O.M.P. (COMM) 232/2024 Page 1 of 41

$~

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

% Judgment reserved on: 07.05.2026

Judgment pronounced on: 29.05.2026

+ O.M.P. (COMM) 232/2024

ORACLE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION .....Petitioner

Through: Ms Swathi Sukumar, Sr. Adv.

with Ms Priyanka Gupta, Mr

Aasheesh Gupta, Mr Palash

Agarwal, Mr Ritik

Raghuvanshi, Ms Ritika

Aggarwal, Advs.

versus

CIS IT SOLUTIONS PVT LTD .....Respondent

Through: Mr. Manoj Yadav & Ms.

Sakshi Arora, Advs.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN

SHANKAR

J U D G M E N T

HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.

1. The present Petition has been instituted under Section 34 of the

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

1

, seeking the setting aside of

the Arbitral Award dated 23.12.2023

2

, rendered by the learned Sole

Arbitrator, in INDRP Case No. 1757 under the .IN Domain Name

Dispute Resolution Policy

3

.

1

A&C Act

2

Impugned Award

3

INDRP

O.M.P. (COMM) 232/2024 Page 2 of 41

2. By way of the Impugned Award, the learned Arbitrator rejected

the complaint preferred in INDRP by the Petitioner seeking transfer of

the domain name “www.exadata.in” from the Respondent to the

Petitioner.

BRIEF FACTS:

3. The Petitioner, Oracle International Corporation, which is a US-

based company, claims to be a globally operating technology

corporation engaged in the business of providing computer hardware,

software platforms, database management systems, cloud computing

solutions and allied technological services. The Petitioner asserts that

it is the proprietor and prior user of the Trade Mark “EXADATA”,

which, according to the Petitioner, has been continuously and

extensively used since the year 2008 in relation to its database and

cloud-based technology offerings.

4. The Petitioner further claims registration of the Trade Mark

“EXADATA” in India under Class 9 vide registration dated

28.05.2008 in respect of computer hardware and software for use in

storage, management, analysis and optimization of data warehouses

and databases, and under Class 42 vide registration dated 19.03.2018

in relation to cloud computing, database management, data storage

and allied technological services.

5. The Respondent registered the domain name “www.exadata.in”

on 21.12.2016.

6. According to the Respondent, the said domain name was

adopted in connection with activities relating to big data analytics,

epidemiology, predictive analytics, data science and research-oriented

informational services. The Respondent further claims that the domain

O.M.P. (COMM) 232/2024 Page 3 of 41

name was not adopted or used in bad faith and was never intended to

create any association with the Petitioner.

7. The record reflects that disputes arose between the parties when

the Petitioner objected to the Respondent‟s use of the aforesaid

domain name on the ground that the same was identical and

deceptively similar to the Petitioner‟s registered Trade Mark

“EXADATA”.

8. The Petitioner, in December 2022, issued a cease-and-desist

notice to the Respondent seeking cessation of use of the impugned

domain name and transfer thereof in its favour.

9. Since the disputes between the parties could not be resolved

amicably, the Petitioner invoked the mechanism under the INDRP

before the National Internet Exchange of India

4

, by filing a

complaint seeking transfer of the impugned domain name

“www.exadata.in”.

10. Upon reference of the disputes under the INDRP framework,

the learned Sole Arbitrator entered upon reference and framed issues

concerning the similarity of the domain name with the Petitioner‟s

trade mark, the Respondent‟s rights and legitimate interests in the

domain name, and the question of whether the domain name had been

registered or used in bad faith.

11. After considering the pleadings and material placed on record

by the parties, the learned Arbitrator rendered the Impugned Award

whereby the complaint preferred by the Petitioner came to be rejected.

4

NIXI

O.M.P. (COMM) 232/2024 Page 4 of 41

12. Aggrieved by the aforesaid Award, the Petitioner has preferred

the present Petition under Section 34 of the A&C Act seeking the

setting aside of the Impugned Award.

CONTENTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER :

13. In response to the objection, which has been raised by the

learned counsel for the Respondent, concerning the alleged delay in

filing the present Petition beyond the permissible period prescribed

under Section 34(3) of the A&C Act, learned senior counsel appearing

on behalf of the Petitioner would submit that the present Petition was

validly instituted within the period of limitation contemplated under

the said provision. It would further be contended that the objections

raised by the Respondent alleging that the filing was non-est are

wholly misconceived, untenable in law, and liable to be rejected.

14. It would be contended that the initial Petition had been filed

within the statutory period and the subsequent filings constituted mere

curing of procedural defects and refiling in accordance with the

practice and procedure of this Court, which would not render the

Petition barred by limitation.

15. On the merits of the Petition, learned senior counsel for the

Petitioner would contend that the Impugned Award is patently illegal,

internally inconsistent and liable to be set aside under Section 34 of

the A&C Act.

16. It would be contended that the learned Arbitrator, despite

recording a categorical finding that the impugned domain name

“www.exadata.in” is identical and/or confusingly similar to the

Petitioner‟s registered Trade Mark “EXADATA” and in violation of

the INDRP, erroneously refused to grant consequential relief in favour

O.M.P. (COMM) 232/2024 Page 5 of 41

of the Petitioner, thereby rendering the Award self-contradictory and

legally unsustainable.

17. Learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner

would submit that the Petitioner is the registered proprietor and prior

adopter of the Trade Mark “EXADATA” in India as well as several

jurisdictions worldwide and has been continuously and extensively

using the said mark since the year 2008 in relation to database

management systems, computing hardware, cloud computing, data

warehousing and allied technological services. It would be submitted

that the Petitioner holds registrations in India under Class 9 dated

28.05.2008 and under Class 42 dated 19.03.2018, whereas the

Respondent registered the impugned domain name only on

21.12.2016 and, therefore, the Petitioner possesses prior statutory and

proprietary rights in the said mark.

18. Learned senior counsel for the Petitioner would further contend

that the learned Arbitrator failed to appreciate that the Petitioner‟s

Trade Mark “EXADATA” is inherently distinctive and has acquired

substantial goodwill and reputation owing to extensive and

uninterrupted global use. It would be submitted that the learned

Arbitrator failed to appreciate that the Respondent had adopted the

entirety of the Petitioner‟s registered mark as part of the impugned

domain name and that such adoption was bound to result in deception,

confusion and false association amongst internet users and consumers.

19. It would further be contended that the learned Arbitrator

committed patent illegality by relying upon considerations dehors the

INDRP framework and settled principles governing Trade Mark and

domain name disputes, including observations relating to “scientific

O.M.P. (COMM) 232/2024 Page 6 of 41

temper”, “national interest” and alleged research-oriented activities of

the Respondent. According to the Petitioner, such considerations were

wholly irrelevant for the determination of rights under the INDRP

mechanism and rendered the findings of the learned Arbitrator

perverse and contrary to law.

20. Learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner

would further submit that the learned Arbitrator failed to appreciate

that the Respondent is admittedly a commercial entity engaged in

activities relating to big data analytics, predictive analytics, artificial

intelligence, data science and allied technological services. It would

be contended that the Respondent‟s own website reflected offerings

concerning data acquisition, data modelling, predictive analytics

platforms, healthcare solutions, training programmes and

technological services, thereby clearly establishing commercial use of

the impugned domain name in the course of trade.

21. It would be further contended that the learned Arbitrator

erroneously accepted the Respondent‟s plea that the impugned domain

name had been adopted for research purposes without any pleading or

material to substantiate such claim. Learned senior counsel for the

Petitioner would submit that the alleged doctoral research project

relied upon by the Respondent bore no reference to “EXADATA” and

no material was placed on record to establish any nexus between the

alleged research work and adoption of the impugned domain name. It

would thus be contended that the findings recorded by the learned

Arbitrator in this regard were based on assumptions contrary to the

pleadings and evidence on record.

O.M.P. (COMM) 232/2024 Page 7 of 41

22. Learned senior counsel for the Petitioner would further contend

that once the Petitioner had established a prima facie case under the

INDRP, the burden shifted upon the Respondent to establish rights

and legitimate interest in the impugned domain name in terms of

Clause 6 of the INDRP. Reliance in this regard would be placed upon

the judgment of this Court in Joseph Taheny v. Taktronix INC

5

. It

would be submitted that the Respondent failed to establish any bona

fide or legitimate interests in the impugned domain name and further

failed to demonstrate the absence of bad faith.

23. Learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner

would further submit that the learned Arbitrator failed to appreciate

that the Respondent was neither commonly known by the name

“EXADATA” nor possessed any independent proprietary rights in the

said expression. It would be contended that the Respondent had

deliberately adopted the Petitioner‟s registered Trade Mark as part of

the impugned domain name despite the Petitioner‟s prior adoption,

use and reputation.

24. It would further be contended that the learned Arbitrator failed

to appreciate the likelihood of consumer confusion and deceptive

association arising from the Respondent‟s use of the impugned

domain name. Reliance in this regard would also be placed upon the

judgment of this Court in Thoughtworks Inc. v. Super Software Pvt.

6

to contend that the learned Arbitrator had failed to properly appreciate

the issue of deceptive similarity and confusion in the context of

domain name disputes.

5

2023 SCC OnLine Del 7927

6

2017 SCC OnLine Del 6474

O.M.P. (COMM) 232/2024 Page 8 of 41

25. It would lastly be contended that the Impugned Award is

unintelligible, internally inconsistent, contrary to the public policy of

India and suffers from patent illegality inasmuch as the findings

recorded therein are based on considerations dehors the pleadings and

contrary to the material available on record. It would therefore be

prayed that the Impugned Award be set aside and consequential

directions be issued for the transfer of the domain name

“www.exadata.in” in favour of the Petitioner.

CONTENTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT :

26. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

Respondent would contend that the present Petition under Section 34

of the A&C Act is liable to be dismissed both on the ground of

limitation as well as on merits.

27. Learned counsel for the Respondent would contend that the

Petitioner admittedly received the signed copy of the Impugned

Award on 26.12.2023 and, therefore, the statutory outer limit of one

hundred and twenty (120) days prescribed under Section 34(3) of the

A&C Act expired on 24.04.2024. It would be submitted that the

purported filing dated 26.03.2024 was incomplete, defective and non-

est in the eyes of law and the subsequent filing dated 17.05.2024

constituted a fresh filing beyond the prescribed period of limitation.

28. It would further be contended that the Petition subsequently

filed by the Petitioner materially differed from the earlier filing

inasmuch as there were changes in the Power of Attorney,

verification, affidavits, Statement of Truth and vakalatnama and,

therefore, the same could not be treated as a mere refiling for curing

defects.

O.M.P. (COMM) 232/2024 Page 9 of 41

29. Learned counsel would submit that the Power of Attorney

authorising institution of the present proceedings was itself executed

subsequent to the alleged initial filing and, therefore, the present

Petition is barred by limitation and liable to be dismissed on this

ground alone.

30. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent would

further contend that the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 34 of

the A&C Act is extremely limited and does not permit re-appreciation

of evidence or substitution of the view taken by the learned Arbitrator

merely because another view is possible. It would be submitted that

the present Petition, in substance, seeks a review on the merits of the

findings returned by the learned Arbitrator, which is impermissible

within the limited scope of Section 34 of the A&C Act jurisdiction.

31. It would further be contended that the Petitioner has failed to

establish any ground falling within Section 34(2) or Section 34(2A) of

the A&C Act and has failed to demonstrate either patent illegality or

conflict with the public policy of India. Learned counsel would submit

that the objections raised by the Petitioner pertain merely to the

appreciation of facts and evidence, which cannot furnish a ground for

interference under Section 34 of the A&C Act.

32. Learned counsel for the Respondent would further contend that

the learned Arbitrator, after due appreciation of the pleadings,

documents and material placed on record, rightly concluded that the

Respondent had neither registered nor used the impugned domain

name in bad faith.

33. It would be submitted that the Respondent registered the

domain name “www.exadata.in” in the year 2016 for activities

O.M.P. (COMM) 232/2024 Page 10 of 41

relating to big data analytics, predictive analytics and informational or

research-oriented purposes and had never attempted to sell the said

domain name either to the Petitioner or to any third party. Learned

counsel would submit that the Respondent never claimed sponsorship,

endorsement or affiliation with the Petitioner and had never attempted

to divert customers through deceptive means.

34. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent would

further contend that under Clauses 4 and 6 of the INDRP, all the

conditions stipulated therein are required to be cumulatively satisfied

before any relief can be granted in favour of a complainant. It would

further be contended that the requirements under Clause 7 of the

INDRP relating to bad faith registration and use are also required to be

established and the Petitioner failed to satisfy the said requirements

before the learned Arbitrator.

35. It would further be submitted that mere ownership of a

registered Trade Mark does not automatically entitle the proprietor to

seek transfer of a domain name and that registration of a Trade Mark

merely confers a right to use the mark in connection with the goods

and services for which registration has been obtained. Learned counsel

would contend that despite possessing registration of the Trade Mark

“EXADATA” since 2008 under Class 9, the Petitioner itself never

registered or acquired the domain name “www.exadata.in”.

36. It would further be contended that the Petitioner‟s registration

under Class 42 was obtained only on 19.03.2018, whereas the

Respondent had registered the impugned domain name on 21.12.2016

and, therefore, the Respondent possesses prior usage rights qua the

activities allegedly falling within Class 42.

O.M.P. (COMM) 232/2024 Page 11 of 41

37. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent would

further submit that the expression “EXADATA” is not a well-known

Trade Mark in India and has not been declared as such under the

provisions of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. It would further be

contended that the Respondent adopted the expression “EXADATA”

by combining the generic expressions “EXA” and “DATA” in

connection with data science and analytical activities and not with any

intention to exploit the goodwill of the Petitioner.

38. Learned counsel for the Respondent would further contend that

the observations of the learned Arbitrator relating to scientific temper,

dissemination of knowledge or research-oriented use were merely

ancillary observations and do not constitute the sole basis of the

Impugned Award. It would be submitted that the Impugned Award is

fundamentally premised upon the learned Arbitrator‟s finding that the

Petitioner had failed to establish bad faith registration and use as

contemplated under the INDRP framework.

39. It would additionally be contended that the learned Arbitrator

passed a reasoned and plausible award upon consideration of the

pleadings and evidence on record and the same does not suffer from

perversity, patent illegality or conflict with the public policy of India,

warranting interference under Section 34 of the A&C Act.

40. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent would

lastly contend that this Court, while exercising jurisdiction under

Section 34 of the A&C Act, may either uphold or set aside the arbitral

award and cannot modify or substitute the award by granting

substantive relief in favour of the Petitioner.

O.M.P. (COMM) 232/2024 Page 12 of 41

41. It would therefore be submitted that the prayer seeking direct

transfer of the domain name “www.exadata.in” in favour of the

Petitioner is itself beyond the scope of proceedings under Section 34

of the A&C Act.

ANALYSIS:

42. This Court has heard the learned counsel appearing for the

parties at length and, with their able assistance, has carefully perused

the Impugned Award and the other material placed on record.

43. At the outset, this Court deems it appropriate to deal with the

preliminary objection raised by the Respondent with respect to

limitation. The Respondent has contended that the initial filing dated

26.03.2024 was non-est and that the subsequent filing dated

17.05.2024 constituted a fresh filing beyond the period prescribed

under Section 34(3) of the A&C Act.

44. This Court, however, is unable to accept the said objection

raised by the learned counsel for the Respondent.

45. The record reflects that the Petition had initially been instituted

on 26.03.2024 within the prescribed period of limitation, since

25.03.2024, being the last date thereof, was a public holiday on

account of Holi.

46. The subsequent filing undertaken pursuant to office objections,

in the facts of the present case, cannot be construed as a fresh filing.

The explanation furnished by the Petitioner that the defects came to be

cured subsequently, owing to the execution of authorisation

documents and logistical formalities concerning its overseas entity,

cannot be said to be lacking in bona fides.

O.M.P. (COMM) 232/2024 Page 13 of 41

47. Significantly, the application seeking condonation of delay in

refilling being I.A. 29908/2024 also came to be allowed by this Court

vide Order dated 06.08.2024, pursuant to which notice in the present

Petition was issued.

48. In the considered opinion of this Court, the objections pointed

out by the Respondent substantially pertain to curable procedural

defects arising at the stage of refiling and do not warrant dismissal of

the petition at the threshold, particularly when the initial filing itself

had been made within the prescribed period of limitation.

49. This Court also does not find merit in the Respondent‟s

contention that the subsequent filing pursuant to curing of defects

amounted to a fresh filing merely because a different authorised

representative had signed the pleadings and a fresh Power of Attorney

came to be placed on record. This Court is of the considered opinion

that the Petitioner, being a corporate entity, necessarily acts through

authorised representatives and mere substitution of an authorised

signatory or execution of a fresh Power of Attorney at the stage of

refiling would not render the original institution of the Petition non-

est, particularly when the petition had already been filed within the

prescribed period of limitation.

50. In this regard, this Court is guided by the principles laid down

by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in United Bank of India v. Naresh

Kumar

7

, wherein it was held that procedural irregularities relating to

authorisation and representation of juristic entities are curable in

nature and ought not to defeat substantive adjudication. The Hon‟ble

Supreme Court further observed that procedural defects which do not

7

1996 (6) SCC 660

O.M.P. (COMM) 232/2024 Page 14 of 41

go to the root of the matter ought not to defeat a just cause. The

relevant portion of the said judgment reads as follows:

“8. In this appeal, therefore, the only question which arises for

consideration is whether the plaint was duly signed and verified by

a competent person.

9. In cases like the present where suits are instituted or defended on

behalf of a public corporation, public interest should not be

permitted to be defeated on a mere technicality. Procedural defects

which do not go to the root of the matter should not be permitted to

defeat a just cause. There is sufficient power in the Courts,

under the Code of Civil Procedure, to ensure that injustice is not

done to any party who has a just case. As far as possible a

substantive right should not be allowed to be defeated on account

of a procedural irregularity which is curable.

10. It cannot be disputed that a company like the appellant can sue

and be sued in its own name. Under Order 6 Rule 14 of the Code

of Civil Procedure a pleading is required to be signed by the party

and its pleader, if any. As a company is a juristic entity it is

obvious that some person has to sign the pleadings on behalf of the

company. Order 29 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure,

therefore, provides that in a suit by against a corporation the

Secretary or any Director or other Principal officer of the

corporation who is able to depose to the facts of the case might

sign and verify on behalf of the company. Reading Order 6 Rule 14

together with Order 29 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure it

would appear that even in the absence of any formal letter of

authority or power of attorney having been executed a person

referred to in Rule 1 of Order 29 can, by virtue of the office which

he holds, sign and verify the pleadings on behalf of the

corporation. In addition thereto and de hors Order 29 Rule 1 of the

Code of Civil Procedure, as a company is a juristic entity, it can

duly authorise any person to sign the plaint or the written statement

on its behalf and this would be regarded as sufficient compliance

with the provisions of Order 6 Rule 14 of the Code of Civil

Procedure. A person may be expressly authorised to sign the

pleadings on behalf of the company, for example by the Board of

Directors passing a resolution to that effect or by a power of

attorney being executed in favour of any individual. In absence

thereof and in cases where pleadings have been signed by one of

it's officers a Corporation can ratify the said action of it's officer in

signing the pleadings. Such ratification can be express or implied.

The Court can, on the basis of the evidence on record, and after

taking all the circumstances of the case, specially with regard to the

conduct of the trial, come to the conclusion that the corporation

had ratified the act of signing of the pleading by it's officer.”

O.M.P. (COMM) 232/2024 Page 15 of 41

51. Accordingly, this Court is satisfied that sufficient cause has

been shown by the Petitioner and the delay, if any, deserves to be

condoned.

52. It is also noted that at the culmination of the oral submissions,

in this case, learned counsel for the Respondent also fairly conceded

that the objection raised on account of execution of the Power of

Attorney would not render the present Petition barred by limitation.

53. In view thereof, the objection raised by the Respondent in

respect of the limitation stands rejected.

54. Now, before proceeding to examine the merits of the rival

submissions advanced on behalf of the parties, this Court considers it

apposite to reiterate the well-settled limitations governing the exercise

of jurisdiction under Section 34 of the A&C Act. The jurisdiction

exercised by this Court under Section 34 of the A&C Act is

supervisory and not appellate in nature, and consequently does not

permit a reappreciation of evidence or a reconsideration of the merits

of the dispute as though this Court were sitting in appeal over the

arbitral award.

55. It is also relevant to note that the Petitioner is a U.S.-based

entity and, in view of Section 2(1)(f)(ii) of the A&C Act, the disputes

arising between the parties would qualify as an International

Commercial Arbitration. In this regard, there exists a consistent and

authoritative line of decisions rendered by the Hon‟ble Supreme

Court, which has clearly delineated the contours of judicial

interference under Section 34 of the A&C Act. The aforesaid

precedents repeatedly emphasise that the scope of interference with an

arbitral award arising out of an International Commercial Arbitration

O.M.P. (COMM) 232/2024 Page 16 of 41

is considerably narrower than that applicable in the case of a purely

domestic award, and interference is warranted only within the limited

parameters expressly contemplated under the statute.

56. This Court considers it apposite to refer to the decision of the

Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Ssangyong Engineering (supra), wherein

the Apex Court, while examining the scope of interference with an

arbitral award arising out of an International Commercial Arbitration,

reiterated that, by virtue of Section 34(2A) read with Section 2(1)(f) of

the A&C Act, the ground of „patent illegality‟ is not available as a

basis for challenging an award rendered in an International

Commercial Arbitration. The Apex Court further clarified that the

additional ground introduced under Section 34(2A) of the A&C Act is

confined only to domestic arbitral awards and does not extend to

awards arising from International Commercial Arbitrations seated in

India. The relevant extracts from the said judgment are reproduced

hereunder:

“34. What is clear, therefore, is that the expression

“public policy of India”, whether contained in Section 34

or in Section 48, would now mean the “fundamental policy of

Indian law as explained in paragraphs 18 and 27 of Associate

Builders (supra), i.e., the fundamental policy of Indian law would

be relegated to the “Renusagar understanding of this expression.

This would necessarily mean that the Western Geco (supra)

expansion has been done away with. In short, Western

Geco (supra), as explained in paragraphs 28 and 29 of Associate

Builders (supra), would no longer obtain, as under the guise of

interfering with an award on the ground that the arbitrator has not

adopted a judicial approach, the Court„s intervention would be on

the merits of the award, which cannot be permitted post

amendment. However, insofar as principles of natural justice are

concerned, as contained in Sections 18 and 34(2)(a)(iii) of the 1996

Act, these continue to be grounds of challenge of an award, as is

contained in paragraph 30 of Associate Builders (supra).

***

36. Thus, it is clear that public policy of India is now constricted to

mean firstly, that a domestic award is contrary to the

O.M.P. (COMM) 232/2024 Page 17 of 41

fundamental policy of Indian law, as understood in paragraphs 18

and 27 of Associate Builders (supra), or secondly, that such award

is against basic notions of justice or morality as

understood in paragraphs 36 to 39 of Associate Builders (supra).

Explanation 2 to Section 34(2)(b)(ii) and Explanation 2 to Section

48(2)(b)(ii) was added by the Amendment Act only so

that Western Geco (supra), as understood in Associate

Builders (supra), and paragraphs 28 and 29 in particular, is now

done away with.

37. Insofar as domestic awards made in India are concerned, an

additional ground is now available under sub-section (2A), added

by the Amendment Act, 2015, to Section 34. Here, there must be

patent illegality appearing on the face of the award, which refers to

such illegality as goes to the root of the matter but which does not

amount to mere erroneous application of the law. In short, what is

not subsumed within “the fundamental policy of Indian law”,

namely, the contravention of a statute not linked to public policy or

public interest, cannot be brought in by the backdoor when it

comes to setting aside an award on the ground of patent illegality.

38. Secondly, it is also made clear that re-appreciation of evidence,

which is what an appellate court is permitted to do, cannot be

permitted under the ground of patent illegality appearing on the

face of the award.

39. To elucidate, paragraph 42.1 of Associate Builders (supra),

namely, a mere contravention of the substantive law of India, by

itself, is no longer a ground available to set aside an arbitral award.

Paragraph 42.2 of Associate Builders (supra), however, would

remain, for if an arbitrator gives no reasons for an award and

contravenes Section 31(3) of the 1996 Act, that would certainly

amount to a patent illegality on the face of the award.

***

41. What is important to note is that a decision which is perverse,

as understood in paragraphs 31 and 32 of Associate

Builders (supra), while no longer being a ground for challenge

under “public policy‟ of India, would certainly amount to a patent

illegality appearing on the face of the award. Thus, a finding based

on no evidence at all or an award which ignores vital evidence in

arriving at its decision would be perverse and liable to be set aside

on the ground of patent illegality. Additionally, a finding based on

documents taken behind the back of the parties by the arbitrator

would also qualify as a decision based on no evidence inasmuch as

such decision is not based on evidence led by the parties, and

therefore, would also have to be characterised as perverse.

42. Given the fact that the amended Act will now apply, and that

the “patent illegality” ground for setting aside arbitral awards in

international commercial arbitrations will not apply.”

(emphasis supplied)

O.M.P. (COMM) 232/2024 Page 18 of 41

57. In view of the aforesaid settled principles governing the limited

scope of judicial interference under Section 34 of the A&C Act in

matters arising out of International Commercial Arbitration, this Court

now proceeds to examine the Impugned Award strictly within the

narrow confines permissible under the said provision. In proceedings

of the present nature, the scope of interference remains circumscribed

by the grounds expressly enumerated under Section 34(2) of the A&C

Act, including Section 34(2)(b)(ii), namely, whether the award is in

conflict with the public policy of India.

58. The significant facet of Section 34 of the A&C Act, namely,

“conflict with the public policy of India”, which constitutes the core

fulcrum for testing an arbitral award arising out of an International

Commercial Arbitration, has been comprehensively explained and

authoritatively summarised by a three-Judge Bench of the Hon‟ble

Supreme Court in OPG Power Generation (P) Ltd. v. Enexio Power

Cooling Solutions (India) (P) Ltd.

8

.

59. The said judgment, after undertaking an exhaustive examination

of a catena of prior decisions rendered on the subject, lucidly

delineates the contours, limitations, and permissible extent of judicial

interference on the ground of “public policy of India”, particularly

after the amendments introduced by the Arbitration and Conciliation

(Amendment) Act, 2015.

60. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court, in that judgment, while

summarising the legal position in paragraph nos. 55 and 56 of the said

judgment, reiterated that following the 2015 Amendments to Sections

34(2)(b)(ii) and 48(2)(b) of the A&C Act, the expression “conflict

8

(2025) 2 SCC 417

O.M.P. (COMM) 232/2024 Page 19 of 41

with the public policy of India” has been accorded a narrow and

restricted interpretation, and since mere contravention of law is

insufficient to invalidate an arbitral award unless such contravention

affects the fundamental policy of Indian law governing the

administration of justice and enforcement of law, only violations such

as breach of natural justice, disregard of binding judgments or orders

of superior courts, or contravention of laws linked to public interest or

public good may justify interference, though even such scrutiny

cannot extend into a review on merits. Certain pertinent observations

from OPG Power (supra) are reproduced hereunder:

“Public policy

31. “Public policy” is a concept not statutorily defined, though it

has been used in statutes, rules, notification, etc. since long, and is

also a part of common law. Section 23 of the Contract Act, 1872

uses the expression by stating that the consideration or object of an

agreement is lawful, unless, inter alia, opposed to public policy.

That is, a contract which is opposed to public policy is void.

*****

36. In fact, in Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co.,

1994 Supp (1) SCC 644], this Court was dealing with the

enforceability of a foreign award. For that end, it had to interpret

the expression “contrary to public policy” in the context of Section

7(1)(b)(ii) of the Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement)

Act, 1961. While doing so, this Court held that:

(a) contravention of law alone will not attract the bar of public

policy, and something more than contravention of law is

required [Renusagar Power Co. case, 1994 Supp (1) SCC 644,

para 65]; and

(b) the expression “public policy” must be construed in the sense

the doctrine of public policy is applied in the field of private

international law.

Applying the said criteria, it was held that enforcement of a foreign

award could be refused on the ground of being contrary to public

policy if such enforcement would be contrary to:

(a) fundamental policy of Indian law, or

(b) the interests of India, or

(c) justice or morality [Renusagar Power Co. case, 1994 Supp (1)

SCC 644, para 66].

The Court thereafter proceeded to hold that a contravention of the

provisions of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act would be

O.M.P. (COMM) 232/2024 Page 20 of 41

contrary to the public policy of India as that statute is enacted for

the national economic interest to ensure that the nation does not

lose foreign exchange which is essential for the economic survival

of the nation [Renusagar Power Co. case, 1994 Supp (1) SCC

644, para 75].

37. What is clear from above is that for an award to be against

public policy of India a mere infraction of the municipal laws of

India is not enough. There must be, inter alia, infraction of

fundamental policy of Indian law including a law meant to serve

public interest or public good.

*****

41. In Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49, a two-Judge

Bench of this Court, held that audi alteram partem principle is

undoubtedly a fundamental juristic principle in Indian law and is

enshrined in Sections 18 and 34(2)(a)(iii) of the 1996 Act. In

addition to the earlier recognised principles forming fundamental

policy of Indian law, it was held that disregarding:

(a) orders of superior courts in India; and

(b) the binding effect of the judgment of a superior court would

also be regarded as being contrary to the fundamental policy of

Indian law [See Associate Builders case, (2015) 3 SCC 49,

para 27].

Further, elaborating upon the third juristic principle (i.e. qua

perversity), as laid down in ONGC Ltd. v. Western Geco

International Ltd., (2014) 9 SCC 263, it was observed that where:

(i) a finding is based on no evidence; or

(ii) an Arbitral Tribunal takes into account something irrelevant to

the decision which it arrives at; or

(iii) ignores vital evidence in arriving at its decision, such decision

would necessarily be perverse [Associate Builders case, (2015)

3 SCC 49, para 31].

To this a caveat was added by observing that when a court applies

the “public policy test” to an arbitration award, it does not act as a

court of appeal and, consequently, errors of fact cannot be

corrected; and a possible view by the arbitrator on facts has

necessarily to pass muster as the arbitrator is the ultimate master of

the quantity and quality of evidence to be relied upon when he

delivers his arbitral award. It was also observed that an award

based on little evidence or on evidence which does not measure up

in quality to a trained legal mind would not be held to be invalid on

that score. Thus, once it is found that the arbitrator's approach is

not arbitrary or capricious, it is to be taken as the last word on facts

[Associate Builders case, (2015) 3 SCC 49, para 33] .

The 2015 Amendment in Sections 34 and 48

42. The aforementioned judicial pronouncements were all prior to

the 2015 Amendment. Notably, prior to the 2015 Amendment the

expression “in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian

O.M.P. (COMM) 232/2024 Page 21 of 41

law” was not used by the legislature in either Section 34(2)(b)(ii) or

Section 48(2)(b). The pre-amended Section 34(2)(b)(ii) and its

Explanation read:

*****

44. By the 2015 Amendment, in place of the old Explanation to

Section 34(2)(b)(ii), Explanations 1 and 2 were added to remove

any doubt as to when an arbitral award is in conflict with the public

policy of India.

45. At this stage, it would be pertinent to note that we are dealing

with a case where the application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act

was filed after the 2015 Amendment, therefore the newly

substituted/added Explanations would apply [Ssangyong Engg. &

Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019) 15 SCC 131].

46. The 2015 Amendment adds two Explanations to each of the

two sections, namely, Section 34(2)(b)(ii) and Section 48(2)(b), in

place of the earlier Explanation. The significance of the newly

inserted Explanation 1 in both the sections is two-fold. First, it does

away with the use of words: (a) “without prejudice to the

generality of sub-clause (ii)” in the opening part of the pre-

amended Explanation to Section 34(2)(b)(ii); and (b) “without

prejudice to the generality of clause (b) of this section” in the

opening part of the pre-amended Explanation to Section 48(2)(b);

secondly, it limits the expanse of public policy of India to the three

specified categories by using the words “ only if”.

Whereas, Explanation 2 lays down the standard for adjudging

whether there is a contravention with the fundamental policy of

Indian law by providing that a review on merits of the dispute shall

not be done. This limits the scope of the enquiry on an application

under either Section 34(2)(b)(ii) or Section 48(2)(b) of the 1996

Act.

47. The 2015 Amendment by inserting sub-section (2-A) in Section

34, carves out an additional ground for annulment of an arbitral

award arising out of arbitrations other than international

commercial arbitrations. Sub-section (2-A) provides that the Court

may also set aside an award if that is vitiated by patent illegality

appearing on the face of the award. This power of the Court is,

however, circumscribed by the proviso, which states that an award

shall not be set aside merely on the ground of an erroneous

application of the law or by reappreciation of evidence.

48. Explanation 1 to Section 34(2)(b)(ii), specifies that an arbitral

award is in conflict with the public policy of India, only if:

(i) the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or

corruption or was in violation of Section 75 or Section 81; or

(ii) it is in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law;

or

(iii) it is in conflict with the most basic notions of morality or

justice.

O.M.P. (COMM) 232/2024 Page 22 of 41

49. In the instant case, there is no allegation that the making of the

award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption, or was in

violation of Section 75 or Section 81. Therefore, we shall confine

our exercise in assessing as to whether the arbitral award is in

contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law, and/or

whether it conflicts with the most basic notions of morality or

justice. Additionally, in the light of the provisions of sub-section

(2-A) of Section 34, we shall examine whether there is any patent

illegality on the face of the award.

50. Before undertaking the aforesaid exercise, it would be apposite

to consider as to how the expressions:

(a) “in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law”;

(b) “in conflict with the most basic notions of morality or justice”;

and

(c) “patent illegality” have been construed.

In contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law

51. As discussed above, till the 2015 Amendment the expression

“in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law” was

not found in the 1996 Act. Yet, in Renusagar Power Co.

Ltd. v. General Electric Co., 1994 Supp (1) SCC 644, in the

context of enforcement of a foreign award, while construing the

phrase “contrary to the public policy”, this Court held that for a

foreign award to be contrary to public policy mere contravention of

law would not be enough rather it should be contrary to:

(a) the fundamental policy of Indian law; and/or

(b) the interest of India; and/or

(c) justice or morality.

52. In the judicial pronouncements that followed Renusagar Power

Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co., 1994 Supp (1) SCC 644, already

discussed above, the domain of what could be considered contrary

to the “public policy of India”/“fundamental policy of Indian law”

expanded, resulting in much greater interference with arbitral

awards than what the lawmakers intended. This led to the 2015

Amendment in the 1996 Act.

53. In Ssangyong Engg. & Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019)

15 SCC 131, this Court dealt with the effect of the 2015

Amendment. While doing so, it took note of a supplementary

report of February 2015 of the Law Commission of India made in

the context of the proposed 2015 Amendments. The said

supplementary report has been extracted in para 30 of that

judgment. The key features of it are summarised below:

(a) Mere violation of law of India would not be a violation of

public policy in cases of international commercial arbitrations

held in India.

(b) The proposed 2015 Amendments in the 1996 Act [i.e. in

Sections 34(2)(b)(ii) and 48(2)(b) including insertion of sub-

section (2-A) in Section 34] were on the assumption that the

O.M.P. (COMM) 232/2024 Page 23 of 41

terms, such as, “fundamental policy of Indian law” or conflict

with “most basic notions of morality or justice” would not be

widely construed.

(c) The power to review an award on merits is contrary to the

object of the Act and international practice.

(d) The judgment in ONGC Ltd. v. Western Geco International

Ltd., (2014) 9 SCC 263 would expand the court's power,

contrary to international practice. Hence, a clarification needs to

be incorporated to ensure that the term “fundamental policy of

Indian law” is narrowly construed. The applicability

of Wednesbury [Associated Provincial Picture Houses

Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223 (CA)] principles

to public policy will open the floodgates. Hence, Explanation 2

to Section 34(2)(b)(ii) has been proposed.

*****

55. The legal position which emerges from the aforesaid discussion

is that after “the 2015 Amendments” in Section 34(2)(b)(ii) and

Section 48(2)(b) of the 1996 Act, the phrase “in conflict with the

public policy of India” must be accorded a restricted meaning in

terms of Explanation 1. The expression “in contravention with the

fundamental policy of Indian law” by use of the word

“fundamental” before the phrase “policy of Indian law” makes the

expression narrower in its application than the phrase “in

contravention with the policy of Indian law”, which means mere

contravention of law is not enough to make an award vulnerable.

To bring the contravention within the fold of fundamental policy of

Indian law, the award must contravene all or any of such

fundamental principles that provide a basis for administration of

justice and enforcement of law in this country.

56. Without intending to exhaustively enumerate instances of such

contravention, by way of illustration, it could be said that:

(a) violation of the principles of natural justice;

(b) disregarding orders of superior courts in India or the binding

effect of the judgment of a superior court; and

(c) violating law of India linked to public good or public interest,

are considered contravention of the fundamental policy of

Indian law.

However, while assessing whether there has been a contravention

of the fundamental policy of Indian law, the extent of judicial

scrutiny must not exceed the limit as set out in Explanation 2 to

Section 34(2)(b)(ii).”

(emphasis supplied)

61. In the backdrop of the aforesaid well-settled contours governing

the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court under Section 34 of the A&C

O.M.P. (COMM) 232/2024 Page 24 of 41

Act, which is applicable in the present case, this Court now proceeds

to examine the validity and sustainability of the Impugned Award.

62. It is pertinent to note that the challenge in respect of the

Impugned Award mounted by the Petitioner fundamentally proceeds

on a dissatisfaction with the factual findings and conclusions arrived

at by the learned Arbitrator, particularly on the issues concerning the

existence of legitimate interest, allegations of bad faith registration,

and the purported deceptive use of the impugned domain name. The

submissions advanced on behalf of the Petitioner essentially seek a

reconsideration and reassessment of the evidentiary material forming

part of the arbitral record, with a view to displacing the conclusions

returned by the learned Arbitrator.

63. In the considered opinion of this Court, ex facie, the challenge

as structured by the Petitioner unmistakably traverses beyond the

statutorily circumscribed contours of interference permissible under

Section 34 of the A&C Act, particularly in relation to the limited

grounds available under the head of conflict with the public policy of

India.

64. The principal submission advanced by the Petitioner is that the

learned Arbitrator, having recorded a finding that the impugned

domain name “www.exadata.in” is identical or deceptively similar to

the Petitioner‟s registered Trade Mark “EXADATA”, could not

thereafter have declined transfer of the domain name in favour of the

Petitioner.

65. The aforesaid submission proceeds on the premise that mere

similarity between a Trade Mark and a domain name, by itself,

necessarily entitles a complainant to transfer of the disputed domain

O.M.P. (COMM) 232/2024 Page 25 of 41

name. Such an interpretation, in the considered opinion of this Court,

would fundamentally dilute the scheme and object of the INDRP

framework, which does not envisage automatic transfer solely on the

basis of deceptive similarity.

66. The policy framework contemplates a broader and cumulative

examination, requiring the arbitral tribunal to assess not merely the

issue of confusing similarity, but additionally the existence of

legitimate interest, bona fide usage, and the element of bad faith in the

registration and use of the impugned domain name, particularly in the

context of Clauses 4(b) and 4(c) read conjointly with Clauses 6 and 7

of the INDRP. The inquiry envisaged under the INDRP framework is,

therefore, neither singular nor mechanical in nature, but is inherently

contextual, fact-sensitive, and dependent upon an overall evaluation of

the surrounding circumstances and evidentiary material placed on

record.

67. A careful reading of the Impugned Award demonstrates that the

learned Arbitrator remained alive to the aforesaid legal position and

consciously undertook an examination not merely of similarity, but

also of the allied requirements concerning legitimate interest and bad

faith registration and use. The Award unmistakably reflects that the

learned Arbitrator evaluated the rival pleadings, examined the

explanation furnished by the Respondent for adoption of the

impugned domain name, considered the nature of activities being

undertaken through the domain, and ultimately arrived at the factual

conclusion that the ingredients necessary for transfer under the

INDRP framework had not been established to his satisfaction.

O.M.P. (COMM) 232/2024 Page 26 of 41

68. In arriving at the aforesaid conclusion, the learned Arbitrator

took note of the Respondent‟s explanation that the impugned domain

name had been adopted in connection with research-oriented and

informational activities pertaining to data analytics, epidemiology,

predictive modelling and artificial intelligence. The learned Arbitrator

additionally noticed that the Respondent had neither attempted to sell

the impugned domain name nor sought sponsorship from the

Petitioner, and that material demonstrating deliberate impersonation,

intentional diversion of consumers or commercial exploitation

targeting the goodwill of the Petitioner had not been established to his

satisfaction.

69. Significantly, the learned Arbitrator also consciously

distinguished between mere usage of a similar expression in a domain

name and actual misuse thereof in a commercially deceptive or

competitive sense. The Impugned Award clearly reflects that the

learned Arbitrator was of the view that if the Respondent were to

initiate or carry out business activities in direct competition with the

Petitioner through the impugned domain name, such conduct may

legitimately furnish a fresh cause of action under the INDRP

framework. However, on the factual material then placed before him,

the learned Arbitrator was not persuaded that the threshold of bad

faith registration and use had been established. The aforesaid

reasoning cannot be said to be either irrational or legally

impermissible merely because another conclusion may also have been

possible on the same material.

70. It also cannot be lost sight of that the issue as to whether the

material on record sufficiently establishes bad faith or deceptive intent

O.M.P. (COMM) 232/2024 Page 27 of 41

is quintessentially a matter falling within the exclusive domain of

factual appreciation by the arbitral tribunal. This Court, while

exercising jurisdiction under Section 34 of the A&C Act, especially in

respect of Section 34(2)(b)(ii), does not sit as a Court of appeal over

arbitral findings. The supervisory jurisdiction vested under Section 34

of the A&C Act does not permit the Court to undertake a de novo

appreciation of evidence or substitute its own factual assessment

merely because a different view may appear preferable.

71. The learned Arbitrator, in the present case, cannot be faulted for

declining relief in the absence of cogent material demonstrating a

deliberate intention to mislead consumers, intentionally divert internet

traffic, impersonate the Petitioner or deceptively exploit its goodwill.

72. It is a well settled mandate of the law that the Court must

remain conscious that arbitral autonomy and finality constitute

foundational principles underlying the arbitral regime. Once the

learned Arbitral Tribunal adopts a view which is plausible, reasoned

and capable of being sustained on the material placed before it,

judicial interference would stand excluded, notwithstanding that

another view may also be possible. The relevant portion of the

Impugned Award reads as follows:

“G. Analysis of the issues on Merit: ……

*****

2. ……………………. (iii) Whether the Respondent has registered

the disputed domain name in bad faith? [Rule - Clause 4(b)(vi)(3)]

A) The respondent has averred that he registered the domain while

pursuing the Ph.D (Doctoral Work), “….Primarily, the

establishment of the domain EXADATA.IN is all for my research

work around my Doctoral topic of "Big Data Analytics in

Epidemiology: Modelling Healthcare Management Systems in

India", synopsis of which was submitted with Punjabi

University, Patiala on Mar 10, 2016. This domain stands as an

invaluable resource for me, my team and fellow fraternity. It

functions as the central repository for my research data, its

O.M.P. (COMM) 232/2024 Page 28 of 41

preparations, cleansing and the multifaceted outcomes of my

Investigations after due analysis find their rightful place.

Through meticulous organization, categorization and

association across a myriad of pertinent topics, it act as a

knowledge-base and provides not only a comprehensive

reference for my own scholarly pursults but also serves as a

platform from which I can share my understandings, potentially

benefiting fellow researchers and the broader academic and

professional community in the realm of Big Data analysis

around my research topic. This documentation serves as a

valuable, resource throughout my doctoral thesis. The doctoral

Synopsis is attached as ANNEXURE-I....

... EXADATA.IN originally represents my research work

and providing solutions in the domains of Data Science:

Big Data, Artificial Intelligence, and Predictive Analytics

only. And requires no authorization to showcase its original

research and development work on one of its most pertinent

domain names, chosen from the freely available pool,

determined by a generic and primary name. Data

acquisition, data modeling, and visualization are

fundamental steps in any data science project, serving as

the foundation for Al and machine learning-based analytics

projects. These processes are distinctly different from the

services outlined in the complainant's trademark. Further,

since it neither competes with similar offerings nor shares

clientele interests of the complainant or products &

services of its trademark.....

B) The complainant has not denied the fact averred but replied that,

…The Respondent's submission that the <exadata.in> domain

name creation is in relation to his research work as a Ph.D.

scholar, and that he has consistently used this domain name for

his research work, is absolutely vague, baseless and misleading

as explained below.

A detailed review of the Respondent's doctoral synopsis

titled "Big Data Analytics in Epidemiology: Modelling

Healthcare Management Systems in India", does not reveal

a single reference to the term EXADATA or the domain

name <exadata.in>, nor provides any valid justification for

him to adopt the infringing domain name. Further, the

Respondent's website does not appear to discuss or show

any doctoral synopsis, research project, central data

repository for the respondent's research, or a purported

knowledge base for researchers or the academic

community. Instead, it appears to simply promote data

solutions and related services under the infringing

EXADATA trade mark.

Further, a quick search on Wayback Machine (a reputable

internet archive that stores historical webpages) for the

O.M.P. (COMM) 232/2024 Page 29 of 41

Respondent's website has revealed that the Respondent has

not made any amendments to his website in the past several

years, and the extracts of the Respondent's website from

2019 appear to be identical to the Respondent's current

website version as of today. This abundantly substantiates

that the Respondent's website with the infringing domain

name <exadata.in> never had any reference to the

Respondent's research work or doctoral synopsis.

Therefore, the Respondent has failed to establish a link

between his research work and the infringing trade mark

and domain name, and his reliance on unrelated doctoral

synopsis appears to be an afterthought and a clear attempt

to mislead the Hon'ble Arbitrator...."

C) It is an admitted fact that the complainant is owner of trademark

"EXADATA" but it is also a fact that the domain names are

registered on first come first serve basis and need no prior

approval from any authority about the proprietary rights over

the trade name. Which means any person can register a domain

name without showing ownership of the trademark/ name used

in the domain name. To my knowledge and belief, the objective

behind this is to decide matter on case-to-case basis based on

the facts & merits of each case.

D) While proceeding further we should also keep in mind the

objectives propounded by Drafting Committee of our

constitution. Our constitution provided fundamental duties

under Part IV, Article 51 A(h) which reads, "...It shall be the

duty of every citizen of India to develop the scientific temper,

humanism and the spirit of inquiry and reform...". To further

illustrate this, the Scientific temperament refers to an

individual's attitude of logical and rational thinking. An

individual is considered to have scientific temper if s/he

employs a scientific method of decision-making in everyday

life. Therefore, I am of opinion that in our national interest we

should strive to promote scientific temper for growth of our

country.

E) It is also admitted that the respondent is not carrying out any

business competing with the complainant through disputed

domain and that he is carrying out/ propounding his research

work which cannot, in any manner, be said to be in bad faith.

F) That in case respondent initiates/ carries out business through

the disputed domain name in competition of complainant it

would amount to contravention of business of complainant's

trademark in violation of INDRP Rules & Policies; and that

would also imply that the respondent acted in violation of

trademark the complainant, that would usher right to

complainant to initiate fresh arbitral proceedings before NIXI.

G) The complainant raised the issues through the instant complaint

being in violation of INDRP Policy; But I am of opinion of the

O.M.P. (COMM) 232/2024 Page 30 of 41

fact that since the respondent is not using the disputed domain

[www.exadata.in] for carrying out business through the disputed

domain [www.exadata.in] in violation of contravening rights or

legitimate interests of the complainant through the domain name

[www.exadata.in] (INDRP Policy, Paragraph 4(b)).

H) I am satisfied with the submissions that the respondent is not

carrying out any business activities or commercial activities

through the domain [www.exadata.in] in violation of Rule -

Clause 4(b)(vi) (1) & [Rule Clause 4(b)(vi)(3)].

I) I conclude that Respondent has registered the disputed domain

name primarily for the purpose of research work through the

domain name [www.exadata.in] thus I also conclude that

Respondent be permitted to spreading out his knowledge

through his research work using registered the domain name

[www.exadata.in]. Thus I conclude that the respondent/ the

Registrant has not contravened Rule – Clause 4(b)(vi)(1) &

[Rule - Clause 4(b)(vi)(3)] by registering disputed domain name

[www.exadata.in]”

73. At this juncture, it becomes necessary to emphasise that the

correctness or otherwise of the factual conclusions arrived at by the

learned Arbitrator is not the issue falling for consideration before this

Court in proceedings under Section 34 of the A&C Act. The limited

question requiring determination is whether the view adopted by the

arbitral tribunal is so perverse, irrational, or fundamentally flawed as

to contravene the fundamental policy of Indian law, thereby rendering

the Impugned Award susceptible to interference on the ground of

conflict with the public policy of India within the meaning of Section

34 of the A&C Act.

74. In the considered opinion of this Court, the answer must

necessarily be in the negative. The findings returned by the learned

Arbitrator are based upon an appreciation of the material placed on

record and represent a plausible and reasonably possible view arising

from the evidence before the tribunal. Once the threshold of arbitral

plausibility stands satisfied, this Court would be wholly unjustified in

substituting the arbitral assessment with its own judicial preference

O.M.P. (COMM) 232/2024 Page 31 of 41

merely because another view may also be possible on the same set of

facts.

75. Considerable emphasis was further placed by the Petitioner on

the submission that the learned Arbitrator travelled beyond the

confines of Trade Mark jurisprudence and the INDRP framework by

referring to concepts such as “scientific temper” and research-oriented

usage, while declining relief. According to the Petitioner, such

conditions are dehors the framework of Trade Mark law and the

INDRP framework.

76. This Court is, however, unable to subscribe to the aforesaid

submission as constituting a ground warranting interference under

Section 34 of the A&C Act.

77. A holistic and balanced reading of the Impugned Award

demonstrates that the learned Arbitrator did not base his conclusions

solely upon Directive Principles of State Policy or abstract

constitutional philosophy.

78. The Arbitral Award, when read in its entirety, clearly

demonstrates that the learned Arbitrator considered the Respondent‟s

explanation regarding adoption of the impugned domain name, the

asserted research-oriented background, the absence of material

indicating attempts to sell the domain name, and the absence of

evidence demonstrating intentional diversion or deceptive targeting of

the Petitioner. The learned Arbitrator cannot be said to have granted

immunity to the Respondent merely on the basis of abstract

constitutional ideals.

79. The observations relating to scientific temper or research-

oriented activities appear to be ancillary observations made while

O.M.P. (COMM) 232/2024 Page 32 of 41

evaluating the Respondent‟s explanation concerning the adoption and

usage of the impugned domain name. That the relevant portion of the

Impugned Award is reproduced herein below for reference:

“G. Analysis of the issues on Merit: ……

*****

2. …….

*****

D) While proceeding further we should also keep in mind the

objectives propounded by Drafting Committee of our

constitution. Our constitution provided fundamental duties

under Part IV, Article 51 A(h) which reads, "...It shall be the

duty of every citizen of India to develop the scientific temper,

humanism and the spirit of inquiry and reform...". To further

illustrate this, the Scientific temperament refers to an

individual's attitude of logical and rational thinking. An

individual is considered to have scientific temper if s/he

employs a scientific method of decision-making in everyday

life. Therefore, I am of opinion that in our national interest we

should strive to promote scientific temper for growth of our

country.

***

3. Analysis of the issue (v): Whether complainant entitled to Relief

4 In accordance with Para 11 of the Policy and for the grounds

described in Section V above, the Complainant requests the

Arbitrator appointed in this administrative proceeding to grant the

following relief to the Complainant: (i) Transfer the disputed

domain name [vwvvv.exadata.in] in the Complainant's name; and

(ii) Award cost of the proceedings to the Complainant, as deemed

fit..

A) I have perused the complaint, affidavit & documents/

Annexures placed on record and after analyzing & discussing

them in details herein-before concluded that the it would not be

in the interest of our nation to restrain the respondent from

prospering/ propounding scientific knowledge/ temper through

the Disputed Domain Name [www.exadata.in].

……….”

80. The said observations, in the considered opinion of this Court,

cannot be read divorced from the broader factual reasoning contained

in the Impugned Award. The learned Arbitrator essentially appears to

have proceeded on the premise that in the absence of demonstrable

commercial exploitation, deceptive targeting or dishonest intent, mere

O.M.P. (COMM) 232/2024 Page 33 of 41

existence of research-oriented or informational usage could not

automatically be equated with bad faith within the meaning of the

INDRP framework. Whether the said reasoning is ultimately

preferable or not is wholly immaterial within the limited confines of

Section 34 scrutiny, so long as the reasoning remains intelligible,

plausible and anchored in the material placed before the tribunal.

81. Merely because certain observations may not have been strictly

necessary or may have been articulated in broader terms would not

render the Award patently illegal or contrary to public policy.

82. An arbitral award cannot be dissected by isolating stray

observations divorced from the Award as a whole. The Impugned

Award is required to be read holistically and meaningfully. The

Hon‟ble Supreme Court in a catena of judgments, has cautioned

Courts against approaching arbitral awards with a hyper-technical or

dissective approach while exercising jurisdiction under Section 34 of

the A&C Act. The Court is not required to search for errors in isolated

sentences nor reinterpret the Impugned Award as though sitting in

appeal over the reasoning adopted by the tribunal. Minor inadequacies

in reasoning, imperfect articulation or stray observations cannot be

transmuted into grounds for annulment unless they strike at the very

root of the arbitral determination and render the Award wholly

unsustainable in law.

83. The Impugned Award, when read as a whole, sufficiently

discloses the reasons that weighed with the learned Arbitrator while

rejecting the Petitioner‟s claim for transfer of the domain name and

arriving at the conclusion that the Petitioner had failed to establish bad

faith registration and use within the meaning of the INDRP. The

O.M.P. (COMM) 232/2024 Page 34 of 41

learned Arbitrator has clearly indicated that despite the similarity

between the mark and the domain name, the Petitioner had failed to

establish the additional ingredients relating to bad faith and lack of

legitimate interest to the satisfaction of the Tribunal. The reasoning

may not be elaborate to the extent desired by the Petitioner; however,

inadequacy of reasoning is not synonymous with patent illegality.

84. This Court further notes that substantial emphasis was placed

by the Petitioner upon Clause 6(c) of the INDRP and the alleged

“likelihood of tarnishment” and diversion of customers.

85. This Court has carefully considered the aforesaid submissions.

The record reveals that the Petitioner‟s assertions, in this regard,

before the learned Arbitrator, were largely founded upon speculative

averments that the Respondent‟s activities “may tarnish” the

Petitioner‟s reputation or “may” lead to confusion amongst the

consumers, without any cogent material having been placed on record

to substantiate the same. The relevant portion of the Impugned Award

recording the same is reproduced herein below for ready reference:

“E. PLEADINGS:

1. ……

*****

A) The Complainant contended under the head A. The domain

name is identical or confusingly similar to a name or trade

mark in which the Complainant has rights:

 The Complainant has been extensively, continuously, and

uninterruptedly using the trade mark "EXADATA globally

since 2008. The Complainant's trade mark "EXADATA" is

an invented trade mark and inherently distinctive. As a

result of the widespread use and publicity, both the public

and the traders identify the "EXADATA" trade mark

exclusively with the Complainant and the Complainant's

goods and services. Therefore, the Complainant's trade

mark "EXADATA has acquired a secondary meaning in

respect of its goods and services.

 As explained in the previous section, the Complainant has

registered the "EXADATA trade mark in class 9 (Reg. No.

O.M.P. (COMM) 232/2024 Page 35 of 41

1692218) since 2008, and in class 42 (Reg. No. 3896540)

since 2018 in India.

 Therefore, the Complainant has a legal, vested, and

statutory right to the exclusive use of the EXADATA trade

mark, and it has a further right to restrain the use of the

same, deceptive, or Identical trade mark through the

process of law being infringement/passing off of its rights.

 The Complainant submits that the second level domain

name of Respondent's domain name www.exadata.in

contains the Complainant's registered and well-known

trade mark "EXADATA" entirely. The Respondent's domain

name is bound to create consumer confusion and dilution of

the Complainant's well-known trade mark.

 In view of the foregoing, it is highly likely that the general

public, users, consumers, and businesses intending to visit

the Complainant's website may be misled by the

Respondent's conflicting domain name. The consumers and

the general public will mistakenly be redirected to the

Respondent's website which contains the Complainant's

"EXADATA" trade mark believing that it belongs to the

Complainant. This will not only result in dilution of the

Complainant's well-known brand but will also cause

serious and irreparable damage to the Complainant's

goodwill and reputation in its "EXADATA trade mark.

 Therefore, the Complainant submits that the Respondent's

conflicting domain name should be immediately transferred

to the Complainant.

B) ……

*****

C) The domain name was registered and is used in bad faith

 The Respondent has registered and has been using the

disputed domain name www.exadata.in, containing the

Complainant's EXADATA trade mark in bad faith.

 The Respondent has adopted and registered a domain name

which contains the Complainant's registered EXADATA

trade mark, thereby wrongfully. illegally and dishonestly

trading upon the Complainant's valuable goodwill and

reputation. The Respondent has done so to derive illegal

pecuniary benefit from the unauthorized use of the

Complainant's trade mark, and also to disrupt the

Complainant's business.

 The Complainant's trade mark "EXADATA" is an inventive,

inherently distinctive and unique trade mark, and it is quite

unlikely that any other trader would choose to use the same

word as a trade mark or a domain name. Therefore, the

Respondent could not have coined the domain name

www.exadata.in without prior knowledge of the

O.M.P. (COMM) 232/2024 Page 36 of 41

Complainant's well-known "EXADATA" brand, and without

an intention to benefit from the Complainant's goodwill and

reputation in the EXADATA trade mark.

 In the present case, the Respondent has registered the

domain name www.exadata.in, using an address located in

Patiala, Punjab (IN) ("375, Street No. 6. Ghuman Nagar A.

Patiala 147001. Punjab (IN)"), as revealed in the details

provided by the. In Registry on 19 September 2023.

However, the Respondent's website reflects a completely

different address located in Gurgaon (IN) ("B 17/1, DLF-1,

GURGAON IN"), which appears to be either a virtual

business office address or an individual's apartment, as

revealed on the Google search. Additionally. the other

address specified on the Respondent's website ("B-811,

Advent, Sector-142, NOIDA IN") appears to belong to, or

be used by a third-party company called Ingenious

Corporate Solutions Private Limited. This demonstrates

that the Respondent has a questionable business and may

not be a legitimate business owner. Annexed hereto and

marked as Annexure-X are the website extracts showing the

Respondent's questionable addresses.

 Therefore, the Respondent created the website and domain

name www.exadata.in solely with the intention of deriving

undue advantage from the Complainant and not for any

genuine or legitimate use. The Respondent has no bona fide

interest in registering the domain name www.exadata.in,

and the Respondent has done so in absolute bad faith.

 The Respondent's foregoing unlawful act is intended to, and

is likely to, blur and erode the distinctiveness of the

Complainant's registered and well-known "EXADATA"

trade mark, and may tarnish the reputation of the

Complainant and its well-known "EXADATA" trade mark

and its services.

 The Respondent's foregoing unlawful act has caused, and

will continue to cause irreparable harm to the Complainant

and its "EXADATA" trade mark, and to the business and

substantial goodwill represented thereunder, unless the

Respondent's domain name www.exadata.in is disabled and

transferred to the Complainant immediately.

 The Complainant has not granted any right to the

Respondent to use its registered trade mark "EXADATA" in

any form. Further, the Respondent does not have any bona

fides in adopting a domain name that contains the

Complainant's registered and internationally well-known

"EXADATA" trade mark. As the Respondent does not have

any legal right or legitimate interest over the trade mark

"EXADATA", its adoption is with clear and absolute bad

faith.

O.M.P. (COMM) 232/2024 Page 37 of 41

 Upon information and belief, the Complainant states that

the Respondent has bad faith intent to profit from the

registration and use of the domain name www.exadata.in,

by creating a false association with the Complainant's well-

known "EXADATA" trade mark as to source or any kind of

affiliation.

 Therefore, if the Respondent is allowed to maintain its

registration of the domain name www.exadata.in, it will

cause irreparable loss and damage to the Complainant and

its goodwill and reputation. Further, there is a strong

likelihood of confusion among the consumers and general

public that the Respondent's domain name is sourced,

sponsored, affiliated, approved, authorized, or endorsed by

the Complainant, which is not true.”

(emphasis supplied)

86. A careful reading of the aforesaid pleadings, as recorded in the

Impugned Award, leaves little room for doubt that the learned

Arbitrator was not fully conscious of, nor did the Impugned Award

meaningfully engage with, the allegations of dilution, tarnishment,

and diversion advanced by the Petitioner.

87. The Impugned Award reflects that the learned Arbitrator

examined the nature of the Respondent‟s usage, the explanation

furnished regarding adoption of the impugned domain name, and the

absence of material indicative of intentional consumer diversion,

impersonation, or commercial exploitation targeting the Petitioner‟s

mark. The learned Arbitrator thus undertook the precise evaluative

exercise contemplated under the INDRP framework and ultimately

arrived at a plausible factual conclusion that the threshold necessary

for establishing bad faith had not been met.

88. To support its assertions, reliance has been placed by the

Petitioner on the Judgment of Joseph Taheny (supra) to contend that

once a prima facie case regarding similarity of the domain name was

O.M.P. (COMM) 232/2024 Page 38 of 41

established, the burden shifted upon the Respondent to demonstrate

legitimate interest.

89. In the opinion of this Court, there can be no quarrel with the

aforesaid proposition. However, the applicability of the principle

necessarily depends upon the peculiar factual backdrop of each case.

90. In the present matter, the learned Arbitrator did consider the

Respondent‟s explanation regarding adoption and usage of the

impugned domain name and, upon appreciation of the material placed

on record, arrived at the factual conclusion that the Respondent had

sufficiently disclosed the basis of its claimed usage and that bad faith

had not been established to the requisite threshold.

91. Whether such an explanation ought to have been accepted or

rejected falls squarely within the domain of factual appreciation by the

arbitral tribunal and cannot be reopened in proceedings under Section

34 of the A&C Act.

92. Furthermore, this Court also finds considerable substance in the

submission advanced on behalf of the Respondent that the jurisdiction

exercisable under Section 34 of the A&C Act is confined to either

sustaining or setting aside an arbitral award and does not extend to

modification of the Award by granting substantive reliefs dehors the

arbitral determination. The scope of jurisdiction under Section 34

being supervisory and not appellate in nature, this Court cannot

assume the role of the arbitral tribunal by moulding reliefs or issuing

fresh substantive directions in substitution of the Award.

93. Accordingly, Prayer (b) in the present Petition, insofar as it

seeks a direction for transfer of the impugned domain name in favour

of the Petitioner, clearly traverses beyond the limited remedial

O.M.P. (COMM) 232/2024 Page 39 of 41

framework contemplated under Section 34 of the A&C Act and is,

therefore, not maintainable in law.

94. This Court also takes note that during the course of oral

arguments, a suggestion had been mooted regarding the incorporation

of an appropriate disclaimer on the Respondent‟s website so as to

obviate any possible confusion concerning association or affiliation

with the Petitioner.

95. However, learned senior counsel for the Petitioner declined the

said course and instead sought to place reliance upon Dean Chandler

v. Sazerac Brands LLC & Anr.

9

to contend that domain names are

entitled to protection equivalent to trademarks and that likelihood of

confusion or diversion of internet users would itself justify transfer of

the disputed domain name.

96. In the opinion of this Court, there can be no quarrel with the

proposition laid down in Dean Chandler (supra) that a domain name

is not merely an internet address but also functions as a business

identifier capable of attracting protection akin to a trade mark,

particularly where deceptive similarity results in diversion of

consumers or passing off.

97. However, the said judgment arose in the context of distinct

peculiar facts, where the Court found a clear likelihood of confusion

and misrepresentation affecting the plaintiff‟s business interests. The

factual matrix of the present case stands on an entirely different

footing. In the present matter, the learned Arbitrator, upon

appreciation of the material placed on record, arrived at a factual

conclusion that the requisite threshold concerning bad faith

9

2022 SCC OnLine Del 1062

O.M.P. (COMM) 232/2024 Page 40 of 41

registration, deceptive diversion and dishonest exploitation had not

been established within the meaning of the INDRP framework.

Consequently, the reliance placed by the Petitioner upon the aforesaid

judgment does not advance its case any further, particularly within the

limited confines of scrutiny permissible under Section 34 of the A&C

Act.

98. Learned senior counsel for the Petitioner also sought to place

reliance upon Gayatri Balasamy v. M/s ISG Novasoft Technologies

Limited

10

to contend that the issue concerning legitimate interest

deserved remand for fresh consideration.

99. This Court, however, finds no merit in the aforesaid

submission.

100. A careful reading of the Impugned Award clearly demonstrates

that the learned Arbitrator had consciously examined the

Respondent‟s explanation regarding adoption and usage of the

impugned domain name while returning findings on legitimate interest

and absence of bad faith. Merely because the learned Arbitrator

arrived at a conclusion unfavourable to the Petitioner would not

justify remand or reopening of factual adjudication.

101. In the considered opinion of this Court, Section 34 jurisdiction

cannot be converted into a mechanism for reappreciation of facts or

for securing a second merits determination under the guise of remand.

102. The present Petition is, in substance, an invitation to this Court

to undertake a merits review of the arbitral determination rendered

under the INDRP framework. Such an exercise would strike at the

very heart of arbitral finality and would amount to converting Section

10

2025 SCC OnLine SC 986

O.M.P. (COMM) 232/2024 Page 41 of 41

34 proceedings into a full-fledged appellate forum, which the statute

consciously does not permit. The findings returned by the learned

Arbitrator constitute plausible conclusions arising from the material

and evidence placed before the learned Arbitrator and cannot be

characterised as being in conflict with the public policy of India

within the meaning and contemplation of Section 34 of the A&C Act.

CONCLUSION:

103. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds no merit in

the challenge laid by the Petitioner to the Impugned Award dated

23.12.2023. The grounds urged by the Petitioner do not disclose any

legitimate or compelling basis so as to warrant interference by this

Court in the exercise of its limited and supervisory jurisdiction under

Section 34 of the A&C Act. The challenge essentially seeks a

reappreciation of factual findings and substitution of the arbitral

tribunal‟s view with an alternate judicial assessment, which is

impermissible within the narrow confines of Section 34 of the A&C

Act.

104. In light of the above, the present Petition, along with pending

application(s), if any, stands dismissed.

105. No order as to costs.

HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.

MAY 29,2026/sm/kr/ma