Page 1 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL No. 5335 OF 2017

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) No.11472/2013)

M/s Unichem Laboratories Ltd. ….Appellant(s)

VERSUS

Rani Devi & Anr. …Respondent(s)

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL No. 5336 OF 2017

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) No.13070/2013)

M/s Unichem Laboratories Ltd. ….Appellant(s)

VERSUS

Amar Kaur & Anr. …Respondent(s)

AND

CIVIL APPEAL No. 5337 OF 2017

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) No.27328/2014)

M/s Unichem Laboratories Ltd. ….Appellant(s)

VERSUS

Rajesh Mohan Kapil …Respondent(s)

1

Page 2 J U D G M E N T

Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.

S.L.P.(c) No. 11472 of 2013

1)Leave granted.

2)This appeal is filed against the final judgment

and order dated 15.10.2012 passed by the High

Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Civil Revision

No. 441 of 2012 whereby the High Court allowed the

revision and set aside the judgment/decree dated

30.07.2012 passed by the Additional District and

Sessions Judge, Small Causes Court, Ghaziabad,

U.P. in SCC No. 39 of 2001.

3)The appellant is the plaintiff whereas the

respondents are the defendants in the civil suit out

of which this appeal arises.

4)The appellant is a Public Limited Company

registered under the Companies Act. Its registered

office is at Mumbai. The appellant has one

2

Page 3 industrial unit at Industrial Area, Meerut Road in

Ghaziabad (UP).

5)The State of U.P. has enacted an Act called

"The Uttar Pradesh Industrial Housing Act, 1955"

(hereinafter referred to as "the Act”). The object of

this Act is to provide housing to industrial workers

by the State or local authorities working in the

industries in the State of UP.

6)Some Sections of the Act, which are relevant

for this case, need mention. Section 3 provides that

the Act shall apply to those houses which are

constructed by the State or the authorities specified

in the Section for the occupation of the Industrial

workers under the Industrial Housing Scheme

subsidized by the Central Government or any

Scheme notified in the Official Gazette. Section 4

empowers the State Government to appoint Labour

Commissioner to exercise the powers under the Act

in relation to the houses and other matters specified

3

Page 4 therein. Section 7 specifies the duties of the Labour

Commissioner. Sections 10 and 11 deal with

allotment of houses and the manner in which the

allotment is to be made. Section 12 specifies the

conditions of occupation of the houses by the

allottees. Section 13 deals with the bar of

jurisdiction of the Court and provides that no order

made by the State or Labour Commissioner under

the Act would be called in question in any Court

and no injunction shall be granted by any Court or

any authority in respect of any action taken in

pursuance of any power conferred by or under the

Act. Sections 15 and 16 empower the Labour

Commissioner to fix the rates of rent and the

manner of its payment. Section 18 empowers the

Labour Commissioner to enter into any house for

the purpose of administering or carrying out the

provisions of the Act. Section 20 enables the

employer of the allottee to enter into an agreement

4

Page 5 with the Labour Commissioner for recovery of rent

every month from the salary of their

employee(allottee). Section 21 so long as it was a

part of the Act (since deleted w.e.f 28.4.72) had

empowered the Labour Commissioner to evict any

allottee from the allotted house on the grounds

specified therein. Section 22 provides a right of

appeal to the State against the order of Labour

Commissioner. Section 28 provides rule-making

power to carry out the provisions of the Act. This, in

substance, is the Scheme of the Act.

7)The State Government constructed several

houses in accordance with the provisions of the Act

and allotted, quarter Nos. 5,6,7,8,11 and 12 in

Block No. 59 at Industrial Labour Colony,

Ghaziabad to the appellant vide order dated

29.04.1971 so as to enable the appellant to allot

these houses/quarters to the workers for their use

and occupation while they were in the appellant's

5

Page 6 employment. The allotment order issued by the

State, inter alia, provided that, (1) monthly rent of

each quarter would be Rs. 23/-; (2) The quarters

would be used only for residence by the eligible

worker; (3) The allottee of the quarter shall deposit

security money of Rs. 46/- per quarter and will also

execute agreement as prescribed before occupying

the quarter; and (4) In the event, it is found that the

allotment is made to ineligible worker, his tenancy

shall cease attracting penal action as provided

under the Act/Rules etc.

8)Respondent No.1's husband-Dharam Dev

Yadav was in the employment of the appellant as

industrial worker. He was working in the appellant's

industrial unit. On 11.05.1971, he applied to the

appellant for allotment of one quarter for his use

and occupation. The appellant, vide order dated

12.05.71, allotted quarter No.5 in Block No. 59 in

the industrial colony at Ghaziabad to Dharam Dev

6

Page 7 Yadav. On allotment, Dharam Dev Yadav executed a

declaration as required under the Act/Rule.

9)Dharam Dev Yadav retired from the appellant's

service on 12.01.1992. He, however, made request

to the appellant vide his letter dated 11.01.92 to

allow him to remain in occupation of the quarter for

a period of six months. The appellant acceded to his

request and accordingly granted him time to vacate

the quarter on or before 30.06.1992 on

humanitarian ground. Dharam Dev Yadav did not

vacate the quarter after expiry of six months and

continued to remain in its occupation. In the

meantime, he died leaving behind his wife

(respondent No. 1 herein) who also continued to

remain in the occupation of the quarter along with

her family members.

10)The appellant, therefore, filed a civil suit in the

year 2001 being S.C.C. No 39/2001 before the

Additional District & Sessions Judge, Ghaziabad

7

Page 8 against the respondents. The suit was for

respondent's eviction from the quarter in question

and also for claiming damages for its use and

occupation payable from 30.06.1992. It was alleged

that the allotment period having come to an end on

the date of retirement of Dharam Dev Yadav on

12.01.1992 and the same having been extended for

six months till 30.06.1992, he was under legal as

well as contractual obligation to vacate the quarter

on and after 30.06.1992. It was alleged that the

respondents, who claim through Dharam Dev Yadav

had no independent right to remain in occupation of

the quarter because they were neither in the

appellant's employment and nor any allotment order

had been issued by the appellant or/and the State

in their favour in relation to quarter No. 5. It was

alleged that the respondents are, therefore, in illegal

occupation of the quarter in question as trespasser

8

Page 9 and hence were liable to be evicted from the said

quarter.

11)The respondents filed their written statement

and denied the claim made by the appellant. It was

alleged that the appellant being a Company had no

right to file a suit unless resolution had been passed

authorizing the plaintiff-Company to file the suit

against the respondents. It was alleged that the

appellant not being the owner of the quarter in

question had no right to file a civil suit seeking

respondent's eviction from the quarter. The

respondents then alleged that they were in

occupation of the suit house as tenant. The

respondents also alleged that the suit was barred by

virtue of Section 13 of the Act read with Section 23

of the Small Cause Courts Act and hence it was

liable to be dismissed as being barred.

12)The Trial Court framed 9 issues. Parties

adduced evidence. The Trial Court, vide

9

Page 10 judgment/decree dated 30.07.2012 decreed the

appellant’s suit and passed eviction decree against

the respondents. It was held that, (i) the suit is

maintainable; (ii) there existed a relationship of

landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and

Dharam Dev Yadav; (iii) the monthly rent of suit

house is Rs 34/-; (iv) the suit is not barred by

Section 13 of the Act read with Section 23 of the

Provincial Small Cause Courts Act; (v) the District

Judge has jurisdiction to try the suit; (vi) the

plaintiff is authorized and hence competent to file

the civil suit; (vii) Dharam Dev Yadav was under

contractual and legal obligation to vacate the suit

house no sooner he retired from service; (viii) the

tenancy in respect of the quarter came to end on

termination of the employment of Dharam Dev; (ix)

defendant No. 1 being wife of the original allottee

had no right to occupy the quarter in question

because she was neither a workman and nor the

10

Page 11 allottee; and (x) the plaintiff was entitled to claim

Rs. 1000/- per month from the defendants from

25.9.1998 till the date of filing the suit and Rs.

1000/- per month during the pendency of suit till

possession is taken of the suit house from the

defendants.

13)Felt aggrieved, the defendants filed revision

before the High Court under Section 25 of the Small

Cause Courts Act. By impugned order, the High

Court allowed the revision, set aside the

judgment/decree of the Trial Court and dismissed

the appellant's suit. The High Court held that, (i) the

civil suit at the instance of the plaintiff (appellant) is

not maintainable for want of plaintiff's (appellant’s)

locus; (ii) the suit, however, is not barred by Section

13 of the Act; (iii) such suit, however, could be filed

by the State Government or/and Labour

Commissioner; and (iv) there was no relationship of

landlord and tenant between the appellant and the

11

Page 12 original allottee. The High Court then proceeded to

give directions to the Principal Secretary, Labour to

take action against the erring officials who failed to

take any action to obtain possession of the quarters

from illegal occupants.

14)Felt aggrieved, the plaintiff filed present appeal

by way of special leave before this Court.

15)Heard Mr. Sudhir Chandra, learned senior

counsel for the appellant and Mr. Jay Savla, learned

counsel for respondent No.2.

16)Having heard learned counsel for the parties

and on perusal of the record of the case, we are

inclined to allow the appeal and while setting aside

the impugned order and restore the

judgment/decree of the Trial Court, which rightly

decreed appellant’s suit against the respondents.

17)In our considered opinion, both the Courts

rightly held that the Civil Suit is not barred under

12

Page 13 Section 13 of the Act. The reasons are not far to

seek.

18)As would be clear from the provisions of the

Act, the power to decide the eviction cases under

the Act was earlier vested with the Labour

Commissioner under Section 21 of the Act.

However, by U.P. Act No. 22/1972, Section 21 was

deleted with effect from 28.04.1972. This

necessarily resulted in restoring the power to try the

eviction suit by the Civil Court under general law in

terms of Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure

1908 (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”).

19)Section 9 of the Code provides that the Courts

shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of a "civil

nature" excepting suits of which their cognizance is

either expressly or impliedly barred. A suit filed to

claim eviction from any accommodation is a suit of

"civil nature" and, therefore, the Civil Court is

competent to take cognizance of such suit unless its

13

Page 14 jurisdiction is expressly or impliedly barred by

virtue of any special Enactment. It is not so here.

20)As mentioned above, the jurisdiction of the

Civil Court to try the eviction cases arising under

the Act was barred by virtue of Section 21 till

28.04.1972 because the power to try such cases

was vested in Labour Commissioner. It was

permissible for the Legislature to do so. However,

on and after 28.04.1972, Labour Commissioner was

divested with the power to try the eviction cases by

reason of deletion of Section 21 from the Act. The

jurisdiction to try the suits arising under the Act,

therefore, stood restored to the Civil Court by virtue

of Section 9 of the Code because the Legislature

then did not confer such powers to try the matters

arising under the Act on other specified authority on

and after 28.04.1972. It is for these reasons, we are

of the considered opinion that the Civil Court was

14

Page 15 justified in trying and deciding the suit out of which

this appeal arises.

21)So far as rigour of Section 13 of the Act is

concerned, in our opinion, it does not put any fetter

on the powers of the Civil Court to try and decide

the eviction cases filed by the State or any authority

or allotee of the houses against the person in

possession of the quarter on and after 28.04.1972.

22)Section 13 only provides that if any order is

passed by the State Government or Labour

Commissioner under the Act, it shall not be called

in question in any Court and no Court shall grant

any injunction in respect of any action taken or to

be taken under the Act.

23)This, in our opinion, only means that no

industrial worker or any person alike him, if feels

aggrieved of any order passed under the Act by the

specified authority, will have a right to file any case

in the Civil Court to challenge the legality of any

15

Page 16 such order or/and action taken under the Act. In

other words, it only restricts the rights of the

worker/person in approaching the Courts to

question the legality of the action taken under the

Act. This Section unlike Section 21 cannot be

construed as ousting the jurisdiction of the Civil

Court to try the eviction suit filed by the employer

under the Act.

24)It is a settled principle of law that exclusion of

jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not to be readily

inferred and such exclusion is either be “explicitly

expressed or clearly implied”. It is a principle by no

means to be whittled down and has been referred to

as a “fundamental rule”. As a necessary corollary of

this rule, provisions excluding jurisdiction of Civil

Courts are required to be construed strictly. In

other words, it is trite rule of interpretation that

existence of jurisdiction in Civil Courts to decide

questions of civil nature is a general rule whereas

16

Page 17 the exclusion is an exception. The burden is,

therefore, on the party who raises such a contention

to prove such exclusion. (See Interpretation of

Statutes by G.P. Singh, 12

th

Edition, pages

747-748). It is not so in this case.

25)It is for these reasons, we are of the view that

both the Courts below were right in holding that the

suit is not hit by rigors of Section 13 of the Act.

26)This takes us to examine the next question,

namely, whether the High Court was justified in

holding that the appellant (company) had no right to

file the suit for want of any locus qua the

defendants in relation to the quarter or in other

words, whether the High Court was justified in

holding that there was no privity of contract of any

nature between the appellant and Dharam Das

Yadav in relation to the quarter and, therefore, they

were not competent to file a suit under the Act to

seek respondents eviction from the quarter and

17

Page 18 such suit could be filed either by the State or/and

Labour Commissioner? Yet another question as to

whether the High Court was justified in holding that

there did not exist any tenancy between the

appellant and the worker in respect of the quarter?

We do not agree with the view taken by the High

Court as, in our view, the questions posed deserve

to be answered in appellant’s favour and against the

respondents for the reasons mentioned infra.

27)It is not in dispute that the State had allotted

the quarters to the appellant under the Act by

issuing an allotment order. It is also not in dispute

that the allotment of quarters was made by the

appellant to their workers for their use and

occupation, who were in their employment. That

apart and as would be clear, the Act enabled the

appellant to deduct the rent every month from the

monthly salary of the workers under the Act and

lastly, there existed a relationship of the employer

18

Page 19 and the employee between the appellant and the

allottee-worker due to which only, the workers were

eligible to secure the quarter under the Act as a part

of their service conditions.

28)In our considered opinion, the aforesaid

undisputed facts were sufficient to hold that

contractual relationship between the appellant and

the allottee-worker in relation to the quarter for

deciding their inter se rights had come into

existence. It could be, therefore, construed as

tenancy agreement between the parties. The

appellant was, therefore, competent to file the civil

suit against the worker for his eviction from the

quarter allotted to him on the strength of such

agreement by taking recourse to the provisions of

the Act. The breaches alleged by the appellant

against the respondents in the suit rendered the

worker and all those claiming through him liable to

19

Page 20 suffer the eviction order because such breaches

were rightly held proved by the Trial Court.

29)This takes us to examine one more question,

which arises for consideration, namely, status of the

allottee-worker qua the appellant on his ceasing to

be in the appellant’s employment in relation to the

quarter. It is not in dispute that the quarter in

question was allotted to Dharam Dev Yadav by

virtue of he being in the appellant's employment. It

is also not in dispute that he retired from the

service on 12.01.1992. He was, therefore, under

contractual obligation to vacate the quarter on his

retirement. He did not do so and instead sought

extension to vacate the quarter after six months.

The appellant granted it. Despite grant of extension,

he did not vacate after expiry of six months. In the

meantime, he died and his family members

(respondents) continued to remain in its occupation.

20

Page 21 30)The law on this question is well settled. A

contract of tenancy created between the employer

and employee in relation to any accommodation

terminates on the cessation of the employment of an

employee. In other words, such tenancy is only for

the period of employment and comes to an end on

termination of the contract of employment. Such

employee then has no right to remain in occupation

of the accommodation once he ceases to be in the

employment of his employer. He has to then

surrender the accommodation to his employer.

31)In this case, the possession of the original

allottee Dharam Dev Yadav became illegal on and

after 12.01.1992 when he retired from service

because on this date, tenancy in relation to suit

quarter also came to an end. In any event, it

became unauthorized on and after 30.06.1992. The

respondents too had no independent right to remain

in occupation of the quarter in question because

21

Page 22 they were neither in the employment of the

appellant and nor were the allottees under the Act

so as to entitle them to remain in possession on

their own rights.

32)The Trial Court was, therefore, justified in

recording the aforesaid findings against the

respondents and was also justified in passing

decree for eviction and recovery of rent by way of

damages against the respondents. We find no good

ground to interfere in any of these findings. They

are accordingly upheld.

33)We may mention here that Section 630 of the

Companies Act also deals with such type of cases

arising between the Company and its employees to

whom the Company has provided the

accommodation as part of his service conditions.

34)The Section enables the Company to file a

complaint against their employee, if he fails to

vacate the accommodation allotted to him by the

22

Page 23 Company by virtue of his employment on

termination of his employment. Such complaint

can be filed by the Company in the competent Court

wherein the Company can seek employee's

prosecution, eviction from the accommodation and

also for imposition of the fine as specified in the

Section.

35)The appellant-Company, in this case could,

therefore, also take recourse to invoke the remedy

available against the respondents under the

Companies Act. It was legally permissible for them

to do so because the Act did not bar the

applicability of Companies Act for resorting to such

remedy against the respondents. Be that as it may.

36)Learned counsel for the respondents lastly

submitted that the State/Central Government has

issued some G.Os. which, according to him, enable

the workers occupying the quarters after ceasing to

23

Page 24 be in the employment to purchase the quarters as

per the procedure prescribed in the G.Os.

37)It is not for this Court to examine this question

in these proceedings for the simple reason that this

appeal is confined only to examine the legality of an

order passed by the High Court in the eviction suit.

We, therefore, express no opinion on this question.

38)In the light of foregoing discussion, we cannot

concur with the reasoning and the conclusion of the

High Court. The appeal thus succeeds and is

allowed. The impugned order is set aside and that of

the Trial Court is restored.

39)The respondents are granted 3 months’ time to

vacate the suit quarter provided they deposit the

entire decreetal amount awarded by the Trial Court

and also deposit the three months’ rent by way of

damages for use and occupation at the same rate

determined by the Trial Court.

24

Page 25 40)Let the decretal amount be deposited in the

concerned Trial Court within one month. Failure to

deposit the amount within one month will entitle

the appellant to execute the decree forthwith.

In S.L.P.(c) Nos. 13070 of 2013 and 27328

of 2014

Leave granted.

In view of the aforesaid judgment passed

in appeal arising out of S.L.P.(c) No. 11472 of 2013,

these appeals are also allowed on the same terms

and conditions.

………...................................J.

[R.K. AGRAWAL]

…...……..................................J.

[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]

New Delhi;

April 18, 2017

25