2025 INSC 674 1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2025

(@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C RIMINAL) NO.3472 OF 2018)

P. SHANTHI PUGAZHENTHI …APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE REPRESENTED BY THE

INSPECTOR OF POLIC E

SPE/CBI/ACB/ CHENNAI …RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

SUDHANSHU DHULIA, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The appellant before this Court, who was working as an

Assistant Superintendent in the Chennai Port Trust assails

the judgment and order dated 10.01.2018 passed by the High

Court of Madras (hereinafter ‘High Court’) which has sustained

her conviction and sentence under section 109 of the Indian

Penal Code (hereinafter ‘IPC’) read with Section 13(2) and

Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988

(hereinafter ‘1988 Act’). The co-accused (husband of the

appellant, at the time) was also convicted and sentenced by

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the same order under section 13(2) and 13(1)(e) of the 1988

Act.

3. In June 2009, an FIR was registered against the appellant’s

husband alleging that he had illegally demanded and received

Rs. 3000 for handing over a cheque relating to a motor

accident claim. While investigating the FIR, certain raids were

conducted at the appellant’s husband’s house and on

31.12.2009 another FIR under section 13(2) read with 13(1)(e)

of the 1988 Act was registered against the appellant ’s

husband, while he was serving as a public servant on the post

of Divisional Manager in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. When

the search was conducted on the residential premise of the

appellant’s husband, various incriminating documents

relating to movable and immovable property in the name of the

appellant and her husband were found. Primarily, it was

alleged that during the check period between 1.09.2002 and

16.06.2009, the appellant’s husband had acquired movable

and immovable properties which were disproportionate to his

income. The properties were in the appellant’s name, as well

as of her husband.

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4. On 18.12.2010, a chargesheet was filed and the appellant was

charged under section 109 IPC read with 13(2) and 13(1)(e) of

the 1988 Act, while her husband was charged under section

13(2) read with 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act, with details of the

various movable and immovable assets acquired by them

during the check period. It was alleged that disproportionate

assets amounting to Rs. 60,99,216 have been acquired by the

accused.

5. After perusing the evidence on record, the Trial Court vide

order dated 27.05.2013 found the appellant and her husband

guilty and held that the appellant’s husband has acquired

disproportionate assets to the extent of Rs. 37,98,752 during

the check period beyond his known sources of income. The

appellant was held guilty of abetting her husband in acquiring

such disproportionate assets. The appellant’s husband was

convicted under section 13(2) read with 13(1)(e) of the 1988

Act and sentenced to 2 years of R.I. Whereas the appellant was

sentenced under section 109 IPC read with 13(2) and 13(1)(e)

of the 1988 Act and sentenced to 1 year of R.I.

6. Both the appellant and her husband preferred their criminal

appeal against the above order of conviction and sentence. On

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10.01.2018, the High Court dismissed the appeal and found

no ground to interfere with the findings of the Trial Court.

While dismissing the appeal, the High Court observed that

although there are minor discrepancies in the calculation of

known sources of income of the accused, the

disproportionality of assets is hugely excessive. Specifically the

High Court observed that there is no material to show that the

assets acquired during the check period, were acquired from

their known source or sources of income, and even if the

explanations provided by the accused is accepted it does not

still remove the disproportionality. Now the appellant is before

this Court.

7. The case of the appellant is that the courts below have grossly

erred in convicting her for abetting her husband (the main

accused) in acquiring disproportionate assets during the

check period, and that any property disproportionately

purchased by her husband in her name during the check

period, cannot be held to be disproportionate in the hands of

the appellant. Further, the appellant would argue that the co-

accused is no longer her husband and he has subsequently

re-married. The prosecution, on the other hand, contends that

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the appellant was hand in glove with her husband in

commission of the crime and she abetted the commission of

offence under section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act.

8. We have heard both the sides and perused the material on

record.

9. The only question that comes up for our consideration is

whether the appellant was rightly convicted for abetment of

offence under section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act.

10. Section 107 of IPC defines and illustrates as to what is

abetment. Section 107 of IPC reads as follows:

“107. Abetment of a thing.—A person abets the

doing of a thing, who—

First.—Instigates any person to do that thing; or

Secondly.—Engages with one or more other person

or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that

thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in

pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the

doing of that thing; or

Thirdly.—Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal

omission, the doing of that thing.

Explanation 1.—A person who, by wilful

misrepresentation, or by wilful concealment of a

material fact which he is bound to disclose,

voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to cause

or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate

the doing of that thing.

Illustration

A, a public officer, is authorised by a warrant from

a Court of Justice to apprehend Z, B, knowing that

fact and also that C is not Z, wilfully represents to

A that C is Z, and thereby intentionally causes A to

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apprehend C. Here B abets by instigation the

apprehension of C.

Explanation 2.—Whoever, either prior to or at the

time of the commission of an act, does anything in

order to facilitate the commission of that act, and

thereby facilitates the commission thereof, is said

to aid the doing of that act.”

Section 108 of IPC defines ‘Abettor’ as follows:

“108. Abettor—A person abets an offence,

who abets either the commission of an offence, or

the commission of an act which would be an

offence, if committed by a person capable by law of

committing an offence with the same intention or

knowledge as that of the abettor.

Explanation 1.—The abetment of the illegal

omission of an act may amount to an offence

although the abettor may not himself be bound to

do that act.

Explanation 2.—To constitute the offence of

abetment it is not necessary that the act abetted

should be committed, or that the effect requisite to

constitute the offence should be caused.

Illustrations

(a) A instigates B to murder C. B refuses to do so. A

is guilty of abetting B to commit murder.

(b) A instigates B to murder D. B in pursuance of

the instigation stabs D. D recovers from the wound.

A is guilty of instigating B to commit murder.

Explanation 3.—It is not necessary that the person

abetted should be capable by law of committing an

offence, or that he should have the same guilty

intention or knowledge as that of the abettor, or any

guilty intention or knowledge.

Illustrations

(a) A, with a guilty intention, abets a child or a

lunatic to commit an act which would be an offence,

if committed by a person capable by law of

committing an offence, and having the same

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intention as A. Here A, whether the act be

committed or not, is guilty of abetting an offence.

(b) A, with the intention of murdering Z, instigates

B, a child under seven years of age, to do an act

which causes Z's death. B, in consequence of the

abetment, does the act in the absence of A and

thereby causes Z's death. Here, though B was not

capable by law of committing an offence, A is liable

to be punished in the same manner as if B had been

capable by law of committing an offence, and had

committed murder, and he is therefore subject to

the punishment of death.

(c) A instigates B to set fire to a dwelling-house. B,

in consequence of the unsoundness of his mind,

being incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or

that he is doing what is wrong or contrary to law,

sets fire to the house in consequence of A's

instigation. B has committed no offence, but A is

guilty of abetting the offence of setting fire to a

dwelling-house, and is liable to the punishment

provided for that offence.

(d) A, intending to cause a theft to be committed,

instigates B to take property belonging to Z out of

Z's possession. A induces B to believe that the

property belongs to A. B takes the property out of

Z's possession, in good faith, believing it to be A's

property. B, acting under this misconception, does

not take dishonestly, and therefore does not

commit theft. But A is guilty of abetting theft, and

is liable to the same punishment as if B had

committed theft.

Explanation 4.—The abetment of an offence being

an offence, the abetment of such an abetment is

also an offence.

Illustration

A instigates B to instigate C to murder Z. B

accordingly instigates C to murder Z, and C

commits that offence in consequence of B's

instigation. B is liable to be punished for his offence

with the punishment for murder; and, as A

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instigated B to commit the offence, A is also liable

to the same punishment.

Explanation 5.—It is not necessary to the

commission of the offence of abetment by

conspiracy that the abettor should concert the

offence with the person who commits it. It is

sufficient if he engages in the conspiracy in

pursuance of which the offence is committed.

Illustration

A concerts with B a plan for poisoning Z. It is agreed

that A shall administer the poison. B then explains

the plan to C mentioning that a third person is to

administer the poison, but without mentioning A's

name. C agrees to procure the poison, and procures

and delivers it to B for the purpose of its being used

in the manner explained. A administers the poison;

Z dies in consequence. Here, though A and C have

not conspired together, yet C has been engaged in

the conspiracy in pursuance of which Z has been

murdered. C has therefore committed the offence

defined in this section and is liable to the

punishment for murder.”

11. The law was laid down by this Court with respect to offences

under section 109 IPC read with 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act, in P.

Nallammal & Anr. v. State, represented by Inspector of

Police (1999) 6 SCC 559, where this court was considering

whether the appellants therein are liable to be convicted of

abetting crime under 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act.

12. In P. Nallamal (Supra), it was contended before this Court

that an offence under section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act cannot

be abetted by a non-public servant. Further, that there is no

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provision in the 1988 Act which provides punishment for

abetment of offence under section 13(1)(e) whereas it provides

punishment for abetment of some other offences under the

1988 Act. However, after discussing the history of Section 13

of the 1988 Act which was a substitute for some of the

provisions of Chapter-IX of IPC which deals with offences by

or relating to public servants, this Court held that an offence

under section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act can be abetted by any

other person. After reading Section 107 of IPC and accepting

suggestions of Counsel, this Court gave illustrations that how

even a person who is not a public servant can abet the offence

under section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act. The relevant

paragraphs are as follows:

“24. Shri Shanti Bhushan cited certain

illustrations which, according to us, would

amplify the cases of abetments fitting with

each of the three clauses in Section 107 of the

Penal Code vis-a-vis Section 13(1)(e) of the PC

Act.

The first illustration cited is this:

If A, a close relative of the public servant tells

him of how other public servants have become

more wealthy by receiving bribes

and A persuades the public servant to do the

same in order to become rich and the public

servant acts accordingly. If it is a proved

position there cannot be any doubt that A has

abetted the offence by instigation.

Next illustration is this:

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Four persons including the public servant

decide to raise a bulk amount through bribery

and the remaining persons prompt the public

servant to keep such money in their names. If

this is a proved position then all the said

persons are guilty of abetment thr ough

conspiracy.

The last illustration is this:

If a public servant tells A, a close friend of his,

that he has acquired considerable wealth

through bribery but he cannot keep them as he

has no known source of income to account, he

requests A to keep the said wealth in A's

name, and A obliges the public servant in

doing so. If it is a proved position A is guilty of

abetment falling under the “Thirdly” clause of

Section 107 of the Penal Code.

25. Such illustrations are apt examples of how

the offence under Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act

can be abetted by non-public servants. The

only mode of prosecuting such offender is

through the trial envisaged in the PC Act.”

(Emphasis Provided)

13. In other words, any person who persuades a public servant to

take bribes, decides to raise money through bribes along with

a public servant and prompts such public servant to keep the

wealth with him/her or keeps the amassed wealth of a public

servant in his/her own name is guilty of committing the

offence of abetment of offence under section 13(1)(e) of the

1988 Act. We must also note that the 2018 Amendment to the

1988 Act has substituted Section 12 of 1988 Act and made all

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offences under the 1988 Act abettable. This Section 12 of 1988

Act reads as follows:

“12. Punishment for abetment of

offences.—Whoever abets any offence

punishable under this Act, whether or not that

offence is committed in consequence of that

abetment, shall be punishable with

imprisonment for a term which shall not be less

than three years, but which may extend to

seven years and shall also be liable to fine.”

In any case, there is no doubt that offence under section

13(1)(e) was abettable even prior to the 2018 Amendment.

14. In the case at hand, it is an admitted position that the

appellant’s husband has acquired assets (disproportionate to

his income), during the check period, in appellant’s name.

Both the courts below have given concurrent findings on this

aspect, and it is not required for us to deal with that aspect in

detail.

15. If we apply the principles laid down in the P. Nallammal case

(supra), the present appellant’s case would definitely fall either

in the 2

nd or 3

rd illustration. It is not clear from the record

whether the appellant and her husband entered into a prior

conspiracy to amass a huge bulk of wealth through bribery,

but there is no doubt that after such disproportionate wealth

was amassed, the appellant has been actively involved in

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concealing such wealth by keeping assets in her name. By

doing so, the appellant is undoubtedly guilty of offence of

abetment falling under section109 IPC read with 13(2) and

13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act.

Moreover, we would like to note that even the appellant

was a public servant at the time of commission of the offence,

as she was holding the post of Assistant Superintendent in the

Chennai Port Trust, though she has been prosecuted here in

her capacity as the wife of the main accused. We would also

like to note that the appellant’s argument that she is no longer

the wife of co-accused as the co-accused has remarried, has

no force because at the time of commission of offence, she was

the wife of the co-accused. Even if we assume that she was not

the wife at the time of commission of crime, then also it is

immaterial since it is proven that she had allowed the co-

accused to accumulate assets in her name and thus, assisted

the co-accused in accumulation of assets disproportionate to

the known sources of income. It is a well settled law that even

a non-public servant can be convicted under section 109 IPC

read with 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act. We, therefore, find no reason

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to hold that the appellant could not have been convicted under

section 109 IPC read with 13(2) and13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act.

16. Considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, we are

of the opinion that the finding of both the courts below does

not require any interference. The appeal is accordingly

dismissed.

17. The appellant, who is on bail, is directed to surrender within

four weeks from today.

18. Interim order(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of. Pending

application(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of.

…......………………………….J.

[SUDHANSHU DHULIA]

….....………………………….J.

[K. VINOD CHANDRAN]

NEW DELHI,

MAY 13, 2025.