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MAC.APP. 888/2013 Page 1 of 44

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

% Reserved on : 17

th

January 2026

Pronounced on : 17

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April 2026

Uploaded on : 20

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April 2026

+ MAC.APP. 888/2013

NATIONAL INSUANCE CO. LTD. .....Appellant

Through: Mr. Pankaj Seth, Advocate for

appellant along with Ms. Shruti

Jain, Advocate.

versus

SHEHNAJ BEGUM & ORS .....Respondents

Through: Mr. S.N. Parashar, Advocate with

Mr. Ritik Singh, Advocate for

respondent nos. 1 to 3.

CORAM:

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ANISH DAYAL

JUDGMENT

ANISH DAYAL, J.

1. This appeal has been filed challenging the award dated 31

st

May

2013 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal [“Tribunal”], Tis

Hazari Courts, Central, in Claim Petition No. 557/2012 [“impugned

award”], whereby compensation of Rs. 18,01,864/- along with 9% interest

was awarded in a fatal accident case.

2. The Insurance Company asserts that the accident was not caused

due to the sole negligence of the respondent no.4/ driver of the offending

vehicle, and further submits that neither the eyewitnesses nor the

Investigation Officer (“IO”) were examined.

3. Moreover, the Tribunal erred in applying minimum wages in

absence of proof of occupation and income, and the claimants were not

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MAC.APP. 888/2013 Page 2 of 44

entitled to loss of dependency. There were other issues relating to the

computation of income on account of future prospects, deduction towards

personal expenses, loss of consortium, loss of love and affection, and

funeral expenses, and the award of penal interest.

Incident

4. On 7

th

October 2012, deceased persons were traveling on a

Rickshaw and, near Pratap Nagar Metro Pillar, Old Rohtak Road, were hit

by a truck bearing no. DL 1GB 6352 [‘offending vehicle’], driven by

Mohd. Ashraf/respondent no. 4. and owned by Mr. Chandan Kumar/

respondent no. 5, and insured by appellant/Insurance Company.

5. Sanjar Alam [injured] passed away due to the injuries and is

survived by his widow Shehnaj Begum, Manjilla Begum (sister), Shahista

Begum (sister), all of whom are the claimants. Sanjar Alam was brought

dead to the hospital; An FIR was lodged and a post-mortem was

conducted. Since, there were two deceased in the accident, the claim

petitions were disposed of by a common order.

Impugned Award

6. On the issue of negligence, Tribunal noticed the testimony of PW-

1 and PW-2, who though were not eyewitnesses, deposed essentially on

the nature of the accident.

7. The driver and the owner denied negligence on part of the driver

but did not put any suggestion to the claimant’s witnesses nor lead any

evidence. An FIR had been registered. As per the MLC, unknown

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MAC.APP. 888/2013 Page 3 of 44

deceased had been brought to the hospital with injuries arising out of the

motor vehicle accident. As per the post-mortem report, Sanjar Alam, died

due to ‘ante-mortem injuries caused by blunt force impact’. As per the

Mechanical Inspection Report, the offending vehicle had fresh damaged

parts on its front. The Tribunal, therefore, held that the accident was

caused due to the negligence of the driver of the offending vehicle.

8. As regards the compensation, deceased was 22 years of age,

working as a rickshaw puller, contributing about Rs. 9,000/- per month,

and was survived by his widow and two minor sisters. His wife was eight

months pregnant at the time of the filing of the petition; however, the child

died after five days after birth.

9. Minimum wages of Rs. 7,254/-, as applicable to an ‘unskilled’

worker, were taken. Future prospects of 50% were added. Since there was

an issue relating to dependency of minor sisters, and there was no proof

regarding who was supporting them, loss of dependency was not granted

to them. 1/3

rd

was deducted as personal expenses of the deceased, there

being only a wife [respondent no.1]. At the time of the accident, relevant

multiplier was taken as ‘18’. The compensation awarded was Rs.

18,01,864/- along with Rs. 10,000/- towards loss of estate, Rs. 1,00,000/-

towards loss of consortium, Rs. 1,00,000/- towards love and affection, and

Rs. 25,000/- towards funeral expenses.

10. For ease of reference, a tabulation of the said compensation is as

under:

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MAC.APP. 888/2013 Page 4 of 44

S.No Heads Amount Awarded By Tribunal

1. Income of deceased Rs.7,254/-

[‘unskilled’]

2. Multiplier 18

3. Loss of Dependency Rs.15,66,864/-

4. Loss of Love and Affection Rs.1,00,000 /-

5. Loss of Consortium Rs.1,00,000 /-

6. Loss of Estate Rs.10,000 /-

7. Funeral Expenses Rs.25,000 /-

Total Compensation Rs.18,01,864/-

Interest 9%

Submissions made by parties

11. Appellant/Insurance company raised the issue that the rickshaw

was hit from the opposite side in the middle of the road, therefore, it could

not be concluded that it was the negligence of respondent no.4. It was

stated that no eyewitnesses were examined, nor was the IO examined, and

therefore such a conclusion could not have been drawn.

12. Reliance was placed on the decision in Oriental Insurance Co.

Ltd. v. Meena Variyal, (2007) 5 SCC 428, to contend that a summary

procedure does not mean that a Tribunal should ignore basic principles of

law in claims for compensation. Further, there was a challenge to the

application of minimum wages, since there was no evidence that the

deceased was gainfully employed.

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MAC.APP. 888/2013 Page 5 of 44

13. On the deduction, towards personal expenses, it was contended

that 50% ought to have been deducted, considering that the

wife/respondent no.1 was the only dependent.

14. Penal interest at 12% was awarded for the default period, for

which reliance was placed on National Insurance Company Ltd. v

Keshav Bahadur and Ors. (2004) 2 SCC 370.

15. Counsel for the respondent, however, stated that as per the

decision in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pushpa Rana 2007 SCC

OnLine Del 1700, since there was no rebuttal and no complaint by the

driver, the reliance on the FIR was wholly legitimate.

16. Mr. Pankaj Seth, counsel for appellant/Insurance Company,

contented that principle of “res ipsa loquitur” ought to be applied and

assessment should be made on the basis of the principle of

‘preponderance of probabilities’, rather than merely relying upon the

principle laid in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pushpa Rana (supra), on

the basis of the FIR and the chargesheet. It was submitted that the

Tribunal had not applied its mind and had only made a cursory assessment

based on the FIR.

Analysis

17. In this regard, it is important to assess the extent to which the

Tribunal is obliged, or ought to be persuaded, by the filing of an FIR and

the filing of a chargesheet pursuant thereto. For the purpose of

determining negligence a Tribunal navigates through some basic

foundational principles to address pleas asserted by the parties on

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MAC.APP. 888/2013 Page 6 of 44

negligence. A more detailed examination of these foundational principles

is being provided here under.

18. At the outset, there is no doubt that negligence has to be proved, as

also stated in Meena Variyal (supra), and the relevant principles are

extracted as under:

“10. Before we proceed to consider the main aspect

arising for decision in this appeal, we would like to

make certain general observations. It may be true

that the Motor Vehicles Act, insofar as it relates to

claims for compensation arising out of accidents, is

a beneficent piece of legislation. It may also be true

that subject to the rules made in that behalf, the

Tribunal may follow a summary procedure in

dealing with a claim. That does not mean that a

Tribunal approached with a claim for compensation

under the Act should ignore all basic principles of

law in determining the claim for compensation.

Ordinarily, a contract of insurance is a contract of

indemnity. When a car belonging to an owner is

insured with the insurance company and it is being

driven by a driver employed by the insured, when it

meets with an accident, the primary liability under

law for payment of compensation is that of the

driver. Once the driver is liable, the owner of the

vehicle becomes vicariously liable for payment of

compensation. It is this vicarious liability of the

owner that is indemnified by the insurance company.

A third party for whose benefit the insurance is

taken, is therefore entitled to show, when he moves

under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, that

the driver was negligent in driving the vehicle

resulting in the accident; that the owner was

vicariously liable and that the insurance company

was bound to indemnify the owner and consequently,

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MAC.APP. 888/2013 Page 7 of 44

satisfy the award made. Therefore, under general

principles, one would expect the driver to be

impleaded before an adjudication is claimed under

Section 166 of the Act as to whether a claimant

before the Tribunal is entitled to compensation for

an accident that has occurred due to alleged

negligence of the driver. Why should not a Tribunal

insist on the driver of the vehicle being impleaded

when a claim is being filed?.

(emphasis added)

Preponderance of Probability

19. However, an accident may have witnesses and, even if it does,

they may not come forward to give evidence. In such cases, the

investigation may also be constrained except for providing a site plan and

a mechanical inspection report. If there is no eyewitness, the only material

which the Tribunal, or in fact the prosecution in the criminal proceedings,

can rely upon is the statement of of any co-passengers who may have

survived or third-party eyewitnesses.

20. However, where nobody has survived in the accident and there is

no passerby to give evidence, there remains only reliance on a statement

made on behalf of the legal heirs of the deceased, which has limited

evidentiary value as far as the assessment of the negligence is concerned.

In such circumstances, the Tribunal is required to assess negligence on the

basis of the surrounding material placed on record, which necessarily

involves an evaluation on the touchstone of probability rather than strict

proof. The principle of preponderance of probabilities has been well

articulated in the following judgments.

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20.1 Bimla Devi v. HRTC (2009) 13 SCC 530:

“11. While dealing with a claim petition in terms

of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, a

Tribunal stricto sensu is not bound by the pleadings of the

parties; its function being to determine the amount of fair

compensation in the event an accident has taken place by

reason of negligence of that driver of a motor vehicle. It

is true that occurrence of an accident having regard to

the provisions contained in Section 166 of the Act is a

sine qua non for entertaining a claim petition but that

would not mean that despite evidence to the effect that

death of the claimant's predecessor had taken place by

reason of an accident caused by a motor vehicle, the

same would be ignored only on the basis of a post

mortem report vis-`-vis the averments made in a claim

petition.

………

15. In a situation of this nature, the Tribunal has rightly

taken a holistic view of the matter. It was necessary to be

borne in mind that strict proof of an accident caused by a

particular bus in a particular manner may not be possible

to be done by the claimants. The claimants were merely

to establish their case on the touchstone of

preponderance of probability. The standard of proof

beyond reasonable doubt could not have been applied.

For the said purpose, the High Court should have taken

into consideration the respective stories set forth by both

the parties.

16. The judgment of the High Court to a great extent is

based on conjectures and surmises. While holding that

the police might have implicated the respondents, no

reason has been assigned in support thereof. No material

brought on record has been referred to for the said

purpose.”

(emphasis added)

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20.2 Dulcina Fernandes v Joaquim Xavier Cruz (2013) 10 SCC

646:

“7. It would hardly need a mention that the plea of

negligence on the part of the first respondent who was

driving the pick-up van as set up by the claimants was

required to be decided by the learned Tribunal on the

touchstone of preponderance of probability and certainly

not on the basis of proof beyond reasonable doubt.”

(emphasis added)

20.3 Mangla Ram v Oriental Insurance (2018) 5 SCC 656:

“24. It will be useful to advert to the dictum in N.K.V.

Bros. (P) Ltd. v. M. Karumai Ammal [N.K.V. Bros. (P)

Ltd. v. M. Karumai Ammal, (1980) 3 SCC 457 : 1980

SCC (Cri) 774] , wherein it was contended by the vehicle

owner that the criminal case in relation to the accident

had ended in acquittal and for which reason the claim

under the Motor Vehicles Act ought to be rejected. This

Court negatived the said argument by observing that the

nature of proof required to establish culpable rashness,

punishable under IPC, is more stringent than negligence

sufficient under the law of tort to create liability. The

observation made in para 3 of the judgment would throw

some light as to what should be the approach of the

Tribunal in motor accident cases. The same reads thus:

(SCC pp. 458-59)

“3. Road accidents are one of the top killers in our

country, specially when truck and bus drivers

operate nocturnally. This proverbial recklessness

often persuades the courts, as has been observed by

us earlier in other cases, to draw an initial

presumption in several cases based on the doctrine

of res ipsa loquitur. Accidents Tribunals must take

special care to see that innocent victims do not

suffer and drivers and owners do not escape liability

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MAC.APP. 888/2013 Page 10 of 44

merely because of some doubt here or some

obscurity there. Save in plain cases, culpability must

be inferred from the circumstances where it is fairly

reasonable. The court should not succumb to

niceties, technicalities and mystic maybes. We are

emphasising this aspect because we are often

distressed by transport operators getting away with

it thanks to judicial laxity, despite the fact that they

do not exercise sufficient disciplinary control over

the drivers in the matter of careful driving. The

heavy economic impact of culpable driving of public

transport must bring owner and driver to their

responsibility to their neighbour. Indeed, the State

must seriously consider no-fault liability by

legislation. A second aspect which pains us is the

inadequacy of the compensation or undue parsimony

practised by tribunals. We must remember that

judicial tribunals are State organs and Article 41 of

the Constitution lays the jurisprudential foundation

for State relief against accidental disablement of

citizens. There is no justification for niggardliness in

compensation. A third factor which is harrowing is

the enormous delay in disposal of accident cases

resulting in compensation, even if awarded, being

postponed by several years. The States must appoint

sufficient number of tribunals and the High Courts

should insist upon quick disposals so that the trauma

and tragedy already sustained may not be magnified

by the injustice of delayed justice. Many States are

unjustly indifferent in this regard.”

………

27. Another reason which weighed with the High Court to

interfere in the first appeal filed by Respondents 2 & 3,

was absence of finding by the Tribunal about the factum

of negligence of the driver of the subject jeep. Factually,

this view is untenable. Our understanding of the analysis

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MAC.APP. 888/2013 Page 11 of 44

done by the Tribunal is to hold that Jeep No. RST 4701

was driven rashly and negligently by Respondent 2 when

it collided with the motorcycle of the appellant leading to

the accident. This can be discerned from the evidence of

witnesses and the contents of the charge-sheet filed by the

police, naming Respondent 2. This Court in a recent

decision in Dulcina Fernandes [Dulcina

Fernandes v. Joaquim Xavier Cruz, (2013) 10 SCC 646 :

(2014) 1 SCC (Civ) 73 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 13] , noted

that the key of negligence on the part of the driver of the

offending vehicle as set up by the claimants was required

to be decided by the Tribunal on the touchstone of

preponderance of probability and certainly not by

standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Suffice it to

observe that the exposition in the judgments already

adverted to by us, filing of charge-sheet against

Respondent 2 prima facie points towards his complicity in

driving the vehicle negligently and rashly. Further, even

when the accused were to be acquitted in the criminal

case, this Court opined that the same may be of no effect

on the assessment of the liability required in respect of

motor accident cases by the Tribunal.”

(emphasis added)

20.4 Mathew Alexander v. Mohd. Shafi, (2023) 13 SCC 510:

“12. In this context, we could refer to the judgments of

this Court in N.K.V. Bros. (P) Ltd. v. M. Karumai Ammal

[N.K.V. Bros. (P) Ltd. v. M. Karumai Ammal, (1980) 3

SCC 457 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 774] , wherein the plea that

the criminal case had ended in acquittal and that,

therefore, the civil suit must follow suit, was rejected. It

was observed that culpable rashness under Section 304-

AIPC is more drastic than negligence under the law of

torts to create liability. Similarly, in Bimla Devi v.

Himachal RTC [Bimla Devi v. Himachal RTC, (2009) 13

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MAC.APP. 888/2013 Page 12 of 44

SCC 530 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 189 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri)

1101] (“Bimla Devi”), it was observed that in a claim

petition filed under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles

Act, 1988, the Tribunal has to determine the amount of

fair compensation to be granted in the event an accident

has taken place by reason of negligence of a driver of a

motor vehicle. A holistic view of the evidence has to be

taken into consideration by the Tribunal and strict proof

of an accident caused by a particular vehicle in a

particular manner need not be established by the

claimants. The claimants have to establish their case on

the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities. The

standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt cannot be

applied while considering the petition seeking

compensation on account of death or injury in a road

traffic accident. To the same effect is the observation

made by this Court in Dulcina Fernandes v. Joaquim

Xavier Cruz [Dulcina Fernandes v. Joaquim Xavier Cruz,

(2013) 10 SCC 646 : (2014) 1 SCC (Civ) 73 : (2014) 1

SCC (Cri) 13] which has referred to the aforesaid

judgment in Bimla Devi [Bimla Devi v. Himachal RTC,

(2009) 13 SCC 530 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 189 : (2010) 1

SCC (Cri) 1101] .

13. In that view of the matter, it is for the appellant herein

to establish negligence on the part of the driver of the

tanker lorry in the petition filed by him seeking

compensation on account of death of his son in the said

accident. Thus, the opinion in the final report would not

have a bearing on the claim petition for the aforesaid

reasons. This is because the appellant herein is seeking

compensation for the death of his son in the accident

which occurred on account of the negligence on the part

of the driver of the tanker lorry, causing the accident on

the said date. It is further observed that in the claim

petitions filed by the dependents, in respect of the other

passengers in the car who died in the accident, they have

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MAC.APP. 888/2013 Page 13 of 44

to similarly establish the negligence in accordance with

law.”

20.5 Geeta Dubey v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. 2024

SCC OnLine SC 3779:

“20. Firstly, it is well settled that in claim cases, in case

the accident is disputed or the involvement of the vehicle

concerned is put in issue, the claimant is only expected to

prove the same on a preponderance of probability and

not beyond reasonable doubt. [See Sajeena Ikhbal v. Mini

Babu George, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2883]. We also

deem it appropriate to extract the following paragraphs

from the judgment of this Court in Bimla Devi v.

Himachal Road Transport Corporation, (2009) 13 SCC

530. Repelling similar contentions raised challenging the

accident and the involvement of the vehicle in question,

this Court held as follows:

“14. Some discrepancies in the evidence of the

claimant's witnesses might have occurred but the

core question before the Tribunal and consequently

before the High Court was as to whether the bus in

question was involved in the accident or not. For the

purpose of determining the said issue, the Court was

required to apply the principle underlying the

burden of proof in terms of the provisions of Section

106 of the Evidence Act, 1872 as to whether a dead

body wrapped in a blanket had been found at the

spot at such an early hour, which was required to be

proved by Respondents 2 and 3.

15. In a situation of this nature, the Tribunal has

rightly taken a holistic view of the matter. It was

necessary to be borne in mind that strict proof of an

accident caused by a particular bus in a particular

manner may not be possible to be done by the

claimants. The claimants were merely to establish

their case on the touchstone of preponderance of

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MAC.APP. 888/2013 Page 14 of 44

probability. The standard of proof beyond

reasonable doubt could not have been applied. For

the said purpose, the High Court should have taken

into consideration the respective stories set forth by

both the parties.

16. The judgment of the High Court to a great extent

is based on conjectures and surmises. While holding

that the police might have implicated the

respondents, no reason has been assigned in support

thereof. No material brought on record has been

referred to for the said purpose.””

(emphasis added)

20.6 ICICI Lombard v Rajani Sahoo (2025) 2 SCC 599:

“9. It is true that the Tribunal had looked into the oral

and documentary evidence including the FIR, final report

and such other documents prepared by the police in

connection with the accident in question. The Tribunal

had also taken note of the fact that based on the final

report, the driver of the offending truck was tried and

found guilty for rash and negligent driving. The High

Court took note of such aspects and found no illegality in

the procedure adopted by the Tribunal and consequently

dismissed the appeal.

10. In the contextual situation it is relevant to refer to a

decision of this Court in Mathew Alexander v. Mohd.

Shafi [Mathew Alexander v. Mohd. Shafi, (2023) 13 SCC

510 : 2023 INSC 621] , this Court held thus : (SCC p.

514, para 12)

………

12. … A holistic view of the evidence has to be taken into

consideration by the Tribunal and strict proof of an

accident caused by a particular vehicle in a particular

manner need not be established by the claimants. The

claimants have to establish their case on the touchstone

of preponderance of probabilities. The standard of proof

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MAC.APP. 888/2013 Page 15 of 44

beyond reasonable doubt cannot be applied while

considering the petition seeking compensation on account

of death or injury in a road traffic accident. To the same

effect is the observation made by this Court in Dulcina

Fernandes v. Joaquim Xavier Cruz [Dulcina

Fernandes v. Joaquim Xavier Cruz, (2013) 10 SCC 646 :

(2014) 1 SCC (Civ) 73 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 13] which

has referred to the aforesaid judgment in Bimla

Devi [Bimla Devi v. Himachal RTC, (2009) 13 SCC 530 :

(2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 189 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1101] .”

11. Thus, there can be no dispute with respect to the

position that the question regarding negligence which is

essential for passing an award in a motor vehicle

accident claim should be considered based on the

evidence available before the Tribunal. If the police

records are available before the Tribunal, taking note of

the purpose of the Act it cannot be said that looking into

such documents for the aforesaid purpose is

impermissible or inadmissible.”

(emphasis added)

Inquiry Proceeding

21. Dovetailed with this aspect is the fact that Tribunal proceedings

are not strictly governed by the rules of procedures or evidence, but are in

the nature of an inquiry. For this also, reference may be made to the

following opinion of the Supreme Court in United India Insurance Co.

Ltd. v. Shila Datta, (2011) 10 SCC 509 and Anita Sharma v. New India

Assurance Co. Ltd. (2021) 1 SCC 171. Relevant paragraphs of the said

judgements are extracted as under:

21.1 United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shila Datta, (supra):

“Nature of a claim petition under the Motor Vehicles

Act, 1988

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MAC.APP. 888/2013 Page 16 of 44

10. A claim petition for compensation in regard to a

motor accident (filed by the injured or in case of death,

by the dependent family members) before the Motor

Accidents Claims Tribunal constituted under Section 165

of the Act is neither a suit nor an adversarial lis in the

traditional sense. It is a proceedings in terms of and

regulated by the provisions of Chapter XII of the Act

which is a complete code in itself. We may in this context

refer to the following significant aspects in regard to the

Tribunals and determination of compensation by the

Tribunals:

(i) Proceedings for award of compensation in regard

to a motor accident before the Tribunal can be initiated

either on an application for compensation made by the

persons aggrieved (the claimants) under Section 166(1)

or Section 163-A of the Act or suo motu by the Tribunal,

by treating any report of accident (forwarded to the

Tribunal under Section 158(6) of the Act as an

application for compensation under Section 166(4) of the

Act).

(ii) The rules of pleadings do not strictly apply as the

claimant is required to make an application in a form

prescribed under the Act. In fact, there is no pleading

where the proceedings are suo motu initiated by the

Tribunal.

(iii) In a proceedings initiated suo motu by the

Tribunal, the owner and driver are the respondents. The

insurer is not a respondent, but a noticee under Section

149(2) of the Act. Where a claim petition is filed by the

injured or by the legal representatives of a person dying

in a motor accident, the driver and owner have to be

impleaded as respondents. The claimants need not

implead the insurer as a party. But they have the choice

of impleading the insurer also as a party-respondent.

When it is not impleaded as a party, the Tribunal is

required to issue a notice under Section 149(2) of the Act.

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MAC.APP. 888/2013 Page 17 of 44

If the insurer is impleaded as a party, it is issued as a

regular notice of the proceedings.

(iv) The words “receipt of an application for

compensation” in Section 168 refer not only to an

application filed by the claimants claiming compensation

but also to a suo motu registration of an application for

compensation under Section 166(4) of the Act on the

basis of a report of an accident under Section 158(6) of

the Act.

(v) Though the Tribunal adjudicates on a claim and

determines the compensation, it does not do so as in an

adversarial litigation. On receipt of an application (either

from the applicant or suo motu registration), the Tribunal

gives notice to the insurer under Section 149(2) of the

Act, gives an opportunity of being heard to the parties to

the claim petition as also the insurer, holds an inquiry

into the claim and makes an award determining the

amount of compensation which appears to it to be just.

(Vide Section 168 of the Act.)

(vi) The Tribunal is required to follow such summary

procedure as it thinks fit. It may choose one or more

persons possessing special knowledge of and matters

relevant to inquiry, to assist it in holding the enquiry.

(Vide Section 169 of the Act.)

(vii) The award of the Tribunal should specify the

person(s) to whom compensation should be paid. It

should also specify the amount which shall be paid by the

insurer or owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the

accident or by all or any of them. (Vide Section 168 of the

Act.)

(viii) The Tribunal should deliver copies of the award

to the parties concerned within 15 days from the date of

the award. (Vide Section 168(2) of the Act.)

We have referred to the aforesaid provisions to show that

an award by the Tribunal cannot be seen as an

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MAC.APP. 888/2013 Page 18 of 44

adversarial adjudication between the litigating parties to

a dispute, but a statutory determination of compensation

on the occurrence of an accident, after due enquiry, in

accordance with the statute.”

21.2 Anita Sharma v New India Assurance (supra):

“21. Equally, we are concerned over the failure of the

High Court to be cognizant of the fact that strict

principles of evidence and standards of proof like in a

criminal trial are inapplicable in MACT claim cases. The

standard of proof in such like matters is one of

preponderance of probabilities, rather than beyond

reasonable doubt. One needs to be mindful that the

approach and role of courts while examining evidence in

accident claim cases ought not to be to find fault with

non-examination of some best eyewitnesses, as may

happen in a criminal trial; but, instead should be only to

analyse the material placed on record by the parties to

ascertain whether the claimant's version is more likely

than not true.”

(emphasis added)

22. Therefore, what remains in situations where there is no eyewitness

that the Tribunal, in its inquiry process, based on the test of

preponderance of probabilities, assesses the facts and circumstances

placed before it. Every accident has its own peculiar circumstances; it

could involve the nature of the vehicles, the location of the accident, and

the extent of the collision.

23. For example, in cases where there might be two vehicles of similar

sizes, say two heavy vehicles, which collide in the middle of the road,

there could arise a situation warranting an assessment of contributory

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MAC.APP. 888/2013 Page 19 of 44

negligence. However, if a heavy vehicle collides with a lighter vehicle, in

the middle of the road, the inquiry would lead to the question as to which

of the vehicles was driving on the wrong side of the lane or carriageway.

If that is also not established, an assessment needs to be made considering

the location of the collision, the circumstances in which traffic moves in

that particular area, and whether there was any indication of intoxication

in the post-mortem of the deceased.

24. Other aspects which may arise include the time of the day, whether

the offending vehicle was in a standing position, abandoned without

flashing lights, or whether it suddenly braked. Many of these aspects

would come to the fore if there is testimony of the driver of the offending

vehicle, who, upon cross-examination, may reveal certain aspects relating

to the nature of the accident. The predicament before the Tribunal is that if

no such evidence is available, then what material it should rely upon. In

such circumstances, the only material available is the first statement made

to any authority, which is usually the FIR.

FIR and Investigation

25. In National Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Smt. Pushpa Rana &

Ors. (supra), the Court held the filing of the FIR, chargesheet and

accompanying police record constitutes sufficient material to sustain a

finding of negligence in motor accident claim proceedings on the

touchstone of preponderance of probabilities. Relevant observations of

this Court are extracted as under:

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MAC.APP. 888/2013 Page 20 of 44

“12. The last contention of the appellant insurance

company is that the respondents claimants should have

proved negligence on the part of the driver and in this

regard the counsel has placed reliance on the judgement

of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Oriental Insurance Co.

Ltd. v. Meena Variyal; 2007 (5) SCALE 269. On perusal

of the award of the Tribunal, it becomes clear that the

wife of the deceased had produced (i) certified copy of the

criminal record of criminal case in FIR No. 955/2004,

pertaining to involvement of the offending vehicle, (ii)

criminal record showing completion of investigation of

police and issue of charge sheet under Section 279/304-

A, IPC against the driver; (iii) certified copy of FIR,

wherein criminal case against the driver was lodged; and

(iv) recovery memo and mechanical inspection report of

offending vehicle and vehicle of the deceased. These

documents are sufficient proofs to reach the conclusion

that the driver was negligent. Proceedings under Motor

Vehicles Act are not akin to proceedings in a civil suit

and hence strict rules of evidence are not required to be

followed in this regard. Hence, this contention of the

counsel for the appellant also falls face down. There is

ample evidence on record to prove negligence on the part

of the driver.”

(emphasis added)

26. Once the FIR comes into play and the investigation proceeds,

thereafter, there may be some material forming of the investigation which

throws light on the nature of the accident and the aspect of the negligence.

27. In this regard, reference may be made to United India Insurance

Co. Ltd. v. Deepak Goel and Ors. 2014: DHC:470, wherein this Court,

following Pushpa Rana (supra), reiterated that where an FIR has been

registered and a chargesheet filed against the driver of the offending

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MAC.APP. 888/2013 Page 21 of 44

vehicle, such material is sufficient to sustain a finding of negligence on the

touchstone of preponderance of probabilities, particularly in the absence

of rebuttal evidence from the driver or owner. Relevant paragraphs are

extracted as under:

“19. Be that as it may, criminal case bearing FIR

No.603/95 was registered against the respondent No.

3/driver at P.S. Singhani Gate, Ghaziabad. The police

investigated the case and thereafter filed the chargesheet

under Sections 279/304-A IPC against the said driver.

The claimants have proved both the documents noted

above before the learned Tribunal. Acquittal of the

driver/respondent No.3 by the learned Judicial

Magistrate vide its judgment dated 30.07.2003 would not

have any adverse affect on the claim petition for the

reason, he was acquitted only on the ground that eye

witness had not seen the driver of the offending vehicle as

he fled away from the spot. Neither any document had

been placed on record nor any witness had been

examined by the owner or Insurance Company to prove

that the respondent No. 3 was not driving the bus bearing

No.PAB 3325 on 18.08.1995 at about 12.45 pm.

Moreover, respondent Nos. 2 and 3 were proceeded ex

parte before the learned Tribunal, and they did not place

any defence before the learned Tribunal. Thus, the

learned Tribunal while deciding the claim petition had

relied upon the FIR, chargesheet and the statements of

the claimants.

20. In deciding the accident cases, the Tribunals or the

Courts bear in mind the caution struck by the Apex Court

that a claim before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal

is neither a criminal case nor a civil case. In a criminal

case in order to have conviction, the matter is to be

proved beyond reasonable doubt and in a civil case the

matter is to be decided on the basis of preponderance of

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MAC.APP. 888/2013 Page 22 of 44

evidence, but in a claim petition before the Motor

Accidents Claims Tribunal, the standard of proof is much

below than what is required in a criminal case as well as

in a civil case. Undoubtedly, the enquiry before the

Tribunal is a summary enquiry and, therefore, does not

require strict proof of liability.

21. Nonetheless, in a case, where FIR is lodged,

chargesheet is filed and specially in a case where driver

after causing the accident had fled away from the spot,

then the documents mentioned above are sufficient to

establish the fact that the driver of the offending vehicle

was negligent in causing the accident particularly when

there was no defence available from his side before the

learned Tribunal. Thus, the claimants have prove

negligence of the driver of the offending vehicle.”

(emphasis added)

28. The Supreme Court in Ranjeet v. Abdul Kayam Neb, 2025 SCC

OnLine SC 497 has recently reiterated its position on the said issue, where

it stated as under:

“4. It is settled in law that once a charge sheet has been

filed and the driver has been held negligent, no further

evidence is required to prove that the bus was being

negligently driven by the bus driver. Even if the

eyewitnesses are not examined, that will not be fatal to

prove the death of the deceased due to negligence of the

bus driver.

5. In view of the aforesaid facts, we are of the opinion

that the Tribunal and the High Court both manifestly

erred in law in refusing to grant any compensation to the

claimants.”

(emphasis added)

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MAC.APP. 888/2013 Page 23 of 44

29. In Meera Bai v. ICICI Lombard General Insurance Company

Ltd. & Anr. 2025:INSC:600, the Supreme Court has observed that in

cases where the eyewitness was not examined, reliance on FIR and

charge-sheet was enough for the finding of negligence to be established.

In this regard, the relevant paragraphs are as under:

“2. The claimants before the Tribunal have filed an

appeal from the order of the High Court which allowed

the appeal of the insurance company and dismissed the

claim petition for reason of no eyewitness having been

examined to prove the rash and negligent driving.

3. On facts, it needs to be stated that the accident

occurred on 29.01.2015 when the deceased was

travelling pillion in a motorbike driven and owned by the

second respondent. The FIR was lodged against the

owner driver of the vehicle for the offence of rash and

negligent driving. A charge sheet was filed against the

owner driver. The owner driver filed a written statement

before the Tribunal denying the rash and negligent

driving on his part, however he did not mount the box to

depose that it was not due to his fault that the accident

occurred.

4. As far as examining the eyewitness, such a witness will

not be available in all cases. The FIR having been lodged

and the charge sheet filed against the owner driver of the

offending vehicle, we are of the opinion that there could

be no finding that negligence was not established.”

(emphasis added)

30. In Srikrishna Kanta Singh v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., 2025

SCC OnLine SC 636, the Supreme Court observed as under:

“8. The accident occurred on 03.11.1999 upon which a

First Information Report was registered produced as

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MAC.APP. 888/2013 Page 24 of 44

Annexure P-4. Annexure P-4 clearly indicates that the

trailer was found to have been driven rashly and

negligently; the owner of which was the 1

st

respondent

before the Tribunal and the insurer, the 3

rd

respondent.

The charge sheet has also been filed which is produced as

Annexure P-9. After investigation, the charge sheet

clearly found that the accident was caused due to the

negligence of the driver of the trailer and arrayed him as

the accused. PW 1 who was riding pillion also spoke of

the rash and negligent driving of the trailer.

…

11. In a motor accident claim, there is no adversarial

litigation and it is the preponderance of probabilities

which reign supreme in adjudication of the tortious

liability flowing from it, as has been held

in Sunita v. Rajasthan State Road Transport

Corporation. Dulcina Fernandes v. Joaquim Xavier

Cruz is a case in which the rider, who also carried a

pillion, died in an accident involving a pick-up van. There

was a contention taken that the claimants who were the

legal heirs of the deceased had not cared to examine the

pillion rider and hence the version of the respondent in

the written statement that the moving scooter had hit the

parked pick-up van, was to be accepted. It was found, as

in the present case, that the Police had charge-sheeted

the driver of the pickup van which prima facie showed

negligence of the charge-sheeted accused. Similarly in

the present case also, the Police after investigation,

charge-sheeted the driver of the trailer finding clear

negligence on him, which led to the accident. This has not

been controverted by the respondents before the Tribunal

by any valid evidence nor even a pleading. In fact, the

Tribunal, on a mere imaginative surmise, found that since

the scooter collided with the tail-end of the trailer, it can

be presumed that the driver of the scooter was not

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MAC.APP. 888/2013 Page 25 of 44

cautious, which in any event is not a finding of

negligence.

12. Finding that the driver was not cautious is one thing

and finding negligence is quite another thing. Prima

facie, we are satisfied that the negligence was on the

trailer driver as discernible from the evidence recorded

before the Tribunal; standard of proof required being

preponderance of probability as has been reiterated

in Mangla Ram v. Oriental Insurance Company Limited”

(emphasis added)

Res ipsa loquitur

31. Res ipsa loquitur means “the things speak for itself”, is a well-

recognised doctrine in the law of negligence. The doctrine enables a court

to draw an inference of negligence from the very nature of the accident,

where the occurrence is such that, in the ordinary course of events, it

would not have happened without negligence. In such circumstances, the

surrounding facts themselves constitute prima facie evidence of

negligence, thereby shifting the evidentiary burden onto the person who

had control over the instrumentality causing the injury to provide an

explanation consistent with due care.

32. As noted in Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edn., Vol. 28, at p.

77, the doctrine represents an exception to the general rule that the burden

of proving negligence lies upon the claimant; where the facts established

are such that the natural inference arising from them is that the injury was

caused by the defendant’s negligence, the event itself may “tell its own

story”, warranting an inference of negligence in the absence of a

satisfactory explanation.

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MAC.APP. 888/2013 Page 26 of 44

33. The origins of the doctrine may be traced to the earlier decision in

Byrne v. Boadle (1863) 2 H & C 722, where the plaintiff was injured

when a barrel of flour fell from the defendant’s premises onto a public

street. The Court held that such an occurrence constituted sufficient prima

facie evidence of negligence, thereby casting upon the defendant the

burden of explaining that the accident had not occurred due to want of

care on his part.

34. The doctrine received its classical formulation in the English

decision of Scott v. London and St Katherine Docks Co. (1865) 3 H & C

596, where it was observed that when the thing causing the accident is

under the management of the defendant or his servants, and the accident is

such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those having

such management use proper care, the occurrence itself affords reasonable

evidence of negligence in the absence of explanation by the defendant.

35. The Supreme Court has also recognised the relevance of this

doctrine in accident cases. In Shyam Sunder v. State of Rajasthan, (1974)

1 SCC 690, the Supreme Court observed that negligence may, in

appropriate cases, be inferred from the surrounding circumstances of the

accident itself where the facts reasonably indicate rash or negligent

conduct. For ease of reference, relevant paragraphs are extracted as under:

“9. The main point for consideration in this appeal is,

whether the fact that the truck caught fire is evidence of

negligence on the part of the driver in the course of his

employment. The maxim res ipsa loquitur is resorted to

when an accident is shown to have occurred and the

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MAC.APP. 888/2013 Page 27 of 44

cause of the accident is primarily within the knowledge of

the defendant. The mere fact that the cause of the

accident is unknown does not prevent the plaintiff from

recovering the damages, if the proper inference to be

drawn from the circumstances which are known is that it

was caused by the negligence of the defendant. The fact

of the accident may, sometimes, constitute evidence of

negligence and then the maxim res ipsa loquitur applies.

10. The maxim is stated in its classic form by Erle, C.J.:

[Scott v. London & St. Katherine Docks, (1865) 3 H&C

596, 601]

“... where the thing is shown to be under the management

of the defendant or his servants, and the accident is such

as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if

those who have the management use proper care, it

affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of

explanation by the defendants, that the accident arose

from want of care.”

The maxim does not embody any rule of substantive law

nor a rule of evidence. It is perhaps not a rule of any kind

but simply the caption to an argument on the evidence.

Lord Shaw remarked that if the phrase had not been in

Latin, nobody would have called it a principle

[Ballard v. North British Railway Co., 1923 SC (HL) 43].

The maxim is only a convenient label to apply to a set of

circumstances in which the plaintiff proves a case so as to

call for a rebuttal from the defendant, without having to

allege and prove any specific act or omission on the part

of the defendant. The principal function of the maxim is to

prevent injustice which would result if a plaintiff were

invariably compelled to prove the precise cause of the

accident and the defendant responsible for it even when

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MAC.APP. 888/2013 Page 28 of 44

the facts bearing on these matters are at the outset

unknown to him and often within the knowledge of the

defendant. But though the parties' relative access to

evidence is an influential factor, it is not controlling.

Thus, the fact that the defendant is as much at a loss to

explain the accident or himself died in it, does not

preclude an adverse inference against him, if the odds

otherwise point to his negligence (see John G.

Fleming, The Law of Torts, 4th Edn., p. 264). The mere

happening of the accident may be more consistent with

the negligence on the part of the defendant than with

other causes. The maxim is based as commonsense and

its purpose is to do justice when the facts bearing on

causation and on the care exercised by defendant are at

the outset unknown to the plaintiff and are or ought to be

within the knowledge of the defendant (see Barkwayv. S.

Wales Transo [(1950) 1 All ER 392, 399] ).

11. The plaintiff merely proves a result, not any

particular act or omission producing the result. If the

result, in the circumstances in which he proves it, makes

it more probable than not that it was caused by the

negligence of the defendants, the doctrine of res ipsa

loquitur is said to apply, and the plaintiff will be entitled

to succeed unless the defendant by evidence rebuts that

probability.

………

13. It should be noticed that the defendant does not

advance his case by inventing fanciful theories,

unsupported by evidence, of how the event might have

occurred. The whole inquiry is concerned with

probabilities, and facts are required, not mere conjecture

unsupported by facts. As Lord Macmillan said in his

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MAC.APP. 888/2013 Page 29 of 44

dissenting judgment in Jones v. Great Western [(1930) 47

PLR 39] :

“The dividing line between conjecture and inference is

often a very difficult one to draw. A conjecture may be

plausible, but it is of no legal value, for its essence is that

it is a mere guess. An inference, in the legal sense, on the

other hand, is a deduction from the evidence, and if it is a

reasonable deduction it may have the validity of legal

proof. The attribution, of an occurrence to a cause is, I

take it, always a matter of inference. The cogency of a

legal inference of causation may vary in degree between

practical certainty and reasonable probability. Where the

coincidence of cause and effect is not a matter of actual

observation there is necessarily a hiatus in the direct

evidence, but this may be legitimately bridged by an

inference from the facts actually observed and proved.”

In other words, an inference is a deduction from

established facts and an assumption or a guess is

something quite different but not necessarily related to

established facts.

14. Alternatively, in those instances where the defendant

is unable to explain the accident, it is incumbent upon

him to advance positive proof that he had taken all

reasonable steps to avert foreseeable harm.

15.Res ipsa loquitur is an immensely important vehicle

for importing strict liability into negligence cases. In

practice, there are many cases where res ipsa loquitur is

properly invoked in which the defendant is unable to

show affirmatively either that he took all reasonable

precautions to avoid injury or that the particular cause of

the injury was not associated with negligence on his part.

Industrial and traffic accidents and injuries caused by

defective merchandise are so frequently of this type that

the theoretical limitations of the maxim are quite

overshadowed by its practical significance [ Millner:

“Negligence in Modern Law”, 92] .”

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MAC.APP. 888/2013 Page 30 of 44

36. Similarly, in Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi v. Ranjit Ginning &

Pressing Co. (P) Ltd., (1977) 2 SCC 745, the Supreme Court emphasised

that in claims arising out of motor accidents the court must examine the

circumstances in which the accident occurred and determine whether the

manner of the occurrence reasonably points towards negligence. Relevant

paragraphs are extracted as under:

“5. The High Court has not gone into the question as to

whether the car was being driven rashly and negligently

by the owner's employee as it held that the act was not in

the course of his employment. We feel that the question as

to whether the car was being driven rashly and

negligently would have to be decided on the facts of the

case first for, if the claimants fail to establish rash and

negligent act no other question would arise. We would

therefore proceed to deal with this question first. The

claimants did not lead any direct evidence as to how the

accident occurred. No eyewitness was examined. But PW

1, the younger brother of the deceased Purshottam

Udeshi, who went to the spot soon after the accident was

examined. He stated that he went with one of his relatives

and an employee of his brother's employer and saw that

the car had dashed against a tree while proceeding from

Nagpur to Pandurna. The tree was on the right hand side

of the road, four feet away from the right hand side of the

main metalled road. The vehicle will have to proceed on

the left hand side of the road. The road was 15 feet wide

and was a straight metalled road. On either side of the

road there were fields. The fields were of lower level. The

tree against which the car dashed was uprooted about 9

to 10 inches from the ground. The car dashed so violently

that it was broken in the front side. A photograph taken at

that time was also filed. According to the witness the

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MAC.APP. 888/2013 Page 31 of 44

vehicle struck so violently that the machine of the car

from its original position went back about a foot. The

steering wheel and the engine of the car receded back on

driver's side and by the said impact the occupants died

and front seat also moved back. The witness was not

cross-examined on what he saw about the state of the car

and the tree. It was not suggested to him that the car was

not driven in a rash and negligent manner. In fact there is

no cross-examination on the aspect of rash and negligent

driving. The Claims Tribunal on this evidence found that

“it was admittedly a mishap on the right side of the road

wherein the vehicle had dashed against a tree beyond the

pavement so violently as not only to damage the vehicle

badly but also entailing death of its three occupants,

maxim “‘ res ipsa loquitur ’ applies”

(see Ellor v. Selfridge [(1930) 46 TLR 236] ). The

Tribunal proceeded to discuss the evidence of PW 1 and

found on the evidence that it cannot help concluding that

the dashing of the car against the tree was most violent

and that it was for the respondents to establish that it was

a case of inevitable accident. They have led no evidence.

It may at once be stated that though the opposite parties

had pleaded that this is a case of inevitable accident they

have not led any evidence to establish their plea. The

burden rests on the opposite party to prove the inevitable

accident. To succeed in such a defence the opposite party

will have to establish that the cause of the accident could

not have been avoided by exercise of ordinary care and

caution. “To establish a defence of inevitable accident

the defendant must either show what caused the accident

and that the result was inevitable, or he must show all

possible causes, one or more of which produced the

effect, and with regard to each of such possible causes he

must show that the result could not have been avoided”.

(Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edn., Vol. 28, p. 81).

No such attempt was made and before us the plea of

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MAC.APP. 888/2013 Page 32 of 44

inevitable accident was not raised. We have therefore to

consider whether the claimants have made out a case of

rash and negligent driving. As found by the Tribunal

there is no eyewitness and therefore the question is

whether from the facts established the case of rash and

negligent act could be inferred. The Tribunal has applied

the doctrine of “res ipsa loquitur”. It has to be

considered whether under the circumstances the Tribunal

was justified in applying the doctrine.

6. The normal rule is that it is for the plaintiff to prove

negligence but as in some cases considerable hardship is

caused to the plaintiff as the true cause of the accident is

not known to him but is solely within the knowledge of the

defendant who caused it, the plaintiff can prove the

accident but cannot prove how it happened to establish

negligence on the part of the defendant. This hardship is

sought to be avoided by applying the principle of res ipsa

loquitur. The general purport of the words res ipsa

loquitur is that the accident “speaks for itself' or tells its

own story. There are cases in which the accident speaks

for itself so that it is sufficient for the plaintiff to prove the

accident and nothing more. It will then be for the

defendant to establish that the accident happened due to

some other cause than his own negligence. Salmond on

the Law of Torts (15th Edn.) at p. 306 states: “The

maxim res ipsa loquitur applies whenever it is so

improbable that such an accident would have happened

without the negligence of the defendant that a reasonable

jury could find without further evidence that it was so

caused”. In Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edn., Vol.

28, at p. 77, the position is stated thus: “An exception to

the general rule that the burden of proof of the alleged

negligence is in the first instance on the plaintiff occurs

wherever the facts already established are such that the

proper and natural inference arising from them is that the

injury complained of was caused by the defendant's

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MAC.APP. 888/2013 Page 33 of 44

negligence, or where the event charged a; negligence

‘tells it own story’ of negligence on the part of the

defendant, the story so told being clear and

unambiguous”. Where the maxim is applied the burden is

on the defendant to show either that in fact he was not

negligent or that the accident might more probably have

happened in a manner which did not connote negligence

on his part. For the application of the principle it must be

shown that the car was under the management of the

defendant and that the accident is such as in ordinary

course of things does not happen if those who had the

management used proper care. Applying the principles

stated above we have to see whether the requirements of

the principle have been satisfied. There can be no dispute

that the car was under the management of the company's

manager and that from the facts disclosed by PW 1 if the

driver had used proper care in the ordinary course of

things the car could not have gone to the right extreme of

the road, dashed against a tree and moved it a few inches

away. The learned counsel for the respondents submitted

that the road is a very narrow road of the width of about

15 feet on either side of which were fields and that it is

quite probable that cattle might have strayed into the

road suddenly causing the accident. We are unable to

accept the plea for in a country road with a width of

about 15 feet with fields on either side ordinary care

requires that the car should be driven at a speed in which

it could be controlled if some stray cattle happened to

come into the road. From the description of the accident

given by PW 1 which stands unchallenged the car had

proceeded to the right extremity of the road which is the

wrong side and dashed against a tree uprooting it about 9

inches from the ground. The car was broken on the front

side and the vehicle struck the tree so violently that the

engine of the car was displaced from its original position

one foot on the back and the steering wheel and the

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MAC.APP. 888/2013 Page 34 of 44

engine of the car had receded back on the driver's side.

The car could not have gone to the right extremity and

dashed with such violence on the tree if the driver had

exercised reasonable care and caution. On the facts made

out the doctrine is applicable and it is for the opponents

to prove that the incident did not take place due to their

negligence. This they have not even attempted to do. In

the circumstances we find that the Tribunal was justified

in applying the doctrine. It was submitted by the learned

counsel for the respondents that as the High Court did

not consider the question this point may be remitted to the

High Court. We do not think it necessary to do so for the

evidence on record is convincing to prove the case of

rash and negligent driving set up by the claimants.”

(emphasis added)

37. Thus, where direct evidence regarding the manner of the accident

is unavailable, the Tribunal is entitled to examine the surrounding

circumstances and assess whether the occurrence is of such a nature that

negligence can reasonably be inferred. In such cases, the doctrine of res

ipsa loquitur operates as a rule of evidence enabling the Tribunal, on the

touchstone of preponderance of probabilities, to determine whether the

accident itself provides a reasonable basis to infer negligence.

Summarizing

38. From the above discussion relating to the nature of inquiry before

the Tribunal, the operation of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and the

applicable standard of proof, three aspects emerge clearly.

39. First, that the proceedings before the Motor Accident Claims

Tribunal are in nature of an inquiry and are not hemmed in by rules of

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MAC.APP. 888/2013 Page 35 of 44

procedure or evidence. The Supreme Court in Shila Datta (supra)

[passages extracted in paragraph 20 (a) above], has elaborated on this

aspect. Essentially, a claim under Section 165 of the MV Act, is neither a

suit nor an adversarial lis.

40. Tribunal holds an inquiry and makes an award to determine

compensation, which ought to be just and reasonable. The procedure to be

followed is summarised in the best discretion of the Tribunal. It has the

power under Section 169 of MV Act to summon persons possessing

special knowledge of the matters relevant to the inquiry.

41. In Anita Sharma (supra), the Supreme Court emphasised that fault

may not be found merely because Tribunals do not examine some of the

best eyewitnesses, as in a criminal trial, but should do their best to analyse

the material placed on record by the parties.

42. Having clearly sketched the contours of the procedure undertaken

by a Tribunal, it brings us to the second issue, which is determination of

negligence. The nature of the accident and the basic facts surrounding the

same are presented before the Tribunal in the form of a DAR (Detailed

Accident Report), or through an FIR, or a recording in a police diary,

along with the claim for compensation. In order to arrive at an assessment

of negligence and, therefore, consequential liability in tort law, the

principle of res ipsa loquitur, particularly in accident cases, is often

brought into play.

43. Doctrine of res ipsa loquitur constitutes an exception to the

general rule that the burden of proving negligence lies upon the claimant.

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MAC.APP. 888/2013 Page 36 of 44

The facts, “tell its own story” and “speak for itself”. The fact of the

accident itself sometimes constitutes evidence of negligence. The principal

function of the maxim is to prevent injustice, that would be caused to a

plaintiff who would otherwise be compelled to prove the precise cause of

the accident and responsibility of the defendant, when the facts are

unknown to plaintiff but lie only within the knowledge of defendant. The

burden then shifts to the defendant, who can, by leading evidence, rebut

the inference drawn by the Court based on the doctrine.

44. A notable line has been drawn in this inference to be drawn by the

Courts, distinguishing between “mere conjecture” and “inference”.

Conjecture leans more towards a mere guess, though plausible. However,

inference in the legal sense is a reasonable deduction from evidence. A

large part of defendant's defence would be to explain or provide proof that

he had taken all reasonable steps to avert foreseeable harm.

45. Therefore, for application of the principle, it must be shown that

the offending vehicle was under the management of the defendant and that

the accident was such that, in the ordinary course of things, it would not

have happened if those who were in management had used proper care.

Having reached a reasonable inference based on the facts of the accident

and being presented with a defence raised by defendants that they

exercised care to avert foreseeable harm, the issue before the Tribunal

would be how to balance the two aspects and what parameter is to be

applied in measuring this balance, or in assessing which side the scales

tilt.

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MAC.APP. 888/2013 Page 37 of 44

46. This brings us to the third aspect, which is the test to be applied.

It is well settled that the test or the burden of proof which applies is not

that of beyond a reasonable doubt (as in criminal cases), but on the test of

preponderance of probabilities.

47. The principle that negligence in motor accident claim proceedings

is to be assessed on the touchstone of probability rather than strict proof

did not emerge for the first time in Bimla Devi (supra), but rests on earlier

jurisprudence recognising that proceedings before statutory tribunals are

not governed by strict rules of evidence and that negligence in accident

cases may be inferred from surrounding circumstances on a reasonable

evaluation of the material placed on record. Evolution of this approach is

also reflected in a previous decision of the Supreme Court in State of

Mysore v. S.S. Makapur, AIR 1963 SC 375, wherein it was observed that

“they can, unlike courts, obtain all information material for the points

under enquiry from all sources, and through all channels, without being

fettered by rules and procedure, which govern proceedings in court. The

only obligation which the law casts on them is that they should not act on

any information which they may receive unless they put it to the party

against whom it is to be used and give him a fair opportunity to explain

it.”

48. This would effectively mean that the Tribunal is required to weigh

the material placed before it, including the police record, evidence,

testimonies, documentary evidence, to determine which way the balance

tilts, i.e. “what is more probable?”.

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MAC.APP. 888/2013 Page 38 of 44

49. Probability is certainly a subjective notion, but draws within its

fold various unquantifiable elements like common sense, judicial

experience, demeanor of witnesses, strength of the police record, location

and manner of accident, nature of vehicles involved, etc. To apply the test

of preponderance of probabilities is not to pick out, in an arbitrary and ad

hoc manner, some fragment from the mass of facts and evidence and reach

a result, but to ultimately balance the whole set.

50. The Supreme Court in Meena Variyal (supra) provides a caution

in the same spirit, for Tribunals to approach a claim for compensation,

albeit in a summary procedure, without ignoring all ‘basic principles of

law’.

51. The ‘basic principles of law’ are those that have been touched

upon above, which can be usefully termed as the ‘three fundamental

pillars’ for assessment of negligence (i.e. proceeding is in nature of

inquiries, application of res ipsa loquitur doctrine and use of

preponderance of probability as the balancing test).

52. These jurisprudential tools are to be used by Tribunals in a

sensible and rational manner, and not cut short the process, merely

because the larger canvas is summary in nature. Any Court assessing

motor accident cases will run that risk, since the jurisprudence provides

considerable scope for applying discretion. There can be no straitjacket

standard beyond what has already been stated and reiterated time and

again by various Courts, and there would be no point paraphrasing it yet

again with more words and explanations.

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`

MAC.APP. 888/2013 Page 39 of 44

53. In the opinion of this Court, the core essence is for a Tribunal to

marshal all facts and evidence before it, assess them on the basis of the

principles stated above, and weigh them with common sense and judicial

experience.

54. What is to be avoided is randomness, irrationality, absurd

reasoning, conjecture, and illogic. Insurance Companies have often, as in

this case, complained about the sketchy nature of Tribunal’s assessment

on the aspect of negligence. While that is a matter of the individual style

of judgment writing of a particular Presiding Officer of Tribunal, essence

of what is stated above cannot be lost.

55. Sometimes, as an Appellate Court, one has to read between the

lines of what has been stated by the Tribunal, the conclusion not being

wrong, but the explanation inadequate or only partly articulated. What,

therefore, needs to be followed by the Tribunals is a simple procedure of

remaining conscious of the three fundamental pillars while assessing

negligence, joining the dots and articulating the analysis in plain and

simple language.

56. The reasons that inform a judge’s mind in reaching conclusion

after meandering through an assessment have to be stated out there, and

not left for guesswork. This does not mean unnecessary extension,

amplification, and elaboration, but simply following a line, of recording

the reasoning, the judicial sense which permits a judge to weigh the

preponderance, and join the dots as it were.

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`

MAC.APP. 888/2013 Page 40 of 44

Conclusion

57. Keeping the above discussion in mind, this Court is not persuaded

by the plea of the appellant/Insurance Company that the accident was not

caused due to the negligence of respondent no.4, driver of the offending

vehicle. There were no eyewitnesses to the accident and, therefore, the

principle of res ipsa loquitur was rightly invoked. As per the post-mortem

report, Sanjar Alam died due to “ante-mortem injuries caused by blunt

force impact”, and the Mechanical Inspection Report reflects damaged

parts on the front of the offending vehicle. Apart from that, an FIR had

been registered against respondent no.4/ driver.

58. Moreover, notice is taken of the possibility that respondent no. 4

was most likely under the influence of liquor, considering the statement of

the owner of the offending vehicle [R2W1], who stated that driver Ashraf

[respondent no.4 herein] had been instructed to not consume liquor on

duty and was warned not to consume liquor on duty or take any drugs. In

the cross-examination, R2W1, he stated that he was aware that the driver

was under the influence of liquor at the time of the accident.

59. Statement of the officer from the Insurance Company by way of

affidavit [Exhibit R3W1/A], also stated that the driver of the vehicle was

under the influence of alcohol as per MLC No. 58261 of Hindu Rao

Hospital, where he was admitted after the accident. The MLC is exhibited

as Exhibit R3W1/6, as per which smell of alcohol was present, which the

Insurance Company relied upon as a defence for violation of policy terms

and conditions. However, R3W1, in his cross examination, stated that he

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MAC.APP. 888/2013 Page 41 of 44

had no personal knowledge as to whether the driver was under the

influence of alcohol at the time of the accident.

60. There is no other material which could displace the finding of

negligence on the part of the driver based on preponderance of

probabilities, in the inquiry conducted by the Tribunal. The Tribunal

might have been slim in its reasoning and narrative; however, no other

conclusion which could have been arrived at regarding the finding of

negligence.

61. Deceased persons were traveling on a rickshaw when they were hit

by a truck. It would be difficult to accept that a truck could not have

avoided a slow-moving rickshaw rather than the other way around. Even

on the facts of the accident, principal of res ipsa loquitur applies with full

force.

Compensation

62. Changes in the computation are made to following effect:

i) Since deceased was 22 years of age, future prospects ought

to have been taken at 40% in place of 50%, following the principles

enunciated in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017)

16 SCC 680, as there was no evidence that he was employed in

permanent employment.

ii) Deduction towards personal expenses was taken at ‘1/3

rd

’

by the Tribunal, whereas appellant/Insurance Company contends

that it ought to have been 50%, on the ground that only the wife was

treated as a dependent. Respondent no.1/wife of deceased, by way

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`

MAC.APP. 888/2013 Page 42 of 44

of affidavit [Exhibit PW2/A], stated that deceased was working as

a rickshaw puller and was contributing towards the household

expenses of the family. In her cross-examination, she reiterated that

deceased used to provide financial support for household

requirements when he visited the native place. Further, as reflected

from memo of parties filed along with the claim petition, the father

had already expired and petitioner nos.2 and 3 [respondent no. 2 &

3 herein] were minor sisters of deceased. In the absence of any

rebuttal evidence led by driver, owner or insurer to show that the

deceased was not contributing towards their maintenance, the

Tribunal cannot be faulted in treating the family structure as

comprising more than one dependent. In these circumstances,

deduction towards personal expenses was rightly taken in the

category applicable to two to three dependents, i.e. ‘1/3

rd

’ of the

income, consistent with principles laid down in Pranay Sethi

(supra). Though, the Tribunal seemed to grant ‘1/3

rd

’ as deduction

despite holding that there was no proof that minor sisters were

dependents, in the opinion of this Court while the deduction of

‘1/3

rd

’ was correct the reasoning was incorrect.

iii) Loss of love and affection shall be ‘Nil’, in view of United

India Insurance Company Limited vs. Satinder Kaur Alias

Satwinder Kaur and Others (2021) 11 SCC 780.

`

`

MAC.APP. 888/2013 Page 43 of 44

iv) Funeral expenses and Loss of estate shall be awarded at Rs.

15,000/- each as per the principles enunciated in Pranay Sethi

(supra).

v) Consortium shall be awarded Rs. 40,000/- each to the wife

and the two sisters as per Magma General Insurance Co. Ltd. v.

Nanu Ram, (2018) 18 SCC 130, which will be Rs. 1,20,000/-

[Rs.40,000/- x 3].

63. Accordingly, compensation is recomputed as under:

S.

NO.

HEADS AWARDED BY

THE TRIBUNAL

AWARDED BY

THIS COURT

1. Income of deceased (A) (less

Income Tax)

Rs.7254/-

[unskilled]

Rs.7254/-

[unskilled]

2. Add Future Prospects (B) @

40%

50% 40%

3. Less Personal expenses of the

deceased (C)

1/3

rd

1/3

rd

4. Monthly loss of dependency

[(A +B)-C = D]

Rs.7,254/- Rs.6,770.40/-

5. Annual loss of dependency

(Dx12)

Rs.87,048/- Rs.81,244.80/-

6. Multiplier (E) 18 18

7. Total loss of dependency

(Dx12xE = F)

Rs.15,66,864/- Rs.14,62,406/-

[Round of

Rs.14,62,406.4/-]

8. Medical expenses (G) Nil Nil

9. Compensation for loss of

consortium (H)

Rs.1,00,000/- Rs.1,20,000/-

[40,000x 3]

10. Compensation for loss of love

and affection (I)

Rs.1,00,000/- Nil

11. Compensation for loss of

estate (J)

Rs.10,000/- Rs.15,000/-

12. Compensation towards

funeral expenses (K)

Rs.25,000/- Rs.15,000/-

TOTAL COMPENSATION

[F+G+H+I+J+K]

Rs.18,01,864/- Rs.16,12,406/-

INTEREST 9% 9%

`

`

MAC.APP. 888/2013 Page 44 of 44

64. In view of the above recomputation, total compensation payable to

the claimants stands reduced to Rs.16,12,406/- along with interest @ 9%

per annum as awarded by MACT.

65. Since 100% of the awarded amount had already been directed to

be deposited before the Registry of this Court vide order dated 30

th

September 2013, out of which 80% was also directed to be released to

claimants, remaining deposited amount shall be adjusted against the

recomputed compensation. In case any excess amount has been deposited

by the appellant, same shall be refunded to the appellant along with

accrued interest thereon. The claimants shall be entitled to release of the

entire amount in terms of the directions contained in the impugned Award.

66. Accordingly, the appeal is partly allowed in the aforesaid terms

and disposed of.

67. Pending applications (if any) are rendered infructuous.

68. Statutory deposit, if any, be refunded to Insurance Company, only

if the order of deposit has been compiled with.

69. Judgment be uploaded on the website of this Court.

ANISH DAYAL

(JUDGE)

APRIL 17, 2026/RK/tk