SWP No.1245/2007

Page 1 of 19

HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH

AT JAMMU

SWP No. 1245/2007

Reserved on : 29.01.2026

Pronounced on: 25.02.2026

Uploaded on : 26.02.2026

Whether the operative part or full

judgment is pronounced: Full

Noshad Ahmed, Aged 29 Years,

R/o Village Harni Gulhuta,

Tehsil Mendhar, District Poonch

…. Petitioner/Appellant(s)

Through:- Mrs. Surinder Kour, Sr. Advocate with

Mr. Michael Singh Dogra, Advocate.

Vs

1. Union of India

through Home Secretary,

Ministry of Home Affairs,

Government of India,

New Delhi

2. Director General of Police,

CRPF, CGO Complex,

Lodhi Road, New Delhi

3. Inspector General of CRPF,

North West Zone,

Hallo Mazara, Chandigarh

C/O 56 APO.

4. Deputy Inspector General,

Central Reserve Police Force,

GC CRPF, Jallandhar (PB)

C/O 56 APO

5. Commandant (127

th

Bn.)

Central Reserve Police Force,

C/o 56 APO

…..Respondent(s)

Through:- Mr. Sumant Sudan, Advocate vice

Mr. Vishal Sharma, DSGI.

SWP No.1245/2007

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CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE WASIM SADIQ NARGAL , JUDGE

JUDGMENT

PRAYER

1. The petitioner, through the medium of the instant writ petition has

sought the following reliefs:

“i) To quash Order No. P.VIII.1/2006-127-Estt.II dated 29.08.2006

issued by the Commandant, 127 Bn. CRPF, whereby the petitioner

has been awarded the punishment of removal from service with

effect from 29.08.2006; Order No. R.XIII-5/06-JDR-EC.I dated

14.11.2006 whereby the appeal of the petitioner has been rejected

by the DIG; and Order No. R.XIII-1/2007-EC-3 dated 16.05.2007

whereby the revision of the petitioner has been dismissed by the

IG; and also to quash the office memorandum, charges framed

against the petitioner vide order dated 20.01.2006, and the entire

departmental enquiry proceedings, by issuance of a writ of

certiorari.

ii) To issue directions to the respondents to consider the case of the

petitioner for reinstatement and to allow the petitioner to resume

duties on the post of Constable (GD), on which the petitioner was

working prior to the issuance of the removal order, and to pay

salary to the petitioner on the said post along with all

consequential service benefits, and to treat the period from the

date of removal from service, i.e., 29.08.2006, till the date of

rejoining as “on duty”, by issuance of a writ of mandamus.

iii) To issue directions restraining the respondents from treating the

period from 29.08.2006 till the date the petitioner rejoins the unit

as “break in service”, by issuance of a writ of prohibition.

iv) To issue directions to the respondents to produce the entire original

record of the departmental enquiry proceedings before this

Hon’ble Court, by issuance of a writ of mandamus.

v) To declare the aforesaid orders dated 29.08.2006, 14.11.2006 and

16.05.2007, the office memorandum, charges framed vide order

dated 20.01.2006, and the departmental enquiry proceedings as

ultra vires, illegal, arbitrary, unconstitutional, unjust, contrary to

the provisions of the CRPF Act and Rules, and violative of the

principles of natural justice, by issuance of an appropriate writ,

order or direction.”

2. The petitioner was appointed as Constable (GD) in the Central Reserve

Police Force (hereinafter referred to as ‘CRPF’) on 22

nd

June 1996 and

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was allotted No.9614412029. The petitioner claimed to have

undertaken training at RTC-4, CRPF, Humhama, Srinagar, and was

thereafter posted in 74 Bn. CRPF, Doda (Jammu). Subsequently, he

was posted in 137 Bn. CRPF, Jalandhar and 127 Bn. CRPF, Delhi. The

petitioner performed his duties efficiently, honestly and to the entire

satisfaction of his superiors and has served CRPF with utmost care and

caution.

3. It is stated that, while the petitioner was discharging his duties,

allegations were levelled against him to the effect that he, along with

Constable (GD) Manbagh Singh No. 941345501, committed

misconduct, disobedience of orders, neglect of duty and remissness

under Section 11(1) of the CRPF Act, 1949. The charge sheet reflects

that the petitioner, along with Constable (GD) Manbagh Singh, was

involved in a fight with CHM Kanwar Singh during the intervening

night of 20.12.2005, in which the said CHM sustained injuries on his

forehead and other parts of the body. The petitioner was served with a

detailed charge sheet on 20.01.2006.

4. It is the specific case of the petitioner that the respondents did not

conduct any proper enquiry and, without conducting an enquiry as

envisaged under the CRPF Act and Rules, passed the order dated

29.08.2006, whereby the petitioner was awarded the punishment of

removal from service w.e.f. 29.08.2006.

5. In addition, the petitioner contended that the respondents conducted a

joint enquiry against the petitioner and Constable (GD) Manbagh

Singh, whereas under the provisions of the CRPF Act and the Rules

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framed thereunder, the allegations are required to be proved against

each individual separately.

6. The petitioner filed a statutory appeal under Rule 28 of the CRPF Act

and Rules against the order of dismissal passed by the DIG and the

respondents, vide order dated 14.11.2006, rejected the appeal of the

petitioner being devoid of any merit.

7. Thereafter, feeling aggrieved of the same, the petitioner has preferred a

revision against the order dated 14.11.2006 under Rule 28 of the CRPF

Act and Rules framed thereunder whereby the IG rejected the

appeal/revision of the petitioner vide order dated 16.05.2007.

Submissions on behalf of the petitioner:

8. Mrs. Surinder Kour, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, has

vehemently argued that the respondents did not conduct a proper

enquiry as prescribed under Rule 27 of the CRPF Rules, on which

reliance has been placed.

9. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has drawn the attention of

this Court to Rule 27 of the CRPF Rules, which prescribes the

procedure for conducting a detailed enquiry that is required to be

followed by the respondents. It is submitted that the respondents

failed to follow the said procedure in letter and spirit and,

therefore, the impugned order is liable to be quashed.

10. Relying upon the aforesaid provision of Rule 27 of the CRPF Rules,

learned senior counsel for the petitioner submits that no proper

enquiry was conducted and that no copy of the enquiry proceedings

was furnished to the petitioner. It is the specific case of the petitioner

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that the respondents conducted the proceedings ex parte and that the

petitioner was neither afforded any opportunity of being heard nor

given any opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses.

11. It is further alleged that the statements of the witnesses were not

recorded in the presence of the petitioner and that no copy of the

proceedings was supplied to him. Thus, the respondents have acted in

breach of the procedure prescribed under Rule 27 of the aforesaid

Rules. Consequently, the impugned order cannot sustain in the eyes

of law and is liable to be quashed.

12. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner also submits that the

respondents have imposed a major penalty upon the petitioner.

However, for imposing a major penalty, the respondents were

required to follow the procedure envisaged under Rule 14 of the CCS

(CCA) Rules, 1965. Under Rule 14, a charge sheet is required to be

framed and the delinquent official must be afforded a reasonable

opportunity to submit a reply thereto. Though a charge sheet was

framed, no effective opportunity was given to the petitioner to submit

his reply. The petitioner was also not afforded an opportunity to

cross-examine the witnesses or to produce defence witnesses. Despite

this, a major punishment has been imposed. Therefore, the entire

procedure stands vitiated and, as a consequence, the impugned order

is liable to be quashed.

13. In addition, learned senior counsel for the petitioner has drawn the

attention of this Court to Rule 27(d)(1) of the CRPF Rules. A perusal

thereof reveals that where two or more members of the Force,

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including those on deputation to the Force, are concerned in any case,

the Inspector General, or any other authority competent to impose the

penalty of dismissal from service on all such members of the Force,

may make an order directing that disciplinary action against all of

them be taken in a common proceeding.

14. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner further submits that the

aforesaid Rule has also not been followed in the instant case, as it was

obligatory upon the Inspector General to pass an order directing that

disciplinary action against the petitioner and the other person, who

was also involved in the same incident, be taken by way of common

proceedings.

15. However, the petitioner has specifically pleaded that the respondents

conducted a joint enquiry against the petitioner and Constable (GD)

Manbagh Singh, whereas under the provisions of the CRPF Act and

the Rules framed thereunder, the allegations are required to be proved

against each individual separately. Thus, according to learned senior

counsel for the petitioner, the respondents have acted in derogation of

the mandate and spirit of Rule 27(d)(1). Consequently, the

proceedings initiated thereafter stand vitiated and are liable to be

quashed.

16. Lastly, learned senior counsel for the petitioner has argued that the

entire enquiry proceedings are liable to be vitiated on the ground that

the doctor was not examined and the medical report was not supplied

to the petitioner. On this ground alone, the impugned order cannot

sustain in the eyes of law.

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Submissions on behalf of the respondents:

17. In rebuttal, the respondents have filed a detailed counter affidavit,

wherein the averments made by the petitioner have been denied. A

preliminary objection has also been raised regarding the jurisdiction

of this Court to entertain the instant petition. Mr. Suman Sudan,

Advocate, appearing vice Mr. Vishal Sharma, learned DSGI, in his

preliminary objections has stated that this Court lacks inherent

jurisdiction to adjudicate the instant matter, as the order impugned in

the present petition was issued at Delhi and, therefore, the Delhi High

Court has jurisdiction to entertain the petition. It is further submitted

that the appeal was preferred before the appellate authority at

Jalandhar, Punjab, and on this ground as well, the present petition is

not maintainable before this Court. On both counts, it is prayed that

the writ petition be dismissed as not maintainable.

18. It has further been prayed that, as the petitioner has suppressed

material facts, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed.

19. It is the specific stand of the respondents that, prior to the issuance of

the memorandum and charge sheet, a preliminary enquiry was

conducted in which it was established that the petitioner and

Constable (GD) Manbagh Singh committed acts of misconduct,

disobedience of orders, and neglect of duty as members of the Force.

The allegation that only Constable (GD) Manbagh Singh, while on

duty, committed such misconduct is stated to be false and a

misrepresentation of facts.

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20. It is further the case of the respondents that, since the petitioner and

Constable (GD) Manbagh Singh were involved in the same act of

misconduct, it was deemed appropriate to conduct a joint departmental

enquiry. The allegations against both officials were proved in the

departmental enquiry, which, according to the respondents, was

conducted strictly in conformity with the provisions of the CRPF Act

and the Rules framed thereunder, therefore, the petitioner cannot be

absolved of his liability.

21. The respondents have taken a further stand that the petitioner was

liable to be punished under Section 11 of the CRPF Act read with

Rule 27 of the CRPF Rules. Insofar as the allegations of the petitioner

that an ex parte departmental enquiry was conducted and that he was

not afforded any opportunity of being heard are concerned, the

respondents have specifically denied the same. It is contended that,

during the departmental enquiry, the petitioner was afforded adequate

opportunity to participate and, in fact, participated in the enquiry

proceedings. He was granted sufficient opportunities at every stage of

the enquiry before the Inquiry Officer arrived at the final findings.

22. It is further stated that a copy of the enquiry report was supplied to the

petitioner with advice to submit his representation within 15 days

from the date of receipt of the report. However, the petitioner, in

writing, stated that he did not wish to submit any reply and that any

action taken by the competent authority would be acceptable to him.

This, according to the respondents, is evident from the record placed

on file along with the counter affidavit.

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23. Thus, according to the respondents, the allegation of the petitioner that

he was not afforded sufficient opportunity is an afterthought and a

misrepresentation of facts, which has been specifically denied as

being contrary to the record.

24. The respondents have further pleaded that an initial preliminary

enquiry was conducted, in which a prima facie case of misconduct

was made out against the petitioner, a member of the Belt Force.

Keeping in view the gravity of the offence, charges were framed

against the petitioner as well as Constable (GD) Manbagh Singh.

Thereafter, a full-fledged departmental enquiry was conducted, in

which the petitioner participated. During the enquiry proceedings, the

petitioner was afforded ample opportunities from time to time to

defend his case. The Inquiry Officer, upon conclusion of the enquiry,

returned findings holding the petitioner guilty of misconduct, and

accordingly, he was punished under Section 11 of the CRPF Act read

with Rule 27 of the CRPF Rules.

25. It is further stated that a copy of the findings of the Inquiry Officer

was supplied to the petitioner along with advice to prefer an appeal

within 15 days from the date of receipt of the order. Therefore, the

allegation of the petitioner that he was not supplied a copy of the

report or other relevant documents and was not afforded an

opportunity to defend his case has been vehemently denied as being

contrary to the record.

26. From a perusal of the service record of the petitioner, it is stated that

he had remained undisciplined on earlier occasions and had been

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suitably punished from time to time, while also being provided

opportunities to improve his conduct. Despite this, the petitioner

allegedly committed a grave offence involving a scuffle and

manhandling of his senior officer.

27. The respondents further state that, prior to the passing of the dismissal

order dated 29.08.2006, which is the subject matter of the present

petition, a full-fledged departmental enquiry was conducted strictly in

conformity with the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. The

respondents have also taken the stand that the petitioner had been

awarded five punishments during a short span from July 1999 to June

2002 and was given sufficient opportunity to improve himself.

However, he continued to indulge in gross indiscipline, which

ultimately led to the passing of the impugned order.

28. The allegations levelled by the petitioner in Grounds 15(A) and 15(B)

have been specifically denied by the respondents in the detailed

counter affidavit.

29. It is stated that the departmental enquiry was conducted strictly in

accordance with the provisions of Rule 27 of the CRPF Rules.

30. Mr. Suman Sudan, Advocate, appearing vice Mr. Vishal Sharma,

learned DSGI, has also drawn the attention of this Court to the order

passed by the appellate authority dated 14.11.2006. A perusal thereof

reveals that a joint departmental enquiry was ordered by the

Commandant, 127 Bn., vide memorandum dated 20.01.2006, against

the petitioner and Constable (GD) Manbagh Singh, wherein Shri Y.K.

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Rajput was appointed as the Inquiry Officer to inquire into the articles

of charge.

31. Thus, according to learned counsel for the respondents, the order for

conducting the joint departmental enquiry was issued by the

Commandant in terms of Rule 27(d)(1). However, to the contrary,

learned senior counsel for the petitioner submits that it was not the

Commandant who was competent to pass such an order, rather, the

power vested with the Inspector General, CRPF. Therefore, the order,

even if issued by the Commandant, is not legally sustainable and is

liable to be set aside.

32. Lastly, learned counsel for the respondents submits that a plain

reading of Rule 27(d)(1) shows that emphasis is laid on the word

“may”, which makes the provision directory in nature and not

mandatory, even assuming that the order was not issued by the

competent authority, as alleged by the petitioner.

33. Learned counsel for the respondents lastly submits that, as this Court

lacks inherent jurisdiction to adjudicate the controversy in question,

and as the petition is devoid of merit, the same is liable to be

dismissed.

34. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on

record.

35. The Learned counsel for the respondents has raised a preliminary

objection to the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground

that this court lacks territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ

petition. It has been submitted that the alleged incident of

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misconduct and its enquiry took place at New Delhi, the impugned

order of dismissal was passed by the concerned Commandant in

New Delhi, the statutory appeal was rejected by the DIG in

Jalandher and subsequently the revision petition was also dismissed

by Inspector General of the CRPF in Chandigarh, all occurring at

places that outside the territorial limits of this Court.

36. Per contra learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that

though the orders by which appeal and revision have been rejected

may have been passed at any place but were served at the residential

address of the petitioner which is within the jurisdiction of this

court, as such a part of cause of action arises within the territorial

limits of this Court and thereby vesting this court with the

jurisdiction to entertain the present writ petition.

Legal analysis

37. Having considered the arguments advanced by both the parties, and

perusing the record, it emerges that it is an admitted fact that the

alleged incident occurred in New Delhi, the impugned order of

dismissal dated 29.08.2006 was issued by a competent Commandant

in New Delhi. The statutory appeal preferred by the petitioner was

thereafter rejected by the DIG at Jalandhar vide order dated

14.11.2006. Subsequently, the revision petition was also dismissed

by the Inspector General, CRPF at Chandigarh vide order dated

16.05.2007.

38. Since, the disciplinary authority, the appellate authority and the

revisional authority are all situated outside the territorial limits of

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this court, no substantial part of cause of action can be said to have

accrued within the jurisdiction of this Court. The mere fact that the

petitioner is a resident of District Poonch or the order of dismissal

and order of rejection of appeal and revision was served to him at

his residential address, does not entitle the petitioner to file his writ

petition before this High Court.

39. In this context, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Oil and Natural Gas

Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu (1994) 4 SCC 711 has

categorically held that the High Court must satisfy itself that a

material, essential or integral part of cause of action has arisen

within its territorial jurisdiction before entertaining a writ petition.

The Court cautioned against entertaining petitions merely because

some insignificant or trivial event occurred within its jurisdiction. It

was further held that the mere service of notice or communication of

an order at a particular place does not by itself constitute a part of

cause of action.

40. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v.

Union of India (2004) 6 SCC 254 further clarified that even if a

small fraction of cause of action accrues within the jurisdiction of a

High Court, the same must have a real and substantial nexus with

the dispute involved. The Court emphasized that the expression

“cause of action” cannot be interpreted liberally so as to permit

litigants to choose a forum of convenience. Territorial jurisdiction

cannot be allowed to depend upon the unilateral act of a party, such

as shifting residence or receiving communication at a chosen

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location. To permit such interpretation would encourage forum

shopping and undermine the orderly administration of justice.

41. From the stand point of the Disciplinary Authority there was no

alternative but to communicate the said order at the native place of

the petitioner in Jammu and Kashmir. However, the mere service of

an order at a particular location does not by itself give rise to a

territorial cause of action at that site. To hold otherwise would allow

the petitioner to unilaterally dictate jurisdiction simply by relocating

to a forum of their choice. Such a result would contradict legislative

intent and invite ‘forum shopping’. Territorial jurisdiction is a matter

of law rooted in the essential facts of the dispute, it is not a mobile

privilege dependent upon the convenience or residence of the

petitioner.

42. In this regard, I am supported by the judgement of Allahabad High

Court in case titled Director General, CRPF v/s Lalji Pandey

‘Special Appeal No.342 of 2010’ decided on 18.03.2010 whereby

the Hon’ble court has held as under:

“Mere communication of these orders at the residential

address of the respondent at district Bhadohi would not

confer territorial jurisdiction to this Court. It has been

held by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of

Rajendra Kumar Mishra (supra) that mere residence of

the petitioner within the territorial jurisdiction of this

Court would not confer the jurisdiction to this Court to

entertain the writ petition in which the order under

challenge has been passed out side the State of U.P. The

writ petition would be maintainable in the territorial

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jurisdiction of the High Court in which the impugned

order was passed.”

43. Reliance is also placed on the judgement of this Court passed in SWP

No. 1175/2011 titled Shahnawaz Ahmad vs. Union of India and

another decided on 26.07.2023. The relevant part of the judgment is

reproduced hereunder:

“15) Coming to the facts of the instant case, the fact that the

petitioner came to know about the order whereby he was

declared as 'deserter' as also the order whereby he was

terminated from service when he was at Kashmir, are not such

facts as would form a part of cause of action in his favour.

None of the acts that are under challenge in this writ petition

have been done by the respondents in Jammu and Kashmir.

The plea of receipt of termination order does not give

jurisdiction to a Court to entertain the writ petition. It is only

those facts which relate termination of services of the

petitioner and the enquiry conducted against him that would

determine the seat of jurisdiction. All these events have taken

place outside the territorial limits of this Court.

16) In the above context, I am supported by the judgment

of this Court in the case of Zahoor Ahmad Baba vs.

Union of India & Ors. 2012 (3) JKJ 119[HC], wherein

this Court has held that only the Court having territorial

jurisdiction over the place where the dismissal order was

made can entertain the writ petition challenging such

dismissal order. It was further held that the mere fact that

the petitioner had received copy of the impugned order at

Ganderbal within the jurisdiction of this Court does not

confer jurisdiction upon this Court to entertain and deal

with the petition. The ratio laid down in the aforesaid

judgment is squarely applicable to the present case.

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Therefore, this Court does not have jurisdiction to

entertain the writ petition.”

The aforesaid principle of law is squarely applicable to facts and

circumstances of the instant case.

44. It is a settled principle of law that a High Court can exercise

jurisdiction under article 226 (2), where any cause of action or at

least a fraction of cause of action arises within its territory. The

Hon’ble Supreme Court in Alchemist Ltd. v. State Bank of Sikkim

(2007) 11 SCC 335 has reiterated that only those facts which have a

direct nexus with the lis constitute cause of action and that facts

which are merely incidental or ancillary cannot confer territorial

jurisdiction. The Court held that the residence of the petitioner or

the place where communication of an order is received does not

furnish a part of cause of action unless such fact has a direct bearing

on the dispute. The principle relevant for determination in the

present matter is that the cause of action, whether in whole or in

part, or even a fraction thereof, must constitute a material, integral

or essential component of the lis. The grievance sought to be

assailed by the petitioner in the present writ petition pertains to the

disciplinary enquiry proceedings and the consequential order of

dismissal followed by the rejection of his appeal and revision

passed by the respondents. Any cause of action, or part thereof,

must therefore be directly connected with the aforesaid events. The

mere supply or service of the copies of documents at the residential

of the petitioner does not give rise to any cause of action, nor even a

fraction thereof, so as to vest this court with the jurisdiction to

entertain the petition. It is well established that both expression

cause of action denotes every fact which the petitioner would be

required to establish, if controverted, in order to substantiate his

entitlement to relief from the court. It must include some act done

by the respondents, since in the absence of such an act no cause of

action would possibly accrue or would arise.

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45. None of the acts under challenge in this writ petition have

been done by the respondents in Jammu and Kashmir. The

plea of receipt of the copies of orders pertaining to dismissal,

rejection of appeal and revision does not give jurisdiction to a

court to entertain the writ petition. It is only those facts which

relate to termination of services of the petitioner and the

enquiry proceedings conducted against him that would

determine the site of jurisdiction. In the instant case, no such

event has taken place in J&K as would give jurisdiction to this

court to entertain the present writ petition.

46. In the similar facts and circumstances, the High Court of

Madhya Pradesh in case titled Union of India and others vs.

Satish Kumar reported as 2026:MPHC-GWL:1541, has held

as under:

“13. It is an admitted fact that the order of dismissal

was passed by the authority situated at District

Lowar Siang (Arunachal Pradesh). The appellate

orders were passed by the authority at Arunachal

Pradesh respectively. The said orders were

communicated to the respondent/petitioner at Bhind

because he was unauthorizedly absent from service.

For the appellant authority there was no other place

to communicate the said order, therefore, the same

was sent to native place of the respondent/petitioner

at Bhind. Merely because the orders were served at

Bhind, it cannot be said that any part of cause of

action arose at Bhind. If the submission made by the

counsel for the respondent/petitioner is accepted,

then any person while shifting to a place of his

choice falling within the territorial jurisdiction of a

particular Court may claim that the said Court has a

territorial jurisdiction. That cannot be the intention

of the legislature. The territorial jurisdiction of a

Court is not dependent upon the mercy of the

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respondent/petitioner, but it is dependent upon the

cause of action. The cause of action would mean

those disputed issues which are required to be

decided while adjudicating the claim of the litigating

parties. When the place of residence of litigating

party has no relevance with subject-matter of the lis,

then the same cannot be said to be an integral part of

cause of action.”

Conclusion:

47. When a Court lacking territorial jurisdiction proceeds to

entertain a writ petition, such defect goes to the very root of

the matter and constitutes an inherent infirmity which is not

curable. As this court does not possess the requisite

jurisdiction to entertain the present writ petition, it cannot

proceed to adjudicate upon the merits of the case.

48. This court, therefore, is of the considered view that since the

entire enquiry proceedings, from issuance of the charge sheet

to the final dismissal of the petitioner, occurred outside the

territorial limits of this court, no cause of action has accrued in

favour of the petitioner within the jurisdiction of this High

Court. Thus, this court finds no reason or

justification to entertain the instant writ petition and

accordingly, is of the view that this writ petition is not

maintainable for want of territorial jurisdiction of this Court.

49. Since the Court is of the view that this Court does not have the

territorial jurisdiction to decide the issue in question, this court

is not dwelling upon the merits of the case and accordingly,

the writ petition is dismissed for lack of territorial jurisdiction.

However, the dismissal will not come in the way of the

petitioner to file petition before the court of appropriate

territorial jurisdiction and in that eventuality, the period which

has been spent over here by choosing the wrong forum shall

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not come in the way of the petitioner to agitate the cause

afresh.

50. Registry is directed to handover the original record to Mr.

Vishal Sharma, DSGI, Learned Counsel for the respondents,

against proper receipt.

51. Dismissed in the above manner.

(Wasim Sadiq Nargal)

Judge

Jammu:

25.02.2026

Gh. Nabi/ Jt. Reg.

Whether approved for reporting : Yes

Whether the order is speaking : Yes