[ 3388 ]

IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA

AT HYDERABAD

TUESDAY, THE TWENTY SECOND DAY OF SEPTEMBER

TWO THOUSAND AND TWENW SIX

PRESENT

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE K.LAKSHMAN

AND

THE HONOURABLE SMT JUSTICE K, SUJANA

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: 683 OF 2025

Criminal Appeal filed under Section 415(2) ot BNSS against the Judgment

dated 30.05.2025 passed in Sessions Case No. 04 of 2021 on the file of the Court of

the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Jagitial.

Between:

Nakka Vamshi, S/o. Anjaiah, age 25 years, It/adiga, R/o. H.No.6-11/2,

R/o.Laxmipur village, Jagitial Mandal and District.

...Appellant /Sole Accused

AND

State of Telangana, Rep.by its Public Prosecutor, High Court, Hyderabad

...Respondent

l.A. NO: 1OF 2025

The lnterlocutory Application filed under section 430(1) of BNSS Act for the

grounds stated in the act for the grounds stated in the criminal Appeal, the praying

that in the circumstances stated in the Criminal Appeal, the High Court may be

pleased to enlarge the PetitioneriAppellant on Bail in Sessions Case No.04/2021

passed by the court of the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Jagitial, by

suspending the sentence imposed to the Petitioner/ Appellant vide Judgment dated

30.5.2025 pending disposal of the Criminal Appeal.

4

Counsel for the Apperllant : Sri C Raghu, Senior Counsel representing

Sri Kona N.D.V.Ramana Rao

Counsel for the Resprondent : Sri RamaChandra Reddy, Additional

Public Prosecutor

The Court delivered t:he following: Judgment

IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF'TELAITGANA

AT TIYDERABAI)

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE K.LAKSHMAN

AND

THE HONOURABLE SMT. JUSTICE K. SUJANA

CRIMINAIAPPEAI.No.683 of 2o25

CNR.No.HBrrco103763920/2s

DATED:

Reserved ou 2o.o8.20126Pronounced on:

Uploaded on:

Betseen:

Nakka Vamshi

... Appellant/Sole accused

AND

The State of Telangana

..Respondent

JUDGMENT:

@s per Honhle Smt. JtLstice K. Sujar.lc.)

This Criminal Appeal is filed challenging the judgment

dated 3O.05.2O25 passed by the learned principal

District and

Sessions Judge, Jagtial, in S.C.No.O 4 of 2021, whereby the

appellant/accused was convicted for the offences punishable

under Sections 302 and 2Ol of the Indian penal Code and

\1

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Crl,A.I{o.683 of2O2S

sentenced to trndergo imprisonment for life and to pay a hne

of Rs.2,00O/-, in default to suffer simple imprisonment for

three months. for the offence under Section 302 IPC and to

undergo simple imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine

of Rs.1,OOO/-, in default to suffer simple imprisonment for two

months, for tL.e offence under Section 201 IPC'

2. The prosecution case, in brief, is that the deceased,

Manda Swap na, was a divorcee having one son and was

acquainted with the appellant/ accused, who was a student

and also used to attend coolie work for his livelihood'

According to the prosecution, the appellant went to Hyderabad

on O4.O7.2O78 for his livelihood and worked at Ratnadeep

Super Marke1., Medchal, Hyderabad. During that period, the

appellant anrl deceased used to meet at various places in

Hyderabad arLd developed a relationship with each other. It is

alleged that they had sexual intercourse ald subsequently

decided to m€rry.

3. It is fu:'ther the case of the prosecution that thereafter

the appellant left his job and returned to Laxmipur village'

The deceased allegedly used to call the appellant over phone

and insist tlrat he should marry her. According to the

3

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Crl.A,[o.683 of 2025

prosecution, the appellant became irritated with her conduct

and decided to eliminate her. In furtherance of the said

intention, the appellalt allegedly called the deceased on

19.1O.20l8 to come to his village.

4. It is alleged that on 2O.lO.2Ola, the deceased came to

Jagtial and boarded a private bus to proceed towards

Vengalapur vil1age. The driver and conductor of the said bus,

who were examined during investigation as LWs.14 and 15,

allegedly recorded their statements under Section 164 Cr.P.C.

before the learned Magistrate. According to the said

statements, the deceased disclosed that her narne was

Swapna and that she was going to meet Vamshi, with whom

she was in love. When the bus reached Peddamma Gudi of

Venga-lapur village, she allegedly got down from the bus and

was received by a male person wearing a pink-coloured towel

around his neck.

5. According to the prosecution, the said person was the

appellant/ accused, who took the deceased to a land situated

near Bandam Bore and cartway bushes, where there would

ordinarily be no public presence. It is alleged that both of

them talked for some time and t-hereafter quarrelled with each

!-E-

4

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Crl.A.Ito'683 of 2025

other. The prrlsecution further alieges that while the deceased

was taking rerst, the appeilant intentionally caused her death

by tying a tovr'el around her neck and strangulating her and

thereafter attempted to cause disappearance of the evidence of

the offence.

6. On rect:iving information regarding the presence of an

unidentified l'ema1e dead body in the shivar of Vengalapur

village, P.w. I , the VRO of Gollapalli village, lodged Ex'Pl

report, based on which initially a case was registered under

Section 174 'Jr.P.C. The police visited the scene of offence'

conducted sicene observation and inquest proceedings'

photographeci and videographed the dead body and recorded

the statements of the witnesses. As the dead body was in a

decomposed condition, post-mortem examination was

conducted at the scene.

7. P.W.10, the Medical Officer, conducted the post-mortem

examination and found a ligature mark around the neck

measuring altproximately 2O inches in length and one inch in

width, which was horizontal and running through the middle

of the neck zrnd was suggestive of strangulation or throttling'

The hyoid 'tone was preserved for forensic examination'

---t /

/

!

5

BLr' & $Gt,.r

Crl.A.[o.583 of2O2S

Subsequently, on receipt of the FSL report, p.W. 10 gave his

final opinion under Ex.p8 that ttre cause of death was

,,due

to

asphyxia due to strangulation". On the basis of the medical

opinion, the case was a_ltered from Section 774 Cr.p.C. to

Section 3O2 IPC.

8. During investigation, the identity of the deceased was

established as Manda Swapna with the assistance of p.Ws.S

and 8. The Investigating Ofhcer also examined the persons

acquainted with the deceased and collected the relevant call

data records. On O1.11.2018, the appellant was apprehended

and, according to the prosecution, in the presence of

mediators, he made a disclosure statement and led the police

to the scene of offence, from where a towel allegedly used in

the commission of the offence and the mobile phone of the

deceased were recovered from nearby bushes. His mobile

phone was also seizcd from his possession.

9. The prosecution further relied upon the statements of

LWs. 14 and 15, the driver and conductor of the private bus,

recorded under Sectio n 164Cr.P.C. According to the

had stated that they could

prosecution, both witnesses

identiff the person who received the deceased at vengalapur

F

6

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Crl.A.[o.6tg of2025

viilage. As L\Vs.14 and 15 died before they couid enter the

witness box, their statements were marked as Exs.P22 and

P23 through P.W.14, the learned Magistrate who recorded the

said statements. A Test Identification Parade was also

conducted by P.W. 14, in which P.Ws.5 and 7 and LWs'14 and

15 allegedly irlentified the appellant.

10. The carre was taken on hle for the offences punishable

under Sectiorrs 302, 201 arrd 4O4 of IPC and, after compliance

with Section 2O7 of Cr.P.C., was committed to the Court of

Sessions. Clrarges were framed against the accused for the

said offences. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to

be tried.

11. In order to substantiate its case, the prosecution

examined P.\Vs.1 to 14, marked Exs.Pl to P23 and produced

M.Os.l to 1l . After completion of the prosecution evidence,

the accused was examined under Section 3 13 Cr.P.C' with

reference tc the incriminating circumstances appearing

against him. He denied the allegations and did not adduce

any defence r:vidence.

12. The trial Court, after appreciating the oral and

documentar; evidence, held that the prosecution had

7

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Crl.A.[o.683 of2025

established the homicidal death of the deceased through the

evidence of P.W. 10 and Exs.p7 and p8.

The trial Court

further relied upon the evidence of p.Ws.5 and 7, the Section

164 Cr.P.C. statements of LWs.14 and 15, Ex.p21 - Test

Identification Parade proceedings, and the recovery of the

towel at the instance of the accused, and concluded that the

last-seen theory and the chain of circumstances connected the

appellant with the offence.

13. The trial Court further held that the recovery of

M.O.6/towel at the instalce of the accused, coupled with the

evidence of P.W.9 and the Investigating OfIicer, established

the offence under Section 2Ol of IpC. However, insofar as

Section 4O4 of IPC was concerned, the trial Court held that

the prosecution tailed to establish that M.O.9/mobile phone

belonged to the deceased and, accordingly, acquitted the

accused of the said offence.

74. Consequently, the trial Court convicted the appellant

under Sections 3O2 and 201 IpC, convicted for the offences

punishable under Sections 3O2 and 2Ol ol the Indian penal

Code and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and to

pay a fine of Rs.2,OO0/-, in default to suffer simple

8

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Crl.A.lfo.6t3 of 2O25

imprisonment for three months, for the offence under Section

3O2 of IPC and to undergo simple imprisonment for three

years and to pay a fine of Rs'1,OOO/-, in default to suffer

simple imprisonment for two months, for the offence under

Section 201 of IPC. Aggrieved thereby, the present Crimina'l

Appeal has beren preferred.

15. Heard Sri C. Raghu, learned Senior Counsel

representing Sri Kona N.D.V. Ramana Rao, iearned counsel

appearing on behalf of the appellant and Sri M. Ramachandra

Reddy, learne'd Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the

respondent-State.

16. Learnetl Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant

submitted that the trial Court erred in convicting the

appellant as the prosecution failed to establish his guilt

beyond reasonable doubt and that the entire prosecution case

rests upon circumstantiai evidence and that the

circumstance s relied upon by the prosecution do not form a

complete ancl unbroken charn leading to the conclusion that

the appellar t alone committed the offence. He further

submitted that the evidence of P.Ws.S and 7, who are stated

to be colony clders, does not establish that they had witnessed

9

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Crl.A.[o.6E3 of2O2S

the deceased being taken by the appellant on the date of

occurrence. Their evidence, at the most, establishes that the

appellant and deceased were acquainted with each other and

that they intended to marry, which by itself ca,not connect

the appellant with the homicidal death of the deceased.

17. Learned Senior Counsel contended that the trial Court

principally relied upon the statements of LWs. 14 and 15, the

driver and conductor of the bus, recorded under Section 164

Cr.P.C. However, both witnesses died before entering the

witness box and, therefore, their statements were not

subjected to cross-examination and that such statements

couid not be treated as substantive evidence of t.Ile fact that

the appellalt was the person who received the deceased at

VengaJapur village.

18. Learned Senior counsel further submitted that the Test

Identification parade

was not conducted in a proper manner

and that the persons who participated in the parade were not

of similar features and appearance. Therefore, the

identihcation proceedings could not safely be relied upon to

establish the identity of the appellant. Further, he challenged

tl're recovery of M.O.6/towel, contending that the alleged

r-

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Crl.A.tIo.683 of 2025

disclosure an<l recovery do not establish that the towel was

used in the commission of the offence and that the

prosecution lailed to establish any scientihc connection

between the t':wel and the deceased and that the recovery' by

itself, cannot :omplete the chain of circumstances'

19. Learne<l Senior counsel further contended that although

P.W. 10 opined that the cause of death was asph5n<ia due to

strangulation, the medical evidence does not establish the

identity of th,: assailant' He contended that the presence of a

ligature marl: and the medical opinion regarding strangulation

only establish the cause of death and do not' by themselves'

connect the appellant with the offence Therefore' he

submitted that the prosecution failed to establish the

circumstancr:s of motive, last seen, identifrcation and recovery

beyond reascnable doubt and that the circumstances relied

upon by tt.e trial Court are capabie of more than one

interpretation. He contended that the benefrt of doubt ought

tohavebeerrextendedtotheappellantandprayedforsetting

aside the corrviction and sentence and acquitting him'

20. In support of his submissions, he relied upon the

judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gcorge and others

11

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Crl,A.IIo.6t3 of2O2s

v. State of Kerala and anotherr, wherein paragraph No.36, it

is held as follows:

"36. We may now turn to the eyidence of pW

50, detailed

earlier. From the judgment

of the trial court we notice that the

substaltial pa-rts of its comments, (quoted earlier) are based on

his statement recorded under Section 164 CrpC and not his

evidence in court. The said statement was treated as

substantive evidence; as would be evident from the following,

amongst other observations made by the learned trial court:

"If Ext. p-42 (the statement recorded under Section

i64 CrPC) is found to be a genuine statement it can be

used as an importalt piece of evidence to connect the

accused with the crime..

In making the above and similar comments the trial

court again ignored a fundamental rule of criminal

jurisprudence

that a statement of a w.itness recorded

under Section 164 CrpC ca-nnot be used as substantive

evidence and can be used only for the purpose of

contradicting or corroborating him. Instead of

appreciating the evidence of pW 50 from that

perspective the trial court confined its attenton mainly

to his statement so recorded and discredited him. This

legal infirmity apart, factuaily a-lso the trial court

committed patent enors. As earlier noticed, one of the

grounds for disbetieving him was that in the trip_sheet

t-he name of the person who performed the journey,

namely, A-1 was not shown. If the trial court had cared

to look into the other trip_sheets which form part of

Ext. P-54 it would have found that in none of them the

narne of the person who hired the car is mentioned.

1

(1998) 4 scc 605

12

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Crl.A.IIo.6t3 of 2025

The triat court was, therefore, not at all justifred in

commenting upon such non-mentioning of the name of

the hirer and concluding therefrom that the document

was suspect. The comments of the trial court that PW

50 madr: the statement before the Magistrate (Ext. P-

42) to olrlige the police as his brother was arrested in

connection with an excise case is also without any

basis whatsoever. In drawing the above inference the

trial court was much influenced by the fact that the

car in qlestion, namely, KEK 3114 was seized by the

police orr 31-5- 1990 and that it was released on 28-6-

1990. A:cording to the triat court it was wrongfully

detained by the police for such a long period to compel

PW 5O lo make a statement according to its dictate.

Once a car is seized in connection with a case it can be

returned pursuant to the order of a competent court

only ani there is nothing on record to indicate that in

spite of such an order the car was not retumed so as

to entitl-- the tria,l court to comment that the long

detentiou of the car was itself a suspicious

circumstance. Havilg gone through the evidence of PW

50 we furd that each of the reasons canvassed by the

trial corrrt for disbelieving PW 50 is either legally

unsustainable or factually incorrect."

2I. He further relied upon the judgment of the Hon'bie

Supreme Court in Pandurang Kalu Patil and another v.

State of Maharashtra2, wherein paragraphs Nos.S, 14 and

15, it is held as follows:

"5. Even the recent decision in State of Maharashtra v. Damu

I(2O0O) 6 S(lC 269 ; 2000 SCC (Cri) 10881 this Court followed

'etn 2ooz supnevE :ouRT 733

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Crl.A.Ito.683 of2O2S

Pulukuri Kottaya IAIR 1947 PC 67 : 48 Cri u 533] vrith

approval. The fallacy committed by the Division Bench as per

the inpugned judgment is possibly on account of truncating

the word "fact" in Section 27 of the Evidence Act from the

adjoining word "discovered". The essence of Section 27 is that it

was enacted as a proviso to the two preceding sections (see

Sections 25 and 261 which imposed a complete ban on the

a&nissibility of aly confession made by an accused either to

the police or to anyone while the accused is in police custody.

The object of making a provision in Section 27 was to permit a

certain portion of the statement made by an accused to a police

oflicer admissible in evidence whether or not such statement is

confessional or non-confessional. Nonetheless, the ban against

admissibility would stand lifted if the statement distinctly

related to a discovery of fact. A fact can be discovered by the

police (investigating ollicer) pursuant to an information elicited

from the accused if such disclosure was followed by one or

more of a variety of causes. Recovery of an object is only one

such cause. Recovery, or even production of object by itself

need not necessarily result in discovery of a fact. That is why

Sir John Beaumont said in Pulukuri Kottaya [AIR 1947 PC 67 :

48 Cri LJ 5331 that (AIR p. 70, para 10) 'it is fallacious to treat

the Tact discovered' yrithin the section as equivalent to the

object produced'. The following sentence of the learned Law

Lord in the said decision, though terse, is eloquent in convefng

the message highlighting the pith of the ratio: (AIR p. 70, para

10)

'Information supplied by a person in custody that 'I

will produce a knife concea-led in the roof of my house'

does not lead to the discovery of a knife; knives were

discovered many years ago. It leads to the discovery of

the fact t].at a knife is concealed in the house of the

informant to his knowledge, and if the knife is proved

t4

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Crl,A.lto.683 of 2qr5

to have been used in the commission of the offence,

the fact discovered is very relevant."

(emphasis supplied)

14. Learnr:d counsel then contended that the High Court had

gone wrong in relying on the evidence of PW 18 Dy SP who said

that wherr A-2 was arrested and interrogated, a gun was

disinterrerl pursuant to the information supplied by him' It is

on the saJd aspect that the Division Bench of the High Court

considererl the ratio in Pulukuri Kottaya [AIR 1947 PC 67 : 4A

Cri LJ 5li3l What PW 18 said in the Court is that the

statement made by A-2 had been recorded in Ext 91

memoran(lum. We have noticed from the said memorandum the

following ritatement of A-2 as recorded therein: 'I have kept the

firearm concealed behind the old house in a heap ofwood "

15. The feLct d.iscovered by PW 18 is certainly not the gun The

fact discogered is that A-2 had concealed the gun (Article 5/2)

behind the old house under a heap of wood lt was the same

gun with which A-2 had fired at PW 2 and that asPect has been

proved wiLh the help of other evidence."

22. Per ccntra. learned Additional Public Prosecutor

appearing for the respondent-State supported the judgment of

the trial Cc,urt and submitted that the prosecution had

established the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonabie doubt

through a c:omplete chain of circumstantial evidence' He

further submitted that the evidence of P'Ws'S an.d 7

establishes 1.he close relationship between the deceased and

the appellalt and that the deceased had left the house to meet

the appellant pursuant to their decision to marry and that the

;FFF7'

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Crl.A.Ito.683 of2O25

evidence of the bus driver and conductor, as recorded under

Section 164 Cr.P.C., establishes that the deceased travelled by

bus on the date of occurrence and was received by the

appellant at Vengalapur village.

23. Learned Additional Pubiic Prosecutor submitted that

LWs. 14 and 15 died before they could be examined in Court

and, therefore, their statements recorded under Section 164

Cr.P.C. were rightly brought on record through P.W.14, the

learned Magistrate who recorded them and that the said

statements are corroborated by the Test Identifrcation Parade

proceedings, wherein the appellant was identifred by the

relevant witnesses. He further submitted that the medical

evidence of P.W.10 and Exs.P7 and P8 establishes that the

death of deceased is a homicidal death due to asphyxia

caused by strangulation and that the medical evidence is

consistent with the prosecution case regarding the manner in

which the deceased was killed.

24. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor contended that

the recovery of M.O.6/towel at the instance of the appellant is

an importalt incriminating circumstance. The recovery was

proved through P.W.9 and the Investigating Officer and

d

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Crt.A.lgo.6t3 of 2O25

colToborates

.J:re

prosecution version regarding the manner of

commission of the offence. He further contended that the

last-seen circumstance assumes significance as the deceased

was seen prrtceeding to meet the appellant on the date of

occurrence and was subsequently found dead arld that the

time gap between the deceased being last seen with the

appellant an<l the discovery of her dead body was suffrciently

proximate

explaration

a ed that the appeliant failed to furnish any

deceased dierl.

25. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor further contended

that the discrepancies and omissions pointed out by the

defence are tninor in nature and do not affect the core of the

prosecution :ase and that when the evidence of P'Ws'S, 7, 9

and 10, the evidence of the Investigating Officer, the Section

164 Cr.P.C statements of LWs. 14 and 15, the Test

IdentihcatiorL Parade proceedings and the recovery of M'O'6

are considered cumulatively, they establish a complete chain

of circumstances connecting the appellant with the homicidal

death of the deceased. Therefore, he prayed the Court to

dismiss the tlriminal Appeal.

1.6

regarding the circumstances in which the

17

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crl.A.Io.6a3 of 2orl5

26. In support of the submissions of the learned Additional

Public Prosecutor, he relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble

Supreme Court in Vijaya Singh and another v. State of

Uttarakhand3, wherein paragraph No.31, it is held as follows:

"31. Having said so, we deem it f1t to observe that a statement

under Section 164 CrPC cannot be discarded at the drop of a

hat and on a mere statement of the witness that it was not

recorded correctly. For, a judicial satisfaction of the Magistrate,

to the eflect that the statement being recorded is the correct

version of the facts stated by the witness, forms part of every

such statement and a higher burden must be placed upon the

witness to retract from the same. To permit retraction by a

witness from a signed statement recorded before the Magistrate

on flimsy grounds or on mere assertions would effectively

negate the difference between a statement recorded by the

police offrcer and that recorded by the Judicial Magistrate. In

the present matter, there is no reasonable ground to reject the

statements recorded under Section 164 CrPC and retance has

correctly been placed upon the said statements by the courts

below."

27 . The following points arise for consideration in the

Criminal Appeal

Whether the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable

doubt that the deatl of Manda Swapna was homicida-l

and that the appellant/accused was responsible for

causing her death by strangulation, thereby committing

the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC?

1

'202a nsc ao5

11

111

18

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Crl.A.fo.683 of2025

Whether the prosecution has established beyond

reasonacle doubt that the appeflant caused

disapperuance of evidence of the offence, or gave false

informa ion with the intention of screening himself from

legal punishment, thereby committing the offence

punishable under Section 201 IPC?

Whethe:' the judgrnent of conviction and sentence

passed by the trial Court under Sections 3O2 arrd' 2Ol

IPC warrants interference by this Court?

28. In the light of the submissions made by both the

learned cour-" se1 and a perusal of the material available on

record, the fc,llowing points arise for consideration. Since the

prosecution r)ase rests entirely upon circumstantial evidence

and there is no direct eyewitness to the actual occurrence, it

is necessary Lo examine each of the circumstances reiied upon

by the prosecution independently and thereafter consider

whether all l;uch circumstances, taken cumulativelli, form a

complete ch ain pointing oniy towards the guilt of the

appellant/ ac cused.

29. At the outset, it is not in dispute that the deceased

Manda Swaltna died an unnatural death. P'W' 1O is the

Medical Offi<:er who conducted the post-mortem examination

over the dea.d body. According to his evidence, he found a

ligature mark around the neck measuring approximately 20

G.

19

I{I,,J & SXS,J

Crl.A.Ito,6t3 of2O2S

inches in length and one inch in width, which was horizontal

and running ttrrough the middle of the neck and was

suggestive of strangulation or throttling. He also preserved

the hyoid bone for forensic examination. Subsequently, after

receipt of the FSL report, he gave his final opinion under

Ex.P8 that the cause of death was due to asphyxia due to

strangulation.

30. The evidence of

p.W. 1O, therefore, establishes the

nature and cause of death of the deceased. The evidence of

P.W. 1, the VRO, and P.W.2, the VRA, further establishes that

an unidentified female dead body was found near Bandam

Bore in the shivar of Vengalapur village and that the matter

was initially reported as a suspicious death. p.Ws.3 and 6 are

the panch witnesses to the scene observation and inquest

proceedings, while p.W.4 is the photographer who

photographed the dead body and scene of offence. Their

evidence supports the fact that the dead body was found at

the place in question and that the police conducted the

necessary proceedings.

31. However, the fact that the deceased died due to

stralgulation, though an important circumstance, by itself

-

20

Br.,J & Srls,J

Cd.A.lto.683 of 2025

does not establish the identity of the person who caused her

death. Mt:dical evidence can establish the nature and cause

of death, but in the absence of other reliable evidence

connectin5l the accused with the occurrence, such medical

evidence ,lannot by itself form the basis for

conviction against the accused. Therefore,

recording a

the crucial

question irs whether the prosecution has established the nexus

between the appellant and the homicidal death of the

deceased '-hrough

legally admissible and reliabie evidence'

32. The prosecution mainly relies upon the circumstances

of the rel,etionship between the deceased and the appellant,

the allegt:d last-seen circumstance, the Test Identifrcation

Parade, the statements of LWs.14 and 15 recorded under

Section 154 Cr.P.C', and the alleged recovery of M'O'6/towe1

at the instance of the appellant. Each of these circumstances

requires c arelul scrutinY.

33. So far as the evidence of P.W.5 is concerned, he is

stated to be a colony elder who had provided shelter to the

deceased. His evidence establishes that the deceased was

residing in the colony and that the appellant had come to his

house arLd expressed his intention to marry the deceased'

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Crl.A.[o.683 of2025

P.W.S also identilied the dead body of the deceased from her

clothes and footwear when the police showed the photograph

of the dead body. His evidence further indicates that the

deceased had left the house during the Dussehra festival and

had gone with the appellant.

34. P.W.7 is another coiony elder. His evidence is to the

effect that he knew the deceased for a considerable period and

that the appellant used to visit her. He also stated that the

appellant had expressed his intention to marrJr the deceased

and that the deceased had informed him tiat the appellant

would marry her. Thus, the evidence of p.Ws.S ald 7

establishes that the deceased and the appeliant were

acquainted with each other and had a close relationship and

that there was an intention on their part to marry.

35. However, the said circumstance has to be appreciated

within its proper iimits. The existence of a relationship

between the deceased ald the appellant is not, by itself,

sufficient to establish that the appellant committed the

murder of the deceased. The said circumstance may provide a

background to the proseculion case, but it cannot substitute

the requirement of proving the essential link connecting the

22

Kr,., & gI(Il,J

Crl.A.[o.663 of2025

accused with the actual occurrence. Even assuming that the

appellalt anrl deceased were last known to be acquainted with

each other, the prosecution must establish by reliable

evidence that the appeilant was with the deceased at or

immediately 1:rior to the time of her death.

36. The prosecution, therefore, heavily relies upon the

evidence of LWs. 14 and 15, the driver and conductor of the

private bus in which the deceased allegedly travelled from

Jagtial towards Vengalapur on 20.10.2018. Admittedly, both

LWs. 14 and L5 died before they could be examined before the

trial Court. Their statements recorded under Section 164

Cr.P.C. were marked as Exs.P22 an-d P23 through P.W. 14, the

learned Magirrtrate who recorded the said statements.

37 . Accord Lng to Exs.P22 and P23, the deceased allegedly

boarded the bus at Jagtial at about 09.3O a.m. and informed

the driver/ conductor that her name was Swapna and that she

was going to meet Vamshi, with whom she was in love. It is

further state(l that when the bus reached Peddamma Gudi of

Vengalapur liilage, the deceased requested the driver to stop

the bus and got down, whereupon a male person wearing a

TF'

/

23

xr,., & sxti,J

Crl.A.[o.683 of 2oil5

pink-coloured towel around his neck received her. The said

witnesse s further stated that they could identify that person.

38. The trial Court treated Exs.P22 and P23 as substantive

evidence and relied upon them for establishing the last-seen

circumstance. The trial Court proceeded on the premise that

as LWs.14 and 15 had died, their statements recorded under

Section 164 Cr.P.C. became relevant and could be used as

evidence after examining the Magistrate who recorded them.

In our considered view, the said approach requires

reconsideration in the light of the settled principles governing

statements recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C.

39. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of George (cited

supra), has reiterated that a statement of a witness recorded

under Section 164 Cr.P.C. cannot be treated as substarrtive

evidence and ordinarily can be used for the purpose of

contradicting or corroborating the testimony of such witness.

The Court specihcally disapproved an approach where the

trial Court treated the statement recorded under Section 164

Cr.P.C. as substantive evidence instead of appreciating the

evidence of the witness before the Court.

F

24

XI,J & SIG,J

Crt.A.ro.6ag of 2O25

40. The si1;nificance of the said principle becomes even

greater in the present case because LWs.14 and 15 did not

enter the wittress box at all. Therefore, there is no substantive

testimony of either of those witnesses before the trial Court

which could be corroborated or contradicted by their eariier

statements under Section 164 Cr.P'C. Their statements,

therefore, callnot be elevated into substantive evidence merely

because the'ritnesses died before trial.

4t. The evidence of P.W. 14, the learned Magistrate,

establishes that he recorded the statements of LWs'14 and 15

under Section 164 Cr.P.C. It also establishes the fact that the

statements vrere recorded by him in the course of his judicial

duties. Horvever, the evidence of the Magistrate as to the

recording of the statements does not transform the contents of

those stateraents into substantive testimony regarding the

facts narra':ed by the deceased bus passengers' The

Magistrate vras not an eyewitness to the occurrence and had

no persona. knowledge as to whether the deceased was

actualiy rece,ived by the appellant at Vengalapur village'

42. The rlistinction between proving the fact that a

statement was recorded and proving the truth of the contents

25

I(IJ & SKS,J

Crl.A.Ito.683 of2O25

of that statement is material. P.W. 14 can establish that

Exs.P22 and P23 were recorded before him, but he cannot give

substantive evidence regarding the truth of the matters stated

therein merely because he recorded them. Consequently, the

contents of Exs.P22 and P23 cannot, in the facts of the

present case, be treated as substantive evidence establishing

that the appellant was the person who received the deceased

from the bus.

43. The contention of the learned Additional Public

Prosecutor that the statements become substantive evidence

because the witnesses died before entering the witness box

cannot be accepted merely on that ground. The death of a

witness may affect the availability of his testimony, but it does

not, by itself, convert every previous statement made by him

into substantive evidence unless the statement falls within a

specilic statutory exception permitting its use for that

purpose. The trial Court, therefore, ought to have examined

the precise statutory basis on which Exs.P22 and P23 could

be treated as substantive proof of the last-seen circumstance.

44. The reliance placed by the trial Court upon Sections 6

and 35 of the Evidence Act also does not cure the

/,,

E

26

Rr,J & SKS,.'

Crl.A.lto.6t3 of2025

fundamental defect. Section 6 relates to facts forming part of

the same tralsaction ald is concerned with the relevancy of

facts. Relevancy and admissibility are distinct from the

question whr:ther a particular statement can be treated as

substantive proof of the truth of its contents. Similarly,

Section 35 (:oncerns entries in public records made by a

public servant or by a person performing a duty specially

enjoined by law. The mere fact that a Magistrate recorded a

statement in the discharge of judicial duty does not mean that

every assertion contained in that statement becomes

substantive proof of the truth of the assertion.

45. .The prosumption regarding regularity or genuineness of

an offrcial acl. also cannot be confused with proof of the truth

of the facts narrated by the person whose statement was

recorded. At the highest, the evidence of P.W.14 establishes

that the stat,lments were recorded in the manner stated by

him. It does not establish, from his personal knowledge, that

the person <lescribed by LWs. 14 and 15 was in fact the

appeliant or that the deceased was actually received by the

appellant at the bus stop. Further, the judgment relied upon

by the proser:ution is also not helpful, as there is a factual

t

27

XIJ & SBS,J

Crl.A. 0.6A3 of 2()2s

difference in the present case, since the said driver and

conductor were not examined by the Court.

46. The Test Identification Parade evidence also requires

consideration in this context. Ex.P2l relates to the

identification proceedings conducted by p.W.14. The trial

Court relied upon the identification of the appeilant by p.Ws.S

and 7 and by LWs.14 and 15. However, insofar as LWs.14

and 15 are concerned, their identihcation cannot

independently supply substantive evidence of the last-seen

circumstance when the witnesses themselves were not

examined before the trial Court. The identihcation

proceedings cannot be treated as a substitute for substantive

testimony which was never given in Court.

47 . As regards P.Ws.S ard 7 , their identification of the

appellant only establishes that they identified the person

whom they already knew as Nakka Vamshi. Their evidence,

as noticed above, establishes acquaintalce and relationship

between the appellant and the deceased. It does not establish

that they saw the appellant taking the deceased to the place

where her dead body was subsequently found or that they saw

the appellant with the deceased immediately before her death.

2a

r(l,J & sas,J

Crl.A.fo,663 of 2925

48. The prosecution has, therefore, not been able to

establish through substantive evidence the crucial

circumstance that the deceased was last seen alive in the

company of tre appellant immediately prior to her death. This

is not a min,:r discrepancy. In a case resting entirely upon

circumstantial evidence, the iast-seen circumstance assumes

importance cnly when it is established by cogent and legally

admissible evidence and when the proximity between the time

of last seen zrnd the time of death is such that the possibility

of intervention by another person is substantiaily excluded.

49. In the present case, once Exs.P22 and P23 are excluded

from consideration as substantive evidence, there remains no

direct or substantive evidence showing that the deceased was

last seen with the appellant immediately before her death.

P.Ws.S and l/ establish the relationship between the two, but

not the last-s;een circumstance on the date and at the relevalt

place of occurrence.

50. The prosecution next relies upon the alleged disclosure

statement arLd recovery of M.O.6/towe1. P.W.9 is stated to be

one of tht: mediators to the confession-cum-recovery

proceedings and P.W. i 3 is the Investigating Offrcer. Their

.,: .r

29

r(r,J & sxs,J

Crl.A,No.663 of2O2S

evidence is relied upon to establish that the appellant gave

information leading to the recovery of M.O.6/towel from the

bushes near the scene of offence. M.O.7 is stated to be the

mobile phone of the accused which was seized from his

possesslon.

51. The evidentiar5r value of such recovery has to be

examined in the light of Section 2Z of the Indian Evidence Act.

The principie iaid down by the Hon,ble Supreme Court in

Pandurang Kalu Patil (cited supra), is that the fact discovered

under Section 27 is not necessarily synonymous with the

object produced or recovered. The admissible portion is that

part of the information supplied by the accused which

distincfly relates to the fact thereby discovered. Recovery of

an object by itself does not automatically establish that the

accused committed the offence.

52. Applyrng the above principle to the present case, even

assuming that the recovery of M.O.6/towel at the instalce of

the appellant is proved, the recovery establishes only such

fact as is legally discoverable from the information furnished

by the accused. The prosecution must further establish the

30

IIL,J & SXS,J

Crl,A.Ito.683 of 2025

incriminating character of the recovered article and its nexus

with the comnrission of the offence

53. In the present case, there is no reliable evidence

establishing that M.O.6/towel belonged to the appellant or

that it was th: very towel used for strangulating the deceased'

Significantly, the prosecution relies upon the Section 164

Cr.P.C. statements of LWs.14 and 15 to suggest that the

person who received the deceased was wearing a pink-

coloured tow':I. Once the statements of LWs'14 and 15 are

not available as substantive evidence, the circumstalce that

the towel alk:gedly recovered from the bushes was the same

towel noticec. by the bus driver and conductor also loses its

evidentiary fcrundation.

54. Further, there is no satisfactory scientifrc evidence

placed on rer:ord establishing that M'O'6 contained any blood'

biological Inaterial or other incriminating substance

connecting it with the deceased' In the absence of such

corroborativt: evidence, the recovery of an ordinary article

such as a towel from bushes near the scene' even if proved'

cannot by itr;elf establish that the appellant used that towel to

cause the death.

31

xr,, & sxs,,

Crl.A.IYo.683 of2O2S

55. The same reasoning applies to M.O.Z , the mobile phone

of the appellant. The evidence of

p.W.

12, the Nodai OfIicer,

establishes the relevant mobiie connection in the name of the

appellant. However, recovery of the appellant,s own mobile

phone from his possession is not an incriminating

circumstance unless it connects him with the commission of

the offence. It does not establish that he was present with the

deceased at the place of occurrence or that he committed the

murder.

56. It is also significant tllat the trial Court itself found the

prosecution evidence insuffrcient to establish the charge

under Section 404 IpC concerning the alleged mobile phone of

the deceased. The trial Court held that there was no sufhcient

evidence to establish that M.O.9 belonged to the deceased.

This finding demonstrates that the prosecution failed to

establish the ownership and evidentiary nexus of the

deceased's mobile phone. Therefore, the alleged recovery of

mobile-related material cannot be given greater evidentiar5r

significalce than what the record permits.

57. The evidence of p.W.

1O, though reliable to the extent of

establishing the cause of death, also does not connect the

32

xr,", & sBs,.,

Crl.A.tro.683 of 2025

appellant with the commission of the offence. The medical

evidence estabiishes strangulation, but it does not identify the

person who r:aused the strangulation' There is no scientific

evidence on record which connects the appellant with the

iigature mark: or with the towel allegedly used in the offence.

58. P.Ws.1 and 2 are also not eyewitnesses to the

commission of the offence. P.W. 1 merely set the criminal law

into motiorL on receiving information regarding the

unidentified dead body. P.W.2 informed P.W.1 about the

presence of the dead body. Their evidence is therefore

relevant to ttLe discovery of the dead body and the initiation of

investigation, but it does not establish the involvement of the

appellant.

59. P.Ws.3 and 6, the panch witnesses, speak about the

scene obsen'ation and inquest proceedings and the articles

found at the scene. Their evidence establishes the

investigative steps undertaken by the police. P.W.4 speaks

about photc,graphing the dead body and scene. These

witnesses d': not connect the appellant with the actua'l

commission ,rf the offence .

33

xIrJ & sxs,.,

Crl,A. o.6ag of 2025

60. P.W.8, the sister of the deceased, assisted in identiSring

the deceased. Her evidence is relevalt to the identity of the

deceased and the surrounding circumstances, but there is no

substantive evidence from her that she saw the deceased in

the company of the appellart immediately before the

occurrence or that the appellant caused her death.

61. P.W.9 is the mediator to the alleged confession-cum_

recovery proceedings. His evidence may establish the

proceedings undertaken by the police ald the recovery of the

article, subject to the admissibility of the information leading

to discovery. However, as already discussed, recovery alone

cannot establish the commission of murder unless the

recovered article is shown to have a reliable and incriminating

connection with the crime.

62. P.W. 1 1/P.W. 13, the police ofhcers connected with

registration and investigation of the case, can establish the

steps taken during investigation. Their evidence regarding

investigation, however, cannot substitute substantive evidence

regarding the actual commission of the offence. The

prosecution must independenfly establish the incriminating

circumstances through legally admissible evidence.

34

IG,J & SIIS,J

Crl.A.l{o.6t3 of2O25

63. Thus, :n an overali appreciation of the evidence, the

prosecution has established certain foundational facts,

namely, tha1. Manda Swapna died an unnatura-i death by

strangulatior., that her dead body was found near Bandam

Bore in the shivar of Vengalapur, that she was acquainted

with the apgrellant and that a towel was allegedly recovered

during inve stigation. However, the crucial connecting

circumstanct:s between the appellant and the homicidal death

have not b:en estabiished with the degree of certainty

required in a criminal tria1.

64. The present case is admittedly one based entirely on

circumstantial evidence. The iaw relating to circumstantial

evidence is u'ell settled.

65. At this stage, it is pertinent to note the judgment of the

Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v.

State of Maharashtraa, wherein paragraph No.153, it is held

as follows:

153. A ctose ana-lysis of this decision would show that the

fotlowing conditions must be fulfrlled before a case against an

accused <ran be said to be fully established:

n

ltss+1 + scc rto

+-@7

I

/

t'

35

8r,", & srs,J

Crl.A.Ito.6a3 of2025

(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be

drawn should be fully established.

It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the

circumstances concerned "must or should" and not "may be"

established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal

distinction between "may be proved" and "must be or should be

proved" as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade

v. State of Maharashtra lll97 31 2 SCC 793 : 1973 SCC (Cri)

1033 : 1973 Crl IJ 17831 where the observations were made:

[SCC

para 19, p. 807: SCC (Cri) p.7047]

"Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be

and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the

mental distance between ?nay be'and tnust be'is long and

divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions."

(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the

hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they

should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that

the accused is guilty,

(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature ald

tendency,

(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the

one to be proved, and

(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to

leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent urith

the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human

probability the act must have been done by the accused.

66. In the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (cited supra),

the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down the five principles which

have to be satisfied before a conviction can be founded solely

36

I{r,J & SKII,.'

Crl.A.[o.6E3 of 2025

on circumstantial evidence: the circumstances must be fully

established; l.he established facts must be consistent only with

the hypothesis of guilt; the circumstances must be conclusive

in nature and tendency; they must exclude every possible

hypothesis e;<cept guilt; and the chain of evidence must be so

complete as to leave no reasonable ground consistent with

innocence artd must show that, in all human probability, the

act must h.ave been committed by the accused. These

principles cc,ntinue to govem appreciation of circumstantial

evidence.

67. Applying the aforesaid principles to the present case,

the first circumstance, namely, the relationship between the

appellant and the deceased, is established only to the extent

that they were acquainted and intended to marry. Such

circumstanc,: is not conclusive of guiit' The second

circumstanc:, namely, the last-seen theory, has not been

established lhrough substantive evidence because LWs 14 and

15 did not erlter the witness box and their Section 164 Cr'P C'

statements cannot, in the circumstances of the case, be

treated as sr.tbstantive evidence'

37

I(I.n, & sxs,J

Crl.A. o.6a3 of 2orrs

68. The third circumstance, namely, the Test Identification

Parade, does not independently establish the last_seen

circumstance. The identification of the appellant by p.Ws.S

and 7 only confirms his identity as the person whom they

already knew. The identifrcatibn attributed to LWs. 14 and 15

cannot be used as substantive proof of their assertions when

they were not examined before the Court.

69. The fourth circumstance, namely, the recovery of

M.0.6/towel, also does not complete the chain. Even

accepting the recovery as proved, the prosecution has not

established by independent evidence that the recovered towel

was the instrument used in strangulaling the deceased or that

it conta-ined any material connecting it with the deceased. As

held in Pandurang Kalu patil,

the discovery contemplated by

Section 27 is the discovery of a fact within the knowledge of

the accused and not merely the production of an object. The

evidentiary value of the discovery therefore depends upon the

further evidence connecting the discovered fact or article with

the offence.

70. The medica,l evidence establishes homicidal death but

does not connect the appellant with that death. The identity

38

RJ.,J & SfiL,J

crl.A.Ito.683 of 2025

of the deceasr:d is established, but the identity of the assailant

is not estaclished through any direct evidence. The

prosecution ltas not placed before the Court any independent

circumstance which conclusively establishes the presence of

the appellant at the scene of offence at or immediately before

the time of dt:ath.

7l. It is al.so important tc.r bear in mind that the burden

upon the prosecution in a case based on circumstantial

evidence doers not become lighter merely because the deceased

and the ar;cused were acquainted or because certain

circumstanct:s create suspicion against the accused'

Suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof'

The circumstances must form a continuous ald complete

chain and eerch important link must be established by legally

admissible e'zidence

72. The lezrrned Additional Public Prosecutor contended that

the circums.:ances have to be considered cumulatively and

that the lzlst-seen circumstance, recovery and medical

evidence together point towards the guilt of the appellant'

There can be no dispute with the proposition that

circumstantial evidence has to be appreciated cumulatively.

39

xr,, & sxlt,J

Crl.A.IIo.683 of2025

However, the cumulative effect can be considered only after

each material circumstance is independently established by

admissible and reliable evidence. A missing or legally

defective link cannot be supplied merely by combining other

circumstances which, individually or collectively, do not

establish the missing link.

73. Likewise, the contention that the appellant failed to

explain the circumstances surrounding the death cannot

relieve the prosecution of its primary burden. The prosecution

must hrst establish the foundational circumstances from

which arr inference of guitt can legitimately be drawn. The

absence of an adequate explanation from the accused cannot

be used to hll serious gaps in the prosecution evidence.

74. In the present case, the prosecution has failed to

establish the most signihcant link, namely, that the deceased

was last seen alive with the appellant shortly before her death.

Once Exs.P22 and P23 are not treated as substantive

evidence, there is no reliable evidence to establish this

circumstance. The evidence of p.Ws.s and 7 does not fill this

gap, as their evidence relates principally to the relationship

40

xLr, & sKs,J

Crl.A.Ito.683 of2025

between the rleceased ald the appellant and not to the events

immediately y>receding the death.

75. The prosecution has also failed to establish an

unbroken ne:<us between the recovered towel and the murder.

The recovery, standing alone, is insufficient. The medical

evidence doe,s not connect the towel with the death. There is

no substantive evidence that the towel recovered at the

instance of the appellant was the same towel a1legedly seen

around the neck of the person who received the deceased,

because the very statements of LWs.14 and 15 on which that

circumstanct: rests cannot be treated as substantive evidence.

76. Therefore, the circumstances relied upon by the

prosecution do not satisly the hve principles laid down in

Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (cited supra). The circumstances

are not ful1y established in the manner required by law. They

do not, even when taken cumulativeiy, exclude every

reasonable hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the

appellant and the chain of circumstances is not complete so

as to lead to the conclusion that, in all human probability, the

appellant alcne committed the offence.

47

XI,J & SKS,J

Crl,A. 0.683 of 2025

77 . Consequenfly, though the evidence establishes that the

deceased suffered a homicidal death, the prosecution has not

established beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was

the person who caused her death. The beneht of the missing

links in the chain must necessarily go to the appellant.

74. Coming to the offence under Section 2Ol of IpC, the trial

Court found the appellant guilty principally on the basis of the

alleged recovery of M.O.6/towel. Section 2Ol of IpC requires

proof that the accused caused disappearance of evidence of

the offence or gave fa,lse information with the intention of

screening the offender from legai punishment. Mere recovery

of an article at the instance of the accused, without

establishing the essential ingredients of the offence and the

connection of the accused with the undering offence, cannot

by itself sustain a conviction under Section 201 of IpC.

79. Once the prosecution has failed to establish beyond

reasonable doubt that the appellant committed the murder

and has further failed to establish that M.O.6 was the article

used in the commission of the offence and that the appellant

caused its disappearance with the requisite intention, the

conviction under Section 201 IpC also calnot be sustained.

42

I(J.J & SBS,J

Crl,/Lfo,6t3 of2025

80. The evidence relating to Section 404 of IPC need not be

reconsidered in detail, as the appellant was already acquitted

of the said oflence by the trial Court and there is no challenge

by the prosecution to the said acquittal before this Court.

8 1 . On an overall consideration of the entire material on

record, this Court is of the view that the prosecution has

established the factum of homicidal death of Manda Swapna,

but has fail,:d to establish the identity of the perpetrator

beyond reasonable doubt. The relationship between the

appellant and the deceased, the alleged last-seen

circumstanc<: based upon the Section 164 Cr.P.C. statements

of deceased witnesses, the Test Identification Parade, the

recovery of M.O.6/towel and the medical evidence, when

examined individually and cumulatively, do not form a

complete chzLin of circumstances leading only to the guilt of

the appellant.

82. The principles relied upon by the learned counsel for the

appellant in George and Pandurang Kalu Patil (cited supra),

when applied to the evidence on record, reinforce the

conclusion that the Section 164 Cr.P.C. statements of LWs. 14

and 15 canlrot be treated as substantive evidence in the

43

xL,J & SXS,J

Crl.A.tro.683 of 2(}25

absence of their testimony before the trial Court and that the

recovery

actually

under Section 27 must be confined to the fact

discovered and cannot, by itself, establish the

commission of the offence

'

83. At the same time, the principle relied upon by the

learned Additiona-l Public Prosecutor that circumstantial

evidence must be considered cumulatively is accepted as a

matter of law. However, the cumulative assessment must still

satisSr the requirement laid down in Sharad Birdhichand

Sarda (cited supra) that the chain must be complete and must

exclude every reasonable hypothesis consistent with

innocence. In the present case, the prosecution has not

crossed that threshold.

84. Therefore, this Court finds that the prosecution has

failed to prove the guiit of the appellant for the offences

punishable under Sections 302 and 2Ol of IPC beyond

reasonable doubt. The appellant is consequently entitled to

t]le benefit of doubt.

85. In the result, the Criminal Appeal is allowed. The

judgment dated 30.05.2025 passed by the learned Principal

District and Sessions Judge, Jagtial, in S.C.No.O4 of 2021,

1

I

44

r{r,,J & srls,J

Crl.A.I{o.6E3 of 2O25

convicting th,: appeilant/ accused for the offences punishable

under Sectiorrs 302 and 201 IPC, is hereby set aside'

86. The appellant/accused is acquitted of the offences

punishable under Sections 302 and 201 of IPC by extending

the benefit c,f doubt. The appellant sha,tl be set at libert5r

forthwith, if lre is not required in any other case.

Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shal1 stald

closed.

SD/. M MANJULA,

JOINT REGISTRAR

//TRUE COPY//

SECTTON OFFICER

One F:rir Copy to the Hon'ble Sri Justice K.Lakshman

(For His Lordship's kind Perusal)

AND

One Fair Copy to the Hon'ble Smt Justice K. Sujana

(For Her Lordship's kind Perusal)

The Principal l)istrict and Sessions Judge, Jagitial

The llAdditioral Judicial First Class lVlagistrate, Jagitial

The Station House Officer, Gollapalli Police Station, Jagitial

4 LR Copies

The Under Ser:retary, Union of lndia, Ministry of Law, Justice and Company

Affairs, New Delhi

The Secretary Advocates Associatron Library, High Court for the State of

Telangana, Hi1lh Court Buildings at Hyderabad

The Superinterdent, Central Prison, Cherlapally, Medchal-Malkajgiri District

(By Special Messenger)

One CC to SRI KONA N.D.V.RAMANA RAO, Advocate tOpUCl

Two CCs to PUBLIC PROSECUTOR High Court for the State of Telangana,

at Hyderabad iOUTI

Two CD Copies

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2

3

+';

5:

To,

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g:

,10'l

ADK

HIGH COURT

DATED: 22109t12026

JUDGMENT

CRLA.No.683 of 2025

ALLOWING THE CRLA

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