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Ncc Limited Vs. Indian Oil Corporation Limited

  Delhi High Court O.M.P. (MISC.) (COMM.) 592/2025
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Case Background

As per case facts, a company petitioned the court to extend the time limit for an arbitrator to finish proceedings and pass an award. The delay was caused by the ...

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O.M.P. (MISC) (COMM) 592/2025 Page 1 of 17

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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Judgment reserved on: 10.10.2025

Judgment pronounced on: 14.01.2026

+ O.M.P. (MISC.) (COMM.) 592/2025

NCC LIMITED ...Petitioner

Through: Dr. Amit George,

Mr. Adhishwar Suri,

Mr. Dusyant Kishan Kaul,

Ms. Ibansara Syiemlieh,

Ms. Rupam Jha, Advocates.

versus

INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LIMITED ...Respondent

Through: Mr. VN Koura,

Ms.Paramjeet Benipal,

Advocates.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JASMEET SINGH

J U D G M E N T

1. This is a petition filed under section 29A(4) read with 29A(5) of the

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“the Act”), seeking extension of

the mandate of the Sole Arbitrator for a period of one year for

concluding the arbitral proceedings and passing the arbitral award.

FACTUAL MATRIX AS PER THE PETITIONER

O.M.P. (MISC) (COMM) 592/2025 Page 2 of 17

2. The petitioner, namely NCC Limited, is a company having its registered

office at Survey No. 64, Corporate Office, Madhapur, Hyderabad

(500081), Telangana.

3. The respondent, namely Indian Oil Corporation Limited, is a

Government of India undertaking having its registered office at G-9, Ali

Yavar Jung Marg, Bandra (East), Mumbai (400050), Maharashtra.

4. The respondent floated a tender for “Civil, Structural & Associated UG

piping works of VGO-HDT, DHDT & HCDS Units (EPCM-2)” for the

Paradip Refinery Project (“the project”). The petitioner was declared as

the successful bidder for the project and consequently, the parties entered

into a formal Agreement dated 28.04.2010.

5. The Agreement between the party clearly designated the commencement

date for the project as 03.03.2010 with scheduled completion date as

02.10.2011. However, the project was ultimately completed with delays

on 28.12.2015. Subsequently, disputes arose regarding payments due

under the terms of the contract.

6. The petitioner invoked the arbitration Agreement vide communication

dated 01.07.2017. Upon failure of the parties to mutually agree on the

constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal, the petitioner approached this

Hon’ble Court by filing a petition under Section 11 of the Act.

7. This Court in a petition under Section 11 of the Act, vide judgment dated

08.02.2019 in NCC Limited v. Indian Oil Corporation Limited

1

,

rejected the objections raised by the respondent and appointed the Sole

Arbitrator to adjudicate the disputes between the parties. The Sole

1

(Arb.Pet.115/2018).

O.M.P. (MISC) (COMM) 592/2025 Page 3 of 17

Arbitrator entered reference and held its first hearing on 05.03.2019,

directing completion of pleadings by 01.07.2019.

8. The respondent challenged the appointment of the Sole Arbitrator before

the Hon’ble Supreme Court by way of a Special Leave Petition S.L.P.

(C.) 13161/2019. Consequently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court vide orders

dated 03.07.2019 and 18.07.2019, stayed further arbitral proceedings.

9. The respondent also preferred an Application under Section 16 of the

Act challenging the jurisdiction of the Sole Arbitrator. The Hon’ble

Supreme Court, vide judgment dated 20.07.2022 decided the Civil

Appeal no. 341 of 2022 arising out of the aforesaid SLP, and dismissed

the respondent’s appeal but directed the Sole Arbitrator to first

adjudicate the pending Section 16 Application regarding “accord and

satisfaction” and arbitrability of the disputes within 3 months from the

date of first sitting.

10. In pursuance of the aforesaid directions, the arbitral proceedings were

resumed on 15.12.2022, wherein the Sole Arbitrator directed the parties

to complete the pleadings with regards to the Section 16 Application by

15.02.2023. However, the timeline for deciding the Section 16

Application was extended with the consent of parties by 5 months vide

Procedural Order No. 3, and the said Application was ultimately

dismissed vide Procedural Order No. 7 dated 16.08.2023. The respondent

thereafter delayed filing its Statement of Defence (“SOD”) and

ultimately filed the same on 30.04.2024, subject to costs.

11. The petitioner filed its rejoinder on 17.06.2024, and on this date i.e.

17.06.2024, the pleadings were completed. Consequently, the statutory

O.M.P. (MISC) (COMM) 592/2025 Page 4 of 17

period of twelve months under Section 29A(1) of the Act commenced

from 17.06.2024 and expired on 17.06.2025.

12. The arbitral proceedings are presently at an advanced stage as the Cross-

examination of the respondent’s sole witness is also completed.

13. Hence, through the present petition, the petitioner has approached this

Court seeking extension of the mandate of the Sole Arbitrator under

Section 29A of the Act.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

14. Dr. Amit George, Ld. Counsel for the petitioner, contends that the

commencement of the 12 month statutory period is calculated from the

date of completion of pleadings, and relying on the judgment of this

Hon’ble Court in Emco Limited v. Delhi Transco Limited

2

, it is

submitted that when a rejoinder is permitted to be filed by the Arbitral

Tribunal, pleadings stand completed on the date of filing of the rejoinder

which in the present case is 17.06.2024. Thus, the mandate of the Sole

Arbitrator continued for a period of 12 months from 17.06.2024 to

17.06.2025, and the present petition filed on 21.07.2025 is maintainable

even after the expiry of the said period.

15. Dr. George, also submits that the petitioner filed its Statement of Claim

(“SOC”) on 18.04.2019 in accordance with timeline fixed by the

Procedural Order. However, the respondent filed Special Leave Petition

(C) No. 13161/2019 before the Hon’ble Supreme Court challenging the

judgment dated 08.02.2019 of this Court, thereby keeping the arbitral

proceedings in abeyance. Further, the Sole Arbitrator resumed its

proceedings on 15.12.2022 and subsequently by Procedural Order No. 3

on mutual consent, the timeline for deciding the Section 16 Application

2

2024 SCC Online Del 6306.

O.M.P. (MISC) (COMM) 592/2025 Page 5 of 17

was extended by five months, which was sought by the respondent itself

after completion of pleadings in the Application so as to file additional

documents. The Sole Arbitrator disposed of the respondent’s Section 16

Application holding that the settlement of disputes, subject to final

determination after evidence, was not genuine and the “accord and

satisfaction” were conditional, and the arbitration Agreement therefore

survived the purported settlement and the disputes are arbitrable. Further,

the respondent delayed the filing of its SOD by 6 months, which was

ultimately filed on 30.04.2024 and taken on record with costs.

16. Dr. George, further submits that the principal cause for the delay in the

arbitral proceedings is the lackadaisical approach of the respondent,

while at the same time the petitioner has consistently complied with the

timelines for filing of its pleadings before the Sole Arbitrator. The

process of recording oral evidence stands completed as on 26.09.2025.

Thus, non-extension of the mandate at this juncture would result in

severe prejudice to both the parties and would lead to wastage of all the

time and resources invested, and would also defeat the very purpose of

the arbitration.

17. Further he also states, that the contentions raised by the respondent

regarding alleged loss of confidence in the Sole Arbitrator and alleged

misconduct in the conduct of proceedings are wholly misplaced in the

context of a petition under Section 29A of the Act. Relying on decisions

in the case of Poonam Mittal v. Created Pvt. Ltd.

3

and Anay Kumar

Gupta v. Jagmeet Singh Bhatia

4

, it is submitted that the courts while

deciding a petition under Section 29A of the Act should restrict

themselves as to whether the Arbitral Tribunal has proceeded with due

3

2024 SCC Online Del 6621.

4

2023 SCC Online Del 3939.

O.M.P. (MISC) (COMM) 592/2025 Page 6 of 17

expedition and does not permit a review of the conduct or the judicial

determinations made by the Arbitral Tribunal. Thus, the said contention

of the respondent and other grievances cannot be the subject matter of

the proceedings under Section 29A petition.

18. In light of the aforesaid submissions, the Ld. Counsel for the petitioner,

submits that there are sufficient grounds to justify the extension of the

mandate.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

19. Mr. V.N. Koura, Ld. Counsel for the respondent, vehemently opposes

the present petition seeking extension of the mandate of the Sole

Arbitrator and submits that no sufficient cause has been shown for the

grant of such extension under Section 29A(5) of the Act. The mandate of

the Sole Arbitrator terminated on 30.04.2025, as the period of 12 months

contemplated under Section 29A(1) of the Act commences from the date

of completion of pleadings and which is understood as the filing of the

SOD when read with Section 23(4) of the Act and not the rejoinder. In

the present case, the respondent filed its SOD on 30.04.2024, and

consequently the statutory period of one year ended on 30.04.2025, with

the mandate of the Sole Arbitrator terminating on that date.

20. Mr. Koura, further submits that the present arbitration arises out of the

judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Indian Oil Corporation

Limited (Supra), wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court provided explicit

and binding directions in clear terms that the Sole Arbitrator shall first

decide the issue of “accord and satisfaction” and the arbitrability of the

disputes by deciding the pending Section 16 Application within a period

of three months from the date of the first sitting held after the judgment.

O.M.P. (MISC) (COMM) 592/2025 Page 7 of 17

21. It is further submitted that the Sole Arbitrator has completely

disregarded the binding directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and has

failed to decide the issues of “accord and satisfaction” and arbitrability

of the disputes. Instead, by Procedural Order No. 7, the Sole Arbitrator

dismissed the respondent’s Section 16 Application without deciding the

core issues raised therein. The Sole Arbitrator merely observed that the

issues of “accord and satisfaction” and whether claims are “Notified

Claims”, were “matters of evidence” to be decided at a later stage and

proceeded to direct the respondent to file its SOD on merits.

22. The Ld. Counsel further submits that the respondent thereafter filed

another Application under Section 16 of the Act, raising the objection

that the agreed procedure under Clause 9.0.2.0 of the GCC, requires that

the General Manager first decide whether the petitioner’s claims were

“Notified Claims” included in the Final Bill in accordance with Clause

6.6.3.0 of the GCC, and that the arbitration could not proceed unless

such decision was first rendered. The Sole Arbitrator dismissed this

Application vide Procedural Order No. 8 dated 01.12.2023 and directed

the respondent to file its SOD on merits, thereby disregarding the agreed

contractual procedure binding upon the Sole Arbitrator under Section

19(2) of the Act.

23. The Ld. Counsel emphasizes that the delay in the arbitral proceedings

has occurred solely due to the misconduct of the Sole Arbitrator in

disregarding the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s directions and the agreed

procedure between the parties. The Sole Arbitrator proceeded to record

evidence and conduct substantive proceedings on the merits without first

complying with the directions or the agreed procedure. Such

disobedience of binding directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and

O.M.P. (MISC) (COMM) 592/2025 Page 8 of 17

disregard of the agreed procedure amounts to misconduct on the part of

the Sole Arbitrator.

24. Mr. Koura, also submits that in light of the principles explained by the

Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rohan Builders (India) Ltd. v. Berger Paints

India Ltd.

5

, the Court must exercise its judicial discretion under Section

29A(5) only where sufficient cause for extension is clearly show, and

such extension should not be granted mechanically. The misconduct of

the Sole Arbitrator in disregarding the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s

directions and the agreed contractual arbitration procedure constitutes a

ground to refuse extension and to terminate the mandate of the Sole

Arbitrator and to further appoint a substituted arbitrator.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

25. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the material

and documents placed on record.

26. It is the case of the respondent that the extension under Section 29A of

the Act should not be granted because of the misconduct of the arbitrator

in not deciding the Application which was directed by the Hon’ble Apex

Court in Indian Oil Corporation Limited (Supra), and to arrogate itself

with jurisdiction in clear violation of the terms of the Contract. The

respondent further opposes extension of the mandate and seeks

substitution of the Sole Arbitrator.

27. It will be pertinent to mention the few relevant dates:

Date Event

28.04.2010 The petitioner and the respondent entered

into a formal Agreement.

5

(2025)10 SCC 802.

O.M.P. (MISC) (COMM) 592/2025 Page 9 of 17

28.12.2015 The Project was actually completed by the

petitioner.

01.07.2017 Disputes arose between the parties,

regarding payments due to the petitioner

and the arbitration was invoked by the

petitioner vide letter dated 01.07.2017.

05.03.2019 The Sole Arbitrator held its First Hearing.

18.04.2019 The claimant/petitioner filed its SOC

03.07.2019

&

18.07.2019

The Hon’ble Supreme Court stayed further

proceedings before the Sole Arbitrator.

20.07.2022 The Hon’ble Supreme Court dismissed the

appeal filed by the respondent, while

directing the Sole Arbitrator to firstly

decide the pending Section 16 application.

16.08.2023 The Sole Arbitrator disposed of the

respondent’s Section 16 Application vide

Procedural Order No. 7.

30.04.2024 After multiple opportunities, the respondent

filed its SOD on 30.04.2024.

17.06.2024 The petitioner filed its rejoinder to the

respondent’s SOD.

28. In the present case, the Sole Arbitrator vide Procedural Order No. 10

dated 01.05.2024 allowed the filing of a rejoinder to the SOD. In cases,

when a rejoinder is allowed to be filed by the tribunal and is actually

filed, the pleadings are deemed complete on the date of filing of the

rejoinder and not on the date of filing of the SOD. This position is

O.M.P. (MISC) (COMM) 592/2025 Page 10 of 17

clearly supported by the judgment of this Court in Emco Limited v.

Delhi Transco Limited

6

and the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s order dated

29.04.2024, while dismissing the SLP in Buoyant Technology

Constellations Pvt. Ltd. v. Manyata Infrastructure Developers Pvt.

Ltd.

7

, relevant paragraph of Buoyant (Supra) reads as under:

“We are in agreement with the findings recorded in the

impugned judgment that in case a rejoinder or sur-rejoinder

are filed and taken on record, the pleadings for the purpose

of Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,

1996, shall concluded on the date the last pleading is filed.

We also agree that the period during which there was a stay

of arbitration proceedings has to be excluded.”

29. Further, the present petition seeking extension was filed on 21.07.2025

and the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rohan Builders (Supra) has

unambiguously held that an Application for extension of mandate under

Section 29A(4) read with 29A(5) is maintainable even after the expiry of

the 12 month or 6 month extended period. The statute also provides that

the Court may extend the time “either prior to or after the expiry of the

period so specified

8

”, the relevant paragraphs of Rohan Builders

(Supra) read as under:

“22. While interpreting a statute, we must strive to give

meaningful life to an enactment or rule and avoid cadaveric

consequences that result in unworkable or impracticable

scenarios. An interpretation which produces an

unreasonable result is not to be imputed to a statute if there

is some other equally possible construction which is

6

2024 SCC Online Del 6306.

7

SLP (C) No. 9331/2024.

8

Section 29A(4), Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

O.M.P. (MISC) (COMM) 592/2025 Page 11 of 17

acceptable, practical and pragmatic.

23. In view of the above discussion, we hold that an

application for extension of the time period for passing an

arbitral award under Section 29A(4) read with Section

29A(5) is maintainable even after the expiry of the twelve-

month or the extended six-month period, as the case may be.

The court while adjudicating such extension applications

will be guided by the principle of sufficient cause and our

observations in paragraph 19 of the judgment.”

30. In view of the aforesaid position, it is clear that in the present case the

rejoinder was actually filed on 17.06.2024 and thus pleadings were

completed on that date. Accordingly, the 12 month statutory period

commenced from 17.06.2024 and expired on 17.06.2025.

CONDUCT OF THE ARBITRATOR

31. The respondent has raised allegations that the Sole Arbitrator

has disregarded the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s directions in Indian Oil

Corporation Limited (Supra), and violated the agreed contractual

procedure.

32. The Sole Arbitrator decided the Section 16 Application vide Procedural

Order No. 7 dated 16.08.2023, the relevant excerpts from the Procedural

Order No.7, read as under:

“29. The further case of learned counsel is that no

arbitrable disputes have arisen in view of Clause 9.0.2.0,

particularly sub-clauses (ii) and (iii) thereof. It is submitted

that the claims raised by the Claimant are not notified

claims. As far as the submission with regard to Clause

9.0.2.0 is concerned, it is really a matter that will need to be

O.M.P. (MISC) (COMM) 592/2025 Page 12 of 17

decided in the event it is held that arbitrable disputes have

been raised by the Claimant. It is not necessary to decide

this issue at this stage, and this was not disputed by learned

counsel for the Respondent.

xxxx

31. A bare perusal of the italicized portion of this clause

makes it clear that notified claims are not covered by the

prohibition regarding arbitrability. There is no dispute that

the Claimant had raised some disputes which it says are

notified claims. The position accepted by learned counsel

for the Respondent is that the question whether the claims

are indeed notified claims is a matter that will have to be

considered by this Tribunal after the disposal of the

application under Section 16 of the act. If that be so, it may

be assumed for the time being and without prejudice, that

the claims raised by the Claimant in its communication

dated 5th August, 2016 are in fact notified claims. These

claims, in view of a plain reading of Clause 6.7.1.0 of the

GCC, are exempted and are not discharged or extinguished,

with the arbitration clause surviving as far as these claims

are concerned.

xxxx

36. Insofar as the present case is concerned, it is quite clear

that there were disputes between the parties, and one of

them, that is, the Claimant succumbed to what it claims to

be economic coercion. The settlement of disputes under the

circumstances was not a genuine settlement, assuming the

Claimant is able to prove its case of economic coercion. It

O.M.P. (MISC) (COMM) 592/2025 Page 13 of 17

must be held that the accord and satisfaction of the disputes

was conditional as far as the Claimant is concerned. This is

evident from the communications sent by the Claimant. As

such, arbitrable disputes do arise and survive. Under the

circumstances, it must be held that the arbitration clause

would survive the contract in terms of the law clearly

exposited by the Hon’ble Supreme Court (and followed in

subsequent decisions). That being so, the arbitration clause

in the contract survives, and the disputes being arbitrable,

reference to arbitration would be justified.”

33. From a conspectus of the determination of the aforesaid Application by

the Sole Arbitrator, it seems that the Sole Arbitrator has substantially

complied with the directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Indian

Oil Corporation Limited (Supra). Be that as it may, it is not for this

court to decide this issue in detail in the present petition, as that would be

the subject matter of a petition under Section 34 or Section 37 of the Act,

as and when filed by the respondent. It is a settled position of law that

while exercising jurisdiction under Section 29A(4), the Court is only

required to see if sufficient cause exists for the extension of mandate of

the Arbitrator.

SUFFICIENT CAUSE

34. In the present petition, the core issue is whether the petitioner has shown

sufficient cause for extension of the mandate of the Sole Arbitrator. The

relevant factors to be considered for the same are at the judicial

discretion of the court

9

.

9

Paragraph 19, Rohan Builders (Supra).

O.M.P. (MISC) (COMM) 592/2025 Page 14 of 17

35. The disputes in this case emanate from a substantial commercial contract

concerning civil, structural and associated works undertaken at a refinery

project and the project also included issues of delays exceeding four

years. The examination and cross-examination of the witnesses

continued after filing of the rejoinder and additionally, there was also a

Section 16 application which was directed to be decided by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court prior to proceeding further with the arbitration. All of the

aforesaid consumed substantial time and the proceedings presently are at

the stage of addressing final arguments.

36. In Rohan Builders (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has enunciated

some observations which will guide the adjudication of Applications for

extension filed under Section 29A(4) read with Section 29A(5), the

relevant paragraphs of the judgment read as under:

“19.Rohan Builders [Rohan Builders (India) (P)

Ltd. v. Berger Paints India Ltd., 2023 SCC OnLine Cal

2645] highlights that an interpretation allowing an

extension application post the expiry period would

encourage rogue litigants and render the timeline for

making the award inconsequential. However, it is apposite

to note that under Section 29-A(5), the power of the court to

extend the time is to be exercised only in cases where there

is sufficient cause for such extension. Such extension is not

granted mechanically on filing of the application. The

judicial discretion of the court in terms of the enactment

acts as a deterrent against any party abusing the process of

law or espousing a frivolous or vexatious application.

Further, the court can impose terms and conditions while

O.M.P. (MISC) (COMM) 592/2025 Page 15 of 17

granting an extension. Delay, even on the part of the

Arbitral Tribunal, is not countenanced. [H.P.

Singh v. Northern Railways, 2023 SCC OnLine J&K 1255]

The first proviso to Section 29-A(4) permits a fee reduction

of up to five per cent for each month of delay attributable to

the Arbitral Tribunal.

xxxx

23. In view of the above discussion, we hold that an

application for extension of the time period for passing an

arbitral award under Section 29-A(4) read with Section 29-

A(5) is maintainable even after the expiry of the twelve-

month or the extended six-month period, as the case may be.

The court while adjudicating such extension applications

will be guided by the principle of sufficient cause and our

observations in para 19 of the judgment.”

37. In RCC Infraventures Ltd. & Ors. v. DMI Finance Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.

10

,

this Court while relying on Rohan Builders (Supra) held that the

foundational precept of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, is a

litigant centric approach to reduce the cost of litigation and expedite

disposal of cases. From a conspectus of the said decision, it is clear that

the termination of the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal results in wastage

of time and resources for the parties. This principle applies with greater

force when the proceedings are at an advance stage, the relevant

paragraphs of RCC Infraventures Ltd. (Supra) read as under:

“27. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment

has relied upon the 176th Report of the Law Commission of

India, wherein it was held that the termination of the

10

2024 SCC Online Delhi 8961.

O.M.P. (MISC) (COMM) 592/2025 Page 16 of 17

mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal results in waste of time,

resources and money for the parties. The same is predicated

on the fact that the parties and the Arbitral Tribunal have

invested a lot of time, effort and energy in the arbitral

proceedings. The essence of the A&C Act is a litigant-

centric process to expedite the disposal of cases and

reducing the cost of litigation.

28. In the present case, the mandate of the Sole Arbitrator

terminated on 31.08.2023 and the present petition was filed

on 12.01.2024 i.e. after a period of four and a half months.

29. To my mind, the said delay of four and a half months in

filing the present petition is not an inordinate delay to direct

that the mandate of the Sole Arbitrator should not be

extended or a substitute arbitrator should be appointed.

30. The pleadings in the arbitral proceedings have already

been completed and the Claimants i.e. the petitioners have

started its evidence. In this regard, my attention has been

drawn to order dated 19.09.2023, whereby CW-1 is being

examined. Further, the entire computed fees of the learned

sole arbitrator with respect to the claims has been paid by

the petitioners.”

38. Further, the petitioner has consistently complied with all timelines fixed

by the Sole Arbitrator for SOC dated 18.04.2019 and also for the

rejoinder dated 17.06.2024. However, despite multiple opportunities the

respondent delayed filing of its SOD and the same was only taken on

record subject to costs vide Procedural Order No. 10.

39. It is for the reasons as enumerated above, the petitioner has shown

sufficient cause for seeking extension under Section 29A of the Act. The

O.M.P. (MISC) (COMM) 592/2025 Page 17 of 17

delay in concluding the arbitral proceedings is neither inordinate nor

unexplainable. Further, the termination of mandate would result in

wastage of substantial time and resources already incurred by both

parties and the Sole Arbitrator.

CONCLUSION

40. Having considered all the material issues, I am of the view that sufficient

cause exists under Section 29A of the Act for granting extension of the

mandate of the Sole Arbitrator.

41. For the aforesaid reasons and discussion, the petition is allowed and the

mandate of the Sole Arbitrator is extended by a period of 1 year from the

date of this judgment.

42. The Sole Arbitrator shall conduct the remaining proceedings

expeditiously.

43. The period from 18.06.2025 till today stands regularised.

44. The petition is disposed of accordingly.

JASMEET SINGH, J

JANUARY 14

th

, 2026 / SS

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