Page 1 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1867 OF 2012

Nanjappa …Appellant

Vs.

State of Karnataka …Respondent

J U D G M E N T

T.S. THAKUR, J.

1.This appeal arises out of a judgment and order dated 9

th

February, 2012 passed by the High Court of Karnataka at

Bangalore whereby the High Court has, while reversing an order of

acquittal passed by the Trial Court, convicted the appellant under

Sections 7 and 13 read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of

Corruption Act, 1988 and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment

1

Page 2 for a period of six months under Section 7 and a period of one year

under Section 13 besides fine and sentence of imprisonment in

default of payment of the same. The facts giving rise to the filing of

the appeal may be summarised as under:

2.The appellant was working as a Bill Collector in

Sabbanakruppe Grama Panchayath, in S.R. Patna Taluk of the

State of Karnataka. The prosecution case is that the complainant

who was examined at the trial as PW-1, appeared before the

Lokayukta Police to allege that the appellant had demanded a bribe

of Rs.500/- from him for issue of a copy of a certain resolution

dated 13

th

March, 1998 passed by the Sabbanakruppe Grama

Panchayath. Since the complainant was unwilling to pay the bribe

amount, he prayed for action against the appellant. The Lokayukta

Police appears to have secured panch witnesses, prepared an

entrustment memo and handed over the intended bribe amount to

the complainant after applying phenolphthalein powder to the

currency notes for being paid to the appellant upon demand. The

prosecution case is that the bribe amount was demanded by the

appellant and paid to him by the complainant whereupon the

2

Page 3 raiding party on a signal given by the complainant arrived at the

spot and recovered the said amount from his possession. The

appellant’s hands were got washed in sodium carbonate solution

which turned pink, clearly suggesting that the bribe money had

been handled by the appellant. On completion of the investigation,

the police filed charge-sheet before the jurisdictional court where

the prosecution examined as many as 5 witnesses in support of its

case. The appellant did not, however, adduce any evidence in his

defence. The Trial Court eventually came to the conclusion that the

prosecution had failed to prove the charges framed against the

appellant and accordingly acquitted him of the same. The Trial

Court held that the prosecution had failed to prove that the

appellant had any role in the passing of the resolution by the

members of the Panchayat, a copy whereof was demanded by the

complainant. The Trial Court further held that there was no

material to suggest that the Sabbanakruppe Grama Panchayat had

joined hands with the appellant in converting the road running in

front of the complainant’s house into sites for allotment to third

parties. The Trial Court found that the property purchased by the

3

Page 4 complainant did not actually show a road on the northern side of

the said property. The Trial Court, on those findings, concluded that

the complainant’s accusation about the appellant demanding bribe

from him was unreliable and unworthy of credit. Relying upon the

decision of this Court in Kaliram vs. State of Himachal Pradesh

(AIR 1973 SC 2773) , the Trial Court held that since two views

were possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to

the guilt of the appellant and the other to his innocence, the view

that was favourable to the appellant had to be accepted. The Trial

Court further held that the sanction for prosecution of the appellant

had not been granted by the competent authority and was,

therefore, not in accordance with Section 19 of the P.C. Act.

Relying upon the deposition of PW-4 examined at the trial, the Trial

Court held that the Chief Officer, Zilla Panchayat was the only

competent authority to grant sanction for prosecution in terms of

Section 113 of the Panchayat Raj Act. The prosecution case against

the appellant was on those findings rejected by the Trial Court and

the appellant acquitted.

3.Aggrieved by the order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court,

4

Page 5 the State preferred Criminal Appeal No.1260 of 2006 which, as

noticed earlier, has been allowed by the High Court in terms of the

judgment and order impugned in this appeal. The High Court held

that since the validity of the sanction order was not questioned at

the appropriate stage, the appellant was not entitled to raise the

same at the conclusion of the trial. On the merits of the case, the

High Court held that the depositions of PWs 1 and 2, who were

none other than the complainant and the shadow witness had

sufficiently proved that the appellant had demanded bribe amount

and received the same. The High Court held that the discrepancies

in the evidence regarding the manner of giving the amount were

inconsequential. The High Court also placed reliance upon the

explanation of the appellant as recorded in the trap mahazar to

hold that the appellant had admitted the receipt of the amount, no

matter he had offered an explanation according to which the

amount represented “tap charges”, which explanation was not

supported by any defence. The High Court has, on those findings,

held the charges framed against the appellant to have been

proved. He was accordingly convicted for the offences punishable

5

Page 6 under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the P.C.

Act and sentenced to imprisonment for six months and one year

respectively besides a fine of Rs.3,000/- under Section 7 and

Rs.5,000/- under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the

P.C. Act with a default sentence of one month and two months

respectively. The sentences were directed to run concurrently.

4.We have heard learned counsel for the parties at considerable

length. This appeal must, in our opinion, succeed on the short

ground that in the absence of a valid previous sanction required

under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the trial

Court was not competent to take cognizance of the offence alleged

against the appellant. Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption

Act reads as under:

“19. Previous sanction necessary for prosecution (1) No

court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under

section 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been

committed by a public servant, except with the previous

sanction,- (a) in the case of a person who is employed in

connection with the affairs of the Union and is not

removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the

Central Government, of that Government; (b) in the case of

a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of a

State and is not removable from his office save by or with

6

Page 7 the sanction of the State Government, of that Government;

(c) in the case of any other person, of the authority

competent to remove him from his office.

(2) Where for any reason whatsoever any doubt arises as to

whether the previous sanction as required under sub-section

(1) should be given by the Central Government or the State

Government or any other authority, such sanction shall be

given by that Government or authority which would have

been competent to remove the public servant from his office

at the time when the offence was alleged to have been

committed.

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the code of

Criminal Procedure, 1973,- (a) no finding, sentence or order

passed by a special Judge shall be reversed or altered by a

Court in appeal, confirmation or revision on the ground of

the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in, the

sanction required under sub-section (1), unless in the

opinion of that court, a failure of justice has in fact been

occasioned thereby; (b) no court shall stay the proceedings

under this Act on the ground of any error, omission or

irregularity in the sanction granted by the authority, unless

it is satisfied that such error, omission or irregularity has

resulted in a failure of justice; (c) no court shall stay the

proceedings under this Act on any other ground and no

court shall exercise the powers of revision in relation to any

interlocutory order passed in any inquiry, trial, appeal or

other proceedings. (4) In determining under sub-section (3)

whether the absence of, or any error, omission or

irregularity in, such sanction has occasioned or resulted in a

failure of justice the court shall have regard to the fact

whether the objection could and should have been raised at

any earlier stage in the proceedings. Explanation.-For the

purposes of this section,- (a) error includes competency of

the authority to grant sanction; (b) a sanction required for

prosecution includes reference to any requirement that the

prosecution shall be at the instance of a specified authority

or with the sanction of a specified person or any

requirement of a similar nature.”

7

Page 8 5.We may also, at the outset, extract Section 465 of the Cr.P.C.

which is a cognate provision dealing with the effect of any error,

omission or irregularity in the grant of sanction on the prosecution.

Section 465 Cr.P.C. runs thus:

“465. Finding or sentence when reversible by reason

of error, omission or irregularity.

(1) Subject to the provisions hereinbefore contained, on

finding sentence or order passed by a Court of competent

jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered by a Court of appeal,

confirmation or revision on account of any error, omission or

irregularity in the complaint, summons, warrant,

proclamation, order, judgment or other proceedings before

or during trial or in any inquiry or other proceedings under

this Code, or any error, or irregularity in any sanction for

the prosecution unless in the opinion of that Court, a failure

of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby.

(2) In determining whether any error, omission or

irregularity in any proceeding under this Code, or any error,

or irregularity in any sanction for the prosecution has

occasioned a failure of justice, the Court shall have regard

to the fact whether the objection could and should have

been raised at an earlier stage in the proceedings.”

6.A plain reading of Section 19(1) (supra) leaves no manner of

doubt that the same is couched in mandatory terms and forbids

courts from taking cognizance of any offence punishable under

Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 against public servants except with

the previous sanction of the competent authority enumerated in

8

Page 9 clauses (a), (b) and (c) to sub-section (1) of Section 19. The

provision contained in sub-section (1) would operate in absolute

terms but for the presence of sub-section (3) to Section 19 to

which we shall presently turn. But before we do so, we wish to

emphasise that the language employed in sub-section (1) of

Section 19 admits of no equivocation and operates as a complete

and absolute bar to any court taking cognizance of any offence

punishable under Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 of the Act against

a public servant except with the previous sanction of the

competent authority. A similar bar to taking of cognizance was

contained in Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947

which was as under:

“"6. (1) No Court shall take cognizance of an offence

punishable under section 161 or section 165 of the Indian

Penal Code or under sub-section (2) of section 5 of this Act,

alleged to have been committed by a public servant except

with the previous sanction, -

(a) in the case of a person who is employed in connection

with the affairs of the Union and is not removable from his

office save by or with the sanction of the Central

Government......., [of the] Central Government;

(b) in the case of a person who is employed in connection

with the affairs of [a State] and is not removable from his

office save by or with the sanction of the State

Government............, [of the] State Government;

9

Page 10 (c) in the case of any other person, of the authority

competent to remove him from his office.

(2) where for any reason whatsoever any doubt arises

whether the previous sanction as required under sub-section

(1) should be given by the Central or State Government or

any other authority, such sanction shall be given by that

Government or authority which would have been competent

to remove the public servant from his office at the time

when the offence was alleged to have been committed."

7.In Baij Nath Tripathi vs. The State of Bhopal and Anr.

(AIR 1957 SC 494) , a Constitution Bench of this of Court was

dealing with the case of a sub-inspector of police from the then

State of Bhopal, who was prosecuted by the Special Judge, Bhopal

and convicted of offences punishable under Section 161 of the IPC

and Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. He was

sentenced by the Trial Court to undergo nine months’ rigorous

imprisonment on each count. In an appeal before the Judicial

Commissioner against the said conviction and sentence, it was held

that since no sanction according to law had been given for the

prosecution of the accused, the Special Judge had no jurisdiction to

take cognizance of the case and that the trial was invalid and void

ab-initio, hence quashed relegating the parties to the position as if

10

Page 11 no legal charge-sheet had been submitted against the appellant.

The accused was then tried for a second time before another

Special Judge to which prosecution, the accused took exception on

the ground that a second trial was impermissible having regard to

the provisions of Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India and

Section 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. A similar contention

was raised by Sudhakar Dube, another Sub-Inspector of Police who

was similarly tried and prosecuted but the Special Judge finding

the sanction order to be incompetent had quashed the

proceedings. Dube was also thereupon sought to be tried for the

second time which second trial was assailed by him in writ petition

before this Court. The short question that fell for consideration in

the above backdrop, was whether the petitioners had been

prosecuted and punished within the meaning of Article 20 of the

Constitution of India or tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction

within the meaning of Section 403(1) of the Code of Criminal

Procedure. It was urged on behalf of the respondent, that in case

the previous trial was null and void and non-est, a second trial was

legally permissible. That contention found favour with the Court.

11

Page 12 Relying upon Yusofalli Mulla vs. The King AIR 1949 PC 264,

Basdeo Agarwalla vs. King Emperor AIR 1945 FC 16 and

Budha Mal vs. State of Delhi, Criminal Appeal No.17 of 1952 ,

it was held that the accused had neither been tried by a Court of

competent jurisdiction nor was there any accusation or conviction

in force within the meaning of Section 403 of Cr.P.C. to stand as a

bar against their prosecution for the same offences. The following

passage from the decision succinctly sums up the legal foundation

for accepting the contention urged on behalf of the State of

Bhopal:

“If no Court can take cognizance of the offences in question

without a legal sanction, it is obvious that no Court can be

said to be a Court of competent jurisdiction to try those

offences and that any trial in the absence of such sanction

must be null and void, and the sections of the Code on

which learned counsel for the petitioners relied have really

no bearing on the matter. Section 530 of the Code is really

against the contention of learned counsel, for it states, inter

alia, that if any Magistrate not being empowered by law to

try an offender, tries him, then the proceedings shall be

void. Section 529(e) is merely an exception in the matter of

taking cognizance of an offence under s. 190, sub-s. (1),

cls. (a) and (b); it has no bearing in a case where sanction

is necessary and no sanction in accordance with law has

been obtained.”

8.In Yusofalli Mulla’s case (supra), the Privy Council was

12

Page 13 examining whether failure to obtain sanction affected the

competence of the Court to try the accused. The contention urged

was that there was a distinction between a valid institution of a

prosecution on the one hand and the competence of the Court to

hear and determine the prosecution, on the other. Rejecting the

contention that any such distinction existed, this Court observed:

“The next contention was that the failure to obtain a

sanction at the most prevented the valid institution of a

prosecution, but did not affect the competency of the Court

to hear and determine a prosecution which in fact was

brought before it. This suggested distinction between the

validity of the prosecution and the competence of the Court

was pressed strenuously by Mr. Page, but seems to rest on

no foundation. A Court cannot be competent to hear and

determine a prosecution the institution of which is prohibited

by law and Section 14 prohibits the institution of a

prosecution in the absence of a proper sanction. The learned

Magistrate was no doubt competent to decide whether he

had jurisdiction to entertain the prosecution and for that

purpose to determine whether a valid sanction had been

given, but as soon as he decided that no valid sanction had

been given the Court became incompetent to proceed with

the matter. Their Lordships agree with the view expressed

by the Federal Court in Agarwalla's case A.I.R. (32) 1945

F.C. 16 that a prosecution launched without a valid sanction

is a nullity.”

9.The Federal Court had in Basdeo Agarwalla’s case (supra),

summed up the legal position regarding the effect of absence of a

sanction in the following words:

13

Page 14 “In our view the absence of sanction prior to the institution

of the prosecution cannot be regarded as a mere technical

defect. The clause in question was obviously enacted for the

purpose of protecting the citizen, and in order to give the

Provincial Government in every case a proper opportunity of

considering whether a prosecution should in the

circumstances of each particular case be instituted at all.

Such a clause, even when it may appear that a technical

offence has been committed, enables the Provincial

Government, if in a particular case it so thinks fit, to forbid

any prosecution. The sanction is not intended to be and

should not be an automatic formality and should not so be

regarded either by police or officials. There may well be

technical offences committed against the provisions of such

an Order as that in question, in which the Provincial

Government might have excellent reason for considering a

prosecution undesirable or inexpedient. But this decision

must be made before a prosecution is started. A sanction

after a prosecution has been started is a very different

thing. The fact that a citizen is brought into Court and

charged with an offence may very seriously affect his

reputation and a subsequent refusal of sanction to a

prosecution cannot possibly undo the harm which may have

been done by the initiation of the first stages of a

prosecution. Moreover in our judgment the official by whom

or on whose advice a sanction is given or refused may well

take a different view if he considers the matter prior to any

step being taken to that which he may take if he is asked to

sanction a prosecution which has in fact already been

started.”

10.So also the decision of this Court in Budha Mal vs. State of

Delhi [Criminal Appeal No.17 of 1952 disposed of on 3/10/1952] ,

this Court had clearly ruled that absence of a valid sanction

affected the competence of the Court to try and punish the

14

Page 15 accused. This Court observed:

“We are satisfied that the learned Sessions Judge was right

in the view he took. Section 403 CrPC applies to cases

where the acquittal order has been made by a court of

competent jurisdiction but it does not bar a retrial of the

accused in cases where such an order has been made by a

court which had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the

case. It is quite apparent on this record that in the absence

of a valid sanction the trial of the appellant in the first

instance was by a Magistrate who had no jurisdiction to try

him.”

11.The above line of reasoning was followed by this Court in

State of Goa vs. Babu Thomas (2005) 8 SCC 130 , where this

Court while dealing with a case under Section 19 of the Prevention

of Corruption Act, 1988 held that absence of a valid sanction under

Section 19(1) went to the very root of the prosecution case having

regard to the fact that the said provision prohibits any Court from

taking cognizance of any offence punishable under Sections 7, 10,

13 and 15 against the public servant, except with the previous

sanction granted by the competent authority in terms of clauses

(a), (b) and (c) to Section 19(1). This Court was in that case

dealing with a sanction order issued by an authority who was not

competent to do so as is also the position in the case at hand. The

15

Page 16 second sanction order issued for prosecution of the accused in that

case was also held to be incompetent apart from the fact that the

same purported to be retrospective in its operation. This Court

noted that on 29

th

March, 1995 when cognizance was taken by the

Special Judge, there was no order sanctioning prosecution with the

result that the Court was incompetent to take cognizance and that

the error was so fundamental that it invalidated the proceedings

conducted by the Court. The Court accordingly upheld the order

passed by the High Court but reserved liberty to the competent

authority to issue fresh orders having regard to the serious

allegation made against the accused.

12.The legal position was reiterated once more by this Court in

State of Karnataka vs. C. Nagarajaswamy (2005) 8 SCC 370 ,

where this Court summed up the law in the following words:

“In view of the aforementioned authoritative

pronouncements, it is not possible to agree with the decision

of the High Court that the trial court was bound to record

either a judgment of conviction or acquittal, even after

holding that the sanction was not valid. We have noticed

hereinbefore that even if a judgment of conviction or

acquittal was recorded, the same would not make any

distinction for the purpose of invoking the provisions of

Section 300 of the Code as, even then, it would be held to

have been rendered illegally and without jurisdiction.”

16

Page 17 13.What is important is that, not only was the grant of a valid

sanction held to be essential for taking cognizance by the Court,

but the question about the validity of any such order, according to

this Court, could be raised at the stage of final arguments after the

trial or even at the appellate stage. This Court observed:

“Ordinarily, the question as to whether a proper sanction

has been accorded for prosecution of the accused persons or

not is a matter which should be dealt with at the stage of

taking cognizance. But in a case of this nature where a

question is raised as to whether the authority granting the

sanction was competent therefore or not, at the stage of

final arguments after trial, the same may have to be

considered having regard to the terms and conditions of

service of the accused for the purpose of determination as

to who could remove him from service.

Grant of proper sanction by a competent authority is a sine

qua non for taking cognizance of the offence. It is desirable

that the question as regard sanction may be determined at

an early stage.

But, even if a cognizance of the offence is taken erroneously

and the same comes to the court's notice at a later stage a

finding to that effect is permissible. Even such a plea can be

taken for the first time before an appellate court.”

14.In B. Saha & Ors. vs. M.S. Kochar (1979) 4 SCC 177 , this

Court was dealing with the need for a sanction under Section 197

of the Cr.P.C. and the stage at which the question regarding its

17

Page 18 validity could be raised. This Court held that the question of validity

of an order of sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. could be raised

and considered at any stage of proceedings. Reference may also be

made to the decision of this Court in K. Kalimuthu vs. State by

DSP (2005) 4 SCC 512 where Pasayat, J., speaking for the Court,

held that the question touching the need for a valid sanction under

Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. need not be raised as soon as the

complaint is lodged but can be agitated at any stage of the

proceedings. The following observation in this connection is

apposite:

“The question relating to the need of sanction under Section

197 of the Code is not necessarily be considered as soon as

the complaint is lodged and on the allegations contained

therein. This question may arise at any stage of the

proceeding. The question whether sanction is necessary or

not may have to be determined from stage to stage.

Further, in cases where offences under the Act are

concerned the effect of Section 19, dealing with question of

prejudice has also to be noted.”

15.The legal position regarding the importance of sanction under

Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption is thus much too clear

to admit equivocation. The statute forbids taking of cognizance by

the Court against a public servant except with the previous

18

Page 19 sanction of an authority competent to grant such sanction in terms

of clauses (a), (b) and (c) to Section 19(1). The question regarding

validity of such sanction can be raised at any stage of the

proceedings. The competence of the court trying the accused so

much depends upon the existence of a valid sanction. In case the

sanction is found to be invalid the court can discharge the accused

relegating the parties to a stage where the competent authority

may grant a fresh sanction for prosecution in accordance with law.

If the trial Court proceeds, despite the invalidity attached to the

sanction order, the same shall be deemed to be non-est in the eyes

of law and shall not forbid a second trial for the same offences,

upon grant of a valid sanction for such prosecution.

16.Having said that there are two aspects which we must

immediately advert to. The first relates to the effect of sub-section

(3) to Section 19, which starts with a non-obstante clause. Also

relevant to the same aspect would be Section 465 of the Cr.P.C.

which we have extracted earlier. It was argued on behalf of the

State with considerable tenacity worthy of a better cause, that in

terms of Section 19(3), any error, omission or irregularity in the

19

Page 20 order sanctioning prosecution of an accused was of no

consequence so long as there was no failure of justice resulting

from such error, omission or irregularity. It was contended that in

terms of explanation to Section 4, “error includes competence of

the authority to grant sanction”. The argument is on the face of it

attractive but does not, in our opinion, stand closer scrutiny. A

careful reading of sub-section (3) to Section 19 would show that

the same interdicts reversal or alteration of any finding, sentence

or order passed by a Special Judge, on the ground that the

sanction order suffers from an error, omission or irregularity,

unless of course the court before whom such finding, sentence or

order is challenged in appeal or revision is of the opinion that a

failure of justice has occurred by reason of such error, omission or

irregularity. Sub-section (3), in other words, simply forbids

interference with an order passed by Special Judge in appeal,

confirmation or revisional proceedings on the ground that the

sanction is bad save and except, in cases where the appellate or

revisional court finds that failure of justice has occurred by such

invalidity. What is noteworthy is that sub-section(3) has no

20

Page 21 application to proceedings before the Special Judge, who is free to

pass an order discharging the accused, if he is of the opinion that a

valid order sanctioning prosecution of the accused had not been

produced as required under Section 19(1). Sub-section (3), in our

opinion, postulates a prohibition against a higher court reversing

an order passed by the Special Judge on the ground of any defect,

omission or irregularity in the order of sanction. It does not forbid

a Special Judge from passing an order at whatever stage of the

proceedings holding that the prosecution is not maintainable for

want of a valid order sanctioning the same. The language

employed in sub-section (3) is, in our opinion, clear and

unambiguous. This is, in our opinion, sufficiently evident even

from the language employed in sub-section (4) according to which

the appellate or the revisional Court shall, while examining whether

the error, omission or irregularity in the sanction had occasioned in

any failure of justice, have regard to the fact whether the objection

could and should have been raised at an early stage. Suffice it to

say, that a conjoint reading of sub-sections 19(3) and (4) leaves no

manner of doubt that the said provisions envisage a challenge to

21

Page 22 the validity of the order of sanction or the validity of the

proceedings including finding, sentence or order passed by the

Special Judge in appeal or revision before a higher Court and not

before the Special Judge trying the accused. The rationale

underlying the provision obviously is that if the trial has proceeded

to conclusion and resulted in a finding or sentence, the same

should not be lightly interfered with by the appellate or the

revisional court simply because there was some omission, error or

irregularity in the order sanctioning prosecution under Section

19(1). Failure of justice is, what the appellate or revisional Court

would in such cases look for. And while examining whether any

such failure had indeed taken place, the Court concerned would

also keep in mind whether the objection touching the error,

omission or irregularity in the sanction could or should have been

raised at an earlier stage of the proceedings meaning thereby

whether the same could and should have been raised at the trial

stage instead of being urged in appeal or revision.

17.In the case at hand, the Special Court not only entertained

the contention urged on behalf of the accused about the invalidity

22

Page 23 of the order of sanction but found that the authority issuing the

said order was incompetent to grant sanction. The trial Court held

that the authority who had issued the sanction was not competent

to do so, a fact which has not been disputed before the High Court

or before us. The only error which the trial Court, in our opinion,

committed was that, having held the sanction to be invalid, it

should have discharged the accused rather than recording an order

of acquittal on the merit of the case. As observed by this Court in

Baij Nath Prasad Tripathi’s case (supra), the absence of a

sanction order implied that the court was not competent to take

cognizance or try the accused. Resultantly, the trial by an

incompetent Court was bound to be invalid and non-est in law.

18.To the same effect is the decision of this Court in

Mohammad Safi vs. The State of West Bengal (AIR 1966 SC

69). This Court observed:

“As regards the second contention of Mr. Mukherjee it is

necessary to point out that a criminal court is precluded

from determining the case before it in which a charge has

been framed otherwise than by making an order of acquittal

or conviction only where the charge was framed by a court

competent to frame it and by a court competent to try the

case and make a valid order of acquittal or conviction. No

23

Page 24 doubt, here the charge was framed by Mr. Ganguly but on

his own view he was not competent to take cognizance of

the offence and, therefore, incompetent to frame a charge.

For this reason the mere fact that a charge had been framed

in this case does not help the appellant.

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

12. In addition to the competent of the court, s. 403 of the

Code speaks of there having been a trial and the trial having

ended in an acquittal. From what we have said above, it will

be clear that the fact that all the witnesses for the

prosecution as well as for the defence had been examined

before Mr. Ganguly and the further fact that the appellant

was also examined under s. 342 cannot in law be deemed to

be a trial at all. It would be only repetition to say that for

proceedings to amount to a trial they must be held before a

court which is in fact competent to hold them and which is

not of opinion that it has no jurisdiction to hold them. A

fortiori it would also follow that the ultimate order made by

it by whatever name it is characterised cannot in law

operate as an acquittal. In the Privy Council case it was

interpreted by Sir John Beaumont who delivered the opinion

of the Board to be an order of discharge. It is unnecessary

for us to say whether such an order amounts to an order of

discharge in the absence of any express provision governing

the matter in the Code or it does not amount to an order of

discharge. It is sufficient to say that it does not amount to

an order of acquittal as contemplated by s. 403(1) and since

the proceedings before the Special Judge ended with that

order it would be enough to look upon it merely as an order

putting a stop to the proceedings. For these reasons we hold

that the trial and eventual conviction of the appellant by Mr.

Bhattacharjee were valid in law and dismiss the appeal.”

19.In Babu Thomas (supra) also this Court after holding the

order of sanction to be invalid, relegated the parties to a position,

where the competent authority could issue a proper order

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Page 25 sanctioning prosecution, having regard to the nature of the

allegations made against accused in that case.

20.The High Court has not, in our opinion, correctly appreciated

the legal position regarding the need for sanction or the effect of

its invalidity. It has simply glossed over the subject, by holding that

the question should have been raised at an earlier stage. The High

Court did not, it appears, realise that the issue was not being

raised before it for the first time but had been successfully urged

before the trial Court.

21.The next question then is whether we should, while allowing

this appeal, set aside the order passed by the High Court and

permit the launch of a fresh prosecution against the appellant, at

this distant point of time. The incident in question occurred on 24

th

March, 1998. The appellant was, at that point of time, around 38

years old. The appellant is today a senior citizen. Putting the clock

back at this stage when the prosecution witnesses themselves may

not be available, will in our opinion, serve no purpose. That apart,

the trial Court had, even upon appreciation of the evidence,

although it was not required to do so, given its finding on the

25

Page 26 validity of the sanction, and had held that the prosecution case was

doubtful, rejecting the prosecution story. It will, therefore, serve no

purpose to resume the proceedings over and again. We do not, at

any rate, see any compelling reason for directing a fresh trial at

this distant point of time in a case of this nature involving a bribe

of Rs.500/-, for which the appellant has already suffered the

ignominy of a trial, conviction and a jail term no matter for a short

while. We, accordingly, allow this appeal and set aside the order

passed by the High Court.

………………………………… .…..…J.

(T.S. THAKUR)

………………………………… .…..…J.

(AMITAVA ROY)

New Delhi

July 24, 2015

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Page 27 ITEM NO.1G-For Judgment COURT NO.2 SECTION IIB

S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Criminal Appeal No(s). 1867/2012

NANJAPPA Appellant(s)

VERSUS

STATE OF KARNATAKA Respondent(s)

Date : 24/07/2015 This appeal was called on for pronouncement of

JUDGMENT today.

For Appellant(s)

Mr. S. N. Bhat,Adv.

For Respondent(s)

Mr. V. N. Raghupathy,Adv.

Hon'ble Mr. Justice T.S. Thakur pronounced the judgment of

the Bench comprising His Lordship and Hon'ble Mr. Justice

Amitava Roy.

The appeal is allowed in terms of the Signed Reportable

Judgment.

(VINOD KR.JHA) (VEENA KHERA)

COURT MASTER COURT MASTER

(Signed Reportable judgment is placed on the file)

27