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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.2788 OF 2005

NATIONAL TEXTILE CORPORATION (MN)LTD. … APPELLANT

VERSUS

M/S DURGA TRADING CO. AND ORS. … RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.

This appeal has been preferred by the appellant against

judgment dated 6

th

February, 2003 passed by the High Court of

Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition No.1552 of 2000. By the

impugned judgment, the Division Bench of the High Court allowed

the writ petition filed by respondent no.1 and held as follows:

“11. In the facts and circumstances of the present

case, the petitioner having acted on the agreement

of sale and having paid the entire consideration

was clearly not an unauthorized occupant within the

meaning of Section 2(g) of the Public Premises Act.

That being so, there is no justification for

applying the summary procedure under the Public

Premises Act, nor has the Estate Officer any

authority or jurisdiction to evict the petitioner

under Section 5(2) of the Public Premises Act.

There seems to be serious dispute about the title

which dispute cannot be resolved under Public

Premises Act. In our opinion, the invocation of the

provisions of the Public Premises Act in the

present case was wholly improper. The Estate

Officer without any application of mind issued

directions for putting locks and seals on the

premises. In our opinion, due process of law in a

case like the present necessarily implies the

filing of suit by the respondents for the

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enforcement of their alleged rights in respect of

the subject premises.”

2.While holding so the Division Bench of the High Court also set

aside the order dated 23

rd

June, 2000 and notices dated 17

th

November, 2000 issued under Sections 4 and 7 of the Public Premises

(Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act 1971 (hereinafter referred

to as the ‘1971 Act’) by Estate Officer, National Textile

Corporation(MN) Ltd.

3.The factual matrix of the case is as follows:-

3.1The respondent no.1 filed a petition being Writ Petition

No.1552 of 2000 before the Bombay High Court challenging the

proceedings initiated by the appellant against it (respondent no.

1) u/s 5A (for removal of movable structures/fixtures) and u/s 4(2)

(b) read with Section 7(1) and (3) (for damages and eviction) of

the 1971 Act, in respect of subject premises i.e. land admeasuring

2921 sq. yards with structures thereon bearing Nos.96 and 97

situated at the premises of Shri Sitaram Mills Ltd. (hereinafter

referred to as ‘SSML’ for short) at N.M. Joshi Marg, Mumbai.

3.2In the said writ petition, respondent no. 1 submitted that the

subject premises belonged to the erstwhile owner, SSML. On 25

th

March, 1975 an agreement to sell the subject premises was entered

into between respondent no.1 and SSML and the full consideration of

RS.25 Lakhs was paid by respondent no.1 to SSML. On 1

st

April, 1975

possession of the subject property was handed over to respondent

no.1 and has since then remained with respondent no.1.

3.3 The management of the textile undertaking of SSML was taken

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over by the Central Government w.e.f. 18

th

October, 1983 under the

Textile Undertakings (Taking over of Management) Act, 1983

(hereinafter referred to as the, ‘1983 Act’) and the appellant

corporation was appointed as its Custodian. Later, the right,

title and interest in relation to the textile undertakings got

transferred and vested in Central Government under the Textile

Undertakings (Nationalization) Act, 1995 (hereinafter referred to

as the, ‘1995 Act’) w.e.f. 1

st

April, 1995.

3.4 On 23

rd

June, 2000, the Estate Officer of the appellant

Corporation passed an order under Sub Section (3) of Section 5A of

the 1971 Act treating the subject premises as ‘public premises’ and

directed respondent no.1 to remove the movable structures and

fixtures from the said premises. Thereafter, on 17

th

November, 2000

the said authority issued two show cause notices to respondent no.1

u/s 4(1) and 7(3) of the 1971 Act calling upon respondent no.1 to

show cause why it should not be evicted from the subject premises

and why it should not be made liable to pay damages. The appellant

Corporation initiated the aforesaid action against respondent no.1

on the ground that the premises were required for bona fide use.

Moreover, the appellant Corporation urged before the High Court

that since conveyance deed was not executed between the erstwhile

owner SSML and respondent no. 1, it was merely an agreement to sell

and hence, the subject premises got vested in the Central

Government under the 1995 Act.

3.5The High Court allowed the said writ petition by the impugned

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judgment and order dated 6

th

February, 2003.

4.The issue involved in the present appeal is:-

“Whether in the facts and circumstances, the proceedings

initiated by the appellant before the Estate Officer against

respondent no.1 under the 1971 Act should continue or the appellant

should be relegated to prefer a suit before the civil court as held

by the High Court?”

5.Learned Solicitor General of India appearing on behalf of the

appellant made the following submissions:

5.1The claim of respondent no.1 is based on unregistered

agreement to sell which never fructified into a registered sale

deed. Moreover, respondent no. 1 is neither the owner of the land

nor can it claim authorized occupancy pursuant to unregistered

agreement.

5.2The land in question got vested with the State and it is

deemed to have been transferred in favour of the appellant in view

of provisions of 1983 Act and 1995 Act. In view of such vesting,

respondent no.1 cannot claim to be an authorized occupant within

the meaning of Section 2(g) of 1971 Act.

6.Per contra, according to the learned senior counsel appearing

on behalf of the respondent:-

6.1The subject premises did not form part of the textile

undertaking of SSML on the appointed day under the 1983 Act i.e. on

18

th

October, 1983 and for that reason the management of the subject

premises never got vested in the Central Government under the 1983

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Act and for the same reason the right, title and interest over the

subject premises never got vested in the Central Government and the

appellant under the 1995 Act. Thus both the Acts have no

applicability to the subject premises.

It was further submitted that there are two independent

preconditions for vesting under 1995 Act.

(i)what is acquired is the right, title and interest of the

owner specified in column 3 of the first schedule and

(ii)such right title and interest must relate to the textile

undertaking specified in column 2 of the first schedule.

6.2.Apart from the factual issue with respect to the second

requirement, the first requirement involves a mixed question of

fact and law. This is because whether or not a particular owner

had “right, title and interest” on the appointed day involves a

factual enquiry apart from vesting by operation of law. The

expression “the right, title and interest of the owner” is a

compenditious expression covering 3 distinct aspects. Since this

is an expropriatory legislation it ought to read strictly and all

three elements must subsist together before any vesting takes

place. In this case, the appellant has no right, title and

interest.

6.3.In any event, more than 12 years after respondent no.1 was put

in possession and enjoyed the property fully, openly, continuously

and in a manner hostile to SSML (and its successor in interest),

respondent no.1 obtained rights in law and any residuary/vestige of

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a title that remained in SSML was rendered ineffective or

unenforceable in law.

6.4.The overwhelming material available on the record suggests the

following:

(i)Respondent no.1 and SSML had entered into an agreement to

sell dated 25

th

March, 1975

(ii) Respondent no.1 was put in possession of the subject

premises on 1

st

April, 1975 pursuant to the agreement to

sell.

(iii) Respondent no.1 had paid the full consideration of

Rs.25 lakhs to SSML (Rs.21,85,000/-,

Rs.1,15,000/-,Rs.20,000/- and Rs.1,80,000/-).

(iv) The sale took place pursuant to a Special Resolution

passed at the Extra Ordinary General Meeting of the

Company held on 2

nd

March, 1975.

(v) The sale of subject premises was reflected in the

Balance Sheet and in Schedule of Fixed Assets of SSML

for the year ended 31

st

March, 1975.

(vi) SSML accepted tenancy under respondent no.1 over an

area of 5802 sq. ft. of the subject premises and was

paying rent to respondent no.1

(vii) SSML paid capital gains tax on the sale of the subject

property which is clear from the letter dated

28.01.1980 written by SSML to the Commissioner of

Income Tax.

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(viii)Various Government authorities have since recognized

that it is the respondent no.1 to whom the said

premises belongs. This is clear, inter alia, from the

following

(a)Order dated 23

rd

March, 1977 passed by the Competent

Authority under the Urban Land Ceiling Act granting

permission to SSML to transfer the subject premises to

respondent no.1 by way of sale.

(b) the agreements dated 5

th

May, 1976 and 1

st

September,

1976 whereby respondent no.1 had let out a portion of

the property on the first and second floor to the

Collector of Customs through President of India. Even

after the 1983 Act and the 1995 Act, the President of

India through the Collector of Customs continued the

agreements with respondent no.1. At no stage did the

Collector of Customs approached the Central Government

or appellant;

(c) BMC made separate property tax assessment in the

name of respondent no.1

(d) the property tax assessed and paid by respondent

no.1 to the Bombay Municipal Corporation

(e) BMC granted separate water connection in the name

of respondent no.1 vide its letter dated 20

th

July,

1981.

(f) NOC dated 5

th

February, 1982 issued u/s 230A(1) by

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the Income Tax Authorities in respect of the sale of

the subject premises.

(g) The order of the Recovery Officer, Provident Fund

and Labour Dues dated 5

th

February, 1983 inter alia

stating that the attachment on Plot No.9 (part) was

raised and vacated as the building on Plot No.9 (part)

was agreed to be sold by SSML to respondent no.1

(h) Though the 1983 Act had come into force, the

Customs Department in 1993 surrendered 12571 sq.ft out

of 15805 sq.ft. in its possession on the 1

st

floor of

the subject premises to respondent no.1.

(i) Though the 1995 Act had come into force, the

Customs Department surrendered the remaining 3234

sq.ft in its possession on the first floor and the

entire 8667 sq.ft in its possession on the 2

nd

floor to

respondent no.1 on 26

th

February, 1997.

(j) Letter dated 23

rd

February, 1985 from Valuation

Officer, Income Tax Department to respondent no.1

regarding assessment of rent of the premises of

respondent no.1 occupied by the Customs admeasuring

8667 sq.ft and 15305 sq.ft.

(k) Various letters from Building Department, New

Customs House, Bombay to respondent no.1 regarding

reassessment of rent of premises occupied by Customs

Department.

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6.5. The Correspondence between the parties also shows that the

subject premises were never considered as a part of the textile

undertaking after the same was sold to respondent no.1 in the year

1975.

6.6.It was submitted that the subject premises herein were not

part of the assets or rights or leaseholds or powers or

authorities or privileges or property of the textile company

(SSML) immediately before 1

st

April, 1994. Since the subject

premises and all rights in respect of these premises stood

excluded from the textile undertaking of SSML in 1975, SSML had no

“ownership, possession, power or control” in relation to the said

premises and hence the subject premises stand excluded from the

first part of Section 4(1) of 1995 Act.

6.7. It was further submitted that there is a serious dispute about

title that cannot be resolved under the 1971 Act. The appellant

cannot be permitted to take a unilateral decision in its own favour

that the property belongs to it, and on the basis of such decision

take recourse to the summary remedy. Due process of law in a case

like the present necessarily implies the filing of a suit by the

appellant for enforcement of their alleged rights in respect of the

subject premises.

6.8.Learned Senior Counsel for the respondent no. 1, also relied

upon decisions of this Court in Govt. of A.P. v. Thummala Krishna

Rao and Anr. (1982) 2 SCC 134 wherein the Court held that having

regard to the bona fide title dispute, the respondents cannot be

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evicted summarily; and State of U.P. v. Zia Khan, (1998) 8 SCC 483

wherein this Court held that the question of title cannot be

decided under U.P. Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised

Occupants) Act, 1972 and the decision on the subject had to be made

by either revenue court or civil court.

7.Before adverting to the rival submissions made by the learned

counsels for the parties, it would be necessary to make a brief

reference to the provisions of the 1983 Act and the 1995 Act.

Section 2(d) of the 1983 Act defines “textile undertaking” as

follows:

“(2)(d) “textile undertaking” or “the textile

undertaking” means an undertaking specified in the

second column of the first Schedule;”

Section 3(1) of the 1995 Act provides that on the appointed

date, the right, title and interest of the owner in relation to

every textile undertaking shall stand transferred to and shall vest

absolutely in the Central Government. Sub-section (2) thereof

provides that every textile undertaking which stands vested in the

Central Government by virtue of sub-section (1) shall immediately

after it has so vested, stand transferred to and vested in the

National Textile Corporation.

Section 3 of the 1995 Act reads:

“3(1) On the appointed day, the right, title and

interest of the owner in relation to every textile

undertakings shall stand transferred to, and shall

vest absolutely in, the Central Government.

(2)Every textile undertaking which stands vested in

the Central Government by virtue of sub-section

(1) shall, immediately after it has so vested,

stand transferred to, and vested in, the

National Textile Corporation.”

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The key expression in sub-section (3) for the purposes of

this case is:

“the right, title and interest of the owner in

relation to every textile undertaking”

8.The real issue in the present case is whether the subject

premises can be said to be an asset of the SSML vested with the

State.

9.In National Textile Corporation Ltd. v. Sitaram Mills Ltd. &

Ors. 1986 (Supp.) SCC 117, this Court noticed the stand taken by

parties with regard to property in question. The said case related

to the very same mill SSML. The Division Bench of the High Court

of Bombay on a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of

India filed by SSML while upholding the constitutional validity of

Section 3(1) of the Textile Undertakings (Taking Over of

Management) Act, 1983 held that the surplus land appurtenant to the

mill was not an ‘asset in relation to the textile undertaking’

within the meaning of sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act and

directed the Central Government to restore the possession of the

said land to the Company. Being aggrieved by the said decision the

appellant corporation approached this Court. In the said case this

Court held:

“40…….The legislature in enacting the law for the

taking over of the management of the textile

undertakings therefore clearly had the intention of

taking over the surplus lands of the Company. In our

opinion, the High Court ought to have interpreted sub-

section (2) of Section 3 of the Act in the context of

sub-section (1) thereof and the other provisions of the

Act in consonance with the intention of the

legislature. It was the intention of the legislature to

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take over all the assets belonging to the Company held

in relation to the textile undertaking. The note

attached to the report of the Task Force includes the

total lands belonging to the petitioners’ Company for

the purpose of determining the value of the assets of

the Company and does not exclude the Real Estate

Division. Even for determining the total compensation

to be paid on nationalisation, the Task Force takes

into account the total surplus lands of the Company and

does not exclude any land belonging to the so-called

Real Estate Division. The viability study of the IDBI

also heavily relied on the surplus lands held by the

petitioners’ Company.

41. In the premises, the High Court has manifestly erred

in holding that the said Real Estate Division was

separate and distinct from the textile undertaking.

Surplus lands of the textile mills taken over under

sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act are but a vital

physical resource capable of generating and sustaining

economic growth of the textile mills. There can be no

doubt that the legislative intent and object of the

impugned Act was to secure the socialisation of such

surplus lands with a view to sustain the sick textile

undertakings so that they could be properly utilised by

the Government for social good i.e. in resuscitating

the dying textile undertakings. Hence, a paradoxical

situation should have been avoided by adding a narrow

and pedantic construction of a provision like sub-

section (2) of Section 3 of the Act which provides for

the consequences that ensue upon the taking over in

public interest of the management of a textile

undertaking under sub-section (1) thereof as a step

towards nationalisation of such undertakings, which was

clearly against the national interest. In dealing with

similar legislation, this Court has always adopted a

broad and liberal approach…….”

10.Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent no.1

placed reliance on the aforesaid decision in Sitaram Mills Ltd. to

suggest that the execution of the agreement dated 25

th

March, 1975

was not disputed in the said case.

11.While giving the impugned judgment, the Division Bench of the

High Court also proceeded on such presumption that the property in

question has been sold by the Textile Undertaking and observed as

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follows:

“9………….It would not be out of place to mention that in

an appeal arising out of the judgment of the Division

Bench of this Court in respect of this very Mill, the

Supreme Court has recorded in its judgment that the

property in question has been sold by the textile

undertaking prior to the commencement of the 1983 Act.

There seems to be hardly any dispute about the factual

position. The execution of the agreement dated 25

th

March, 1975 is not disputed. There is also no serious

dispute that the entire consideration has been paid.

Further the transaction is duly substantiated by the

contemporaneous records like the balance sheet, profit

and loss account, the resolution passed by the Board of

Directors, etc. During the period 1975 to 1998 the

property has been dealt with by the petitioner as its

own property. It has been let out to various Government

bodies from time to time. The rent in respect of the

subject premises has been collected by the petitioner

and the tax has always been paid by the petitioner.

Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act furnishes

a statutory defence to a person who has no registered

title deed in his favour to maintain his possession if

he can prove a written and signed contract in his

favour and some action on his part in part performance

of that contract.”

12.From bare perusal of paragraph 35 of decision in Sitaram Mills

Ltd. it is apparent that in the said case the learned counsel for

the Maharashtra Girni Kamgar Union filed a detailed tabular chart

before the Court to demonstrate that the Real Estate Division was

part and parcel of the textile undertaking. In the said chart it

was mentioned that ‘of the remaining plots, on plot no.4

admeasuring 9765 square yards there were certain old godowns of the

textile mill and they were sold by the petitioners (i.e. SSML) to a

charitable trust of the tantias in 1974-75 for setting off loans

taken from the trust for the textile business.’

The aforesaid chart produced by one of the parties before this

Court was though noticed but no finding has been given by this

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Court that the property in question was sold by the textile

undertaking prior to commencement of 1983 Act. On the other hand

if show that the land in question was point of the textile mills.

13.The agreement to sell relied upon by respondent no.1 itself

contains clause 1(d), 2, 3, 6 etc. which mandates the execution of

registered sale-deed or conveyance deed within three years.

However, the same was never done. A suit for specific performance

was filed by respondent no.1 before Bombay High Court against SSML

25 years after unregistered agreement to sell dated 25

th

March,

1975, thereby, acknowledging that there was no registered document

of title with respondent no.1. The said suit is still pending.

14.Section 4 of 1995 Act relates to general effect of vesting.

Relevant parts of which read as follows:-

“4(1).The textile undertakings referred to in Section 3

shall be deemed to include all assets, rights,

leaseholds, powers, authorities and privilege and all

property, moveable and immovable including lands,

buildings, workshops, stores, instruments, machinery

and equipment, cash balances, cash on hand, reserve

funds, investments and book debts pertaining to the

textile undertakings and all other rights and interests

in, or arising out of, such property as were

immediately before the appointed day in the ownership,

possession, power or control of the textile company in

relation to the said undertakings, whether within or

outside India, and all books of account, registers and

all other documents of whatever nature relating thereto

and shall also be deemed to include the liabilities and

obligations specified in sub-section (2) of Section 5.”

“4(2) All property as aforesaid which have vested in

the Central Government under sub-section (1) of Section

3 shall, by force of such vesting, be freed and

discharged from any trust, obligation, mortgage,

charge, lien and all other incumbrances affecting it,

and any attachment, injunction or decree or order of

any court or other authority restricting the use of

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such property in any manner shall be deemed to have

been withdrawn.”

“4(5)For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared

that the mortgage of any property referred in sub-

section (2) or any other person holding any charge,

lien or other interest in, or in relation to, any such

property shall be entitled to claim, in accordance with

his rights and interests, payment of the mortgage money

or other dues, in whole or in part, out of the amounts

specified in relation to such property in the First

Schedule, but no such mortgage, charge, lien or other

interest shall be enforceable against any property

which has vested in the Central Government.”

“4(6) If, on the appointed day, any suit, appeal or

other proceeding of whatever nature in relation to any

property which has vested in the Central Government

under section 3, instituted or preferred by or against

the textile company is pending, the same shall not

abate, be discontinued or be, in any way, prejudicially

affected by reason of the transfer of the textile

undertakings or of anything contained in this Act, but

the suit, appeal or other proceeding may be continued,

prosecuted or enforced by or against the National

Textile Corporation.”

Thus, it is clear that all other rights and interests in or

arising out of such property as were existing immediately before

the appointed day in the ownership, possession, power or control of

the textile company in relation to the said undertaking vested with

the Central Government and by virtue of sub-section (2) of Section

(3) stood transferred to, and vested in, the National Textile

Corporation. Liability if any of the owner of a textile

undertaking i.e. SSML of any period to the appointed day is

liability of such owner (SSML) and can be enforceable against him

and not against the Central Government or the National Textile

Corporation in view of Section 5(1) of 1995 Act, which reads as

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follows:

“5(1) Every liability, other than the liability

specified in sub-section (2), of the owner of a textile

undertaking, in relation to the textile undertakings in

respect of any period prior to the appointed day, shall

be the liability of such owner and shall be enforceable

against him and not against the Central Government or

the National Textile Corporation.”

15.Therefore respondent no.1 cannot derive any advantage against

the Central Government or the National Textile Corporation on the

ground of pendency of a suit against the owner (SSML).

16.In M/s Doypack Systems Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors,

(1988) 2 SCC 299, while dealing with a case involving National

Textile Corporation-appellant herein, the Court noticed the meaning

of the expressions “arising out of, pertaining to and in relation

to” and observed:

“49. The words “arising out of” have been used in the

sense that it comprises purchase of shares and lands

from income arising out of the Kanpur undertaking. We

are of the opinion that the words “pertaining to” and

“in relation to” have the same wide meaning and have

been used interchangeably for among other reasons,

which may include avoidance of repetition of the same

phrase in the same clause or sentence, a method

followed in good drafting. The word “pertain” is

synonymous with the word “relate”, see Corpus Juris

Secundum, Volume 17, page 693.

50. The expression “in relation to” (so also

“pertaining to”), is a very broad expression which

presupposes another subject matter. These are words of

comprehensiveness which might have both a direct

significance as well as an indirect significance

depending on the context, see State Wakf Board v. Abdul

Azeez29, following and approving Nita Charan Bagchi v.

Suresh Chandra Paul30, Shyam Lal v. M. Shyamlal31 and 76

Corpus Juris Secundum 621. Assuming that the

investments in shares and in lands do not form part of

the undertakings but are different subject matters,

even then these would be brought within the purview of

the vesting by reason of the above expressions. In this

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connection reference may be made to 76 Corpus Juris

Secundum at pages 620 and 621 where it is stated that

the term “relate” is also defined as meaning to bring

into association or connection with. It has been

clearly mentioned that “relating to” has been held to

be equivalent to or synonymous with as to “concerning

with” and “pertaining to”. The expression “pertaining

to” is an expression of expansion and not of

contraction.”

17.The First Schedule of the 1995 Act provides the amount which

the Central Government has to pay to the owner of every textile

undertaking for the transfer and vesting of such undertaking to it.

This provision cannot be the starting point of investigation as to

which amount relates to which property or as a guide to

construction (See paragraph 54 of M/s Doypack Systems Pvt. Ltd. v.

Union of India & Ors, (1988) 2 SCC 299).

In the said case of M/s Doypack Systems Pvt. Ltd. the Court

further held:

“57. The expression “and all other rights and interests

in or arising out of such property, as were immediately

before the appointed day, in the ownership, possession,

power or control of the company in relation to the said

undertakings”, appearing in sub-section (1) of Section

4 of the Act indicates that the shares which have been

purchased from out of the funds of the textile

undertakings and which have been held for the benefit

of the said textile undertakings, would come within the

scope of Section 4 of the Act and thus would also vest

in Central Government under Section 3. The origin of

these shares and their connection with the textile

undertakings have been fully corroborated. The textile

business is the only business of Swadeshi Cotton Mills.

There is interconnection and interrelation between all

the six undertakings. Investments in Swadeshi Polytex

Limited from the funds of Kanpur undertaking have

always been made. Investments in Swadeshi Mining and

Manufacturing Company Ltd. were always made from the

funds of the Kanpur undertaking. Assets/ investments

held and used for the benefit of the textile business

of SCM, were carried on in its textile undertakings.”

Therefore, it is clear that the property in question stood

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vested in the Central Government and, in turn, stood transferred

and vested with National Textile Corporation under sub-section (2)

of Section 3 of 1995 Act. Even if it is admitted that respondent

no.1 has acted on the agreement to sell and has paid the entire

consideration, it cannot be a ground to hold that respondent no.1

is authorized occupant within the meaning of Section 2(g) of the

1971 Act.

18.We are of the view that the Division Bench of the High Court

failed to analyze the provisions correctly and wrongly presumed

that the property in question has been sold to the Textile

Undertaking prior to the commencement of 1983 Act. The Court

wrongly relied on Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act to

hold that respondent no.1 has valid defence available under the

said provision and hence erred in holding that respondent no. 1 is

an authorized occupant within the meaning of Section 2(g) of the

1971 Act.

19.For the reasons aforesaid, we set aside the impugned judgment

dated 6

th

February, 2003 passed by the Division Bench of High Court

of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition No.1552 of 2000 and uphold

notices dated 17

th

November, 2000 issued under Sections 4 and 7 of

the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971.

Now, it is open to the Competent Authority/Court to proceed in

accordance with the provisions of the 1971 Act and pass an

appropriate order. The appeal is allowed but there is no order as

to costs.

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………………………………………….J.

(SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)

………………………………………….J.

(PRAFULLA C. PANT)

NEW DELHI;

FEBRUARY 17, 2015.

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