Neutral Citation No. - 2024:AHC:190636

Reserved on 14.11.2024

Delivered on 05.12.2024

A.F.R.

Court No. - 36

Case :- FIRST APPEAL No. - 388 of 2015

Appellant :- Natthan Singh

Respondent :- State of U.P. and Others

Counsel for Appellant :- Madan Mohan, Rakesh Pande, Shailesh

K Upadhyay, Shailesh Upadhyay

Counsel for Respondent :- Ashok Mehta, Prabhat Tripathi,

S.C.,Subodh Kumar

Connected with

Case :- FIRST APPEAL No. - 357 of 2016

Appellant :- Ganga Ram And Others

Respondent :- State of U.P.

Counsel for Appellant :- Madan Mohan, Shailesh Upadhyay

Counsel for Respondent :- S.C., Subodh Kumar

and

Case :- FIRST APPEAL No. - 1104 of 2003

Appellant :- State of U.P.

Respondent :- Nathan

Counsel for Appellant :- S.C., Manoj Kumar Singh, Subodh

Kumar, Udit Chandra

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Counsel for Respondent :- Rakesh Pande, Shailesh Upadhyay

and

Case :- FIRST APPEAL No. - 1138 of 2003

Appellant :- State

Respondent :- Ganga Ram

Counsel for Appellant :- S.C., Subodh Kumar, Udit Chandra

Counsel for Respondent :- Rakesh Pande, Shailesh Upadhyay

Hon'ble Kshitij Shailendra,J.

APPEALS ARISING OUT OF LAND ACQUISITION

REFERENCES

1. Heard Shri Shailesh Upadhyay, learned counsel appearing

for the claimants/tenure holders in all matters and Shri Subodh

Kumar alongwith Shri Udit Chandra, learned counsel appearing

for C.P.W.D. as well as U.O.I. at length.

2. Since common questions of fact and law are involved in

all the matters, the same are being decided by common

judgment. Distinguishing features of individual cases, if any,

would reflect at appropriate places in this judgment or in the

judgment/order passed in such matters separately. For the

convenience sake, First Appeal No. 388 of 2015 is being treated

as the leading appeal.

3. The instant appeal is directed against the judgment and

order dated 30.03.1991 passed by learned Additional District

Judge, Ghaziabad in Land Acquisition Reference No. 29 of 1987.

The land in dispute situates in village Raispur, Tehsil and District

Ghaziabad. The description of area and all gatas number does not

seem to be relevant as the issue involved in all these matters

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revolves around few orders passed by this Court earlier in other

matters and few orders passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court. As a

matter of fact, these appeals are to be decided in the light of

effect of those decided proceedings.

BRIEF FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

4. The land of tenure holders, namely, Ran Singh, Ganga

Ram, Nathhan Singh, Khoob Singh, Ram Kishan etc. was

acquired by the State of U.P. for the purposes of development by

the Central Public Works Department (hereinafter referred to as

“C.P.W.D.”). Notification under Section 4 of the Land

Acquisition Act, 1894 was issued on 28.12.1963 that was

published on 04.01.1964. It was followed by notification under

Section 6 of the Act published on 24.07.1965. A corrigendum

was issued on 10.10.1972 regarding certain plots that were

skipped in the earlier notifications and, consequently, the left-out

plots were also included in the acquired land. State Government

took possession over the acquired land on 09.03.1973. An award

was published by the Special Land Acquisition Officer

(hereinafter referred to as “S.L.A.O.”) on 22.09.1986 awarding

compensation at the rate of Rs. 1.90/- per Sq. Yd.

5.Five land owners filed Land Acquisition References

(hereinafter referred to as “L.A.Rs.”) seeking enhancement of

compensation. These L.A.Rs. were clubbed together with

following details and were jointly decided by the reference court

by judgment dated 30.03.1991 enhancing compensation from

Rs.1.90/- per Sq. Yd. to Rs. 8/- per Sq. Yd.:-

(i) L.A.R. No. 25 of 1987 (Ran Singh and others vs. State

of U.P.)

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(ii) L.A.R. No. 26 of 1987 (Ganga Ram and others vs.

State of U.P.)

(iii) L.A.R. No. 27 of 1987 (Ram Kishan vs. State of U.P.)

(iv) L.A.R. No. 29 of 1987 (Natthan and others vs. State

of U.P.)

(v) L.A.R. No. 30 of 1987 (Khoob Singh and another vs.

State of U.P.)

6.Three (3) land owners, out of five (5), filed following First

Appeals before this Court:-

(i) First Appeal No. 809 of 1993 (Ran Singh vs. State of

U.P.)

(ii) First Appeal (Defective) No. 322 of 1992 (Natthan and

others vs. State of U.P.) ( subsequently registered as

regular First Appeal No. 388 of 2015, i.e. the instant

leading appeal).

(iii) First Appeal (Defective) No. 248 of 1992 (Ganga Ram

and others vs. State of U.P.) (subsequently registered as

regular First Appeal No. 357 of 2016)

7.State of U.P. also filed five (5) First Appeals against

Reference Court’s order dated 30.03.1991with following details:-

(i) First Appeal (Defective) No. 612 of 1991 (State of U.P.

vs. Ran Singh) (subsequently renumbered as First Appeal

No. 1140 of 2003)

(ii) First Appeal (Defective) No. 614 of 1991 ( State of

U.P. vs. Ram Kishan) (subsequently renumbered as First

Appeal No. 1119 of 2003)

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(iii) First Appeal (Defective) No. 609 of 1991 (State of

U.P. vs. Khoob Singh) (subsequently renumbered as First

Appeal No. 1143 of 2003)

(iv) First Appeal (Defective) No. 613 of 1991 (State of

U.P. vs. Natthan) (renumbered as First Appeal No. 1104 of

2003)

(v) First Appeal (Defective) No. 611 of 1991 (State of U.P.

vs. Ganga Ram) (renumbered as First Appeal No. 1138 of

2003)

8.First Appeal No. 809 of 1993 (Ran Singh vs. State of U.P.)

(herein-after referred to as “Ran Singh’s case”) was allowed by

this Court by judgment dated 10.01.2002 enhancing

compensation from Rs.8/- per Sq. Yd to Rs. 84/- per Sq. Yd. In

the meantime, some affected land holders filed applications

under Section 28-A of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 that were

allowed by the S.L.A.O. and an award was declared on

16.08.1992. Being aggrieved, Union of India preferred Writ

Petition Nos. 31447 of 1992, 31448 of 1992, 31449 of 1992,

31450 of 1992 that were allowed by a Division Bench of this

Court by a common order dated 27.03.2003, the award dated

16.08.1992 was quashed with further observation that

“applications under Section 28-A shall be kept pending by the

Collector/Land Acquisition Officer and shall be decided in

accordance with law after the decisions in pending first appeals”,

i.e. above-referred first appeals filed by the State of U.P.

9.Challenging the aforesaid order dated 10.01.2002 passed

in Ran Singh’s case enhancing compensation from Rs.8/- per Sq.

Yd to Rs. 84/- per Sq. Yd, the State of U.P. filed Special Leave

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Petition No. 5022 of 2004 (S.L.P. No. at some places is

described as 3022 but the case is same) before the Supreme

Court that was rejected on the ground of delay on 19.07.2004.

The State of U.P. filed Review Application No. 227 of 2005,

which was also rejected on 15.02.2005 after condoning the delay.

Thereafter, C.P.W.D. filed a review application alongwith

impleadment application before this Court seeking review of the

order dated 10.01.2002 passed in Ran Singh’s case. The said

applications were rejected by this Court on 12.08.2009 as barred

by time and after making certain other observations. Challenging

the order dated 12.08.2009, C.P.W.D. filed S.L.P. Nos. 16202-

16203 of 2010, which were dismissed by the Supreme Court on

18.07.2011 with observation that the question whether the

acquiring body was a necessary party or not, was not gone into

S.L.Ps..

10.Taking aid of observations made in order dated

18.07.2011, C.P.W.D. and U.O.I. filed impleadment applications

in the pending appeals and the same were allowed.

Consequently, in the appeals filed by the State of U.P., C.P.W.D.

and U.O.I. were impleaded as appellants whereas in the appeals

filed by the tenure holders, they were impleaded as respondents.

The orders allowing impleadment applications were never

challenged and, therefore, these appeals were heard by and

against the said impleaded parties. The Court may observe here

that in orders dated 01.11.2017 passed in First Appeal Nos. 1104-

2003 and 1138-2003 it has already been observed that State had

chosen not to press these appeals and the appeals shall remain

only at the instance of C.P.W.D./Union of India.

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11.When the appeals came up for joint consideration on

merits, this Court, after taking into consideration the above-

referred orders passed by this Court and the Supreme Court in

Ran Singh’s case, dismissed the First Appeal No. 1119 of 2003

(State of U.P. vs. Ram Kishan) by order dated 06.11.2012

observing finality attached to the determination of market value

of the property and non-filing of any cross-objections or cross

appeals against the award of the Reference Court.

12.Thereafter, successors of late Ram Kishan, i.e.,

respondents in First Appeal No. 1119 of 2003, filed delay

condonation application, leave to press an abatement application

accompanied by review application with the contention that the

appeal could not be decided on merits as factum of death of Ram

Kishan was not brought to the notice of the Court and, hence, the

appeal had stood abated by operation of law. This Court, by

order dated 02.02.2016, allowed the review application, recalled

the order dated 06.11.2012 and another order dated 26.08.2015

earlier dismissing the application seeking leave to press an

abatement application, restored the said application to its original

number, allowed the abatement application and dismissed the

appeal as abated. This Court, however, made it clear that order

dismissing the appeal as abated would be read in relation to the

First Appeal No. 1119 of 2003 (State vs. Ram Kishan) only and

insofar as other four connected appeals are concerned, the order

dated 06.11.2012 would remain operative. It is needless to

mention that on 06.11.2012 when First Appeal No. 1119 of 2003

(State vs. Ram Kishan) was dismissed on merits, connected First

Appeal Nos. 1140 of 2003 (State vs. Ran Singh) 1143 of 2003

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(State vs. Khaoob Singh) were also dismissed for the reasons

given in the order deciding First Appeal No. 1119 of 2003.

POINTS FOR DETERMINATION

13.Having heard learned counsel for the parties, following

points for determination arise for consideration in these appeals:-

1.“Whether in view of the judgment/order of

this Court dated 10.01.2002 passed in First

Appeal No. 809 of 1993 (Ran Singh’s case)

having travelled upto the Supreme Court,

C.P.W.D. and/or U.O.I, have been left with any

say in the matter and can determination of

compensation as Rs.84/- per Sq. Yd. be set

aside/reduced by this Court ignoring doctrine of

merger?”

2.Whether the tenure holders having not

raised a claim pursuant to notice issued under

section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as it

then existed, they are, at all, entitled for any

amount over and above the one awarded by the

S.L.A.O. in view of bar contained in section 25?

ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF TENURE

HOLDERS

14.Shri Shailesh Upadhyay, learned counsel appearing for the

tenure-holders, vehemently argued that once this Court enhanced

compensation from Rs.8/- per Sq. Yd. to Rs. 84/- per Sq.Yd. and

the said judgment was carried upto the Supreme Court by the

State of U.P. and also by C.P.W.D. and U.O.I. and the Supreme

Court dismissed the S.L.Ps. as well as review application

granting no relief to either State of U.P. or C.P.W.D. or U.O.I., no

contrary view can be taken by this Court against the

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determination of compensation at the rate of Rs.84/- per Sq. Yd.

and, hence, all the appeals filed by C.P.W.D. and U.O.I. are liable

to be dismissed and those filed by the tenure-holders are entitled

to be allowed determining compensation at the rate of Rs. 84/-

per Sq.Yd. It was also argued that when the Reference Court

decided five L.A.Rs. by judgment dated 30.03.1991, the Special

Land Acquisition Officer, Joint Organization, Ghaziabad wrote a

letter dated 13.05.1991 to the concerned Engineer of C.P.W.D.,

Hinden, Ghaziabad asking him to furnish his opinion regarding

filing of appeal against the order of Reference Court and

associated aspects like expenses qua the same. Responding to the

said letter, the concerned Engineer of C.P.W.D. sent a

communication dated 27.06.1991 to the S.L.A.O stating that

since the Department was not a party to the proceedings and was

informed at the very last stage, it was not possible for the

Department to prefer appeal, until and unless the Department

was arrayed as a party. The Engineer asked the S.L.A.O to file an

appeal at his own end. Submission is that once C.P.W.D.

expressed its reluctance to challenge the decision of the

Reference Court and asked State to prefer appeal and, once, the

State preferred appeals and lost from this Court and, then, upto

the Supreme Court, C.P.W.D. cannot make any submission

against the determination which has attained finality. It has

further been argued that even if C.P.W.D. has made submissions

in this case, since all the tenure holders are identically placed and

their land was also acquired under same notifications, they are

entitled for the same rate of compensation as has been

determined in Ran Singh’s case.

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ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF C.P.W.D. AND

U.O.I.

15.Per contra, Shri Subodh Kumar alongwith Shri Udit

Chandra, learned counsel for C.P.W.D. and U.O.I., vehemently

opposed each and every submission advanced on behalf of tenure

holders. Their arguments are as under:-

(i) C.P.W.D. and U.O.I. not being parties to the

proceedings, determination made on the contest made by

the State of U.P. would not affect their rights and

contentions and, in view of decision of the Supreme Court

in Uttar Pradesh Awas Vikas vs. Gyan Devi (deceased),

1995 (2) SCC 326, they have their own legal right to

contest and press the matter.

(ii) S.L.P. No. 5022 of 2004 preferred by the State of U.P.

against the judgment and order dated 10.01.2002 passed in

Ran Singh’s case was dismissed only on the ground of

delay by order dated 19.07.2004, which order would not

amount to merger of the order of this Court, at least

adversely affecting the rights of C.P.W.D. and U.O.I.

(iii) Order dated 15.02.2005 rejecting the Review

Application No. 227 of 2005 filed by the State even after

condoning the delay would not result in closure of rights

of C.P.W.D. and U.O.I. to lay their challenge to the

determination made at the rate of Rs.84/- per Sq. Yd.

(iv) Though, C.P.W.D.’s/U.O.I.’s review application in Ran

Singh’s case, was dismissed on 12.08.2009 by this Court

on the ground of delay and S.L.Ps. No. 16202-16203 of

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2010 filed their-against, were dismissed by the Supreme

Court on 18.07.2011, since the Supreme Court clearly

observed that the question of acquiring body being a

necessary party had not been gone into in the said S.L.Ps.

and, subsequently, the C.P.W.D. and U.O.I. have been

impleaded in these proceedings, they have their own say in

the matter and, hence, their rights cannot be curtailed

merely on the basis of determination made in Ran Singh’s

case. Further in none of the S.L.Ps., leave was granted by

Supreme Court, therefore, doctrine of merger would not

apply in the instant case.

(v) Judgment dated 10.01.2002 passed in Ran Singh’s case

runs on absolutely wrong premise recording entirely

different facts having no concern with the present lis. This

Court began judgment in Ran Singh’s case with the

statement that “the Ghaziabad Development Authority

framed a scheme for development of the City within the

municipal limits and for that purposes the land of the

appellants and of other persons was acquired”, whereas the

instant case has no concern with Ghaziabad Development

Authority nor did the said Authority ever frame any

scheme; rather it was the State of U.P. that acquired land

for the project, namely, ‘Central Public Works Department

for constructions of quarters of Government Employees’.

(vi) In Ran Singh’s case, this Court described notification

under Section 6 of the Act having been issued on

22.09.1986, whereas, in the instant case notification under

Section 6 is 21 years old and is dated 20.07.1965.

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(vii) In Ran Singh’s case, acquisition was referred to in

relation to development of two colonies within the

municipal limits of Ghaziabad whereas, in other cases, the

construction of houses for employees of C.P.W.D. was to

be made over 31 acres of Mauza Sahari, Pargana Loni,

District Meerut, 353 acres of Mauza Harson, Pargana

Dasna, district Meerut and 371 acres of Mauza Raispur,

Pargana Dasna, District Meerut.

(viii) In Ran Singh’s case, basis of the order was location

of land of Sewak Ram and Anoop Singh situated in village

Jatwara Kalan, District Ghaziabad for development of

some colonies, though notification under Section 4

regarding land of Jatwara Kalan was issued on 18.06.1962,

Section 6 notification was dated 27.10.1964, possession

was taken on 22.12.1964 and the award was declared on

26.06.1967. However, the issues involved in the present

case arise out of acquisition made by the State of U.P.

pursuant to the notifications of other dates in relation to

other land having a different identity and location,

possession whereof was taken on different dates and award

was also made on a different date.

(ix) Judgment dated 10.01.2002 is based upon the

judgment of Anoop Singh and others, who had filed First

Appeal No. 288 of 1985 against the decision of Reference

Court dated 31.05.1984 in L.A.Rs No. 376 of 1982 and the

said appeal was decided by this Court on 05.02.1993

awarding compensation at the rate of Rs.84/- per Sq. Yd.

Anoop Singh’s case arose from acquisition made by the

Improvement Trust, Ghaziabad that had framed scheme for

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planned development in relation to village Jatwara Kalan

and the discussion made in the judgment of the Reference

Court as well as this Court was entirely on different

parameters, particularly, when the Court had found user of

the land acquired for commercial purposes, which is not

the case here.

(x) In Anoop Singh’s case, the land acquired was found to

be in close vicinity of Basant Cinema, Chaudhary Market,

Power House, Shops, Halwara Residential Colony,

Chaudhary Hammer Factory and other commercial

properties having higher value, which is not the case here.

(xi) Any adjudication based on suppression or non-

disclosure of relevant material documents and facts would

amount to nullity and, therefore, the decision in Ran

Singh’s case would not prejudice rights and contention of

C.P.W.D./U.O.I., i.e. acquiring body.

(xii) C.P.W.D. has already deposited compensation in

favour of Additional District Judge, Vth Ghaziabad and the

same was disbursed to the land owners of First Appeal No.

809 of 1993 (Ran Singh and others vs. State of U.P. and

others) and no parity can be claimed in alive matters.

16.Shri Subodh Kumar, learned counsel has raised another

argument with quite vehemence, based upon Section 25 read

with Section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as applicable

at the time of issuance of notifications. He submits that Section

25 provides that when the applicant has made a claim for

compensation pursuant to any notice under Section 9 of the Act,

the award shall not exceed the amount so claimed nor would it be

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less than the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11

of the Act, however, in case the applicant has refused or omitted

to make such claim, the amount awarded by the Court shall, in

no case, exceed the amount awarded by the Collector. The

contention, therefore, is that since none of the claimants in these

appeals ever made a claim for enhanced compensation after

S.L.A.O. had declared the award and in pursuance of notice

under Section 9, amount of compensation in relation to such non-

objectors would not exceed Rs.1.90/- per Sq. Yd. He further

submitted that notice under Section 9 of the Act was issued to all

affected tenure-holders on 20.01.1973 fixing 05.02.1973 as the

date for hearing their objections but none of the claimants

responded to the notice and the award itself shows that the

objections of the tenure-holders other than the claimants

involved in these appeals were filed and considered. Shri Subodh

Kumar, in support of his argument based upon applicability of

Section 25 of the Act, placed reliance upon certain authorities,

reference whereof would come in the later part of this judgment.

The Court may also observe here that when the appeal was heard

by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court on 22.05.2017, this Court

passed an order granting adjournment to the claimants’ counsel

to prepare the matter in the light of provisions contained in

unamended Section 9 read with Section 25 of the Land

Acquisition Act.

17.As regards arguments of Shri Subodh Kumar in relation to

Section 25 of the Act, Shri Shailesh Upadhyay, learned counsel

for tenure holders vehemently argued that the tenure holders had

filed objections before the S.LA.O and he specifically referred to

Objection No. 4 mentioned in the award. In this regard, Shri

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Subodh Kumar submitted that one of the objectors to the

Objection No. 4 was Ram Kishan Pradhan, who did not object in

relation to the amount of compensation, rather, he stated that

there was a public rasta in certain Khasras, which should also be

acquired. As regards other objections, though it is mentioned that

56 objections were filed, Shri Subodh Kumar submits that they

were not in pursuance of the notice issued to the tenure holders

under Section 9 of the Act, rather, the award specifically

mentions that these objections were filed under Section 5-A of

the Act pursuant to the notification issued under Section 4(1) of

the Act.

ANALYSIS OF RIVAL CONTENTIONS AND DISCUSSION

ON POINTS FOR DETERMINATION

FIRST POINT:

“Whether in view of the judgment/order of this

Court dated 10.01.2002 passed in First Appeal

No. 809 of 1993 (Ran Singh’s case) having

travelled upto the Supreme Court, C.P.W.D.

and/or U.O.I, have been left with any say in the

matter and can determination of compensation as

Rs.84/- per Sq. Yd. be set aside/reduced by this

Court ignoring doctrine of merger?”

18. First of all, the Court may observe that Ran Singh’s case

was decided on 10.01.2002 against which State filed Special

Leave Petition No. 5022 of 2004 that was rejected on the ground

of delay on 19.07.2004 and review also met the same fate. In

view of above, it is apparent that it was the State of U.P that has

lost the matter before the Supreme Court in terms of dismissal of

its S.L.P. on the ground of delay without granting leave to file

appeal and, hence, the present matter is not being heard and

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decided inter se State and tenure holders. Though, it is true that

C.P.W.D./U.O.I. had also approached the Supreme Court after

their review application in Ran Singh’s case was rejected by this

Court, the Supreme Court, while dismissing the S.L.Ps. No.

16202-16203 of 2010, clearly observed that the question whether

acquiring body is a necessary party or not, has not been gone into

by the Supreme Court in the said S.L.Ps. Apparently, dismissal of

these S.L.Ps. was also in view of order dated 19.07.2004 passed

in State’s S.L.P., i.e. on the ground of delay. Question of grant of

leave, therefore, did not arise in case of C.P.W.D./U.O.I. too. For

a ready reference, all the orders passed by the Supreme Court are

quoted hereunder: -

Special Leave Petition No. 5022 of 2004 ( U.P. State vs Ran

Singh and others), order dated 19.07.2004:

“The special leave petition is dismissed on

the ground of delay.”

Review Petition No. 227 of 2005 (U.P. State vs. Ran Singh and

others), order dated 15.02.2005:

“ Delay condoned.

We have carefully gone through the

review petition and the annexures thereto.

We do not find any merit in the same.

Hence, the review petition is dismissed.”

Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 16202-16203

of 2010 (Union of India and another vs. Ran Singh and others)

Order dated 18.07.2011:-

“ Delay condoned.

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The Special Leave Petitions are dismissed

in view of order dated 19.07.2004 passed in

SLP (C) No. 3022/2004. The question

whether the acquiring body is a necessary

party or not is not gone into in the present

SLPs.”

(It appears that S.L.P. No. 3022/2004 is a typographical

error. Correct number appears to be 5022 of 2004.)

19.It is, therefore, clear that the Supreme Court did not

examine the effect of non-impleadment of C.P.W.D./U.O.I. as a

party in the proceedings decided upto the Supreme Court and all

the matters, whether of State or of C.P.W.D./U.O.I. were not

entertained on the ground of delay except that rejection of

Review Petition No. 227 of 2005 filed by the State is after

condoning delay in filing review but that would not, with due

respect, amount to an order granting leave to file appeal against

final order dated 10.01.2002 passed in Ran Singh’s case.

Ultimately, the impleadment applications filed by

C.P.W.D./U.O.I. in the pending proceedings were allowed, orders

to which effect have never been assailed. Hence, right of hearing

in toto has been given to C.P.W.D./U.O.I.

20.On the question of merger, reliance was placed by Shri

Subodh Kumar on Supreme Court’s judgment in State of U.P.

and another vs. Virendra Bahadur Katheria and others, 2024 (3)

SLJ 1, where doctrine of merger, in a case where special leave

petition was dismissed in limine, was dealt with in the light of

various judicial precedents and it was held that such a dismissal

would not amount to merger. Relevant paragraphs of Virendra

Bahadur Katheria (supra) are reproduced hereunder:-

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……..(iii) Doctrine of merger is not a doctrine

of universal or unlimited application. It will

depend on the nature of jurisdiction exercised

by the superior forum and the content or

subject-matter of challenge laid or capable of

being laid shall be determinative of the

applicability of merger. The superior

jurisdiction should be capable of reversing,

modifying or affirming the order put in issue

before it. Under Article 136 of the Constitution

the Supreme Court may reverse, modify or

affirm the judgment-decree or order appealed

against while exercising its appellate

jurisdiction and not while exercising the

discretionary jurisdiction disposing of petition

for special leave to appeal. The doctrine of

merger can therefore be applied to the former

and not to the latter.

(iv) An order refusing special leave to appeal

may be a non- speaking order or a speaking

one. In either case it does not attract the

doctrine of merger. An order refusing special

leave to appeal does not stand substituted in

place of the order under challenge. All that it

means is that the Court was not inclined to

exercise its discretion so as to allow the appeal

being filed.

(v) If the order refusing leave to appeal is a

speaking order, i.e. gives reasons for refusing

the grant of leave, then the order has two

implications. Firstly, the statement of law

contained in the order is a declaration of law

by the Supreme Court within the meaning of

Article 141 of the Constitution. Secondly, other

than the declaration of law, whatever is stated

in the order are the findings recorded by the

Supreme Court which would bind the parties

thereto and also the court, tribunal or authority

in any proceedings subsequent thereto by way

of judicial discipline, the Supreme Court being

the apex court of the country. But, this does not

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amount to saying that the order of the court,

tribunal or authority below has stood merged in

the order of the Supreme Court rejecting

special leave petition or that the order of the

Supreme Court is the only order binding as res

judicata in subsequent proceedings between

the parties.

(vi) Once leave to appeal has been granted and

appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court has

been invoked the order passed in appeal would

attract the doctrine of merger; the order may be

of reversal, modification or merely affirmation.

[Emphasis supplied] ”

21.On the question of decision for want of disclosure of

relevant material documents, Shri Subodh Kumar placed reliance

upon the judgment of Supreme Court in Ram Kumar vs. State of

U.P. and others, AIR 2022 SC 4705, paragraph 21 whereof reads

as under:-

“21. This Court, in the case of S.P. Chengalvaraya

Naidu (Dead) By LRs. Vs. Jagannath (Dead) by LRs

and others (1994) 1 SCC 1, has held that non-

disclosure of the relevant and material documents

with a view to obtain an undue advantage would

amount to fraud. It has been held that the judgment or

decree obtained by fraud is to be treated as a nullity.

We find that respondent No.9 has not only suppressed

a material fact but has also tried to mislead the High

Court. On this ground also, the present appeal

deserves to be allowed.”

22.As far as distinguishing features in between the case of

Ran Singh and those involved in the present appeals are

concerned, a bare perusal of the judgment dated 10.01.2002

passed in Ran Singh’s case would reflect that the said judgment

runs on entirely different facts having no concern with the

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present lis. This Court began judgment in Ran Singh’s case with

the statement that “the Ghaziabad Development Authority

framed a scheme for development of the City within the

municipal limits and for that purposes the land of the appellants

and of other persons was acquired” whereas the instant case has

no concern with Ghaziabad Development Authority nor did the

said Authority ever frame any scheme, rather it was the State of

U.P. that acquired land for the project, namely, ‘Central Public

Works Department for constructions of quarters of Government

Employees’. In Ran Singh’s case, this Court described

notification under Section 6 of the Act having been issued on

22.09.1986, whereas, in the instant case notification under

Section 6 was issued 21 years ago, i.e. on 20.07.1965. In Ran

Singh’s case, acquisition was referred to in relation to the

development of two colonies within the municipal limits of

Ghaziabad, whereas, in other cases the construction of houses for

employees of C.P.W.D. was to be made over 31 acres of Mauza

Sahari, Pargana Loni, District Meerut, 353 acres of Mauza

Harson, Pargana Dasna, district Meerut and 371 acres of Mauza

Raispur, Pargana Dasna, District Meerut. In Ran Singh’s case,

basis of the order was location of land of Sewak Ram and Anoop

Singh situated in village Jatwara Kalan, District Ghaziabad for

development of some colonies, though notification under Section

4 regarding land of Jatwara Kalan was issued on 18.06.1962,

Section 6 notification was dated 27.10.1964, possession was

taken on 22.12.1964 and the award was declared on 26.06.1967,

whereas the issues involved in the present case arise out of

acquisition made by the State of U.P. pursuant to the notifications

of altogether different dates in relation to land having a different

identity and location, possession whereof was taken on different

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dates and award was also made on a different date. Judgment in

Ran Singh’s case is based upon the judgment of Anoop Singh

and others, who had filed First Appeal No. 288 of 1985 against

the decision of Reference Court dated 31.05.1984 in L.A.Rs No.

376 of 1982 and the said appeal was decided by this Court on

05.02.1993 awarding compensation at the rate of Rs.84/- per Sq.

Yd. Anoop Singh’s case arose from acquisition made by the

Improvement Trust, Ghaziabad that had framed scheme for

planned development in relation to village Jatwara Kalan and the

discussion made in the judgment of the Reference Court as well

as this Court was entirely on different parameters. In Anoop

Singh’s case, the land acquired was found to be in close vicinity

of Basant Cinema, Chaudhary Market, Power House, Shops,

Halwara Residential Colony, Chaudhary Hammer Factory and

other commercial properties having higher value, which is not

the case here.

23.This Court is conscious of the fact that it is not deciding a

review application against the order dated 10.01.2002 but, at the

same time, since C.P.W.D./U.O.I. were not parties to the lis

culminating into the order dated 10.01.2002, the contentions

raised by them, pursuant to their impleadment in the light of

order of Supreme Court in S.L.Ps. filed by C.P.W.D./U.O.I.,

cannot be shut down or given a go by and effect of order dated

10.01.2002 on matters not decided by then or thereafter has to be

seen, particularly inter se C.P.W.D./U.O.I. and tenure holders

looking at all aspects involved. This is also for the reason that

doctrine or merger would not apply in this case and the points

that were not raised by the State of U.P. nor could it be raised by

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it, cannot be restricted to be raised by the acquiring body, i,.e,

C.P.W.D./U.O.I.

24. The first point, therefore, is decided in favour of

C.P.W.D./U.O.I. holding that the adjudication made by this Court

in Ran Singh’s case would not amount to merger or confirmation

of this Court’s judgment dated 10.01.2002 in the Supreme

Court’s orders, at least affecting or prejudicing any right of

acquiring body, i.e. C.P.W.D./U.O.I., to get the determination of

compensation as Rs.84/- per Sq. Yd. Set aside/reduced.

SECOND POINT:

“Whether the tenure holders having not raised a

claim pursuant to notice issued under section 9 of

the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as it then existed,

they are, at all, entitled for any amount over and

above the one awarded by the S.L.A.O. in view of

bar contained in section 25?”

25.Now coming to the arguments based upon Sections 9 and

25 of the Act of 1894 as existing at the time of issuance of

notifications giving rise to these cases, it would be signifiant to

note that the said aspect has remained untouched in Ran Singh’s

matter. It is apt to quote the said provisions for a ready

reference:-

“9. Notice to persons interested- (1) The Collector

shall then cause public notice to be given at

convenient places on or near the land to be taken,

stating that the Government intends to take

possession of the land, and that claims to

compensation for all interests in such land may be

made to him.

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(2) Such notice shall state the particulars of the land

so needed, and shall require all persons interested in

the land to appear personally or by agent before the

Collector at a time and place therein mentioned (such

time not being earlier than fifteen days after the date

of publication of the notice), and to state the nature of

their respective interests in the land and the amount

and particulars of their claims to compensation for

such interests, and their objections (if any) to the

measurements made under Section 8. The Collector

may in any case require such statement to be made in

writing and signed by the party or his agent.

(3) The Collector shall also serve notice to the same

effect on the occupier (if any) of such land and on all

such persons known or believed to be interested

therein, or to be entitled to act for persons so

interested, as reside or have agents authorised to

receive service on their behalf, within the revenue

district in which the land is situate.

(4) In case any person so interested resides elsewhere,

and has no such agent, the notice shall be sent to him

by post in a letter addressed to him at his last known

residence, address or place of business and registered

under Part III of the Indian Post Office Act, 1866.”

"25. Rules as to amount of compensation- (1) When

the applicant has made a claim to compensation,

pursuant to any notice given under Section 9, the

amount awarded to him by the Court shall not exceed

the amount so claimed or be less than the amount

awarded by the Collector under Section 11.

(2) When the applicant has refused to make such

claim or has omitted without sufficient reason (to be

allowed by the Judge) to make such claim, the

amount awarded by the Court shall in no case exceed

the amount awarded by the Collector.

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(3) When the applicant has omitted for a sufficient

reason (to be allowed by the Judge) to make such

claim the amount awarded to him by the Court shall

not be less than, and may exceed, the amount

awarded by the Collector."

26.It has been found in these matters that the objector in the

Objection No. 4 was one Ram Kishan Pradhan, who did not

object in relation to the amount of compensation, rather, he

stated that there was a public rasta in certain Khasras, which

should also be acquired. As regards other objections, though it is

mentioned that 56 objections were filed, the Court finds that they

were not in pursuance of notice issued under Section 9 of the

Act, rather, the same were under Section 5-A of the Act. Scope of

objections under both provisions of law is altogether different

and this Court, by no stretch of imagination, can substitute

objection under one statutory provision by an objection under

another statutory provision, particularly when the appeal does

not arise out of challenge to the acquisition made but is an appeal

challenging the judgment of Reference Court. Therefore, this

Court is of the view that the claimants involved in these appeals

had not made any claim pursuant to notice issued under Section

9 of the Act. Even no dispute regarding service of notice has

been raised before this Court. Therefore, this Court cannot ignore

the rider contained in Section 25 in clear and unambiguous terms

restricting the rights of such claimants to make any claim over

and above the one contained in award passed by the

Collector/S.L.A.O.

27.Reference to judgment of Supreme Court cited by Shri

Subodh Kumar as reported in Dadoo Yogendranath Singh and

others vs. The Collector, Seoni , 1977 (2) SCC 1, can be made

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here. In paragraph No. 6 of the said judgment, Hon’ble Supreme

Court held as under:-

“6. On merits, we find, in agreement with the High

Court, that the District Judge was palpably wrong

inasmuch as he awarded compensation at a rate far

higher than what had been claimed by the appellants

themselves, pursuant to the notice under Section 9 of

the Act. The learned Additional District Judge acted

contrary to the legislative mandate contained in

Section 25 (1) of the Act, according to which, the

Court "shall not award" compensation to an applicant

in excess of the amount claimed by him pursuant to

any notice under Section 9.”

28.On the same issue, the matter again travelled up to

Supreme Court in Gobardhan Mahto vs. State of Bihar, 1979 (4)

SCC 330 in paragraph 8 whereof the Supreme Court held as

under:-

“8. It is urged by the learned counsel that, at any rate,

there was no justification for the High Court for

reducing the compensation awarded for the well. The

short answer to this contention is to be found in the

provisions of Section 25 of the Land Acquisition Act.

By sub-section (1) of that section, when an applicant

makes a claim to compensation pursuant to a notice

given to him under Section 9, the amount awarded to

him by the Court shall not exceed the amount so

claimed. By sub-section (2) of Section 25, when the

applicant has refused to make such claim or has

omitted without sufficient reason to make such claim,

the amount awarded by the court shall in no case

exceed that amount awarded by the Collector. It is

common ground that in pursuance of the notice given

under Section 9, the appellant contented himself by

saying that there was a deep and wide well on the

land. He did not ask for any specific amount as

representing the value of the well. The learned

District Judge would appear to have overlooked the

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provisions of Section 25(2) and in any case, his

judgment does not show that he had come to the

conclusion that the appellant was prevented by any

sufficient reason from making a claim for

compensation in respect of the well.”

29.The Supreme Court, even earlier, in Dilawarsab Babusab

Mullasab and others vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, 1975

(1) SCC 158, had explained the aforesaid proposition based upon

Section 25 of the Act and laid down that non-claimants would

not be entitled for any compensation higher than what had been

awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer. Placing reliance upon

the Supreme Court’s judgment in Dilawarsab (supra), the

Division Bench of Bombay High Court in State of Maharashtra

vs. Shanta Bai and another, AIR 1980 Bombay 36, laid down the

same proposition.

30.Shri Shailesh Upadhyay, learned counsel for tenure

holders, however, has placed reliance upon the decisions of

Supreme Court in Ashok Kumar and another vs. State of

Haryana, (2016) 4 SCC 544 and Narendra Kumar and others vs.

State of U.P. and others, 2017 (9) SCC 426 and he submits that

Section 25 of the Act does not create a bar in award of higher

compensation.

31.The Court finds that in Ashok Kumar (supra), the effect of

non-filing of objections under Section 9 was not the matter in

issue before the Supreme Court and the observation made in

paragraph 10 of the report was based upon another judgment in

the case of Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti vs. Kanhaiya Lal and

others, 2002 (7) SCC 756 observing that amended provisions of

Land Acquisition Act would be applicable under which there is

no restriction that award could only be upto the amount claimed

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by the claimant. Similarly, in Narendra Kumar (supra), the matter

had arisen out of notifications issued after the Land Acquisition

Act had been amended w.e.f. 24.09.1984 and the Supreme Court

clearly held that pre-amended provision puts a cap on the

maximum, the compensation by Court should not be beyond the

amount claimed and cannot be less than what was awarded by

the Land Acquisition Collector. The Supreme Court also dealt

with the effect of omission of cap on maximum amount by way

of amendment made in the statute. With due regards to the

decisions of Supreme Court in Ashok Kumar (supra) and

Narendra Kumar (supra), they would be of no help to the tenure

holders, inasmuch as the notifications in the instant case were

issued 20 years prior to the amendment made in the Act and

when Section 25 existed in the statute book. The facts of cited

decisions being clearly distinguishable, with great respect, the

said judgments have no application in the present case, rather

they would be read against the tenure-holders.

32.In view of aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the

considered view that Section 25 of the Act, as existed on the date

of issuance of notifications, would operate as a statutory

obstruction standing against the claimants to claim any higher

compensation over and above Rs.1.90/- per Sq. Yd. as

determined by the S.L.A.O. under the initial award. Further, the

facts noted in the order dated 10.01.2002 based upon Anoop

Singh’s case and the adjudication made on all the parameters

discussed in the said judgment, being totally irrelevant as far as

the controversy involved in these pending appeals is concerned,

this Court is of the view that C.P.W.D./U.O.I. has successfully

established that no amount over and above Rs.1.90/- per Sq. Yd.

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could be awarded as compensation. Second point is also,

accordingly, decided in favour of C.P.W.D./U.O.I.

33.As a consequence of above discussion, following is the

end result of these appeals:-

(i) First Appeal No. 388 of 2015 (Natthan Singh and others

vs. State of U.P.) is dismissed.

(ii) First Appeal No. 357 of 2015 (Ganga Ram and others vs.

State of U.P.) is dismissed.

(iii) First Appeal No. 1104 of 2003 (State of U.P. vs. Nathan)

is allowed.

(iv) First Appeal No. 1138 of 2003 (State of U.P. vs. Ganga

Ram) is allowed.

34.The initial award dated 22.09.1986 passed by the Special

Land Acquisition Officer, Ghaziabad is upheld in favour of

C.P.W.D./U.O.I. Judgment and order dated 30.03.1991 passed

by learned Additional District Judge, Ghaziabad in L.A.R. Nos.

26 of 1987 and 29 of 1987 is set aside.

35. This Court records its all appreciation for Shri Shailesh

Upadhyay, Shri Subodh Kumar and Shri Udit Chandra, learned

Advocates, for very ably presenting the cases and assisting the

Court in deciding these old matters arising out of acquisition

made in the decade of 1960.

Order Date :- 05.12.2024

Sazia

(Kshitij Shailendra, J.)

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