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Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL No. 8297-8298 OF 2004

M/s. Pushpa Sahakari Avas Samiti Ltd. ….. Appellant

Versus

M/s. Gangotri Sahakari Avas S. Ltd. & Ors.… Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Dipak Misra, J.

The present appeals by special leave are directed against

the judgment and order dated 10.01.2002 and 07.03.2003

passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of

Judicature at Allahabad in Civil Revision No. 341 of 1997 and

Review Application No. 38861 of 2002 respectively. The facts

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as uncurtained in the two appeals are that the appellant as

plaintiff initiated a civil action forming subject matter of suit No.

501 of 1995 against the respondent and others for permanent

injunction. In the suit, the parties entered into a compromise

and on the basis of the compromise, a decree was drawn up on

06.09.1996. The terms and conditions of the compromise were

made a part of the decree. Be it noted, the compromise

between the parties stipulated certain conditions and one such

condition was that within a span of six months’ time, the

defendant would pay a certain sum to the plaintiff. For the sake

of clarity and convenience, the said clause of the compromise

is reproduced hereunder:-

“That the defendant No. 1 acknowledges

and undertakes to pay Lacs Rs. 38,38000/-

(Rupees Thirty Eight Lacs and Thirty Eight

Thousand) only to the plaintiff within six

months from the date of this compromise.

The payment of the said amount by the

defendant No. 1 to the plaintiff shall have the

effect of settling entire claim of the plaintiff

as against the defendant No. 1 in full and

final”

2.In the petition for compromise which formed a part of the

decree, there were other stipulations but they are not

necessary to be stated for the adjudication of these appeals.

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As has been indicated earlier, the decree was drawn up on

06.09.1996.

3.As the first respondent did not honour the terms of the

decree, the appellant filed an application for execution of the

decree on 17.02.1997 and the said application was registered

as Misc. Case No. 9 of 1997. The respondent No. 1 entered

contest and filed an objection under Section 47 of the Code of

Civil Procedure (for short, ‘the Code’) which was registered as

Misc. Case No. 43 of 1997. Allegations, counter allegations

and rejoinders were put forth before the Executing Court. One

of the objections raised in the application under Section 47 of

the Code was that as the decree holder had moved the

executing court for execution of the decree prior to the expiry

of the six months’ period, the application was premature and,

therefore, entire execution proceeding was vitiated being not

maintainable. The learned Civil Judge who dealt with the

execution case did not find any merit in any of the objections

raised and rejected the same. It is worth noting that by the

time the matter was taken up and the order came to be passed,

the decree had become mature for execution. After rejection of

the objection, the executing court took into consideration the

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submission of the judgment-debtor and, accordingly, directed

that the entire balance money as agreed to in the compromise

should be paid to the decree holder.

4.Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the first respondent

preferred Civil Revision No. 341 of 1997. The learned Single

Judge noted the contentions and subsequent orders that were

passed in the execution petition. The revisional court opined

that no other objection could be raised for the first time in the

revision and hence, no finding was warranted to be recorded on

the said score.

5.As far as the premature filing of the execution petition is

concerned, the learned Single Judge expressed his view as

under:-

“The question whether the execution was

premature or not is to be decided with regard

to the date at which the execution was filed.

If a suit is found to have been filed

premature, it cannot be decreed for the

reason that the period has expired during the

pendency of the suit. Similar principle will

not apply to the execution. If the execution

was premature when it was filed, it is liable to

be rejected and cannot be proceeded with

because it has prematured during the

pendency of the case.”

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Being of this view, he allowed the revision and set aside the

order passed by the learned Civil Judge as a consequence of

which the execution case entailed in dismissal.

6.We have heard Mr. Dinesh Dwivedi, learned senior counsel

for the appellant, and Mr. S. K. Dubey, learned Senior counsel

for the first respondent.

7. Criticizing the impugned order passed in Civil Revision,

Mr. Dwivedi, learned senior counsel, has contended that when a

suit is premature on the date of its institution and the Court can

grant relief to the plaintiff if no manifest injustice or prejudice is

caused to the party proceeded against, there is no reason or

justification for not applying the said principle to an execution

proceeding. It is urged by him that the question of a suit being

premature does not go to the root of the jurisdiction of the

Court, but the Court in its judicial discretion may grant a decree

or refuse to do so and, therefore, in the case at hand, when the

executing court had proceeded after the expiry of the

stipulated period in the decree, there was no warrant on the

part of the revisional court to interfere with the same, for the

said order did not suffer from lack of appropriate exercise of

jurisdiction or exercise of jurisdiction that the court did not

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possess. It is canvassed by him that if the petition filed under

Section 47 of the Code is scrutinized, it will clearly reveal that

objections have been raised in a routine manner to delay the

execution proceeding and such dilatory tactics by a judgment-

debtor should, in all circumstances, be deprecated and decried.

In support of his contentions, he has placed reliance on

Vithalbhai (P) Ltd. v. Union Bank of India

1

.

8.Mr. Dubey, learned senior counsel for the first respondent,

per contra, contended that the executing court could not have

entertained the application as it was filed prior to the expiration

of the period. In support of his stand, he has placed reliance on

Lal Ram v. Hari Ram

2

.The next submission of Mr. Dubey is

that as the execution was levied in a premature manner before

the expiry of the period, the decree lost its potentiality of

executability. Elaborating the said submission, it is canvassed

that the compromise decree could not have been taken up for

the purpose of execution and hence, the objection under

1

(2005) 4 SCC 315

2

AIR 1970 SC 1093

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Section 47 of the Code should have been accepted by the

executing court, but as it failed to do so, the High Court, in

exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction, has rectified the

jurisdictional error.

The learned senior counsel further urged that when the

compromise decree imposed mutual obligations on both sides

some of which were conditional, no execution could be ordered

unless the party seeking execution not only offered to perform

his part but also satisfied the executing court that he was in a

position to do so. In essence, the proponement of Mr. Dubey

is that by levying the execution in a premature manner, the

stipulations in the compromise decree have been totally

overlooked and the real construction of the terms of the decree

have been given an indecent burial. To bolster the said

submissions, he has commended us to the decisions in Jai

Narain Ram Lundia v. Kedar Nath Khetan

3

and Chen Shen

Ling v. Nand Kishore Jhajharia

4

.

3

AIR 1956 SC 359

4

AIR 1972 SC 726

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9.At the very outset, it may be stated that it is an admitted

position that the execution was levied prior to the expiration of

the period stipulated in the decree. The executing court, as is

evident, has addressed itself to all the objections that were

raised in the application and rejected the same. The principal

objection relating to the maintainability of the proceeding on

the foundation that it was instituted prematurely did not find

favour with it. The learned Single Judge has observed that if

an execution is premature when it is filed, it is liable to be

rejected. Mr. Dwivedi has drawn an analogy between a

premature suit and premature execution by placing heavy

reliance on the authority in Vithalbhai (P) Ltd. (supra). In

Vithalbhai (supra), while dealing with the premature filing of a

suit, a two-Judge Bench of this Court, after referring to a

number of decisions of various High Courts and this Court,

came to hold as follows:-

“The question of suit being premature does

not go to the root of jurisdiction of the court;

the court entertaining such a suit and passing

decree therein is not acting without

jurisdiction but it is in the judicial discretion of

the court to grant decree or not. The court

would examine whether any irreparable

prejudice was caused to the defendant on

account of the suit having been filed a little

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before the date on which the plaintiff’s

entitlement to relief became due and

whether by granting the relief in such suit a

manifest injustice would be caused to the

defendant. Taking into consideration the

explanation offered by the plaintiff for filing

the suit before the date of maturity of cause

of action, the court may deny the plaintiff his

costs or may make such other order adjusting

equities and satisfying the ends of justice as

it may deem fit in its discretion. The conduct

of the parties and unmerited advantage to

the plaintiff or disadvantage amounting to

prejudice to the defendant, if any, would be

relevant factors.”

After so stating, the Bench ruled that the plea as

regards the maintainability of the suit on the ground of its

being premature should be promptly raised and it will be

equally the responsibility of the Court to dispose of such a

plea. Thereafter, it was observed as follows:-

“However, the court shall not exercise its

discretion in favour of decreeing a premature

suit in the following cases: (i) when there is a

mandatory bar created by a statute which

disables the plaintiff from filing the suit on or

before a particular date or the occurrence of

a particular event; (ii) when the institution of

the suit before the lapse of a particular time

or occurrence of a particular event would

have the effect of defeating a public policy or

public purpose; (iii) if such premature

institution renders the presentation itself

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patently void and the invalidity is incurable

such as when it goes to the root of the court ’ s

jurisdiction; and (iv) where the lis is not

confined to parties alone and affects and

involves persons other than those arrayed as

parties, such as in an election petition which

affects and involves the entire constituency.

(See Samar Singh v. Kedar Nath 13.) One

more category of suits which may be added

to the above, is: where leave of the court or

some authority is mandatorily required to be

obtained before the institution of the suit and

was not so obtained.”

[Emphasis Supplied]

10. We have referred to the aforesaid dictum in extenso as we

find that the Bench has given emphasis on various aspects,

namely, an issue getting into the root of the jurisdiction of the

Court; causing of irreparable and manifest injustice; adjustment

of equities; concept of statutory bar; presentation that invites a

void action and anything that affects the rights of the other

party; and obtaining of leave of the Court or authority where it

is a mandatory requirement, etc. On a perusal of the various

provisions relating to execution as enshrined under Order XXI of

the Code, we do not find anything which lays down that

premature filing of an execution would entail its rejection. The

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principles that have been laid down for filing of a premature

suit, in our considered opinion, do throw certain light while

dealing with an application for execution that is filed

prematurely and we are disposed to think that the same can

safely be applied to the case at hand.

11.Presently, we shall advert to the submission of Mr. Dubey

that the executing court could not have entertained the

application as it was filed before the expiration of the period.

The learned senior counsel has relied on the decision rendered

in Lala Ram (supra). In the said case, an order of acquittal

passed -by the learned Magistrate was assailed before the High

Court by seeking leave under Section 417(3) of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1898 and the High Court granted leave as a

consequence of which the appeal came to be filed eventually.

The High Court accepted the appeal and convicted the accused.

It was contended before this Court that the appeal could not

have been entertained by the High Court having been filed

beyond the expiry of sixty days in view of the language

employed under Section 417(4) of the Code. Emphasis was laid

on the term “entertain”. Repelling the contention, this court

held as follows: -

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“The learned counsel also suggests that

the word “entertain” which occurs in Section

417 (4) means “to deal with or hear” and in

this connection he relies on the judgment of

this Court in Lakshmi Rattan Engineering

Works v. Asst. Commr., Sales Tax, (1968) 1

SCR 505 = (AIR 1968 SC 488). It seems to us

that in this context “entertain” means “file or

received by the Court” and it has no

reference to the actual hearing of the

application for leave to appeal; otherwise the

result would be that in many cases

applications for leave to appeal would be

barred because the applications have not

been put up for hearing before the High Court

within 60 days of the order of acquittal”

On a perusal of the aforesaid passage, it is vivid that the three-

Judge Bench interpreted the terms ‘were entertained’ in the

context they were used under the old Code and did not accept

the submission ‘to deal with or hear’. Regard being had to the

context, we have no shadow of doubt that the said decision is

distinguishable and not applicable to the obtaining factual

matrix.

12.In this context, we may refer with profit to the two-Judge

Bench decision in Martin & Harris Ltd. v. VIth Additional

Distt. Judge and others

5

. In the said Case, the Court was

5

(1998) 1 SCC 732

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interpreting the language employed in the proviso to Section

21(1) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent

and Eviction) Act, 1972. The proviso stipulated that where the

building was in occupation of a tenant before its purchase by

the landlord, such purchase being made after the

commencement of the Act, no application shall be entertained

on the grounds mentioned in Clause (a) of the said Section

unless three years’ period had lapsed since the date of

purchase. A contention was canvassed that filing of an

application before the expiry of the three years’ period was

barred by the provision contained in the said proviso. Repelling

the said submission, the Bench opined thus: -

“It must be kept in view that the proviso

nowhere lays down that no application on the

grounds mentioned in clause (a) of Section

21(1) could be “instituted” within a period of

three years from the date of purchase. On

the contrary, the proviso lays down that such

application on the said grounds cannot be

“entertained” by the authority before the

expiry of that period. Consequently it is not

possible to agree with the extreme

contention canvassed by the learned Senior

Counsel for the appellant that such an

application could not have been filed at all

within the said period of three years.”

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After so stating, the Bench distinguished the decision rendered

in Anandilal Bhanwarlal v. Kasturi Devi Ganeriwala

6

which

dealt with “institution” and eventually came to hold as follows:

-

“Thus the word “entertain” mentioned in the

first proviso to Section 21(1) in connection

with grounds mentioned in clause (a) would

necessarily mean entertaining the ground for

consideration for the purpose of adjudication

on merits and not at any stage prior thereto

as tried to be submitted by learned Senior

Counsel, Shri Rao, for the appellant. Neither

at the stage at which the application is filed

in the office of the authority nor at the stage

when summons is issued to the tenant the

question of entertaining such application by

the prescribed authority would arise for

consideration.

13. In this context, we may usefully refer to the decision in

Hindusthan Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Punnu Sahu (Dead)

Through Legal Representatives

7

. In the said case, this

Court was interpreting Rule 90 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil

6

(1985) 1 SCC 442

7

(1971) 3 SCC 124

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Procedure as amended by the Allahabad High Court. The

amended proviso to Rule 90 stipulated the circumstances under

which no application to set aside the sale shall be entertained.

It was contended before this Court that the expression

“entertain” found in the proviso referred to the initiation of the

proceedings and not to the stage when the Court had taken up

the application for consideration. This Court referred to the

earlier decision in Lakshmiratan Engineering Works Ltd. v.

Asst. Comm., Sales Tax, Kanpur

8

and opined that the

expression “entertain” conveys the meaning “adjudicate upon”

or “proceed to consider on merits”.

14.In State of Haryana v. Maruti Udyog Ltd. and Others

9

, this Court was dealing with Section 39 (5) of the Haryana

General Sales Tax Act, 1973 which stipulated that no appeal

shall be entertained unless it is filed within sixty days from the

date of the order appealed against and the appellate authority

was satisfied that the amount of tax assessed and the penalty

8

AIR 1968 SC 488

9

(2000) 7 SCC 348

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and interest, if any, recoverable from the persons had been

paid. The Bench interpreting the term “entertainment” of the

appeal ruled that when the first proviso to Section 39 (5)

speaks of the “entertainment of the appeal”, it means that the

appeal will not be admitted for consideration unless there is

satisfactory proof available of the making of the deposit of

admitted tax.

15. In view of the aforesaid authorities in the field, the

submission of Mr. Dubey that the executing court could not

have entertained the execution proceeding solely because it

was instituted before the expiry of the period stipulated in the

compromised decree despite the factum that by the time the

Court adverted to the petition the said period was over, is

absolutely unacceptable.

16.The next limb of proponement of Mr. Dubey is that the

decree had lost its potentiality of executability having been

filed on a premature date. On a first flush, the aforesaid

submission looks quite attractive but on a deeper probe and

keener scrutiny, it melts into insignificance. In Dhurandhar

Prasad Singh v. Jai Prakash University and Others

10

, while

10

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dealing with the power of the executing court under Section 47

of the Code of Civil Procedure, a two-Judge Bench has

expressed thus:-

“The exercise of powers under Section 47 of

the Code is microscopic and lies in a very

narrow inspection hole. Thus it is plain that

executing court can allow objection under

Section 47 of the Code to the executability of

the decree if it is found that the same is void

ab initio and a nullity, apart from the ground

that the decree is not capable of execution

under law either because the same was

passed in ignorance of such a provision of law

or the law was promulgated making a decree

inexecutable after its passing ”

17.Tested on the anvil of the aforesaid principle, it is difficult

to accept the stand that the decree had become inexecutable,

and, accordingly, we repel the same.

18.The learned senior counsel for the respondent has further

propounded that the executing court could not have passed

any order on the application for execution as it was filed prior

to the expiry of the period. Pyramiding the said submission, it

is urged by him that such advertence in an execution

proceeding frustrates the construction of the terms of the

(2001) 6 SCC 534

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decree. Mr. Dubey has drawn immense inspiration from the

verdict in Chen Shen Ling (supra). On a careful perusal of

the aforesaid decision, it is plain and patent that the three-

Judge Bench had dealt with the consideration of the terms of

the decree and eventually, placing reliance on the decision in

Jai Narain Ram Lundia (supra), expressed the view that no

execution can be ordered unless the party seeking execution

not only offered to perform his part but, also when objection

was taken, satisfied the executing court that he was in a

position to do so. Be it noted, in the case Jai Narain Ram

Lundia (supra), this Court has adverted to the reciprocal

application, their inter-linking and the indivisibility of the terms

of the decree and opined that the executing court cannot go

behind the decree and it cannot defeat the directions in the

decree. In both the decisions, the issue pertained to the nature

of order to be passed by the executing court or the type of

direction to be issued by it. The ratio enunciated therein does

not remotely deal with the filing of an execution petition in

respect of a compromise decree prior to the expiry of the date

as stipulated in the terms and conditions of the decree. Hence,

we have no scintilla of doubt that the said authorities do not

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support the stand so vehemently put forth by Mr. Dubey,

learned senior counsel for the first respondent.

19. In view of our aforesaid premised reasons, we arrive at the

irresistible conclusion that the executing court did not commit

any error by entertaining the execution petition. The learned

Single Judge in civil revision has annulled the said order without

any justification. While so doing, he had not dealt with other

objections raised by the Judgment-debtor on the ground that

they are raised for the first time. On a query being made, Mr

Dwivedi, learned senior counsel for the petitioner, fairly stated

that the said objections were raised in a different manner in the

objection filed under Section 47 of the Code and the revisional

court should have been well advised to deal with the same on

merits. Regard being had to the aforesaid analysis, we set

aside the order passed in civil revision and remit the matter to

the High Court to deal with the objections on merits. As it is an

old matter, we request the learned Chief Justice of the High

Court of Allahabad to nominate a learned Judge to dispose of

the civil revision within a period of six months. It is hereby

made clear that the parties shall not seek unnecessary

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adjournment before the revisional court and should cooperate

so that the revision shall be disposed of within the timeframe.

20.Consequently, the appeals are allowed to the extent

indicated hereinabove leaving the parties to bear their

respective costs.

......................................J.

[Deepak Verma]

......................................J.

[Dipak Misra]

New Delhi;

March 30, 2012.