W.P. (C) No. 3989/2026 Page 1 of 18

$~J

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Judgment reserved on:09.04.2026

Judgment pronounced on: 16 .04.2026

+ W.P.(C) 3989/2026 & CM APPL. 19590/2026

MS TEKRAM ENTERPRISES ....Petitioner

Through: Mr. Deepak Mehra, Mr. Vikas

Kumar, Mr. Vikshit Kumar, Advs.

versus

DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ....Respondent

Through: Ms. Kritika Gupta

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JASMEET SINGH

J U D G M E N T

1. By way of this writ petition, the petitioner has approached this Court to

challenge the disqualification of the petitioner from participation in the

tender process (“Impugned decision”) for all sports complexes where it

has participated.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

2. The petitioner namely, M/s Tekram Enterprises is a sole proprietorship

concern of Ms. Arpana Tiwari, which is engaged in the business of

running and maintenance of swimming pools.

3. Ms. Arpana Tiwari, has been working since 2015 as a receptionist in the

Paschim Vihar Sports Complex hired on temporary outsource/private

W.P. (C) No. 3989/2026 Page 2 of 18

basis and at present is working for the contractor i.e., M/s Rajsheel

Enterprises.

4. For the sake of brevity and clarity, the term “petitioner” is used

interchangeably for M/s Tekram Enterprises (petitioner enterprise) and its

sole proprietor i.e., Ms. Arpana Tiwari.

5. The respondent namely, Delhi Development Authority (“DDA”) invited

11 tenders by issuing notice inviting tender (“NIT”) for hiring contractors

for maintenance and other ancillary functions of its swimming pools at

various sport centres in DDA complexes.

6. The petitioner participated in 10 tenders and was duly qualified for

participation for PDKP Sports Complex, Chilla Sports Complex, Yamuna

Sports Complex. However, the petitioner received an email dated

25.03.2026 disqualifying the petitioner just two days prior to the

scheduled draw of lots from the said tender process on the ground of

violation of Clause Nos. 47 and 77 of the NIT. The disqualification email

is reproduced as under:

W.P. (C) No. 3989/2026 Page 3 of 18

7. Hence, the present petition impugning the said disqualification action has

been filed by the petitioner.

8. This Court vide Order dated 27.03.2026, issued notice in the main petition

and after taking a prima facie view passed an interim Order staying the

effect and operation of the impugned decision i.e., disqualification email

dated 25.03.2026.

W.P. (C) No. 3989/2026 Page 4 of 18

9. Pursuant to the Order of this Court, the petitioner participated in the

scheduled draw of lots on 31.03.2026 and 01.04.2026 and has turned out

to be the successful bidder for Hari Nagar sports complex and Yamuna

sports complex. However, the petitioner has not been assigned the works

because this disqualification subsists against it.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

10. Mr. Mehra, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that the impugned

decision is in teeth of Article 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India

on the ground that the said action is arbitrary and unreasonably curtail the

petitioner’s right to carry on lawful business and profession.

11. The respondent in the present case where petitioner is only working as an

outsource staff has wrongly relied on Clause Nos. 47 and 77 of the NIT,

and illegally disqualified the petitioner from all tender processes.

12. He states that the Clause No. 47 could only have been invoked, if at all, to

disqualify the petitioner from only the concerned sports complex i.e.,

Paschim Vihar sports complex, where the proprietor is working and the

disqualification from participation for all other sports complex is arbitrary

and illegal.

13. Clause No. 77 finds no application to the case of the petitioner as the

petitioner is neither an employee of DDA/any government agency nor

under any contractual relationship with the DDA. The petitioner is only

engaged at the Paschim Vihar sports complex in outsourced/temporary

capacity under M/s Rajsheel Enterprises, who is a private contractor.

Thus, the petitioner cannot be characterised as an employee of DDA.

14. He further states that the impugned decision was taken in blatant violation

of principles of natural justice without any show cause notice or

W.P. (C) No. 3989/2026 Page 5 of 18

opportunity of hearing. Reliance is placed on Erusian Equipment &

Chemicals Ltd. v. State of West Bengal

1

.

15. The petitioner also contends that the impugned decision is violative of the

doctrine of legitimate expectation as the petitioner qualified for

participation in all the tenders and is expecting the award of the same.

Reliance is placed on Navjyoti Coop. Group Housing Society v. Union of

India

2

.

SUBMISSIONS OF BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

16. Ms. Gupta, learned counsel for the respondent, submits that it is

undisputed fact that Ms. Arpana Tiwari and Mr. Krishnanand Tiwari i.e.,

father of Ms. Tiwari, have been contractual employees of DDA for a

considerable period of time and have deep links within the sports centre

network. Hence, the petitioner was disqualified from participating in the

tender process vide email dated 25.03.2026.

17. Ms. Gupta, to buttress her submissions before this Court places reliance

on the Clause Nos. 47 and 77 of NIT and states that the said clauses

squarely applies to case the petitioner. Thus, the impugned decision is

taken in accordance with the law.

18. It is also submitted by Ms. Gupta, that the action of the respondent is in

accordance with law and it is the tender issuing authority which is the best

judge for its eligibility conditions. Thus, the contentions of the petitioner

should not be accepted. She also states that when the factual matrix is

clear and only one conclusion is possible, no show cause notice or

opportunity of being heard is required.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

1

(1975) 1 SCC 70.

2

(1992) 4 SCC 477.

W.P. (C) No. 3989/2026 Page 6 of 18

19. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the material

and documents placed on record.

Principles of Natural Justice

20. At the outset, it is imperative for this Court to examine the matter on the

issue of compliance of principles of natural justice by the respondent

before wielding the disqualification axe.

21. The disqualification email was addressed to the respondent merely two

days before the scheduled draw of lots, without affording any opportunity

of being heard or even a procedural show cause notice.

22. To my mind, harsh actions like debarment/disqualification carry profound

civil consequences and procedural fairness is the sine qua non for its

legitimacy and legality.

23. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgment of UMC Technologies (P)

Ltd. v. Food Corpn. of India

3

, summarised the position of law with

respect to show cause notice/opportunity of hearing and stated the

principles of natural justice to be the first principles of civilised

jurisprudence. The relevant paragraph of the judgment reads as under:

“13. At the outset, it must be noted that it is the first

principle of civilised jurisprudence that a person against

whom any action is sought to be taken or whose right or

interests are being affected should be given a reasonable

opportunity to defend himself. The basic principle of

natural justice is that before adjudication starts, the

authority concerned should give to the affected party a

notice of the case against him so that he can defend

himself. Such notice should be adequate and the grounds

3

(2021) 2 SCC 551.

W.P. (C) No. 3989/2026 Page 7 of 18

necessitating action and the penalty/action proposed

should be mentioned specifically and unambiguously. An

order travelling beyond the bounds of notice is

impermissible and without jurisdiction to that extent. This

Court in Nasir Ahmad v. Custodian General, Evacuee

Property [Nasir Ahmad v. Custodian General, Evacuee

Property, (1980) 3 SCC 1] has held that it is essential for

the notice to specify the particular grounds on the basis of

which an action is proposed to be taken so as to enable the

noticee to answer the case against him. If these conditions

are not satisfied, the person cannot be said to have been

granted any reasonable opportunity of being heard.”

(Emphasis Supplied)

24. Applying the aforesaid settled position of law on the facts at hand, the

respondent’s ex-parte disqualification through an email constitute

violation of principles of natural justice. Therefore, the impugned decision

conveyed by the email is ipso facto void.

25. Ms. Gupta, learned counsel for the respondent, states that in the present

case, show cause notice or grant of an opportunity of hearing was not

warranted as there existed no disputed questions of fact requiring any

response from the petitioner. Even if such an opportunity had been

afforded, the decision of the DDA or the outcome would not have

changed, since, in case of violation of aforesaid clauses and the

undisputed factual matrix, there is only one conclusion possible i.e.,

disqualification of the petitioner from the said tender processes.

W.P. (C) No. 3989/2026 Page 8 of 18

26. I am unable to agree with this contention of the respondent, as this

contention is based on the assumption that factual situation in the present

case is undisputed and admitted. However, this assumption does not hold

good in the present case. The impugned decision is based on both the

interpretation and applicability of Clause Nos. 47 and 77 of the NIT on

facts of the case of the petitioner, which to my mind is a disputed factual

situation necessitating an opportunity of hearing. The respondent has

without even affording an opportunity to the petitioner of being heard,

already assumed and interpreted clause Nos. 47 and 77 of the NIT to the

detriment of the petitioner.

27. Even though the petition needs to be allowed on this ground alone, I am

inclined to consider the merits of the matter as well.

Scope of Judicial Interference

28. At this stage, the preliminary question before this Court is the confines of

its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Court

under its writ jurisdiction is having limited scope of interference with

administrative decisions requiring technical expertise, especially in

matters of tender evaluation and award of contracts but at the same time

this court is to ensure that no such action of any administrative authority

suffers from the vice of arbitrariness or unreasonableness. The scope of

judicial review of administrative decision pertaining to tender process is

well settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Tata Cellular v.

Union of India

4

, which was relied upon and summarised by the Hon’ble

Division Bench of this Court in the Case of Vision Diagnostic India

4

(1994) 6 SCC 651.

W.P. (C) No. 3989/2026 Page 9 of 18

Private Limited v. All India Institute Of Medical Sciences & Anr.

5

, the

relevant paragraphs of which read as under:

“58. Now the question is whether the respondents are

justified in prescribing the qualification criteria that no

criminal proceedings/FIRs should be pending against the

bidders. Suffice it to state, the Tender Inviting Authority is

entitled to prescribe Tender conditions it deems fit and

necessary to ensure sanctity of the Tendering process. The

court only examines the decision making process, and does

not sit in appeal to review the merits of such decision.

However, when the process or the decision is vitiated by

arbitrariness, unfairness, illegality, irrationality or the

principle of Wednesbury unreasonableness, the same can

be subjected to judicial review. The law in this regard is

well-settled by the judgment of the Supreme Court in Tata

Cellular (supra) wherein it has been observed as under:

“94. The principles deducible from the above are:

(1) The modern trend points to judicial restraint in

administrative action.

(2) The court does not sit as a court of appeal but

merely reviews the manner in which the decision was

made. (3) The court does not have the expertise to

correct the administrative decision. If a review of the

administrative decision is permitted it will be

substituting its own decision, without the necessary

expertise which itself may be fallible.

5

2026 SCC OnLine Del 545.

W.P. (C) No. 3989/2026 Page 10 of 18

(4) The terms of the invitation to tender cannot be

open to judicial scrutiny because the invitation to

tender is in the realm of contract.

Normally speaking, the decision to accept the tender

or award the contract is reached by process of

negotiations through several tiers. More often than

not, such decisions are made qualitatively by experts.

(5) The Government must have freedom of contract. In

other words, a fair play in the joints is a necessary

concomitant for an administrative body functioning in

an administrative sphere or quasi-administrative

sphere. However, the decision must not only be tested

by the application of Wednesbury principle of

reasonableness (including its other facts pointed out

above) but must be free from arbitrariness not

affected by bias or actuated by mala fides.

(6) Quashing decisions may impose heavy

administrative burden on the administration and lead

to increased and unbudgeted expenditure.”

(emphasis supplied)

59. Further, in the judgment titled Erusian Equipment &

Chemicals Limited (supra), the Supreme Court has held

that the activities of the government, having a public

element, should be undertaken with great fairness and

equality. It observed that the State need not enter into any

contract with anyone, but if it does, it must do so in a fair

manner without any discrimination.”

W.P. (C) No. 3989/2026 Page 11 of 18

(Emphasis Supplied)

29. In another judgment of the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court titled

Ozar Homes LLP v. DDA

6

, the settled position of law was summarised by

placing reliance on Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. v. MB Power (M.P.)

Ltd.

7

, in the following words:

“18…

a. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Jaipur Vidyut

Vitran Nigam Ltd. v. MB Power (M.P.) Ltd.,(2024) 8 SCC

513, after referring to an earlier judgment in Air India

Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd., (2000) 2 SCC

617 and Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC

651, has held that unless the Court finds that decision

making process is vitiated by arbitrariness, malafides or

irrationality, it will not be permissible for the Court to

interfere with the same. Paragraphs 136 to 138 of

the Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. (supra) are extracted

herein below:

“136. In any case, we find that the High Court was

not justified in issuing the mandamus in the nature

which it has issued. This Court in Air India

Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd. [Air India

Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd., (2000) 2

SCC 617 : 2000 INSC 39] has observed thus : (SCC

pp. 623-24, para 7)

6

2025 SCC OnLine Del 6210.

7

(2024) 8 SCC 513.

W.P. (C) No. 3989/2026 Page 12 of 18

“7. The law relating to award of a contract by

the State, its corporations and bodies acting as

instrumentalities and agencies of the

Government has been settled by the decision of

this Court in Ramana Dayaram

Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India

[Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International

Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489],

Fertilizer Corpn. Kamgar Union v. Union of

India [Fertilizer Corpn. Kamgar Union v. Union

of India, (1981) 1 SCC 568], CCE v. Dunlop

India Ltd. [CCE v. Dunlop India Ltd., (1985) 1

SCC 260], Tata Cellular v. Union of India [Tata

Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651 :

1994 INSC 283], Ramniklal N. Bhutta v. State of

Maharashtra [Ramniklal N. Bhutta v. State of

Maharashtra, (1997) 1 SCC 134] and Raunaq

International Ltd. v. I.V.R. Construction Ltd.

[Raunaq International Ltd. v. I.V.R. Construction

Ltd., (1999) 1 SCC 492] The award of a

contract, whether it is by a private party or by a

public body or the State, is essentially a

commercial transaction. In arriving at a

commercial decision considerations which are

paramount are commercial considerations. The

State can choose its own method to arrive at a

decision. It can fix its own terms of invitation to

tender and that is not open to judicial scrutiny. It

W.P. (C) No. 3989/2026 Page 13 of 18

can enter into negotiations before finally

deciding to accept one of the offers made to it.

Price need not always be the sole criterion for

awarding a contract. It is free to grant any

relaxation, for bona fide reasons, if the tender

conditions permit such a relaxation. It may not

accept the offer even though it happens to be the

highest or the lowest. But the State, its

corporations, instrumentalities and agencies are

bound to adhere to the norms, standards and

procedures laid down by them and cannot depart

from them arbitrarily. Though that decision is

not amenable to judicial review, the court can

examine the decision-making process and

interfere if it is found vitiated by mala fides,

unreasonableness and arbitrariness. The State,

its corporations, instrumentalities and agencies

have the public duty to be fair to all concerned.

Even when some defect is found in the decision-

making process the court must exercise its

discretionary power under Article 226 with great

caution and should exercise it only in

furtherance of public interest and not merely on

the making out of a legal point. The court should

always keep the larger public interest in mind in

order to decide whether its intervention is called

for or not. Only when it comes to a conclusion

W.P. (C) No. 3989/2026 Page 14 of 18

that overwhelming public interest requires

interference, the court should intervene.”

….

138. As has been held by this Court in Tata Cellular

[Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651 :

1994 INSC 283], the Court is not only concerned with

the merits of the decision but also with the decision-

making process. Unless the Court finds that the

decision-making process is vitiated by arbitrariness,

mala fides, irrationality, it will not be permissible for

the Court to interfere with the same.”

(Emphasis Supplied)

30. From a conspectus of the aforementioned judgments it is clear that the

Court cannot interfere with administrative decisions in a routine manner

and should exercise its judicial wisdom to interfere with great

circumspection. While the administrative decisions involving technical

expertise are not amenable to scrutiny, the decision making process can

always be subjected to the same. The Court does not sit in appeal/review

over those decisions, and it is only the decision making process which

needs to be tested on the touchstones of irrationality, mala fides and

arbitrariness, while being subjected to judicial scrutiny.

31. With the above scope of interference in mind, I shall now deal with rival

contentions to decide, if at all, any interference by this Court is warranted.

Interpretation of Clause No. 47 of the NIT

W.P. (C) No. 3989/2026 Page 15 of 18

32. At this stage, it is relevant to see Clause No. 47 of the NIT, which reads as

under:

“There should be no relationship between the contractor and

officer/officials working in the concerned sports complex. In case of any

concealment of facts, necessary action will be initiated against the agency

as per terms & conditions of CRB, DDA.”

33. At the outset, the petitioner is neither a contractor nor an officer but an

outsourced employee of the contractor namely, M/s Rajsheel Enterprises,

even otherwise assuming that the said Clause No. 47 would be applicable,

to a person like the petitioner, a plain reading of the aforesaid Clause

makes it evident that it is not placing any general or omnibus embargo.

This prohibition Clause is undoubtedly and clearly directed against

existence of any relationship between the contractor and the officials

working in the “concerned sports complex”.

34. The respondent by disqualifying the petitioner from participating in all of

the tender processes, has rendered the expression “concerned sports

complex” otiose. By this impugned decision, the respondent has enlarged

the scope of the said Clause beyond the reasonable and plain meaning.

35. I am of the view that Clause No. 47, is only intended to operate in relation

to the specific sports complex where the alleged specific relationship exist

between the contractor and the officer/officials working in the concerned

sports complex.

36. In the factual matrix of the present case, it is an admitted fact that the

petitioner, as of today, is a contractual employee of M/s Rajsheel

Enterprises Ltd. and is working as a receptionist in Paschim Vihar Sports

W.P. (C) No. 3989/2026 Page 16 of 18

Complex. It is also admitted that the petitioner has been a receptionist in

the said sports complex for the more than 10 years now.

37. In this view of the matter, not even an iota of doubt exists that the Clause

No. 47 could only be applicable to the case of the petitioner if the

petitioner was participating in the tender process of Paschim Vihar sports

complex. Once language of clause is clear, no external aid is required for

its interpretation.

38. It is also not the case of the respondent nor could it plausibly be, that by

being a receptionist at Paschim Vihar Sports Complex, the petitioner

would be privy to the tender details of other sports complexes or sensitive

details pertaining to other sports complexes such as tender quotations

given by the other participants to the tender, thereby gaining any sort of

unfair advantage therein.

39. Additionally, the NIT process envisages that where multiple bidders quote

identical rates, the successful bidder is determined through a computerised

draw of lots. Hence, it also cannot be said that the petitioner in its limited

capacity of being a receptionist at Paschim Vihar Sports Complex could

tamper with fair and free selection of the successful bidder in tender for

unrelated sports complexes.

40. Therefore, the impugned decision disqualifying the petitioner based on

Clause No. 47 is incorrect, based on erroneous and irrational interpretation

of the Clause No. 47.

Interpretation of Clause No. 77 of the NIT

41. The Clause No. 77 of the NIT reads as under:

“Any person who is in government service or an employee

of D.D.A. or on contract with D.D.A. should not be made a

W.P. (C) No. 3989/2026 Page 17 of 18

partner to the contract by the Contractor directly, or

indirectly in any manner whatsoever.”

42. The prohibitive ambit of the aforesaid Clause can be classified under three

distinct heads namely;

a. Persons in service of government.

b. Employees of DDA.

c. Persons on contract with DDA.

43. Individuals falling in these three prohibited categories cannot be made

partner to the awarded subject contract by the contractor, “directly or

indirectly”. This expression “directly or indirectly” is used to exclude the

aforesaid three prohibited categories of individuals from being directly or

indirectly made a party to the awarded contract through the tender process

for which the tender is invited by the NIT.

44. The respondent by invoking Clause No. 77 has erred in interpreting the

relation of the proprietor of the petitioner with the DDA and enlarged the

scope of the aforesaid Clause to include third party engagements through

independent private contractors within the ambit of the aforesaid three

prohibited categories. The proprietor of the petitioner is engaged by M/s

Rajsheel Enterprises (independent private contractor) in an

outsourced/private temporary capacity with no privity of contract

whatsoever with the DDA.

45. Therefore, the petitioner in the aforesaid factual background does not

qualify as falling in any of the three categories as stated above and the

impugned decision by the respondent can be categorised as irrational and

arbitrary.

46. Additionally during the course of hearing, Ms. Arpana Tiwari has handed

over an affidavit that in order to put the controversy to rest, she will resign

from the post within 2 months i.e., before June 2026.

W.P. (C) No. 3989/2026 Page 18 of 18

CONCLUSION

47. In the light of the aforesaid discussion and interpretation of Clause Nos.

47 and 77, I am of the view that the even though the scope of judicial

interference with administrative decision is narrow but the same is not

barred when the decision making process is vitiated by reasons of

irrationality and arbitrariness. Having held the decision making process of

the respondent based on irrationality, arbitrariness and procedural

impropriety, the decision making process is unconstitutional for being in

violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

48. Additionally the impugned decision undermines public interest by

suppressing fair play in competition. The blanket disqualification from the

process for all tenders, non-compliance with the principles of natural

justice and the disproportionate overreach beyond the plain meaning of the

Clauses of NIT collectively leads to this Conclusion that the impugned

decision is arbitrary and thus, deserves to be set aside.

49. In this view of the matter, the impugned decision is quashed and set aside

to the extent that the petitioner shall remain disqualified for participation

in the tender process for Paschim Vihar Sports Complex.

50. The petition is allowed and disposed of, in the aforesaid terms, along with

the pending applications, if any.

51. The affidavit furnished by Ms. Arpana Tiwari is taken on record.

JASMEET SINGH, J

APRIL 16, 2026/SS