REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.383 OF 2002

Nepal Singh ....Appellant

Versus

State of Haryana ....Respondent

J U D G M E N T

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

1.Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a Division Bench of the

Punjab and Haryana High Court convicting the appellant for offences

punishable under Sections 304-B, 498-A of the Indian Penal Code,

1860 (in short the ‘IPC’). He was sentenced to undergo rigorous

imprisonment for seven years and to pay a fine with default

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stipulation for the first offence. But no separate sentence was

awarded in respect of the later offence. The appellant faced trial

before learned Sessions Judge, Narnaul, and was acquitted by learned

Sessions Judge giving him the benefit of doubt. The State

Government preferred an appeal which was allowed by the High

Court.

2.Prosecution version in a nutshell is as follows:

The marriage of Manju (hereinafter referred to as the ‘deceased’) was

solemnised with appellant-Nepal Singh on 26.1.1989. Though Yudhishter

Singh (PW5) the father of the deceased had spent sufficient money for the

marriage, accused Nepal Singh was not satisfied with the dowry. He

demanded a gas connection which deceased conveyed to her mother Lajwant

(PW6) on which her father (PW5) got the gas connection and gave it to

Manju.

On 16.5.1991, deceased had come to Bapora (village of her father) to

attend the marriage of the daughter of Shyam Pal Singh (brother of her

father). Deceased told her father (PW5) and mother (PW6) that accused had

completed his course and wanted her to bring Rs. One lakh from them and

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that if she failed to do so, accused would turn her out of the house.

Yudhishter Singh (PW5) told her that he would arrange for the money.

On 23.5.1991 deceased left for Kanti (village of her in-laws)

accompanied by Sunil Kumar (PW7), her brother. While going, deceased

told her father to arrange for the money otherwise her in laws would not

allow her to live.

Since Yudhishter Singh (PW5) could not arrange money, Manju had

committed suicide by consuming some poisonous substance. On receiving

information on 26.5.1991, Yudhishter Singh (PW5) alongwith Sarpanch-

Mitter Pal and Head Constable Rohtas Singh (PW3) met SI-Ramji Lal

(PW8) at the bus stand of Ateli and Yudhishter Singh (PW5) made the above

said statement which formed the basis for registering the formal FIR.

Investigation was undertaken.

After investigation was completed, charge sheet was filed. Since the

accused pleaded innocence, trial was held. The prosecution primarily relied

upon the evidence of Yudhishter Singh (PW5) father of the deceased and

Lajwant (PW6) mother of the deceased and Sunil Kumar (PW7) brother of

the deceased. The trial court found that this was a case of suicide and little

physical contact between the accused and the deceased was the primary

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reason. It was noted that the accused was pursuing studies till 13

th

May,

1991, and thereafter he returned home. Finding the prosecution version to

be suspect, the trial court directed acquittal. As noted above State preferred

an appeal. It was the primary stand that some thing must have happened

otherwise the victim would not have committed suicide and the fact that the

accused and the deceased could not have any sexual relationship was an

additional ground for suicide. The High Court found that the evidence of

Sunil Kumar (PW7) the brother of the deceased conclusively established the

accusations and accordingly set aside the order of acquittal and recorded

conviction.

3.In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant submitted

that the High Court has not even discussed the conclusions of the trial court

in the proper perspective and even no reason was indicated as to why the

High Court differed with the view of the trial court. The allegation of dowry

demand was not stated during investigation and lot of improvements were

made in court for the first time. It is in essence submitted that considering

the limited scope for interference with the judgment of acquittal, the High

Court should not have interfered with the judgment of the trial court.

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4.Learned counsel for the respondent-State on the other hand supported the

judgment of the High Court submitting that the High Court has rightly

analysed the evidence of PWs 5, 6 & 7 which was casually done by the

trial court.

5.The parameters for dealing with an appeal against judgment of

acquittal have been laid down by this Court in several cases.

6.It would be appropriate to consider and clarify the legal position first.

Chapter XXIX (Sections 372-394) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

(hereinafter referred to as “the Code”) deals with appeals. Section 372

expressly declares that no appeal shall lie from any judgment or order of a

criminal court except as provided by the Code or by any other law for the

time being in force. Section 373 provides for filing of appeals in certain

cases. Section 374 allows appeals from convictions. Section 375 bars

appeals in cases where the accused pleads guilty. Likewise, no appeal is

maintainable in petty cases (Section 376). Section 377 permits appeals by

the State for enhancement of sentence. Section 378 confers power on the

State to present an appeal to the High Court from an order of acquittal. The

said section is material and may be quoted in extenso:

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“378. Appeal in case of acquittal.—(1) Save as otherwise

provided in sub-section (2) and subject to the provisions of

sub-sections (3) and (5), the State Government may, in any

case, direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the

High Court from an original or appellate order of acquittal

passed by any court other than a High Court, or an order of

acquittal passed by the Court of Session in revision.

(2) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case in

which the offence has been investigated by the Delhi Special

Police Establishment constituted under the Delhi Special

Police Establishment Act, 1946 (25 of 1946), or by any

other agency empowered to make investigation into an

offence under any Central Act other than this Code, the

Central Government may also direct the Public Prosecutor to

present an appeal, subject to the provisions of sub-section

(3), to the High Court from the order of acquittal.

(3) No appeal under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall

be entertained except with the leave of the High Court.

(4) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case

instituted upon complaint and the High Court, on an

application made to it by the complainant in this behalf,

grants special leave to appeal from the order of acquittal, the

complainant may present such an appeal to the High Court.

(5) No application under sub-section (4) for the grant of

special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal shall be

entertained by the High Court after the expiry of six months,

where the complainant is a public servant, and sixty days in

every other case, computed from the date of that order of

acquittal.

(6) If, in any case, the application under sub-section (4) for

the grant of special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal

is refused, no appeal from that order of acquittal shall lie

under sub-section (1) or under sub-section (2).

7.Whereas Sections 379-380 cover special cases of appeals, other

sections lay down procedure to be followed by appellate courts.

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8.It may be stated that more or less similar provisions were found in the

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (hereinafter referred to as “the old Code”)

which came up for consideration before various High Courts, Judicial

Committee of the Privy Council as also before this Court. Since in the

present appeal, we have been called upon to decide the ambit and scope of

the power of an appellate court in an appeal against an order of acquittal, we

have confined ourselves to one aspect only i.e. an appeal against an order of

acquittal.

9.Bare reading of Section 378 of the Code (appeal in case of acquittal)

quoted above, makes it clear that no restrictions have been imposed by the

legislature on the powers of the appellate court in dealing with appeals

against acquittal. When such an appeal is filed, the High Court has full

power to reappreciate, review and reconsider the evidence at large, the

material on which the order of acquittal is founded and to reach its own

conclusions on such evidence. Both questions of fact and of law are open to

determination by the High Court in an appeal against an order of acquittal.

10.It cannot, however, be forgotten that in case of acquittal, there is a double

presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is

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available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that

every person should be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved to be guilty

by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured an acquittal,

the presumption of his innocence is certainly not weakened but reinforced,

reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.

11.Though the above principles are well established, a different note was

struck in several decisions by various High Courts and even by this Court. It

is, therefore, appropriate if we consider some of the leading decisions on the

point.

12.The first important decision was rendered by the Judicial Committee

of the Privy Council in Sheo Swarup v. R. Emperor [(1934) 61 IA 398)]. In

Sheo Swarup, the accused were acquitted by the trial court and the local

Government directed the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High

Court from an order of acquittal under Section 417 of the old Code (similar

to Section 378 of the Code). At the time of hearing of appeal before the High

Court, it was contended on behalf of the accused that in an appeal from an

order of acquittal, it was not open to the appellate court to interfere with the

findings of fact recorded by the trial Judge unless such findings could not

8

have been reached by him had there not been some perversity or

incompetence on his part. The High Court, however, declined to accept the

said view. It held that no condition was imposed on the High Court in such

appeal. It accordingly reviewed all the evidence in the case and having

formed an opinion of its weight and reliability different from that of the trial

Judge, recorded an order of conviction. A petition was presented to His

Majesty in Council for leave to appeal on the ground that conflicting views

had been expressed by the High Courts in different parts of India upon the

question whether in an appeal from an order of acquittal, an appellate court

had the power to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the trial

Judge. Their Lordships thought it fit to clarify the legal position and

accordingly upon the “humble advice of their Lordships”, leave was granted

by His Majesty. The case was, thereafter, argued. The Committee considered

the scheme and interpreting Section 417 of the Code (old Code) observed

that there was no indication in the Code of any limitation or restriction on

the High Court in exercise of powers as an Appellate Tribunal. The Code

also made no distinction as regards powers of the High Court in dealing with

an appeal against acquittal and an appeal against conviction. Though several

authorities were cited revealing different views by the High Courts dealing

with an appeal from an order of acquittal, the Committee did not think it

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proper to discuss all the cases.

13.Lord Russel summed up the legal position thus:

“There is, in their opinion, no foundation for the view,

apparently supported by the judgments of some courts in

India, that the High Court has no power or jurisdiction to

reverse an order of acquittal on a matter of fact, except in

cases in which the lower court has ‘obstinately blundered’,

or has ‘through incompetence, stupidity or perversity’

reached such ‘distorted conclusions as to produce a positive

miscarriage of justice’, or has in some other way so

conducted or misconducted itself as to produce a glaring

miscarriage of justice, or has been tricked by the defence so

as to produce a similar result.”

14.His Lordship, then proceeded to observe: (IA p.404)

“Sections 417, 418 and 423 of the Code give to the High

Court full power to review at large the evidence upon which

the order of acquittal was founded, and to reach the

conclusion that upon that evidence the order of acquittal

should be reversed. No limitation should be placed upon that

power, unless it be found expressly stated in the Code.”

15.The Committee, however, cautioned appellate courts and stated: (IA

p.404)

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“But in exercising the power conferred by the Code and

before reaching its conclusions upon fact, the High Court

should and will always give proper weight and consideration

to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the

credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption of

innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly

not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his

trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt;

and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a

finding of fact arrived at by a judge who had the advantage

of seeing the witnesses. To state this, however, is only to say

that the High Court in its conduct of the appeal should and

will act in accordance with rules and principles well known

and recognised in the administration of justice.”

(emphasis supplied)

16.In Nur Mohd. v. Emperor (AIR 1945 PC 151), the Committee

reiterated the above view in Sheo Swarup (Supra) and held that in an appeal

against acquittal, the High Court has full powers to review and to reverse

acquittal.

17.So far as this Court is concerned, probably the first decision on the

point was Prandas v. State (AIR 1954 SC 36) (though the case was decided

on 14-3-1950, it was reported only in 1954). In that case, the accused was

acquitted by the trial court. The Provincial Government preferred an appeal

which was allowed and the accused was convicted for offences punishable

under Sections 302 and 323 IPC. The High Court, for convicting the

accused, placed reliance on certain eyewitnesses.

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18.Upholding the decision of the High Court and following the

proposition of law in Sheo Swarup (supra), a six-Judge Bench held as

follows:

“6. It must be observed at the very outset that we cannot

support the view which has been expressed in several cases

that the High Court has no power under Section 417,

Criminal Procedure Code, to reverse a judgment of

acquittal, unless the judgment is perverse or the subordinate

court has in some way or other misdirected itself so as to

produce a miscarriage of justice.”

(emphasis supplied)

19.In Surajpal Singh v. State (1952 SCR 193), a two-Judge Bench

observed that it was well established that in an appeal under Section 417 of

the (old) Code, the High Court had full power to review the evidence upon

which the order of acquittal was founded. But it was equally well settled that

the presumption of innocence of the accused was further reinforced by his

acquittal by the trial court, and the findings of the trial court which had the

advantage of seeing the witnesses and hearing their evidence could be

reversed only for very substantial and compelling reasons.

20.In Ajmer Singh v. State of Punjab (1953 SCR 418) the accused was

acquitted by the trial court but was convicted by the High Court in an appeal

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against acquittal filed by the State. The aggrieved accused approached this

Court. It was contended by him that there were “no compelling reasons” for

setting aside the order of acquittal and due and proper weight had not been

given by the High Court to the opinion of the trial court as regards the

credibility of witnesses seen and examined. It was also commented that the

High Court committed an error of law in observing that “when a strong

‘prima facie’ case is made out against an accused person it is his duty to

explain the circumstances appearing in evidence against him and he cannot

take shelter behind the presumption of innocence and cannot state that the

law entitles him to keep his lips sealed”.

21.Upholding the contention, this Court said:

“We think this criticism is well founded. After an order of

acquittal has been made the presumption of innocence is

further reinforced by that order, and that being so, the trial

court’s decision can be reversed not on the ground that the

accused had failed to explain the circumstances appearing

against him but only for very substantial and compelling

reasons.”

(emphasis supplied)

22.In Atley v. State of U.P. (AIR 1955 SC 807) this Court said:

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“In our opinion, it is not correct to say that unless the

appellate court in an appeal under Section 417, Criminal

Procedure Code came to the conclusion that the judgment of

acquittal under appeal was perverse it could not set aside

that order.

It has been laid down by this Court that it is open to the

High Court on an appeal against an order of acquittal to

review the entire evidence and to come to its own

conclusion, of course, keeping in view the well-established

rule that the presumption of innocence of the accused is not

weakened but strengthened by the judgment of acquittal

passed by the trial court which had the advantage of

observing the demeanour of witnesses whose evidence have

been recorded in its presence.

It is also well settled that the court of appeal has as wide

powers of appreciation of evidence in an appeal against an

order of acquittal as in the case of an appeal against an order

of conviction, subject to the riders that the presumption of

innocence with which the accused person starts in the trial

court continues even up to the appellate stage and that the

appellate court should attach due weight to the opinion of

the trial court which recorded the order of acquittal.

If the appellate court reviews the evidence, keeping those

principles in mind, and comes to a contrary conclusion, the

judgment cannot be said to have been vitiated.”

(emphasis supplied)

23.In Aher Raja Khima v. State of Saurashtra [(1955) 2 SCR 1285)] the

accused was prosecuted under Sections 302 and 447 IPC. He was acquitted

by the trial court but convicted by the High Court. Dealing with the power of

the High Court against an order of acquittal, Bose, J. speaking for the

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majority (2:1) stated: (para 1) “It is, in our opinion, well settled that it is not

enough for the High Court to take a different view of the evidence; there

must also be substantial and compelling reasons for holding that the trial

court was wrong.”

(emphasis supplied)

24.In Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1961) 3 SCR 120, a three-

Judge Bench considered almost all leading decisions on the point and

observed that there was no difficulty in applying the principles laid down by

the Privy Council and accepted by the Supreme Court. The Court, however,

noted that appellate courts found considerable difficulty in understanding the

scope of the words “substantial and compelling reasons” used in certain

decisions. It was observed inter-alia as follows:

“This Court obviously did not and could not add a condition

to Section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The words

were intended to convey the idea that an appellate court not

only shall bear in mind the principles laid down by the Privy

Council but also must give its clear reasons for coming to

the conclusion that the order of acquittal was wrong.”

The Court concluded as follows:

“9. The foregoing discussion yields the following results: (1)

an appellate court has full power to review the evidence

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upon which the order of acquittal is founded; (2) the

principles laid down in Sheo Swarup case afford a correct

guide for the appellate court’s approach to a case in

disposing of such an appeal; and (3) the different

phraseology used in the judgments of this Court, such as, (i)

‘substantial and compelling reasons’, (ii) ‘good and

sufficiently cogent reasons’, and (iii) ‘strong reasons’ are not

intended to curtail the undoubted power of an appellate court

in an appeal against acquittal to review the entire evidence

and to come to its own conclusion; but in doing so it should

not only consider every matter on record having a bearing

on the questions of fact and the reasons given by the court

below in support of its order of acquittal in its arriving at a

conclusion on those facts, but should also express those

reasons in its judgment, which lead it to hold that the

acquittal was not justified.”

25.Again, in M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra (1963) 2 SCR 405,

the point was raised before a Constitution Bench of this Court. Taking note

of earlier decisions, it was observed as follows:

“17.In some of the earlier decisions of this Court,

however, in emphasising the importance of adopting a

cautious approach in dealing with appeals against acquittals,

it was observed that the presumption of innocence is

reinforced by the order of acquittal and so, ‘the findings of

the trial court which had the advantage of seeing the

witnesses and hearing their evidence can be reversed only

for very substantial and compelling reasons’: vide Surajpal

Singh v. State (1952 SCR 193). Similarly in Ajmer Singh v.

State of Punjab (1953 SCR 418), it was observed that the

interference of the High Court in an appeal against the order

of acquittal would be justified only if there are ‘very

substantial and compelling reasons to do so’. In some other

decisions, it has been stated that an order of acquittal can be

reversed only for ‘good and sufficiently cogent reasons’ or

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for ‘strong reasons’. In appreciating the effect of these

observations, it must be remembered that these observations

were not intended to lay down a rigid or inflexible rule

which should govern the decision of the High Court in

appeals against acquittals. They were not intended, and

should not be read to have intended to introduce an

additional condition in clause (a) of Section 423(1) of the

Code. All that the said observations are intended to

emphasize is that the approach of the High Court in dealing

with an appeal against acquittal ought to be cautious because

as Lord Russell observed in Sheo Swarup the presumption of

innocence in favour of the accused ‘is not certainly

weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial’.

Therefore, the test suggested by the expression ‘substantial

and compelling reasons’ should not be construed as a

formula which has to be rigidly applied in every case. That

is the effect of the recent decisions of this Court, for

instance, in Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan and Harbans

Singh v. State of Punjab (1962 Supp 1 SCR 104) and so, it

is not necessary that before reversing a judgment of

acquittal, the High Court must necessarily characterise the

findings recorded therein as perverse.”

(emphasis supplied)

26.Yet in another leading decision in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State

of Maharashtra (1973 (2) SCC 793) this Court held that in India, there is no

jurisdictional limitation on the powers of appellate court. “In law there are

no fetters on the plenary power of the appellate court to review the whole

evidence on which the order of acquittal is founded and, indeed, it has a duty

to scrutinise the probative material de novo, informed, however, by the

weighty thought that the rebuttable innocence attributed to the accused

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having been converted into an acquittal the homage our jurisprudence owes

to individual liberty constrains the higher court not to upset the holding

without very convincing reasons and comprehensive consideration.”

27.Putting emphasis on balance between importance of individual liberty

and evil of acquitting guilty persons, this Court observed as follows:

“6. Even at this stage we may remind ourselves of a

necessary social perspective in criminal cases which suffers

from insufficient forensic appreciation. The dangers of

exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt at the

expense of social defence and to the soothing sentiment that

all acquittals are always good regardless of justice to the

victim and the community, demand especial emphasis in the

contemporary context of escalating crime and escape. The

judicial instrument has a public accountability. The

cherished principles or golden thread of proof beyond

reasonable doubt which runs thro’ the web of our law should

not be stretched morbidly to embrace every hunch, hesitancy

and degree of doubt. The excessive solicitude reflected in

the attitude that a thousand guilty men may go but one

innocent martyr shall not suffer is a false dilemma. Only

reasonable doubts belong to the accused. Otherwise any

practical system of justice will then breakdown and lose

credibility with the community. The evil of acquitting a

guilty person light-heartedly, as a learned author (Glanville

Williams in Proof of Guilt) has saliently observed, goes

much beyond the simple fact that just one guilty person has

gone unpunished. If unmerited acquittals become general,

they tend to lead to a cynical disregard of the law, and this in

turn leads to a public demand for harsher legal presumptions

against indicted ‘persons’ and more severe punishment of

those who are found guilty. Thus, too frequent acquittals of

the guilty may lead to a ferocious penal law, eventually

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eroding the judicial protection of the guiltless. For all these

reasons it is true to say, with Viscount Simon, that ‘a

miscarriage of justice may arise from the acquittal of the

guilty no less than from the conviction of the innocent....’ In

short, our jurisprudential enthusiasm for presumed

innocence must be moderated by the pragmatic need to

make criminal justice potent and realistic. A balance has to

be struck between chasing chance possibilities as good

enough to set the delinquent free and chopping the logic of

preponderant probability to punish marginal innocents.”

(emphasis supplied)

28.In K. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P (1979) 1 SCC 355, the Court was

considering the power of the High Court against an order of acquittal under

Section 378 of the Code. After considering the relevant decisions on the

point it was stated as follows:

“9. The principles are now well settled. At one time it was

thought that an order of acquittal could be set aside for

‘substantial and compelling reasons’ only and courts used to

launch on a search to discover those ‘substantial and

compelling reasons’. However, the ‘formulae’ of

‘substantial and compelling reasons’, ‘good and sufficiently

cogent reasons’ and ‘strong reasons’ and the search for them

were abandoned as a result of the pronouncement of this

Court in Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1961) 3 SCR

120. In Sanwat Singh case this Court harked back to the

principles enunciated by the Privy Council in Sheo Swarup

v. R. Emperor and reaffirmed those principles. After Sanwat

Singh v. State of Rajasthan this Court has consistently

recognised the right of the appellate court to review the

entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion bearing in

mind the considerations mentioned by the Privy Council in

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Sheo Swarup case. Occasionally phrases like ‘manifestly

illegal’, ‘grossly unjust’, have been used to describe the

orders of acquittal which warrant interference. But, such

expressions have been used more as flourishes of language,

to emphasise the reluctance of the appellate court to interfere

with an order of acquittal than to curtail the power of the

appellate court to review the entire evidence and to come to

its own conclusion. In some cases (Ramaphupala Reddy v.

State of A.P., (AIR 1971 SC 460) Bhim Singh Rup Singh v.

State of Maharashtra (AIR 1974 SC 286), it has been said

that to the principles laid down in Sanwat Singh case may be

added the further principle that ‘if two reasonable

conclusions can be reached on the basis of the evidence on

record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of

the trial court’. This, of course, is not a new principle. It

stems out of the fundamental principle of our criminal

jurisprudence that the accused is entitled to the benefit of

any reasonable doubt. If two reasonably probable and evenly

balanced views of the evidence are possible, one must

necessarily concede the existence of a reasonable doubt.

But, fanciful and remote possibilities must be left out of

account. To entitle an accused person to the benefit of a

doubt arising from the possibility of a duality of views, the

possible view in favour of the accused must be as nearly

reasonably probable as that against him. If the

preponderance of probability is all one way, a bare

possibility of another view will not entitle the accused to

claim the benefit of any doubt. It is, therefore, essential that

any view of the evidence in favour of the accused must be

reasonable even as any doubt, the benefit of which an

accused person may claim, must be reasonable.”

(emphasis supplied)

29.In Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat (1996) 9 SCC 225, this

Court said:

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“While sitting in judgment over an acquittal the appellate

court is first required to seek an answer to the question

whether the findings of the trial court are palpably wrong,

manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. If the

appellate court answers the above question in the negative

the order of acquittal is not to be disturbed. Conversely, if

the appellate court holds, for reasons to be recorded, that

the order of acquittal cannot at all be sustained in view of

any of the above infirmities it can then-and then only-

reappraise the evidence to arrive at its own conclusions.”

30.In Allarakha K. Mansuri v. State of Gujarat (2002) 3 SCC 57,

referring to earlier decisions, the Court stated:

“7. The paramount consideration of the court should be to

avoid miscarriage of justice. A miscarriage of justice which

may arise from the acquittal of guilty is no less than from

the conviction of an innocent. In a case where the trial court

has taken a view based upon conjectures and hypothesis and

not on the legal evidence, a duty is cast upon the High Court

to reappreciate the evidence in acquittal appeal for the

purposes of ascertaining as to whether the accused has

committed any offence or not. Probable view taken by the

trial court which may not be disturbed in the appeal is such a

view which is based upon legal and admissible evidence.

Only because the accused has been acquitted by the trial

court, cannot be made a basis to urge that the High Court

under all circumstances should not disturb such a finding.”

31.In Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P. (2002) 4 SCC 85, the trial court

acquitted the accused but the High Court convicted them. Negativing the

contention of the appellants that the High Court could not have disturbed the

21

findings of fact of the trial court even if that view was not correct, this Court

observed:

“7. We do not agree with the submissions of the learned

counsel for the appellants that under Section 378 of the

Code of Criminal Procedure the High Court could not

disturb the finding of facts of the trial court even if it found

that the view taken by the trial court was not proper. On the

basis of the pronouncements of this Court, the settled

position of law regarding the powers of the High Court in an

appeal against an order of acquittal is that the Court has full

powers to review the evidence upon which an order of

acquittal is based and generally it will not interfere with the

order of acquittal because by passing an order of acquittal

the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused is

reinforced. The golden thread which runs through the web of

administration of justice in criminal case is that if two views

are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one

pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his

innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused

should be adopted. Such is not a jurisdiction limitation on

the appellate court but judge-made guidelines for

circumspection. The paramount consideration of the court is

to ensure that miscarriage of justice is avoided. A

miscarriage of justice which may arise from the acquittal of

the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent.

In a case where the trial court has taken a view ignoring the

admissible evidence, a duty is cast upon the High Court to

reappreciate the evidence in acquittal appeal for the

purposes of ascertaining as to whether all or any of the

accused has committed any offence or not”.

32.In Harijana Thirupala v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P.

(2002) 6 SCC 470, this Court said:

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“12. Doubtless the High Court in appeal either against an

order of acquittal or conviction as a court of first appeal

has full power to review the evidence to reach its own

independent conclusion. However, it will not interfere with

an order of acquittal lightly or merely because one other

view is possible, because with the passing of an order of

acquittal presumption of innocence in favour of the

accused gets reinforced and strengthened. The High Court

would not be justified to interfere with order of acquittal

merely because it feels that sitting as a trial court it would

have proceeded to record a conviction; a duty is cast on the

High Court while reversing an order of acquittal to

examine and discuss the reasons given by the trial court to

acquit the accused and then to dispel those reasons. If the

High Court fails to make such an exercise the judgment

will suffer from serious infirmity.”

33.In Ramanand Yadav v. Prabhu Nath Jha (2003) 12 SCC 606, this

Court observed:

“21. There is no embargo on the appellate court reviewing

the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based.

Generally, the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with

because the presumption of innocence of the accused is

further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which

runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal

cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence

adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused

and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable

to the accused should be adopted. The paramount

consideration of the court is to ensure that miscarriage of

justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may

arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the

conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible

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evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate court to

reappreciate the evidence in a case where the accused has

been acquitted, for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether

any of the accused committed any offence or not”.

34.Again in Kallu v. State of M.P. (2006) 10 SCC 313, this Court stated:

“8. While deciding an appeal against acquittal, the power of

the appellate court is no less than the power exercised while

hearing appeals against conviction. In both types of appeals,

the power exists to review the entire evidence. However, one

significant difference is that an order of acquittal will not be

interfered with, by an appellate court, where the judgment of

the trial court is based on evidence and the view taken is

reasonable and plausible. It will not reverse the decision of

the trial court merely because a different view is possible.

The appellate court will also bear in mind that there is a

presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and the

accused is entitled to get the benefit of any doubt. Further if

it decides to interfere, it should assign reasons for differing

with the decision of the trial court.”

(emphasis supplied)

35.From the above decisions, in Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of

Karnataka (2007 (4) SCC 415), the following general principles regarding

powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order

of acquittal were culled out:

(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate

and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.

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(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation,

restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court

on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on

questions of fact and of law.

(3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling

reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”,

“distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to

curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against

acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of

language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere

with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the

evidence and to come to its own conclusion.

(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case

of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly,

the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental

principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to

be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law.

Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of

his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the

trial court.

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(5)If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the

evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of

acquittal recorded by the trial court.

36.A person has, no doubt, a profound right not to be convicted of an

offence which is not established by the evidential standard of proof beyond

reasonable doubt. Though this standard is a higher standard, there is,

however, no absolute standard. What degree of probability amounts to

“proof” is an exercise particular to each case. Referring to the

interdependence of evidence and the confirmation of one piece of evidence

by another, a learned author says [see “The Mathematics of Proof II”:

Glanville Williams, Criminal Law Review, 1979, by Sweet and Maxwell,

p.340 (342)]:

“The simple multiplication rule does not apply if the

separate pieces of evidence are dependent. Two events are

dependent when they tend to occur together, and the

evidence of such events may also be said to be dependent. In

a criminal case, different pieces of evidence directed to

establishing that the defendant did the prohibited act with

the specified state of mind are generally dependent. A junior

may feel doubt whether to credit an alleged confession, and

doubt whether to infer guilt from the fact that the defendant

fled from justice. But since it is generally guilty rather than

innocent people who make confessions, and guilty rather

than innocent people who run away, the two doubts are not

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to be multiplied together. The one piece of evidence may

confirm the other.”

37.Doubts would be called reasonable if they are free from a zest for

abstract speculation. Law cannot afford any favourite other than truth. To

constitute reasonable doubt, it must be free from an overemotional response.

Doubts must be actual and substantial doubts as to the guilt of the accused

persons arising from the evidence, or from the lack of it, as opposed to mere

vague apprehensions. A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or a

merely possible doubt, but a fair doubt based upon reason and common

sense. It must grow out of the evidence in the case.

38.The concepts of probability, and the degrees of it, cannot obviously be

expressed in terms of units to be mathematically enumerated as to how many

of such units constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. There is an

unmistakable subjective element in the evaluation of the degrees of

probability and the quantum of proof. Forensic probability must, in the last

analysis, rest on a robust common sense and, ultimately, on the trained

intuitions of the Judge. While the protection given by the criminal process to

the accused persons is not to be eroded, at the same time, uninformed

legitimization of trivialities would make a mockery of administration of

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criminal justice. This position was illuminatingly stated by Venkatachaliah,

J. (as His Lordship then was) in State of U.P. v. Krishna Gopal (1988 (4)

SCC 302).

39.The above position was highlighted in Krishnan and Anr. v. State

represented by Inspector of Police (2003 (7) SCC 56).

40.PW5 had gone to the Police Station at Ateli at about 9.50 P.M. on

25.5.1991 to lodge the report regarding the death of the deceased. The

father of the appellant had already sent one Dharam Pal for giving intimation

of the death to her parents. PW5 admitted that at the time of marriage Nepal

Singh was studying in MA Class in Delhi and after doing M.A. he had gone

to Ahmedabad to undergo some training. He accepted that the deceased had

told him that the accused had returned from Ahmedabad on 13.5.1991 after

completing his course. It has also been admitted by PW5 that he did not

send any amount to Nepal Singh while he was prosecuting studies at

Ahmedabad. In the FIR PW had stated that he had told that he would

arrange money. After the marriage on 23.5.1991 victim went back to village

Kanti with her brother Sunil Kumar (PW7) and while going back she told

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her father that if money was not arranged the accused and his family

members will not allow her to breathe.

41.During cross-examination he accepted that all this was not stated

during investigation. He also accepted that it was not mentioned in the FIR

that gifts and other articles were given as dowry. He accepted that his father

in law Udai Singh had settled the marriage between the accused and the

deceased. Interestingly Udai Singh (DW1) has stated that there was no

demand from the side of the accused at the time of marriage. The deceased

and her parents had never complained to him that the accused or any

member of his family was raising any demand of any kind when confronted

with the statement made during investigation, PW5 accepted that he had not

stated many vital things during investigation which for the first time he was

speaking in Court. Similar is the position with PW7 the brother of the

deceased. He also accepted on being confronted with the statement made

during investigation that he had not stated particularly certain relevant

aspects. Similar is the position with the evidence of mother of deceased

(PW6).

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42.As was rightly noted by the trial court there was no evidence towards

the claim regarding any demand of dowry. That being so the High Court

ought not to have interfered with the well reasoned judgment of the trial

court directing acquittal. The reasoning of the High Court that something

must have happened and otherwise deceased would not have committed

suicide is clearly indefensible. That certainly could not have been a reason

to set aside the trial Court’s judgment of acquittal.

43.The appeal is allowed. The bail bonds executed with effect to the

order of bail dated 18

th

May, 2002 and subsequent date shall stand

discharged.

..............................................J.

(Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)

…….......................................J.

(ASOK KUMAR GANGULY)

New Delhi;

April 24, 2009

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