Page 1 of 18

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK

I.A. No.13540 of 2026

(Arising out of WP(C) No.33186 of 2025)

ODHC010838162025 ]

(An application for intervention, filed under Chapter - VI, Rule - 27 of the

Orissa High Court Rules)

---------------

M/s. Paltronics Allied

Industries Pvt. Ltd., Khurda …… Petitioner

- Versus -

State of Odisha & Others ...…. Opp. Parties

Advocate(s) appeared in this case: -

_____________________________________________________________

For Intervenor : Mr. B. Baug, Sr. Advocate with

Mr. G Sahoo, Advocate

For Opp. Parties : Mr. A.K Parija, Sr. Advocate with

Mr. S. Mishra, Advocate

Mr. S. Palit, Sr. Advocate with

Mr. A. Mohanty, Advocate

[For writ Petitioner]

Mrs. J Sahoo,

[Additional Standing Counsel-State]

___________________________________________________________

CORAM:

JUSTICE SASHIKANTA MISHRA

ORDER

21.08.2026

SASHIKANTA MISHRA, J.

The petitioner of the present intervention application

seeks leave to intervene in the writ petition and for his

impleadment as a party to the case.

Page 2 of 18

2. Bereft of unnecessary facts, the case of the intervenor-

petitioner is that the case land was recorded as Rakhit

Khata with Kisam ‘Jungle’ in the Settlement ROR of 1973,

which fact, according to him, was suppressed by the writ

petitioner. It is stated that the ROR relied upon by the writ

petitioner under Annexure-2 to the writ petition, showing

the land as Stitiban with Kisam ‘Patita’, is a forged and

manipulated one and is not available in the records of the

Tahasil office. It is further stated that the registered lease

deed dated 13.12.1979, relied by the writ petitioner, does

not disclose the Kisam of the case land. According to the

intervenor-petitioner, at that point of time, the land was

recorded as Rakhit with Kisam ‘Jungle’ and therefore, the

subsequent recording of the land as Stitiban with Kisam

Patita, immediately after execution of the lease deed, raises

a serious question as to the manner and circumstances in

which such entry came to be made. It is also stated that the

land being recorded as Jungle, its conversion to non-forest

use could not have been effected only by invoking Section 8-

A of the OLR Act and the provisions governing forest land

were required to be complied with. The proposed intervenor

Page 3 of 18

has further stated that he is a public-spirited person and

has already approached this Court by filing W.P.(C)(PIL)

No.20181 of 2026, bringing to the notice of the Court the

illegalities committed by the authorities in respect of the

case land. On such basis, he seeks his impleadment in the

writ petition.

3. The writ petitioner has filed its written objection to the

intervention application opposing the prayer for intervention

and impleadment. It is stated that the intervenor-petitioner

has no locus standi to intervene in the present writ petition

and has failed to demonstrate any direct, personal or legal

interest in the subject matter of the writ petition. It is also

stated that the intervenor was not a party to the proceedings

before the quasi-judicial authorities and, therefore, cannot

claim to be an aggrieved person in respect of the order

under challenge. The writ petitioner has also disputed the

allegations regarding manipulation or fabrication of the

ROR. It is further stated that the intervenor had earlier

approached this Court in W.P.(C)(PIL) No.20181 of 2026 on

substantially similar allegations, which was dismissed as

withdrawn on 22.07.2026 without granting any liberty. The

Page 4 of 18

writ petitioner has also opposed the intervention on the

ground of delay, contending that the intervenor has sought

to raise objections relating to a transaction and entries

dating back more than four decades. It is also stated that

the writ petition had already been heard at length and the

judgment had been reserved on 15.07.2026, and therefore,

the intervention application, filed at such a belated stage, is

liable to be rejected.

4. Heard Mr. B. Baug learned Senior Counsel with G.

Sahoo, learned counsel for the Petitioner of the I.A; Mrs. J

Sahoo, learned Additional Standing Counsel for the State

and Mr. A.K Parija, learned Senior Counsel along with Mr.

S. Palit, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr. S. Mishra

and Mr. A. Mohanty, learned counsel for the writ Petitioner.

5. Mr. Baug, would argue that the intervenor has an

interest in the subject matter of the writ petition, as the case

land, according to the revenue record of 1973 was recorded

under Rakhit Khata with Kisam ‘Jungle’. He argues that the

subsequent recording of the land as Stitiban with Kisam

‘Patita’ immediately after execution of the lease deed dated

13.12.1979 raises serious questions regarding the legality

Page 5 of 18

and manner of such change. He also submits that the ROR

relied by the writ petitioner is a manipulated and fabricated

document and does not reflect the actual status of the land.

He further submits that the conversion of the land under

Section 8-A of the OLR Act could not have been validly

effected if the land continued to retain the character of

forest (jungle) land and the statutory requirements

governing forest land were required to be complied with. On

the question of locus standi to maintain the I.A., he submits

that the proposed intervenor, being a public-spirited person

and a resident of Bhubaneswar has approached this Court

in the larger public interest for protection of the forest land

and therefore, cannot be treated as a mere stranger to the

proceeding. He relies on certain decisions of the Supreme

Court wherein it has been recognized that it is the duty of

citizens to protect the environment and forests. He

therefore, submits that the intervenor has locus to intervene

in the writ petition.

6. Mr. Parija and Mr. Palit, learned Senior Counsels, on

the other hand, would submit that the intervenor is a

stranger to the lis having neither any personal or legal

Page 6 of 18

interest in the case land nor is an aggrieved person. They

submit that the intervenor was not a party to the

proceedings before the revenue authorities and his claim of

being a public-spirited person does not, by itself, confer any

right to intervene. They further submit that the PIL filed by

the intervenor having been withdrawn without liberty to

institute a fresh proceeding, he cannot seek to revive the

same cause in the present writ petition. They submit that

the intervenor is not a necessary nor a proper party. The

intervention application, according to Mr. Parija and

Mr.Palit, seeks to enlarge the scope of the writ petition by

introducing a new case regarding the character of the land,

validity of the lease and fraud and collusion, which cannot

be permitted. They further submit that the ROR relied by

the intervenor does not pertain to the case land under Khata

No.474/5 and the allegations of manipulation and collusion

are specifically denied by the State authorities. The lease

was executed in 1979, prior to the enforcement of the Forest

(Conservation) Act, 1980. They also submit that, as can be

seen from the lease deed, the requisite statutory sanction

had been obtained.

Page 7 of 18

7. Mrs. Sahoo, learned State counsel would submit that

the intervenor has no locus standi to intervene in the

present writ petition, as he was neither a party to the

proceedings before the Tahasildar nor before the appellate

authority. She submits that the conversion of the subject

land under Section 8-A of the OLR Act was found to be

erroneous by the appellate authority and the same was

accordingly set aside by order dated 22.07.2025 passed in

OLR Appeal No.15 of 2024. She submits that the State

authorities, after coming to know of the erroneous

conversion, took corrective steps in accordance with law and

have also initiated resumption proceedings. She further

submits that the allegations of fraud, manipulation of the

ROR and collusion between the writ petitioner and the State

authorities were never raised before the revenue authorities.

According to her, the ROR relied by the intervenor does not

pertain to the case land and the allegations regarding

character of the land are, therefore, misconceived.

8. Having heard learned counsel for the parties at length

and having perused the materials placed on record, at the

outset, it is necessary to keep in view the nature and scope

Page 8 of 18

of the present writ petition. The writ petitioner has

approached this Court challenging the order passed by the

appellate authority in OLR Appeal No.15 of 2024/2025,

whereby the order of conversion passed by the Tahasildar

under Section 8-A of the OLR Act was interfered with. The

dispute in the writ petition, therefore, mainly concerns the

legality of the order passed by the appellate authority and

the consequential action taken by the revenue authorities.

9. It is an admitted fact that the intervenor was not a

party either to the original proceeding before the Tahasildar

or in the appeal. He does not claim any title, possession,

leasehold right or other proprietary interest in the subject

land. His claim to locus is founded mainly on the ground

that the land was recorded as ‘Jungle’ in the earlier ROR

and being a public-spirited person and a resident of

Bhubaneswar, he has an interest in protecting the forest

land.

10. There can be no two opinions with the proposition that

protection of forests and the environment is a constitutional

imperative and in an appropriate case, a person having a

Page 9 of 18

substantial and genuine interest may invoke the writ

jurisdiction of this Court. The decision of the Supreme Court

in the case of Jasbhai Motibhai Desai V. Roshan Kumar,

Haji Bashir Ahmed

1 recognizes that the rule of locus

standi in proceedings under Article 226 is not inflexible and

in exceptional circumstances, a stranger having a

substantial and genuine interest in the subject matter may

be permitted to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court.

However, according to this Court, the above principle does

not imply that every person claiming to be a public-spirited

citizen acquires an indefeasible right to be impleaded in

every proceeding concerning a subject matter which,

according to him, involves a matter of public interest. The

Court is required to examine the nature of the lis, the

interest claimed by the applicant and whether his presence

is necessary for a complete and effective adjudication of the

controversy.

11. In the present case, the intervenor does not claim any

independent right in the case land. He was not a party in

the proceedings which resulted in the order under

1

(1976) 1 SCC 671

Page 10 of 18

challenge. The writ petition can effectively be adjudicated on

the basis of the records of the proceedings and the pleadings

of the parties thereto. The State, which was a party to the

proceeding is already before this Court and has placed its

stand. Thus, the presence of the intervenor is not necessary

for an effective adjudication of the controversy raised in the

writ petition.

12. The distinction between a necessary party and a proper

party is well settled. A necessary party is one without whom

no effective order can be passed, whereas a proper party is

one whose presence is necessary for a complete and effective

adjudication of the questions involved. The principles stated

by the Supreme Court in cases of Ramesh Hirachand

Kundanmal V. Municipal Corporation of Greater

Bombay

2; Kasturi V. Iyyamperumal

3; Mumbai

International Airport (P) Ltd. V. Regency Convention

Centre & Hotels (P) Ltd.

4; and Vidur Impex & Traders (P)

Ltd. V. Tosh Apartments (P) Ltd.

5 as relied by Mr. Palit,

are apposite in this regard. Tested on the above principles,

2

(1992) 2 SCC 524

3

(2005) 6 SCC 733

4

(2010) 7 SCC 417

5

(2012) 8 SCC 384

Page 11 of 18

this Court finds that the intervenor does not satisfy either of

the tests.

13. As regards the allegations made by the intervenor

regarding manipulation of the ROR, alteration of the Kisam

of the land, illegality in the lease and collusion between the

writ petitioner and the State authorities are all matters

which are disputed by the writ petitioner and the State. On

the contrary, the conduct of the State, as borne out from the

record, prima facie, repels the allegation of collusion. The

conversion order passed by the Tahasildar under Section 8-

A of the OLR Act was itself challenged by the State before

the appellate authority and was thereafter set aside.

Consequential steps, including initiation of resumption

proceedings, have also been taken. Thus, the order which is

alleged to have been obtained through collusion was

subjected to scrutiny at the instance of the State and set

aside. This Court therefore, finds no basis to doubt the

bonafides of the State authorities merely on the basis of an

unsubstantiated allegation of collusion.

Page 12 of 18

14. Another important aspect is that the intervenor himself

had earlier approached this Court by filing W.P.(C)(PIL)

No.20181 of 2026 concerning the illegalities relating to the

case land. The said writ petition was permitted to be

withdrawn by order dated 22.07.2026. The order passed

therein reads as follows:

“Learned counsel for the Petitioner submits a

memo seeking permission to withdraw the Writ

Petition. The Petitioner is permitted to withdraw

the Writ Petition.

Accordingly, the Writ Petition is dismissed as

withdrawn.”

15. The earlier proceeding was thus permitted to be

withdrawn without any liberty to file any further proceeding

on the same cause of action. In the case of Sarguja

Transport Service V. State Transport Appellate

Tribunal

6, the Supreme Court considered whether the

principle underlying Order XXIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil

Procedure should be extended to writ proceedings under

Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. The Court held

that the principle should be extended in the interest of

administration of justice and on the ground of public policy.

It was held that where a writ petition is withdrawn without

6

(1987) 1 SCC 5

Page 13 of 18

permission to institute a fresh petition, the remedy under

Article 226 should be deemed to have been abandoned by

the petitioner in respect of the cause of action relied in the

earlier writ petition. The observation of the Supreme Court

is reproduced below-

“8. The question for our consideration is whether it would

or would not advance the cause of justice if the principle

underlying Rule 1 of Order XXIII of the Code is adopted in

respect of writ petitions filed under Articles 226/227 of the

Constitution of India also. It is common knowledge that

very often after a writ petition is heard for some time when

the petitioner or his counsel finds that the court is not

likely to pass an order admitting the petition, request is

made by the petitioner or by his counsel to permit the

petitioner to withdraw from the writ petition without

seeking permission to institute a fresh writ petition. A court

which is unwilling to admit the petition would not

ordinarily grant liberty to file a fresh petition while it may

just agree to permit the withdrawal of the petition. It is

plain that when once a writ petition filed in a High Court is

withdrawn by the petitioner himself he is precluded from

filing an appeal against the order passed in the writ

petition because he cannot be considered as a party

aggrieved by the order passed by the High Court. He may

as stated in Daryao v. State of U.P. [AIR 1961 SC 1457 :

(1962) 1 SCR 574] in a case involving the question of

enforcement of fundamental rights file a petition before the

Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India

because in such a case there has been no decision on the

merits by the High Court. The relevant observation of this

Court in Daryao case [AIR 1961 SC 1457 : (1962) 1 SCR

574] is to be found at p. 593 and it is as follows:

“If the petition is dismissed as withdrawn it cannot be a

bar to a subsequent petition under Article 32, because in

such a case there has been no decision on the merits by

the court. We wish to make it clear that the conclusions

thus reached by us are confined only to the point of res

judicata which has been argued as a preliminary issue in

these writ petitions and no other.”

Page 14 of 18

9. The point for consideration is whether a petitioner after

withdrawing a writ petition filed by him in the High Court

under Article 226 of the Constitution of India without the

permission to institute a fresh petition can file a fresh writ

petition in the High Court under that article. On this point

the decision in Daryao case [AIR 1961 SC 1457 : (1962) 1

SCR 574] is of no assistance. But we are of the view that

the principle underlying Rule 1 of Order XXIII of the Code

should be extended in the interests of administration of

justice to cases of withdrawal of writ petition also, not on

the ground of res judicata but on the ground of public

policy as explained above. It would also discourage the

litigant from indulging in bench-hunting tactics. In any

event there is no justifiable reason in such a case to permit

a petitioner to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of the

High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution once

again. While the withdrawal of a writ petition filed in a

High Court without permission to file a fresh writ petition

may not bar other remedies like a suit or a petition under

Article 32 of the Constitution of India since such

withdrawal does not amount to res judicata, the remedy

under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should be

deemed to have been abandoned by the petitioner in

respect of the cause of action relied on in the writ petition

when he withdraws it without such permission. In the

instant case the High Court was right in holding that a

fresh writ petition was not maintainable before it in respect

of the same subject-matter since the earlier writ petition

had been withdrawn without permission to file a fresh

petition. We, however, make it clear that whatever we

have stated in this order may not be considered as being

applicable to a writ petition involving the personal liberty

of an individual in which the petitioner prays for the issue

of a writ in the nature of habeas corpus or seeks to enforce

the fundamental rignt guaranteed under Article 21 of the

Constitution since such a case stands on a different footing

altogether. We, however leave this question open.”

16. The rationale behind the above principle is to prevent

repeated invocation of the extraordinary jurisdiction of the

High Court in respect of the same cause and to discourage a

litigant from circumventing the consequences of withdrawal

by adopting a different procedural route. Though the

Page 15 of 18

present proceeding is not a fresh writ petition filed by the

intervenor, the principle cannot be rendered meaningless

merely by permitting him to enter into an existing writ

petition and seek adjudication of substantially the same

allegations which formed the basis of his earlier PIL.

17. In the present case, the earlier PIL was filed by the

intervenor himself alleging illegalities concerning the case

land. The present intervention application again seeks to

raise the forest character of the land, manipulation of the

revenue records and illegality and collusion in relation to the

same subject matter. The intervenor cannot, having

withdrawn his earlier proceeding without liberty, seek to

revive substantially the same cause indirectly by way of an

intervention application in another writ proceeding.

18. The principle is also consistent with the

observations of the Supreme Court in the case of State of

Orissa V. Laxmi Narayan Das

7, wherein the Court

emphasized the consequences flowing from withdrawal of an

earlier proceeding and the obligation of a litigant not to

circumvent such consequence by seeking to agitate the

7

(2023) 15 SCC 273

Page 16 of 18

same cause in another proceeding. The administration of

justice requires finality not only to adjudications but also, in

appropriate circumstances, to the abandonment of a

particular remedy. The observation of the Supreme Court is

reproduced below-

“The respondents had filed a civil suit in January 2003,

claiming that the plaintiffs therein be declared owner of the

land which is in their adverse possession since 1965. Part

of property in dispute which was allotted to Reserve Bank

of India on which staff quarters had been constructed long

back. (Para 35)

After withdrawal of the aforesaid suit, the writ petition

was filed to call upon the respondents to show cause as to

how the land owned by the writ petitioners was allotted to

Reserve Bank of India. That the writ petitioners be allotted

land equivalent to the same in terms of the observation

made in the order dated 1-3-1990 passed by the

Settlement Officer. In fact, the real dispute started after the

finalisation of the record-of-rights. (Para 36)

Applying the principles of constructive res judicata, the

present writ petition filed by the respondents after

withdrawal of the civil suit, was not maintainable, in the

sense that it ought not to have been entertained. In case

the respondents still wanted to justify filing of the writ

petition, they should have at least disclosed complete facts

and then justified filing of the writ petition. (Paras 37 and

38)

The writ petition also ought to be dismissed on the ground

of concealment of material facts regarding filing and

withdrawal of the civil suit claiming the same relief.

Neither in the writ petition nor in the appeal against the

order passed in the writ petition, the respondents

disclosed the filing of civil suit and withdrawal thereof. It

only transpired at the time of the hearing of the appeal.

(Para 39)

The respondents writ petitioners deserve to be non-suited

because they have not approached the court with clean

hands. (Para 41)

In view of the settled position of law, the respondents writ

petitioners waived off their right to challenge the record-of-

rights which stood finalised way back in the year 1962

and till date there has been no challenge made to the

Page 17 of 18

same. Indirectly relief was sought by filing appeal before

the Settlement Officer, which was not maintainable: civil

suit which was ultimately withdrawn and then filed the

writ petition and thereafter writ appeal which is the

subject-matter of the present proceedings. (Paras 42 to

50)”

19. It is also necessary to note that an intervention

application cannot be permitted to enlarge the scope of the

writ petition. The writ petitioner has challenged a particular

order passed by the appellate authority. The intervenor

seeks to introduce issues concerning the manipulation of

the ROR, validity of the lease, forest character of the land

and collusion between the writ petitioner and the State

authorities. These allegations constitute a different line of

controversy and are not necessary for determining the lis

brought before this Court by the writ petitioner.

20. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the

considered view that the intervenor has failed to establish

either a direct and substantial legal interest in the subject

matter or such a genuine and substantial public interest as

would warrant his impleadment in the present writ petition

and that too, at a stage where it has already been heard and

kept reserved for pronouncement of judgment.

Page 18 of 18

21. For the forgoing reasons therefore, this Court does

not find any merit in the present application seeking

intervention and impleadment.

22. In the result, the I.A. 13540 of 2026 is dismissed.

23. List W.P.(C) No.33186 of 2025 on 02.09.2026.

(Sashikanta Mishra),

Judge

High Court of Orissa, Cuttack

21

st

August,2026, Puspanjali Ghadai, Jr. Steno.