Neutral Citation No. - 2023:AHC:243237

A.F.R.

Court No. - 49

Case :- WRIT - C No. - 26762 of 2023

Petitioner :- Nirmala Devi

Respondent :- State Of U.P. And 4 Others

Counsel for Petitioner :- Vishal Khandelwal

Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Anil Kumar,Avinash Chandra

Srivastava,Satish Kumar Pandey

Hon'ble Syed Qamar Hasan Rizvi,J.

1. Heard Sri Vishal Khandelwal, learned counsel for the petitioner; Sri

Awadesh Kumar Patel, learned Standing Counsel appearing on behalf

of the State-respondent nos. 1 to 3, Shri A.C. Srivastava, learned

counsel for the Land Management Committee (respondent no. 4) and

Sri Satish Kumar Pandey, learned counsel for the respondent no. 5.

2. The present writ petition has been filed seeking a writ in the nature

of certiorari quashing the impugned order dated 29.05.2023 passed by

the Additional Commissioner (Judicial), Agra Division, Agra

(respondent no. 2) dismissing the Revision having Case No. 02238 of

2018 as well as the order dated 14.09.2018 passed by the District

Magistrate/Collector, Mainpuri (respondent no. 3), by means of which

the Collector (respondent no. 3), took the decision to suo moto proceed

for cancellation of the allotment and lease in Case No.1858 of 2018.

3. With the consent of the learned counsel for the parties, this Court

proceeds to decide the present Writ Petition at the admission stage

itself.

4. The facts in a nutshell, as are available on record before this Court,

are that by a Resolution passed by the Land Management Committee

(respondent no. 4) in its meeting held on 19.05.1979, lease was granted

in favour of 150 persons including one Naresh Singh, son of Munshi

Lal. In pursuance of the said lease, plot no. 60-M ad-measuring area

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Neutral Citation No. - 2023:AHC:243237

0.202-hectare, plot no. 360 ad-measuring area 0.526 hectare and plot

no. 363 ad-measuring area 0.405 hectare were allotted in favour of the

said Naresh Singh and accordingly his name was entered in the

revenue records.

5. Subsequently, the aforesaid Naresh Singh transferred the said plots

in favour of the petitioner whereby the petitioner was delivered

possession of the same and subsequently, her name was recorded in

the revenue records as ‘bhumidhar with transferable rights'.

6. After a lapse of about 39 years, on an application/complaint dated

21.09.2017 moved by Pradeep Kumar (respondent no.5); proceeding

for cancellation of allotment and lease, under Section 128 of the U.P.

Revenue Code, 2006, was instituted against the aforesaid Naresh Singh

and also against the petitioner being the transferee of Naresh Singh.

The said proceeding was registered as Case No. 01858 of 2018.

7. The petitioner along with the aforesaid Naresh Singh preferred

preliminary objections regarding the maintainability of the said

proceeding on the ground of limitation. A reply to the notice was also

filed by the petitioner on 29.05.2019, asserting therein that the

aforesaid proceeding is not legally tenable; firstly, for the reason that

the same is barred by time having been initiated after a lapse of about

39 years and secondly, the complainant/applicant (respondent no.5)

was a minor at the time when the allotment in question was made in

the year 1979 and being a minor, he was not eligible for the grant of

the said lease in his favour, as such, he does not fall within the

category of an ‘aggrieved person’. Further, there was no illegality or

infirmity in the allotment in question in favour of Naresh Singh and

the same was made perfectly in accordance with the procedure as

prescribed under law, after due approval of the resolution and the

names in Aakar Pattra 57-kha, as has been reported by the Tehsil

authorities and is available in the concerned Records. As such, the

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proceeding under Section 128 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 are not

at all maintainable and is liable to be dropped.

8. The District Magistrate/Collector, Mainpuri (respondent no.3) called

for an inquiry report and in pursuance of the same the Sub-Divisional

Officer concerned got the said inquiry conducted through the Tehsildar

and forwarded the same to the Collector (respondent no.3) on

08.12.2017. On the basis of the same, the Collector (respondent no.3)

proceeded with the aforesaid proceeding and passed the order dated

14.09.2018, categorically holding therein that although, the said

proceeding is ‘barred by time’ (Neuteral है) but as per the report

submitted by the Sub Divisional Officer, the lessee was not a resident

of the concerned Gaon Sabha at the time of the allotment and lease as

such the allotment in question is ‘proved illegal’ (ioCaen.N सानिबत है).

Thereby, the Collector (respondent no. 3) decided to proceed suo

moto, for cancellation of the allotment and lease and consequently,

issued notice to the lessee.

9. Assailing the aforesaid order dated 14.09.2018, the petitioner along

with the aforesaid Naresh Singh filed a Revision before the

Commissioner, Agra Division, Agra, under section 210 of the U.P.

Revenue Code, 2006, which was registered as Case No. 02238 of

2018. The main ground raised by the petitioner in the said Revision

was that the aforesaid proceeding under section 128 of the U.P.

Revenue Code, 2006 is vitiated as it could only be instituted up to the

period of five years after the grant of lease, but since the proceeding in

question has been initiated beyond the prescribed period, rather, after a

lapse of about 39 years, the same is not at all maintainable. It was

further pleaded by the petitioner that the question of limitation goes to

the root of the jurisdiction of the Court and as such, the Collector

(respondent no.3) could not have proceeded with the case in the teeth

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of the fact that the Collector (respondent no.3) by the same order

himself held the proceeding as barred by time.

10. The learned Additional Commissioner, Agra Division, Agra

(respondent no. 2) declined to entertain the aforesaid revision by

treating the aforesaid order dated 14.09.2018 passed by the learned

Collector (respondent no.3) to be an order of interlocutory nature and

dismissed the said Revision having Case No. 02238 of 2018; vide

order dated 29.05.2023, with the observation that the Revisionists have

ample opportunity to contest their case before the respondent no.3.

11. Being aggrieved by the above-mentioned orders dated 29.05.2023

and 14.09.2018, the petitioner preferred the instant writ petition, inter

alia, praying for the following reliefs:

“i. Issue a writ, order or direction in the mature of Certiorari quashing the

impugned order dated: 29.5.2023 (Annexure No. 9) passed by the

respondent no. 2 Additional Commissioner (Judicial), Agra Division,

Agra, in Revision No. 02238/2018 (computerized no.

C201801000002238) as well as that of order dated: 14.9.2018 (Annexure

No. 6) passed by the respondent no. 3- District Magistrate/Collector,

Mainpuri, in Case No. 1858/2018 (computerised no. D20181490001858).

ii. Issue any other writ, order or direction as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit

and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.

iii. Award the cost of the petitioner to the petitioner.”

12. At the very outset, Shri Awadesh Kumar Patel, learned Standing

Counsel appearing on behalf of the State (respondent nos. 1 to 3) and

Shri Avinash Chandra Srivastava, learned Standing Counsel for the

Land Management Committee (respondent no. 4) have raised serious

objections on the maintainability of the present writ petition and have

made the following submissions:

12.1. It has been contended on behalf of the respondents that the order

impugned in the present Writ Petition is simply a show cause notice

and the petitioner has every opportunity to defend her case before the

learned District Magistrate/Collector (respondent no.3) by a detailed

reply to the show-cause notice and as such the writ petition is not at all

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entertainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In support

of his submission, the learned Standing Counsel has relied upon the

judgment passed by this Court in the case of Ghanshyam and 11 others

versus Union of India and 2 others: Writ-C No. 5606 of 2020.

13. Refuting to the objections raised by the learned standing counsels

on the maintainability of the present writ petition; Sri Vishal

Khandelwal, learned counsel for the petitioner has advanced the

following submissions:

13.1. He submits that in the present case, the impugned order dated

14.09.2018 passed by the Collector (respondent no. 3) is a

premeditated order that has finally decided the question of limitation

and moreover, determined the allotment and lease of the plots in

question, as ‘proved illegal’ (ioCaen.N सानिबत है). The said show cause

notice is inflicted by premeditated adjudication on the legality of the

question of allotment and lease holding the same to be illegal thereby

adversely affecting the valuable rights of the petitioner. Therefore, the

said impugned order dated 14.09.2018/show cause notice is not a mere

show cause notice simpliciter and as such deserves interference by this

Court in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of

India. In support of his case, he has placed before this Court, the

judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Siemens

Ltd. versus State of Maharashtra and others, reported in (2006) 12

SCC 33; and the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court

in the case of Joyous Blocks and Panels Pvt. Ltd. and another versus

Assistant Commissioner, Commercial Taxes, Ballygunj Charge and

another, reported in 2022 SCC Online Cal 2032.

14. Addressing on the merits of the case, Sri Vishal Khandelwal,

learned counsel for the petitioner pressed the following arguments:

14.1. He submits that undisputedly the proceeding for cancellation of

the allotment and lease granted in the year 1979 has been initiated after

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a lapse of about 39 years, i.e., in the year 2017. Thus, the same is

highly barred by the limitation as contemplated under Section 128 of

the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006. Further, the said bar of limitation

applies to the proceedings initiated on the basis of

application/complaint as well as suo moto proceedings.

14.2. Moreover, the proceeding for cancellation of allotment and lease

was initiated on the basis of an ex-parte inquiry report dated

08.12.2017 as no prior notice of the aforesaid inquiry was ever given

to the petitioner or to the aforesaid Naresh Singh as they were never

afforded any opportunity to participate in the aforesaid inquiry. Not

only this much, even the said inquiry report was not formally proved in

the manner as provided under law, and therefore, the same is

inadmissible as evidence and cannot be relied upon.

14.3. Further, proceeding in question whereby the lease has been

sought to be cancelled is based on the ground of alleged ineligibility of

the allottee namely Naresh Singh (through whom the petitioner is

claiming) that he was a resident of different village at the time of

allotment in question, is not an illegality but a mere irregularity, if any,

in the grant of lease and that does not come within the purview of

fraud, especially when that the tehsil report itself categorically

acknowledges the resolution of the respondent no. 4 passed in its

meeting held on 29.5.1979 regarding the allotment and also entry of

the name of the allottee at serial no. 78 in the Aakar Pattra 57 kha, as is

evident from the said Tehsil report as contained in Annexure No.5 to

the writ petition. Therefore, the allegations made in the impugned

orders are contrary to the records inasmuch as the same do not match

the facts mentioned in the said report.

14.4. The next submission of the learned counsel is that the Land

Management Committee passed the resolution dated 29.5.1979 for

allotment in favour of 150 persons including one Naresh Singh son of

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Munshi Lal, who after acquiring the status of ‘bhumidhar with

transferable rights’ transferred the plots in question in favour of the

petitioner and accordingly the petitioner was delivered possession and

later on her name was duly entered in the revenue records, as is

evident from the khatauni as contained in Annexure No.1 to the writ

petition. Therefore, after the change of the legal status of the allottee

from lessee to ‘bhumidhar with transferrable rights’, no proceeding for

cancellation of allotment and lease under section 128 of the U.P.

Revenue Code, 2006 is maintainable.

14.5. Further, he contended that a large number of villagers filed

affidavit as contained in Annexure No.10 to the writ petition, deposing

therein that the allottee was residing in the village concerned.

14.6. It has been vehemently argued by Shri Khandelwal that the

respondent no.5 does not come within the purview of ‘aggrieved

person’ as the complainant was a minor at the time when the allotment

in question was made in the year 1979 and being a minor, he was not

eligible for the grant of the said lease in his favour. Further, by way of

single resolution the lease was granted to 150 persons including

Naresh Singh, but the present proceeding has been initiated only

against the petitioner/ Naresh Singh at the behest of the respondent

no.5 who is not even qualified to move the application as per the

requirement contemplated under Section 128 of the U.P. Revenue

Code, 2006.

14.7. The learned counsel further contended that the proceedings for

cancellation of the allotment and lease is solely based on the allegation

that the allottee was not a resident of the Gram Sabha concerned at the

time of allotment in question. He submits that for the sake of argument

even if it be assumed, though not admitted to be true that the allottee

was ineligible for allotment and lease, that may at the most be taken as

an irregularity, and cannot be attributed as fraud on the part of the

allottee, especially when the inquiry report dated 08.12.2017

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specifically provides that there is a valid resolution of the Land

Management Committee for the said allotment and a due entry in the

Aakar Pattar 57 kha.

14.8. As, in the present case, neither there is any allegation of fraud

nor fraud has been specifically pleaded or proved, the limitation of 5

years as stipulated under section 128 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006,

is inevitable.

14.9. Moreover, the learned counsel drew attention of this Court to the

provisions of section 198 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land

Reforms Act, 1950. He submitted that the same is pari materia to

section 128 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006. He submits that it has

been held by this Court, time and again, that the period of limitation as

stipulated in the Act cannot be stretched beyond its limits irrespective

of the fact that the proceeding for cancellation of allotment and lease

was initiated on an application by the aggrieved person or by the

Collector, suo moto. In support of this contention, he has placed

reliance on the judgments passed by this Court in the case of Subhag

and Another versus Board of Revenue U.P. at Allahabad and others,

reported in 2011 (114) RD 219; Suresh Giri and others versus Board of

Revenue U.P. at Allahabad and others, reported in 2010 (109) RD 566

and Jiya Ram and others versus State of U.P. and others, reported in

2012 (115) RD 372.

14.10. It has also been contended by the learned counsel for the

petitioner that the entire proceeding is not only irrelevant but patently

illegal as the petitioner is a bonafide purchaser of the abovementioned

plots for valuable consideration and her rights stands protected by

virtue of Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

14.11. Assailing the order dated 29.05.2023 passed by the Additional

Commissioner (respondent no.2), the contention of the learned counsel

is that by means of the said impugned order, the revisional court has

declined to entertain the revision filed by the petitioner treating the

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order dated 14.09.2018 passed by the Collector (respondent no. 3) as

an ‘interlocutory order’. His contention is that the learned Revisional

Court has failed to appreciate the very nature of the impugned order

dated 14.09.2018 by treating it to be an interlocutory order, whereas

the same is an order giving finality to the issue of limitation and

adversely affected the valuable rights of the petitioner/revisionist.

Therefore, the same being arbitrary is liable to be set aside.

15. Sri Satish Kumar Pandey, learned counsel for the respondent no.5

vehemently opposed the writ petition by refuting the submissions

made on behalf of the petitioner and has raised the following

arguments:

15.1. The learned counsel has argued that the learned Additional

Commissioner (respondent no. 2) has very rightly dismissed the

revision filed by the petitioner challenging the impugned order dated

14.09.2018, which is an interlocutory order and against which revision

does not lie and this issue has already been taken into consideration by

this Court in the case of Smt. Bhoodevi versus Board of Revenue and

others reported in 1994 RD 92 (HC) wherein it was held that a

decision taken suo moto or an application of an aggrieved party to

start proceeding for cancellation of allotment under section 198(4) of

U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 is an order to

commence the proceeding. Mere decision to commence the proceeding

would not tantamount “to any suit or proceeding decided”. He

contended that the impugned order dated 29.05.2023 passed by the

revisional court of Additional Commissioner (respondent no. 2) is just

and legal.

15.2. The learned counsels further submit that as the proceedings for

cancellation of allotment were initiated suo moto, the benefit of the

period of limitation is not available to the petitioner in the instant case.

In support of his contention, he placed reliance on the judgment passed

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by this Court in the case of Kishnu and others versus Sheesh Pal and

others, reported in 2011(7) ADJ 684.

15.3. Next submission advanced by the learned counsel for the

respondent no. 5 is that the petitioner has failed to establish that the

original allottee, namely, Naresh Singh, was the resident of the

concerned village at the time of allotment and as such, the learned

Collector (respondent no.3), vide order dated 14.09.2018 has rightly

speculated that the allotment and lease in question has been obtained

by fraud and held it to be illegal.

15.4. In addition to the above, Shri Pandey, learned counsel for

respondent no. 5 contended that the petitioner as well as the original

allottee Shri Naresh Singh, are not entitled to avail the benefit of the

restriction of time limit prescribed for the initiation of the proceeding

of cancellation of allotment and lease, for the simple reason that the

petitioner could not bring on record any evidence to establish the fact

that Shri Naresh Singh was the resident of the village concerned at the

time of allotment in question, which is a mandatory requirement under

law and as such, the allotment made in favour of Naresh Singh was

fraudulent. He submits that it is well settled that fraud unravels

everything and further vitiates every solemn act, and an act of fraud is

always to be viewed seriously. In support of his contention, he has

relied upon the judgment passed by this Court in the case of Suresh

Giri and others versus Board of Revenue and others, reported in 2010

(3) AWC 2834.

16. Before delving into the merits of the case, this Court finds it

imperative to firstly deal with the issue of entertainability of the

present writ petition.

17. From a bare perusal of the impugned order dated 14.09.2018, it is

abundantly clear that, although, the learned Collector (respondent no.

3) has held that the claim of the applicant as ‘barred by time’

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(Neuteral है) but on the footing of a report dated 08.12.2017

submitted by the Sub-District Magistrate concerned, recorded a finding

that since the defendant is not the resident of the Gram Sabha Division,

the allotment in his favour is prima facie ‘proved illegal’ (ioCaen.N

सानिबत है) and by relying upon the judgment passed by this Court in the

case of Jairam versus State of Uttar Pradesh and others, reported in

2013 RD (119) 567 has contemplated that the issue of limitation in the

present case is ‘not worth consideration’ (काल सीमा का निबन्द

ु

निवचारणीय

हीं है). It is relevant to mention here that the learned Collector

(respondent no. 3) has completely turned a blind eye to the fact that the

Order dated 18.09.2012 passed by this Court in the case of Jairam

(Supra) was already reviewed and set aside by this Court vide Order

dated 12.08.2013 passed in Review Application No. 316024 of 2012

In: WRIT-C No. 51989 of 2007. For ready reference, the relevant

portion of the impugned order dated 14.09.2019 is extracted

hereinbelow,

“…दावा वादी Neuteral है, परन्तु s9WIueraNe42 की आख्या से प्रधितवादी का

आवंट प्रथम दृष्टया प्रधितवादी के ग्रामसभा मण्डल से बाहर का निवासी होे के कारण

ioCaen.N सानिबत है। WIue शासकीय iraoye 4eI'o द्वारा प्रस्तुत आर.डी.-2013

(119/पृष्ठ 567) IF4e0 बाम स्टेट आफ उ० प्र० में उद्धृत माीय उच्च न्यायालय की

nora व्यवस्था पूण:तः लागू होती है। ऐसी स्थिस्थधित में इस वाद में काल सीमा का निबन्दु

निवचारणीय हीं है।...”

18. The Collector (respondent no. 3) on the aforesaid premise took the

decision to initiate the suo moto proceeding for cancellation of the

allotment and lease, against the allottee by issuing notice to him.

19. It would not be out of place to elucidate that the power to issue

prerogative Writs under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is

plenary in nature. It does not, in terms, impose any restraint on the

exercise of the power to issue Writs. It is the discretion of the Writ

Court to entertain writ petition or not, depending upon the facts and

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circumstances of each case. One of the self-imposed restrictions on the

exercise of the power under Article 226 of the Constitution that has

evolved through judicial precedents, is that the High Court should

normally not entertain a writ petition against a show-cause notice

unless the same, inter alia, appears to have been issued without

jurisdiction.

20. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Siemens Ltd. (Supra)

and also the Hon’ble Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the

case of Joyous Blocks (Supra) have held that if the authority has pre-

decided the issue and the show-cause is pre-mediated then it is not a

show-cause and in such a situation, the Writ Court may very well

interfere with the said notice/order, in exercise of its extra-ordinary

jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

21. As far as the judgment passed by this Court in the case of

Ghanshyam (Supra) is concerned, which has been relied upon by the

learned Standing Counsel, the same is in respect of the issue of

entertainability of the writ petition against a show cause notice

simpliciter and in the light of the discussion made herein above the

same is not attracted in the instant case.

22. It is a well settled legal position that wherever there is an

infringement of any legal right, the Writ Court has the jurisdiction to

take cognisance of the same, in exercise of its power conferred under

Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Taking into consideration the

aforesaid legal preposition, this Court finds substance in the

submission advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the

impugned order dated 14.09.2018 passed by the Collector (respondent

no. 3) is a premeditated order and not a show cause notice simpliciter

that has finally decided the question of limitation by recording a

categorical finding that the issue of limitation in the present case is

‘not worth consideration’(काल सीमा का निबन्द

ु

निवचारणीय हीं है) and

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moreover, virtually determined the allotment and lease of the plots in

question, as ‘proved illegal’ (ioCaen.N सानिबत है). The impugned order

in the name of show cause notice is inflicted by premeditated

adjudication on the legality of the question of allotment and lease,

holding the same to be illegal that adversely affects the valuable rights

of the petitioner and further, the petitioner being a recorded

‘bhumidhar with transferable rights’ carries a valuable right and

interest in the property / plots in question. Her rights of not to be

deprived of property save by the authority of law are protected under

Article 300 A of the Constitution of India.

23. Since, the issue of limitation goes to the root of the matter and

once the limitation expires, it attaches finality to the rights of the

parties by operation of law. In view of the factual matrix of the case,

the question of jurisdiction as well as the violation of the rights

guaranteed under the Constitution of India, is involved in the instant

case; justice demands indulgence by this Court in exercise of its Writ

jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

24. Once the preliminary objection raised by the learned standing

counsels regarding the maintainability of the present writ petition has

been overruled; it would now be apt to delve into the merits of the

case.

25. Having heard the learned counsels for the parties and on

considering the materials available on record; the pivotal issue that has

emerged for consideration is that whether after a lapse of about 39

years, the impugned Order dated 14.09.2018 passed by the learned

Collector (respondent no.3) to proceed for the cancellation of the

allotment and lease of land, will endure the test of the time frame, as

envisaged by Section 128 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 ?

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26. Before proceeding further, it would be germane to go through the

provisions of Section 128 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006. For a ready

reference, the same are extracted below:

“128. Cancellation of allotment and lease. (1) The Collector may, of his

own motion and shall on the application of any person aggrieved, inquire

in the manner prescribed into any allotment and if he is satisfied that the

allotment is in contravention of the provisions of this Code or any of the

enactments repealed by this Code or the rules made there under, he may

cancel the allotment and the lease, if any.

[(1-A)] Under the provisions of sub section (1), an application may be

moved in the case of an allotment or lease of land made before or after the

commencement of this code, within five years from the date of such

allotment of lease.

(2) Where the allotment or lease of any land is cancelled under sub-section

(1), the following consequences shall ensue, namely-

(a) the right, title and interest of the allottee or lessee or any other person

claiming through him in such land and in every tree or other improvement

existing thereon shall cease, and the same shall revert to the Gram

Panchayat;

(b) the Collector may direct delivery of possession over such land, tree or

improvement forthwith to the Gram Panchayat after ejectment of every

person holding or retaining possession thereof and may for that purpose

use or cause to be used such force as may be necessary.

(3) Where in proceedings for cancellation of allotment or lease referred to

in clause (b) of sub-section (1) the Collector is satisfied that any land

referred to in section 77 excepting clause (a) or clause (h) or (i) thereof has

been allotted to any person as bhumidhar with non-transferable rights, he

may instead of cancelling the allotment, or lease, direct that the allottee or

lessee shall be treated as an asami under clause (b) of section 125.

(4) Every order made by the Collector under this section shall, subject to

the provisions of section 210, be final.

(5) The provisions of sections 5 and 49 of the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation

of Holdings Act, 1953 shall not apply to the proceedings under this

section.”

27. From a bare perusal of the aforesaid provisions of Section 128 of

the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006, it is evident that the said Section

contains the following two situations in which the Collector can

proceed for cancellation of allotment and lease by holding inquiry:

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(i) the collector may, of his own motion inquire in the manner prescribed,

into any allotment.

(ii) the collector shall on the application of any person aggrieved, inquire in

the manner prescribed, into any allotment.

28. Further, the sub-section (1-A) specifically provides the limitation

of five years for an application to be moved from the date of such

allotment and lease. As such, in clear words, the limitation mentioned

under the said sub-section (1-A) applies to the application moved by

an aggrieved person. It is also noteworthy that the Appendix-I

appended to Rule 191 of the U.P. Revenue Code Rules, 2016, which

specifies the period of limitation for the suits, applications and

proceedings also does not mention any limitation regarding

cancellation of allotment and lease as provided under section 128 of

the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006.

29. The learned counsel for the petitioner has placed heavy reliance on

the judgments passed by this Court in the case of Subhag and another

versus Board of Revenue U.P. at Allahabad and others, reported in

2011 (114) RD 219; Suresh Giri and others versus Board of Revenue

U.P. at Allahabad and others, reported in 2010 (109) RD 566 and Jiya

Ram and others versus State of U.P. and others, reported in 2012 (115)

RD 372.

30. Since, the above-mentioned judgments relate to the issue of

limitation as provided under section 198 of the U.P. Zamindari

Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 and in the present case the

dispute relates to the proceeding under section 128 of the U.P.

Revenue Code, 2006. As such, for a better understanding, it would be

apt to have a brief comparative study of both the said sections,

particularly the provisions of limitation contained therein, in respect of

the proceeding for cancellation of allotment and lease.

15

Neutral Citation No. - 2023:AHC:243237

31. It would not be out of place to mention here that the provisions of

section 128 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 are pari materia to the

provisions contained in Section 198 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition

and Land Reforms Act, 1950, which now has been repealed. For a

better appreciation of the same, the sub-sections (4), (5) and (6) of the

said section 198 are extracted below,

“198. Order of preference in admitting persons to land under Sections 195

and 197.

[(4) The [Collector] may of his own motion and shall on the application

of any person aggrieved by an allotment of land inquire in the manner

prescribed into such allotment and if he is satisfied that the allotment is

irregular, he may cancel the allotment and the lease, if any.

(5) No order for cancellation of an allotment or lease shall be made under

sub-section (4), unless a notice to show cause is served on the person in

whose favour the allotment or lease was made or on his legal

representatives:

…

(6) Every notice to show' cause mentioned in sub-section (5) may be

issued-

(a) in the case of an allotment of land made before November 10, 1980,

(hereinafter referred to as the said date), before the expiry of a period of

[seven years from the said date; and

(b) in the case of an allotment of land made on or after the said date,

before the expiry of a period of [five years from the date of such

allotment or lease or up to November 10, 1987, which ever be later].”

32. The aforesaid sub-section (4) of Section 198 provides the manner

and the power of the Collector to inquire into the matter, before

proceeding for cancellation of an allotment or lease.

33. At this stage, it would be relevant to refer to the judgment passed

by this Court in the case of Smt. Sona Devi versus Board of Revenue,

WRIT-B No. 48418 of 2015, wherein it has been held that the phrase

“every notice to show cause” as mentioned in section 198 (6) of the

U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, makes it clear

that there is one limitation for the action in the case filed by aggrieved

16

Neutral Citation No. - 2023:AHC:243237

persons as well as suo motu initiation of proceeding for cancellation of

patta. For a ready reference, Paragraph 8 of the said judgment is

quoted hereinbelow,

“8. By U.P. Act No. 20 of 1982 and U.P. Act No. 24 of 1986, the Act

itself provided limitation for initiation of cases for cancellation of patta

under Section 198 (4) of the Act, as such the limitation as provided in

Appendix III (vide Entry 24) has become redundant. In case of

contradiction between the Act and the Rules, the Act will prevail. The

phrase "every notice to show cause", as mentioned in Section 198 (6) of

the Act, makes it clear that different limitation as previously provided for

suo motu action under Entry 24 of Appendix III has also came to an end

and by using words "every notice to show cause" under Section 198 (6)

of the Act, one limitation for the action in the case filed by aggrieved

persons as well as suo motu initiation of proceeding for cancellation of

patta has been provided. Full Bench of Board of Revenue U.P. in

Virendra Singh vs. State of U.P., 1994 RD 540 has not taken notice of

above legislative change and does not hold the good law.”

34. Similarly, in the case of Suresh Giri (Supra), a Co-ordinate Bench

of this Court has repelled the argument that the limitation has no

application for initiation of suo motu action under Section 198(6) of

the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950. For a

ready reference, the Paragraph 14 of the said judgment is extracted

hereinbelow,

“14. Entry 24 of Appendix III prescribes a period of six months for

moving an application raising objection against any irregular allotment of

land and three years for suo motu action by the Collector for setting aside

the allotment of land. Therefore, the limitation for initiation of

proceedings for cancellation of allotment by the Collector on suo motu

action is three years whereas notice for such purpose can be issued within

5 years as provided under Section 198(6) of the Act. Thus, the legislator

clearly intend to provide limitation even for suo motu action and the

submission that the limitation has no application for initiation of suo

motu action for cancellation of allotment of land/lease is baseless and is

to be rejected.”

35. Needless to say that the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 is a

comprehensive and self-contained Code and it has been enacted with

17

Neutral Citation No. - 2023:AHC:243237

the objective to consolidate and amend the law relating to land tenures

and land revenue in the State of Uttar Pradesh. It goes without saying

that unlike the limitation period for issuing notice as provided under

section 198(6) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act,

1950, read with Entry 24 of Appendix III under Rule 338 of the U.P.

Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules, 1952; the provisions of

Section 128 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 read with Appendix-I

appended to Rule 191 of the U.P. Revenue Code Rules, 2016,

prescribe limitation only for an application to be moved by an

aggrieved person, but no limitation is expressly prescribed for the

initiation of suo moto action by the collector, for the cancellation of

allotment and lease. Thus, the limitation to proceed under sub-section

(1) of section 128 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 is confined to the

limitation period as provided under sub-section (1-A) of the same and

as such, it is crystal clear that the aforesaid Section 128 is silent in

respect of an inquiry to be initiated by the Collector, on his own

motion.

36. In view of the above, the above quoted judgments that are relied

upon by the learned counsels, specifically deals with the limitation as

provided under the section 198 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and

Land Reforms Act, 1950, which has now been repealed, and as such

they are not applicable in the present case where the proceeding has

been initiated under section 128 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006.

37. The issue of no express prescription of the time limit being

provided with regard to the exercise of a statutory jurisdiction by an

authority has been considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the

case of State of Punjab and others versus Bhatinda District

Cooperative Milk Producers Union, reported in (2007) 11 SCC 363

wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has been pleased to make the

18

Neutral Citation No. - 2023:AHC:243237

following observation. The extract of Paragraph 18 of the said

judgment is reproduced as under,

“18. It is trite that no period of limitation has been prescribed, statutory

authority must exercise its jurisdiction within a reasonable period. What,

however, shall be reasonable period would depend upon the nature of the

statute, rights and liabilities thereunder and other relevant factors.”

38. The aforesaid principle has also been reiterated by the Hon’ble

Apex Court in the case of Securities and Exchange Board of India

versus Sunil Krishna Khaitan and Others, reported in (2023) 2 SCC

643.

39. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Jagdish versus State of

Karnataka, reported in (2021) 12 SCC 812, has been pleased to

observe that where the concerned statute does not prescribe a

limitation, the rights conferred therein must be exercised within a

“reasonable time” (emphasis supplied).

40. Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s North

Eastern Chemicals Industries (P) Ltd. and another versus M/S Ashok

Paper Mill (Assam) Ltd and another, Civil Appeal No. 2669 of 2013,

decided on 11.12.2023 condensed the view which the Courts should

take when it is seized of a situation where no limitation is specially

provided for an act to be done under a statute. The Hon’ble Apex

Court held that a Court in such a situation, should consider the facts

and circumstances of the case at hand, the conduct of the parties, the

nature of the proceeding, the length of delay, the possibility of

prejudice being caused, and the scheme of the statute in question. For a

ready reference, Paragraph 25 of the same is extracted hereinbelow,

“25. In light of above discussion, it is clear that when a Court is seized of

a situation where no limitation stands provided either by specific

applicability of the Limitation Act or the special statute governing the

dispute, the Court must undertake a holistic assessment of the facts and

circumstances of the case to examine the possibility of delay causing

prejudice to a party. When no limitation stands prescribed it would be

inappropriate for a Court to supplant the legislature’ s wisdom by its own

19

Neutral Citation No. - 2023:AHC:243237

and provide a limitation, more so in accordance with what it believes to

be the appropriate period. A court should, in such a situation consider in

the facts and circumstances of the case at hand, the conduct of the parties,

the nature of the proceeding, the length of delay, the possibility of

prejudice being caused, and the scheme of the statute in question. It may

be underscored here that when a party to a dispute raises a plea of delay

despite no specific period being prescribed in the statute, such a party

also bears the burden of demonstrating how the delay in itself would

cause the party additional prejudice or loss as opposed to, the claim

subject matter of dispute, being raised at an earlier point in time.”

41. In the case at hand, the allottee, Naresh Singh was granted patta

along with 150 other persons through the Resolution passed by the

Land Management Committee in its meeting held on 19.05.1979. The

said Naresh Singh transferred the allotted plots in question in favour of

the petitioner and after acquiring the possession over the same, her

name was recorded in the revenue records. From the Khatauni annexed

as Annexure No. 1 to the instant writ petition, it is evident that her

name is recorded as ‘bhumidhar with transferable rights’.

42. Further, after a lapse of around 39 years from the date of the

aforesaid allotment, on an application moved by the respondent no. 5

on 21.09.2017, the learned Collector (respondent no. 3) got an inquiry

conducted in pursuance of Section 128 of the U.P. Revenue Code,

2006 and on the basis of an inquiry report dated 08.12.2017 submitted

by the Sub-Divisional Officer, the learned Collector (respondent no. 3)

passed the order dated 14.09.2018 holding therein that although, the

said proceeding is ‘barred by time’ (Neuteral है) but on the ground

that the lessee was not a resident of the concerned Gram Sabha, held

the allotment in question as ‘proved illegal’ (ioCaen.N सानिबत है).

Though, the Collector (respondent no. 3) found the proceeding to be

barred by time but taking the shelter of a judgment passed by this

Court in the case of Jairam versus State of U.P. and others, reported in

2013 (119) RD 567 decided to proceed for the cancellation of

allotment and lease under section 128 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006

20

Neutral Citation No. - 2023:AHC:243237

on his own motion. It is most unfortunate that the learned Collector

(respondent no. 3) vide order 14.09.2018 took the decision to proceed

for cancellation of an allotment made way back in the year 1979, on

the strength of an annulled judgment that was already reviewed and set

aside by this Court itself vide Order dated 12.08.2013 passed in

Review Application No. 316024 of 2012 in Writ-C No. 15989 of 2007.

For a ready reference, the extract of the said Order dated 12.08.2013 is

reproduced hereinbelow:

“The Writ petition arose out of proceedings for cancellation of patta,

which had been granted to the petitioner applicant in 1975-76. Initially,

the application for cancellation of patta filed by respondent No.4 on

05.08.1985 was rejected on 30.06.1986, however review filed after about

19 years (on 31.05.2005) was allowed on 06.07.2006 by Collector,

Jhansi, order dated 30.06.1986 was set aside and the case for cancellation

of patta was restored. The said order was challenged through the writ

petition. Through the judgment and order dated 18.09.2012, I dismissed

the writ petition, directed the Collector/ Additional Collector to decide

the matter expeditiously and further directed that in case patta was

cancelled, damages at the rate of Rs.5000/- per hectare per year should

also be recovered from the petitioner.

This review petition has been filed for setting aside the order dated

18.09.2012.

The main ground on which I dismissed the writ petition was that at two

occasions land had been allotted to the petitioner; at one occasion four

acres and after about a year on the second occasion about 4.5 acres. After

filing of the review application, pursuant to the judgment dated

18.09.2012 (sought to be reviewed), Collector decided the matter on

30.03.2013. Copy of the said order has been filed along with affidavit

filed in the review petition by respondent No.4. The Collector

categorically held that petitioner was not allotted land twice and the

earlier proposal dated 28.02.1975 proposing to allot 4 acres of land was

not finalized. Learned standing counsel as well as learned counsel for

respondent No.4 admitted this position that pursuant to resolution dated

28.02.1975, no effective allotment was made. Accordingly, the main

basis of my judgment has vanished. The other points like previous

residence in another state etc. taken in the cancellation application by

respondent No.4 were not so serious, which could warrant review after 19

years ignoring the limitation at both the occasions; in filing cancellation

application and thereafter in filing the review. At the earlier occasion, the

application was rejected on the ground that it had been filed after

10.11.1982 hence by virtue of Section 198(4) of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, it

was barred by time.

21

Neutral Citation No. - 2023:AHC:243237

Accordingly, review petition is allowed. Judgment and order dated

18.09.2012 is set aside. Writ Petition is allowed. Order dated 06.07.2006

through which Collector allowed the review petition of respondent No.4

is set aside. Consequent order of the Collector dated 30.03.2013

automatically stands recalled. Revision filed against the order dated

30.03.2013 may be dismissed as infructuous.”

43. That apart, the impugned order dated 14.09.2018 passed by the

Collector (respondent no. 3) deciding to proceed suo moto for

cancellation of the allotment and lease is based on a report dated

08.12.2017 submitted by the Sub Divisional Officer concerned

whereby the allottee was reported to be the non-resident of the

concerned Gram Sabha at the time of the allotment that took place in

the year 1979 and on this ground alone, the Collector (respondent no.

3) held the patta to be ‘proved illegal’ (ioCaen.N सानिबत है). As such,

this finding recorded by the Collector (respondent no. 3) is not only

arbitrary and without application of mind, but also inconsistent with

the report dated 08.12.2017 submitted by the tehsil authority as

contained in Annexure No. 5 to the writ petition. From the perusal of

the said report, it is evident that the allotment in favour of Naresh

Singh was made through the Resolution of the Land Management

Committee duly approved by the Sub Divisional Officer, Mainpuri on

03.07.1979 and there is nothing on record to show that the said order

of approval and resolution have been challenged before any competent

forum. For ready reference, the relevant part of the said report is

extracted hereinbelow:

"4e1/Ne1/NeFe(uF/0c/s1m1-1/N4205DI/NT/tC‘N/n:.eDN/29.05.79 का 57

j/s9u’a/ C/8-NP /G0eDN/78 94/.4P,/B- /9A“/0A3,2/ueu/n.1/,e /6u09A4/NP

ाम गाटा संख्या 360/1335, 363/1.10, 60/0.45 3 निकता/2.8 एकड़ का

आवंट अंनिकत है। पट्टा एस०डी०ओ० मैपुरी द्वारा निदांक 3.7.79 को स्वीकृत

निकया गया है। अन्य सेवा में प्रेनिKत है।"

44. Further, the Collector (respondent no.3) vide order dated

14.09.2018 dismissed the claim of the respondent no. 5 for

22

Neutral Citation No. - 2023:AHC:243237

cancellation of the allotment and lease in question as ‘barred by time’

(Neuteral है) and dropped the said proceeding but without indicating

any plausible reason to justify the laches in not initiating the said

proceeding earlier, during the period of about 39 years i.e. since 1979

when the resolution for patta was approved and granted; abruptly

switched over to the other mode of cancellation by picking up the

same exercise from that very stage and on the basis of the same

material, under a different complexion of suo moto proceeding. As

narrated above, Section 128 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006

contemplates two situations where the Collector (1) of his own motion

and (2) on the application of any person aggrieved can proceed for

cancellation of allotment and lease, the said modes are altogether

independent and not substitute or supplement to each other. The

calamitous way in which Collector (respondent no.3) shifted from one

mode to the other by deciding to proceed suo moto, reflects his

premeditated decision to accomplish the very task that could not have

succeeded due to the legal impediment of ‘time bar’ and is also against

the well-known principle that ‘what may not be done directly cannot

be allowed to be done indirectly’.

45. In any case, the long period of 39 years to initiate suo moto

proceeding for cancellation of allotment and lease, without any

genuine reason; cannot by any stretch of imagination be considered as

a ‘reasonable period’. Furthermore, the proceedings in question for the

cancellation of allotment and lease cast an adverse impact directly on

the valuable rights of the petitioner, who has been admitted as

‘bhumidhar with transferable right’. As such, the impugned suo moto

proceeding initiated under Section 128 of the U.P. Revenue Code,

2006, adversely effecting the valuable rights of the petitioner who is

recorded as ‘bhumidhar with transferable right’ is unwarranted and

unsustainable.

23

Neutral Citation No. - 2023:AHC:243237

46. That apart, the impugned proceedings for cancellation of the

allotment and lease is solely based on the allegation that the allottee

was not a resident of the Gram Sabha concerned at the time of

allotment which was made way back in the year 1979, the said alleged

ineligibility is admittedly neither a fraud nor a charge of such a

magnitude that warrants suo moto cognizance under section 128 of

U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 after a lapse of about 39 years, that too

when the person has attained the legal status of ‘bhumidhar with

transferable right’. It would not be out of place to note that this Court

in the case of Smt. Shakuntla and others versus State of U.P. and

others, reported in 2019 (5) AWC 5007, has held that leases without

observing the prescribed statutory provisions cannot be termed as

fraudulent and even if there is an allegation that the lease is obtained

through fraud, the recourse for cancellation should be within a

‘reasonable time’. For a ready reference, excerpts from Paragraph 22

of the said judgment is extracted hereinbelow,

“22. Thus, even the Supreme Court has held that even in cases of fraud,

the action should be taken within a reasonable time. In the present case,

the action has been taken after a period of 12 years which cannot be

termed as reasonable tome and thus, I hold that even in the cases of fraud

action has to be taken within the period of limitation. Thus, I summarise

the findings in response to the questions framed as under:

…

(C) The leases without observing the statutory provisions prescribed for

grant of lease cannot be termed as fraudulent, and

(D) Even if fraud is alleged the recourse for cancellation should be taken

within a reasonable time.”

47. At this stage, it is appropriate to flag that even though this Court

finds the lapse of about 39 years being not at all a ‘reasonable time’ to

initiate suo moto proceeding by the Collector under section 128 of

the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006, but at the same time, this Court refrains

itself from prescribing time limit for the same, in the light of the

observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court from time to time.

24

Neutral Citation No. - 2023:AHC:243237

In the case of Ajaib Singh versus The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing

Cum-Processing Service Society Limited and Others, reported in

(1999) 6 SCC 82, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has been pleased to

observe that,

“11… It is not the function of the court to prescribe the limitation where

the Legislature in its wisdom had though it fit not to prescribe any period.

The courts admittedly interpret law and do not make laws. Personal views

of the Judges presiding the court cannot be stretched to authorise them to

interpret law in such a manner which would amount to legislation

intentionally left over by the Legislature…”

48. Moreover, the judgment of this Court in the case of Kishnu and

others versus Sheesh Pal and others, reported in 2011(7) ADJ 684,

which has been relied upon by the learned counsels for the respondents

is a case wherein this Court on noticing the fact that the Gram Pradhan

himself usurped the property by distributing the same to his father,

son, nephew etc., categorised it as a classic case of the ‘fence eating

the crop’ and a fraud of highest order and held that the allotment was

not only illegal and void but also of a fraud of the highest degree. For

brevity the relevant paragraph of the aforesaid judgement is

reproduced below:

“6. In the instant case the Pradhan who is custodian of Gaon Sabha property

has himself usurped the property by distributing the same to his father, son,

nephew etc. It is a classical case of the 'fence eating the crop' (a Hindi

proverb). It was a fraud of highest order which was played by the Pradhan

and petitioners allottees. The allotment was not only irregular and illegal

but also void and result of fraud of the highest degree. Section 198 (4) deals

with irregularity of the allotment, hence, the limitation will be relevant only

when there is some irregularity in the allotment. However, if the allotment

is utterly void and fraudulent then even formal proceedings under Section

198 (4) are not required. In case of stark usurpation of Gaon Sabha property

Collector is entitled to take corrective measures. Proceedings may be

justified under Section 33/39 of U. P. Land Revenue Act also. Under

somewhat similar circumstances (expiry of period of assami lease) it was so

held In Hari Ram v. Collector, Dist. Saharanpur/Additional Collector,

MANU/UP/1052/2004 : 2004 (2) RD 360 : 2005 (1) AWC 758. The power

to evict in case of void allotment which is tantamount to usurpation of Gaon

Shaba property like the present one may also be traced to Section 122B of

U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. However opportunity of hearing was utmost

essential which was fully provided.”

25

Neutral Citation No. - 2023:AHC:243237

49. From the perusal of the impugned order dated 14.09.2018, it

emerges that the suo moto proceeding under 128 of the U.P. Revenue

Code, 2006, whereby the lease has been sought to be cancelled is

based on the alleged ineligibility of the allottee being non-resident of

Gram Sabha concerned, at the time of allotment and not of fraud on

the part of the allottee, therefore the case of Kishnu (Supra) as relied

upon by the learned counsel for the respondent is also not attracted in

the present case.

50. As far as, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner

that the respondent no. 5 does not qualify the condition of a “aggrieved

person” as required under section 128 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006

on the ground that no prejudice has been caused to him as he was not

entitled/eligible for the grant of lease in question, being a minor at the

time of grant of the same, needs no advertence by this Court at this

stage, in the teeth of the fact that his claim has already been rejected as

“barred by time” vide the impugned order dated 14.09.2018.

51. That apart, the arguments advanced by Sri. Khandelwal that the

petitioner being the purchaser of the land acquired bhumidhari rights

in the property in question and there being no case of malafide or

otherwise against her with regards to the purchase of the property in

question, she has been victimised, for no fault on her part, under the

garb of the proceeding for cancellation of allotment and lease that was

granted 39 year ago in favour of the allottee, whereby justice demands

protection to the valuable rights of the petitioner as guaranteed under

Article 300A of the Constitution of India. This Court finds substance

in the aforesaid contentions as advanced by the learned counsel.

52. In so far as the impugned order 29.05.2023 is concerned, the same

is unsustainable in law, for the obvious reason that the learned

revisional court of learned Additional Commissioner, Agra

26

Neutral Citation No. - 2023:AHC:243237

(respondent no. 2) has misconstrued the order dated 14.09.2018 passed

by the Collector (respondent no.3) as interlocutory, whereas the same

is an order giving finality to the issue of limitation, whereby the

Collector (respondent no. 3) decided to suo moto proceed for

cancellation of the allotment and lease under Section 128 of the U.P.

Revenue Code, 2006, by shutting down the legal question of limitation

with a categorical finding that issue of time limit in the present case is

‘not worth consideration’(काल सीमा का निबन्द

ु

निवचारणीय हीं है) and

virtually determined the allotment and lease of the plots in question, as

‘proved illegal’ (ioCaen.N सानिबत है). The learned revisional court by

holding the impugned order dated 14.09.2018 to be an order of

interlocutory nature, has seriously failed to appreciate the trite law that

limitation goes to the root of the matter and once limitation expires, it

attached finality to the rights of the parties by operation of law. For a

ready reference, the relevant portion of the aforesaid order dated

29.05.2023 passed by learned Additional Commissioner, Agra

(respondent no. 2) is extracted hereinbelow,

“5....तहसील आख्या के आलोक में अवर न्यायालय द्वारा आदेश निदांक

14.09.2018 से पट्टा निरस्तीकरण की काय:वाही संचालिलत करते हुये निगराीकता:

NK/Ne47/tle…/.Knv-/Ie42/nNFe/5Fe/ C, IK/xN/i3l]40/mNृधित का आदेश है

lpe/l -2u/6fFe/0c/iDnNl/lEF"/NP /-&t3a/0c/n.54e.2Nle(57/NK/iU2/U2

io4/3FeFeuF/NP /-0Q/i9.e/9Q/m'lAl/N4.P/Ne/9Fe(R/io-4/s9u’a/ Cw

s94Ky/nooPH.e/NP /6ae4/94/io4/3FeFeuF/be4e/9e]4l/6:P,/n:.eDN

14.09.2018 अन्तरिरम प्रकृrl/Ne/ K.P/NP /Ne47/q'p4/4 .P/FKSF/. R/ C, निकसी

'lQP9/NT/6oTFNle/. R/ Cw/n.54e.2/tu 2./ K.P/NP /Ne47/n.4'l/nNFP/Ie.P

योग्य है।"

53. In view of what has been discussed herein above, the impugned

order dated 29.05.2023 passed by the learned Additional

Commissioner, Agra (respondent no. 2) deserves to be set aside and is

hereby set aside.

54. For the reasons and the legal proposition enumerated in the

foregoing paragraphs, no useful purpose will be served to remand the

27

Neutral Citation No. - 2023:AHC:243237

matter to the revisional court of learned Additional Commissioner,

Agra (respondent no. 2) to decide afresh the Revision having Case No.

02238 of 2018 wherein the impugned order dated 14.09.2018 was

under challenge.

55. Taking into consideration the aforementioned legal preposition as

well as factual matrix of the case, this Court is of the considered view

that the impugned order dated 14.09.2018 passed by the District

Magistrate/Collector, Mainpuri (respondent no.3) in Case No.1858 of

2018, in so far as it relates to the decision to suo moto proceed for the

cancellation of the allotment and lease in question and the

consequential actions, if any, against the petitioner being unwarranted

are not at all sustainable in law. The same are liable to be set aside and

are hereby set aside.

56. Accordingly, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. No order as

to costs.

Order Date :- 28.11.2023

Abhishek Gupta

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