2023 INSC 649 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 5263 of 2023

M/S UNIVERSAL SOMPO GENERAL …PETITIONER(S)

INSURANCE CO. LTD.

VERSUS

SURESH CHAND JAIN & ANR. …RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

J. B. PARDIWALA, J.:

1.This petition seeking leave to appeal under Article 136 of the

Constitution is at the instance of M/s Universal Sompo General

Insurance Company Limited, Original appellant before the National

Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (for short, ‘the NCDRC’)

in the First Appeal No. 376 of 2016 by which the NCDRC dismissed

the appeal filed by the petitioner herein thereby affirming the order

passed by the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (for

short, ‘the SCDRC’) of Delhi, holding that the respondent No. 1

/complainant was entitled to receive the claim amount and appropriate

compensation from the petitioner and its joint venture partner viz.

Allahabad Bank (respondent No. 2) for the goods stolen from the

premises in question.

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FACTUAL MATRIX

2.It appears from the materials on record that the respondent Bank,

acting as an intermediary issued a Standard Fire and Special Perils

Policy dated 05.12.2011 in favour of the complainant through the

petitioner herein. Similarly, a Burglary Insurance Policy was also

issued in favour of the complainant dated 08.12.2011. Both the

policies covered a sum of Rs. 50 lakh for the risk of fire and burglary.

The policies were for the period between 25.11.2011 and 24.11.2012.

3.By way of letter dated 28.03.2012, the complainant informed the

respondent Bank that the construction of his new premises at Bawana,

Delhi had been completed and he had transferred his stock to the

above premises situated in Bawana from the premises situated in

Rajgarh Ext., Gandhi Nagar, Delhi and Bhagirath Palace, Chandni

Chowk, Delhi. In this letter the complainant had also instructed the

Bank to inform the petitioner.

4.The respondent Bank acknowledged the aforesaid intimation and

claims to have informed the petitioner by way of letter dated

31.03.2012. The Bank claims to have also forwarded the letter dated

28.03.2012 of the complainant to the petitioner.

5.On 29.06.2012, a theft took place at the Bawana premises and for that

FIR No. 213/2012 was lodged on 30.06.2012 at the PS Bawana. Both,

the petitioner and the Bank were also informed about the theft. A

surveyor was appointed by the petitioner to inspect the premises and

on 01.07.2012, a formal complaint was lodged by the complainant

with the petitioner.

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6.After the theft, the complainant informed that a fire had also broken

out in the premises at Bawana on 18.10.2012, and the status report in

that regard was issued by the fire department. Subsequently, the

complainant filed claims for both, theft and fire amounting to Rs. 49

lakh. The petitioner repudiated the theft claim vide letter dated

22.08.2013 and the fire claim was closed on account of non-

submission of documents by the complainant.

7.On 03.06.2013, the complainant aggrieved by the inaction on the part

of the petitioner approached the SCDRC, Delhi under Section 17 of

the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (for short, ‘the Act 1986’), by way

of Complaint No. 357/2013. He prayed for his claim of Rs. 49 lakh to

be processed along with compensation of Rs. 20 lakh and interest at

the rate the respondent Bank was charging from the complainant, with

costs of the complaint.

8.By order dated 18.03.2016, the SCDRC partly allowed the complaint

holding that the petitioner and the respondent bank were jointly and

severally liable for the deficiencies in providing services to the

complainant and the complainant was entitled to be compensated for

the theft of goods worth Rs. 41,31,180/- @ 12 % interest per annum

from the date of the claim. The petitioner and the bank were also

directed to pay Rs. 2 lakh to the complainant towards compensation

for mental agony, harassment and deficiency in providing services.

The petitioner was further directed to finalise the fire claim of Rs. 4

lakh of the complainant.

9.The petitioner herein feeling aggrieved with the order passed by the

SCDRC challenged the same before the NCDRC by filing the First

Appeal No. 376 of 2016 under Section 19 of the Act 1986. The

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petitioner prayed before the NCDRC to set aside the SCDRC’s order

in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction and grant costs against the

complainant in favour of the petitioner.

10.By order dated 16.01.2023, the First Appeal filed by the petitioner

herein came to be dismissed.

11.In such circumstances referred to above, the petitioner is here before

this Court with the present petition, seeking special leave to appeal

under Article 136 of the Constitution.

DISCUSSION

12.In the course of the hearing of this matter, manyfold contentions were

raised on either side. However, the moot question that falls for our

consideration is whether we should entertain this petition seeking

special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution directly

against the order passed by the NCDRC in exercise of its appellate

jurisdiction or relegate the petitioner to avail the remedy of filing a

writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution or a petition

invoking supervisory jurisdiction of the jurisdictional High Court

under Article 227 of the Constitution?

13.Before, we proceed to answer the aforesaid question, we must look

into the few relevant provisions of the Act 1986.

14.Section 21(a) of the Act 1986 is titled ‘Jurisdiction of the National

Commission’. The same reads thus:

“21. Jurisdiction of the National Commission. - Subject to

the other provisions of this Act, the National Commission shall

have jurisdiction —

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(a)to entertain —

(i) complaints where the value of the goods or services

and compensation, if any, claimed exceeds rupees one

crore; and

(ii) appeals against the orders of any State Commission;

….”

15.Section 23 of the Act 1986 provides for an ‘Appeal’. The same reads

thus:

“23. Appeal.- Any person, aggrieved by an order made

by the National Commission in exercise of its powers

conferred by sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of section 21,

may prefer an appeal against such order to the Supreme

Court within a period of thirty days from the date of the

order:

Provided that the Supreme Court may entertain an

appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if

it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing

it within that period:

Provided further that no appeal by a person who is

required to pay any amount in terms of an order of the

National Commission shall be entertained by the

Supreme Court unless that person has deposited in the

prescribed manner fifty per cent. of that amount or

rupees fifty thousand, whichever is less.”

(Emphasis Supplied)

16.The Consumer Protection Act, 1986 stood repealed on 20.07.2020

(Section 106, the Act 1986) and the Consumer Protection Act, 2019

(for short, ‘the Act 2019’) came into force. In the instant case, the

complaints were instituted under the Act 1986. However, we must

highlight the relevant provisions of the Act 2019, which are pari

materia to the provisions of the Act 1986.

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“58. Jurisdiction of National Commission. – (1) Subject to

the other provisions of this Act, the National Commission shall

have jurisdiction—

(a) to entertain—

(i) complaints where the value of the goods or services paid as

consideration exceeds rupees ten crore:

Provided that where the Central Government deems it

necessary so to do, it may prescribe such other value, as it

deems fit;

(ii) complaints against unfair contracts, where the value of

goods or services paid as consideration exceeds ten crore

rupees;

(iii) appeals against the orders of any State Commission;

(iv) appeals against the orders of the Central Authority;……..

Xxx xxx xxx

67. Appeal against order of National Commission. - Any

person, aggrieved by an order made by the National

Commission in exercise of its powers conferred by sub-

clause (i) or (ii) of clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section

58, may prefer an appeal against such order to the Supreme

Court within a period of thirty days from the date of the

order:

Provided that the Supreme Court may entertain an

appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it

is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it

within that period:

Provided further that no appeal by a person who is

required to pay any amount in terms of an order of the

National Commission shall be entertained by the Supreme

Court unless that person has deposited fifty per cent. of that

amount in the manner as may be prescribed.”

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17.A plain reading of the aforesaid provisions of the Act 1986 and Act

2019, respectively would indicate that the remedy of appeal to this

Court is available only with respect to the orders passed by the

NCDRC in exercise of its powers conferred by Section 21(a)(i) of the

Act 1986 and 58(1)(a)(i) or 58(1)(a)(ii) of the Act 2019. In other

words, both the Acts provide for the remedy of appeal to this Court

only with respect to the orders which are passed by the NCDRC in its

original jurisdiction or as the court of first instance (original orders)

and no further appeal lies against the orders which are passed by the

NCDRC in exercise of its appellate or revisional jurisdiction.

18.Adverting to the case at hand, the appeal before the NCDRC was

against the order passed by the SCDRC under Section 17(1)(a)(i) of

the Act 1986. Such appeal to the NCDRC was maintainable, as

provided under Section 21(a)(ii) of the Act 1986. As per Section 23 of

the Act 1986, any person, aggrieved by an order made by the NCDRC

in exercise of its powers conferred by Section 21(a)(i), may prefer an

appeal against such order to this Court. Therefore, an appeal against

the order passed by the NCDRC to this Court would be maintainable

only in case the order is passed by the NCDRC in exercise of its

powers conferred under Section 21(a)(i) of the Act 1986. No further

appeal to this Court is provided against the order passed by the

NCDRC in exercise of its powers conferred under Section 21(a)(ii) of

the Act 1986. There is no provision for filing any further appeal

against the order passed on the appeal filed against the order of the

SCDRC. In such circumstances, the petitioner has come before this

Court under Article 136 of the Constitution.

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SCOPE AND GRANT OF SPECIAL LEAVE UNDER ARTICLE 136

OF THE CONSTITUTION

19.This Court has held in Pritam Singh v. State reported in 1950 SCC

189 : 1950 SCR 453 at p. 459: “Generally speaking this Court will

not grant special leave, unless it is shown that exceptional and

special circumstances exist, that substantial and grave injustice has

been done and that the case in question presents features of sufficient

gravity to warrant a review of the decision appealed against”. It was

also said in that case that the view that once an appeal has been

admitted by special leave the entire case is at large and that the

appellant is free to contest all the findings of fact and raise every point

which could be raised in the High Court is wrong. Only those points

can be urged at the final hearing of the appeal which are fit to be

urged at the preliminary stage when leave to appeal is asked for. This

principle was stated, it is true, in a criminal case but it is of as much

significance in civil cases as in the trial of criminal appeals. [See:

Murtaza and Sons and Another v. Nazir Mohd. Khan and Others

reported (1970) 3 SCC 876].

20.A Constitution Bench of this Court in Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd.

v. Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal, reported in (1955) 1

SCR 941 : AIR 1955 SC 65 made the following observations:

“7. … It is not possible to define with any precision the

limitations on the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction

vested in this Court by the constitutional provision made in

article 136. The limitations, whatever they be, are implicit in

the nature and character of the power itself. It being an

exceptional and overriding power, naturally it has to be

exercised sparingly and with caution and only in special and

extraordinary situations. Beyond that it is not possible to fetter

the exercise of this power by any set formula or rule. All that

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can be said is that the Constitution having trusted the wisdom

and good sense of the Judges of this Court in this matter, that

itself is a sufficient safeguard and guarantee that the power

will only be used to advance the cause of justice, and that its

exercise will be governed by well established principles which

govern the exercise of overriding constitutional powers. It is,

however, plain that when the Court reaches the conclusion

that a person has been dealt with arbitrarily or that a court or

tribunal within the territory of India has not given a fair deal

to a litigant, then no technical hurdles of any kind like the

finality of finding of facts or otherwise can stand in the way of

the exercise of this power because the whole intent and

purpose of this article is that it is the duty of this Court to see

that injustice is not perpetuated or perpetrated by decisions of

Courts and tribunals because certain laws have made the

decisions of these Courts or tribunals final and

conclusive. …”

(Emphasis supplied)

21.In Ujagar Singh and Another v. State (Delhi Administration) reported

in (1979) 4 SCC 530, Y. V. Chandrachud, C.J., speaking for the Bench

observed as under:

“1. … There is hardly a case, civil or criminal, which does not

raise some question of law or the other. But no question of law

of general public importance is involved in these petitions. It

is time that it was realised that the jurisdiction of this Court to

grant special leave to appeal can be invoked in very

exceptional circumstances. A question of law of general public

importance or a decision which shocks the conscience of the

Court are some of the prime requisites for the grant of special

leave. … ”

(Emphasis supplied)

22.In the case of S.G. Chemicals and Dyes Trading Employees' Union

v. S.G. Chemicals and Dyes Trading Limited and Another, (1986) 2

SCC 624, this Court observed in para 6 as under:

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“6. The Union has directly come to this Court in appeal

against the said order of the Industrial Court without first

approaching the High Court under Article 226 or 227 of the

Constitution for the purpose of challenging the said order. The

powers of this Court under Article 136 are very wide but as

clause (1) of that article itself states the grant of special leave

to appeal is in the discretion of the court. Article 136 is,

therefore, not designed to permit direct access to this Court

where other equally efficacious remedy is available and where

the question is not of public importance….”

(Emphasis supplied)

23.This Court in Jyotendrasinhji v. S.I. Tripathi and Others, reported in

1993 Supp (3) SCC 389 observed in para 16 as under;

“16. It is true that the finality clause contained in Section 245-

I does not and cannot bar the jurisdiction of the High Court

under Article 226 or the jurisdiction of this Court under

Article 32 or under Article 136, as the case may be. But that

does not mean that the jurisdiction of this Court in the appeal

preferred directly in this Court is any different than what it

would be if the assessee had first approached the High Court

under Article 226 and then come up in appeal to this Court

under Article 136. A party does not and cannot gain any

advantage by approaching this Court directly under Article

136, instead of approaching the High Court under Article 226.

This is not a limitation inherent in Article 136; it is a

limitation which this Court imposes on itself having regard to

the nature of the function performed by the Commission and

keeping in view the principles of judicial review….”

(Emphasis supplied)

24.Thus, what is discernible from the aforesaid decisions of this Court is

that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to grant special leave to

appeal can be invoked in very exceptional circumstances. The

question of law of general public importance or a decision which

shocks the conscience of the Court are some of the prime requisites

10

for the grant of special leave. The provisions of Article 136 of the

Constitution as such are not circumscribed by any limitation. But

when the party aggrieved has alternative remedy to go before the High

Court, invoking its writ jurisdiction or supervisory jurisdiction as the

case may be, this Court should not entertain petition seeking special

leave thereby short-circuit the legal procedure prescribed. The

limitation, whatever, they be are implicit in the nature and character of

the power itself. It being an exceptional and overriding power,

naturally it has to be exercised sparingly and with caution and only in

very exceptional situations. The power will only be used to advance

the cause of justice and its exercise will be governed by well-

established principles which govern the exercise of overriding

constitutional powers.

25.Almost six decades back, this Court speaking through M.

Hidayatullah, J. in the case of the State of Bombay v. M/s Ratilal

Vadilal and Bros., reported in (1961) 2 SCR 367 observed as under:

“3. … We have frequently noticed that all the remedies which

are open to an appellant are not first exhausted before moving

this Court. Ordinarily, this Court will not allow the High

Court to be bypassed in this manner, and the proper course for

an appellant is to exhaust all his remedies before invoking the

jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136. …”

(Emphasis supplied)

26.We shall now look into a very recent pronouncement of this Court in

the case of Ibrat Faizan v. Omaxe Buildhome Private Limited

reported in 2022 INSC 573. In the said case, the appellant had booked

a flat in the project floated by the respondent. The appellant paid the

entire amount of consideration but the respondent did not hand over

the flat within the time stipulated in the agreement. Therefore, the

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appellant filed a consumer complaint before the SCDRC on

10.08.2013, alleging deficiency of service on the part of the

respondent. The SCDRC allowed the complaint filed by the appellant

vide its order dated 16.10.2020. The SCDRC directed the respondent

to hand over the flat to the possession of the appellant subject to their

meeting the requirements. The SCDRC further directed the

respondent to pay compensation for the deficiency of service of the

respondent in the form of nine per cent simple interest till the date of

delivery of the flat in possession of the appellant.

27.The appellant filed an execution and contempt petition against the

respondent since he did not comply with the order of the SCDRC.

Vide its order dated 12.03.2021, the SCDRC directed the respondent

to produce the details of bank accounts or properties for the purpose

of attaching the same and to implement the order passed by the

SCDRC.

28.The respondent filed an appeal before the NCDRC. On 30.03.2021,

the NCDRC stayed the order of SCDRC subject to the deposit of the

cost of entire flat along with nine per cent interest on the amount paid

till date in the Registry of the SCDRC.

29.The respondent, being aggrieved against the order of NCDRC filed a

writ petition before the High Court, challenging the order passed by

the NCDRC. Before the High Court the respondent contended that the

NCDRC ought not to have directed the respondent, the builder, to

deposit the entire cost of the apartment along with the compensation

awarded by the SCDRC. The High Court stayed the order of National

Commission, vide its order dated 25.05.2021. The said stay order was

issued subject to the condition that the respondent is to deposit with

the State Commission fifty per cent of the amount directed to be

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deposited by way of interest towards compensation, within four weeks

from the date of stay order issued by the High Court.

30.In the meantime, the NCDRC passed the final order, confirming the

order passed by the State Commission, vide its order dated

09.12.2021. The respondent also filed a writ petition before the High

Court, challenging the final order passed by the NCDRC. The High

Court, in this petition, also granted interim stay vide its order dated

22.12.2021. Against this order the appellant filed an SLP before this

Court. This Court vide its order dated 21.03.2022 directed the High

Court to decide the jurisdictional issue under Article 227 of the

Constitution against the order passed by the NCDRC on or before

18.04.2022 and intimate the outcome to this Court. The High Court

vide its order dated 31.03.2022 held that the writ petition before the

High Court against the order of NCDRC was maintainable. This order

was challenged by the appellant before this Court.

31.The appellant submitted the following before this Court:

(a)Against the order of NCDRC, a petition before the High Court

under Article 227 of the Constitution is not maintainable.

(b)Only appeal is maintainable before this Court against the order

of NCDRC as per the provisions of the Consumer Protection

Act.

(c)Without exhausting the appellate remedy, the High Court ought

not to have entertained the petition under Article 227 of the

Constitution.

(d)The High Court ought not to have stayed the order passed by

the NCDRC in the limited jurisdiction available under Article

227 of the Constitution.

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32.The respondent submitted the following before this Court:

(a)The provisions of the Act 2019 do not have appeal provisions

against the order of NCDRC passed in exercise of

appellate/revisional jurisdiction and therefore writ petition

under Article 226 or petition under Article 227, as the case may

be, is maintainable before the High Court against the order of

NCDRC.

(b)For the aforesaid purpose the respondent relied on the following

judgments:

Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. P. N. Sharma,

AIR 1965 SC 1595; and

L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC

261.

33.This Court considered the question for its decision as to whether

against the order passed by the NCDRC in an appeal under Section

58(1)(a)(iii) of the Act 2019, petition before the High Court under the

Article 227 of Constitution of India would be maintainable.

34.After due analysis of the provisions of the Act 2019, which are pari

materia to the provisions of the Act 1986, this Court in Ibrat Faizan

(supra) held as under:

“11. ….Therefore, an appeal against the order passed by the

National Commission to this Court would be maintainable

only in case the order is passed by the National Commission in

exercise of its powers conferred under Section 58(1)(a)(i) or

under Section 58(1)(a)(ii) of the 2019 Act. No further appeal

to this Court is provided against the order passed by the

National Commission in exercise of its powers conferred

under Section 58(1)(a)(iii) or under Section 58(1)(a)(iv) of the

14

2019 Act. In that view of the matter, the remedy which may be

available to the aggrieved party against the order passed by

the National Commission in an appeal under Section 58(1)(a)

(iii) or Section 58(1)(a)(iv) would be to approach the

concerned High Court having jurisdiction under Article 227 of

the Constitution of India.”

xxx xxx xxx

14. ….while exercising the powers under Article 227 of the

Constitution of India, the High Court subjects itself to the

rigour of Article 227 of the Constitution and the High Court

has to exercise the jurisdiction under Article 227 within the

parameters within which such jurisdiction is required to be

exercised.”

(Emphasis supplied)

35.In Ibrat Faizan (supra), this Court took notice of its earlier decision in

the case of Associated Cement (supra), wherein, a Constitution Bench

held as under:

“9. … Special matters and questions are entrusted to them for

their decision and in that sense, they share with the Courts one

common characteristic; both the courts and the tribunals are

“constituted by the State and are invested with judicial as

distinguished from purely administrative or executive

functions”, (vide Durga Shankar Mehta v. Raghuraj

Singh, 1955 1 SCR 267 at p. 272: (AIR 1954 SC 520 at p.

522). They are both adjudicating bodies and they deal with

and finally determine disputes between parties which are

entrusted to their jurisdiction. The procedure followed by the

Courts is regularly prescribed and in discharging their

functions and exercising their powers, the Courts have to

conform to that procedure. The procedure which the tribunals

have to follow may not always be so strictly prescribed, but

the approach adopted by both the Courts and the tribunals is

substantially the same, and there is no essential difference

between the functions that they discharge. As in the case of

Courts, so in the case of tribunals, it is the State's inherent

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judicial power which has been transferred and by virtue of the

said power, it is the State's inherent judicial function which

they discharge. Judicial functions and judicial powers are one

of the essential attributes of a sovereign State, and on

considerations of policy, the State transfers its judicial

functions and powers mainly to the Courts established by the

Constitution; but that does not affect the competence of the

State, by appropriate measures, to transfer a part of its

judicial powers and functions to tribunals by entrusting to

them the task of adjudicating upon special matters and

disputes between parties. It is really not possible or even

expedient to attempt to describe exhaustively the features

which are common to the tribunals and the Courts, and

features which are distinct and separate. The basic and the

fundamental feature which is common to both the Courts and

the tribunals is that they discharge judicial functions and

exercise judicial powers which inherently vest in a sovereign

State.

Xxx xxx xxx

44. An authority other than a Court may be vested by statute

with judicial power in widely different circumstances, which it

would be impossible and indeed inadvisable to attempt to

define exhaustively. The proper thing is to examine each case

as it arises, and to ascertain whether the powers vested in the

authority can be truly described as judicial functions or

judicial powers of the State. For the purpose of this case, it is

sufficient to say that any outside authority empowered by the

State to determine conclusively the rights of two or more

contending parties with regard to any matter in controversy

between them satisfies the test of an authority vested with the

judicial powers of the State and may be regarded as a tribunal

within the meaning of Art. 136. Such a power of adjudication

implies that the authority must act judicially and must

determine the dispute by ascertainment of the relevant facts on

the materials before it and by application of the relevant law

to those facts. This test of a tribunal is not meant to be

exhaustive, and it may be that other bodies not satisfying this

test are also tribunals. In order to be a tribunal, it is essential

that the power of adjudication must be derived from a statute

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or a statutory rule. An authority or body deriving its power of

adjudication from an agreement of the parties, such as a

private arbitrator or a tribunal acting under S. 10A of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, does not satisfy the test of a

tribunal within Art. 136. It matters little that such a body or

authority is vested with the trappings of a Court. The

Arbitration Act, 1940 vests an arbitrator with some of the

trappings of a Court, so also the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

vests an authority acting under S. 10 A of the Act with many of

such trappings, and yet, such bodies and authorities are not

tribunals.

45. The word “tribunal” finds place in Art. 227 of the

Constitution also, and I think that there also the word has the

same meaning as in Art. 136.”

(Emphasis supplied)

36.Having regard to the aforesaid, this Court in Ibrat Faizan (supra)

observed as under:

“12. … Therefore, the National Commission can be said to be

a ‘Tribunal’ which is vested by Statute the powers to

determine conclusively the rights of two or more contending

parties with regard to any matter in controversy between them.

Therefore, as observed hereinabove in the aforesaid decision,

it satisfies the test of an authority vested with the judicial

powers of the State and therefore may be regarded as a

‘Tribunal’ within the meaning of Article 227 and/or 136 of the

Constitution of India. …”

(Emphasis supplied)

37.This Court in Ibrat Faizan (supra), while explaining the importance

of approaching the High Court, more particularly when a remedy is

available by way of a writ petition under Article 226 of the

Constitution or by way of a petition under Article 227 of the

Constitution (supervisory jurisdiction) observed as under:

“12. ….Also, in a given case, this Court may not exercise its

powers under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, in view

of the remedy which may be available to the aggrieved party

17

before the concerned High Court under Article 227 of the

Constitution of India, as it is appropriate that aggrieved party

approaches the concerned High Court by way of writ petition

under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

Xxx xxx xxx

13. Now so far as the remedy which may be available

under Article 136 of the Constitution of India is concerned, it

cannot be disputed that the remedy by way of an appeal by

special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution of India

may be too expensive and as observed and held by this Court

in the case of L. Chandra Kumar (supra), the said remedy can

be said to be inaccessible for it to be real and effective.

Therefore, when the remedy under Article 227 of the

Constitution of India before the concerned High Court is

provided, in that case, it would be in furtherance of the right

of access to justice of the aggrieved party, may be a

complainant, to approach the concerned High Court at a

lower cost, rather than a Special Leave to Appeal under

Article 136 of the Constitution.

Xxx xxx xxx

14.1. The scope and ambit of jurisdiction of Article 227 of the

Constitution has been explained by this Court in the case

of Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd., (2001) 8 SCC 97,

which has been consistently followed by this Court (see the

recent decision of this Court in the case of Garment

Craft v. Prakash Chand Goel, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 29).

Therefore, while exercising the powers under Article 227 of

the Constitution, the High Court has to act within the

parameters to exercise the powers under Article 227 of the

Constitution. It goes without saying that even while

considering the grant of interim stay/relief in a writ petition

under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court

has to bear in mind the limited jurisdiction of superintendence

under Article 227 of the Constitution. Therefore, while

granting any interim stay/relief in a writ petition under Article

227 of the Constitution against an order passed by the

National Commission, the same shall always be subject to the

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rigour of the powers to be exercised under Article 227 of the

Constitution of India.”

(Emphasis supplied)

38.In the aforesaid view of the matter, we have reached to the conclusion

that we should not adjudicate this petition on merits. We must ask the

petitioner herein to first go before the jurisdictional High Court either

by way of a writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution or

by invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of the jurisdictional High

Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. Of course, after the High

Court adjudicates and passes a final order, it is always open for either

of the parties to thereafter come before this Court by filing special

leave petition, seeking leave to appeal under Article 136 of the

Constitution.

39.We take notice of the order passed by this Court dated 29.03.2023

which reads thus:

“2. In the meantime, there shall be stay of the impugned

judgment and order, subject to deposit of 50 per cent of the

awarded amount in this Court.”

40.However, in the aforesaid context, it is also necessary for us to look

into the office report dated 03.07.2023, which reads thus:

“It is further submitted that Dr. S.K. Verma, Advocate for

respondent no.1 has on 28.06.2023 filed an application for

release of deposited amount made by the Petitioner. However,

the same is defective as original property papers are not filed.

Also, the documents relating to valuation of property are not

filed as in the lease papers the amount mentioned is Rs.

6,30,000/-. Hence, the amount was not disbursed to the

respondent no.1.”

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41.It appears from the aforesaid that the complainant was not in a

position to withdraw the fifty per cent amount deposited by the

petitioner herein. It further appears that the amount deposited by the

petitioner herein is still with the Registry of this Court. Since we are

not entertaining this petition on merits, we direct the Registry to

refund the amount to the petitioner after due and proper verification.

42.In the result, this petition is disposed of with liberty to the petitioner to

approach the jurisdictional High Court and challenge the order passed

by the NCDRC, in accordance with law.

43.It is needless to clarify that we have not expressed any opinion on the

merits of the case. The merits of the case shall be looked into by the

jurisdictional High Court.

…….………………………J.

(J.B. PARDIWALA)

…………………………….J.

(MANOJ MISRA)

NEW DELHI;

JULY 26, 2023.

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