REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IN DIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL No. 3538 OF 2009

(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 24236 of 2008)

Ningamma & Anr. ..…Appellants

Versus

United India Insurance Co. Ltd. .….Respondent

With

CIVIL APPEAL No. 3540 OF 2009

(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 25497of 2008)

JUDGMENT

Dr. Mukundakam Sharma, J.

1.Leave granted.

2.Since both these appeals arise out of the same set of facts and

involve similar questions of law, we propose to dispose of both

these appeals by this common judgment.

3.The present appeals arise out of a motor accident claim. The

claimant no. 1 and 2 are the wife and son respectively of the

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deceased-Ramappa. On 09.09.2000, the deceased was traveling

on Hero Honda Motor Cycle, which he borrowed from its real

owner for going from Ilkal to his native place Gudur. When the

said motor cycle was proceeding on Ilkal-Kustagl, National

Highway, a bullock cart proceeding ahead of the said motor cycle

carrying iron-sheet suddenly stopped and consequently

deceased-Ramappa who was proceeding on the said motor cycle

dashed against it. Consequent to the aforesaid incident, he

sustained fatal injuries over his vital part of body and on the way

to Govt. Hospital, Ilkal, he died. The doctor of the general

hospital, Ilkal conducted post mortem examination over dead

body of the deceased and gave his opinion that the death of the

deceased was caused due to hemorrhage and shock due to the

injury to his liver. The aforesaid motor cycle in which the

deceased was traveling at the time of accident was insured with

the Insurance Company, namely, the United India Insurance Co.

Ltd. and the said motor cycle was owned by one Paranagouda.

4.On 04.10.2000 Appellant No. 1, the wife of the deceased and

Appellant No. 2 – minor son of the deceased filed a claim petition

under Section 163-A of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (in short ‘the

MVA’) before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal No. VI, Bijapur,

Karnataka (in short ‘the Tribunal’) being M.V.C. No. 896/2000

praying for compensation of Rs. 8,10,000/- along with future

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interest etc. on the ground that at the time of accident the

deceased was a healthy person, aged about 32 years and

engaged in agriculture, earning Rs. 5,000/- per month and was

the sole earning member in their family.

5.The Tribunal received evidence and tested the claim. The

Tribunal held that in absence of definite and cogent proof of

income, the income of the deceased was to be considered as Rs.

60/- per day as per the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act.

Accordingly, the monthly income of the deceased was

ascertained as Rs. 1,800/- and yearly income as Rs. 21,600/-

from which 1/3 was to be deducted leaving thereby Rs. 14,400/-

as the net income of the deceased. Since the age of the

deceased was found to be in between 30 to 35 years, the

relevant multiplier to be applied was ‘17’.

6.Accordingly, the Tribunal under its award dated 09.02.2005

partly allowed the claim petition filed by the appellants holding

that the said appellants are entitled to receive a total

compensation amount of Rs. 2,59,800/- along with interest at

the rate of 8% p.a. from the respondent – Insurance Company.

It is required to be stated at this stage that compensation as

determined by the Tribunal was paid and received by the legal

representatives of the deceased, namely the widow and the

minor son.

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7.Aggrieved by the said decision, the Insurance Company

preferred an appeal being Miscellaneous First Appeal No.

4152/2005 before the High Court of Karnataka on the ground

that the accident occurred due to the fault of the deceased and

claim petition before the Tribunal was not maintainable as

Section 163-A of the Act is not applicable unless there was

another vehicle involved in the accident. The other ground of

challenge was that the Tribunal erred in allowing the claim

petition when the total income of the deceased was stated to be

more than Rs. 40, 000/- per annum.

8.The High Court by its judgment and order dated 08.08.2007

allowed the appeal holding that the claim petition before the

Tribunal was not maintainable as there was no tort-feasor

involved. It was also held that the claim Section 163-A of the

Act was barred when the income of the claimant is stated to be

above Rs. 40,000/- per annum. Consequently, the High Court

set aside the judgment and award passed by the Tribunal and

directed the appellants herein to refund the amount of

compensation to the Insurance Company.

9.Aggrieved by the aforesaid decision, the appellants filed a review

petition bearing no. 337/2007. However the same was dismissed

on 19.11.2007 by the High Court with costs of Rs. 500/-.

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10.Consequently, the appellants preferred two Special Leave

Petitions, one bearing No. 25497/2008 against the judgment and

order dated 08.08.2007 passed in Miscellaneous First Appeal No.

4152/2005 by the High Court of Karnataka, Bangalore and

another bearing No. 24236/2008 which is against the judgment

and order dated 19.11.2007 passed in Review Petition No.

337/2007.

11.The counsel appearing for the appellants contended before us

that the High Court erred in setting aside the judgment and

order of the Tribunal as the Tribunal acted within its jurisdiction

in directing payment of compensation on structured formula

basis under Section 163-A of the MVA. It was also submitted

that the High Court erred in ignoring the jurisdiction of the

Tribunal to determine the “Just Compensation” which must be

done in accordance with law and not on the basis of the pleading

of a party who invoked its jurisdiction. It was also contended

that the High Court erroneously held that the Tribunal erred in

law in not deciding the claim petition as one under Section 166

of the MVA.

12.On the other hand, the counsel for the respondent has argued

that the High Court rightly set aside the judgment and order of

the Tribunal since in order to become eligible for compensation

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for the loss caused due to the use of motor vehicle as provided

under Section 163-A of the MVA, the person who has suffered

the loss must be a third party under the MVA and since in the

present case the deceased or the appellants are not the third

party, therefore, judgment rendered by the High Court did not

call for any interference. It was further submitted that the driver

is a representative of the owner if he was driving under the

owner’s instructions or permission and is thus owner qua

insurance company and not a third party.

13.In the light of the aforesaid submissions, the question that falls

for our consideration is whether the legal representatives of a

person, who was driving a motor vehicle, after borrowing it from

the real owner meets with an accident without involving any

other vehicle, would be entitled to compensation under Section

163-A of MVA or under any other provision(s) of law and also

whether the insurer who issued the insurance policy would be

bound to indemnify the deceased or his legal representative?

Before dwelling further, it would be useful to discuss the relevant

paras of Section 163-A and 166 of the MVA applicable in the

present case.

“163-A. Special provisions as to payment of

compensation on structured formula basis.—

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in

any other law for the time being in force or instrument

having the force of law, the owner of the motor vehicle

of the authorised insurer shall be liable to pay in the

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case of death or permanent disablement due to

accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle,

compensation, as indicated in the Second Schedule, to

the legal heirs or the victim, as the case may be.

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(2) In any claim for compensation under sub-section

(1), the claimant shall not be required to plead or

establish that the death or permanent disablement in

respect of which the claim has been made was due to

any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of

the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other

person.

(3) The Central Government may, keeping in view the

cost of living by notification in the Official Gazette, from

time to time amend the Second Schedule.”

166. Application for compensation- (1) An

application for compensation arising out of an accident

of the nature specified in sub-section (1) of section 165

may be made-

(a) by the person who has sustained the injury;

or

(b) by the owner of the property; or

(c) where death has resulted from the accident,

by all or any of the legal representatives of

the deceased; or

(d) by any agent duly authorised by the person

injured or all or any of the legal

representatives of the deceased, as the case

may be:

Provided that where all the legal representatives of the

deceased have not joined in any such application for

compensation, the application shall be made on behalf

of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives of

the deceased and the legal representatives who have

not so joined, shall be impleaded as respondents to the

application.

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14.Section 163-A of the MVA was inserted by Act 54 of 1994 by way

of a social security scheme. It is needless to say that the said

provision is a code by itself. The said provision has been inserted

to provide for a new predetermined structured formula for

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payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis

of age/income of the deceased or the person suffering

permanent disablement. In view of the language used in said

section there could be no manner of doubt that the said provision

has an overriding effect as it contains a non obstante clause in

terms whereof the owner of the motor vehicle or the authorised

insurer is liable to pay compensation in the case of death or

permanent disablement due to accident arising out of the use of

motor vehicle, as indicated in the Second Schedule, to the legal

heirs or the victim, as the case may be.

15.A number of decisions have been rendered by this Court in

respect of the Section 163A of the MVA. In Deepal Girishbhai

Soni v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd.,(2004) 5 SCC 385, at

page 402, one of us (Hon’ble Justice S. B. Sinha) has observed

as follows:

“42. Section 163-A was, thus, enacted for grant of

immediate relief to a section of the people whose

annual income is not more than Rs 40,000 having

regard to the fact that in terms of Section 163-A of the

Act read with the Second Schedule appended thereto,

compensation is to be paid on a structured formula not

only having regard to the age of the victim and his

income but also the other factors relevant therefor. An

award made thereunder, therefore, shall be in full and

final settlement of the claim as would appear from the

different columns contained in the Second Schedule

appended to the Act. The same is not interim in nature.

The note appended to column 1 which deals with fatal

accidents makes the position furthermore clear stating

that from the total amount of compensation one-third

thereof is to be reduced in consideration of the

expenses which the victim would have incurred towards

maintaining himself had he been alive. This together

with the other heads of compensation as contained in

columns 2 to 6 thereof leaves no manner of doubt that

Parliament intended to lay a comprehensive scheme for

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the purpose of grant of adequate compensation to a

section of victims who would require the amount of

compensation without fighting any protracted litigation

for proving that the accident occurred owing to

negligence on the part of the driver of the motor

vehicle or any other fault arising out of use of a motor

vehicle.

This Court further observed in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.

v. Meena Variyal, (2007) 5 SCC 428, at page 428:

”18. In New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Asha Rani this

Court had occasion to consider the scope of the

expression “any person” occurring in Section 147 of the

Act. This Court held: (SCC p. 235, para 26)

“… that the meaning of the words ‘any person’

must also be attributed having regard to the

context in which they have been used i.e. ‘a third

party’. Keeping in view the provisions of the 1988

Act, we are of the opinion that as the provisions

thereof do not enjoin any statutory liability on the

owner of a vehicle to get his vehicle insured for

any passenger travelling in a goods vehicle, the

insurers would not be liable therefor.”

In other words, this Court clearly held that the

apparently wide words “any person” are qualified by the

setting in which they occur and that “any person” is to

be understood as a third party.

27. We think that the law laid down in Minu B. Mehta v.

Balkrishna Ramchandra Nayan was accepted by the

legislature while enacting the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988

by introducing Section 163-A of the Act providing for

payment of compensation notwithstanding anything

contained in the Act or in any other law for the time

being in force that the owner of a motor vehicle or the

authorised insurer shall be liable to pay in the case of

death or permanent disablement due to accident arising

out of the use of the motor vehicle, compensation, as

indicated in the Second Schedule, to the legal heirs or

the victim, as the case may be, and in a claim made

under sub-section (1) of Section 163-A of the Act, the

claimant shall not be required to plead or establish that

the death or permanent disablement in respect of which

the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act

or neglect or default of the owner of the vehicle

concerned. Therefore, the victim of an accident or his

dependants have an option either to proceed under

Section 166 of the Act or under Section 163-A of the

Act. Once they approach the Tribunal under Section

166 of the Act, they have necessarily to take upon

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themselves the burden of establishing the negligence of

the driver or owner of the vehicle concerned. But if they

proceed under Section 163-A of the Act, the

compensation will be awarded in terms of the Schedule

without calling upon the victim or his dependants to

establish any negligence or default on the part of the

owner of the vehicle or the driver of the vehicle.

28. In Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi v. Ranjit Ginning &

Pressing Co. (P) Ltd., two of the learned Judges who

constituted the Bench in Minu B. Mehta held that when

a car is driven by the owner’s employee on owner’s

business, the normal rule was that it was for the

claimant for compensation to prove negligence. When

the Manager of the owner while driving the car on the

business of the owner took in a passenger, it would be

taken that he had the authority to do so, considering

his position unless otherwise shown. If due to his

negligent driving an accident occurred and the

passenger died, the owner would be liable for

compensation. The Court noticed that the modern trend

was to make the master liable for acts of his servant

which may not fall within the expression “in the course

of his employment” as formerly understood. With

respect, we think that the extensions to the principle of

liability have been rightly indicated in this decision”.

16.The aforesaid decisions make it quite clear that the Parliament

by introducing Section 163-A in the MVA provided for payment of

compensation on structured formula basis by mandating that the

owner of a motor vehicle or the authorised insurer would be

liable to pay compensation, as indicated in the Second Schedule

in the case of death or permanent disablement due to accident

arising out of the use of the motor vehicle, to the legal heirs or

the victim, as the case may be in a claim made under sub-

section (1) of Section 163-A of the MVA. In order to prove a

claim of this nature the claimant would not be required to plead

or establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect

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of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act

or neglect or default of the owner of the vehicle concerned.

17.However, in the facts of the present case, it was forcefully

argued by the counsel appearing for the respondent that the

claimants are not the ‘third party’, and therefore, they are not

entitled to claim any benefit under Section 163-A of the MVA. In

support of the said contention, the counsel relied on the decision

of this Court in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v.

Rajni Devi, (2008) 5 SCC 736; and New India Assurance Co.

Ltd. v. Sadanand Mukhi and Ors., (2009) 2 SCC 417.

18.In the case of Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. v. Rajni

Devi and Others, (2008) 5 SCC 736, wherein one of us,

namely, Hon’ble Justice S.B. Sinha is a party, it has been

categorically held that in a case where third party is involved, the

liability of the insurance company would be unlimited. It was

also held in the said decision that where, however, compensation

is claimed for the death of the owner or another passenger of the

vehicle, the contract of insurance being governed by the contract

qua contract, the claim of the claimant against the insurance

company would depend upon the terms thereof. It was held in

the said decision that Section 163-A of the MVA cannot be said to

have any application in respect of an accident wherein the owner

of the motor vehicle himself is involved. The decision further

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held that the question is no longer res integra. The liability

under section 163-A of the MVA is on the owner of the vehicle.

So a person cannot be both, a claimant as also a recipient, with

respect to claim. Therefore, the heirs of the deceased could not

have maintained a claim in terms of Section 163-A of the MVA.

In our considered opinion, the ratio of the aforesaid decision is

clearly applicable to the facts of the present case. In the present

case, the deceased was not the owner of the motorbike in

question. He borrowed the said motorbike from its real owner.

The deceased cannot be held to be employee of the owner of the

motorbike although he was authorised to drive the said vehicle

by its owner, and therefore, he would step into the shoes of the

owner of the motorbike.

19.We have already extracted Section 163-A of the MVA

hereinbefore. A bare perusal of the said provision would make it

explicitly clear that persons like the deceased in the present case

would step into the shoes of the owner of the vehicle. In a case

wherein the victim died or where he was permanently disabled

due to an accident arising out of the aforesaid motor vehicle in

that event the liability to make payment of the compensation is

on the insurance company or the owner, as the case may be as

provided under Section 163-A. But if it is proved that the driver

is the owner of the motor vehicle, in that case the owner could

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not himself be a recipient of compensation as the liability to pay

the same is on him. This proposition is absolutely clear on a

reading of Section 163-A of the MVA. Accordingly, the legal

representatives of the deceased who have stepped into the shoes

of the owner of the motor vehicle could not have claimed

compensation under Section 163-A of the MVA.

20.When we apply the said principle into the facts of the present

case we are of the view that the claimants were not entitled to

claim compensation under Section 163-A of the MVA and to that

extent the High Court was justified in coming to the conclusion

that the said provision is not applicable to the facts and

circumstances of the present case. However, the question

remains as to whether an application for demand of

compensation could have been made by the legal

representatives of the deceased as provided in Section 166 of

the MVA. The said provision specifically provides that an

application for compensation arising out of an accident of the

nature specified in sub-section (1) of section 165 may be made

by the person who has sustained the injury; or by the owner of

the property; or where death has resulted from the accident, by

all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased; or by any

agent duly authorised by the person injured or all or any of the

legal representatives of the deceased, as the case may be.

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When an application of the aforesaid nature claiming

compensation under the provisions of Section 166 is received,

the Tribunal is required to hold an enquiry into the claim and

then proceed to make an award which, however, would be

subject to the provisions of Section 162, by determining the

amount of compensation, which is found to be just. Person or

persons who made claim for compensation would thereafter be

paid such amount. When such a claim is made by the legal

representatives of the deceased, it has to be proved that the

deceased was not himself responsible for the accident by his rash

and negligent driving. It would also be necessary to prove that

the deceased would be covered under the policy so as to make

the insurance company liable to make the payment to the heirs.

In this context reference could be made to relevant paras of

Section 147 of the MVA which reads as follows:-

147. Requirements of policies and limits of

liability- (1) In order to comply with the requirement

of this Chapter, a policy of insurance must be a policy

which-

(a) is issued by a person who is an authorised

insurer; or

(b) insurer the person or classes of persons specified in

the policy to the extent specified in sub-section (2)-

(i) against any liability which may be incurred by

him in respect of the death of or bodily [injury to any

person, including owner of the goods or his authorised

representative carried in the vehicle] or damage to any

property of a third party caused by or arising out of the

use of the vehicle in a public place;

(ii) against the death of or bodily injury to any

passenger of a public service vehicle caused by or

arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place:

Provided that a policy shall not be required-

(i) to cover liability in respect of the death,

arising out of and in the course of his employment,

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of the employee of a person insured by the policy

or in respect of bodily injury sustained by such an

employee arising out of and in the course of his

employment other than a liability arising under

the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of

1923) in respect of his death of, or bodily injury

to, any such employee-

(a)engaged in driving the vehicle, or

(b)if it is a public service vehicle engaged as

conductor of the vehicle or in examining

tickets on the vehicle, or

(c)if its is a goods carriage, being carried in the

vehicle, or

(ii) to cover any contractual liability.

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(2) Subject to the proviso to sub-section (1), a

policy of insurance referred to in sub-section (1), shall

cover any liability incurred in respect of any accident,

up to the following limits, namely:-

(a) save as provided in clause (b), the amount

of liability incurred;

(b) in respect of damage to any property of a

third party, a limit of rupees six thousand:

Provided that any policy of insurance issued with

any limited liability and in force, immediately before the

commencement of this Act, shall continue to be

effective for a period of four months after such

commencement or till the date of expiry of such policy

whichever is earlier.

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(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in any

law for the time being in force, an insurer issuing a

policy of insurance under this section shall be liable to

indemnify the person or classes of persons specified in

the policy in respect of any liability which the policy

purports to cover in the case of that person or those

classes of persons.

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21.Section 147 of the MVA provides that the policy of insurance

could also cover cases against any liability which may be

incurred by the insurer in respect of death or fatal injury to any

person including owner of the vehicle or his authorised

representative carried in the vehicle or arising out of the use of

vehicle in the public place.

22.When we analyze the impugned judgment of the High Court in

terms of aforesaid discussion, we find that the counsel for the

insurance company himself contended before the High Court that

the policy of insurance was an Act policy and the risk that is

covered is only in respect of persons contemplated under Section

147 of the MVA. It is the finding of fact which we have also

upheld in this Judgment that the deceased was authorised by the

owner of the vehicle to drive the vehicle. When we examined

the facts of the present case in view of the aforesaid submission

made, we are of the opinion that such an issue was required to

be considered by the High Court in the light of the facts and

evidence adduced in the case. On consideration of the Judgment

and Order passed by the High Court we find the same to be

sketchy on the aforesaid issue as to whether the claim could be

considered under the provisions of Section 166 of the MVA. In

this connection, reference can be made to a judgment of this

Court in the case of Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. vs.

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Rajni Devi and Others (supra), wherein, it was held that where

compensation is claimed for the death of the owner or another

passenger of the vehicle, the contract of insurance being

governed by the contract qua contract, the claim of the

insurance company would depend upo n the terms thereof.

23.Recently, this Court in the case of Raj Rani & Ors. v. Oriental

Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors., [C.A. Nos. 3317-3318 of 2009 @

SLP(C) Nos. 27792-27793 of 2008 pronounced on 06.05.2009],

wherein one of us (Hon’ble Justice S. B. Sinha) has taken the

view that it is not necessary in a proceeding under the MVA to go

by any rules of pleadings or evidence. Section 166 of the MVA

speaks about “Just Compensation”. The court’s duty being to

award “Just Compensation”, it will try to arrive at the said

finding irrespective of the fact as to whether any plea in that

behalf was raised by the claimant or not. It was further observed

in the aforesaid case that although the multiplier specified in the

Second Schedule appended to the MVA are stricto sensu not

applicable in a case under Section 166 of the MVA, it is not of

much dispute that wherever the court has to apply the

appropriate multiplier having regard to several factors in mind.

The Court has placed reliance on earlier judgment of this Court in

Nagappa v. Gurudayal & Ors., (2003) 2 SCC 274, wherein it

was observed as follows in para 7:

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“7. Firstly, under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles

Act, 1988, (hereinafter referred to as “the MV Act”)

there is no restriction that compensation could be

awarded only up to the amount claimed by the

claimant. In an appropriate case, where from the

evidence brought on record if the Tribunal/court

considers that the claimant is entitled to get more

compensation than claimed, the Tribunal may pass such

award. The only embargo is — it should be “just”

compensation, that is to say, it should be neither

arbitrary, fanciful nor unjustifiable from the evidence.

This would be clear by reference to the relevant

provisions of the MV Act. Section 166 provides that an

application for compensation arising out of an accident

involving the death of, or bodily injury to, persons

arising out of the use of motor vehicles, or damages to

any property of a third party so arising, or both, could

be made (a) by the person who has sustained the

injury; or (b) by the owner of the property; or (c)

where death has resulted from the accident, by all or

any of the legal representatives of the deceased; or (d)

by any agent duly authorised by the person injured or

all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased,

as the case may be. Under the proviso to sub-section

(1), all the legal representatives of the deceased who

have not joined as the claimants are to be impleaded as

respondents to the application for compensation. The

other important part of the said section is sub-section

(4) which provides that “the Claims Tribunal shall treat

any report of accidents forwarded to it under sub-

section (6) of Section 158 as an application for

compensation under this Act”. Hence, the Claims

Tribunal in an appropriate case can treat the report

forwarded to it as an application for compensation even

though no such claim is made or no specified amount is

claimed.”

24.There are indeed cases like New India Assurance Company

Limited vs. Sadanand Mukhi and Others, (2009) 2 SCC 417,

wherein, the son of the owner was driving the vehicle, who died

in the accident, was not regarded as third party. In the said

case the court held that neither Section 163-A nor Section 166

would be applicable.

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25.Undoubtedly, Section 166 of the MVA deals with “Just

Compensation” and even if in the pleadings no specific claim was

made under Section 166 of the MVA, in our considered opinion a

party should not be deprived from getting “Just Compensation”

in case the claimant is able to make out a case under any

provision of law. Needless to say, the MVA is beneficial and

welfare legislation. In fact, the court is duty bound and entitled

to award “Just Compensation” irrespective of the fact whether

any plea in that behalf was raised by the claimant or not.

However, whether or not the claimants would be governed with

the terms and conditions of the insurance policy and whether or

not the provisions of Section 147 of the MVA would be applicable

in the present case and also whether or not there was rash and

negligent driving on the part of the deceased, are essentially a

matter of fact which was required to be considered and answered

at least by the High Court.

26.While entertaining the appeal, no effort was made by the High

Court to deal with the aforesaid issues, and therefore, we are of

the considered opinion that the present case should be

remanded back to the High Court to give its decision on the

aforesaid issues. The High Court was required to consider the

aforesaid issues even if it found that the provision of Section

163-A of MVA was not applicable to the facts and circumstances

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of the present case. Since all the aforesaid issues are purely

questions of fact, we do not propose to deal with these issues

and we send the matter back to the High Court for dealing with

the said issues and to render its decision in accordance with law.

The High Court will also consider the question of quantum of

compensation, if any, to which the claimants might be entitled

to, having regard to the earning capacity of the deceased and

“Just Compensation”, if any. Since the claim is a very old claim,

we request the High Court to consider the matter as

expeditiously as possible.

22.In terms of the aforesaid order, we remand back both the

matters to the High Court to dispose of the same. The appeals are

disposed of in terms of the aforesaid order.

…................………………..J.

[S.B. Sinha]

...............………………………J.

[Dr. Mukundakam Sharma]

New Delhi,

May 13, 2009

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