http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 10

PETITIONER:

NARCOTICS CONTROL BUREAU

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

KRISHAN LAL AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT29/01/1991

BENCH:

PANDIAN, S.R. (J)

BENCH:

PANDIAN, S.R. (J)

REDDY, K. JAYACHANDRA (J)

CITATION:

1991 AIR 558 1991 SCR (1) 139

1991 SCC (1) 705 JT 1991 (1) 258

1991 SCALE (1)97

ACT:

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act,

1985:Sections 36 and 37(2)-Special Courts-Powers to grant

bail-Restrictions- Whether to be treated as fetters on High

Court to grant bail under s. 439, Cr. P.C.

Code of Criminal Procedure 1973: Section 439-Bail-High

Court's power-Whether restricted by s. 37(2) of the

Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985.

HEADNOTE:

The respondents in the appeals who were arrested for

offences under various sections of the narcotic Drugs and

Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, were refused bail, and

were remanded to judicial custody. On the basis of the

report the Magistrate took cognizance, and remanded them to

judicial custody.

The respondents filed writ petition and criminal

miscellaneous petition before the High Court seeking bail

under s. 167(2), Criminal Procedure Code on the grounds of

belated submission of the chargesheet, and on account of

illness. The matter was referred to a Division Bench held

that the limitations placed on the Special Court under s. 37

(2) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act

could not be read as fetters on the High Court in exercise

of its power under s. 439, Cr.P.C. to grant bail.

Aggreieved, the Narcotics Control Bureau appealed to

this Court, and contended that the High Court had no

untremelled powers in the matter of granting bail, as the

provisions of s. 37 of the NDPS Act override those of s.

439, Cr. P.C.

On the question: whether the limitation placed on the

Special Court under s. 37(2) of the NDPS Act is to be

treated as fetters on the powers of the High Court also in

granting bail under s. 439, Cr. P.C.

Disposing of the appeals, this Court,

140

HELD: 1. The powers of the High Court to grant bail

under s. 439, Cr. p.C. are subject to the limitations

contained in the amended s.37 of the Narcotic Drugs and

Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, and the restrictions

placed on the powers of the Court under the said section are

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 10

applicable to the High Court also in the matter of granting

bail. [151E]

2. When there is a special enactment in force relating

to the manner of investigation, enquiry or otherwise dealing

with offences, the other powers under the Code of Criminal

Procedure should be subject to such special enactment. In

interpreting the scope of such a statute the dominant

purpose underlying the statute has to be borne in mind.

[145C]

3.1 The Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances

Act, 1985 is a special enactment, enacted with a view to

make stringent provisions for the control and regulation of

operations relating to narcotic drugs and psychotropic

substances. That being the underlying object and

particularly when the provisions of s.37 of the NDPS Act are

in negative terms limiting the scope of the applicability

of the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code regarding

bail, it cannot be said that the High Court's power to grant

bail under s. 439, cr. P.C. are not subject to the

limitation mentioned under s. 37 of the NDPS Act. [144E-G]

3.2 Section 37 of the NDPS Act starts with a non-

obstinate clause stating that notwithstanding anything

contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 no person

accused of an offence prescribed therein shall be released on

bail unless the conditions contained therein were

satisfied/[144E; 145F]

3.3 The non-obstante clause with which s. 37 of the

NDPS Act starts should be given its due meaning and clearly

it is intended to restrict the powers to grant bail [144G]

3.4 In case of inconsistency between s. 439, Cr. P.C.

and S.37 of the NDPS Act, s. 37 prevails.

3.5 Consequently the power to grant bail under any of

the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure should

necessarily be subject to the conditions mentioned in s. 37

of the NDPS Act. [145F,G]

Lt. Col. Prithi Pal Singh Bedi etc. v. Union of India &

Others, [1983] 1 SCR 393 and Balchand Jain v. State of

Madhya Pradesh, [1977] 2 SCR page 52, relied on.

141

Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai Memon and Others v. State of

Gujarat, [1988] 2 SCC 271, referred to.

4. The two accused-respondents being on bail for a

long time under the orders of the High Court and the

Narcotics Control Bureau not passing the cancellation of

bail, the matter need not be remitted to the High Court, and

the respondents would continue to be on bail. [151F]

JUDGMENT:

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal Nos.

810-811 of 1989.

From the Judgement and Order dated 22.9.1989 of the

Delhi High Court in Crl. W.P. No. 622 of 1988 and Crl. Misc.

Main Petition No. 1132 of 1988.

J.S. Arora, Sudhansu S. Das, Satish Agrawal and N.P.

Kaushik for the Appellant.

V.C. Mahajan, A.K. Ganguli Ashok Bhan, A. Subhashini,

P.P.. Tripathi and S.K. Sabharwal for the Respondents.

The Judgement of the Court was delivered by

K. JAYACHANDRA REDDY, J. The High Court of Delhi by a

common order in two petitions filed under The Narcotic Drugs

& Psychtropic Substances Act, 1985 (`NDPS Act' for short)

held that the restrictions placed on the powers of the Court

to grant bail in certain offences under the amended Section

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 10

37 of the NDPS Act are not applicable to the High Court.

Aggrieved by the said order, the Narcotic Control Bureau has

filed these two appeals.

The peritioners before the High Court in two different

cases were arrested for offences under various Sections of

the NDPS Act. They were refused bail and remanded to

judicial custody. On the basis of the report the Magistrate

concerned took cognizance and remanded them to judicial

custody. The petitioners filed a writ petition as well as a

criminal miscellaneous petition seeking bail firstly on the

ground that they are entitled to be released on bail as

required under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal

Procedure as the charge-sheet was filed at a belated stage

and secondly on the ground of illness. A learned Single

Judge referred this matter to a Division Bench and the

Division Bench by the impugned order held that the

limitations placed on the Special Court under Section 37(2)

of the NDPS Act cannot be read as

142

fetters on the High Court in exercise of powers under

Section 439 Cr. P.C. for granting bail. The only limited

question to be decided in these appeals is whether the view

taken by the High Court is right or wrong and we may also

mention that leave was granted only to this limited extent.

The learned counsel appearing for,the appellants

submitted that the High Court has misconstrued the

provisions of Section 36-A and 37 of the NDPS Act and that

latter Section as amended starts with the non-obstante

clause limiting the scope of provisions of the Cr.P.C. in

the matter of granting bail and as such the High Court has

no untremelled powers to grant bail inasmuch as the

provisions of the amended Section 37 of the NDPS Act

override the provisions of Section 439 Cr. P.C.

We may at this stage note the relevant provisions of

NDPS Act. The preamble to the NDPS Act shows that the

object of the Act is to consolidate and amend the law

relating to narcotic drugs and to make stringent provisions

for the control and regulation of operations relating to

narcotic drugs and psychotrophic substances etc. Sections

15 to 35 deal with various offences and penalties. Section

36 provides for constitution of Special Courts and empower

the Government to constitute Special Courts and a person

shall not be qualified for appointment as a Judge of the

Special Court unless he is immediately before such

appointment, a Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions

Judge. Section 36-A enumerates the offences triable by

Special Courts and also deals with the procedure regarding

the detention of the accused when produced before a

Magistrate. Sub-section (b) of Section 36-A lays down that

if the Magistrate to whom an accused is forwarded under

Section 167 Cr. P.C., considers that the detention of such

person for fifteen days is unnecessary he shall forward him

to the Special Court having jurisdiction who shall take

cognizance and proceed with the trial. Sub-section (3) of

Section 36-A reads thus:

"Nothing contained in this section shall be

deemed to affect the special powers of the High

Court regarding bail under Section 439 of the Code

of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), and the

High Court may exercise such powers including the

power under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of that

section as if the reference to "magistrate" in that

section included also a reference to a "Special

Court" constituted under Section 36."

143

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 10

Now let us note Section 37 as amended in the year 1989 and

the same is in the following terms:

"37. Offences to be cognizable and non-bailable-

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code

of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),-

(a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be

cognizable;

(b) no person accused of an offence punishable for a

term of imprisonment of five years or more under this Act

shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless-

(i) The Public Prosecutor has been given an

opportunity to oppose the application for such release, and

(ii) where the Public Prosecutor oppose the

application, the court is satisfied that there are

reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of

such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence

while on bail.

(2) The ,limitations on granting of bail specified in

clause (b) of sub-section (1) are in addition to the

limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of

1974), or any other law for the law being in force on

granting of bail."

Now it becomes necessary to extract Section 439 Cr. P..C.

which reads as under:

"439. Special powers of the High Court or Court of

Section regarding bail--(1) A High Court or Court

of Session may direct--

(a) that any person accused of an offence and in

custody be released on bail, and if the offence is

of the nature specified in sub-section (3) of

Section 437 , may impose any condition which it

considers necessary for the purposes mentioned in

that sub-section;

(b) that any condition imposed by a magistrate

when releasing any person on bail be set aside or

modified;

Provided that the High Court or the Court of

Session shall,

144

before granting bail to a person who is accused on

anoffence which is triable exclusively by the Court

of Session or which, though not so triable, is

punishable with imprisonment for life, give notice

of the application for bail to the Public

prosecutor unless it is, for reason to be recorded

in writing , of opinion that it is not practicable

to give such notice.

(2) A High Court or Court of Session may direct

that any person who has been released on bail under

this Chapter be arrested and commit him to

custody."

The High Court having taken into consideration sub-

section (3) of Section 36-A took the view that the

limitations placed on the Special Courts cannot be read as

fetters in its exercise of the powers under Section 439 Cr.

P.C. In this context, the Division Bench referred to to sub-

sections(8) and (9) of Section 20 of the Terrorist and

Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 ('TADA Act' for

short) which are similar to Section 37 of NDPS Act and also

relied on a judgment of this Court in Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai

Memon and Others v. State of Gujarat, [1988] 2 SCC 271 a

case which arose under the TADA Act. We shall refer to this

judgment at a later stage after analysing the scope and

effect of Section 37 of NDPS Act.

Section 37 as amended starts with a non-obstante clause

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 10

stating that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code

of Criminal Procedure, 1973 no person accused of an offence

prescribed therein shall be released on bail unless the

conditions contained therein were satisfied. The nDPS Act

is a special enactment as already noted it was enacted with

a view to make stringent provision for the control and

regulation of operations relating to narcotic drugs and

psychotropic substances. The being the underlying object

and particularly when the provisions of Section 37 of NDPS

Act are in negative terms limiting the scope of the

applicability of the provisions of Cr. P.C. regarding bail,

in our view, it cannot be held that the High Court's powers

to grant bail under Section 439 Cr. P.C. are not subject to

the limitation mentioned under Section 37 of NDPS Act. The

non-obstante clause with which the Section starts should be

given its due meaning and clearly it is intended to restrict

the powers to grant bail. In case of inconistency between

Section 439 Cr. P.C. and Section 37 of the NDPS Act, Section

37 prevails. In this context Section 4 Cr. P.C. may be

noted which read thus:

145

"(4) Trial of offences under the Indian Penal Code

and other laws--(1) All offences under the Indian

Penal Code (45 of 1860) shall be investigated,

inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with

according to the provision hereinafter contained.

(2) All offences under any other law shall be

investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise

dealt with according to the same provision, but

subject to any enactment for the time being in

force regulating the manner or place of

investigating, inquiring into, trying or otherwise

dealing with such offences."

It can thus be seen that when there is a special enactment

in force relating to the manner of investigation, enquiry

or otherwise dealing with such offences, the other powers

under Cr. P.C. should be subject to such special enactment.

In interpretating the scope of such a statute the dominant

purpose underlying the statute has to be borne in mind. In

Lt. Col. Prithi Pal Singh Bedi etc. v. Union of India &

Others, [1983] 1 SCR 393 regarding the mode of

interpretation the Supreme Court observed as follows:

"The dominant purpose in construing a statute is

to ascertain the intention of Parliament. One of

the well recognised canons of construction is that

the legislature speaks its mind by use of correct

expression and unless there is any ambiguity in the

language of the provision, the Court should adopt

literal construction if it does not lead to an

absurdity."

As already noted, Section 37 of the nDPS Act starts with a

non-obstante clause stating that notwithstanding anything

contained in the Conde of Criminal Procedure, 1973 no

personaccused of an offence prescribed therein shall be

released on bail unless the conditions contained therein are

satisfied. Consequently the power to grant bail under any

of the provisions of Cr. P.C. should necessarily be subject

to the conditions mentioned in Section 37 of the NDPS Act.

We shall now refer to some of the decisions of the

Court dealing with the analogous provision in other special

enactments. Rule 184 of the Defence and Internal Security

of India Rules, 1971 which is analogous to Sec. 37 of the

NDPS Act runs as follows:

146

"Rule 184. Notwithstanding anything contained in

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 10

the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (V of 1898) no

person accused or convicted of a contravention of

these Rules or orders made thereunder shall, if in

custody, be released on bail or his own bond

unless--

(a) the prosecution has been given an opportunity

to opposed the application for such release, and

(b) where the prosecution opposes the application

and the contravention is of any such provision of

these Rules or orders made thereunder as the Central

Government or the State Government may be notified

order specify in this behalf, the Court is

satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for

believing that he is not guilty of such

contravention."

The Rule commences with a non-obstante clause and in its

operative part imposes a ban on release on bail of a person

accused or convicted of a contravention of the Rules. it

imposes fetters on the exercise of the power of granting

bail in certain kinds of cases. In Balchand Jain v. State

of Madhya Pradesh, [1977] 2 SCR 52 a question arose whether

the power to grant anticipatory bail under Section 438 can

stand side by side with Rule 184 of whether former provision

is overridden by the latter. This Court held that Rule 184

does not stand in the way of Court of Session or High Court

granting anticipatory bail on the ground that the two

provision operate at two different stages. Of course, in

the instant case, we are not concerned with Section 438 but

the observation regarding the scope of Rule 184 are relevant

which read thus:

"But even if Rule 184 does not apply in such a

case, the policy behind this Rule would have to be

borne in mind by the Court while exercising its

power to grant 'anticipatory bail' under Section

438. The Rule making authority obviously though

offences arising out of contravention of Rules and

orders made there-under were serious offences as

they might imperil the defence of India or civil

defence or internal security or public safety or

maintenance of public order or hamper maintenance

of supplies and services to the life of the

community and hence it provided in Rule 184 that no

person accused or convicted or contravention of any

Rule or order made under the Rules, shall be-

147

released on bail unless the prosecution is given

an opportunity to oppose the application for such

release and in case the contravention is of a Rule

or order specified in this behalf in a notified

order, there are reasonable grounds for

believing that the person concerned is not guilty

of such contravention. If these are the conditions

provided by the Rule making authority for releasing

on bail a person arrested on an accusation of

having committed contravention of any Rule or order

made under the Rules, it must follow a fortiori

that the same conditions must provide the

guidelines while exercising the power to grant

'anticipatory bail'to a person apprehending arrest

on such accusation, though they would not be

strictly applicable."

(emphasis supplied)

Fazal Ali, J. in his concurring judgment also held thus:

"(4)_that in cases covered by r. 184 of the Rules

the Court exercising power under s. 436 or s. 438

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 10

of the Code has go to comply with the conditions

mentioned in clauses (a) & (b) of r. 184 and only

after the Court has complied with those conditions

that an order under any of these section of the

Code in respect of such offences could be passed."

In Usmanbhai's case a question whether the provisions of

sub-sections (8) and (9) of Section 20 of the TADA Act limit

the scope of Sections 437 and 439, came up for

consideration. The language of sub-sections (8) and (9) of

section 20 is analogous to Section 37 of NDPS Act and they

read thus:

"(8) Notwithstanding anything contained in the

Code, no person accused on an offence punishable

under this Act or any rule made thereunder shall, if

in custody, if in custody, be released on bail or

on his own bond unless--

(a) the Public Prosecutor has been given an

opportunity to oppose the application for such

release, and

(b) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the

application, the court is satisfied that there are

reasonable grounds for believing that he is not

guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to

commit any offence while on bail.

(9) The limitation on granting of bail specified

in sub-section (8) are in addition to the

limitations under the Code or any other law for the

time being in force or granting of bail."

It may be noted at this stage that the power of the High

Court or the Sessions Court to grant anticipatory bail has

been completely taken away under Section 20(7) of the TADA

Act. The contention was that the sources of power of a

designated court to grant bail is under Section 437 subject

to some limitations under Section 20(8) and that it does not

in any manner affect the power of the High Court

independently under Section 439 to grant bail. It is also

contended that to take away the power of the High Court

would tantamount to strike at the very foundation of an

independent judiciary free from executive control. After

considering these submissions this Court held that:

"Though there is no express provision excluding

the applicability of Section 439 of the Code

similar to the one contained in Section 20(7) of

the Act in relation to a case involving the arrest

of any person on an accusation of having committed

an offence punishable under the Act or any rule

made thereunder, but that result must, by

necessary implication, follow. it is true that the

source of powerof a Designated Court to grant bail

is no Section 20(8) of the Act as it only places

limitations on such power. This is made explicit

by Section 20(9) which enacts that the limitations

on granting of bail specified in Section 20(8) are

'in addition to the limitations under the Code or

any other law law for the time being in force'.

But it does not necessarily follow that the power

of a Designated Court to grant bail is relatable to

Section 439 of the Code. it cannot be doubted that

a Designated Court is 'a court other than the High

Court or the Court of Session' within the meaning

of of section 437 of the Code. The exercise of the

power to grant bail by a Designated Court is not

only subject to the limitations contained therein,

but is also subject to the limitations placed by

Section 20(8) of the Act."

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 10

(emphasis supplied)

Having held so, the learned Judge proceeded to consider the

controversy as to the power of the High Court to grant bail

under Section 439 Cr. P.C. Act excluding the jurisdiction

of the High Court entertain an

149

appeal or revision against the judgment of the designated

court, it is held that the High Court had no jurisdiction to

entertain an application for bail under Section 439 or

Section 482 of the Code of Criminal procedure. however,

regarding the construction of non-obstante clause in Sec.

20(8) of the Act, this Court held as under:

"The controversy as to the power of the High Court

to grant bail under Section 439 of the Code must

also turn on the construction of Section 20(8) of

the Act. It commences with a non-obstante clause

and in its operative part by the use of negative

language prohibits the enlargement on bail of any

person accused of commission of an offence under

the Act, if in custody, unless two conditions are

satisfied. The first condition is that the

prosecution must be given an opportunity to oppose

the application for such release and the second

condition is that where there is such opposition,

the court must be satisfied that there are

reasonable grounds for believing that he is not

guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to

commit any offence while on bail. If either of

these two conditions is not satisfied, the ban

operates and the person under detention cannot be

released on bail. it is quite obvious that the

source of power of a Designated Court to grant bail

is not section 20(8) of the Act but it only places

limitations on such powers. This is implicit by

Section 20(9) which in terms provides that the

limitations or granting of bail specified in sub-

section (8) are in addition to the limitations

under the Code or any other law for the time being

in force on granting of bail. it therefore follows

that the power derived by a Designated Court to

grant bail to a person accused of an offence under

the Act, if in custody, is derived from the Code

and not from section 20(8) of the Act.

It can thus be seen that even in Usmanbhai's case also there

is no observation supporting the view taken by the High

Court in the impugned judgment. As a matter of fact in

Usmanbhai's case Sen, J. who spoke for the Bench, after

referring to the ratio laid down in Balchand Jain's case

observed thus:

"The view expressed in Balchand Jain case is not

applicable at all for more than one reason. There

was nothing in the defence and Internal Security of

India Act or the Rules framed there-under which

would exclude the jurisdiction

150

and power of the High Court altogether. On the

contrary, Section 12(2) of that Act expressly

vested in the High Court the appellate jurisdiction

in certain specified cases. In view of the

explicit bar in Section 19(2), there is exclusion

of the jurisdiction of the High Court. It

interdicts that no appeal or revision shall lie to

any court, including the High Court, against any

judgment, sentence or order, not being an

interlocutory order, of a Designated Court. The

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 10

Act by Section 16(1) confers the right of appeal

both on facts as well as on law to the Supreme

Court. Further while it is true that Chapter

XXXIII of the Code is still preserved as otherwise

the Designated Court would have no power to grant

bail, still the source of power is not Section 439

of the Code but Section 437 being a court other

than the High Court or the Court of Session. Any

other view would lead to an anomalous situation.

If it were to be held that the power of a

Designated Court to grant bail was relatable to

Section 439 it would imply that not only the High

Court but also the High Court of Session would be

entitled to grant bail on such terms as they deem

fit. The power to grant bail under Section 439 is

unfettered by any conditions and limitations like

Section 437. It would run counter to the express

prohibition contained in Section 20(8) of the Act

which enjoins that notwithstanding anything in the

code, no person accused of an offence punishable

under the Act or any rule made thereunder shall,

if in custody, be released on bail unless the

conditions set forth in clauses (a) and (b) are

satisfied."

(emphasis supplied)

The High Court in the impugned judgment, however,

referred to Usmanbhai's case and held that the limitations

placed under Section 37 of the NDPS Act are exactly similar

to the ones in sub-section (8) and (9) of Section 20 of the

TADA Act and they are applicable only to special courts.

But we may point out that in paragraph 16 in Usmanbhai's

case it is observed:

"As a murder of construction, we must accept the

contention advanced by learned counsel appearing

for the State Government that the Act being a

special Act must prevail in respect of the

jurisdiction and power of the High Court to

entertain an application for bail under section 439

of the Code or by recourse to its inherent powers

under section 482."

151

However, as already mentioned, the learned Judges held that

the view expressed in Balchand Jain's case is not applicable

to the facts in Usmanbhai's case and the same is clear from

the observations made in Usmanbhai's case which read as

under:

"Lastly both the decision in Balchand Jain and that

in Ishwar Chand turn on the scheme of the Defence

and Internal Security of India Act, 1971. They

proceed on the well recognised principle that an

outer of jurisdiction of the ordinary courts is not

to be readily inferred, except by express provision

or by necessary implication. It all depends on the

scheme of the particular Act as to whether the

power of the High Court and the Court of Session to

grant bail under Sections 438 and 439 exists. We

must accordingly uphold the view expressed by the

High Court that it had no jurisdiction to entertain

an application for bail under Section 439 or under

Section 482 of the Code"

From the above discussion it emerges that in Usmanbhai's

case the Supreme Court did not express anything contrary to

what has been observed in Balchand Jain's case and on the

other hand at more than one place observed that such

enactments should prevail over the general enactment and the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 10

non-obstante clause must be powers of the High Court to

grant bail under Section 439 are subject to the limitations

contained in the amended Section 37 of the NDPS Act and the

restrictions placed on the powers of the Court under the

said section are applicable to the High Court also in the

matter of granting bail. The point of law is ordered

accordingly.

The two accused respondents in these two appeals have

been on bail pursuant to the order of the High Court, for a

long time. The learned counsel appearing for the Narcotics

Control Bureau, the appellant herein, is also not pressing

cancellation of the bail. Therefore, we are not remitting

the matters of the High Court for fresh consideration.

Pending the proceedings, they would continue to be on bail.

Subject to the above clarification of law, the appeals are

disposed of.

R.P. Appeals disposed of.

152