RFA 674/2025 & connected matters Page 1 of 44

$~J-

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Judgment delivered on 29

th

May 2026

+ RFA 674/2025, CM APPL. 44427/2025, CM APPL. 44428/2025

SH. BALBIR PRASAD SHARMA .....Appellant

Through: Mr. Vinay Sabharwal and Mr.

Karunesh Shah, Advocates.

versus

M/S TEXMACO INFRASTRUCTURE AND HOLDINGS LIMITED

.....Respondent

Through: Mr. Dhanesh Relan, Ms. S.

Pandey, Mr. Shikhar Misra and Mr.

Harshul Mehta, Advocates.

Ms. Manisha Gupta, AR.

+ RFA 677/2025, CM APPL. 44588/2025, CM APPL. 44589/2025

SH. RAM BAHADUR .....Appellant

Through: Mr. Vinay Sabharwal and Mr.

Karunesh Shah, Advocates.

versus

M/S TEXMACO INFRASTRUCTURE AND HOLDINGS LIMITED

.....Respondent

Through: Mr. Dhanesh Relan, Ms. S.

Pandey, Mr. Shikhar Misra and Mr.

Harshul Mehta, Advocates.

Ms. Manisha Gupta, AR.

+ RFA 679/2025, CM APPL. 44603/2025, CM APPL. 44604/2025

SH. NANAN .....Appellant

Through: Mr. Vinay Sabharwal and Mr.

Karunesh Shah, Advocates.

versus

M/S TEXMACO INFRASTRUCTURE AND HOLDINGS LIMITED

.....Respondent

Through: Mr. Dhanesh Relan, Ms. S.

Pandey, Mr. Shikhar Misra and Mr.

Harshul Mehta, Advocates.

Ms. Manisha Gupta, AR.

RFA 674/2025 & connected matters Page 2 of 44

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANUP JAIRAM BHAMBHANI

J U D G M E N T

ANUP JAIRAM BHAMBHANI, J

By way of the present regular first appeals filed under section 96

of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (‘CPC’), the appellants (defendants)

impugn 3 separate but identical judgments and decrees, all dated

10.02.2025, passed by the learned District Judge-06, Central District, Tis

Hazari Courts, Delhi in suits bearing CS DJ No. 2902/2017, CS DJ No.

2903/2017, and CS DJ No. 2904/2017 respectively. Since all three

judgments are identical, for ease and convenience, reference in the

following paras is made to them as the ‘impugned judgment’, and the

paras extracted relate to the impugned judgment in CS DJ No. 2903/2017

since submissions were made by counsel in the said matter. It may

further be clarified that the 03 suits in which the three judgments have

been passed, relate to premises being Quarters bearing Nos. 60-A, 37-A,

and 41-B situate at Shivaji Lines, Roshnara Building, Shakti Nagar,

Delhi respectively (being referred-to in each of the appeals as ‘suit

premises’).

2. By way of the impugned judgments, the learned trial court has allowed

three applications under Order XII Rule 6 CPC filed by the respondent

(plaintiff) and has passed decrees of possession in favour of the

respondent with respect of the suit premises.

RFA 674/2025 & connected matters Page 3 of 44

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS (DEFENDANTS)

3. In support of the appeals, the appellants have raised the following

principal contentions:

3.1. On application of Order XII Rule 6 CPC: The appellants

submit, that the impugned decrees granting possession to the

respondent have been erroneously passed under Order XII Rule 6

CPC, which is an enabling, discretionary provision and can be

invoked only where there are clear, categorical and unequivocal

admissions, leaving no triable issue on facts or law. It is urged

however, that the learned trial court has treated disputed questions

of fact as admitted matters, without a trial.

3.2. To support this submission, the appellants have placed reliance on

the decision of a Division Bench of this court in Delhi Jal Board

vs. Surendra P. Malik,

1

to submit that the test for applying Order

XII Rule 6 CPC is: (i) whether admissions of fact arise in the suit,

(ii) whether such admissions are plain, unambiguous and

unequivocal, (iii) whether the defence set-up is such that it

requires evidence for determination of the issues, and (iv) whether

the objections raised against rendering a judgment on admissions

are such that they go to the root of the matter or whether these are

inconsequential, making it impossible for the defendant to

succeed even if the objections are entertained.

1

2003 SCC OnLine Del 292

RFA 674/2025 & connected matters Page 4 of 44

3.3. The appellants have further relied on the Supreme Court ruling in

Himani Alloys Ltd. vs. Tata Steel Ltd.,

2

to contend that the

Supreme Court has held that: “11. It is true that a judgment can be given on an

“admission” contained in the minutes of a meeting. But the

admission should be categorical. It should be a conscious and

deliberate act of the party making it, showing an intention to

be bound by it. Order 12 Rule 6 being an enabling provision,

it is neither mandatory nor peremptory but discretionary. The

court, on examination of the facts and circumstances, has to

exercise its judicial discretion, keeping in mind that a

judgment on admission is a judgment without trial which

permanently denies any remedy to the defendant, by way of

an appeal on merits. Therefore unless the admission is clear,

unambiguous and unconditional, the discretion of the Court

should not be exercised to deny the valuable right of a

defendant to contest the claim. In short the discretion should

be used only when there is a clear which can acted upon. (See

also Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. vs. United Bank of India

[2000 (7) SCC 120], Karam Kapahi vs. Lal Chand Public

Charitable Trust [2010 (4) SCC 753] and Jeevan Diesels and

Electricals Ltd. vs. Jasbir Singh Chadha [2010 (6) SCC 601].

There is no such admission in this case.”

3.4. Reliance is also placed on Indu Singh vs. Surender Kamboj &

Ors.,

3

where another Division Bench of this court has said this: “30. A reading of the aforesaid decisions would show

that ordinarily, the rights of the parties have to be decided in

the suit. The controversy on merits of the disputed questions

of fact cannot be considered at the stage of deciding an

application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC. For a judgment on

admission to be passed under Order XII Rule 6 CPC, the

court has to see as to whether the admission of facts are plain,

unambiguous and unequivocal and go to the root of the matter

which would entitle the other party to succeed. The object of

2

(2011) 15 SCC 273

3

2020 SCC OnLine Del 1415

RFA 674/2025 & connected matters Page 5 of 44

Order XII Rule 6 is that once there are categorical admissions

of facts made by a party, then the litigation should not be

permitted to linger on unnecessarily and on an application

filed by a party asking for a decree on the basis of the said

admissions, the court should exercise its discretion and bring

such a litigation to an end.”

4. Based on the above precedents, the appellants contend that: (i) none of

the respondent/plaintiff’s documents are admitted by the

appellants/defendants; (ii) there are no express or constructive

admissions in the written statements filed by the appellants, and (iii)

every foundational ingredient, viz., ownership, employer-employee

relationship, cause of action to evict, and the appellants’ own right to

continue in occupation, remain seriously in dispute, and therefore the

suits could not have been decreed for possession under Order XII Rule

6 of the CPC.

5. On ownership of the suit premises: The appellants have pleaded, that

possession of the suit premises was never taken by the appellants from

the respondent company; and the respondent company has failed to

prove ownership of the suit premises, and ownership could not have been

presumed based on disputed and largely illegible documents.

6. It is argued that as per the respondent, the suit premises were originally

owned by a company called “The Birla Cotton Spinning and Weaving

Mills Ltd.” (‘BCSWM’) and the factory under the name of “Birla Textile

Mills” was also owned by that company; but both these propositions are

specifically disputed by the appellants. The appellants claim that the

factory was owned and run by a partnership firm called “Birla Textile

Mills” and the partnership comprised: (a) Upper Ganges Sugar and

RFA 674/2025 & connected matters Page 6 of 44

Industries Ltd., (b) Sutlej Industries Ltd., and (c) Hindustan Times Ltd.,

and this partnership firm was the employer of the appellants. Attention

in this behalf has been drawn to the written statements filed by the

appellants and to a certified copy of the Register of Firms, to argue that

the said documents support the appellant’s submission.

7. The appellants point-out, that to establish ownership, the respondent has

placed reliance on (i) a photocopy of an “Agreement to Sale” between

Delhi Improvement Trust (‘DIT’), predecessor of the Delhi

Development Authority (‘DDA’), and “BCSWM”; and on (ii) a Scheme

of Arrangement/Scheme of Amalgamation approved by the Calcutta

High Court and the Delhi High Court, to contend that the suit premises

were transferred to the respondent by the said documents. The appellants

have however submitted, that these pleas and documents relied upon by

the respondent have been specifically denied by the appellant; and, in

any case, these documents do not mention either the factory styled as

“Birla Textile Mills” or the suit premises.

8. The appellants have highlighted, that the “Agreement to Sale” is mostly

illegible; it has not been filed in original; and in any event expressly

stipulates as under:

“(7). Nothing in these presents contained shall be considered

as a sale at law of piece of land hereby sold or any part thereof so as

to give to the said intended vendee any legal interest therein until the

said sale deed shall be executed, but the said intended vendee shall

only have a right to enter upon the said land for the purpose of

performing this Agreement.”

9. Based on the above narration on the agreement, the appellants have

urged that the document is only an “Agreement for Sale” and not a “Sale

RFA 674/2025 & connected matters Page 7 of 44

Deed”, and even by its own terms, does not confer ownership or title

upon “BCSWM”.

10. With respect to the Scheme of Arrangement cited by the respondent, the

appellants have submitted, that even assuming its validity, Schedule-II

of that scheme does not describe the suit premises; and consequently,

neither the company named ‘BCSWM’ was ever the owner of the

premises, nor did the suit premises ever get transferred to the respondent

company.

11. The appellants have additionally contended, that on the respondent’s

own showing, the land forming the subject matter of the “Agreement for

Sale” continues to be owned by and vests in the DDA, which has

declined to execute any sale deed in favour of the said company; the

properties in question remain in unauthorized occupation of BCSWM;

and no document of sale has ever been produced to establish ownership

in the name of the respondent’s predecessor-in-interest. Moreover, it is

pointed- out, that even the Agreement for Sale does not mention or

describe the suit premises or “Birla Textile Mills” as forming part of the

subject matter of the agreement.

12. On the employer-employee relationship and character of the

accommodation: The appellants have asserted that the employer was

the partnership firm called “Birla Textile Mills” and not the respondent

company, and there has never been any employer-employee relationship

between the appellants and the respondent company or with BCSWM.

13. The appellants have averred, that accommodation in the form of the suit

premises was provided to the appellants by the partnership firm as part

of the service benefits extended to its employees. Thus, the employer of

RFA 674/2025 & connected matters Page 8 of 44

the appellants was the partnership firm named Birla Textile Mills; and

therefore, only the employer had the locus to withdraw such service

benefit by seeking recovery of the premises.

14. It has been further argued by the appellants, that Allotment Letters dated

23.09.1976, 25.12.1985 and 31.10.1986 issued by BCSWM, in favour

of the various appellants, which the respondent has relied upon to show

that the appellants are described therein as ‘licensee’, have been disputed

by the appellants in their written statements. It has been urged that the

said allotment letters emanate from an entity that was not the employer,

and the alleged ‘licensor-licencee’ relationship is neither admitted by the

appellants nor has it been independently proved by the respondent.

15. In their written statements and replies to Order XII Rule 6 applications,

the appellants have maintained that “Birla Textile Mills” (partnership

firm) was the owner/landlord of the suit premises and the relationship

between “Birla Textile Mills” and the appellants was that of landlord and

tenant; the appellants were variously paying Rs. 40/- and Rs. 7/- per

month as ‘rent’ to the partnership firm, and therefore the dispute lay

within the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller, and not of the civil court.

16. On the effect of M.C. Mehta vs. Union of India rulings and continuity

of service/occupation: A major plank of the appellants’ case is the series

of orders of the Supreme Court in M.C. Mehta vs. Union of India

relating to closure/relocation of hazardous industries from Delhi. The

appellants have specifically cited:

- M.C. Mehta vs. Union of India, W.P.(C) No. 4677/1985,

(1996) 4 SCC 750, judgment dated 08.07.1996;

- M.C. Mehta vs. Union of India, W.P.(C) No. 4677/1985,

(1996) 4 SCC 351, judgment dated 10.05.1996; and

RFA 674/2025 & connected matters Page 9 of 44

- M.C. Mehta vs. Union of India, W.P.(C) No. 4677/1985,

(1999) 2 SCC 91, judgment dated 18.12.1998.

17. The appellants have also relied upon the following extracts of the

aforementioned judgment :

“28. We, therefore, hold and direct as under:-

(1)… We direct that 168 industries listed above shall stop

functioning and operating in the city of Delhi with effect from

30.11.1996. These industries shall close down and stop functioning

in Delhi with effect from the said date.

* * * * *

“(9) The workmen employed in the above mentioned 168

industries shall be entitled to the rights and benefits as indicated

hereunder:

(a) The workmen shall have continuity of employment

and new town and place where the industry is shifted. The

terms and conditions of their employment shall not be altered

to their detriment;

(b) The period between the closure of the industry in

Delhi and its restart at the place of relocation shall be treated

as active employment and the workmen shall be paid their full

wages with continuity of service;

(c) All those workmen who agree to shift with the

industry shall be given one year's wages as "shifting

bonus”…;

(d)… shall be deemed to have been retrenched with

effect from 30.11.1996…;

(e) The “shifting bonus” and the compensation

payable… shall be paid by the management before

31.12.1996.

(f) The gratuity amount payable… shall be paid in

addition.”

- from M.C. Mehta vs. Union of India,

W.P.(C) No. 4677/1985, (1996) 4 SCC 750,

judgment dated 08.07.1996

RFA 674/2025 & connected matters Page 10 of 44

18. The appellants have accordingly argued, that the words “continuity” and

“restart” used in sub-paras (a) and (b) of para 9 of order dated 08.07.1996

as clarified on 18.12.1998 in M.C. Mehta, bring about the main

intendment of the order. The appellants have submitted, that it is clear

from a plain reading of the aforementioned paras that workmen were to

be treated as if they were in service till the time the industry restarted at

the relocated place; and till such time, their service was to be treated as

continuing. It has been argued that there was, therefore, no question of

the employer giving them the option to agree to shift or fix an earlier

time than the date of starting of the industry at Baddi. The submission

has been that the industry could not be said to have been restarted unless

and until the plant was installed and all necessary permission had been

obtained.

19. Based on the directions of the Supreme Court, the appellants have

submitted that the mill did not “close” on 30.11.1996 but, as recorded

before the Supreme Court, it was shifted to Baddi, Himachal Pradesh.

Under the scheme, if the factory is shifted (and not closed), a workman’ s

employment continues at the relocated place; the service is to be treated

as continuous until “restart”; and the existing accommodation in Delhi

is to be retained until alternative accommodation is provided at the place

of relocation.

20. The appellants claim that they joined at Baddi, continued in service, and

were never provided alternative accommodation at Baddi; hence, they

remain entitled to occupy the suit premises as per the Supreme Court’s

directions.

RFA 674/2025 & connected matters Page 11 of 44

21. The appellants have characterized as “incorrect and misleading” the plea

contained in the plaint, that Birla Textile Mills was closed down on

30.11.1996. The appellants submit, that in the face of the directions

contained in M.C. Mehta, their right of service and occupancy could not

be treated as extinguished, nor could continued possession of the suit

premises be termed as “unauthorised” without a full examination of

facts.

22. On additional documents filed by the respondent, RTI and

illegibility: Furthermore, the appellants have objected to the respondent

having filed 14 additional documents at a later stage to shore-up the

claim to ownership of the suit premises, including the alleged Agreement

for Sale and various layout and plan documents relating to the

DIT/DDA, mutation orders, etc. It has been submitted, that all the said

documents are disputed by the appellants and many of them are illegible.

Attention has been drawn to the applications filed by the respondent

seeking permission to file additional documents, and to the appellants’

replies, to argue that the appellants had taken the stand that (i) the

additional documents filed by the respondent were totally illegible and

were in any event disputed documents, and hence could not be relied

upon; and (ii) even assuming, arguendo, that the documents could be

looked at, none of the additional documents describe or mention the suit

premises.

23. In one of the connected appeals, the appellants have also referred to an

RTI reply dated 17.11.2017, allegedly showing Birla Textile Mills

(partnership) as the owner of the suit premises.

RFA 674/2025 & connected matters Page 12 of 44

24. Parallel criminal proceedings and findings: The appellants have

pointed- out, that the respondent had earlier instituted complaints under

Section 630 of the Companies Act, 1956 against the appellants, which

were dismissed by the Ld. ACMM on 24.12.2010; and according to the

appellants, the said judgment clearly held that the Appellants/Defendants

cannot be said to be unauthorizedly occupying the premises in question.

An appeal by the respondent is stated to be pending in the Delhi High

Court.

25. The appellants have contended, that even though findings of the criminal

court may not bind the civil court, such a clear finding against

“unauthorised occupation” underscores that the appellants’ possession

and rights are at least seriously arguable, and cannot be brushed aside as

“moonshine” at the threshold under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC.

Summarising the challenge, the appellants have submitted that:

26. Ownership of the premises by the respondent company is disputed and

not admitted, with the foundational documents being either illegible, not

original, or not containing a reference to the suit premises.

27. Employer-employee relationship between the respondent company and

the appellant is denied; according to the appellants the employer is the

partnership firm “Birla Textile Mills,” which alone could control service

benefits, including housing.

28. The appellants’ right to continue in occupation of the suit premises flows

from binding Supreme Court directions in M.C. Mehta regarding

continuity of service and accommodation till alternative housing is

provided by the respondent company at the relocated site, and no such

housing has been provided.

RFA 674/2025 & connected matters Page 13 of 44

29. The additional documents filed on behalf of the respondent company are

illegible and are disputed; the alleged “allotment letter” is a contested

document issued by a company that was not the appellants’ employer.

30. No clear, unambiguous, or unconditional admission exists on any of the

aforesaid critical issues; hence, the stringent standard of Delhi Jal Board,

Himani Alloys, and Indu Singh for passing a decree on admissions is not

met.

31. Based on the above contentions, the appellants have prayed that the

decrees passed against them under Order XII Rule 6 CPC be set-aside

and the suits be remanded back for full trial based on evidence.

S

UBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT COMPANY

(PLAINTIFF)

32. The respondent/plaintiff (Texmaco Infrastructure & Holdings Ltd.,

formerly Texmaco Ltd.) has opposed the contentions raised by the

appellants, defending the decrees on admissions passed by the learned

trial court.

33. The respondent has stated, that it is the proprietor of the textile mill

popularly known as “Birla Textile Mills”, located at G.T. Road, Subzi

Mandi Ghanta Ghar, Delhi.

34. It has been submitted that originally, BCSWM had constructed the

quarters at Shivaji Lines, Roshanara Road/Bagh, Shakti Nagar for its

employees; and on 15.07.1966, 04.04.1968, and 26.09.1975 the

appellants had joined the services of BCSWM.

35. It has been submitted, that under a Scheme of Amalgamation approved

by the Calcutta High Court on 20/22.12.1982 (Company Petition No.

191/1982) and by the Delhi High Court on 03.01.1983 (Company

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Petition No. 59/1982), all assets and liabilities of BCSWM, including the

suit premises stood transferred to Texmaco Ltd.; and by allotment letters

bearing the sign and seal of Texmaco Ltd., two of the appellants were

allotted the quarters that are subject matter of the present proceedings,

expressly as licensees at a fixed licence fee of Rs. 40/- per month, with

the licence being expressly co-terminus with their employment. The

respondent has stressed that these letters are the only document

explaining how the appellants came into possession of the suit premises;

and that the said letters repeatedly use the expression “license” and

stipulates termination of the license upon cessation of service of the

appellants. It has been pointed-out , that there is no specific denial of

execution of the said allotment letters but only an evasive plea that it

“requires formal proof”.

36. The respondent had argued that on 30.11.1996, pursuant to M.C. Mehta

orders passed in W.P.(C) No. 4677/1985, the mill stopped functioning

and the appellants “ceased to be in the plaintiff’s employment” but

despite repeated requests (including a visit by the estate officer/attorney

on 10.07.2003, and criminal complaints having been filed on 21.08.2003

and 28.08.2003 under Section 630 of the Companies Act 1956, the

appellants had refused to vacate the suit premises.

37. It has been argued on behalf to the respondent that consequently, on

29.08.2017 the respondent/plaintiff instituted the suits seeking: a decree

of possession in respect of the suit premises; a decree of damages/use

and occupation charges, with interest up to the date of filing of suit; a

decree for mesne profits from the date of filing of the suit till delivery of

possession; along with costs and other ancillary reliefs.

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38. The respondent has characterised the appellants’ conduct as “malicious”,

asserting: (i) that the appellants have repeatedly improved upon their

case by making submissions beyond their pleadings, (ii) that the

appellants have made ex-facie false submissions, (iii) that the appellants

have adopted self‑contradictory stands, and (iv) that they have relied on

documents which are either not part of the record or that have been filed

without leave. The detailed submissions on these points are summarised

below.

39. Submissions beyond pleadings: Using a tabulated comparison, the

respondent has pointed-out that:

39.1. That in the written statements, the appellants have nowhere taken

the plea that alternative accommodation or compensation was not

provided by the respondent, but such pleas appear for the first time

in the appellants’ replies to the Order XII Rule 6 applications and

in the present appeals.

39.2. A copy of letter dated 08.12.1999, allegedly showing that Birla

Textile Mills (partnership firm) was taken over by Chambal

Fertilizers & Chemicals Ltd., was filed by the appellants without

leave of the court along with their replies to the Order XII Rule 6

applications; and in the present appeal, the appellants now assert

that control over service conditions and accommodation in

relation to employees vested in Chambal Fertilizers & Chemicals

Ltd., which case was never pleaded earlier.

39.3. The plea that the property vests in the DDA finds no mention in

the written statements, but appears in the present appeals.

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40. Ex-facie false submissions: The respondent has further alleged that the

appellants have made ex-facie false submissions, inter alia: that the

appellants have relied on the “alleged” letter dated 08.12.1999, to assert

that Birla Textile Mills (partnership firm) was taken-over by Chambal

Fertilizers & Chemicals Ltd., though no such case appears in the written

statement and the letter is an additional document filed without leave,

addressed to a third party (“Sh. Tarachand Dingliwal”). Furthermore, the

appellants have claimed that they had paid electricity and water charges

for the suit premises, without any documents in support of that plea. The

appellants have referred to an RTI reply dated 17.11.2017 allegedly

showing that Birla Textile Mills (partnership firm) is the owner of the

suit premises, whereas no such RTI reply is on record, and the

appellants’ own certified copy from the Register of Firms shows that the

partnership firm never owned any property adjacent to the subject

quarters. The appellants have also asserted that they continued to be in

the employment of Chambal Fertilizers & Chemicals Ltd. even after

30.11.1996, despite there being not a mention or whisper of that entity

in the written statement.

41. Self‑contradictory stands: The respondent points-out that, at different

stages, the appellants have claimed that the suit premises belong to: “M/s

Birla Textile Mills (partnership firm)” (in their written statements); to

Chambal Fertilizers & Chemicals Ltd. (in their replies to Order XII Rule

6 applications), and to the DDA (in the present appeals). Thus, it has

been pointed- out that the appellants have alleged that three different

entities were owners of the suit premises.

RFA 674/2025 & connected matters Page 17 of 44

42. Reliance on documents not on record: The respondent has

emphasized, that letter dated 08.12.1999 (same letter in all three appeals)

relied upon by the appellants is an additional document, which was filed

without leave of the court, and therefore, cannot be considered.

Likewise, the appellants have also placed reliance upon alleged RTI

reply dated 17.11.2017, which is also not on the record at all.

43. Ownership of the suit premises: The respondent has submitted, that the

impugned judgments correctly hold that the respondent is the owner of

the suit premises on the strength of the chain of title, in the following

manner:

43.1. Orders dated 03.01.1983 (Delhi High Court) and 20/22.12.1982

(Calcutta High Court) approving the Scheme of Amalgamation of

BCSWM into Texmaco Ltd.;

43.2. Schedule II, Clause 5 (effective 01.04.1981) inter-alia

transferring the suit premises to the respondent;

43.3. Mutation Order dated 09.06.2014 passed by the Tehsildar, Civil

Lines, mutating the property in the respondent’s favour;

43.4. Order dated 13.12.2018 in Texmaco Infrastructure & Holdings

Ltd. vs. Rajesh Kumar Dudani CS(OS) No. 433/2017, whereby

the Delhi High Court has reaffirmed the respondent’s ownership

in respect of similar quarters.

44. It has been submitted that in paras 14-18 of the impugned judgments, the

learned trial court has traced the chain of title and has correctly

concluded that the suit premises did not belong to Birla Textile Mills

(partnership firm) but to the respondent/plaintiff. The respondent has

pointed- out that, apart from “bald denials”, the appellants have not

RFA 674/2025 & connected matters Page 18 of 44

specifically traversed the assertions of the respondent to this chain of

title.

45. Invoking the principles set-down in the Supreme Court’s decision in

Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes & Ors. vs. Erasmo Jack De

Sequeira (Dead),

4

the respondent has submitted that anyone resisting a

title holder’s claim to possession must plead with particularity and place

documents regarding: (i) who is or are the actual owner/owners of the

property;(ii) title documents of the property; (iii) who is in possession of

the title documents; (iv) identity of the claimant(s) in possession; (v) the

date of entry into possession; (vi) how he came into possession of the

property - whether he purchased the property or inherited or got the same

in gift or by any other method; (vii) in case he purchased the property,

what is the consideration, or if he has taken the property on rent/license,

how much is the rent or license fees he is paying; (viii) if the property is

taken on rent, license fee or lease – then he must place on record the rent

deed, license deed or lease deed; (ix) who are the persons in

possession/occupation or otherwise living with him, and in what

capacity (as family members, friends, servants, etc.); (x) subsequent

conduct, i.e., any event which might have extinguished his entitlement

to possession or caused a shift therein; and (xi) the basis of his claim that

he is not required to deliver possession but is entitled to continue in

possession of the property.

46. The respondent has argued, that apart from baldly naming three different

“owners”, the appellants have not produced a single document to show

4

(2012) 5 SCC 370

RFA 674/2025 & connected matters Page 19 of 44

(i) how or when they entered into possession, (ii) in what capacity, (iii)

to whom they allegedly paid rent, or (iv) any tenancy/lease document. It

is submitted that in the absence of such particulars, the appellants cannot

be permitted to illegally hold-over the suit premises.

47. As to the new plea that the land belongs to the DDA, the respondent has

submitted that: (i) this is an entirely new defence raised at the appellate

stage and cannot be considered; (ii) that without prejudice, in WP (C)

No. 4006/2006 decided on 08.08.2007, the court has specifically

examined alleged encroachment by the respondent on DDA land at this

very site and the DDA itself concluded that “no encroachment had taken

place.”

48. The respondent has further invoked section 116 of the Indian Evidence

Act, 1872, pointing to the appellants’ own application for allotment of

the quarters (vidé letters dated ‘nil’, copies of which have been filed as

part of the appeals), to submit that having applied to the respondent for

allotment, the appellants are estopped from now challenging the

respondent’s title. Reliance is placed in this belief on Sky Land

International Pvt. Ltd. vs. Kavita P. Lalwani.

5

49. Nature of appellant’s occupation is licence, not tenancy: On the

second principal issue, the respondent has submitted that the appellants

are mere licensees in the suit premises under Allotment Letters dated

23.09.1976, 25.12.1985 and 31.10.1986 and that no lease or tenancy in

respect thereof is either pleaded or shown.

5

2012 191 DLT 594

RFA 674/2025 & connected matters Page 20 of 44

50. It has been submitted that in paras 19-21 and 23-27 of the impugned

judgments, the learned trial court has concluded that the allotment letters

comprise a mere licence agreement. The learned trial court has observed

that the quarters in question were given on request of the licensees; and

the term “license” is used multiple times, including in relation to the fee

that was paid in relation to the suit premises. Furthermore, applying the

decision in Associated Hotels of India Ltd. vs. R.N. Kapoor,

6

the

learned trial court has distinguished ‘lease ’from ‘licence ’and has

concluded that the appellants were granted only a personal right to

occupy the suit premises, co-extensive with their employment, and that

the respondent had retained full right to revoke the licence.

51. The respondent has stressed, that the appellants have failed to discharge

the initial burden under sections 101, 102 and 106 of the Evidence Act,

1872 to prove any tenancy: that no rent receipt, or rental agreement has

been produced to show a landlord–tenant relationship between the

appellant and Birla Textile Mills (partnership firm) or Chambal

Fertilizers & Chemicals Ltd. Rather, the only document establishing any

legal relationship produced by the appellants are the allotment letters,

from which it is seen that the appellants were mere licensees of the

respondent.

52. The respondent has also contended, that even if the appellants formally

deny the allotment letters, there is literally no explanation on record of

how they came into possession at all, in which case, far from being

6

AIR 1959 SC 1262

RFA 674/2025 & connected matters Page 21 of 44

tenants, the appellants would have no recognisable right to remain in

possession of the suit premises.

53. Limitation under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963: On the plea

that the suits were time‑barred, since employment of the appellants had

allegedly ceased on 30.11.1996 and the suits were filed in 2017, the

respondent has submitted, that as a matter of law, a licensee remains in

permissive possession of a property and a fresh cause of action for

seeking recovery of possession arises each time the licensor calls upon a

licensee to vacate.

54. The respondent has relied on Article 65 read with Section 27 of the

Limitation Act, 1963 to contend that limitation for recovery of

possession based on title begins only when a defendant sets-up a hostile

title by way of adverse possession, and even then, limitation runs for 12

years from the date of such assertion. In the present case however, the

respondent has argued that the appellants have neither filed a counter-

claim nor instituted any separate suit seeking declaration of ownership

by adverse possession; hence, in that sense, limitation under Article 65

has not even commenced. The respondent has cited Mahesh Chand vs.

Sumnesh Kumar Chaturvedi

7

and Laxmi Narayan Soni vs. Sudha

Gupta & Ors.

8

55. In this behalf, it has been pointed-out that the learned trial court has held

(in para 29) that “the licensee is always a licensee”; that a fresh cause of

action arises every time a licensor demands vacation; and that permissive

occupation does not ripen into adverse possession merely because the

7

2014 SCC OnLine Del 6474

8

2018 SCC OnLine Del 8679

RFA 674/2025 & connected matters Page 22 of 44

licensor does not sue within 12 years of such demand. In support of this

contention reliance has been placed on Brij Narayan Shukla (D)

through LRs vs. Sudesh Kumar (D) through LRs.

9

The respondent has

also said that the issue of limitation was not even orally argued before

the learned trial court.

56. Allegation of “unadmitted” documents: In their appeals, the

appellants have contended that the learned trial court has relied on

“unadmitted” documents while deciding the Order XII Rule 6 CPC

applications. The respondent has answered that by submitting: (i) that

on 17.08.2023, applications under Order VII Rule 14 CPC were filed by

the respondent to bring on record additional title documents (viz., layout

plans, building plans, agreement to sell, building permit, amalgamation

orders, mutation order dated 09.06.2014, DDA layout plan dated

15.08.2015, orders and Commissioner’s report in WP (C) 4006/2006,

ROC name change certificate, NDMC letter dated 04.01.2013, site plan,

and an application for allotment); (ii) by order dated 08.02.2024, the

learned trial court has allowed these applications, noting that evidence

was yet to be led.

57. In the above circumstances, the respondent has contended that absent of

any specific indication in the appeals as to which particular documents

are “unadmitted” or incorrectly relied upon, this ground raised by the

appellants is wholly vague and untenable.

58. Satisfaction of ingredients of Order XII Rule 6 CPC: In response to

the appellants’ contention that the prerequisites for a decree on

9

(2024) 2 SCC 590

RFA 674/2025 & connected matters Page 23 of 44

admissions under Order XII Rule 6 CPC are not satisfied, the respondent

has answered briefly as follows: (i) that the issues of limitation and

ownership have been addressed as above; (ii) that there was an

employer-employee contract between the parties is established by

allotment letters, inter-alia signed and sealed by Texmaco Ltd., copies

of which were annexed to the plaints and have not been specifically

denied; (iii) that the right to evict the appellants arises from para 9 of the

plaints, which asserts that from the dates indicated in the plaints, the

appellants had ceased to be the respondent’s employees; hence, the

licence stood determined, and subject to Article 65 of the Limitation Act,

1963, a fresh cause of action accrued each time the respondent called-

upon the appellants to vacate the suit premises; (iv) that, as asserted in

paras 15 and 27 of the plaints, the cause of action arose when the

appellants refused to hand-over possession of the suit premises despite

termination of licence; and (v) since the claim in the suits was for

recovery of possession from illegal occupants, whose licences had

ended, the suit would lie before the civil court, and not before the Rent

Controller.

59. The respondent has further relied on Karam Kapahi & Ors. vs. Lal

Chand Public Charitable & Anr.,

10

Rajeev Tandon & Anr. vs. Rashmi

Tandon,

11

Mangal Sain Mittal vs. PPA Impex Limited,

12

Charanjit Lal

Mehra & Ors. vs. Kamal Saroj Mahajan (Smt) & Anr.,

13

and S.M. Arif

10

(2010) 4 SCC 753

11

2019 SCC OnLine Del 7336

12

(2009) 112 DLT 532

13

(2005) 11 SCC 279

RFA 674/2025 & connected matters Page 24 of 44

vs. Virender Kumar Bajaj

14

to submit that: (i) Order XII Rule 6 CPC is

an enabling, and discretionary provision and the learned trial court has

correctly exercised the discretion vested in it by decreeing the suits for

possession; (ii) admissions need not be express and constructive

admissions can be inferred from evasive and vague denials, which

inferences the learned trial court has correctly drawn; and (iii) pleadings

that lack material particulars or do not go to the root of the controversy

are liable to be rejected.

60. The respondent has also argued that, in paras 30-33 of the impugned

judgments, the learned trial court has held that the appellants’ defence

consisted of “unsubstantiated pleas” and “vague averments” amounting

to admissions, sufficient to justify a decree on admissions, relying inter-

alia on Rajeev Tandon, and Monika Tyagi vs. Subhash Tyagi

15

on the

issue of whether the defence taken in a suit is “complete moonshine”;

and on Charanjit Lal Mehra, on the question of inferring admissions

from surrounding facts and circumstances. The respondent has adopted

these findings and submits that the appellants have raised only

“moonshine defences.”

61. Alleged disputed questions of fact/law and other objections: On the

appellants’ claim that serious disputed questions of fact and law arise in

the matter, the respondent has answered: (i) that the issue of limitation

has been answered under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 read

with the decision in Brij Narayan Shukla; (ii) that the respondent’s

ownership is established by a complete chain of documents and prior

14

(2015) 9 SCC 287

15

2021 SCC OnLine Del 5400

RFA 674/2025 & connected matters Page 25 of 44

judicial recognition of that right vesting in the respondent, whereas the

appellants have not produced a single title document in favour of Birla

Textile Mills (partnership firm); (iii) that the lease vs. licence issue

stands concluded by the language of the allotment letters and the settled

jurisprudence on the concept of a licence; (iv) that dismissal of the earlier

criminal complaints do not bind the civil court, since as a matter of law,

findings in criminal proceedings do not conclude civil rights, as held in

Syed Askari Hadi Ali Augustine Imam & Anr. vs. State (Delhi Admn.)

& Anr.;

16

(v) that as regards non‑receipt of the termination notice, the

respondent has cited Nopany Investments (P) Ltd. vs. Santokh Singh

(HUF)

17

to submit, that filing of a suit for possession is itself sufficient

notice to quit and a separate notice under section 106 of the Transfer of

Property Act, 1882 is not a pre-condition for entertaining such a suit.

62. On the appellants’ argument based on the M.C. Mehta case, the

respondent has pointed-out, that the appellants cannot attribute the

Supreme Court’s directions issued to M/s Birla Textile Mills (which was

a partnership firm) to the respondent/plaintiff, namely to Ms. Texmaco

Infrastructure and Holdings Ltd. It has been submitted, that the

respondent company was incorporated only in 1987, whereas the

concerned M.C. Mehta proceedings commenced in 1985 and related to

companies that existed before that time. Furthermore, it has been

submitted, that interlocutory applications relating to the Delhi region

were filed in 1988-1989. It has also been submitted, that the sanctioned

scheme of arrangement in favour of the respondent was drawn-up in

16

(2009) 5 SCC 528

17

(2008) 2 SCC 728

RFA 674/2025 & connected matters Page 26 of 44

1982-1983, predating the M.C. Mehta litigation. Accordingly, it has been

argued that the entity referred to in M.C. Mehta is distinct from the

present respondent, and the appellants’ plea is a bald averment aimed at

creating confusion on account of the similarity in names.

63. On the foregoing premises, the respondent has prayed that the decrees

for possession passed by the learned trial court on 10.02.2025 be

affirmed alongwith the finding that the appellants are mere licensees of

the respondent whose licence has long since terminated; and that the

appellants’ inconsistent and unsubstantiated claims of third-party

ownership and tenancy, be rejected. It has been prayed that the appeals

be dismissed as being devoid of merit, there being no substantial

question of fact or law warranting interference with the learned trial

court’s judgment on admissions.

DISCUSSION

& ANALYSIS

64. This court has heard learned counsel for the appellants as well as learned

counsel for the respondent. Upon considering the submissions made and

the documents on records, the position that emerges is discussed below.

Scope of Application of Order XII Rule 6 CPC

64.1. At the outset, it is necessary to examine the scope and applicability

of Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC, which is a provision that enables

a court to pronounce judgment on admissions without proceeding

to trial, where admissions of fact have been made either in the

pleadings or otherwise. However, as rightly contended by learned

counsel for the appellants, application of this provision is

discretionary and its use must be made by the court judiciously.

RFA 674/2025 & connected matters Page 27 of 44

64.2. The law on this aspect has been clearly laid down by the Supreme

Court in Himani Alloys Ltd., wherein it has been held that for

application of Order XII Rule 6 CPC, admissions of fact must be

clear, categorical, unambiguous and unconditional. Similarly, in

Delhi Jal Board, a Division Bench of this court has held that the

test for applying Order XII Rule 6 CPC includes examining: (i)

whether admissions of fact arise in the suit; (ii) whether such

admissions are plain, unambiguous and unequivocal; (iii) whether

the defence set-up requires evidence for determination of the

issues; and (iv) whether objections raised go to the root of the

matter.

64.3. However, it is equally well-settled that admissions need not

always be express. Constructive admissions can be inferred from

evasive denials, vague averments, or pleadings that lack material

particulars. As observed by the Supreme Court in Charanjit Lal

Mehra, admissions can be inferred from surrounding facts and

circumstances. Similarly, in Rajeev Tandon and Monika Tyagi,

this court has held that where the defence is “complete

moonshine” and consists of unsubstantiated pleas lacking

particularity, a decree on admissions is warranted.

64.4. The law on the exercise of discretion under Order XII Rule 6 CPC

has been summarized by the Supreme Court in Karam Kapahi,

and by this court in Mangal Sain Mittal, S.M. Arif, and Rajeev

Tandon. These decisions make it clear that Order XII Rule 6 CPC

is an enabling provision, and that admissions need not be express

but can be inferred from evasive and vague denials. Pleadings that

RFA 674/2025 & connected matters Page 28 of 44

lack material particulars or do not go to the root of the controversy

are also liable to be rejected.

Ownership of the Suit Premises

64.5. The primary ground of challenge raised by the appellants is that

ownership of the suit premises by the respondent has not been

established, and that the documents relied upon by the respondent

are disputed, illegible, and do not specifically mention the suit

premises.

64.6. However on carefully examining this contention, it is noticed that

the record reveals that the respondent has established a complete

chain of title through the following documents: (i) Order dated

03.01.1983 of the Delhi High Court and order dated

20/22.12.1982 of the Calcutta High Court approving the Scheme

of Amalgamation of BCSWM into Texmaco Ltd. (‘said Scheme’);

(ii) Schedule II, Clause 5 of the said Scheme (effective

01.04.1981) inter-alia transferring the suit premises to the

respondent; (iii) Mutation Order dated 09.06.2014 passed by the

Tehsildar, Civil Lines, mutating the property, where the suit

premises are located, in the respondent's favour; and (iv) Order

dated 13.12.2018 of this court in Texmaco Infrastructure &

Holdings Ltd. vs. Rajesh Kumar Dudani CS(OS) No. 433/2017,

wherein this court has reaffirmed the respondent's ownership in

respect of similar staff quarters which was occupied by another

former employee.

64.7. In paras 14-18 of the impugned judgments, the learned trial court

has traced this chain of title and has correctly concluded that the

RFA 674/2025 & connected matters Page 29 of 44

suit premises belong to the respondent/plaintiff and not to the

partnership firm styled as "Birla Textile Mills”.

64.8. In contrast, the appellants have not produced a single document

evidencing ownership of the suit premises in favour of the

partnership firm "Birla Textile Mills" or any other entity. The

appellants' reliance on letter dated 08.12.1999 allegedly showing

that Birla Textile Mills (partnership firm) was taken over by

Chambal Fertilizers & Chemicals Ltd. is misplaced for multiple

reasons. First, this document was filed without leave of the court

along with their replies to the Order XII Rule 6 applications , and

is therefore not properly on record. Second, even if the document

were to be considered, it is addressed to a third party and does not

establish ownership of the suit premises. Third, the plea regarding

Chambal Fertilizers & Chemicals Ltd. finds no mention in the

written statement and has been raised in the appellate proceedings,

which is impermissible.

64.9. Similarly, the appellants' reliance on an alleged RTI reply dated

17.11.2017 is wholly untenable, since no such document is on

record. Furthermore, the appellants have at different stages

claimed that the suit premises belong: (i) to the partnership firm

“Birla Textile Mills”; (ii) to Chambal Fertilizers & Chemicals

Ltd.; and (iii) to the DDA. These self-contradictory and mutually

inconsistent stands completely undermine the credibility of the

appellants' case. As rightly submitted by learned counsel for the

respondent, the appellants have in the same breath alleged three

RFA 674/2025 & connected matters Page 30 of 44

different owners for the same suit premises, which demonstrates

the lack of bona fides in the defence.

64.10. The plea that the property vests in the DDA, raised in para 20 of

the present appeals, is also a defence that was not taken by the

appellants in their written statements and cannot be entertained at

the appellate stage. In any event, this plea is factually incorrect,

since in WP(C) No. 4006/2006, a Division Bench of this court

had specifically examined the alleged encroachment by the

respondent on DDA land at this very site, and vidé order dated

08.08.2007 passed in those proceedings, the said writ petition was

disposed of based on a local commissioner’s report and on the

stand taken by the DDA, that there was no encroachment by the

respondent.

64.11. In the light of the Supreme Court's decision in Maria Margarida

Sequeira Fernandes, any person resisting a title holder's claim to

possession must plead with particularity and place documents

inter-alia regarding: (i) who is the actual owner of the property;

(ii) title documents of the property; (iii) when and how he entered

into possession; (iv) in what capacity; (v) consideration or rent

paid; and (vi) the basis of his claim to continue in possession.

Evidently, the appellants have failed to discharge this burden.

Apart from baldly naming three different "owners" at different

stages, the appellants have not produced a single document

showing how or when they entered into possession, in what

capacity, to whom they allegedly paid rent, or any tenancy/lease

document.

RFA 674/2025 & connected matters Page 31 of 44

64.12. Furthermore, by virtue of section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act,

1872, the appellants are estopped from challenging the

respondent's title. The appellants' own applications/letters for

allotment of the quarters, and allotment letters dated 23.09.1976,

25.12.1985 and 31.10.1986 issued to them, which are on record,

demonstrate that the appellants had sought and obtained

possession of the suit premises from the respondent. Having

applied to the respondent for allotment and having accepted the

same, the appellants cannot now be permitted to turn around and

deny the respondent's ownership. This principle has been affirmed

by this court in Aman Mehta.

64.13. Accordingly, this court is satisfied that the respondent has

established clear, cogent and documentary evidence of its

ownership of the suit premises, whereas the appellants have made

only bald denials without any supporting material. The learned

trial court has therefore correctly concluded that ownership of the

suit premises vests in the respondent.

Nature of Occupation: Licence vs. Tenancy

64.14. The second issue that arises relates to the nature of the appellants'

occupation of the suit premises. The respondent contends that the

appellants are mere licensees under the aforementioned 03

allotment letters, whereas the appellants claim to be tenants under

the partnership firm "Birla Textile Mills" and assert that the

dispute therefore lies within the jurisdiction of the Rent

Controller.

RFA 674/2025 & connected matters Page 32 of 44

64.15. However, allotment letters dated 23.09.1976, 25.12.1985 and

31.10.1986 issued by Texmaco Ltd. (or its predecessors-in-

interest) are the only documents on record explaining how the

appellants came into possession of the suit premises. Besides,

these letters expressly describe the appellants as "licensee" and

even fix a monthly licence fee of various amounts. The letters also

expressly provide that the licence is co-terminus with the

appellants’ employment.

64.16. In paras 19-21 and 23-27 of the impugned judgment the learned

trial court has carefully analyzed the language of the allotment

letters and has correctly held that these constitute a licence

agreement and not a lease. Applying the principles laid down by

the Supreme Court in Associated Hotels of India Ltd. the learned

trial court has distinguished a 'lease' from a ‘licence’ and has

concluded that the appellants were granted only a personal right

to occupy the suit premises, co-extensive with their employment,

and that the respondent retained full right to revoke the licence.

64.17. It is significant that while in their written statements the appellants

have sought to dispute the allotment letters, there is no specific

denial of the execution of those letters. The appellants have merely

stated that the allotment letters require formal proof, which is an

evasive plea falling far short of a specific denial. In the absence of

a specific denial, the execution and contents of the allotment

letters must be taken as admitted.

64.18. Furthermore, the appellants have failed to discharge the initial

burden under sections 101, 102 and 106 of the Indian Evidence

RFA 674/2025 & connected matters Page 33 of 44

Act, 1872 to prove their alleged tenancy. No rent receipt, rental

agreement, or any other document evidencing a landlord-tenant

relationship has been produced. If, as claimed by the appellants,

they were tenants of the partnership firm “Birla Textile Mills”

paying rent of certain amounts per month, one would expect the

appellants to produce rent receipts or some documentary evidence

of their claimed tenancy. The complete absence of any such

evidence is fatal to the appellants’ case.

64.19. The only documents produced by the appellants establishing any

legal relationship are in fact the allotment letters, which refer to

the appellants as “licensee” of the respondent. As rightly

submitted by learned counsel for the respondent, even if the

appellants formally deny the allotment letters, there is literally no

explanation on record of how the appellants came into possession

of the suit premises at all, in which case they would have no

recognizable legal right to remain in possession of the suit

premises.

64.20. This court is therefore in agreement with the conclusion reached

by the learned trial court, that the appellants are mere licensees of

the respondent, and not tenants; and that the licence stood

terminated upon cessation of their employment.

Employer-Employee Relationship

64.21. The appellants have contended that their employer was the

partnership firm "Birla Textile Mills" and not the respondent

company, and that there has never been any employer-employee

relationship between the appellants and the respondent company.

RFA 674/2025 & connected matters Page 34 of 44

64.22. However, this contention is belied by the record. In particular,

Allotment Letters dated 23.09.1976, 25.12.1985 and 31.10.1986

have been issued by Texmaco Ltd. or its predecessor; and pursuant

to the Scheme of Amalgamation approved by the Calcutta High

Court on 20/22.12.1982 and by the Delhi High Court on

03.01.1983, all assets and liabilities of BCSWM, including

employment contracts, stood transferred to Texmaco Ltd.

64.23. By way of the said allotment letters, the suit premises were

expressly allotted to the appellants as licensees at a fixed licence

fee, with the licence being expressly co-terminus with their

employment. These documents establish beyond doubt that an

employer -employee relationship subsisted between Texmaco Ltd.

(now Texmaco Infrastructure & Holdings Ltd.) and the appellants.

64.24. The appellants have not specifically denied the execution of the

allotment letters. The plea that the allotment letter “requires

formal proof” is evasive and amounts to a constructive admission.

Having applied for and obtained allotment of staff quarters from

the respondent, the appellants cannot now be permitted to turn

around and deny the employer-employee relationship with the

respondent.

64.25. The appellants' belated plea that their employer was a partnership

firm or that Chambal Fertilizers & Chemicals Ltd. had control

over service conditions is wholly unsubstantiated and unsupported

by any documentary evidence. These pleas find no mention in the

written statement and have been raised in the replies to the Order

RFA 674/2025 & connected matters Page 35 of 44

XII Rule 6 applications and in the present appeals, which is

impermissible.

64.26. Accordingly, this court is of the view that the employer-employee

relationship subsisted between the respondent (or its predecessor-

in-interest Texmaco Ltd.) and the appellants, and not with any

partnership firm or third party.

Effect of M.C. Mehta vs. Union of India

64.27. A major plank of the appellants' case is the reliance on the series

of orders passed by the Supreme Court in M.C. Mehta relating to

closure/relocation of hazardous industries from Delhi. The

appellants contend that under the Supreme Court’s directions,

their service was to be treated as continuing until the industry

restarted at the relocated place, and that they were entitled to

continue to occupy the existing accommodation in Delhi until

alternative accommodation was provided at the place of

relocation. The following portion of the Supreme Court order

dated 08.07.1996 in MC Mehta is relevant for this purpose. The

said portion reads as under:

“28. We, therefore, hold and direct as under:

(8) The closure order with effect from 30-11-1996

shall be unconditional. Even if the relocation of industries is

not complete they shall stop functioning in Delhi with effect

from 30-11-1996.

(9) The workmen employed in the above-mentioned

168 industries shall be entitled to the rights and benefits as

indicated hereunder:

(d) The workmen employed in the industries

which fail to relocate and the workmen who are not

willing to shift along with the relocated industries,

shall be deemed to have been retrenched with effect

from 30-11-1996 provided they have been in

RFA 674/2025 & connected matters Page 36 of 44

continuous service (as defined in Section 25-B of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947) for not less than one

year in the industries concerned before the said date.

They shall be paid compensation in terms of Section

25-F(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. These

workmen shall also be paid, in addition, one year's

wages as additional compensation;”

(emphasis supplied)

64.28. In light of the Supreme Court directions extracted above, the

appellants’ contention is misconceived for multiple reasons. First

and foremost, even assuming that the M.C. Mehta directions were

applicable to the respondent, as per the record, pursuant to the

closure of the mill in Delhi, the appellants have not placed any

material to substantiate their claim that the mill relocated or that

they joined service at Baddi and thereby continued in

employment. In these circumstances, the appellants’ employment

ceased as on 30.11.1996, and accordingly, the licence to occupy

the staff quarters also stood automatically terminated.

64.29. Any alleged breach of the appellants’ right to continue in

employment would, at best, be relevant only to the question of the

retrenchment compensation/other dues that may have been

payable to them as workmen; but the directions in MC Mehta

cannot be construed as conferring upon the appellants an absolute

or perpetual right to occupy the staff accommodation irrespective

of whether they continued in employment or not.

64.30. Also, as narrated above, the allotment letters expressly provided

that the licence to occupy the staff quarters was co-terminus with

employment. Therefore, the appellants cannot seek to defeat this

RFA 674/2025 & connected matters Page 37 of 44

clear contractual obligation by relying on the M.C. Mehta

directions.

64.31. It is also noticed, that the plea regarding entitlement to alternative

accommodation finds no mention in the written statement but has

been raised in the reply to the Order XII Rule 6 application and in

the present appeal. This is a clear case of the appellants seeking to

improve upon their pleadings, which is impermissible.

64.32. For all the aforesaid reasons, this court finds no merit in the

appellants' reliance on the M.C. Mehta case. The learned trial

court has therefore correctly concluded that the appellants'

continued possession of the suit premises after 30.11.1996 is

unauthorized.

Limitation

64.33. Next, the appellants have contended that the suit is barred by

limitation, since their employment allegedly ceased on 30.11.1996

and the suit was filed in 2017.

64.34. This contention is wholly untenable. As a matter of law, a licensee

remains in permissive possession and a fresh cause of action for

seeking recovery of possession arises each time the licensor calls

upon the licensee to vacate.

64.35. Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 read with section 27 thereof

provides that limitation for recovery of possession based on title

begins only when a defendant sets-up a hostile title by way of

adverse possession, and even then, limitation runs for 12 years

from the date of such assertion. In the present case, the appellants

have neither filed a counter-claim nor have they instituted any

RFA 674/2025 & connected matters Page 38 of 44

separate suit seeking declaration of ownership by adverse

possession. Accordingly, limitation under Article 65 has not even

commenced. The law on this aspect has been consistent, inter-alia

as laid down in Mahesh Chand, Laxmi Narayan Soni, and Brij

Narayan Shukla.

64.36. In para 29 of the impugned judgment the learned trial court has

correctly held that "a licensee is always a licensee", that a fresh

cause of action arises every time a licensor demands vacation, and

that permissive occupation does not ripen into adverse possession

merely because the licensor does not sue within 12 years of such

demand.

64.37. Furthermore, as rightly submitted by learned counsel for the

respondent, the filing of a suit for possession is itself sufficient as

a notice to quit, and a separate notice under section 106 of the

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is not a pre-condition for

entertaining such suit. This principle has been affirmed by the

Supreme Court in Nopany Investments (P) Ltd.

64.38. For the foregoing reasons, this court is of opinion that the suit was

not barred by limitation.

Additional Documents

64.39. The appellants have also contended that the learned trial court has

relied on "unadmitted" documents while deciding the Order XII

Rule 6 CPC applications .

64.40. This contention is factually incorrect. The record shows that on

17.08.2023, the respondent had filed applications under Order VII

Rule 14 CPC seeking permission to bring on record additional title

RFA 674/2025 & connected matters Page 39 of 44

documents, which application was allowed by order dated

08.02.2024. In allowing this application, the learned trial court

had noted that evidence was yet to be led, and had therefore

permitted the filing of additional documents.

64.41. In any event, the appellants have not specified which particular

documents are allegedly "unadmitted" or incorrectly relied upon.

In the absence of any specific assertion, this ground is wholly

vague and untenable.

64.42. Furthermore, as noted above, the appellants have themselves

relied on documents which are not properly on record, such as

letter dated 08.12.1999 and alleged RTI reply dated 17.11.2017.

The appellants cannot be permitted to adopt double standards by

objecting to the respondent's documents while themselves relying

on documents filed without leave.

Parallel Criminal Proceedings

64.43. The appellants have sought to rely on the dismissal of the criminal

complaints under section 630 of the Companies Act, 1956 by the

learned ACMM on 24.12.2010, as a ground for challenging the

impugned order.

64.44. This reliance is also misplaced. As a matter of law, findings in

criminal proceedings do not conclude civil rights. This principle

has been affirmed by the Supreme Court in Syed Askari Hadi Ali

Augustine Imam.

64.45. For the said reason, the dismissal of the criminal complaint has no

bearing on the present civil proceedings.

RFA 674/2025 & connected matters Page 40 of 44

Jurisdiction of Civil Court

65. The appellants have also contended that the dispute lies within the

jurisdiction of the Rent Controller and not that of the civil court, as they

claim to be tenants at a ‘rent’ of Rs. 40/- per month in two cases and

Rs.7/- in one case.

66. This contention is also untenable. As this court has held above, the

appellants are mere licensees and not tenants. The suits filed were for

recovery of possession from illegal occupants, whose licences had

ended. Accordingly, such suits would lie before the civil court and not

before the Rent Controller.

67. Accordingly, this court is of the view that the civil court had jurisdiction

to entertain and decide the suits.

Satisfaction of Ingredients of Order XII Rule 6 CPC

67.1. Having examined the various contentions raised by the appellants,

this court would now proceed to consider whether the ingredients

for passing decrees of possession under Order XII Rule 6 CPC are

satisfied in the present case.

67.2. In paras 30-33 of the impugned judgments, the learned trial court

has meticulously analyzed the pleadings and has concluded that

the appellants’ defence consisted of “unsubstantiated pleas” and

“vague averments” amounting to admissions. On the question of

inferring admissions from surrounding facts and circumstances

and whether the defence is “complete moonshine”, the learned

trial court has correctly relied on Rajeev Tandon, Monika Tyagi,

and Charanjit Lal Mehra.

RFA 674/2025 & connected matters Page 41 of 44

67.3. This court is in complete agreement with the aforesaid findings

and reasoning of the learned trial court. The appellants have not

specifically denied the execution of Allotment Letters dated

23.09.1976, 25.12.1985 and 31.10.1986, which are the

foundational documents establishing the nature of the appellants’

occupation of the suit premises. The appellants’ plea that the said

documents require formal proof is evasive and amounts to a

constructive admission.

67.4. The appellants have also made self-contradictory claims regarding

ownership of the suit premises, alleging at different stages that the

suit premises belongs to the partnership firm “Birla Textile Mills”,

to Chambal Fertilizers & Chemicals Ltd., and to the DDA. These

mutually inconsistent stands demonstrate that the appellants’

defence is not bona fide but mere “moonshine".

67.5. Furthermore, the appellants have failed to produce a single

document evidencing ownership of the suit premises by any entity

other than the respondent; or evidencing a tenant-landlord

relationship with the respondent; or evidencing their employment

with any entity other than the respondent or its predecessor-in-

interest. In contrast, the respondent has produced a complete chain

of title documents and the allotment letters establishing the licence

agreement with the appellants.

67.6. The appellants have raised new pleas for the first time in their

replies to the Order XII Rule 6 applications and in the present

appeals, such as the plea regarding entitlement to alternative

accommodation, the plea that the property vests in Chambal

RFA 674/2025 & connected matters Page 42 of 44

Fertilizers & Chemicals Ltd., or in the DDA. These pleas find no

mention in the written statements filed by the appellants and are

therefore impermissible.

67.7. The appellants have also relied on documents which are not

properly on record, such as letter dated 08.12.1999 and the alleged

RTI reply dated 17.11.2017. This demonstrates a lack of bona

fides on the part of the appellants.

67.8. In the light of the above, this court is satisfied that the following

admissions clearly emerge from the pleadings and documents on

record:

67.8.1. The respondent is the owner of the suit premises by virtue

of the Scheme of Amalgamation and the chain of title

documents referred to above;

67.8.2. The appellants obtained possession of the suit premises

pursuant to Allotment Letters dated 23.09.1976,

25.12.1985 and 31.10.1986 issued by the respondent/its

predecessor-in-interest;

67.8.3. The appellants were allotted the suit premises as

‘licensees’ at certain monthly licence fees, as indicated in

the allotment letters;

67.8.4. The licences were co-terminus with the appellants’

employment;

67.8.5. The appellants’ employment ceased on 30.11.1996 when

the mill stopped functioning;

RFA 674/2025 & connected matters Page 43 of 44

67.8.6. The licence to occupy the suit premises also stood

automatically terminated upon cessation of the appellants’

employment; and

67.8.7. The appellants have accordingly continued to occupy the

suit premises without any right or title to remain in

possession thereafter.

68. The admissions enumerated above go to the root of the matter and entitle

the respondent to decrees of possession. The defence set-up by the

appellants does not require any evidence for determination, since the

appellants’ pleas and contentions are only vague, evasive and

unsubstantiated assertions, which amount to a “moonshine" defence.

69. Applying these principles to the facts of the present case, this court is

satisfied that the learned trial court has correctly concluded that the

appellants have made constructive admissions sufficient to warrant the

passing of decrees for possession under Order XII Rule 6 CPC.

CONCLUSION

70. In the circumstances, this court is of the view that the learned trial court

has correctly exercised its discretion under Order XII Rule 6 CPC in

decreeing the suits insofar as the relief of possession is concerned,

without proceeding to trial. The impugned judgments do not suffer from

any error of law or fact warranting interference in these appeals.

71. Accordingly, the appeals are dismissed.

72. The impugned judgments and decrees dated 10.02.2025 passed by the

learned District Judge-06, Central District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi in

suits bearing CS DJ No. 2902/2017, CS DJ No. 2903/2017, and CS DJ

No. 2904/2017 are hereby affirmed.

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73. The appellants are directed to vacate and hand-over peaceful and vacant

possession of the suit premises bearing Quarters Nos. 60-A, 37-A, and

41-B situate at Shivaji Lines, Roshnara Building, Shakti Nagar, Delhi to

the respondent within 04 weeks from today, failing which the respondent

shall be entitled to take appropriate steps for recovery of possession in

accordance with law.

74. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed-of.

ANUP JAIRAM BHAMBHANI, J

MAY 29, 2026

HJ