involved a fundamental question of whether the Railway was

entitled to require the contractor to execute a substantially and

qualitatively altered scope of work, amounting in substance to a new

project, at the rates originally tendered, which raised a significant

public law issue pertaining to the exercise of contractual power

arbitrarily and beyond the four corners of the agreement. The factual

matrix of the present case is materially different, as we shall presently

demonstrate.

24.Before examining whether the disputes in the present case are

essentially factual in nature, we must address the principal ground

urged by the petitioner, namely, the alleged violation of the principles of

natural justice. The petitioner's learned Advocate has vehemently

contended that the impugned communications dated 13.11.2025 and

02.12.2025 were issued without affording the petitioner any

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opportunity of being heard. We find this submission to be factually

unsustainable in the present case. From the record before us, it is

evident that the respondent railway authorities had issued multiple

show-cause notices and adverse progress reports to the petitioner over a

prolonged period, spanning several months prior to the issuance of the

part termination notice. The minutes of meetings held on 06.01.2025

and 13.06.2025, and the communications between the parties, establish

beyond any doubt that the petitioner was made fully aware of the

concerns of the respondents regarding the slow progress of the work

and the non-deployment of adequate manpower and machinery at the

site. The petitioner was not only present at those meetings but was also

given specific target dates for completion of various items of work.

Seven Days' Notices were issued to the petitioner on at least five

separate occasions and 48-Hours' Notices were also issued repeatedly,

all of which were received by the petitioner.

25.In this background, The work assigned to the petitioner was of

national importance, and therefore completion of the said project

within time was absolutely necessary for the public at large and also for

the nation. The respondents, being public authorities involved in

essential services like Railways, have a primary duty towards the

citizens of this nation, and therefore the targeted completion of the

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work was not only necessary but rather mandatory. The record shows

that the respondent authorities have constantly raised their concern

with the petitioner regarding the slow progress of the work and have,

from time to time, issued instructions and directions to the petitioner to

expedite the work and complete the same within the allotted time as

well as the extended time. It will, therefore, be incorrect to characterize

the impugned action as one taken behind the back of the petitioner

without any opportunity of being heard. The communication dated

13.11.2025 and the subsequent termination notice dated 02.12.2025

were not the first communications from the respondents; they were the

culmination of a long chain of notices, meetings, and communications,

all of which afforded the petitioner more than adequate opportunity to

explain its position, mobilize resources, and remedy the defaults

complained of. The submission of the petitioner that its managing

partner was abroad and therefore could not respond is, in our

considered view, an afterthought that cannot be elevated to the level of

a valid legal ground of natural justice violation. The petitioner is a

partnership firm, capable in law of acting through its authorized

representative or any other partner, and the absence of the managing

partner from the country does not create a legal vacuum that would

nullify the actions taken by the respondents after following the due

contractual process. The principles of natural justice do not require the

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respondents to wait indefinitely for a response or to maintain the status

quo until such time as it suits a contracting party to engage with the

notices issued to it.

26.Turning now to the crux of the matter, we are of the considered

view that the disputes sought to be agitated in the present writ petition

are essentially and overwhelmingly disputes involving contested

questions of fact. The petitioner alleges, on one hand, that the works

were in progress and that the extension of time without penalty is

indicative of the absence of any default on its part. The respondents, on

the other hand, have specifically averred that the progress of work was

consistently unsatisfactory, that the petitioner repeatedly failed to

adhere to contractual milestones, that no activity was observed at the

site for the casting of the deck slab despite repeated notices, and that

the Commissioner of Railway Safety's inspection was delayed by four

months on account of the petitioner's poor performance and planning.

The petitioner has alleged that certain works were offloaded to other

agencies without its consent, which prevented it from completing its

own work. The respondents have denied that such offloading was

improper or beyond the scope of the contractual power reserved to the

railway. The petitioner has claimed that a sum of approximately Rs.7.5

crores is yet to be paid for work already executed, while the

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respondents have submitted that the measurements and technical

documentation required to process payment for the balance work have

not been submitted by the petitioner.

27.It is manifest that each and every one of these contentions raises

a disputed question of fact that cannot be examined, evaluated, or

adjudicated in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. A

writ court does not record evidence, examine witnesses, or scrutinize

technical specifications and site records. The determination of whether

the work was progressing satisfactorily or not, whether the offloading of

certain works was in accordance with or contrary to the terms of the

contract, whether the petitioner is entitled to additional time for

completion, whether any amount is due and payable to the petitioner,

whether the default in completion is attributable to the petitioner or to

other agencies appointed by the respondents, and whether the

termination was for bona fide reasons related to public interest and the

operational requirements of the railway — all of these are questions

that can only be resolved through a detailed examination of evidence,

including technical site records, minutes of meetings, correspondence

between the parties, measurement books, and the opinions of experts, if

any. The appropriate forum for such an exercise is the Arbitral Tribunal

as specifically agreed upon by the parties under Clauses 63 and 64 of

the General Conditions of Contract.

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28.We are also of the view that the petitioner has failed to

demonstrate the existence of any element of public law that would

justify the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under

Article 226 of the Constitution. The rights sought to be enforced by the

petitioner are purely contractual rights arising from the agreement

dated 17.08.2024. The petitioner's grievance, at its core, is that the

respondent authorities terminated the contract before the expiry of the

extended completion period, and that the reasons given for termination

are factually incorrect or insufficient. This is a private law dispute

arising in the realm of contract and is not a matter involving the

violation of any fundamental right or any statutory right that requires

the intervention of this Court under Article 226. As the Hon'ble

Supreme Court observed in Kerala State Electricity Board v. Kurien E.

Kalathil (supra), not every action of a statutory body or instrumentality

of the State raises a public law issue, and where the dispute is purely in

the domain of private law, the appropriate remedy is before a civil court

or an arbitrator, as the case may be.

29.We have also considered the submission of the petitioner's

learned Advocate that if the petitioner is relegated to arbitration, the

material at the site would get damaged and become unusable, thus

causing irreparable harm. While we are sensitive to this concern, we

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find that this submission does not, by itself, create a ground for

invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court. The Arbitration and

Conciliation Act, 1996 itself provides adequate mechanisms for

obtaining interim relief, including under Section 9 of the Act, where a

party may approach the competent court for interim measures of

protection pending arbitration proceedings. The petitioner is at liberty

to avail of those statutory remedies. The availability of interim relief

through the arbitration framework further reinforces our conclusion

that the present writ petition is not the appropriate vehicle for the

adjudication of the petitioner's grievances.

30.Having regard to the foregoing analysis, we are of the

considered view that the present writ petition is not maintainable for

the following principal reasons. First, the disputes raised in the petition

are essentially disputes involving contested questions of fact arising out

of the execution of a works contract, which are incapable of

adjudication in a writ proceeding and must be resolved through the

mechanism of arbitration as contractually agreed upon between the

parties. Second, the petitioner has failed to make out any case of

violation of the principles of natural justice, inasmuch as the respondent

railway authorities had issued multiple notices, held numerous

meetings, and provided the petitioner with ample and repeated

606-26-WP.odt

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opportunities over a prolonged period to respond, mobilize resources,

and remedy the alleged defaults before issuing the impugned

communications. Third, the petitioner has not demonstrated the

infringement of any fundamental right or statutory right that would

attract the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of

the Constitution. Fourth, both parties, having agreed to the mechanism

of arbitration under Clauses 63 and 64 of the General Conditions of

Contract for the resolution of all disputes arising out of the contract, it

would be wholly inappropriate for this Court to permit a party to bypass

the agreed dispute resolution mechanism and invoke the extraordinary

jurisdiction of the writ court to adjudicate upon essentially contractual

grievances. Fifth, the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

State of U.P. v. Bridge & Roof Co. (India) Ltd. (supra), and Kerala State

Electricity Board v. Kurien E. Kalathil (supra), read together with the

principles enunciated in Joshi Technologies International Inc. v. Union

of India (supra), fully supports the conclusion that this Court ought to

exercise its discretion to decline to entertain the petition and to relegate

the parties to the arbitral forum agreed upon by them.

31.The judgment in Union of India v. Tantia Construction Pvt. Ltd.

(supra) does not assist the petitioner in the facts of the present case. As

we have already observed, the factual matrix of Tantia Construction

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{26}

involved a qualitatively different and more fundamental challenge,

namely, the question of the railway's entitlement to alter the entire

design of a project and compel the contractor to execute a substantially

new and different project at the original tendered rates, which raised a

pure public law issue of arbitrary exercise of statutory power. In the

present case, in contrast, the petitioner's challenge is to the termination

of a contract on the ground of slow progress and non-completion, which

is a matter squarely within the domain of contract law and is subject to

the arbitration clause agreed upon by the parties. The principle laid

down in Tantia Construction (supra) that an alternative remedy is not

an absolute bar to the exercise of writ jurisdiction is a rule of discretion,

and in the exercise of that discretion, having regard to the nature of the

dispute, the adequacy of the alternative remedy, and the essentially

factual character of the controversy, we decline to entertain this

petition.

32.Before parting with this order, we deem it appropriate to record

that by dismissing the present writ petition, we have not adjudicated

upon the merits of the dispute between the parties, and our

observations on the facts contained in this judgment are solely for the

purpose of determining the maintainability of the petition and shall not

prejudice either party in any future proceedings. The petitioner shall be

at liberty to raise all its claims and contentions, including the legality of

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{27}

the termination, the question of payments due, the alleged offloading of

works without consent, and any other grievance, before the Arbitral

Tribunal constituted in accordance with the provisions of the General

Conditions of Contract. It is further clarified that the security deposit,

the EMD amount retained by the respondents, and the Bank Guarantee

submitted by the petitioner shall continue to be maintained and shall

not be forfeited, encashed, or acted upon by the respondents pending

the initiation and conclusion of the arbitration proceedings, for a period

of twelve weeks from today, to enable the petitioner to initiate

arbitration proceedings.

33.In view of the above, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Rule

discharged. There shall be no order as to costs.

34.The observations made herein above shall not prejudice the

rights of either party before the Arbitral Tribunal.

35.The protection granted by way of interim order, if any, subsisting

as on date shall stand vacated subject to the aforesaid direction with

respect to the security deposit, EMD, and Bank Guarantee.

[ HITEN S. VENEGAVKAR ] [ SMT. VIBHA KANKANWADI ]

JUDGE JUDGE

S P Rane