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Item No. 5

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MANIPUR

AT IMPHAL

W.P.(CRL) No. 34 of 2025

Mutum Ranjan Meitei @ Lamjingba, aged about 21

years, S/o M. Deban Meitei, resident of Yairipok

Chandrakhong Mamang Leikai, P.O. & P.S. Yairipok,

Thoubal District, Manipur.

… Petitioner

- Versus -

1. District Magistrate, Thoubal District, DC office

Complex, P.O. & P.S. Thoubal, District :Thoubal, Manipur

– 795138.

2. The State of Manipur represented by

Commissioner/Secretary (Home), Government of

Manipur, Manipur Secretariat, North block, P.O. & PS.

Imphal, District Imphal West, Manipur – 795001.

3. The Union of India represented by Secretary

(Home), Govt. of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, North

Block, New Delhi – 110 001.

4. The Superintendent, Manipur Central Jail, Sajiwa,

P.O. Lamlong, P.S. Porompat : Imphal East, Manipur –

795114.

… Respondents

B E F O R E

HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. M. SUNDAR

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE A. BIMOL SINGH

For the petitioner : Mr. L. Shashibhushan, Senior Advocate

Instructed by Md. Fakhruddin, Advocate

For the respondents : Mr. Th. Vashum, Government Advocate for

R-1, R-2 & R-4

Mr. Boboy Potsangbam, CGC for R-3

Date of hearing : 11.02.2026

Date of order : 11.02.2026

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JUDGMENT & ORDER

(O R A L)

[M. Sundar, CJ]

[1] Captioned writ petition (WP) has been filed assailing a

preventive detention order dated 20.05.2025 bearing reference No. Cril.

NSA Case No. 4 of 2025 made by R-1 (District Magistrate, Thoubal

District). Captioned WP is a habeas corpus plea. To be noted, ‘R-1’ is an

abbreviation denoting ‘first respondent’ and similar abbreviation/s will

be used with regard to other respondent/s also. This preventive

detention order made by R-1 shall be referred to as ‘impugned

preventive detention order’, R-1 shall be referred to as ‘detaining

authority’.

[2] Factual matrix in a nutshell is that the writ petitioner was

arrested on 17.04.2025 and an FIR was lodged on the same day, this

FIR dated 17.04.2025 bears No. 0076 and it is on the file of Thoubal

Police Station in Thoubal District, Manipur qua alleged offences under

Sections 17, 20 of ‘The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (37 of

1967)’ [‘UAPA’ for the sake of brevity] and Section 5 of Arms Act, 1959

(54 of 1959). The writ petitioner was produced before jurisdictional

Court i.e. Special Judge (NIA, Thoubal) and remanded to judicial

custody. While the writ petitioner remained incarcerated ,

‘Superintendent of police, Thoubal’ who shall be referred to as

‘Sponsoring Authority’ sent 2 (two) communications, one dated

02.05.02025 and another dated 16.05.2026 bearing reference No.

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9/37/2025/SP-TBL/2493 and No. 9/37/2025/SP-TBL/2728 respectively

requesting R-1 to make a detention order qua writ petitioner under the

‘National Security Act, 1980 (65 of 1980)’ [‘NSA’ for the sake of brevity].

Acting on these two communications from the sponsoring authority, R-

1 (detaining authority) made the impugned preventive detention order.

Thereafter, R-1 made grounds of detention dated 23.05.2025 bearing

No. Cril. NSA Case No. 4 of 2025 and this Court is informed that the

grounds of detention was served on the writ petitioner/detenu on the

same day (23.05.2025) in the Central Jail Sajiwa, Imphal East, Manipur

- 795114 where the detenu is now lodged.

[3] To capture facts which are necessary to appreciate this

order, this Court deems it appropriate to write that R-1 (detaining

authority) is an officer on whom powers have been conferred by the

State Government vide Section 3(3) of NSA. This means that the

impugned detention order made by R-1 shall remain in force only for 12

days but post 12 days it will operate subject to approval by State

Government. The State Government approved the impugned preventive

detention vide an order dated 31.05.2025 bearing reference No. H-

1401/5/2025-HD.HD. This means that the impugned preventive

detention order continued to operate beyond 12 days and to be noted,

it continues to operate. Thereafter State Government placed the matter

before Advisory Board constituted under Section 9 of NSA, the Advisory

Board sat on 18.06.2025 and gave a report dated 21.06.2025 to the

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effect that there are sufficient grounds for detention of the writ

petitioner. Acting on such report of the Advisory Board, State

Government vide an order dated 02.07.2025 bearing reference No. H-

1401/5/2025 – HD.HD confirmed the impugned preventive detention

order by exercising powers under Section 12 of NSA. Captioned WP has

been filed in this Court on 27.11.2025 which means that the impugned

preventive detention order dated 20.05.2025 made by R-1 (detaining

authority), approval of the State Government dated 31.05.2025 (under

Section 3(4) of NSA) and confirmation order dated 02.07.2025 (under

Section 12 of NSA) are all under challenge in the captioned WP.

[4] Notwithstanding very many averments/grounds in the

captioned WP, Mr. L. Shashibhushan, learned senior advocate instructed

by Md. Fakhruddin, learned counsel on record for the writ petitioner

predicated his campaign against the impugned preventive detention

order, approval order and confirmation order on 2 (two) points. These

two points were resisted by Mr. Th. Vashum, learned State counsel

appearing for R-1, 2 & 4. Mr. Boboy Potsangbam, learned Central

Government Counsel (CGC) for respondent No. 3 is before this Court.

To be noted, R-3 is only a formal authority.

[5] This Court, now embarks upon the drill of discussing and

giving dispositive reasoning qua the two points on which learned senior

counsel for writ petitioner predicated his campaign against the

impugned preventive detention order, approval and confirmation orders.

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[6] The first ground or first point is that the detaining authority

has recorded subjective satisfaction qua imminent possibility of the

detenu being enlarged on bail without the same being grounded on any

material which is of rationally probative value. Learned State counsel

submitted to the contrary by stating that detenu had moved a bail

application on 25.04.2025 in the jurisdictional NIA Court, the same was

pending and this was the basis for subjective satisfaction of detaining

authority.

[7] This Court, carefully examined the rival contentions. At the

outset, it is to be noted that the question of justiciability of subjective

satisfaction of a detaining authority in preventive detention matters

came up for consideration before Hon’ble Supreme Court in several

cases and we respectfully refer to a recent judgment of Hon’ble Supreme

Court being ‘Ameena Begum vs. State of Telangana & Ors.’

reported in (2023) 9 SCC 587. In Ameena Begum, after a survey of

various case laws on preventive detention including case laws on

preventive detentions under NSA, Hon’ble Supreme Court made it clear

that areas within which validity of subjective satisfaction can be tested

have been carved out and an adumbration of the carved out areas is as

follows:

(a) When the detaining authority has not applied its

mind at all;

(b) When there is dishonest exercise of power by

detaining authority;

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(c) Exercise of power of detaining authority for

improper purpose;

(d) Detaining authority acting under dictation of

another body;

(e) When the subjective satisfaction recorded by

detaining authority is based on application of wrong test

or misconception of a statute;

(f) When the detaining authority has arrived at and

recorded subjective satisfaction without the same being

grounded on materials which are rationally probative

value.

(Underlining made by this Court for ease of reference.)

To be noted, adumbration supra has been set out by this

Court by respectfully following paragraph No. 16 of Ameena Begum

[paragraph No. 16 as in SCC report being (2023) 9 SCC 587] wherein

Hon’ble Supreme Court relied on paragraph Nos. 8 & 9 of ‘Khudiram

Das vs. State of West Bengal’ reported in (1975) 2 SCC 81 which

was rendered by a Hon’ble four Judges Bench.

[8] In the case on hand, we tested subjective satisfaction of

detaining authority qua imminent possibility of detenu being enlarged

on bail applying aforesaid principles laid down by Hon’ble Supreme

Court as touchstone. We find that the subjective satisfaction is clearly

flawed on two grounds viz., detaining authority not having applied its

mind at all and subjective satisfaction being arrived at without being

grounded on any material which are of rationally probative value. The

reason is, the impugned preventive detention order is dated 20.05.2025,

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the grounds of impugned preventive detention is dated 23.05.2025 but

in the grounds also in paragraph No. 8, the detaining authority has

recorded that the hearing of detenu’s bail application (Bail application

dated 25.04.2025) is fixed (for hearing in Trial Court) on 21.05.2025.

This means that while making the grounds of impugned preventive

detention order on 23.05.2025, the detaining authority has not applied

its mind and examined what happened to the bail application on

21.05.2025. To be noted, as regards the two letters from the sponsoring

authority i.e., Superintendent of Police, Thoubal District (alluded to

supra) in the first letter dated 02.05.2025 it has been mentioned by

sponsoring authority that the bail application is listed in Trial Court on

06.05.2025 and in the second letter dated 16.05.2025 the sponsoring

authority has categorically mentioned that the date of hearing of bail

application in Trial Court is 21.05.2025. In this view of the matter, this

Court has no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the detaining

authority making grounds of detention on 23.05.2025 without

ascertaining what happened to the bail application in the hearing on

21.05.2025 is clearly a case of not applying its mind which is Test (a)

qua justiciability of subjective satisfaction set out in Ameena Begum

an adumbration which has been set out supra. To be noted, ultimately,

the bail application came to be rejected by the jurisdictional NIA Court

on 30.05.2025 but we are not delving into this as it is post impugned

preventive detention order though it is prior to approval of the State

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Government (under Section 3(4) of NSA) on 31.05.2025 and

confirmation by the State Government on 02.07.2025 (under Section 12

of NSA). As regards material which are of rationally probative value,

there is no whisper either in the impugned preventive detention order

or in the grounds of detention as to any material which points towards

imminent possibility of bail being granted to detenu. It is also to be

noted that the learned State counsel is unable to point out that there

was any such material before the detaining authority. Therefore

subjective satisfaction qua imminent possibility of detenu being enlarged

on bail has been arrived at by the detaining authority without the same

being grounded on any material of rationally probative value which leads

this Court to the inevitable conclusion that the impugned preventive

detention order is vitiated by Test (f) qua Ameena Begum which has

been set out supra. This Court, therefore, has no hesitation in coming

to the conclusion that the impugned preventive detention order suffers

from the vice of arriving at subjective satisfaction qua imminent

possibility of detenu being enlarged on bail without application of mind

and without basing the same on any material of rationally probative

value.

[9] This takes this Court to the second point/ground.

Adverting to the grounds of preventive detention dated 23.05.2025 and

more particularly paragraph No. 10 thereat, learned senior counsel for

the writ petitioner submitted that the detaining authority has written in

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the grounds that the detenu has a right to make three representations

(to three different entities) but has fixed time frames for making of all

three representations. This, according to learned senior counsel, is an

infraction of sacrosanct right embedded /enshrined in Article 22, more

particularly, Clause (5) of Article 22 of the Constitution of India. On a

careful reading of the grounds of detention and more particularly

paragraph No. 10 thereat that the detaining authority has referred to

three representations and they are : (a) representation to the detaining

authority, (b) representation to the State Government and (c)

representation to Central Government but has also written that the

representation to the detaining authority should be made within twelve

days from the date of detention and representation to the State and

Central Governments should be made within three weeks from the date

of detention. This is infraction of sacrosanct principle underpinning

Article 22(5) of Constitution of India is learned senior counsel’s say.

Responding to this argument, Mr. Th. Vashum, learned State counsel

submitted that the impugned preventive detention order has been made

by an officer within the meaning of Section 3(3) of NSA and therefore

the same will remain in force only for twelve days unless it is approved

by the State Government under Section 3(4) of NSA and therefore, this

twelve days time fame was fixed. It was further submitted by learned

State counsel that State Government should place the representation

before the Advisory Board (under Section 10 of NSA) within three weeks

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from the date of detention and therefore, three weeks time frame was

fixed with regard to representation to State Government.

[10] This Court carefully considered the rival submissions qua

second point/ground. Before setting out our dispositive reasoning on the

second point, we deem it appropriate to write that in a long line of

authorities starting from ‘Union of India vs. Paul Manikum’ reported

in (2003) 8 SCC 342, Hon’ble Supreme Court has repeatedly held that

the right of a detenu to make a ‘representation’ within the meaning of

Article 22(5) of Constitution of India implies the right of making an

‘effective representation’. It has also been made clear that a detenu

qua a impugned preventive detention order is entitled to have his

representation considered as expeditiously/at the earliest. The

significant clincher is, neither the Constitution nor the long line of

authorities have either provided for or justified fixing of time frames for

making such representations. It comes to light that in ‘Premlata

Sharma (Smt.) vs. District Magistrate, Mathura & Ors.’ reported

in (1998) 4 SCC 260, Hon’ble Supreme Court has made it clear that

there can be no period of limitation regarding exercise of right of the

detenu to make a representation and corresponding obligation of the

Central Government to consider the same for deciding upon the question

of order of detention as such a right of a detenu and obligation of State

subsist so long as the preventive detention order continues. To be

noted, on facts, Premlata also arose under NSA, a preventive

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detention order made under NSA was assailed and the issue that fell for

consideration is refusal to send detenu’s representation to Central

Government on the ground that the power of the revocation of a

detention order is vested only in the State Government under Section

14 of NSA. It is in this context that in Premlata, Hon’ble Supreme Court

laid down the ratio that the right of detenu to make a representation

and corresponding obligation of the Government to consider the same

expeditiously (at the earliest) subsist so long as the preventive detention

order operates/detention continues. In the case on hand, therefore,

fixing of twelve days time frame qua representation to the detaining

authority and fixing of three weeks time frame for representations to

the State and Central Governments is clearly flawed and unacceptable.

On an extreme demurer, even if the argument of learned State counsel

that the time frames were fixed as impugned preventive detention order

will be valid only for twelve days unless approved by the State

Government and the State Government has a responsibility to place the

representation before the Advisory Board within three weeks is

accepted, the same does not come to the aid of learned State counsel

in his effort to defend the impugned preventive detention order. The

reasons are, as regards twelve days, though there may be some

semblance of justification, there is absolutely no justification as regards

fixing three weeks time frame for representation to the State

Government. The reason is, Section 10 of NSA captioned ‘Reference to

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Advisory Board’ makes it clear that the appropriate Government shall

within 3 weeks from the date of detention of a person place before the

Advisory Board, the grounds on which order has been made and

representation, if any. Section 10 of NSA reads as follows :

‘10. Reference to Advisory Board.—

Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, in every

case where a detention order has been made under this

Act, the appropriate Government shall, within three weeks

from the date of detention of a person under the order,

place before the Advisory Board constituted by it under

section 9, the grounds on which the order has been made

and the representation, if any, made by the person

affected by the order, and in case where the order has

been made by an officer mentioned in sub-section (3) of

section 3, also the report by such officer under sub-section

(4) of that section.’

(underlining and bold font made /used by this Court for

ease of reference).

[11] The above makes it clear that the statute i.e. Section 10

of NSA is clear as daylight that a State Government is under obligation

to place the representation of the detenu before the Advisory Board only

if the detenu chooses to send a representation. To put it differently, it

is axiomatic that if the detenu does not send a representation within

three weeks from the date of detention, State Government will be under

no obligation much less a statutory obligation to place it before the

Advisory Board and the State Government cannot be found fault with in

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this regard. Therefore, the argument that three weeks time frame for

representation to State Government was fixed in grounds of detention

to ensure that the representation is placed before the Advisory Board

does not hold water. The buttressing factor is, if State Government

receives a representation after three weeks from the date of detention,

it has a sacrosanct duty to consider the same for revocation under

Section 14 of NSA. To be noted, this is a indefeasible analogy that flaws

from Premlata principle i.e., principle that detenu’s right to make a

representation and obligation/duty of State to consider the same at the

earliest subsist as long as the preventive detention order

operates/detention continues. As regards the representation to the

Central Government this three weeks phenomenon does not exist at all

and therefore the argument is a non starter.

[12] Mr. Boboy Potsangbam, learned CGC submits that there

can be no disputation that it is open to the detenu to send representation

to the Central Government at any point of time as long as detention

order subsists/detention continues.

[13] In the case on hand, vide paragraph No. 10 of grounds of

detention, the detaining authority has fixed three weeks time frame for

representation to the Central Government also. This is clearly flawed

and this Court has no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that this is

an infraction of sacrosanct right enshrined in Article 22 (5) of the

Constitution of India as already alluded supra. Hon’ble Supreme Court

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has repeatedly held that ‘making a representation’ within the meaning

of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India necessarily means make an

‘effective representation’ about which there is allusion supra in this

order. The argument of learned counsel that the grounds of detention

do not say that the detenu cannot send representation/s after twelve

days/three weeks pales into insignificance as fixing time frame

necessarily leads to axiomatic corollary that representation, if any,

should be sent within twelve days to detaining authority and three weeks

to the State or Central Governments and in this case, it has infringed

the right of the detenu as it has led the detenu to believe that there are

time limits/caps within representations should be made and he cannot

make representation/s after the time limits elapse. This has been

specifically articulated and emphatically averred by the writ petitioner in

paragraph No. 3 of the additional affidavit which reads as follows:

‘3. That, the petitioner submit that even though the order

of detention dated 20/05/2025 and the grounds of his detention

dated 23/05/2025 enclosed as Annexure – A/1 and Annexure –

A/2 respectively to the petition were furnished to him on time,

he could not consult and file any representations to the

authorities named in the grounds of his detention dated

23/05/2025 within the time specified in the said grounds of

detention or hereafter on account of his being in custody and

was also under bona fide belief that the time period has expired

for filing representations to the authorities named in the

aforesaid grounds of detention dated 23/05/2025.’

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To be noted, this additional affidavit of the writ petitioner

is dated 27.1.2026, there is an affidavit in opposition in response to this

additional affidavit and this affidavit-in-opposition is dated 05.02.2026.

As regards to Para 3 of the additional affidavit the State has met the

same in para 5 of affidavit in opposition and the same reads as follow:

‘5. That, with reference to Para Nos. 3, 4 and 5 of the

Additional Affidavit of the writ petitioner, the dependent has no

comment to offer.’

The above means that the positive assertion and emphatic

averment of the petitioner/detenu that he was led to believe that he

cannot make any representation after 3 weeks owing to the time being

fixed in the grounds of detention order served on him has not been

subjected to any disputation.

[14] This Court has already come to the conclusion that fixing

three weeks time frame qua representation to State Government is

flawed owing to the language in which Section 10 of NSA is couched

and as regards representation to Central Government the same is clearly

flawed inter alia in the light of Premlata principle. Therefore, the

second point also enures to the benefit of the writ petitioner in writ

petitioner’s campaign against the impugned preventive detention order

made by detaining authority as well as approval and confirmation orders

made by the State Government under Section 3(4) and 12 respectively

of NSA. Therefore, the second point also enures to the benefit of the

writ petitioner.

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[15] Ergo, sequitur is, captioned writ petition is allowed. The

impugned preventive detention order dated 20.05.2025 bearing

reference No. Cril. NSA Case No. 4 of 2025 made by R-1 (District

Magistrate, Thoubal District, Manipur), approval of the State

Government dated 31.05.2025 bearing reference No. H-1401/5/2025-

HD.HD and confirmation order dated 02.07.2025 bearing reference No.

H-1401/5/2025-HD.HD are all set aside and Shri Mutum Ranjan Meitei

@ Lamjingba resident of Yairipok Chandrakhong Mamang Leikai,

Thoubal District, aged about 21 years now lodged in Manipur Central

Jail Sajiwa, Imphal East, is directed to be set at liberty forthwith, if not

required in connection with any other case/s. There shall be no order

as to costs.

JUDGE CHIEF JUSTICE

FR/NFR

Bipin

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