ARB.P. 1787/2025 & connected matters Page 1 of 52

$~

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

% Judgment reserved on: 24.04.2026

Judgment pronounced on: 29.05.2026

+ ARB.P. 1787/2025, I.A. 30458/2025 (U/O 1 Rule 10), I.A.

8810/2026 (Delay of 1 day in filing of the chamber appeal),

O.A. 42/2026 (Seeking setting aside of the order dt.

23.01.2026 passed by the Ld. Joint Registrar (Judicial) &

REVIEW PET. 187/2026 (Filed on behalf of the R-2, Seeking

review of the order dt. 02.04.2026)

M/S RAMACIVIL INDIA CONSTRUCTION PVT LTD

THROUGH ITS AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE

DIRECTOR SH R N GUPTA .....Petitioner

Through: Mr. Anurag Ahluwalia, Senior

Advocate along with Mr.

Avinash Trivedi, Mr. Dipanshu

Gaba, Ms. Ritika Trivedi, Mr.

Rahul Aggarwal, Mr. Anurag

Kaushik, Mr. Jatin Arora, Mr.

Rhythem Nagpal, Mr. Rishank

Gola and Mr. Aryan Sangwan,

Advocates.

versus

CENTRAL PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT THROUGH

ITS ADDL DIRECTOR GENERAL .....Respondent

Through: Mr. Vikram Jetly, CGSC along

with Ms. Laavanya Kaushik,

GP, Ms. Shreya Jetly and Ms.

Khyaati Bansal, Advocates for

Respondent No. 1.

Mr. Rajshekhar Rao, Senior

Advocate along with Mr.

Praveen Kumar Jain, Ms.

Rashmi Kumari, Mr. Yash

Chauhan, Mr. Aditya Rathi, Mr.

Harshil Wason, Advocates

ARB.P. 1787/2025 & connected matters Page 2 of 52

along with Cmdr. Kesavan

Baskkaran (CAO, IIM Jammu)

for Respondent No. 2.

+ O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 35/2025

RAMA CIVIL INDIA CONSTRUCTION PRIVATE LTD

THROUGH AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE MR R N

GUPTA DIRECTOR .....Petitioner

Through: Mr. Vivek Narayan Sharma,

Ms. Mahima Bhardwaj

Kalucha, Mr. Akash Singh, Ms.

Palak Kaushik and Ms. Annika

Khurana, Advocates.

versus

CENTRAL PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT JAMMU (J

AND K) REPRESENTED THROUGH THE EXECUTIVE

ENGINEER AND SENIOR MANAGER IIM JAMMU

PROJECT DIVISION & ANR. .....Respondents

Through: Mr. Vikram Jetly, CGSC along

with Ms. Laavanya Kaushik,

GP, Ms. Shreya Jetly and Ms.

Khyaati Bansal, Advocates for

Respondent No. 1.

+ O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 447/2025, I.A. 26536/2025 (Dir.), I.A.

27193/2025 (Dir.), I.A. 30390/2025 (U/O 1 Rule 10), I.A.

8915/2026 (Delay of 1 day in filing of the chamber appeal),

O.A. 41/2026 (Seeking setting aside of the order dt.

23.01.2026 passed by the Ld. Joint Registrar (Judicial) &

REVIEW PET.190/2026 (U/S 114 R/W order XLVII and

Section 151 of the CPC Order dt. 02.04.2026)

M/S RAMACIVIL INDIA CONSTRUCTION PVT LTD

THROUGH ITS AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE

DIRECTOR SH R N GUPTA .....Petitioner

Through: Mr. Anurag Ahluwalia, Senior

Advocate along with Mr.

Avinash Trivedi, Mr. Dipanshu

Gaba, Ms. Ritika Trivedi, Mr.

ARB.P. 1787/2025 & connected matters Page 3 of 52

Rahul Aggarwal, Mr. Anurag

Kaushik, Mr. Jatin Arora, Mr.

Rhythem Nagpal, Mr. Rishank

Gola and Mr. Aryan Sangwan,

Advocates.

versus

CENTRAL PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT THROUGH

ITS ADDL DIRECTOR GENERAL .....Respondent

Through: Mr. Vikram Jetly, CGSC along

with Ms. Laavanya Kaushik,

GP, Ms. Shreya Jetly and Ms.

Khyaati Bansal, Advocates for

Respondent No. 1.

Mr. Rajshekhar Rao, Senior

Advocate along with Mr.

Praveen Kumar Jain, Ms.

Rashmi Kumari, Mr. Yash

Chauhan, Mr. Aditya Rathi, Mr.

Harshil Wason, Advocates

along with Cmdr. Kesavan

Baskkaran (CAO, IIM Jammu)

for Respondent No. 2.

+ O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 484/2025, I.A. 29299/2025 (Stay), I.A.

29796/2025 (U/O 1 Rule 10), I.A. 29997/2025 (U/O 1 Rule 10),

I.A. 8914/2026 (Delay of 1 day in filing of the chamber

appeal), O.A. 40/2026 (Seeking setting aside of the order

dt. 23.01.2026 passed by the Ld. Joint Registrar

(Judicial) & REVIEW PET. 188/2026 (Filed on behalf of the

R-2, Seeking review of the order dt. 02.04.2026)

M/S RAMACIVIL INDIA CONSTRUCTION PVT. LTD

.....Petitioner

Through: Mr. Avinash Trivedi, Ms.

Ritika Trivedi, Mr. Rahul

Aggarwal, Mr. Anurag

Kaushik, Mr. Jatin Arora, Mr.

Rhythem Nagpal, Mr. Rishank

Gola and Mr. Aryan Sangwan,

Advocates.

ARB.P. 1787/2025 & connected matters Page 4 of 52

versus

CENTRAL PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT .....Respondent

Through: Mr. Vikram Jetly, CGSC along

with Ms. Laavanya Kaushik,

GP, Ms. Shreya Jetly and Ms.

Khyaati Bansal, Advocates for

Respondent No. 1.

Mr. Rajshekhar Rao, Senior

Advocate along with Mr.

Praveen Kumar Jain, Ms.

Rashmi Kumari, Mr. Yash

Chauhan, Mr. Aditya Rathi, Mr.

Harshil Wason, Advocates

along with Cmdr. Kesavan

Baskkaran (CAO, IIM Jammu)

for Respondent No. 2.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN

SHANKAR

J U D G M E N T

HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.

1. All four Petitions have been instituted by the same Petitioner,

namely, Ramacivil India Construction Pvt. Ltd., against the same

Respondent, namely, Central Public Works Department. Since the

Petitions arise out of the same factual background and emanate from a

common set of facts involving interconnected issues and overlapping

reliefs, with the consent of the parties, they were heard together and

are being disposed of by way of this common judgment.

ARB.P. 1787/2025 & connected matters Page 5 of 52

2. ARB.P. 1787/2025 has been filed, on 27.10.2025, under Section

11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

1

, seeking the

following reliefs:

“(a) Reject the respondent’s nominee as appointed vide letter dated

24.10.2025 and appoint the Nominee Arbitrator on behalf of the

respondent strictly in accordance with the mandatory qualification

prescribed in Clause 25 of the GCC to adjudicate the dispute

between the parties arising out - of letter of- acceptance dated

16.10.2020 and agreement bearing no. 01/EE/CE cum

ED/IIM/2020-21 in favour of the petitioner and against the

respondent and in the interest of justice; And / Or;

(b) Direct the two nominee arbitrators to appoint the presiding

arbitrator within 30 days; And /Or;

(c) Cost of this petition may be allowed in favour of the petitioner and

against the respondents; And /Or;

…”

3. O.M.P.(I)(COMM.) 35/2025 has been filed, on 03.02.2025,

under Section 9 of the A&C Act, seeking the following reliefs:

“….

(a) Pass an ad-interim stay on the operation and execution of the

tender issued by the Respondent under NIT No. 02/NIT/CE

cum ED/JPZ/IIM/2024-25 (Recall) with tender opening date as

14.01.2025, pending the resolution of the disputes between the

parties through Arbitration;

(b) Pass an ad-interim Order appointing an independent 3

rd

body of

expert(s) or any other technical person as a court commissioner

to assess and verify:

i) the scope and extent of the works done by the

petitioner under its original EPC Contract and to

ascertain fresh NIT (Recall) was within Petitioner's

scope or is it an additional work that Respondent

wants to get executed;

ii) the inventory lying at the site and not included in

the recent inventory prepared pursuant to the joint

inspection conducted on 23

rd

January 2025, and

iii) the unauthorized use of the LV facilities erected by

the petitioner under the contract without any

corresponding payment, till the respondent issues

the taking over /completion certificate to the

petitioner and make the due payment.

1

A&C Act

ARB.P. 1787/2025 & connected matters Page 6 of 52

(c) Pass an ad-interim stay directing the Respondents to stop using

the LV facilities erected by the Petitioner under the contract,

till the respondent issues the taking over /completion certificate

to the Petitioner and making due payment;

(d) Pass an ad-interim stay thereby restraining the Respondents

from altering, modifying, adding, or removing any equipment,

device, software, or any other component in the already

designed and operational system executed by the Petitioner,

which may affect or disturb its operations, efficiency, or

efficacy till the adjudication of the present Application.

(e) Any other relief that this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and

proper in the facts and circumstances of the present case and in

the interest of justice.”

4. O.M.P.(I)(COMM.) 447/2025 has been filed, on 27.10.2025,

under Section 9 of the A&C Act, seeking the following reliefs:

“….

a) Pass an ex-parte order thereby restraining the Respondent from

passing any order in pursuance to the show cause dated

09.10.2025 (Document No. 77) consequently not to levy any

compensation under Clause 2 of the GCC since time has not

remained essence of contract during the pendency of the

arbitration proceedings; And/Or;

b) In-1alternative to Prayer (a) above, the Respondent be

restrained from enforcing any order if passed in pursuance to

show cause dated 09.10.2025 during the pendency of the

arbitration proceedings; And /Or;

c) Pass an order thereby restraining the respondent from taking

any further coercive action against the petitioner for the project

in question; And/Or;

d) Pass an order thereby directing the respondent to record

completion of the already completed/handed over buildings of

the project in terms of Clause 8 of the GCC as requested vide

letter dated 07.08.2024 (Document No. 26) of the petitioner;

And/ Or;

e) Pass an order thereby directing the Respondent to provide

documents as requested by the petitioner in Para 11.6 of the

reply dated 16.10.2025 to the show cause notice dated

09.10.2025 for filing of a complete reply by the petitioner;

And/Or;

f) Pass any other and further order(s) as are deemed fit and proper

in the facts and circumstances of the case and to meet the end

of justice in favour of the petitioner and against the

Respondent.”

ARB.P. 1787/2025 & connected matters Page 7 of 52

5. O.M.P.(I)(COMM.) 484/2025 has been filed, on 22.11.2025,

under Section 9 of the A&C Act, seeking the following reliefs:

“….

a) Pass an ex-parte order thereby restraining the Respondent from

passing any order in pursuance to the show cause notices dated

10.10.2025 (Document No. 87) and 17.11.2025 (Document No.

132) consequently not to terminate the contract without

complying with the provision of Clause l(v) of the GCC during

the pendency of the arbitration proceedings; And/Or;

b) In alternative to Prayer (a) above, the respondent be restrained

from enforcing any order if passed in pursuance to show cause

notices dated 10.10.2025 (Document No. 87) and 17.11.2025

(Document No. 132) without complying with the provision of

Clause l(v) of the GCC during the pendency of the arbitration

proceedings without complying with the provision of Clause

l(v) of the GCC during the pendency of the arbitration

proceedings; And/Or;

c) Pass an order thereby directing the respondent to conduct a

joint verification of the defects rectified by the petitioner in the

presence of an independent expert/local commissioner before

passing any final order pursuant to show cause notice dated

10.10.2025 and 17.11.2025; And/Or;

d) Pass an order thereby permitting the Petitioner to rectify the

defects if any within 60 days of the joint verification; And/or

e) Pass any other and further order(s) as are deemed fit and proper

in the facts and circumstances of the case and to meet the end

of justice in favour of the petitioner and against the

Respondent.”

BRIEF FACTS LEADING TO THE PRESENT

ADJUDICATION:

6. Shorn of unnecessary details, before proceeding to adjudicate

upon the issues involved in the present Petitions, the brief factual

background germane to the institution thereof may be summarised as

follows:

(a) The Petitioner herein is a company duly incorporated under the

Companies Act, 2013, and is an enlisted contractor in various

Government Departments, including the Respondent/CPWD.

ARB.P. 1787/2025 & connected matters Page 8 of 52

(b) The Petitioner was declared the successful bidder by CPWD for

the work of Construction of Permanent campus under Phase-

1 for IIM Jammu at Jagti Jammu, containing the work of

various nature

2

vide letter of acceptance dated 16.10.2020

3

.

(c) Upon the submission of a Bank Guarantee by the Petitioner, the

parties herein entered into an Agreement bearing No.

01/EE/CE-cum-ED/IIM/2020-21.

(d) Material on record indicates that the Agreement contains a

Dispute Resolution Clause, being Clause 25 of the GCC, which

stipulates the reference of disputes firstly to the Dispute

Redressal Committee

4

.

(e) It is stated that during the course of execution of the Project,

certain disputes arose between the Petitioner and the CPWD

concerning execution of the works, pending dues, delays,

defects, rectification works and contractual obligations under

the agreement.

(f) It is further stated that substantial portions of the project,

including academic, residential and infrastructure facilities,

were progressively handed over between July 2023 and June

2024 and the project campus was inaugurated on 20.02.2024.

(g) Material placed on record reflects that CPWD issued show

cause notices to the Petitioner in October-November, 2025

concerning alleged defects and deficiencies in the execution of

the works.

2

Project

3

Letter of Acceptance

4

DRC

ARB.P. 1787/2025 & connected matters Page 9 of 52

(h) Pursuant to the disputes that had arisen inter se the parties, the

Petitioner invoked Clause 25 of the GCC and initiated the

contractual dispute resolution mechanism.

(i) It is stated that following the failure to initiate the proceedings

before the DRC, disagreements arose between the parties

regarding the constitution of the learned Arbitral Tribunal,

including objections concerning the appointment and eligibility

of the nominee Arbitrators and the Presiding Arbitrator.

(j) Consequently, the Petitioner instituted ARB.P. 1787/2025 under

Section 11 of the A&C Act before this Court, seeking

appropriate reliefs in relation to the constitution of the Arbitral

Tribunal in terms of Clause 25 of the Agreement.

(k) In addition, the Petitioner also instituted, from time to time,

various proceedings under Section 9 of the A&C Act, being

OMP(I)(COMM.) 35/2025, OMP(I)(COMM.) 447/2025 and

OMP(I)(COMM.) 484/2025, seeking interim protection against

alleged coercive measures initiated by the CPWD.

(l) In the interregnum, and during the pendency of the aforenoted

Petitions, IIM Jammu moved applications under Order 1 Rule

10 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure,

1908

5

, being I.A. 30458/2025, I.A. 30390/2025, and I.A. No.

29997/2025

6

, seeking impleadment as a respondent in the

petitions, being ARB.P. 1787/2025, O.M.P.(I)(COMM.)

447/2025 and O.M.P.(I)(COMM.) 484/2025, on the grounds,

inter alia, that IIM Jammu was the ultimate beneficiary of the

project, having funded the project works through CPWD and

5

CPC

6

Impleadment Applications

ARB.P. 1787/2025 & connected matters Page 10 of 52

having participated in review meetings and correspondence

concerning the execution of the project.

(m) The said Impleadment Applications came to be listed before the

learned Joint Registrar of this Court and came to be finally

allowed vide Order dated 23.01.2026

7

, thereby IIM Jammu

came to be impleaded as Respondent No. 2 in the said petitions.

(n) Aggrieved by the aforesaid Impleadment Orders passed by the

learned Joint Registrar, the Petitioner herein preferred the

Chamber Appeals before this Court, in the respective petitions,

assailing the legality and correctness thereof.

(o) The said Chamber Appeals preferred by the Petitioner came to

be allowed by this Court vide common Judgment dated

23.01.2026, whereby the Impugned Impleadment Orders passed

by the learned Joint Registrar were set aside and thereby IIM,

Jammu, was removed from the array of the parties.

(p) Being dissatisfied with the aforesaid common Judgment, IIM

Jammu preferred Appeals before the Division Bench of this

Court. The Division Bench, however, without entering into or

expressing any opinion on the merits of the rival contentions,

disposed of the said Appeals, vide Order dated 24.03.2026, in

the following terms:

“….

FAO(OS) 32/2026, FAO(OS) (COMM) 62/2026 &

FAO(OS) (COMM) 63/2026

3. The present appeals have been preferred under Section

10 of the Delhi High Court Act, 1966, impugning the

common Order dated 19.02.2026 passed by the learned

Single Judge in O.A. No. 42/2025, O.A. No. 41/2025 and

O.A. No. 40/2025, filed by Respondent No.1 in ARB.P.

7

Impleadment Order

ARB.P. 1787/2025 & connected matters Page 11 of 52

No. 1787/2025, OMP (I) (COMM.) No. 447/2025 and

OMP (I) (COMM.) No. 484/2025, respectively.

4. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant submits

that the appeals preferred before the learned Single Judge

impugns the Separate Orders passed by the learned Joint

Registrar on 23.01.2026. In terms of the applicable Delhi

High Court Rules, such appeals were required to be filed

within 15 days, i.e., on or before 04:00 PM on 07.02.2026.

However, the same came to be filed only at 10:47 PM on

the said date, resulting in a delay of at least 01 day. It is

contended that no application seeking condonation of

delay accompanied the said appeals, and yet, without

condoning the delay, the learned Single Judge proceeded

to allow the said appeals.

5. Per Contra, learned counsel for the respondents raises a

preliminary objection with regard to the maintainability of

present appeals.

6. At this stage, after advancing some arguments, learned

counsel for the parties agree that, without going into the

merits of the matter, or adjudicating upon the issue of

maintainability, the ends of justice would be met if the

matter is remanded back to the learned Single Judge. It is

agreed that the Respondent No.1 shall move an

appropriate application seeking condonation of delay in

support of the said appeals preferred before the learned

Single Judge against the Separate Orders dated

23.01.2026.

7. It is further agreed that the learned counsel for the

appellant shall be at liberty to file a reply to the said

application in the shortest possible time. Thereafter, the

learned Single Judge may decide the applications for

condonation of delay and the said appeals, in accordance

with the law.

8. In view of the aforesaid consensus and without

expressing any opinion on the merits of the case or the

issue of maintainability, the Impugned Orders dated

19.02.2026 are set aside, with the aforesaid directions.

9. The present appeals stand disposed of in the above

terms and the said appeals are restored before the learned

Single Judge to their original number.”

(emphasis supplied)

(q) Pursuant to the restoration of the Chamber Appeals in terms of

the order passed by the Division Bench, the Petitioner filed

ARB.P. 1787/2025 & connected matters Page 12 of 52

appropriate applications in the said Chamber Appeals seeking

condonation of the delay of one day in their institution.

(r) In view thereof, and as a necessary sequitur, this Court is first

required to adjudicate upon the applications seeking

condonation of delay in filing the Chamber Appeals. Only upon

such delay being condoned, if permissible in law, would this

Court proceed to examine the merits of the Chamber Appeals in

the abovementioned three Petitions.

(s) The ultimate adjudication upon the merits of the present four

petitions would thereafter necessarily depend upon and follow

the outcome rendered in those Chamber Appeals.

(t) Since subsequently elaborate submissions were addressed

before this Court not only in relation to the applications seeking

condonation of delay and the merits of the Chamber Appeals,

but also with respect to the substantive issues arising in the

present four petitions, this Court considers it appropriate to

examine and adjudicate all such issues comprehensively in this

common order in the sequence noted hereinabove.

I.A. 8810/2026 (Delay of 1 day in filing of the Chamber Appeal) in

O.A. 42/2026 in ARB.P. 1787/2025

I.A. 8915/2026 (Delay of 1 day in filing of the Chamber Appeal) in

O.A. 41/2026 in O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 447/2025

I.A. 8914/2026 (Delay of 1 day in filing of the Chamber Appeal) in

O.A. 40/2026 in O.M.P.(I)(COMM.) 484/2025

7. The Chamber Appeals, being O.A. 42/2026, O.A. 41/2026 and

O.A. 40/2026, under Rule 5, Chapter II of the Delhi High Court

ARB.P. 1787/2025 & connected matters Page 13 of 52

(Original Side) Rules, 2018

8

, read with Section 151 of the CPC, have

been filed seeking to challenge the Impleadment Orders passed by the

learned Joint Registrar in the respective petitions.

8. Pursuant to the Order dated 24.03.2026 passed by the Division

Bench of this Court in FAO(OS) 32/2026, FAO(OS) (COMM)

62/2026 & FAO(OS) (COMM) 63/2026, the Applications, being I.A.

8810/2026, I.A. 8915/2026 and I.A. 8914/2026, have been filed, in the

respective Chamber Appeals, under Section 5 of the Limitation Act,

1963

9

read with Section 151 of the CPC, seeking the condonation of

the delay of one day in filing those Chamber Appeals.

9. At the very outset, this Court considers it appropriate to first

adjudicate upon the applications seeking condonation of the delay of

one day in filing the present Chamber Appeals. Before proceeding to

examine the merits of the said applications, this Court shall record and

consider the rival submissions advanced on behalf of the respective

parties in relation thereto, hereinafter.

Submissions on behalf of the Parties:

10. Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of IIM Jammu

raises a preliminary objection on the Applications seeking

condonation of delay.

11. He would seek to challenge the maintainability of the

Applications on the ground that, firstly, the Impleadment Order that

came to be passed by the learned Joint Registrar was done while

exercising its power that came to be delegated by this Court. It would

be submitted that since the learned Joint Registrar was acting upon the

powers delegated by this Court, the Impleadment Orders have to be

8

Original Side Rules

9

Limitation Act

ARB.P. 1787/2025 & connected matters Page 14 of 52

construed as orders that have come to be passed by this Court itself,

and therefore, this Court cannot sit in appeal over such Orders that

essentially, as per the learned Senior Counsel for IIM Jammu, are

passed by this Court itself.

12. The second ground that the learned Senior Counsel for IIM

Jammu would seek to canvass is that the Original Side Rules do not

expressly provide for condonation of delay in filing the Chamber

Appeal, nor does it expressly provide that the Limitation Act would be

applicable to the Original Side Rules.

13. It would be contended that the Original Side Rules constitute a

complete and self-contained procedural code governing proceedings

on the Original Side of this Court and, therefore, the applicability of

the provisions of the Limitation Act stands excluded either expressly

or by necessary implication.

14. It would further be argued that where the Rules prescribe a

specific procedure, timeline, or remedy, the same must be strictly

adhered to and cannot be supplemented by recourse to the general

provisions of the Limitation Act.

15. In essence, the submission would be that the Original Side

Rules, being a special procedural framework framed in exercise of

statutory powers, prevail over the general law of limitation, and

consequently, provisions such as Section 5 of the Limitation Act

would not stand attracted unless specifically incorporated.

16. The learned Senior Counsel would further argue that the

Chamber Appeals under Chapter II Rule 5 of the Original Side Rules

is not an ordinary statutory appeal. It is a sui generis internal appellate

ARB.P. 1787/2025 & connected matters Page 15 of 52

mechanism, created by the said Rules, against specified procedural

orders of the learned Registrar passed under Chapter II Rule 3.

17. He would submit that if such a remedy is permitted to be filed

at any indefinite future point through Section 5 of the Limitation Act,

or by resort to any of the inherent powers conferred upon this Court,

the inevitable consequence would be that every order passed by the

learned Registrar would remain vulnerable to challenge ad infinitum,

without there being a definitive bar to preferring the same.

18. It would further be argued that a perusal of the Original Side

Rules would indicate that the intent of the said Rules to provide for

“flexibility” is expressed equivocally wherever the lawmakers

intended to do so.

19. A comparison would be sought to be made with Chapter VII

Rule 4, where the right to file a Written Statement stands closed

within the time prescribed, being 30 days and upon showing sufficient

cause, the same can be extended up to 90 days, but not thereafter.

This, as would be submitted by the learned Senior Counsel, clearly

shows that, if intended, the flexibility has been granted within the

Original Side Rules itself and since Chapter II Rule 5 only provides

for a period of 15 days, it indicates that the statute does not provide

for such a flexibility to be extended to the litigant who chose to sleep

over its rights within the time prescribed to prefer a Chamber Appeal

as per the provisions therein.

20. To further buttress his argument, he would seek to rely upon the

judgments of this Court passed by the Division Bench in Ram Sarup

ARB.P. 1787/2025 & connected matters Page 16 of 52

Lugani v Nirmal Lugani

10

and CM Corps Ltd. v Rani Kapoor and

Others

11

.

21. Learned Senior Counsel for IIM Jammu would also seek to

place reliance upon the judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

CCE & Customs v. Hongo India (P) Ltd.

12

to contend that the ratio

laid down in the said judgement squarely applies to the present case

and that the Original Side Rules create the remedy, prescribe the

limitation, and consciously do not confer the power to condone the

delay under Chapter II Rule 5, and therefore, Section 5 of the

Limitation stands excluded by necessary implication.

22. On a demurrer, learned Senior Counsel would also submit that

the said Chamber Appeals, which have been filed belatedly, cannot be

salvaged by invoking the inherent powers under Chapter I Rule 16 of

the Original Side Rules or under Section 151 of the CPC. He would

submit that it is well settled that inherent powers may supplement

procedure where there is a genuine vacuum. They cannot be used to

defeat the structure of rules or to override a deliberate omission.

23. It would therefore be argued that once Section 5 of the

Limitation Act stands excluded and no independent power of

condonation exists under the Original Side Rules, this Court cannot

inquire into the sufficiency of the cause shown. The defect is not

merely procedural; it would be submitted that it is jurisdictional.

Therefore, it would be contended that the said Chamber Appeals,

having been instituted beyond the prescribed period of fifteen days,

10

2020 SCC OnLine Del 1353

11

2025 SCC OnLine Del 9838

12

(2009) 5 SCC 791

ARB.P. 1787/2025 & connected matters Page 17 of 52

are not maintainable and are liable to be dismissed in limine at the

threshold.

24. Per contra, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the

Applicant would submit that the objections sought to be raised by the

non-applicant proceed on a fundamentally misconceived

understanding of the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by the learned

Joint Registrar as well as the scope and operation of the Original Side

Rules.

25. It would be submitted that the contention that the present

Chamber Appeals are not maintainable since the learned Joint

Registrar exercises powers delegated by this Court is wholly

untenable.

26. Learned Senior Counsel would contend that the very existence

of Chapter II Rule 5 of the Original Side Rules itself demolishes the

said submission, inasmuch as the Rules expressly contemplate a

remedy by way of Chamber Appeal against specified orders passed by

the learned Joint Registrar. Once the Rules themselves create a

statutory intra-court remedy against such orders, it is not open for the

non-applicant to contend that this Court cannot examine the

correctness of the same.

27. It would further be submitted that the learned Joint Registrar,

though exercising powers delegated by this Court, nevertheless

functions as a distinct procedural authority under the scheme of the

Original Side Rules, and the Chamber Appeal is nothing but a

continuation of the supervisory jurisdiction expressly preserved under

the Rules themselves.

ARB.P. 1787/2025 & connected matters Page 18 of 52

28. Learned Senior Counsel for the Applicants would further

submit that the argument seeking exclusion of Section 5 of the

Limitation Act is equally devoid of merit. It would be contended that

exclusion of the provisions of the Limitation Act cannot be readily

inferred and must either be expressly provided or flow by necessary

implication from the statutory framework.

29. According to the learned Senior Counsel, neither the Original

Side Rules nor the Delhi High Court Act, 1966, contains any

provision expressly barring the applicability of Section 5 of the

Limitation Act to Chamber Appeals preferred under Chapter II Rule 5.

To further buttress his argument, he would seek to rely upon the

judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v.

Borse Bros. Engineers & Contractors (P) Ltd.

13

.

30. It would further be argued that the Original Side Rules are

merely procedural rules framed by this Court in exercise of delegated

rule-making powers and do not constitute a self-contained code so as

to completely oust the operation of the general law of limitation.

31. The Rules, it would be submitted, regulate procedure and

practice on the Original Side; however, they do not create substantive

rights in derogation of statutory enactments such as the Limitation

Act. In the absence of an express exclusionary clause, the provisions

of the Limitation Act would continue to apply, particularly where the

consequence sought to be imposed is the extinguishment of a vested

remedy of appeal.

32. Learned Senior Counsel would submit that the reliance placed

by IIM Jammu upon the judgment in Hongo India (supra) is

13

(2021) 6 SCC 460

ARB.P. 1787/2025 & connected matters Page 19 of 52

misplaced and wholly distinguishable. It would be argued that the said

judgment arose in the context of a special fiscal statute where the

legislature itself had prescribed a rigid and peremptory limitation

regime and consciously excluded the applicability of Section 5 of the

Limitation Act. In contradistinction, the Original Side Rules are not a

parliamentary enactment creating a special statutory tribunal with

restricted jurisdiction. Rather, they are procedural rules framed for

regulating the internal administration and procedure of this Court. It

would therefore be submitted that the ratio of Hongo India (supra)

cannot be mechanically imported into the present case.

33. Learned Senior Counsel would further contend that the mere

prescription of a limitation period under Chapter II Rule 5 does not,

ipso facto, amount to exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It

would be submitted that Section 5 itself employs language of the

widest possible amplitude by providing that “any appeal” or “any

application”, other than those specifically excluded, may be admitted

after the prescribed period upon sufficient cause being shown.

34. According to the learned Senior Counsel, the legislature

consciously employed the expression “any appeal” without restricting

the same only to appeals arising under specific parliamentary

enactments. In the present case, the Chamber Appeal contemplated

under Chapter II Rule 5 is unquestionably an appellate remedy created

under the Rules against orders passed by the learned Registrar and

therefore squarely falls within the ambit of the expression “any

appeal” occurring under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

35. It would be argued that once the lawmakers have neither

expressly excluded the applicability of Section 5 nor employed any

ARB.P. 1787/2025 & connected matters Page 20 of 52

prohibitory language restricting the power of condonation, the

ordinary operation of Section 5 must necessarily continue to apply.

36. Learned Senior Counsel would also submit that any

interpretation seeking to curtail the scope of the expression “any

appeal” would amount to judicially reading limitations into the statute

which the legislature itself has consciously refrained from imposing.

37. It would further be submitted that if the lawmakers intended to

completely prohibit condonation of delay, the Rules would have

expressly employed language indicating a peremptory embargo, as has

been done in several statutory schemes where the legislature

consciously restricts the power of extension beyond a prescribed

period.

38. The absence of such restrictive language, according to the

learned Senior Counsel, is significant and indicative of the fact that

the Rules never intended to exclude the general discretionary

jurisdiction of this Court to condone marginal delays upon sufficient

cause being shown.

39. Insofar as the comparison sought to be drawn with Chapter VII

Rule 4 is concerned, learned Senior Counsel would submit that the

same, in fact, militates against the case sought to be set up by IIM

Jammu. It would be argued that Chapter VII Rule 4 pertains to the

filing of Written Statements in commercial causes, where strict

timelines have been statutorily engrafted pursuant to the amendments

introduced under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, and the CPC. The

same operate in a wholly distinct field and derive their rigidity from a

statutory mandate. The absence of similar restrictive language under

Chapter II Rule 5 would therefore clearly demonstrate that no absolute

ARB.P. 1787/2025 & connected matters Page 21 of 52

embargo upon condonation was intended in respect of Chamber

Appeals.

40. It would further be submitted that the power of this Court to

condone delay also inheres in its plenary procedural jurisdiction

preserved under Section 151 of the CPC as well as Chapter I Rule 16

of the Original Side Rules.

41. Learned Senior Counsel would submit that procedural rules are

handmaidens of justice and cannot be interpreted in a manner that

defeats substantive adjudication, particularly where the delay involved

is merely of one day and no prejudice whatsoever is demonstrated to

have been caused to the non-applicant.

42. Learned Senior Counsel for the Applicant would also submit

that the objection raised by the non-applicant is hyper-technical and

seeks to elevate procedure above substance. It would be contended

that the Chamber Appeals had, in fact, already been entertained and

adjudicated upon by this Court earlier and the Division Bench, while

remanding the matter, never held that the delay was incapable of being

condoned. On the contrary, the Division Bench merely directed that

appropriate applications seeking condonation be filed and adjudicated

first. It would therefore be submitted that the very remand order

proceeds on the implicit recognition that this Court possesses the

jurisdiction to examine and condone the delay, if sufficient cause

exists.

43. It would also be submitted that the present Applications

disclose sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 5 of the

Limitation Act; that the delay is minimal, bona fide, and wholly

ARB.P. 1787/2025 & connected matters Page 22 of 52

unintentional; and that refusal to condone the delay would result in

grave prejudice by shutting out adjudication on merits.

44. Lastly, it would also be submitted by the learned Senior

Counsel for the Applicant that even though the Impleadment Order

came to be passed by the learned Registrar on 23.01.2026, it only

came to be signed and uploaded on the website of this Court on

24.01.2026, where the complete order came to be made available to

the parties. Seen from the date of signing and uploading of the said

Order, the Chamber Appeals, filed on 07.02.2026, are within the

prescribed period of 15 days and therefore are not filed belatedly.

Analysis:

45. This Court has heard the learned Senior Counsel appearing on

behalf of the parties and, with their able assistance, perused the record.

46. The controversy that arises for consideration in the present

Applications is narrow and lies within a limited compass, namely,

whether the delay of one day in filing the present Chamber Appeals

under Chapter II Rule 5 of the Original Side Rules is capable of being

condoned by this Court.

47. The preliminary objection raised by IIM Jammu proceeds on

two broad limbs: firstly, that the Chamber Appeals themselves are not

maintainable since the order impugned therein is an order passed by

the learned Joint Registrar while exercising delegated powers of this

Court; and secondly, that the Original Side Rules constitute a self-

contained procedural code which excludes, either expressly or by

necessary implication, the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation

Act.

ARB.P. 1787/2025 & connected matters Page 23 of 52

48. Insofar as the first objection is concerned, this Court finds itself

wholly unable to accept the same. Chapter II Rule 5 of the Original

Side Rules expressly contemplates and preserves a remedy by way of

Chamber Appeal against specified orders passed by the Registrar/Joint

Registrar. The very existence of such a provision is indicative of the

intent that orders passed by the learned Registrar or Joint Registrar are

not intended to attain unquestionable finality and remain amenable to

judicial scrutiny by the Court. Once the Rules themselves create an

appellate or supervisory mechanism against such orders, it would be

wholly impermissible to contend that this Court lacks the authority to

examine the correctness thereof.

49. The submission of the non-applicant proceeds upon an incorrect

conflation between the delegation of power and the identity of the

forum. Merely because the learned Joint Registrar exercises powers

delegated by this Court does not mean that every order passed by the

learned Joint Registrar assumes the character of a judicial

determination rendered by the Court itself. Delegation of procedural

powers is an administrative and functional device intended to facilitate

the efficient conduct of proceedings and streamline judicial

administration. However, the authority exercised by the learned Joint

Registrar remains circumscribed by the framework of delegation and

continues to be subject to the supervisory and corrective jurisdiction

expressly retained by this Court under the Rules.

50. If the submission canvassed by IIM Jammu were to be

accepted, the inevitable consequence would be that Chapter II Rule 5

itself would stand rendered otiose and nugatory.

ARB.P. 1787/2025 & connected matters Page 24 of 52

51. A settled principle of interpretation requires that a statutory

provision or rule must be construed in a manner that gives meaningful

effect to it and not in a manner that renders it redundant or

superfluous. The Court cannot adopt an interpretation which

effectively nullifies an express remedy consciously created under the

Rules themselves.

52. The Chamber Appeal mechanism under Chapter II Rule 5 is not

an ornamental or illusory remedy. It constitutes an integral part of the

procedural architecture of the Original Side Rules whereby judicial

oversight over procedural and interlocutory determinations made by

the Registrar/Joint Registrar is preserved. The said mechanism ensures

that parties aggrieved by orders passed in exercise of delegated

authority are not left remediless and that procedural determinations

remain subject to scrutiny by the Court. Therefore, the argument that

this Court cannot “sit in appeal” over an order passed by the learned

Joint Registrar fundamentally misunderstands the very nature and

purpose of the appellate framework expressly embedded in the Rules.

53. Further, the use of the expression “appeal” under Chapter II

Rule 5 itself carries significance. The draftspersons were fully

conscious that the orders impugned therein would emanate from the

exercise of delegated powers of the Court and yet consciously created

a remedy permitting an appellate remedy. Thus, the jurisdiction

exercised by this Court in a Chamber Appeal is not an exercise of

sitting in appeal over its own order, but rather an exercise of

jurisdiction expressly preserved against determinations rendered by a

delegate functioning under the procedural scheme of the Rules.

ARB.P. 1787/2025 & connected matters Page 25 of 52

54. Therefore, this Court finds no merit in the preliminary objection

raised by IIM Jammu. The contention, if accepted, would not only

defeat the plain language of Chapter II Rule 5 but would also denude

litigants of a remedy specifically conferred upon them under the

Original Side Rules. Such an interpretation cannot be countenanced

either on principle or on a plain reading of the Rules.

55. At this point, this Court also take note of the fact that the Rule

is not under challenge and the submissions advanced would

encompass and be subsumed in a challenge to the Rules itself and this

Court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under the Rules, cannot

conduct the exercise of a determination of what, in essence, is a

substantive challenge to the Rule while exercising the jurisdiction

conferred under the Rule.

56. This Court also finds no merit in the submission that the

provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act stand excluded in

relation to Chamber Appeals preferred under Chapter II Rule 5.

57. It is a settled principle of law that exclusion of the Limitation

Act is not to be readily inferred. Such exclusion must either be express

or arise by necessary implication from the statutory framework. Mere

prescription of a period of limitation does not, by itself, amount to

exclusion of the power to condone delay.

58. A careful perusal of the Original Side Rules reveals no

provision expressly barring the applicability of Section 5 of the

Limitation Act. Equally, this Court is unable to discern any necessary

implication flowing from the scheme of the Rules so as to conclude

that the lawmakers intended to altogether exclude the discretionary

jurisdiction of this Court to condone delay in appropriate cases.

ARB.P. 1787/2025 & connected matters Page 26 of 52

59. The submission that the Original Side Rules constitute a

complete and self-contained code also does not commend acceptance.

The said Rules are procedural in character and have been framed to

regulate practice and procedure on the Original Side of this Court.

They do not possess the status of a special parliamentary enactment

creating substantive rights coupled with rigid exclusionary limitation

provisions. In the absence of an express legislative bar, the general

principles embodied under the Limitation Act cannot be held to stand

displaced merely by implication.

60. The reliance placed by the non-applicant upon the judgment of

Hongo India (supra) is misconceived. The said decision arose in the

context of a special fiscal statute where the legislature had consciously

enacted a strict and exhaustive limitation regime. The observations

made therein cannot be mechanically extended to procedural rules

framed by this Court for internal administration and regulation of

proceedings on the Original Side.

61. This Court also finds substance in the submission advanced on

behalf of the Applicant that the comparison sought to be drawn with

Chapter VII Rule 4 of the Original Side Rules, in fact, undermines the

case of the non-applicant itself. Wherever the lawmakers intended to

impose a rigid and inflexible embargo, the same has been expressly

articulated in clear language. No such restrictive or prohibitory

language finds place under Chapter II Rule 5. The absence thereof

assumes significance and militates against the contention that the

power of condonation stands excluded.

62. Insofar as the reliance placed by the learned Senior Counsel for

IIM Jammu upon the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in

ARB.P. 1787/2025 & connected matters Page 27 of 52

Ram Sarup Lugani (supra) is concerned, this Court finds the same to

be clearly distinguishable and inapplicable to the facts of the present

case.

63. The decision in Ram Sarup Lugani (supra) turned upon the

interpretation of a provision which itself employed express

exclusionary language by stipulating that the prescribed period could

be extended “but not thereafter”. It was in the backdrop of such

peremptory and prohibitory language that the Division Bench came to

hold that the power to condone delay beyond the statutorily prescribed

outer limit stood excluded.

64. The present case stands on an entirely different footing. Chapter

II Rule 5 of the Original Side Rules merely prescribes a period of

limitation of fifteen days for filing a Chamber Appeal. Significantly,

the said provision does not contain any restrictive expression akin to

“but not thereafter”, nor does it prescribe any absolute outer limit

beyond which the delay becomes incurable. The absence of such

exclusionary phraseology assumes considerable significance. It is a

settled principle that where the legislature or the rule-making authority

intended to place an absolute embargo upon extension of time, it has

consciously done so in express terms.

65. Thus, the very foundation upon which the judgment in Ram

Sarup Lugani (supra) proceeded is absent in the present case. The

reliance placed thereupon by IIM Jammu is therefore misconceived.

Rather, the omission of any restrictive phrase such as “but not

thereafter” under Chapter II Rule 5 militates against the contention

that the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act stands

excluded by necessary implication. In the absence of any such express

ARB.P. 1787/2025 & connected matters Page 28 of 52

or implied prohibition, this Court finds no reason to deny recourse to

the beneficial and enabling provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation

Act, particularly where the delay involved is merely of one day.

66. This Court cannot lose sight of the fact that the delay involved

in the present matter is merely of one day. The law relating to

condonation of delay is founded upon advancement of substantial

justice and not upon punishing litigants for marginal procedural

lapses. Unless gross negligence, deliberate inaction, or mala fides are

demonstrated, Courts ought to lean in favour of adjudication on merits

rather than shutting the doors of justice on technical considerations.

67. Insofar as the contention advanced on behalf of IIM Jammu is

concerned, namely that permitting such Chamber Appeals to be

entertained beyond the prescribed period of limitation, in the absence

of any express enabling provision for condonation of delay, would

open the floodgates for parties to file appeals at any point of time after

a prolonged delay and thereby render the orders passed by the learned

Joint Registrar perpetually vulnerable, this Court is of the considered

opinion that the said contention is wholly misconceived.

68. The power of condonation of delay under Section 5 of the

Limitation Act is neither unbridled nor automatic. The benefit thereof

can be availed only by a party that is able to satisfactorily establish the

existence of “sufficient cause” preventing it from approaching the

Court within the prescribed period of limitation. The principles

governing the interpretation and application of the expression

“sufficient cause” are no longer res integra and have been consistently

settled through judicial pronouncements, which require the Court to

ARB.P. 1787/2025 & connected matters Page 29 of 52

examine the facts and circumstances of each case with due regard to

bona fides, diligence and absence of deliberate inaction.

69. Therefore, the apprehension expressed by IIM Jammu that

recognition of the power to condone delay would permit filing of

appeals at any indefinite stage, irrespective of the length or nature of

delay, is unfounded and contrary to the settled legal position.

Consequently, this Court finds no merit in the said submission.

Conclusion:

70. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is satisfied that

sufficient cause has been shown by the Applicants for condonation of

the delay of one day in filing the Chamber Appeals in the respective

Petitions. The present Applications are accordingly allowed, and the

delay in filing the Chamber Appeals stands condoned.

71. The Applications are disposed of in the aforesaid terms.

O.A. 42/2026 in ARB.P. 1787/2025

O.A. 41/2026 in O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 447/2025

O.A. 40/2026 in O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 484/2025

72. Since this Court has found the delay in filing the present

Chamber Appeals to be liable to be condoned, this Court now

proceeds to adjudicate upon the Chamber Appeals on their merits,

which have been preferred assailing the Impugned Impleadment

Orders passed by the learned Joint Registrar.

73. This Court notes that the reliefs sought in the aforesaid

Chamber Appeals are identically framed and essentially challenge the

separate Orders dated 23.01.2025 passed by the learned Joint

Registrar (Judicial) of this Court, whereby I.A. 30458/2025, I.A.

ARB.P. 1787/2025 & connected matters Page 30 of 52

30390/2025 and I.A. 29997/2025 were allowed, leading to the

impleadment of IIM Jammu/Applicant therein, as a party to the

proceedings instituted under Sections 9 and 11 of the A&C Act.

74. It is not in dispute that the reasoning adopted by the learned

Joint Registrar in the respective Impugned Orders, while allowing the

aforesaid applications, is materially identical.

75. In view of the fact that the present set of matters arises from

Orders of a similar character and involves common questions for

determination, this Court, for the purposes of convenience, brevity

and consistency, proposes to refer to the facts of O.A. 42/2026, which

is filed in ARB.P. 1787/2025, save and except where the context may

otherwise require.

76. The principal challenge raised by the Appellant before this

Court proceeds on the assertion that there exists no privity of contract

between the Petitioner and IIM Jammu.

77. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Petitioner would

submit that although IIM Jammu may be the principal beneficiary of

the project, the tender in question was floated by the CPWD, pursuant

to which the agreement came to be executed exclusively between the

Petitioner and CPWD. It would, thus, be contended that there exists

no contractual relationship between the Petitioner and IIM Jammu so

as to justify its impleadment in the present proceedings.

78. Per contra, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the

impleaded party, being IIM Jammu, would submit that IIM Jammu is

both a necessary and proper party to the present proceedings. It would

be contended that IIM Jammu is the principal entity for whose benefit

the project is being executed and that all financial disbursements

ARB.P. 1787/2025 & connected matters Page 31 of 52

towards the works carried out by the Petitioner emanate from IIM

Jammu.

79. Learned Senior Counsel for IIM Jammu would further submit

that the institution is the ultimate beneficiary of the works executed

and has played a substantive role in the overall decision-making

process relating to the execution of the project. To further buttress this

argument, he would seek to rely upon the minutes of various

meetings, which reveal that the same were chaired by the Director of

IIM Jammu, thereby indicating the dominant role allegedly played by

IIM Jammu in the execution and supervision of the project and

consequently, justifying its impleadment.

80. Reliance would also be placed upon a communication dated

19.11.2025 to contend that the Petitioner itself had approached IIM

Jammu seeking intervention and assistance in relation to disputes that

had arisen between the Petitioner and CPWD.

81. This Court has heard learned Senior Counsel appearing on

behalf of the parties and, with their able assistance, carefully

examined the material placed on record.

82. The sum and substance of the issue that arises for consideration

before this Court concerns the contours and permissibility of arbitral

participation by entities that are admittedly non-signatories to the

underlying Agreement and seek participation primarily on the basis

that they are the ultimate beneficiaries.

83. Upon a comprehensive consideration of the factual matrix, this

Court is of the considered opinion that IIM Jammu remains a non-

signatory to the agreement which forms the substratum of the present

ARB.P. 1787/2025 & connected matters Page 32 of 52

disputes. The contracts giving rise to the present lis stand executed

exclusively between the Petitioner and CPWD.

84. Acceptance of the submissions advanced on behalf of IIM

Jammu would result in far-reaching consequences. If the mere status

of being a principal entity or beneficiary of a project were held

sufficient to justify impleadment, then in every arbitration arising

from layered or delegated governmental projects, principal institutions

at multiple levels would necessarily have to be impleaded, thereby

disturbing the settled principle of party autonomy which forms the

bedrock of the A&C Act.

85. It is a matter of common commercial practice, particularly in

governmental projects, that principal institutions entrust execution to

specialised agencies such as CPWD, which alone undertake the

tendering process and execute agreements with contractors.

Contractors, in turn, perform works and raise bills strictly within the

contractual framework entered into with the tendering authority. The

legal relationship is thus defined by the instrument executed and not

by the identity of the ultimate institutional beneficiary.

86. In the present case, IIM Jammu had entered into a

Memorandum of Understanding dated 09.03.2019 with CPWD for the

execution of construction works pertaining to its proposed campus.

87. Pursuant thereto, CPWD issued a tender acceptance letter dated

16.10.2020 for the construction and maintenance of the academic

block of the proposed campus of IIM Jammu.

88. The disputes that have arisen emanate solely from the

agreement subsequently executed between the Petitioner and the

ARB.P. 1787/2025 & connected matters Page 33 of 52

CPWD, and the arbitration clause invoked in the present proceedings

is traceable only to the said agreement.

89. At the outset, it is pertinent to note that the scheme of the A&C

Act proceeds on the premise that every arbitration agreement operates

within the confines of the particular contract and the parties thereto.

Even where disputes may appear factually interconnected, the Court,

while exercising jurisdiction under Section 11 of the A&C Act, is

required to independently examine the existence of an arbitration

agreement in respect of each distinct contract.

90. The statutory framework does not contemplate a composite or

omnibus arbitral reference merely because multiple transactions may

be interlinked. The legal position in this regard has been succinctly

explained by this Court in Arunachalam Chandrasekharan and Ors

v. Concept Capital Infra Project Pvt. Ltd and Anr

14

, which reads as

under:

“8. At the outset, it is apposite to note that the Hon’ble Supreme

Court in Duro Felguera, S.A. v. Gangavaram Port Ltd. has

categorically held that where parties have entered into multiple

independent contracts, each containing a separate arbitration

clause, a single arbitral tribunal cannot be constituted to adjudicate

disputes arising out of all such contracts. The Apex Court, while

considering the provisions of the Act, held that the Court’s

jurisdiction at the stage of appointment of an arbitrator is confined

to examining the existence of an arbitration agreement.

9. In that case, which concerned five separate contracts, each

dealing with distinct subject matters and containing independent

arbitration clauses, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that there

could not be a “composite reference” or the constitution of a single

arbitral tribunal to adjudicate disputes arising under all such

contracts, notwithstanding any interconnection between them. The

relevant portion of Duro Felguera (supra) is extracted herein

under:

“22. On behalf of GPL, it was repeatedly urged that the

works are intrinsically connected, inseparable, integrated,

interlinked and that they are one composite contract and

14

2026:DHC:1364

ARB.P. 1787/2025 & connected matters Page 34 of 52

that they were split up only on the request and

representations given by Duro Felguera and FGI. As

discussed earlier, as per amended provision Section 11(6-

A), the power of the Supreme Court or the High Court is

only to examine the existence of an arbitration agreement.

From the record, all that we could see are five separate

letters of award; five separate contracts; separate subject-

matters; separate and distinct work; each containing

separate arbitration clause signed by the respective parties

to the contract.

23. All the above five contracts awarded to Duro Felguera

and FGI have independent arbitration clauses. Mr Sunil

Gupta and Mr A.M. Singhvi, learned Senior Counsel have

taken us through the contract agreements in New Package

No. 4 awarded to M/s Duro Felguera and Package No. 6

(for sample) awarded to FGI and submitted that all the

five different contracts have independent arbitration

clauses (in sub-clause 20.6). In the contract New Package

No. 4 there is a header “Supply of bulk material handling

equipments and parts on F.O.B. basis”. Likewise, contract

agreement for Package No. 6 contains the header “Design,

manufacture, supply, installation, erection, testing

commissioning of bulk material handling equipments and

all other activities related therewith”. Various clauses in

the Original Package No. 4 TD were suitably modified

and incorporated in the split-up contract agreements. Sub-

clause 20.6 dealing with arbitration in the Original

Package No. 4 TD has been reproduced in New Package

No. 4 and other Packages Nos. 6 to 9. The contract for

New Package No. 4 which was entered into between M/s

Duro Felguera and GPL, also contains an arbitration

clause, which reads as under:

“Sub-clause 20.6—Arbitration

Any dispute in respect of which amicable

settlement has not been reached within the

period stated in sub-clause 20.5, shall be

finally and conclusively settled by arbitration

under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,

1996 by appointing two arbitrators one by

each party and a presiding arbitrator to be

appointed by the said arbitrators. Any such

arbitration proceeding shall be within the

exclusive jurisdiction of court of law at

Hyderabad, India. The place of arbitration

shall be Hyderabad and the language of

arbitration shall be English. The contractor

shall continue to attend to discharge all his

ARB.P. 1787/2025 & connected matters Page 35 of 52

obligations under the contract during pendency

of the arbitration proceedings.”

38. The submission of GPL is that since reference to

Original Package No. 4 TD is made in MoU, the

arbitration clause is incorporated in the MoU and there has

to be a “composite reference” for settling the disputes

under different contracts by constitution of single Arbitral

Tribunal for dealing with the international commercial

arbitration. As discussed earlier, as per the amended

provision of sub-section (6-A) of Section 11, the power of

the court is only to examine the existence of arbitration

agreement. When there are five separate contracts each

having independent existence with separate arbitration

clauses, that is, New Package No. 4 (with foreign

company Duro Felguera) and Packages Nos. 6, 7, 8 and 9

[with Indian subsidiary (FGI)] based on MoU and

Corporate Guarantee, there cannot be a single Arbitral

Tribunal for “international commercial arbitration”.

(emphasis added)

10. The aforesaid proposition is not only judicially recognized but

is also embedded in the statutory framework of the Act.

11. This Court also takes note of Section 2(8) of the Act, which

contemplates a party to a specific arbitration agreement, as is

evident from the repeated reference to “an arbitration agreement”.

The statutory language makes it clear that the Act proceeds on the

basis of identifiable parties to a particular agreement. Section 2(8)

of the Act reads as follows:

“2. Definitions.-

****

(8) Where this Part-

(a) refers to the fact that the parties have agreed or that

they may agree, or

(b) in any other way refers to an agreement of the parties,”

….”

12. Further, Section 7 of the Act defines an “arbitration agreement”

as an agreement between the parties to submit to arbitration

disputes that have arisen or may arise between them in respect of a

defined legal relationship. It also mandates that such an agreement

must be in writing and may either be in the form of an arbitration

clause in a contract or a separate agreement. The emphasis

throughout the provision is on “an agreement” between specific

parties concerning a defined legal relationship. Section 7 of the Act

is reproduced hereunder:

“7. Arbitration agreement.- (1) In this Part, “arbitration

agreement” means an agreement by the parties to submit

to arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen or

which may arise between them in respect of a defined

legal relationship, whether contractual or not.

ARB.P. 1787/2025 & connected matters Page 36 of 52

(2) An arbitration agreement may be in the form of an

arbitration clause in a contract or in the form of a separate

agreement.

(3) An arbitration agreement shall be in writing.

(4) An arbitration agreement is in writing if it is contained

in—

(a) a document signed by the parties;

(b) an exchange of letters, telex, telegrams or other means

of telecommunication which provide a record of the

agreement; or

(c) an exchange of statements of claim and defence in

which the existence of the agreement is alleged by one

party and not denied by the other. (5) The reference in a

contract to a document containing an arbitration clause

constitutes an arbitration agreement if the contract is in

writing and the reference is such as to make that

arbitration clause part of the contract. ”

(emphasis supplied)

13. A plain reading of Section 7(1) of the Act makes it abundantly

clear that the statute contemplates “an agreement” between “the

parties” to that particular agreement to submit disputes to

arbitration. The expression necessarily refers to the parties of a

particular agreement governing a defined legal relationship. Such

parties are bound in respect of that agreement alone. The provision

does not envisage the consolidation of numerous independent

agreements executed by different parties into a single arbitral

reference. However, the manner in which the present Petition has

been instituted, by clubbing together disputes arising out of

multiple, distinct agreements, effectively seeks to create a form of

class-action proceeding, which is alien to the scheme of Section 11

of the Act.

14. This Court also takes note of Section 11(6A) of the Act, which

mandates that while considering an application for appointment of

an arbitrator, the Supreme Court or the High Court shall confine

itself to the examination of the existence of “an arbitration

agreement”. Section 11(6A) of the Act reads as follows:

“11. Appointment of arbitrators.-

****

(6A) The Supreme Court or, as the case may be, the High

Court, while considering any application under sub-

section (4) or sub-section (5) or sub-section (6), shall,

notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any

Court, confine to the examination of the existence of an

arbitration agreement.

…. ”

(emphasis supplied)

15. A careful perusal of Section 11(6A) indicates that the

legislative intent is to restrict the Court’s scrutiny to the existence

ARB.P. 1787/2025 & connected matters Page 37 of 52

of “an arbitration agreement” between “the parties” to that

particular agreement before it. The use of the singular expression

reinforces the position that the Court must examine each arbitration

agreement independently. This statutory limitation effectively

undermines the Petitioners’ contention that a composite petition,

founded upon multiple separate agreements, is maintainable.”

(emphasis supplied)

91. In the present case, therefore, the adjudicatory exercise must

remain confined to the specific agreement which binds the parties to

arbitration and cannot be expanded so as to include entities or

arrangements falling beyond the scope of that defined legal

relationship.

92. The Impugned Impleadment Orders passed by the learned Joint

Registrar proceed on the premise that IIM Jammu, being the ultimate

beneficiary and funding authority, deserves to be impleaded. The

relevant extracts of the Impugned Orders are reproduced herein

below:

“28. On perusal of law laid down in aforesaid judgments and on

applying the same to the facts and circumstances of the case in

hand, I am of the considered view that applicant/IIM Jammu is

entitled of being impleaded as a party in the present matter as the

premises in question have been constructed for applicant/IIM

Jammu. Applicant/IIM Jammu is beneficiary of the premises in

question and all the payment for construction of premises has been

made/is to be made by IIM/Jammu. Applicant/IIM Jammu is the

ultimate beneficiary/sufferer of all the acts/omissions of petitioner.

Applicant/IIM Jammu has supervised the entire construction

process and has been involved in day-to-day affairs/decisions with

respect to construction of premises in question. Para/Clause 36.0

(page no. 115) of Notice inviting tender gives applicant/IIM

Jammu the power to do so. Applicant/IIM Jammu had played

active role in performance of the Contract/Agreement in question.

29. It is also a matter of record that the petitioner itself had written

letter to Director as well as other Board Members of IIM Jammu to

intervene and mediate when disputes arose between petitioner and

respondent.

30. Respondent/CPWD was acting as an agent of applicant/IIM

Jammu and presence of applicant/IIM Jammu is very much

essential and required for the complete and effective adjudication

ARB.P. 1787/2025 & connected matters Page 38 of 52

of the dispute between parties. Though IIM Jammu is not signatory

to the Arbitration Agreement but the positive, direct and

substantial involvement of applicant/IIM Jammu in fulfilling the

terms and conditions of notice inviting tender etc. establishes its

role as necessary party to the dispute.”

93. As is evident from the reasoning adopted by the learned Joint

Registrar, impleadment has primarily been permitted on the ground

that IIM Jammu stands to benefit from the project and has supervised

certain aspects of its execution.

94. This Court is unable to accept that the status of an “ultimate

beneficiary” can constitute the governing test for impleadment in

arbitral proceedings. Arbitration, being fundamentally consensual in

nature, cannot be enlarged to include entities merely because they

derive a benefit or possess an institutional interest in the project. The

law in this regard has been succinctly laid down by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. BCL

Secure Premises Pvt. Ltd.

15

, which reads as under:

“24. The scope of jurisdiction of the referral court hearing a

Section 11-Petition when faced with an issue of joinder of a non-

signatory to the arbitration agreement has been lucidly set out by

the five-judge Bench of this Court in Cox and Kings

Limited v. Sap India Private Limited

1

. Though said in the context

of considering the Group of Companies doctrine, the said judgment

has a great bearing for the present case. This Court, speaking

through Chief Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, held as under:—

“84. It is presumed that the formal signatories to an

arbitration agreement are parties who will be bound by it.

However, in exceptional cases persons or entities who

have not signed or formally assented to a written

arbitration agreement or the underlying contract

containing the arbitration agreement may be held to be

bound by such agreement. As mentioned in the preceding

paragraphs, the doctrine of privity limits the imposition of

rights and liabilities on third parties to a contract.

Generally, only the parties to an arbitration agreement can

be subject to the full effects of the agreement in terms of

15

2025 SCC OnLine SC 2746

ARB.P. 1787/2025 & connected matters Page 39 of 52

the reliefs and remedies because they consented to be

bound by the arbitration agreement. Therefore, the

decisive question before the Courts or tribunals is whether

a non-signatory consented to be bound by the arbitration

agreement. To determine whether a non-signatory is

bound by an arbitration agreement, the Courts and

tribunals apply typical principles of contract law and

corporate law. The legal doctrines provide a framework

for evaluating the specific contractual language and the

factual settings to determine the intentions of the parties to

be bound by the arbitration agreement. [Gary

Born, International Arbitration Law and Practice,

(3

rd

Edn., 2021) at p. 1531.]

101. A formalistic construction of an arbitration

agreement would suggest that the decision of a party to

not sign an arbitration agreement should be construed to

mean that the mutual intention of the parties was to

exclude that party from the ambit of the arbitration

agreement. Indeed, corporate entities have the commercial

and contractual freedom to structure their businesses in a

manner to limit their liability. However, there have been

situations where a corporate entity deliberately made an

effort to be not bound by the underlying contract

containing the arbitration agreement, but was actively

involved in the negotiation and performance of the

contract. The level of the non-signatory party's

involvement was to the extent of making the other

party believe that it was a veritable party to the

contract, and the arbitration agreement contained

under it. Therefore, the Group of Companies doctrine

is applied to ascertain the intentions of the parties by

analysing the factual circumstances surrounding the

contractual arrangements. [Gary Born, International

Arbitration Law and Practice, (3

rd

Edn., 2021) at p. 1568.]

126. Evaluating the involvement of the non-signatory

party in the negotiation, performance, or termination of a

contract is an important factor for a number of

reasons. First, by being actively involved in the

performance of a contract, a non-signatory may create

an appearance that it is a veritable party to the

contract containing the arbitration agreement; second,

the conduct of the non-signatory may be in harmony

with the conduct of the other members of the group,

leading the other party to legitimately believe that the

non-signatory was a veritable party to the contract;

and third, the other party has legitimate reasons to

rely on the appearance created by the non-signatory

party so as to bind it to the arbitration agreement.

ARB.P. 1787/2025 & connected matters Page 40 of 52

169. In case of joinder of non-signatory parties to an

arbitration agreement, the following two scenarios will

prominently emerge: first, where a signatory party to an

arbitration agreement seeks joinder of a non-signatory

party to the arbitration agreement; and second, where a

non-signatory party itself seeks invocation of an

arbitration agreement. In both the scenarios, the referral

court will be required to prima facie rule on the

existence of the arbitration agreement and whether the

non-signatory is a veritable party to the arbitration

agreement. In view of the complexity of such a

determination, the referral court should leave it for the

Arbitral Tribunal to decide whether the non-signatory

party is indeed a party to the arbitration agreement on

the basis of the factual evidence and application of

legal doctrine. The Tribunal can delve into the factual,

circumstantial, and legal aspects of the matter to decide

whether its jurisdiction extends to the non-signatory party.

In the process, the Tribunal should comply with the

requirements of principles of natural justice such as giving

opportunity to the non-signatory to raise objections with

regard to the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal. This

interpretation also gives true effect to the doctrine of

competence-competence by leaving the issue of

determination of true parties to an arbitration agreement to

be decided by the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 16.

170.12. At the referral stage, the referral court should

leave it for the Arbitral Tribunal to decide whether the

non-signatory is bound by the arbitration agreement.”

(Emphasis supplied)

25. A careful reading of the above passage reveals that the referral

court should be prima facie satisfied that there exists an arbitration

agreement and as to whether the non-signatory is a veritable party.

It further holds that even if the referral court prima facie arrives at

the satisfaction that the non-signatory is a veritable party, the

Arbitral Tribunal is not denuded of its jurisdiction to decide

whether the non-signatory is indeed a party to the arbitration

agreement on the basis of factual evidence and application of legal

doctrine. The Court further reinforces this proposition by holding

that as to whether the non-signatory is bound would be for the

Arbitral Tribunal to decide.

*****

39. It will be apt to refer to the judgment of this Court in Khardah

Company Limited v. Raymon & Co.

6

wherein this Court held as

under:—

“The law of the subject is well settled and might be

stated in simple terms. An assignment of a contract might

result by transfer either of the rights or of the obligations

ARB.P. 1787/2025 & connected matters Page 41 of 52

thereunder. But there is a well-recognised distinction

between these two classes of assignments. As a rule

obligations under a contract cannot be assigned except

with the consent of the promise, and when such consent is

given, it is really a novation resulting in substitution of

liabilities. On the other hand rights under a contract are

assignable unless the contract is personal in its nature the

rights are incapable of assignment either under the law or

under an agreement between the parties.”

(emphasis supplied)

95. This Court is of the considered view that the reasoning adopted

by the learned Joint Registrar would lead to anomalous consequences.

Large infrastructure projects often involve several institutional

stakeholders at different levels. If every beneficiary were to be

regarded as a necessary party, arbitral proceedings would cease to

retain their consensual character and instead be converted into

sprawling multi-party disputes detached from the contractual

foundation of arbitration law.

96. The Impugned Impleadment Orders also place reliance upon the

supervisory role allegedly exercised by IIM Jammu and its alleged

involvement in day-to-day decision-making processes. In support

thereof, reliance has been placed upon Clause 36 of Part B (Civil

Works) of the Notice Inviting Tender No. 02/NIT/CE cum

ED/JPZ/2020-21, which reads as under:

“36.0 Quality Assurance: Quality of work is of paramount

importance. Contractor will be required to engage well-

experienced supervisors, engineers, skilled labour and deploy

modern T&P and other equipments to execute the work in a time

bound manner. Many items like exposed finish form work,

specialized flooring work, factory made door- window shutters,

proper slope maintaining in toilet units, sanitary- water supply

installation, textured finishing, aluminium and glass work and

water proofing treatment will specially require engagement of

skilled workers having experience particularly in execution of such

items.

ARB.P. 1787/2025 & connected matters Page 42 of 52

The contractor shall ensure quality construction in a planned and

time bound manner. Any substandard material / work beyond set

out tolerance limit shall be summarily rejected by the Engineer-in-

Charge & contractor shall be bound to replace / remove such sub-

standard / defective work immediately. If any material, even

though approved by Engineer -in-Charge is found defective or not

conforming to specifications shall be replaced / removed by the

contractor at his own risk & cost.

In addition to the supervision of work by CPWD engineers, the

Consultants / third party quality assurance representatives / Quality

Assurance of CPWD and IIM Jammu representatives shall also be

carrying out regular and periodic inspections of the on-going

activities in the work and deficiencies, shortcomings, inferior

workmanship pointed out by them shall be communicated by

CPWD engineers to the contractor. Upon receipt of instructions

from Engineer -in-Charge these are also to be made good by

necessary improvement, rectification, replacement upto his

complete satisfaction. Special attention shall be paid towards line

and level of internal and external plastering, exposed smooth

surface of RCC members by providing fresh shuttering plates,

rubberized linings to all the shuttering joints, accurate joinery work

in wooden doors and windows, thinnest joints in stone/ tiling /

cladding work, non-hollowness in floor and dado tiles work,

protection of scratches over flooring by impounding layer of

Plaster of Paris, water tight pipe linings, absence of hollow vertical

joints in brick masonry, proper compaction of filled up earth and

up keeping of quality assurance shall be of paramount importance.

It is proposed to have monthly meeting having CPWD officers,

IIM officials, Third party consultant of CPWD/IIM, consultant of

EPC contractor etc. for progress review. The progress of the work

shall be captured using Drone mounted camera. The entire battery

limit and path to be constructed along the boundary wall shall be

video graphed and still pictures captured for the purpose of

progress review on monthly basis after the planning period of

Three months is over. The approvals required for drone operation,

if any, shall be obtained by the EPC contractor from the concerned

department(s).”

(emphasis supplied)

97. A careful reading of Clause 36 demonstrates that although

representatives of IIM Jammu were entitled to participate in quality

assurance inspections, any observations made by them were

necessarily required to be communicated through CPWD engineers.

ARB.P. 1787/2025 & connected matters Page 43 of 52

The clause, therefore, preserves a clear distinction between the

executing authority and the principal institution.

98. The contractual framework thus recognises CPWD as the nodal

authority responsible for supervision, communication and contractual

enforcement vis-à-vis the contractor. The role assigned to IIM Jammu

remains merely advisory and supervisory to a limited extent and does

not translate into contractual control or privity.

99. Acceptance of the reasoning adopted in the Impugned

Impleadment Orders would effectively amount to rewriting the

contractual architecture by permitting IIM Jammu to assume a direct

contractual and supervisory role contrary to the express terms of the

agreement itself. Such an interpretation cannot be sustained in law.

Effectively, thereby, IIM Jammu would stand transposed as the

primary contestant instead of the contractual parties themselves.

100. Insofar as reliance placed upon the communication dated

19.11.2025 addressed by the Petitioner to the Director of IIM Jammu

is concerned, this Court finds that the said communication merely

indicates an attempt on the part of the Petitioner to seek institutional

assistance in resolving disputes with CPWD. The said letter, to the

mind of this Court, only evinces a request for facilitation or

intervention and cannot be construed as conferring upon IIM Jammu

the status of a contracting party or a party to the arbitration agreement.

101. Further, although the Impugned Impleadment Orders record a

finding regarding the “positive, direct and substantial involvement” of

IIM Jammu, the reasoning supporting such a conclusion is

conspicuously absent. The finding appears to rest upon broad

ARB.P. 1787/2025 & connected matters Page 44 of 52

generalisations rather than any demonstrable analysis of contractual

rights and obligations.

102. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the

considered opinion that the Impugned Orders passed by the learned

Joint Registrar in all three Chamber Appeals suffer from fundamental

infirmities. The reasoning adopted therein overlooks the settled

principle that arbitration is founded upon consent and that a party can

be subjected to arbitral proceedings only where it is bound by the

arbitration agreement. In the absence of privity of contract between

the Petitioner and IIM Jammu, and there being no material to

demonstrate that IIM Jammu is either a signatory to, or otherwise

bound by, the arbitration agreement, its impleadment is legally

unsustainable.

103. Accordingly, all three Chamber Appeals are allowed and the

separate Impugned Impleadment Orders dated 23.01.2025, passed in

I.A. 30458/2025, I.A. 30390/2025 and I.A. 29997/2025 are set aside.

ARB.P. 1787/2025

104. This Petition has been filed seeking the reference of the

disputes that have arisen between the parties to arbitration. The

Petition, inter alia, seeks directions to CPWD to abide by the

requisites as stated in the dispute resolution clause in terms of

nomination of the learned arbitrator on its behalf. The relevant clause,

being clause 25 of the GCC, reads as follows:

“Clause 25: Settlement of Disputes & Arbitration

Except where otherwise provided in the contract, all questions and

disputes relating to the meaning of the specifications, design,

drawings and instructions here-in before mentioned and as to the

quality of workmanship or materials used on the work or as to any

other question, claim, right, matter or thing whatsoever in any way

ARB.P. 1787/2025 & connected matters Page 45 of 52

arising out of or relating to the contract, designs, drawings,

specifications, estimates, instructions, orders or these conditions or

otherwise concerning the works or the execution or failure to

execute the same whether arising during the progress of the work

or after the cancellation, termination, completion or abandonment

thereof shall be dealt with as mentioned hereinafter:

(i) If the contractor considers any work demanded of him to be

outside the requirements of the contract, or disputes any

drawings, record or decision given in writing by the Engineer-

in-Charge or if the Engineer in Charge considers any act or

decision of the contractor on any matter in connection with or

arising out of the contract or carrying out of the work, to be

unacceptable and is disputed, such party shall promptly within

15 days of the arising of the disputes request the Chief

Engineer/ CPM, or where there is no Chief Engineer/CPM,

request the Additional Director General/Special Director

General ,who shall refer the disputes to Dispute Reressal

Committee (DRC) within 15 days along with a list of disputes

with amounts claimed if any in respect of each such dispute.

The Dispute Redressal Committee (DRC) give its decision

within a period of 60 days extendable by 30 days by consent of

both the parties from the receipt of reference from

CE/CPM/ADG/SDG. The constitution of Dispute Redressal

Committee (DRC) shall be as indicated in Schedule 'F'.

Provided that no party shall be represented before the Dispute

Redressal Committee by an advocate/legal counsel etc.

The DRC will submit its decision to the concerned ADG/SDG

for acceptance. ADG/ SDG in a time limit of 30 days from

receipt of DRC decision will convey acceptance or otherwise on

the said decision .If the Dispute Redressal Committee (DRC)

fails to give its decision within the aforesaid period or the

ADG/SDG fails to give his decision in the aforesaid time limit

or any party is dissatisfied with the decision of Dispute

Redressal Committee (DRC)/ ADG/ SDG the neither party may

within a period of 30 days from the receipt of the decision of

Dispute Redressal Committee (DRC)/ ADG/ SDG or on expiry

of aforesaid the time limits available to DRC/ ADG/SDG ,may

give notice to the Chief Engineer/CPM, CPWD, in charge of the

work or if there be no Chief Engineer/ CPM,, the Additional

Director General /Special Director General concerned or if there

be no Additional Director General/ Special Director General, the

Director General, CPWD for appointment of arbitrator on

prescribed proforma as per Appendix XVII under intimation to

the other party.

It is a term of contract that each party invoking arbitration must

exhaust the aforesaid mechanism of settlement of

claims/disputes prior to invoking arbitration.

ARB.P. 1787/2025 & connected matters Page 46 of 52

The CE/ADG/ SDG shall in such case appoint the sole arbitrator

or one of the three arbitrators as the case may be within 30 days

of receipt of such a request and refer such disputes to

arbitration. Wherever the Arbitral Tribunal consists of three

Arbitrators, the contractor shall appoint one arbitrator within 30

days of making request for arbitration or of receipt of request by

Engineer-in-charge to CE/ADG/ SDG /DG for appointment of

arbitrator, as the case may be, and two appointed arbitrators

shall appoint the third arbitrator who shall act as the Presiding

Arbitrator.

In the event of

(a) A party fails to appoint the second Arbitrator, or

(b) The two appointed Arbitrators fail to appoint the Presiding

Arbitrator, then the Director General, CPWD shall appoint

the second or Presiding Arbitrator as the case may be.

(ii) Disputes or difference shall be referred for adjudication through

arbitration by a Tribunal having sole arbitrator where claimed

amount is Rs. 20 Crore or less. Where claimed Value is more

than Rs. 20 Crore, Tribunal shall consist of three Arbitrators as

above. The requirements of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,

1996 (26 of 1996) and any further statutory modification or re-

enactment thereof and the rules made there under and for the

time being in force shall be applicable.

It is a term of this contract that the party invoking arbitration shall

give a list of disputes with amounts claimed, if any, in respect of

each such dispute along with the notice for appointment of

arbitrator and giving reference to the decision of the ADG/ SDG on

the finding / recommendation of DRC.

It is also a term of this contract that member(s) of the Arbitration

Tribunal shall be a Graduate Engineer with experience in handling

public works engineering contracts, and further he shall have

earlier worked at a level not lower than Chief Engineer/ equivalent

(i.e. Joint Secretary level of Government of India). This shall be

treated as a mandatory qualification to be appointed as arbitrator.

Parties, before or at the time of appointment of Arbitral Tribunal

may agree in writing for fast track arbitration as per the Arbitration

and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996) as amended in 2015.

Subject to provision in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

(26 of 1996) as amended in 2015 whereby the counter claims if

any can be directly filed before the arbitrator without any

requirement of reference by the appointing authority. The arbitrator

shall adjudicate on only such disputes as are referred to him by the

appointing authority and give separate award against each dispute

and claim referred to him and in all cases where the total amount of

the claims by any party exceeds Rs. 1,00,000/-, the arbitrator shall

give reasons for the award.

ARB.P. 1787/2025 & connected matters Page 47 of 52

It is also a term of the contract that fees payable to arbitral tribunal

shall be as approved by DG, CPWD, OM issued vide

no.2/2006/SE(TLC)/CSQ /137 dated 19-11-2019 (or its latest

amendment as approved by DG, CPWD). This fee shall be shared

equally by parties.

The place of arbitration shall be as mentioned in Schedule F. In

case there is no mention of place of arbitration, the arbitral tribunal

shall determine the place of arbitration.

The venue of the arbitration shall be such place as may be fixed by

the Arbitral Tribunal in consultation with both the parties. Failing

any such agreement, then the Arbitral Tribunal shall decide the

venue.”

(emphasis supplied)

105. It is stated that Petitioner was constrained to prefer the present

Petition owing to the following disputes that had arisen as between the

parties while attempting to constitute the learned Arbitral Tribunal in

terms of the Dispute Resolution Clause as noted herein above.

106. It is stated that, through various correspondences exchanged

between the parties, a consensus had been reached for referring the

disputes to arbitration. Pursuant thereto, vide letter dated 04.07.2025,

the Petitioner informed CPWD of its nomination of Shri Vinod Kumar

Malik, Former Special Director General, CPWD, as its nominee

arbitrator, and simultaneously called upon CPWD to appoint its

nominee arbitrator in terms of the arbitration agreement. Thereafter,

vide communication dated 30.07.2025, CPWD informed the Petitioner

that it had nominated Shri Vineet Kumar Jayaswal, Retired Director

General, CPWD, as its nominee arbitrator.

107. Thereafter, the nominee arbitrators appointed by the respective

parties jointly appointed Shri Sudhir Kumar, Former Additional

Director General, CPWD, as the Presiding Arbitrator. Pursuant to his

appointment, the learned Presiding Arbitrator furnished the disclosure

ARB.P. 1787/2025 & connected matters Page 48 of 52

contemplated under Section 12(1) of the A&C Act, vide

communication dated 09.08.2025.

108. However, it is stated that CPWD raised allegations regarding

the disclosure made by the learned presiding arbitrator, which was in

violation of CPWD’s OM dated 13.06.2025 and requested the learned

nominee arbitrators to propose someone else as the presiding

arbitrator. It is stated that another letter dated 26.08.2025 came to be

addressed by CPWD to the nominee arbitrators, raising allegations

including influence and bias of the learned presiding arbitrator.

109. Consequent thereof, the learned presiding arbitrator vide his

letter dated 23.09.2025 withdrew from the post of the presiding

arbitrator. As a result, Sh. Vineet Kumar Jayaswal, CPWD’s nominee

arbitrator, also withdrew from the office as a member of the learned

Arbitral Tribunal vide his letter dated 01.10.2025.

110. The Petitioner, vide letter dated 04.10.2025, requested CPWD

to nominate a substitute arbitrator in place of Sh. Vineet Kumar

Jayaswal.

111. CPWD vide letter dated 24.10.2025 confirmed the appointment

of Sh. Vinod Kumar Malik as the Petitioner’s nominee and further

informed about the nomination of Hon’ble Mr. Justice J.R. Midha,

Former Judge of this Court, as their nominee, which is stated to be

violative of the clear and binding stipulation under Clause 25 of the

GCC, which provides for the qualification of the arbitrator to

adjudicate the disputes arising out of the agreement entered into

between the parties.

112. It is stated that, in these factual backdrops, the Petitioner was

constrained to file the present Petition.

ARB.P. 1787/2025 & connected matters Page 49 of 52

113. It would be argued by the learned Senior Counsel for the

Petitioner that the said act of CPWD is violative of the agreed terms as

between the parties.

114. This Court is also of the considered view that the intent and

objective of the A&C Act, namely, party autonomy and equal

participation, would be rendered otiose if the parties were permitted to

step back from the agreed terms of their agreement.

115. Upon a pointed query, the learned CGSC appearing for CPWD,

on instructions, fairly submits that CPWD shall appoint its nominee

arbitrator in accordance with the Dispute Resolution Clause of the

GCC as agreed by the parties.

116. In view thereof, and since disputes have arisen inter se the

parties, this Court finds no impediment to referring the same to

arbitration. Accordingly, this Petition is allowed.

117. Since the Petitioner has already nominated its learned nominee

arbitrator, CPWD is directed to communicate to the Petitioner its

learned nominee arbitrator within 15 days from the receipt of this

Order.

118. Thereafter, the learned nominee arbitrators so appointed shall,

within a period of 15 days thereafter, appoint the presiding arbitrator

and thereafter proceed with the arbitration proceedings expeditiously

in accordance with the law.

119. All rights and contentions of the parties in relation to the

claims/counter-claims are kept open, to be decided by the learned

Tribunal on their merits, in accordance with law.

ARB.P. 1787/2025 & connected matters Page 50 of 52

120. Needless to say, nothing in this Order shall be construed as an

expression of opinion of this Court on the merits of the controversy

between the parties.

121. Accordingly, ARB.P. 1787/2025, along with pending

application(s), if any, stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms.

O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 35/2025

O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 447/2025

O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 484/2025

122. As a necessary corollary, and upon the consent of the parties

herein, the captioned Petitions under Section 9 of the A&C Act shall

be treated as Applications under Section 17 of the A&C Act, instead

of being adjudicated on merits by this Court.

123. The learned Arbitral Tribunal so appointed is requested to take

up the captioned applications for hearing as expeditiously as possible

upon entering into the reference.

124. All rights and contentions of the parties in relation to the

claims/counter-claims are kept open, to be decided by the learned

Tribunal on their merits, in accordance with law.

125. Needless to say, nothing in this Order shall be construed as an

expression of opinion of this Court on the merits of the controversy

between the parties.

CONSOLIDATED SUMMARY:

126. Brevitatis causa, the final conclusions in relation to the

Applications, Chamber Appeals, and the captioned Petitions

considered herein above may be summarised hereunder:

ARB.P. 1787/2025 & connected matters Page 51 of 52

S.

No.

Particulars Summary of the

conclusions

1. I.A. 8810/2026 (Delay of 1

day in filing of the Chamber

Appeal) in O.A. 42/2026 in

ARB.P. 1787/2025

I.A. 8915/2026 (Delay of 1

day in filing of the Chamber

Appeal) in O.A. 41/2026 in

O.M.P.(I) (COMM.)

447/2025

I.A. 8914/2026 (Delay of 1

day in filing of the Chamber

Appeal) in O.A. 40/2026 in

O.M.P.(I)(COMM.) 484/2025

Applications seeking condonation

of delay of one day in filing of the

Chamber Appeals are allowed,

and therefore, the said delay

stands condoned.

2. O.A. 42/2026 in ARB.P.

1787/2025

O.A. 41/2026 in O.M.P.(I)

(COMM.) 447/2025

O.A. 40/2026 in O.M.P.(I)

(COMM.) 484/2025

The Chamber Appeals are

allowed. Consequently, the

Impleadment Applications filed

by IIM Jammu, which had been

allowed by the learned Joint

Registrar vide Orders dated

23.01.2026, stand set aside.

3. ARB.P. 1787/2025

The Petition under Section 11 of

the A&C Act is allowed. CPWD

is directed to communicate to the

Petitioner the name of its

nominee Arbitrator within a

period of 15 days from the date of

ARB.P. 1787/2025 & connected matters Page 52 of 52

receipt of this Order.

Upon such nomination, the

nominee Arbitrators appointed by

the respective parties shall, within

a further period of 15 days,

appoint the Presiding Arbitrator,

thereby constituting the Arbitral

Tribunal.

The Arbitral Tribunal so

constituted shall thereafter

proceed to adjudicate the disputes

between the parties in accordance

with law.

4. O.M.P.(I)(COMM.) 35/2025

O.M.P.(I)(COMM.) 447/2025

O.M.P.(I)(COMM.) 484/2025

In view of the constitution of the

Arbitral Tribunal, the Petitions

under Section 9 of the A&C Act

stand disposed of. The petitions

shall be treated as Applications

under Section 17 of the A&C Act

and shall be taken up by the

learned Arbitral Tribunal for

consideration on their merits, in

accordance with law.

127. These Petitions as well as all pending Applications stand

disposed of in the above terms.

HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.

JULY 29, 2026/va