REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2010

(Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 29478 of 2009)

M/s Speedline Agencies .... Appellant(s)

Versus

M/s T. Stanes & Co. Ltd. .... Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

P. Sathasivam, J.

1) Leave granted.

2) This appeal is directed against the final judgment and order

dated 05.08.2009 passed by the High Court of Judicature at

Madras in Civil Revision Petition (NPD) No. 1729 of 2003

whereby the High Court dismissed the civil revision filed by

the appellant herein.

1

3)Brief facts in a nutshell are as under:

(a) The appellant took the suit premises in TS No. 1357

(bearing Old No. 6/499 and New No.8/499) on Trichy Road,

Coimbatore comprising an area of 1.4 acres, i.e., 61,872 sq. ft.

with a building having built up area of 5,274 sq. ft. on lease

under lease deed dated 17.11.1965 for use as residence-cum-

office from M/s United Coffee Supply Co. Ltd., for a period of

five years on a monthly rental of Rs.400/-. On the expiry of

the period, the lease was further renewed for a period of five

years under lease deed dated 01.10.1970. On failure to renew

the lease from 01.10.1975, the appellant instituted a suit in

O.S. No. 209 of 1976 for specific performance of the renewal

clause in the lease agreement dated 1.10.1970. In the said

suit, a settlement dated 12.04.1978 was arrived at whereby

the appellant agreed to pay fair rent of Rs.1200/- w.e.f.

1.10.1975.

(b) In the meantime, Government of Tamil Nadu brought into

force the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act,

1978 (hereinafter referred to as “the Ceiling Act”) on

17.05.1978. Under the provisions of the said Act, ceiling was

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fixed regarding extent of vacant land which may be owned by a

person and Government had the right to take possession of

the excess land over the ceiling limit. On 13.09.1978, the

erstwhile landlord-company applied for exemption from

acquisition of excess vacant lands. On 04.11.1981, the

erstwhile landlord company was granted partial exemption

from acquisition of vacant lands under Section 21(1)(a) of the

Ceiling Act on the ground of public interest by way of G.O. Ms.

No. 2900. On 25.06.1986, by way of G.O. (Rt) No. 852 issued

by the Revenue Department, the partial exemption earlier

granted was reviewed and extended to the entire extent of the

suit premises under Section 21(1)(a) of the Ceiling Act, i.e. on

the ground of public interest.

(c) In 1984, the landlord-company filed RCOP No. 397 of 1984

claiming monthly rental of Rs. 9500/- retrospectively from

01.10.1980. However, the Rent Controller, by order dated

18.10.1994, fixed the fair rent as Rs.6465/- from 1.10.1980.

The appellant filed R.C.A. No. 171 of 1994 whereunder the

rent was fixed as Rs.7852/- on 19.12.2001 which is currently

being paid. On 15.09.1985, the name of the landlord-

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company, M/s United Coffee Supply Co. Ltd. was changed to

Stanes Tea and Coffee Ltd.

(d) Stanes Tea and Coffee Ltd. filed RCOP No. 105 of 1987 on

03.04.1987 under Sections 10(3)(a)(i) and (iii) of the Tamil

Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960

(hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) on the ground that it

required the building and premises for their own use and

occupation and for providing residential accommodation to its

employees and that vacant areas were required for agency,

warehouses and research and development building, office

quarters and amenities for staff such as garage, cycle stand,

staff recreation club, community hall etc. The Rent Controller,

by its order, dated 09.04.1992 allowed the petition and

directed eviction of the appellant. Aggrieved by the said order,

the appellant filed an appeal being RCA No. 42 of 1992 before

the Appellate Authority and IInd Additional Subordinate Judge

of Coimbatore and the same was dismissed on 10.04.2003.

Against the said order, the appellant filed C.R.P. No. 1729 of

2003 before the High Court. During the pendency of the said

C.R.P. before the High Court, by a Scheme of Amalgamation,

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M/s Stanes Tea and Coffee Limited was transferred to M/s T.

Stanes & Company Ltd., with effect from 01.04.2005 under

Sections 391 to 394 of the Companies Act, 1956 and this was

duly approved by the High Court. Thereafter, an application

for amendment of the cause title was filed which was also duly

allowed by the High Court by order dated 10.07.2009. On

05.08.2009, the High Court dismissed the revision filed by the

appellant herein. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant

has preferred the above appeal before this Court by way of

special leave petition.

4)Heard Mr. K.K. Venugopal, learned senior counsel for the

appellant-tenant and Mr. K. Parasaran, learned senior counsel

for the respondent-landlord.

5)Mr. Venugopal, learned senior counsel for the appellant-

tenant mainly submitted that upon the amalgamation of the

original rent control petitioner with the respondent herein, the

new entity was not entitled to continue the eviction

proceedings under Section 10(3)(a)(i) and (iii) of the Act since

the need of the new entity will be different. In addition to the

same, though not seriously raised before the Courts below, he

5

submitted that other residential and non-residential buildings

owned by the respondent herein disable the new entity to

claim the benefit of order of eviction.

6)On the other hand, Mr. K. Parasaran, learned senior

counsel for the respondent-landlord, by taking us through the

Scheme of Amalgamation approved by the Company Judge

and the relevant provisions in the Act, submitted that after

merging of the Company which is the landlord with another

Company, there is no forfeiture of any right of the landlord

under the provisions of the Rent Control Act or the Transfer of

Property Act. He also submitted that the amalgamation of the

erstwhile landlord with the respondent herein involved not

merely the transfer of the particular leasehold property but the

entire business of the erstwhile landlord including their

requirement of the leasehold premises for the acquired

business. He also submitted that the subsequent events,

namely, the merger had taken place during the pendency of

the Revision before the High Court, are not matters of

automatic cognizance by this Court or a mandate on the

Courts below. He elaborately submitted that in the present

6

case, the landlord required the premises for its own business

and for residential purposes of its employees and the

requirement continues to exist also for the transferee company

since the entire business of the transferor company stood

transferred to the transferee company.

7) We have considered all the relevant materials and rival

contentions.

8) It is not in dispute that Stanes Tea and Coffee Ltd. has

approached the Rent Controller by filing a petition under

Section 10 (3) (a) (i) and (iii) of the Act for possession and

eviction against the tenant with regard to the premises in

question for its own use and occupation for residential and

non-residential purpose. The relevant provisions are extracted

hereunder:

“10. Eviction of tenants.- (1) xxx xxxx

(2) xxxxx

(3) (a) A landlord may, subject to the provisions of

clause (d), apply to the Controller for an order directing

the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the

building-

(i) in case it is residential building, if the landlord

requires it for his own occupation or for the occupation

of any member of his family and if he or any member of

his family is not occupying a residential building of his

own in the city, town or village concerned;

(ii) xxxx

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(iii) in case it is any other non-residential building, if the

landlord or any member of his family is not occupying

for purposes of a business which he or any member of

his family is carrying on, a non-residential building in

the city, town or village concerned which is own:…..”

9)After analyzing the materials the Rent Controller and the

Appellate Authority accepting the case of the landlord

concurrently found that there is a bona fide need and passed

an order of eviction against the tenant-appellant herein. It is

relevant to note that the rent control petition was filed on

03.04.1987 and the Rent Controller ordered eviction on

09.04.1992. The appeal filed by the tenant came to be

dismissed on 10.04.2003 by the Rent Control Appellate

Authority. Thereafter, the tenant filed a civil revision petition

under Section 25 of the Act on 18.08.2003 before the High

Court. During the pendency of the above said civil revision

petition before the High Court, the Scheme of Amalgamation

was finalized and by order dated 26.06.2006, the Company

Court sanctioned the Scheme. Thereafter, an application was

filed for amendment of the cause title in the civil revision

petition was filed by the tenant and the same was also

allowed.

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10)The Scheme of Amalgamation, filed in the appeal paper-

book, contains various definitions and clauses. Clause 1.1

defines “Transferor Company” and Clause 1.2 defines

“Transferee Company”. Among other clauses, we are

concerned with Clauses 1.5 and 6, which read thus:

“1.5 The “Effective date” shall mean the date on which the

certified copy of the order of the High Court of Madras

sanctioning the scheme vesting the assets, properties,

liabilities, rights, duties, obligations and the line of the

Transferor Company in the Transferee Company are filed

with Registrar of Companies of Tamil Nadu after obtaining

the consents, approvals, permissions, resolutions

agreements, sanctions and orders necessary thereof.”

“6. Legal Proceedings - With effect from the effective

date, if any suit, petition, appeal, revision or other

proceedings of whatever nature (hereinafter called “the

proceedings) by or agents the Transferor Company

under any statute whether pending on the Transfer

Date or which may be instituted in future (whether

before or after the effective date) in respect of any matter

arising before the effective date and relating to the

Transferred undertaking as agreed between the

Transferor Company and the Transferee Company shall

not abate be discontinued or be in any way prejudicially

affected by reason of the transfer of the said

assets/liabilities of the Transferor Company or of

anything contained in the scheme but the proceedings

may be continued, prosecuted and enforced by or

against the Transferee Company in the same manner

and to the same extent as it would be or might have

been continued prosecuted and enforced by or against

the Transferor Company as if the Scheme had not been

made.”

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Clause 15 makes it clear that the Transferor Company shall be

dissolved without winding up as and from the effective date or

such other date as the High Court of Madras may direct.

11)As mentioned earlier, after analyzing the Company

Petition filed for sanctioning the Scheme of Amalgamation

under Sections 391 to 394 read with Section 79 of the

Companies Act, 1956 and after satisfying all aspects, by order

dated 26.06.2006, the High Court sanctioned the Scheme with

effect from the transfer dated 01.04.2005 and allowed the

petitions accordingly.

12)After getting the order from the Company Court, the

Transferee Company filed a petition in the pending civil

revision petition filed by the tenant for amendment of the

cause title and it is not in dispute that the same was ordered

by the learned single Judge subject to objection by the tenant.

In the light of the above factual position, let us consider

whether after amalgamation of the original landlord with the

Transferee Company, the Transferee Company is entitled to

avail the benefit of the order of eviction granted under

10

Section 10 (3) (a) (i) and (iii) as passed by the Rent Controller,

approved by the Appellate Authority and the High Court.

13) Mr. Venugopal, learned senior counsel submitted that the

eviction was ordered on the ground of personal requirement

and such requirement must continue to exist till final

determination of the case. In view of the same, according to

him, the Appellate/Revisional Court must take cognizance of

subsequent events taking into account that the requirement of

the landlord is still continuing. In support of the above

proposition, he relied on the following three judgments:-

(i) In Hasmat Rai & Anr. vs. Raghunath Prasad (1981) 3

SCC 103, this Court held:-

“14……..If a landlord bona fide requires possession of a

premises let for residential purpose for his own use, he can

sue and obtain possession. He is equally entitled to obtain

possession of the premises let for non-residential purposes if

he wants to continue or start his business. If he commences

the proceedings for eviction on the ground of personal

requirement he must be able to allege and show the

requirement on the date of initiation of action in the court

which would be his cause of action. But that is not

sufficient. This requirement must continue throughout the

progress of the litigation and must exist on the date of the

decree and when we say decree we mean the decree of the

final court. Any other view would defeat the beneficial

provisions of a welfare legislation like the Rent Restriction

Act. If the landlord is able to show his requirement when the

action is commenced and the requirement continued till the

date of the decree of the trial court and thereafter during the

pendency of the appeal by the tenant if the landlord comes

in possession of the premises sufficient to satisfy his

11

requirement, on the view taken by the High Court, the

tenant should be able to show that the subsequent events

disentitled the plaintiff, on the only ground that here is

tenant against whom a decree or order for eviction has been

passed and no additional evidence was admissible to take

note of subsequent events. When a statutory right of appeal

is conferred against the decree or the order and once in

exercise of the right an appeal is preferred the decree or

order ceases to be final. What the definition of “tenant”

excludes from its operation is the person against whom the

decree or order for eviction is made and the decree or order

has become final in the sense that it is not open to further

adjudication by a court or hierarchy of courts. An appeal is a

continuation of suit. Therefore a tenant against whom a

decree for eviction is passed by trial court does not lose

protection if he files the appeal because if appeal is allowed

the umbrella of statutory protection shields him. Therefore it

is indisputable that the decree or order for eviction referred

to in the definition of tenant must mean final decree or final

order of eviction. Once an appeal against decree or order of

eviction is preferred, the appeal being a continuation of suit,

the landlord’s need must be shown to continue to exist at

appellate stage. If the tenant is in a position to show that the

need or requirement no more exists because of subsequent

events, it would be open to him to point out such events and

the court including the appellate court has to examine,

evaluate and adjudicate the same. Otherwise the landlord

would derive an unfair advantage. An illustration would

clarify what we want to convey. A landlord was in a position

to show that he needed possession of demised premises on

the date of the suit as well as on the date of the decree of the

trial court. When the matter was pending in appeal at the

instance of the tenant, the landlord built a house or

bungalow which would fully satisfy his requirement. If this

subsequent event is taken into consideration, the landlord

would have to be non-suited. Can the court shut its eyes and

evict the tenant? Such is neither the spirit nor intendment of

Rent Restriction Act which was enacted to fetter the

unfettered right of re-entry. Therefore when an action is

brought by the landlord under Rent Restriction Act for

eviction on the ground of personal requirement, his need

must not only be shown to exist at the date of the suit, but

must exist on the date of the appellate decree, or the date

when a higher court deals with the matter. During the

progress and passage of proceeding from court to court if

subsequent events occur which if noticed would non-suit the

plaintiff, the court has to examine and evaluate the same

and mould the decree accordingly. This position is no more

in controversy in view of a decision of this Court in

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Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu where Justice Krishna Iyer

speaking for the court observed as under: (SCC p. 772, para

4)

We affirm the proposition that for making the right or

remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful as also

legally and factually in accord with the current realities, the

court can, and in many cases must, take cautious

cognizance of events and developments subsequent to the

institution of the proceeding provided the Rules of fairness to

both sides are scrupulously obeyed.……..

…….Therefore, it is now incontrovertible that where

possession is sought for personal requirement it would be

correct to say that the requirement pleaded by the landlord

must not only exist on the date of the action but must

subsist till the final decree or an order for eviction is made. If

in the meantime events have cropped up which would show

that the landlord’s requirement is wholly satisfied then in

that case his action must fail and in such a situation it is

incorrect to say that as decree or order for eviction is passed

against the tenant he cannot invite the court to take into

consideration subsequent events. He can be precluded from

so contending when the decree or order for eviction has

become final. In view of the decision in Pasupuleti case the

decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Taramal case

must be taken to have been overruled and it could not be

distinguished only on the ground that the definition of

“tenant” in the Madhya Pradesh Act is different from the one

in Andhra Pradesh Act. Therefore, the High Court was in

error in declining to take this subsequent event which was

admittedly put forth in the plaint itself into consideration…

….”

In the present case, Clause 6 (Legal proceedings) of the

Scheme of Amalgamation makes it clear that with effect from

the effective date i.e. 01.04.2005 all proceedings in which

Transferor Company was a party be continued, prosecuted

and enforced by or against the Transferee Company in the

same manner and to the same extent as it would be or might

13

have been continued, prosecuted and enforced by or against

the Transferor Company as if the Scheme had not been made.

In view of the above specific clause coupled with other clauses

of the Scheme and taking note of the fact that the Transferor

Company in its entirety merged with the Transferee Company,

the above decision is not directly applicable to the case on

hand.

(ii) The next decision relied on by him is Saraswati

Industrial Syndicate Ltd. vs. C.I.T. 1990 (Supp) SCC 675.

In that case, the question was whether on the amalgamation

of the Indian Sugar Company with the appellant-Company i.e.

Saraswati Industrial Syndicate Ltd., the Indian Sugar

Company continued to have its entity and was alive for the

purposes of Section 41 (1) of Income Tax Act, 1961. This

Court held as under:-

“5. Generally, where only one company is involved in change

and the rights of the shareholders and creditors are varied, it

amounts to reconstruction or reorganisation of scheme of

arrangement. In amalgamation two or more companies are

fused into one by merger or by taking over by another.

Reconstruction or ‘amalgamation’ has no precise legal

meaning. The amalgamation is a blending of two or more

existing undertakings into one undertaking, the

shareholders of each blending company become

substantially the shareholders in the company which is to

carry on the blended undertakings. There may be

amalgamation either by the transfer of two or more

14

undertakings to a new company, or by the transfer of one or

more undertakings to an existing company. Strictly

‘amalgamation’ does not cover the mere acquisition by a

company of the share capital of other company which

remains in existence and continues its undertaking but the

context in which the term is used may show that it is

intended to include such an acquisition. See: Halsbury’s

Laws of England (4th edition volume 7 para 1539). Two

companies may join to form a new company, but there may

be absorption or blending of one by the other, both amount

to amalgamation. When two companies are merged and are

so joined, as to form a third company or one is absorbed into

one or blended with another, the amalgamating company

loses its entity.

6. In General Radio and Appliances Co. Ltd. v. M.A. Khader

the effect of amalgamation of two companies was considered.

M/s General Radio and Appliances Co. Ltd. was tenant of a

premises under an agreement providing that the tenant shall

not sub-let the premises or any portion thereof to anyone

without the consent of the landlord. M/s General Radio and

Appliances Co. Ltd. was amalgamated with M/s National

Ekco Radio and Engineering Co. Ltd. under a scheme of

amalgamation and order of the High Court under Sections

391 and 394 of Companies Act, 1956. Under the

amalgamation scheme, the transferee company, namely, M/s

National Ekco Radio and Engineering Company had

acquired all the interest, rights including leasehold and

tenancy rights of the transferor company and the same

vested in the transferee company. Pursuant to the

amalgamation scheme the transferee company continued to

occupy the premises which had been let out to the transferor

company. The landlord initiated proceedings for the eviction

on the ground of unauthorised sub-letting of the premises by

the transferor company. The transferee company set up a

defence that by amalgamation of the two companies under

the order of the Bombay High Court all interest, rights

including leasehold and tenancy rights held by the transferor

company blended with the transferee company, therefore the

transferee company was legal tenant and there was no

question of any sub-letting. The Rent Controller and the

High Court both decreed the landlord’s suit. This Court in

appeal held that under the order of amalgamation made on

the basis of the High Court’s order, the transferor company

ceased to be in existence in the eye of law and it effaced itself

for all practical purposes. This decision lays down that after

the amalgamation of the two companies the transferor

company ceased to have any entity and the amalgamated

company acquired a new status and it was not possible to

15

treat the two companies as partners or jointly liable in

respect of their liabilities and assets. …….

……The true effect and character of the amalgamation

largely depends on the terms of the scheme of merger. But

there cannot be any doubt that when two companies

amalgamate and merge into one the transferor company

loses its entity as it ceases to have its business. However,

their respective rights or liabilities are determined under the

scheme of amalgamation but the corporate entity of the

transferor company ceases to exist with effect from the date

the amalgamation is made effective.”

This case deals with reference to liability to pay income tax by

Transferor Company after amalgamation and hence not

applicable to the case on hand.

(iii) The third decision heavily relied on by Mr. Venugopal is

Hindustan Lever & Anr. vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr.

(2004) 9 SCC 438. In that case, Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd.

(transferor Company) was incorporated on 10.12.1917 under

the Companies Act, 1913. Hindustan Lever Ltd. (transferee

Company) was incorporated under the same Act on

17.10.1933. The scheme of amalgamation of the transferor

Company with the transferee Company was formulated and

approved by the Board of Directors of the respective

companies on 19.03.1993. On 03.03.1994 the scheme of

amalgamation of the transferor Company with the transferee

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Company was sanctioned with certain modifications by a

learned single Judge of the High Court. Appeal filed against

the judgment and order of the learned single Judge was

rejected by the Division Bench on 18.05.1994. The special

leave petition against the above judgment of the Division

Bench was dismissed by this Court on 24.10.1994. The

drawn-up order of amalgamation of the transferor Company

with the transferee Company was approved by the High Court

on 24.11.1994. On presentation of the certified copy of the

Court’s order, the Registrar of Companies, Maharashtra issued

a certificate amalgamating the two companies. In view of the

stamp duty sought to be levied on the order of amalgamation

passed under Section 394 of the Companies Act, 1956 the

appellant-Hindustan Lever filed writ petition in the Bombay

High Court challenging the constitutional validity of the

provisions of Section 2 (g)(iv) of the Bombay Stamp Act, 1958.

The Division Bench upheld the validity and dismissed the writ

petition. This decision mainly deals with payment of stamp

duty levied on the order of amalgamation and not helpful to

the case on hand.

17

14) With reference to the submissions made by Mr. Venugopal

and the above mentioned decisions relied on, amalgamation of

a company with another company under Sections 391 to 394

of the Companies Act has different legal consequences on the

rights of the Company in a case where it is a tenant of a

building entitled to the benefits of the Act and in a case where

company which amalgamates with another company is a

landlord of the building. When a company which is a tenant

amalgamates with another company, the amalgamating

company (Transferor Company) loses its identity. It would, in

law, amount to the amalgamating company inter alia

transferring its right under the lease even if it be considered as

an involuntary transfer. Such amalgamation would fall within

the mischief of Section 10(2)(ii)(a) of the Act when it is without

the written consent of the landlord and would result in

forfeiture of the tenancy [vide General Radio and Appliances

Co. Ltd. & Ors. vs. M.A. Khader (dead) by LRs. (1986) 2 SCC

656 and Singer India Ltd. vs. Chander Mohan Chadha and

Ors. (2004) 7 SCC 1.] As in the present case, the company

which is the landlord merges with another company, there is

18

no forfeiture of any right of the landlord under the provisions

of the Act or under the Transfer of Property Act.

15) In a case where a company is a tenant, amalgamation is

the cause of action for the landlord to sue the tenant company

for eviction on the ground of subletting without the consent of

the landlord. In the present case, the petition by the landlord

for eviction of the tenant was filed on 03.04.1987. The cause

of action has no relation to amalgamation, irrespective of

whether it is prior or subsequent to filing of the application for

eviction. The Rent Controller ordered eviction on 09.04.1992.

The appeal of the tenant was disposed of by the Appellate

Authority on 10.04.2003. The rights of the landlord are to be

determined as on the date of the application for eviction. The

order of eviction crystallized the rights of the landlord. The

tenant had filed the revision in the High Court on 18.08.2003.

During the pendency of the revision petition, the order for

amalgamation under the Companies Act passed by the High

Court was made on 26.02.2006 which is a subsequent event.

Revision Petition was disposed of by the High Court on

05.08.2009. As rightly pointed out by Mr. Parasaran, learned

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senior counsel, had the revision petition been disposed of

before 26.02.2006, this contention would not have arisen at

all. The delay in the disposal of the revision petition should

not prejudice the vested rights of the landlord under the

decree of the Rent Controller confirmed by the Appellate

Authority.

16) Further, the amalgamation of the erstwhile landlord with

the respondent herein involved not merely the transfer of the

particular leasehold property but the entire business of the

erstwhile landlord including the requirement of the leasehold

premises for the acquired business. In view of the factual

details including various clauses in the Scheme of

Amalgamation which was approved by the High Court, while

there is no quarrel about the proposition in the decision relied

on by Mr. Venugopal, they are not applicable to the case on

hand.

17) As far as the appellant’s prayer before this Court to take

note of the subsequent event of amalgamation, it is at the

outset submitted that subsequent events are not matters of

automatic cognizance by this Court or a mandate on the

20

courts below. A subsequent event is one which may be taken

into account in certain circumstances and deserves to be

eschewed and kept out of the purview of judicial consideration

in certain other cases. Mr. Parasaran, learned senior counsel

pointed out that in cases under Rent Acts there are two lines

of cases. One has taken into account subsequent events and

moulded the relief and the other refused to take into account

subsequent events. According to him, the present case falls

within the line of cases where subsequent event was not taken

into account. In the present case, he submitted that the

subsequent events do not have a fundamental impact on the

order of eviction based on the requirement of the landlord for

its own occupation and/or for purpose of its business.

According to him, the subsequent event is therefore not to be

taken into account. In Shakuntala Bai and Ors. vs.

Narayan Das & Ors. (2004) 5 SCC 772, it was held that with

regard to the category of cases where a decree for eviction is

passed and the landlord died during the pendency of the

appeal, the estate is entitled to the benefit which, under a

decree, has accrued in favour of the landlord and the legal

21

representatives are entitled to defend further proceedings like

an appeal which is challenged to the benefit under the decree.

18) We agree with Mr. Parasaran that, in normal

circumstances, after passing of the decree by the trial Court,

the landlord would have obtained possession of the premises,

but for the tenant continuing in occupation of the premises

only on account of stay order from the appellate court. In

such circumstances, the well known principle that “an act of

the court shall prejudice no man” shall come into operation.

Therefore, the heirs of the landlord will be fully entitled to

defend the appeal preferred by the tenant. When a company

stands dissolved (with or without winding up) due to

amalgamation, its rights under the decree for eviction devolves

on the amalgamated company.

19) Further in Usha P. Kuvelkar & Ors. vs. Ravindra

Subrai Dalvi, (2008) 1 SCC 330, this Court clearly brought

out the distinction between the cases where death occurred

after the decree and death occurring during the decree. It was

held in para 14 that:-

22

“……In the same decision a contrary note expressed by this

Court in P.V. Papanna v. K. Padmanabhaiah was held to be

in the nature of an obiter. This Court in Shakuntala Bai

referred to the decision in Shantilal Thakordas v. Chimanlal

Maganlal Telwala and specifically observed that the view

expressed in Shantilal Thakordas case did not, in any

manner, affect the view expressed in Phool Rani v. Naubat

Rai Ahluwalia to the effect that where the death of landlord

occurs after the decree for possession has been passed in his

favour, his legal heirs are entitled to defend the further

proceedings like an appeal and the benefit accrued to them

under the decree. Here in this case also it is obvious that the

original landlord, Prabhakar Govind Sinai Kuvelkar had

expired only after the eviction order passed by the Additional

Rent Controller. This is apart from the fact that the landlord

had sought the possession not only for himself but also for

his family members. There is a clear reference in Section

23(1)(a)(i) of the Act regarding occupation of the family

members of the landlord. In that view the contention raised

by the learned counsel for the respondent must be rejected.”

20) As to subsequent events, this Court in Gaya Prasad vs.

Pradeep Srivastava (2001) 2 SCC 604 at 609 para 10

observed as under:

“10. We have no doubt that the crucial date for deciding as

to the bona fides of the requirement of the landlord is the

date of his application for eviction. The antecedent days may

perhaps have utility for him to reach the said crucial date of

consideration. If every subsequent development during the

post-petition period is to be taken into account for judging

the bona fides of the requirement pleaded by the landlord

there would perhaps be no end so long as the unfortunate

situation in our litigative slow-process system subsists.

During 23 years, after the landlord moved for eviction on the

ground that his son needed the building, neither the

landlord nor his son is expected to remain idle without doing

any work, lest, joining any new assignment or starting any

new work would be at the peril of forfeiting his requirement

to occupy the building. It is a stark reality that the longer is

the life of the litigation the more would be the number of

developments sprouting up during the long interregnum. If a

young entrepreneur decides to launch a new enterprise and

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on that ground he or his father seeks eviction of a tenant

from the building, the proposed enterprise would not get

faded out by subsequent developments during the traditional

lengthy longevity of the litigation. His need may get dusted,

patina might stick on its surface, nonetheless the need

would remain intact. All that is needed is to erase the patina

and see the gloss. It is pernicious, and we may say, unjust to

shut the door before an applicant just on the eve of his

reaching the finale, after passing through all the previous

levels of the litigation, merely on the ground that certain

developments occurred pendente lite, because the opposite

party succeeded in prolonging the matter for such unduly

long period.”

It was further held in para 15 that:-

“15. The judicial tardiness, for which unfortunately our

system has acquired notoriety, causes the lis to creep

through the line for long long years from the start to the

ultimate termini, is a malady afflicting the system. During

this long interval many many events are bound to take place

which might happen in relation to the parties as well as the

subject-matter of the lis. If the cause of action is to be

submerged in such subsequent events on account of the

malady of the system it shatters the confidence of the

litigant, despite the impairment already caused.”

It would inflict great injustice in many cases if subsequent

events are taken into account when long years have passed

unless there are very compelling circumstances to take into

account the subsequent events.

21) In Smt. Phool Rani & Ors. vs. Shri Naubat Rai

Ahuluwalia, (1973) 1 SCC 688, at page 693, this Court, after

discussing the issue in paras 9, 10, 11 and 12 held in para 13

and 14 as under:-

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“13. Several decisions were cited before us but those falling

within the following categories are to be distinguished—

(i) cases in which the death of the plaintiff occurred after a

decree for possession was passed in his favour; say, during

the pendency of an appeal filed by the unsuccessful tenant;

(ii) cases in which the death of the decree-holder landlord

was pleaded as a defence in execution proceedings; and

(iii) cases in which, not the plaintiff but the defendant —

tenant died during the pendency of the proceedings and the

tenant’s heirs took the plea that the ejectment proceedings

cannot be continued against them.

14. Cases of the first category are distinguishable because

the decisions therein are explicable on the basis, though not

always so expressed, that the estate is entitled to the benefit

which, under a decree, has accrued in favour of the plaintiff

and therefore the legal representatives are entitled to defend

further proceedings, like an appeal which constitute a

challenge to that benefit.”

22) Particularly in matters governed by the Rent Acts to take

into account subsequent events would inflict hardship to

landlords, in a case like the present one. In this context, it

was held in para 9 of Joginder Pal vs. Naval Kishore Behal

(2002) 5 SCC 397 that:-

“9. The rent control legislations are heavily loaded in favour

of the tenants treating them as weaker sections of the society

requiring legislative protection against exploitation and

unscrupulous devices of greedy landlords. The legislative

intent has to be respected by the courts while interpreting

the laws. But it is being uncharitable to legislatures if they

are attributed with an intention that they lean only in favour

of the tenants and while being fair to the tenants, go to the

extent of being unfair to the landlords. The legislature is fair

to the tenants and to the landlords — both……”

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23) It is pointed out by Mr. Parasaran, learned senior counsel

that the tenant, in the present case, is an affluent company

and is not a tenant falling under the category of weaker

sections of tenants of small properties. He further submitted

that the principle of taking into consideration subsequent

event is to be confined only to appeals on the principle that an

appeal is a continuation of the proceedings and the appellate

court exercises all the powers of the trial Court. [Vide

Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul and Ors. vs. Keshwar Lal

Chaudhuri & Ors. AIR 1941 F.C. 5 at page 13.]

24) In the present case, subsequent event of amalgamation of

a company took place during the pendency of the revision in

the High Court. Though, subsequent events which have

occurred during the pendency of a revision petition in the High

Court or the matter was pending before this Court, have been

taken into consideration by this Court in some cases, the

question as to the difference between the exercise of

jurisdiction in appeal and revision was not argued or decided

in those cases.

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25) In a revision under Section 25 of the Act, the Court is

exercising a restricted jurisdiction and not wide powers of the

appellate court. In M/s Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works

and Ors. vs. Rangaswamy Chettiar (1980) 4 SCC 259 at

page 262 it was held:-

“……Therefore, despite the wide language employed in

Section 25, the High Court quite obviously should not

interfere with findings of fact merely because it does not

agree with the finding of the subordinate authority. The

power conferred on the High Court under Section 25 of the

Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act may not

be as narrow as the revisional power of the High Court under

Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure but in the words

of Untwalia, J., in Dattonpant Gopalvarao Devakate v.

Vithalrao Maruthirao Janagaval

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; “it is not wide enough to

make the High Court a second Court of first appeal”.

26) Mr. Parasaran reiterated that the High Court having only

the power of limited jurisdiction and not powers of appellate

court, the subsequent event which occurred during the

pendency of the revision petition is not to be taken into

account, the High Court will decide only as to the legality of

the order under revision.

27) Coming to the expression “for its own use/occupation”, it

has to be construed widely and given wide and liberal

meaning. When a company wants to expand its business and

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amalgamates with another company, this would also be a case

of “for its own use”. If a landlord which is a company cannot

advance its interest in the business by amalgamating with

another company by putting to use its own property, it would

be unjust, unfair and unreasonable. Further, the provisions

of Rent Control Act should not be so construed as to frustrate

and defeat the legislation. If in a case of landlord requiring the

premises for its own use, to amalgamate with another

company and expands its business, the rent control legislation

may clash with the provisions of the Companies Act. The

Companies Act and the Rent Control Act have to be

harmoniously interpreted and not to be so interpreted as to

result in the one Act destroying a right under the other Act.

28) As stated earlier, death of a landlord after passing the

order of eviction does not ipso facto destroy the accrued right

under the decree. The cases which have taken into account

the subsequent event in favour of the tenant are cases where

during the pendency of the appeal or revision, the requirement

of the landlord had been fully satisfied and met or ceased to

exist. In the case on hand, the landlord required it for its own

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business and for residential purposes of its employees. That

requirement continues to exist also for the transferee company

since the entire business of the transferor company stood

transferred to the transferee company. The requirement of the

company has neither been satisfied nor extinguished. The

right to evict has already crystallized into a decree to which

the company after amalgamation has succeeded by

involuntary assignment. As the decree for eviction was under

stay, the decree could not be executed. Once the stay is

vacated or dissolved, the respondent would be entitled to

execute the decree. In the present case, the amalgamation

order has also preserved the said right. As per Clause 1.7 of

the Scheme, all assets vest in the transferee company. As per

Clause 6, any suit, petition, appeal or other proceedings in

respect of any matter shall not abate or be discontinued and

shall not be prejudicially affected by reason of the transfer of

the said assets/liabilities of the Transferor Company or of

anything contained in the scheme but the proceedings may be

continued, prosecuted and enforced by or against the

transferee company in the same manner and to the same

29

extent as it would be or might have been continued prosecuted

and enforced by or against the Transferor company as if the

scheme has not been made. In view of the same, by virtue of

the provisions in the Scheme of Amalgamation and operation

of Order 21 rule 16 of C.P.C., the decree holder is deemed to

execute the decree. Section 18 of the Act provides that the

order of eviction shall be executed by the Controller as if such

order is an order of a civil court and for this purpose, the

Controller shall have all the powers of the civil court. For the

purpose of execution of the order, all the powers of civil court

have been invested in the Rent Controller. Therefore, the

principle of Order 21 Rule 16 of the C.P.C. will apply. In any

event, as rightly pointed out by learned senior counsel for the

respondent that the C.P.C. provisions to the extent advance

public interest or ensure a just, fair and reasonable procedure

and does not conflict with the Act will apply to execution of the

order of eviction.

29) The landlord’s entitlement to evict the tenant had merged

with the decree. Further, the amalgamation took place long

after the decree for eviction and rights had crystallized under

30

the decree for eviction and merged into it. The tenant has

been in possession of vast extent of property which comprises

of a big building with built up area of 5,274 sq. ft. together

with appurtenant space i.e. vacant land total measuring

61,872 sq. ft. from the year 1965 for a period of over 45 years.

The appellant was initially paying rent of Rs. 400/- for the

building and Rs. 300/- for the furniture and fixtures which

was raised to Rs. 400/- and Rs. 475/- respectively in 1970’s.

The Rent Controller fixed the fair rent as Rs. 6,465/- by order

dated 18.10.1994 which was enhanced by the appellate

authority in an appeal filed by the appellants to Rs. 7,852/- by

order dated 19.12.2001.

30) The assets of the erstwhile company had vested in the

amalgamated company. A decree constitutes an asset. The

said asset of erstwhile company has devolved on the

amalgamated company. The eviction was on the ground of its

own requirement of the erstwhile company. The said business

will be continued to be carried by the amalgamated company.

If the amalgamated company is deprived of the said benefit, it

will frustrate the very purpose of amalgamation and defeat the

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order of amalgamation passed by the High Court exercising

jurisdiction under the Companies Act.

31) Further, the vacant land which was leased along with the

building is the subject matter of the proceedings under the

Ceiling Act. The landlord has obtained an order of exemption

under Section 21 of the Act vide G.O. Rt. No. 2900 dated

04.11.1981 and the order G.O. Rt. No. 852 dated 25.06.1986.

The exemption was expressly for the extension of the industry

which is a public purpose. It is relevant to mention that under

Section 21, only when the requirement of public interest is

satisfied, the Government has power to grant exemption. It is

also pointed out the conduct of the tenant when the landlord

obtained an order of exemption under Section 21 of the Ceiling

Act, the tenant moved the Government for cancellation of

exemption and to assign the land in its favour. It also

challenged the order of exemption before the High Court in

Writ Petition No. 6434 of 1987 which was dismissed by the

High Court by order dated 18.04.1991 and Writ Appeal No.

1177 of 1992 which was dismissed by the Division Bench of

the High Court by order dated 12.07.1993.

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32) The reliance placed on behalf of the tenant, Section 10,

sub-clause 3, first proviso, is a new plea. The said proviso

reads as under:-

“Provided that a person who becomes a landlord after the

commencement of the tenancy by an instrument inter vivos

shall not be entitled to apply under this clause before the

expiry of three months from the date on which the

instrument was registered.”

It has no application to pending revisions. On the other hand,

it applies only to an application made before the Rent

Controller. The proviso enjoins that the landlord “is not

occupying” the building. Even if the landlord owns other

properties but is not in occupation thereof, the proviso will not

be attracted. The Rent Act does not deal with the ownership

or title, but only with regard to the entitlement to occupation.

Even otherwise, this Court will not permit this new plea to be

raised for the first time. In any event, it is pointed out that the

plea taken in the application for permission to place on record

additional facts and documents that the amalgamated

company owns other land, it is not pleaded that it is in

occupation of such land, therefore, the proviso to Section

10(3)(iii) is not attracted.

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33) The object of the Act is to prevent unreasonable eviction of

the tenant in occupation and to control rents. Similarly, when

landlord wants the property for its own purpose, it takes into

account the fact of the landlord’s occupation of other

properties and not its ownership of other properties which

does not in occupation. The Act permits eviction on

reasonable grounds as provided for in the Act. It may be that

there may be cases where it would be reasonable to evict the

tenant, but that requirement may not strictly fall in any one of

the provisions of Section 10 of the Act to entitle the landlord to

evict the tenant. Section 29 of the Act therefore, enables the

Government to grant exemption of the building in such cases

so that the landlord may be entitled to evict the tenant under

the ordinary remedy of suit.

34) The present case being one where the order of eviction is

eminently just, fair and equitable as ordered by two

authorities and confirmed by the High Court, we do not find

any valid ground for interference, on the other hand, we are in

agreement with the conclusion arrived at by the authorities as

well as the High Court. Taking into consideration the

34

appellant-tenant is continuing in the premises for more than

four decades, we grant time for handing over possession till

31.12.2010 on usual condition of filing an undertaking within

a period of four weeks. With the above observation, the appeal

fails and the same is dismissed. No order as to costs.

...…………………………………J.

(P. SATHASIVAM)

...…………………………………J.

(J.M. PANCHAL)

NEW DELHI;

MAY 14, 2010.

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